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THE
POLITICS OF ARISTOTLE

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THE
POLITICS OF ARISTOTLE

*WITH AN INTRODUCTION, TWO PREFATORY ESSAYS
AND NOTES CRITICAL AND EXPLANATORY*

BY

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VOLUME I

INTRODUCTION TO THE POLITICS

Oxford

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PREFACE.

THE first of the two volumes which I now publish is an introductory volume designed to throw light on the political teaching of Aristotle. I have sought to view his political teaching in connexion not only with the central principles of his philosophical system, but also with the results of earlier speculation. I have endeavoured to discover how it came to be what it is, and especially to trace its relation to the political teaching of Plato, and to ask how far the paths followed by the two inquirers lay together, how far and at what points they diverged. It is only thus that we can learn how much came to Aristotle by inheritance and how much is in a more especial sense his own. If the investigation of these questions has often carried me beyond the limits of the *Politics*, I have sought in recapitulating and illustrating Aristotle's political teaching to follow as far as possible in the track of its inquiries. It will be seen, however, that I have dealt in my First Volume with some books of the *Politics* at far greater length than with others. Thus, while I have analysed with some fulness the contents of the Third, Fourth, and Fifth Books (in the order which I have adopted) and have also had much to say with regard to the inquiries of the First, I have dwelt but little on the Second Book and have given only a short summary of the contents of the Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth. My plan has been in my First Volume to devote most space to the books in which the Political Theory of Aristotle is more especially embodied, particularly as they are books

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the full significance of which is easily missed, and which are perhaps better dealt with in a continuous exposition than in notes on the text, so far at least as their substance is concerned. Other books seemed to be best studied in a commentary: thus, while I have said but little in my First Volume with regard to the Second Book, I have dealt with it at some length in the Notes contained in the Second Volume. The two volumes are, in fact, designed to complete each other. I shall have much to add in a subsequent volume on the Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Books.

In both volumes I have sought to keep in view the links which connect the Politics with Greek literature generally. It is the work of a widely read man who writes for readers hardly less familiar with Greek literature than himself, and light is often thrown not only on the origin of a doctrine, but also on the meaning of a sentence or the turn of a phrase, when we can recall some kindred passage from the poets or prose-writers of Greece. Aristotle's contemporaries were probably far more aware than any modern reader of the Politics can be, how often he tacitly repeats or amends or controverts the opinions of others. He is especially fond of tacitly echoing or impugning the opinions of Plato, and in a less degree of Xenophon and Isocrates. But not a few works are lost to us which Aristotle had before him in writing the Politics. Among these is the historical work of Ephorus, of which we possess only fragments. We have no doubt lost much by losing all but the fragments of Aristotle's own 'Polities.'

My inquiries have carried me over a wide field, and the conclusions at which I have arrived cannot fail to be often open to correction. I would gladly have made my two volumes shorter than they are, but I have not found it easy to do so. The length of my explanatory notes is mainly due to the frequent—indeed, almost incessant—occurrence of ambiguities of language in the Greek of the Politics, which

cannot be cleared up without discussion, and which often need all the light that can be thrown on them from parallel passages. The style of the Politics is of an easy, half-conversational character and readily lends itself to ambiguities of this kind. My notes, however, would have been shorter if I had not often thought it well to print in full passages referred to in them. I hope to be less lengthy in my notes on the Third, Fourth, and Fifth Books, with which I have already dealt pretty fully in my Introduction. I fear that I shall frequently be found to try the patience of my readers, and not least in some of the opening pages of the First Volume, which treat of matters of a somewhat technical nature. I trust, however, that this volume may sometimes serve to smooth the path of thoughtful readers of the Politics, though I am well aware that no single student of the treatise can hope to exhaust its meaning. The volume, or volumes, completing the work will, I hope, follow after a not too long interval.

Since my remarks on the MSS. of the Politics (vol. 2. p. xli sqq.) were in type, the general preference which I have expressed in them for the authority of the second family of MSS. has received welcome confirmation from the discovery, or rediscovery, in the Vatican Library of twelve palimpsest leaves forming part of the second volume of a Vatican MS. of Aristides (gr. 1298), which contain fragmentary portions of the Third and Sixth Books of the Politics and are said to belong to the tenth century. These fragments were already known to Mai, who gives a short notice of them in *Script. vet. nova collectio* 2. 584 without, however, enabling his readers to identify the MS. in which they occur; hence they were lost sight of till the winter of 1886, when they were brought to the knowledge of Dr. G. Heylbut, who has published a collation of them in the *Rheinisches Museum* for 1887 (p. 102 sqq.), to which I may refer my readers. The

twelve leaves are stated by him to comprise the following passages of the Politics :—

3. 1. 1275 a 13—3. 2. 1275 b 33,
 3. 4. 1276 b 17—1277 b 1,
 3. 5. 1278 a 24—3. 10. 1281 a 37,
 3. 15. 1286 b 16—6 (4). 1. 1288 b 37,
 6 (4). 4. 1290 a 36—6 (4). 5. 1292 b 20.

According to a short notice of Dr. Heylbut's article contributed by Mr. R. D. Hicks to the *Classical Review*, No. 1, p. 20 sq., Professor Susemihl finds that these Palimpsest Fragments agree with the readings of the second family of MSS. in sixty-two cases and with those of the first family in twenty-seven only. Mr. Hicks suggests that the codex of which these are the fragments, or its original, 'belongs to a period anterior to any sharp distinction between the manuscripts of the two families': be that, however, as it may, it is clear that the fragments lend the support of whatever authority they possess rather to the second family than to the first. Dr. Heylbut, in fact, holds (p. 107), that 'any future recension of the text of the Politics should be based primarily on the manuscripts of the second family (eine künftige Textrecension in erster Linie auf Grund von Π² herzustellen ist).' He here anticipates the conclusion at which I had myself already in the main arrived.

My indebtedness to the writings of others may be measured by the frequency with which I refer to them. To no one do I owe more than to Professor Susemihl. His editions of the Politics, and especially that of 1872, have been invaluable to me, though I have never been able to follow him in his preference for the first family of MSS. and have often arrived at conclusions respecting the text at variance with his. I need not repeat here what I have said elsewhere (vol. 2. pp. xlii, 57 sqq.) of my indebtedness to his *apparatus criticus*. My debt to the Index

Aristotelicus of Bonitz is only second to that which I owe to Susemihl. The concise but important comments on passages of the *Politics* which it contains are but too likely to escape notice from their brevity, and I have done my best to draw attention to them. Among the works which I have found especially useful I may mention Zeller's *Philosophie der Griechen*; C. F. Hermann's *Lehrbuch der griechischen Antiquitäten*; several of the writings of Vahlen, Bernays, Teichmüller, and Eucken; Leopold Schmidt's *Ethik der alten Griechen*; Büchschütz' *Besitz und Erwerb im griechischen Alterthume*, and Henkel's *Studien zur Geschichte der griechischen Lehre vom Staat*. Dittenberger's valuable review of Susemihl's first edition of the *Politics* has long been known to me. To my many predecessors in the task of editing and commenting on the *Politics* from Victorius downwards, and to the numerous translators of the work, beginning with Sepulveda, I owe not a little. Mr. Welldon's careful and thoughtful version has constantly been consulted by me and often with profit, and I have made as much use of Professor Jowett's interesting work on the *Politics* as the comparative lateness of its appearance allowed. For a mention of other works which have been used by me I may refer my readers to the citations scattered over my two volumes.

My best thanks are due to the President and Fellows of Corpus Christi College, Oxford, for twice allowing me the use at the Bodleian Library of the MS. of the *Politics* (No. 112) belonging to the College; to the authorities of Balliol and New College for the loan of their MSS. 112 and 228; and to the authorities of the Bodleian and Phillipps Libraries for the courtesy they have shown me. I have mentioned elsewhere (vol. 2. p. 60) how much I am indebted to Mr. E. Maunde Thompson, Keeper of the MSS. in the British Museum, and to Mr. F. Madan, Sub-Librarian of the Bodleian Library, for important assistance in the

interpretation of an inscription in MS. Phillipps 891. To the friends who have done me the service of criticising my proof-sheets as they have passed through the press I am under the greatest obligations, and especially to Mr. Alfred Robinson of New College, who has kindly found time in the midst of his many engagements patiently to peruse the whole of them, and whose criticisms and suggestions have been of much value to me, to the Warden of Wadham College, to whom I owe a similar acknowledgment, and to Mr. Ingram Bywater, who has perused many of my proofs. The comments of Mr. R. L. Nettleship and Mr. Evelyn Abbott of Balliol College, and of Professor Andrew Bradley, on portions of my proof-sheets have also been of much use to me. I have profited much by the criticisms of friends, but for the shortcomings of this work I am alone responsible. I should add that Mr. Bywater has kindly lent me the late Mr. Mark Pattison's copy of Stahr's edition of the *Politics*, containing a few annotations from his hand, from which I have been glad to have the opportunity of quoting now and then.

In referring to the works of Aristotle, I give, in addition to the book and chapter of the treatise cited, the page, column, and line of Bekker's edition of 1831. My references to the work of Zeller are to the last edition, except where another is specified; those to C. F. Hermann's *Lehrbuch* are to K. B. Stark's edition of it, unless the contrary is specified, the latest edition being still incomplete. The abbreviation *Sus.*¹ refers to Susemihl's first edition of the *Politics* published in 1872, *Sus.*² and *Sus.*³ to the two editions subsequently published by him. I have thought it better, especially in my First Volume, to translate the quotations which I have occasionally made from German books; I have, however, usually left German renderings of passages in the *Politics* untranslated.

AUGUST, 1887.

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THE POLITICS OF ARISTOTLE.

INTRODUCTION.

ARISTOTLE'S treatment of the science of *πολιτική* falls, unlike Plato's, into two distinct parts, and extends over two treatises, the Nicomachean Ethics and the Politics. The fact is significant, and we are not surprised to find that the two sections show, as we shall see hereafter, a certain tendency to draw away from each other. They stand, however, in the closest mutual relation: the Ethics comes first in order, the Politics second. The Ethics naturally precedes, as it mainly analyses happiness in the individual, and Aristotle's principle is that the study of the part (*τὸ ἐλάχιστον, τὸ ἀσύνθετον*) should precede the study of the whole. Other reasons for the precedence of the Ethics will be pointed out elsewhere.

The Politics linked to the Nicomachean Ethics—the transition from the latter treatise to the former examined.

The transition from the one treatise to the other, however, is by no means as smooth and easy as we might expect. We are told in the last chapter of the Ethics that it is not enough for the student of Practical Philosophy to know what happiness and virtue and pleasure are without seeking their realization in practice, and that they can hardly be realized in practice without the aid of Law. The State, Aristotle continues, should use Law with a view to their realization, but the Lacedaemonian State is almost the only one which does this systematically, and which exercises a supervision over the rearing and life of its members. The head of the household is almost everywhere left to himself by the State and allowed to rule his household as he

pleases. He is, in fact, a lawgiver on a small scale, and hence it is desirable that he should learn to use Law scientifically for the purpose of making those he rules better, or in other words, that he should acquire the art of Legislation. He will hardly learn this art from persons versed in political life; still less will he learn it from the Sophists: Aristotle will therefore himself take in hand the subject of legislation, and indeed the whole topic of constitutional organization, in order that, as far as may be, his philosophy of things human¹ may be brought to completion.

'First, then,' he proceeds, 'let us try to notice anything of value on the subject, which has been said by those who have gone before us, and then to learn from a comparison of constitutions what things are preservative of, or destructive to, States, and what are so to each separate constitution², and for what reasons some constitutions are good and others bad: for when we have considered all these matters, we shall perhaps be better able to discern both what form of constitution is the best, and how each form must be ordered, and with what laws and customs, to be what we should desire it to be³.'

When Aristotle wrote these, the concluding sentences of the *Ethics*, he evidently intended to deduce the true structure of the best and other States from a study of various constitutions and from a study of the causes which tend to the preservation or decay of States and of each constitution. This is, in fact, to some extent the plan followed by Plato in the *Laws*, though he does not go on to draw conclusions as to the true form of every constitution,

¹ This expression is apparently inherited from Socrates (*Xen. Mem.* i. 1).

² This inquiry would seem to involve a study of the history of the States themselves—a matter, however, into which Aristotle does not propose to enter.

³ As much doubt has been thrown, not without good ground,

on the authenticity of many of the references, backwards or forwards, to be found in the writings which bear the name of Aristotle, it may be as well to remark that this programme would hardly have been forged by any one who had the *Politics* before him either in its traditional order or perhaps in any conceivable order.

but confines himself to tracing the outline of one ideal community. He reviews in the Third Book the Lacedaemonian, Persian, and Athenian constitutions, noting the causes of the failure or success of each, and then proceeds to construct his State. The Politics, however, is arranged on a different plan. The Second Book, which contains the review of constitutions, does not commence the work, nor does it include or introduce an inquiry into the things which preserve or destroy States or constitutions. This is reserved for a book which, wherever we place it, must come much later. The first book of the Politics deals with a subject not marked out for consideration in the last chapter of the Ethics: it seeks to establish and emphasize a distinction between the householder and the statesman, the household and the State. We hear no more of the notion that the individual householder can, by acquiring the legislative art, in some degree make up for the State's neglect of education.

In some respects, no doubt, the close of the Ethics and the opening of the Politics are in harmony. The one implies what the other emphatically asserts—the natural supremacy of the State over the household and the individual. So again, the programme in the Ethics correctly foreshadows the scope of the inquiries of the Politics. It prepares us for an inquiry, not merely into the best constitution, but into every constitution. Both treatises agree that the true lawgiver will be capable of organizing all constitutions aright, and not merely of devising a best constitution. Still the fact remains that a track is marked out in the Ethics for the investigations of the Politics which they certainly do not follow. There is no need to imagine any other cause for Aristotle's departure from his programme than a simple change of plan on his part. The Politics was probably not only not written, but also not fully conceived, when the paragraph in the Ethics was drawn up, and the paragraph had not been amended when Aristotle died.

Nature of the distinction drawn by Aristotle between Theoretic, Practical, and Productive Science: the πολιτική ἐπιστήμη falls under the second head.

Our first step must be to discuss as briefly as we may the somewhat thorny question, what is the nature of the science of πολιτική and its relation to other sciences. Is it a science in the sense in which Physics is a science, and how far is it related to sciences such as Physics?

If we follow the division of Science which we find in the *Metaphysics* (E. 1. 1025 b 18 sqq., E. 2. 1026 b 4) into theoretic, practical, and productive Science, πολιτική as a whole appears to fall within, or to be identical with, Practical Science, the kind of Science which serves as a guide to right action.

The groundwork of this classification of the Sciences seems to have been laid by Plato. Plato had already classified sciences by their subject-matter. In the *Philebus* (55 C sqq.) we find sciences contrasted in respect of the degree of truth attained by them, and this proves to vary according to their subject-matter, as does also the method employed. Sciences concerned with sensible things (τὰ γιγνόμενα καὶ γενησόμενα καὶ γεγονότα, 58 E sqq.) ask the aid of Opinion and attain only a low degree of truth: whereas the science dealing with Being and that which really is and that which is unchangeable is far the truest (58 A). This is Dialectic, which is thus distinguished from Physics (59 A). Πολιτική is not here mentioned, but would no doubt be distinguished by Plato from both, though we know not whether he conceived it as less or more exact than Physics: he describes it in the *Gorgias* (464) as 'ministering to the soul for its highest good,' and as comprising two parts, the art of legislation, which does for the soul what gymnastic does for the body, and justice, which does for the soul what medicine does for the body.

The distinction between Theoretic and Practical Science, again, is inherited by Aristotle from Plato, who distinguishes in the *Politicus* (258 E) between Cognitive (γνωστικά) and Practical (πρακτικά) Sciences, but the Practical Sciences of Plato correspond more nearly to the Productive Sciences of Aristotle, and the Political or

Kingly Science is classed by him among Cognitive Sciences: it is said to belong to that species of Cognitive Science which does not stop short at judging, but also rules (260 A-D). Plato seems to merge Ethical Science in *πολιτική*¹, for he has no separate name for it, and as his Political Science always has an ethical aim, he is quite consistent in closely connecting the two sciences of Ethics and Politics. Indeed, he not only relates Ethics more closely to Politics than Aristotle, but also makes the link between Dialectic and the less exact sciences a closer one than that which exists between the Theoretic Science of Aristotle and the other sciences. He seems usually to treat Political Science, at all events, as inseparably bound up with philosophy (Rep. 473 C, 501). A knowledge of the Ideas is as much a condition of true virtue and true statesmanship as it is of true knowledge².

Aristotle, on the other hand, though he describes the 'First Philosophy' in a remarkable passage of the *Metaphysics* (A. 2. 982 b 4 sqq.) as 'the most sovereign of the sciences, determining for what end everything is to be done,' appears in the *Ethics* to derive the first principles of Ethical, and probably also of Political, Science, not from the First Philosophy, but from Experience. He commonly speaks in the *Ethics* as if Practical Science sprang from a different root from Theoretic Science. It is to Opinion that he appeals in the First Book, not to the First Philosophy, when he seeks to discover what is 'the good for man' (*τὸ ἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθόν*)³. It is from correct minor premisses furnished by experience that the end of moral action is obtained (Eth. Nic. 6. 12. 1143 b 4), or, as we read

¹ Cp. *Euthyd.* 291 C-D, where *πολιτική* is called *ἡ αἰτία τοῦ ὁρθῶς πράττειν ἐν τῇ πόλει*.

² See Zeller, *Plato E. T.*, pp. 152, 218; and cp. Rep. 517 C, *δεῖ ταύτην (τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέαν) ἰδεῖν τὸν μέλλοντα ἐμφρόνως πράξειν ἢ ἰδίᾳ ἢ δημοσίᾳ*. Plato does not seem even to arrange for any special training of his guardians

in Political Science: all he appears to do in this direction is to give them fifteen years' practical experience in military command and in offices suited to young men (Rep. 537 D sqq.).

³ Cp. Eth. Nic. 1. 5, 1097 a 28, *τὸ δ' ἀριστον τέλειόν τι φαίνεται: 30, τέλει-ότερον δὲ λέγομεν: 34, τοιοῦτον δ' ἡ εὐδαιμονία μάλιστα εἶναι δοκεῖ*.

elsewhere, in somewhat different language, from virtue rooted in the character by habituation.

Theoretic and Practical Science are regarded by him as differing (1) in subject-matter, (2) in aim, (3) in the faculty employed, and (4) in method¹.

1. The *subject-matter* of Theoretic Science is either 'things self-existent, unchangeable, and separable from matter' (this is the subject-matter of the First Philosophy), or 'things unchangeable and separable from matter only in logical conception' (the subject-matter of Mathematics), or 'things inseparable from matter and subject to change' (the subject-matter of Physics): see *Metaph. E. 1. 1026 a 13*². The subject-matter of Physics is in close contact with that of Practical Science, though it is marked off from the latter by the fact that its principle is within and not outside itself (*ἐν αὐτῷ*, not *ἐν ἄλλῳ*). Man is a subject of Physics, so far as he has a soul which is the source of nutrition and growth (*de Part. An. 1. 1. 641 a 32 sqq.*: *Metaph. E. 1. 1026 a 5*), but at the point at which he commences to act, he ceases to be a subject of Physics and becomes the subject of Practical Science. So suddenly does the field of Physics break off and that of Practical Science begin. Both 'things done' (*τὰ πρακτά*), which are the subject of *πολιτική*, and 'things produced' (*τὰ ποιητά*) have their originating principle (*ἀρχή*) outside themselves in an agent or producer (*Eth. Nic. 6. 4. 1140 a 1*, τοῦ δ' ἐνδεχομένου ἄλλως ἔχειν ἔστι τι καὶ ποιητὸν καὶ πρακτόν: *cp. Metaph. E. 1. 1025 b 22*, τῶν μὲν γὰρ ποιητικῶν ἐν τῷ ποιοῦντι ἡ ἀρχή, ἡ νοῦς ἡ τέχνη ἡ δύναμις τις, τῶν δὲ πρακτικῶν ἐν τῷ πράττοντι ἡ προαίρεσις). It is thus that 'things done' lie as it were passively at the disposition of the agent, just as 'things produced' do at the disposition of the producer. They are therefore said to be in our power (*ἐφ' ἡμῖν*, *Eth. Nic. 3. 5. 1112 a 31*), and we are said to deliberate about things

¹ In dealing with this subject I have found more than one of Teichmüller's works useful.

² *Cp. Eth. Nic. 6. 2. 1139 a 6*, ὑπο-

κείσθω δύο τὰ λόγον ἔχοντα, ἐν μὲν ᾧ θεωροῦμεν τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν ὄντων ὅσων αἱ ἀρχαὶ μὴ ἐνδέχονται ἄλλως ἔχειν, ἐν δὲ ᾧ τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα.

which 'come to pass by our agency, but not always uniformly' (1112 b 3). The defective exactness (ἀκρίβεια) of practical science is perhaps regarded by Aristotle as partly due to this subjection of 'things done' (τὰ πρακτά) to human *arbitrium*, but it is still more due to the fact that practical science, being concerned with action, is concerned with particulars. The Universal of Practical Science is only roughly exact. It cannot supply the place of a keen insight into particulars.

2. It follows from the modifiability both of the subject-matter of action and of the agent that the *purpose* of practical science is different from that of theoretic science. However much it may inquire, it never loses sight of the aim of promoting right action (Eth. Nic. 2. 2. 1103 b 26 sqq.). This need not, indeed, be its sole aim: cp. Pol. 3. 8. 1279 b 12, τῷ δὲ περὶ ἐκάστην μέθοδον φιλοσοφοῦντι καὶ μὴ μόνον ἀποβλέποντι πρὸς τὸ πράττειν οἰκεῖόν ἐστι τὸ μὴ παρορᾶν μηδέ τι καταλείπειν, ἀλλὰ δηλοῦν τὴν περὶ ἑκάστον ἀλήθειαν: and Eth. Eud. 1. 1. 1214 a 10, τὰ μὲν αὐτῶν (sc. τῶν θεωρημάτων) συντείνει πρὸς τὸ γινῶναι μόνον, τὰ δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰς κτήσεις καὶ περὶ τὰς πράξεις τοῦ πράγματος. Nor should it be forgotten that even in the interest of right action it is desirable to arrive at conclusions as scientifically accurate as possible (Eth. Nic. 10. 1. 1172 b 3, εὐκασιν οὖν οἱ ἀληθεῖς τῶν λόγων οὐ μόνον πρὸς τὸ εἰδέναι χρησιμώτατοι εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς τὸν βίον· συνψοδοὶ γὰρ ὄντες τοῖς ἔργοις πιστεύονται, διὸ προτρέπονται τοὺς ξυνιέντας (ἦν κατ' αὐτούς)).

3. Non-theoretic science differs from theoretic also in respect of the *faculty* employed in it. The rational part of the soul (τὸ λόγον ἔχον) is divided into two parts, the scientific and the calculative: λεγέσθω δὲ τούτων τὸ μὲν ἐπιστημονικόν τὸ δὲ λογιστικόν· τὸ γὰρ βουλευέσθαι καὶ λογίζεσθαι ταῦτόν, οὐδεὶς δὲ βουλεύεται περὶ τῶν μὴ ἐνδεχομένων ἄλλως ἔχειν (Eth. Nic. 6. 1. 1139 a 11). Both τέχνη, the faculty which operates in productive science, and φρόνησις, the chief virtue of the Practical Reason (Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 655. 1), belong to the calculative part. In strictness φρόνησις deals with the individual and his welfare, πολιτική with that of the

State (Eth. Nic. 6. 7. 1141 b 23 sqq.), but they are so nearly the same that we need not attend to this distinction. The faculty concerned in moral action would seem to be in Aristotle's opinion the same as that which deals with the science of moral action. The deliberation which precedes a moral act and which is expressed in the practical syllogism is apparently regarded by him as a repetition on a small scale of the process which ends in the construction of practical science. In both operations the act of deliberation, as we shall see, is conceived to follow the same path¹.

The ends, or at all events the ultimate ends, of action are held by Aristotle to be given by the character, the true end by moral virtue: it remains for *φρόνησις* to determine the means, under which term we must probably include the intermediate ends. *Φρόνησις* conducts the whole process of deliberation, till it lights on the actual step which must be taken in order that the end may be attained: this is the last point reached in the deliberation, and the point at which action begins (Zeller, *ibid.* 650. 2). As these means must be morally correct, or in other words, as *φρόνησις* has to adjust its choice of means to the end suggested by moral virtue, *φρόνησις* needs to be completed by moral virtue, just as moral virtue is incomplete without *φρόνησις*. Its close connexion with moral virtue relates it to the passions and even to man's physical nature, and separates it from speculative virtue (Eth. Nic. 10. 8. 1178 a 9 sqq.). It belongs to the more human part of man's nature, as that to the more divine. Its genesis is also different. Moral virtue, from which it is inseparable, is the outcome of correct habituation: the germ of it only, an undeveloped perception of the good and the bad, the just

¹ We note, however, in Eth. Nic. 6. 8. 1141 b 22 sqq. the recognition of two forms of *φρόνησις* *περί πόλιν*: one *ἀρχιτεκτονική*, the other more distinctly *πρακτική καὶ βουλευτική*, and therefore more impressed with the characteristics of *φρόνησις*, for *φρόνησις* is essentially *πρακτική καὶ βουλευτική*. Thus it would

seem that the *φρόνησις* of the *νομοθέτης* is to some extent different from that of the practical statesman and less characteristically *φρόνησις*. We should have been glad of some further treatment of the subject, but we do not seem to learn anything more about it from Aristotle.

and the unjust (Pol. 1. 2. 1253a 15), is born with us and comes by nature. *Φρόνησις*, again, is mainly, though not exclusively (Eth. Nic. 6. 7. 1141 b 14), concerned with particulars (*τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα*). Its particular judgments need to be correct, and this they can hardly be without experience: experience, though it arrives at a sort of Universal, never wanders far from particulars. It is evident, then, that the faculty which is concerned with practical science, is to be developed in life and in life only. Its beginning lies in habituation, its growth in experience. The young fall short in both respects. It is a faculty which cannot be passed from hand to hand. Hence, though the sphere of Contingency (and this is the sphere of Practical and Productive Science) is that which is most amenable to human influence, the faculty which is concerned with it can only be produced by a circuitous and indirect process beginning in infancy—a slower process than that by which speculative virtue comes into being, though intellectual virtue generally, which includes speculative virtue no less than *φρόνησις* and *τέχνη*, is said to 'stand in need of experience and time' (Eth. Nic. 2. 1. 1103 a 15). Thus the faculty which presides over conduct was once for all parted off by Aristotle from the speculative faculty. The two faculties might be and should be possessed by the same person, but they were different. The Greek language already distinguished between *γνώμη* and *σοφία*, and Aristotle reasserted the important truth embodied in this distinction.

4. Lastly, non-theoretic science differs from theoretic in *method*. *Θεωρία* finds a place in the methods of both; but the *θεωρία* of the one is not the same as the *θεωρία* of the other. In theoretic science, the object is simply to analyse: in practical and productive science, to bring into being. *Τὸ ὄν* is to the former what *τὸ ἐσόμενον* is to the latter (de Part. An. 1. 1. 640 a 3). Theoretic Science takes a given fact or thing and inquires into its cause. Thus 'the plan of Aristotle's biological treatise on the Parts of Animals is to take the parts in succession and inquire what share Necessity and the Final Cause respectively have

in their formation¹. Practical science, on the other hand (and productive science also), starts from an end to be attained, and inquires into the means of attaining it, till it arrives at a means which it lies within the power of the inquirer to set in action. Cp. *Metaph. Z. 7. 1032 b 6*, γίγνεται δὴ τὸ ὑγιὲς νοήσαντος οὕτως· ἐπειδὴ τοδὶ ὑγίεια, ἀνάγκη, εἰ ὑγιὲς ἔσται, τοδὶ ὑπάρξαι, οἷον ὁμαλότητα, εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, θερμότητα· καὶ οὕτως αἰεὶ νοεῖ ἕως ἂν ἀγάγῃ εἰς τοῦτο ὃ αὐτὸς δύναται ἔσχατον ποιεῖν. Εἴτα ἤδη ἡ ἀπὸ τούτου κίνησις ποίησις καλεῖται ἡ ἐπὶ τὸ ὑγιαίνειν. (The illustration here is taken from productive science, not practical, but in this point there is no difference between the two: cp. *Eth. Nic. 3. 5. 1112 b 12 sqq.*) In practical and productive science the analysis is pressed forward till we reach 'that which we have it in our power to do.' The man of practical science who wishes to produce happiness inquires into its cause, which he finds to be mainly virtue, then he inquires into the cause of virtue and finds it to be law; the framing of law, however, is a thing which lies in his power; hence here his analysis stops, and the question which he has to solve is, how should laws be framed so as to produce virtue? Thus, while both in theoretic and non-theoretic science there is a search for the cause, in the former we search for the cause which will explain a given thing or fact, in the latter for the cause with the aid of which we can attain a given end.

It is easy to see how different the plan of the *Politics* would have been if Aristotle had identified the methods of physical and political study. We should have had the actual phenomena presented by the life of States accepted as normal, and the problem would have been to refer them to the Material or the Final Cause. As it is, happiness is the starting-point of Political Science, and the object of the inquiry is to discover some line of action lying within the power of the inquirer—the correct way of framing laws, in fact—which will bring it into being to the utmost extent possible in each particular case.

The difference which exists between the problem of

¹ Ogle's translation, p. xxxv.

Practical Science and that of Theoretic Science is not, however, the only cause of the difference between their methods of inquiry. The subject-matter of Practical Science is more variable and less universal, and the faculty which operates in it, though scientific in its nature, ripens only with the help of Experience and correct habituation: it cannot hope to achieve the same exactness as is attained in Theoretic Science, and leans more largely on Opinion, and especially the opinion of *φρόνιμοι*.

We might almost expect, looking to the language which Aristotle holds, to find him constructing Practical Science from the judgments of experienced and well-habituated Greeks, and accepting in its fulness the principle that in this sphere the *φρόνιμος* is the standard.

How far does the method actually followed by Aristotle in the Politics agree with that which he ascribes to πολιτικὴ?

But this he is far from doing. If he consults Opinion, as he constantly does, the opinion he consults is not exclusively the opinion of this small class, but that of Philosophers or even of the Many. The opinions of the Many are valuable as expressions of Experience¹. But he does not accept Opinion as conclusive without verification: he subjects it to a variety of tests. First, that of 'observed fact' (*τὰ ἔργα, τὰ γινόμενα*). Συμφωνεῖν δὴ τοῖς λόγοις εὐκασιναὶ αἱ τῶν σοφῶν δόξαι· πῶστιν μὲν οὖν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔχει τινα, τὸ δ' ἀληθὲς ἐν τοῖς πρακτοῖς ἐκ τῶν ἔργων καὶ τοῦ βίου κρίνεται· ἐν τούτοις γὰρ τὸ κύριον. Σκοπεῖν δὴ τὰ προειρημένα χρὴ ἐπὶ τὰ ἔργα καὶ τὸν βίον ἐπιφέροντας, καὶ συναδόντων μὲν τοῖς ἔργοις ἀποδεκτέον, διαφωνούντων δὲ λόγους ὑποληπτέον (*Eth. Nic.* 10. 9. 1179 a 16 sqq.). Thus, for instance, questions as to the true nature of happiness are to be settled by observing what sort of persons are, as a matter of fact, happy, and how they come to be so. We see that the happy individual is he who has much virtue and a not more than adequate amount of external goods (*Pol.* 4 (7). 1. 1323 a 38 sqq.); that a State, if it is to be well ordered, must not exceed a certain size (*Pol.* 4 (7). 4. 1326 a 25 sqq.). We learn best from the lives men lead what their real opinions are (*Eth. Nic.* 10. 1. 1172 a 27 sqq.). It is true, that even

¹ See the authorities in Zeller, *Gr. Ph.* 2. 2. 243. 3.

when Aristotle appeals to observed fact, he often means by this not so much 'facts' as men's impressions about them. This is not always so, however: see for instance the well-known passage, *de Gen. An.* 3. 10. 760 b 27 sqq.

Next, he controls Opinion by 'reasoning' (*λόγος*). That which is reasonable and probable (*τὸ εὐλογον*) has a certain *prima facie* weight with him: of this the arguments in *de Gen. An.* 3. 11. 760 a 31–b 27 afford an instance. These are arguments from our reasonable anticipations, looking to the principles which prevail generally in Nature. He has, indeed, more confidence in deductions from less general principles: still we shall find that his conception of Nature and the natural is constantly present to him in his political inquiries, and the conception of Nature is one which falls within the province of Theoretic Science.

Aristotle's own account in the *Ethics* of the method of *πολιτική* leads us, in fact, to expect in his treatment of the subject a larger use of unproved Opinion and a slighter reference to the results of Theoretic Science than we actually discover in it. Practical Science turns out to be more a matter of reasoning and less a matter of insight than we were prepared to find it. The interval which parts man as an agent—the subject of Practical Science—from man as possessing a nutritive and perceptive soul—the subject of Physics—cannot, after all, be insuperably great. The study of the passions falls within the province of Ethics, yet they are closely related to man's physical nature (*Eth. Nic.* 10. 8. 1178 a 9 sqq.), with which Physics has to do. The principle which enables Aristotle to explain the subject-matter of Physics is also that which enables him to explain moral action and the State: the movement from Potentiality to Actuality is common to both. The end of Man and of Society—living nobly and well (*τὸ εὖ ζῆν*)—is an end which appears also in the field of Physics¹. The truth that man lives for this end, and that the State should be constructed for its attainment, is one which Aristotle does not need to rest on Opinion, for his physical

¹ *De Part. An.* 2. 10. 656 a 3 sqq.

studies have proved to him that the end of every individual thing, according to the design of Nature, is 'the best of which it is capable' (*τὸ ἐκάστω ἐνδεχόμενον βέλτιστον*). And if it be urged that without the aid of Opinion we cannot tell what is the best which is possible to man, we may reply that when Aristotle seeks to discover the highest element in happiness (*Eth. Nic. 10. 7*), or to illustrate its dependence on character rather than on external goods (*Pol. 4 (7). 1. 1323 b 23*), he refers us to his conception of God—a chief topic of the First Philosophy, or, as it is otherwise called, the Theologic Science. Teichmüller has pointed out in reference to the Ethics, how much the actual method of Aristotle in Practical Science differs from that which he lays down for himself in theory. 'The philosophy of Aristotle,' he remarks, 'with its fondness for sharp distinctions cannot possibly preserve its logical consistency. It is as a complete man (*als ganzer Mensch*), in full possession of all practical, technical, and theoretic powers and perceptions, that Aristotle everywhere speaks: he forgets that he has only the right to speak as a good and wise man or Statesman (*φρόνιμος*)¹.'

Aristotle does not probably intend, even in theory, to ignore the links between Theoretic and Practical Science, or the elements which are common to both. He traces, as we have said, in 'things done' (*τὰ πρακτά*) no less than in the subject-matter of Physics the operation of the Four Causes—the movement of matter to an end, an advance from Potentiality to Actuality. If this could not be done, there would be no Science of Practice. He is less clear on the question whether Practical Science derives any of its principles from Theoretic. But even if he answered this question in the affirmative, it would still be open to him to assert the distinctness of Practical and Theoretic Science, as he unquestionably does. He not only holds that Practical Science aims at Practice in addition to knowledge, but that neither the end of man nor the means to its attainment can be ascertained, at all events in detail, except by

¹ Neue Studien zur Geschichte der Begriffe, 3. 354-7.

an appeal to the judgment of the *φρόνιμος*, and also to the collective experience of men, sifted and corrected as we have seen that he sifts and corrects it. Even Plato does not think that a knowledge of the Ideas will suffice to make his guardians good rulers without fifteen years of practical experience. Perhaps, if Aristotle's treatment of Ethical and Political Science had been more abstract and had concerned itself less with concrete detail, and if, again, he had not construed its aim to be the promotion of correct Practice, he might have been better able to dispense with the aid of Opinion: but, after all, do not all inquirers on these subjects to this day tacitly follow the method which Aristotle avowedly adopts? Where is the inquirer who does not tacitly refer to the best Opinion of his own epoch in framing his account of virtue? What European philosopher ever doubts that European institutions are the best?

The alleged difference between the aims of Practical and Theoretic Science, which seems more than anything else to lead Aristotle to distinguish between the two, appears, indeed, to be an unreal ground of distinction between them. May not moral and political science speculate about moral action without any aim beyond the attainment of truth? Is not Aristotle himself led by his view that the aim of Political Science is to promote right action to make his study of social facts, patient and comprehensive though it is, less the central feature of the Politics than the study of Society as it ought to be? Should not the careful analysis of social tendencies, which we find, for instance, in the book on Revolutions, have preceded and prepared the way for the attempt to depict a best state¹? Might we not have been gainers, if he had addressed himself even more closely than he has done to understanding social phenomena and less to modifying them? Political Science

¹ We have already noticed that this would seem to have been the plan which Aristotle intended to adopt in his political

investigations, when he penned the concluding sentences of the Nicomachean Ethics.

'begins' for him 'in History,' no less than in Ethics: but might not History have filled with advantage an even greater place in his investigations?

It is possible, again, to overrate the value of the verdict of the *φρόνιμος*, both in ethical and political questions. In politics, the 'wise and good man' often clings overmuch to the Good at the very moment when the Better is about to take its place. Even on ethical questions, the *φρόνιμος* perhaps has no monopoly of insight. There is some truth in one of the many shrewd remarks which are scattered over the Laws of Plato—*οὐ γὰρ ὅσον οὐσίας ἀρετῆς ἀπεσφαλμένοι τυγχάνουσιν οἱ πολλοί, τοσοῦτον καὶ τοῦ κρίνειν τοὺς ἄλλους οἱ πονηροὶ καὶ ἄχρηστοι, θείον δέ τι καὶ εὖστοχον ἔνεστι καὶ τοῖς κακοῖς, ὥστε παμπολλοὶ καὶ τῶν σφόδρα κακῶν εἰ τοῖς λόγοις καὶ ταῖς δόξαις διαιροῦνται τοὺς ἀμείνους τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ τοὺς χείρονας* (Laws, 950 B-C). With this we may compare a remarkable saying of Niebuhr:—'I am bold enough not to shrink from the admission that I can picture to myself as the inspired preacher of a wisdom at once elevated and profound, I won't exactly say Satan himself, but a possessed person over whom the evil spirit often comes and whom he often pervades; and looking to the risk that denouncers of heresy may lay hold of what I say, I will not speak hypothetically, but name Rousseau and Mirabeau¹.'

We need not wonder that the science of *πολιτική* is one which is 'hardly meet to be called' a science, and that it demands maturity both of mind and character, if we bear in mind the sphere in which it works and the difficulties with which it has to grapple. Its sphere is, as we have seen, that of the Contingent—one in which the tendencies to Good, that here, as elsewhere, exist, are met, and often baffled, by the irregularities which attach to matter and, above all, to human agency. It possesses

Powers acting within the domain of *πολιτική*—Necessity, Nature, Spontaneity, Fortune, Man.

¹ Kleine Schriften, I. 472, quoted by Bernays, Phokion, p. 104. I am well aware how imper-

fectly I have rendered this energetic and highly characteristic utterance.

not only all the variability which characterises Matter, but also that which characterises Man.

The first rude analysis of the subject-matter with which it has to deal—we now confine our attention to the political branch of *πολιτική*—reveals to us the working of powers well known to Greek literature and speculation—Necessity, Nature, Chance, and Man; and if, as we gain a clearer view of things, these agencies tend to fade away and to be replaced by less familiar and less personal entities—the four causes, or again, Potentiality and Actuality—it will still be worth while to cast a hasty glance over these more popular conceptions before they disappear.

The poets had spoken in well-known utterances of Chance, Art, Necessity and Nature, as supreme in human things. Agathon (Fr. 8) had said—

Καὶ μὴν τὰ μὲν γε τῇ τέχνῃ πράσσειν, τὰ δὲ
ἡμῖν ἀνάγκη καὶ τύχῃ προσγίγνεται.

Euripides had connected Necessity and Nature—

Τί ταῦτα δεῖ
στένειν ἄπερ δεῖ κατὰ φύσιν διεκπερᾶν;
δεινὸν γὰρ οὐδὲν τῶν ἀναγκαίων βροτοῖς.

Fr. 757, from the *Hypsipyle* :

and had elsewhere doubted whether Zeus is the necessity which reigns in nature, or the intelligence of man—

Ὅστις ποτ' εἴ σύ, δυστόπαστος εἰδέναι,
Ζεὺς, εἴτ' ἀνάγκη φύσεος, εἴτε νοῦς βροτῶν.

Troad. 847-8: cp. *Fragm.* 1007.

There were philosophers who traced back the universe of things to Nature and Chance, Art supervening upon them but not adding much to their work (Plato, *Laws*, 889 A sqq.: cp. 967 A); and Plato himself finds it easy to understand how everything in the State, at all events, looks like the outcome of Chance (*Laws*, 709 A); but he adds at once that this is not the fact; on the contrary, God and Art co-operate with Chance to shape its destinies. More scientifically, Plato finds Matter, or Necessity, and Mind, or the Idea, at the root of things¹. 'He is unable, owing

¹ Cp. *Tim.* 68 E-69 A.

to his Dualism, to merge these two causes in one, or to recognize in Necessity the work of Reason and the positive intermediary, not merely the limitation and negative condition, of her working' (Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. I. 489 sq., ed. 2).

It is the tendency of Aristotle to soften this sharp Necessity. antithesis, and to view the Necessary as the friend, if often the inconstant friend, of the Good. He distinguishes three kinds of the Necessary, two of which have no place in the State (Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 331. 1): cp. *Metaph. A. 7. 1072 b 11*, τὸ γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον τοσανταχῶς, τὸ μὲν βίᾳ ὅτι παρὰ τὴν ὁρμὴν, τὸ δὲ οὐ οὐκ ἄνευ τὸ εὖ, τὸ δὲ μὴ ἐνδεχόμενον ἄλλως ἀλλ' ἀπλῶς: *de Part. An. 1. 1. 642 a 1*, εἰσὶν ἄρα δύο αἰτίαι αὗται, τό θ' οὐ ἕνεκα καὶ τὸ ἐξ ἀνάγκης· πολλὰ γὰρ γίνεται ὅτι ἀνάγκη· ἴσως δ' ἂν τις ἀπορήσειε ποῖαν λέγουσιν ἀνάγκην οἱ λέγοντες ἐξ ἀνάγκης· τῶν μὲν γὰρ δύο τρόπων οὐδέτερον οἷόν τε ὑπάρχειν, τῶν διωρισμένων ἐν τοῖς κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν· ἔστι δ' ἐν γε τοῖς ἔχουσι γένεσιν ἡ τρίτη· λέγομεν γὰρ τὴν τροφήν ἀναγκαῖόν τι κατ' οὐδέτερον τούτων τῶν τρόπων, ἀλλ' ὅτι οὐχ οἷόν τε ἄνευ ταύτης εἶναι· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ὥσπερ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως. The State falls so far under the sway of Necessity, as it begins in Matter¹ and needs instruments (*ὄργανα*)²: its matter and its provision of instruments are necessary pre-requisites, if it is to attain the Good: they are conditionally necessary (ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ἀναγκαῖα). But these indispensable conditions may assume two very different characters. They may, if favourably present, be positive contributors to the End, almost rising to the level of its efficient cause (*de Gen. An. 2. 6. 742 a 19 sqq.*). Necessity, if only we have to do with favourable Matter, may be the fore-runner, the first or nascent form of the Best: it may be Nature in disguise. On the other hand, there may lurk in it an element of unfitness for the Best, which will mar the whole evolution: the indispensable condition, which may be the friend of the Best, may also be its worst foe. The State must have a territory; yet

¹ *Phys. 2. 9. 200 a 30 sqq.*: cp. 200 a 14, ἐν γὰρ τῇ ὕλῃ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον.

² Zeller, *ibid.*: cp. *de Gen. An. 2. 6. 742 a 22 sqq.*

the characteristics of this territory may be unfavourable to its political wellbeing (Pol. 7 (5). 3. 1303 b 7 sqq.). It must start with a population, and here again the same thing may occur (Pol. 4 (7). 7. 1327 b 23 sqq.). It must have a due supply of external goods; yet the pursuit of them may draw men away from higher things. Thus the indispensable condition may prove a fetter and even a stumbling-block, for men may mistake the necessary for the best, the means for the end. In any case, as the statesman, unlike the carpenter or builder, is seldom free to select the material for his State, this element is likely, whether for weal or for woe, to play a considerable part in shaping its destiny. It might be better away, were this possible: but there is a power capable of giving it a new direction and making it a positive aid to the Best. Many things come into existence for one end, marked out by Necessity; and then Nature adroitly gives them a new turn, directing them to the Best. The State itself came into existence, in the hands of Necessity, 'for the sake of mere life'; but Nature carries it on to the higher end of 'good life.' Slavery, which originates in necessity (Pol. 1. 3. 1253 b 25), becomes eventually a source of virtue: the household in general undergoes a similar re-adaptation. But indeed things that are necessary may often be also expedient: thus the relation of ruling and being ruled is not only a necessary condition of unity, but also expedient (Pol. 1. 5. 1254 a 21); and if Necessity forges the link which binds together man and wife, father and child, master and slave (Pol. 1. 2. 1252 a 26 sqq.), and so calls into existence the Household and State, Necessity and Expediency here coincide.

Nature.

Closely allied with the 'conditionally necessary' is one side of the conception which Aristotle terms Nature. *Ἐνα μὲν οὖν τρόπον οὕτως ἡ φύσις λέγεται, ἡ πρώτη ἐκάστῳ ὑποκειμένη ὕλη τῶν ἐχόντων ἐν αὐτοῖς ἀρχὴν κινήσεως καὶ μεταβολῆς, ἄλλον δὲ τρόπον ἡ μορφή καὶ τὸ εἶδος τὸ κατὰ τὸν λόγον* (Phys. 2. 1. 193 a 28). It is in the former of these two senses that Nature borders closely on Necessity. Nature is also spoken

of as the end (*ἡ δὲ φύσις τέλος καὶ οὐ ἕνεκα*, Phys. 2. 2. 194 a 28); and even as the path which leads from the one point to the other (*ἔτι δὲ ἡ φύσις ἡ λεγομένη ὡς γένεσις ὁδὸς ἐστὶν εἰς φύσιν*, Phys. 2. 1. 193 b 12)¹. Nature is thus 'a principle of motion and rest implanted and essentially inherent in things, whether that motion be locomotion, increase, decay, or alteration' (Phys. 2. 1. 192 b 13). For though Aristotle in countless passages speaks of Nature as a person, seeking to realize aims and giving evidence of wisdom and virtue, we soon learn to seek its agency rather in things themselves. Its working seems hardly distinguishable from that of God², except that it is more ubiquitous, more immanent in things, more Protean and multiform; evidencing itself, as we see in the Politics, not only in 'that which is best,' but also in 'that which is necessary,' 'that which is coeval with birth' (*τὸ εὐθὺς ἐκ γενετῆς*), 'that which obtains for the most part' (*τὸ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ*). If we know the State to be the work of Nature from the fact that it brings what is best, we learn this also by tracing it back to its beginnings in Necessity, by investigating its origin in the Household and Village. The real being, however, of Nature is rather to be found in the end than in the process, and rather in the process than its starting-point.

With Aristotle's conception of Nature as bringing the Best we may contrast the less cheerful Epicurean view, which Lucretius adopts (5. 195 sqq.):—

Quod superest arvi, tamen id natura sua vi
Sentibus obducat, ni vis humana resistat
Vitai causa valido consueta bidenti
Ingemere et terram pressis proscindere aratris :

and Virgil in his train (Georg. 1. 197 sqq.):—

Vidi lecta diu et multo spectata labore
Degenerare tamen, ni vis humana quotannis
Maxima quaeque manu legeret : sic omnia fatis
In peius ruere, ac retro sublapsa referri.

Aristotle, on the contrary, finds in things a tendency to

¹ Sir A. Grant, Ethics, 1. 278-9. and cp. de Gen. An. 731 b 24

² See Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 387-9, sqq.

evolve themselves right. Men sometimes can hardly choose but do or say the right thing (de Part. An. 1. 1. 642 a 19, 27: Metaph. A. 3. 984 a 18: Teichmüller, Kunst, p. 383): and if the State needs human contrivance to bring it into existence (cp. ὁ πρῶτος συστήσας, Pol. 1. 2. 1253 a 30), its contriver perhaps only 'followed the guidance of things themselves,' for we hear of a 'growth in things' (τὰ πράγματα φύόμενα) in connexion with the rise of the State (Pol. 1. 2. 1252 a 24). Nature often gives us clear intimations of the true course: she seeks, for instance, to mark off the natural slave by a special physical aspect and bearing (1. 5. 1254 b 27 sqq.); she creates in men a difference of age, and so suggests the true basis for distinctions of political privilege within the citizen body (4 (7). 14. 1332 b 35). Yet she is often baffled (1. 5. 1254 b 32 sqq.), and needs the aid of Art to bring things right. Thus it is that Art partly completes what Nature is unable to carry to completion, partly imitates Nature (Phys. 2. 8. 199 a 15).

Aristotle, as we shall see, is at even more pains to show that the State is a product of Nature than Plato¹ had been before him. His direct object in so doing is to strengthen and consecrate its authority and to exhibit its true relation to the individual. An incidental consequence of his arguments, however, is that whatever holds good of 'compounds formed by Nature' (τὰ φύσει συνεστῶτα) holds good of the State. Thus, as Nature does everything 'either from considerations of that which is necessary or from considerations of that which is better²,' the structure of the State must satisfy one or other of these tests. So again, in all things that exist by nature, and not by accident, whose essence is disorder (ἀταξία)³, we look to find order (τάξις) and proportion (cp. Phys. 8. 1. 252 a 11, ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδέν γε ἄτακτον τῶν φύσει καὶ κατὰ φύσιν· ἡ γὰρ φύσις αἰτία πᾶσι τάξεως· τὸ δ' ἄπειρον πρὸς τὸ ἄπειρον οὐδένα λόγον ἔχει, τάξις δὲ πᾶσα λόγος: Phys. 8. 6. 259 a 10, ἐν γὰρ

¹ Laws, 889 sq.

² De Gen. An. 1. 4. 717 a 15, ἡ διὰ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον ἢ διὰ τὸ βέλτιον:

cp. Plato, Tim. 75 D.

³ De Part. An. 1. 1. 641 b 23.

τοῖς φύσει δεῖ τὸ πεπερασμένον καὶ τὸ βέλτιον, ἂν ἐνδέχεται, ὑπάρχειν μᾶλλον). Consequently, Aristotle insists on order and proportion in the State: he cannot accept the haphazard organization of actual communities (Pol. 4 (7). 2. 1324 b 5), the social anarchy of democracies (8 (6). 4. 1319 b 27 sqq.), or even the indefinite and varying magnitude of Greek cities (4 (7). 4. 1326 a 8 sqq.: cp. de An. 2. 4. 416 a 16, τῶν δὲ φύσει συνισταμένων πάντων ἐστὶ πέρασ καὶ λόγος μεγέθους τε καὶ αὐξήσεως). So again, 'Nature always gives things to those who can use them, either exclusively or more largely than to others' (de Part. An. 4. 8. 684 a 28). The State, therefore, must follow the same rule in distributing the advantages at its disposal—wealth, office, political power, and the like. So again, in all products of Nature we find elements of two kinds—ὧν οὐκ ἄνευ and μέρη: the former necessary conditions of the thing but not parts of it, the latter its parts. This holds also of the State (Pol. 4 (7). 8. 1328 a 21 sqq.), and thus we find Aristotle breaking the population of his State into two sections, the one merely a necessary condition of the State and not a part of it, the other concentrating in itself the substance and true life of the State.

We have already seen that Matter, while indispensable as a condition of the things into which it enters, is also so variable that it may prove either the first step in the process of Nature which ends in Actuality, or a distorting and enfeebling influence. It is in this variability of Matter that Spontaneity (τὸ αὐτόματον) and Fortune (τύχη) take their rise (Metaph. E. 2. 1027 a 13, ὥστε ἡ ὕλη ἐστὶ αἰτία ἢ ἐνδεχομένη παρὰ τὸ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ ἄλλως τοῦ συμβεβηκότος). 'The accidental,' says Zeller¹, 'arises when a free or unfree activity directed to an end is brought by the influence of external circumstances to produce a result other than that end.' Spontaneity is predicated in the case of such a disturbance generally, whether the activity disturbed and impeded is that of a being exercising Moral

Spontaneity and Fortune.

¹ Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 335.

Choice or not; Fortune, only when the agent whose activity is thus modified is a being exercising Moral Choice. A third form of the Accidental is the *σύμπτωμα*—e.g. the occurrence of an eclipse while one is taking a walk; and here the Accidental appears in its purest form¹. It here takes the shape of a mere co-existence in Space or Time of two events standing in no causal relation to each other. As Torstrik points out², Accident is not always a marring influence: the movement to an end may be satisfactorily accomplished, and yet incidentally set going the aimless activity of Chance. Chance plays round the ordered process of Nature, careless whether it mars or aids it³ or does neither. Its essential characteristic is to be without design and irregular; it is the negation of Intelligence and Nature—a power which acts without reason and without that approach to regularity (*τὸ ὥς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ*) which Nature exhibits. Aristotle evidently holds that if everything happened by accident, nothing would be calculable beforehand. This is not really the case. Chance itself is in some degree reducible to uniformities.

The popular Greek view set down the Accidental to the Gods: thus Herodotus speaks frequently of *θείη τύχη*, Thucydides of *ἡ τύχη ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ*⁴; Timoleon, according to Plutarch⁵, 'having built a temple to Automatia close to his house, sacrificed to her and consecrated the house itself to the *Ἱερὸς Δαίμων*.' Euripides, however, distinguished between Fortune and the hand of the Deity⁶, and we find Philemon⁷ placing in the mouth of one of his characters the utterance—

¹ Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 335. 3.

² *Hermes*, 9. 425.

³ It sometimes aids Art at all events: cp. *τέχνη τύχην ἑσπερξε καὶ τύχη τέχνην* (Eth. Nic. 6. 4. 1140 a 19).

⁴ Thuc. 5. 104, 112.

⁵ Timol. c. 36. The fate of the Athenian Timotheus, who had said that his success was due to himself more than to Fortune (Scholiast on Aristophanes, Plu-

tus, 180), was perhaps present to Timoleon's mind.

⁶ L. Schmidt, *Ethik der alten Griechen*, 1. 56, who refers to Cycl. 606 (582 Bothe), *Hecub.* 491 (465 Bothe)—to which references may be added *Herc. furens*, 1205 sqq., where gods no less than men are viewed as the sport of fortune.

⁷ Inc. Fab. Fragm. 48 Didot.

οὐκ ἔστιν ἡμῖν οὐδεμία Τύχη θεός,
οὐκ ἔστιν, ἀλλὰ ταυτόματον, ὃ γίνεται
ὡς ἔτυχ' ἐκάστω, προσαγορεύεται Τύχη.

Menander makes a near approach to Aristotle in the lines—

Ὡς ἄδικον, ὅταν ἡ μὲν φύσις
ἀποδῇ τι σεμνόν, τοῦτο δ' ἡ Τύχη κακοῖ¹,

and

οὐδὲν κατὰ λόγον γίνεθ' ὧν ποιεῖ Τύχη.

To Aristotle, at any rate when he speaks scientifically, Accident is an influence arising at the opposite pole of things to the Deity, and inasmuch as it is not directed to an end, bordering closely on the non-existent².

The domain of Politics is exposed to the action of Accident in all its forms. It was a σύμπτωμα that brought the extreme democracy of Athens into being (Pol. 2. 12. 1274 a 12). It rests with Fortune whether the State possesses the adequate supply of accessories (σύμμετρος χορηγία) with which it should start, or not (Pol. 4 (7). 13. 1332 a 29: cp. c. 4. 1325 b 37 sq.).

To these powers Aristotle apparently adds as a fourth *Man.* that of human agency, for though we might conceive it as already included under the heads of Nature, Necessity, and Accident, inasmuch as human beings form, as we shall see, the Matter of the State, he clearly marks off the agency of διάνοια from that of φύσις (e.g. Phys. 2. 5. 196 b 21)³.

He does not trace the gradual ripening of political wisdom in man, as he traces in the Poetics the dawn of Poetry. We do not learn whether Chance played the same part in the growth of the State as it did in the development of the Poetic Art (Poet. 4. 1448 b 22: 14. 1454 a 10). Was the State the outcome of Trial and Failure (πείρα, Poet. 24. 1459 b 32)? We are not told, but we may probably

¹ Ὀλυμπία, Fragm. 1 Didot.

² Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 336.

³ The enumeration in Eth. Nic. 3. 5. 1112 a 31, αἷτια δοκοῦσιν εἶναι φύσις καὶ ἀνάγκη καὶ τύχη, ἐτι δὲ νοῦς

καὶ πᾶν τὸ δι' ἀνθρώπου, may also be referred to, though it loses weight owing to the employment of the word δοκοῦσιν.

assume that in this, as in other fields, Experience long preceded Science.

The State only imperfectly amenable to human control.

But even when human agency approaches the subject-matter of Politics with all the resources both of Experience and Science, it finds the State only imperfectly amenable to its control. The reason of this will be readily inferred from our review of the agencies at work in this sphere. Science has to steer her way among the potent influences of Necessity, Nature, and Accident, not to speak of human aberrations. Nature, indeed, is her ally and guide, but with the rest she has to do the best she can.

The State is to Aristotle neither an 'organism' which it is beyond man's power to influence, nor a creation of man which man can mould as he likes. It is in part, though only in part, beyond his control. The Matter out of which the State issues—the population with which it starts—may be untowardly; the territory may be other than it should be; and even if, as in the best State, both population and territory are all that can be wished, Accident may still mar its development. The lawgiver often has to deal with adverse conditions which he cannot alter, and it is the business of Political Science to point out not only what is to be done when wind and tide are favourable, but also how the best may be made of adverse circumstances¹.

The necessity of the State, its value to man and its authority over the

In entering on his subject, Aristotle's first care is to reassert the authority of the State, nominally in opposition to those who had drawn only a quantitative distinction between it and the household, but really in correction of more serious errors—the error of those who had asserted

¹ Cp. 6 (4). 1. 1289 a 5 sqq. It is hardly necessary to remark that in asserting the existence of a Science of Society Aristotle is far from claiming that it enables us to 'ascertain the fundamental laws of social evolution' or to 'forecast the future of society.'

History hardly groups itself to him as an evolution. Accident plays a large part in it. All he asserts is that it is possible to determine more or less scientifically how the State should be organized and administered under varying social conditions.

it to exist, not φύσει, but νόμῳ, and the error of those who, like the Cynics, regarded it as a non-essential.

The distinction between τὰ φύσει and τὰ νόμῳ arose in connexion with the question as to the reality of things—a question which presented itself early in the history of Greek philosophy. Gorgias appears to have denied existence *in toto*. Others distinguished between things which exist φύσει and things which exist νόμῳ. Some inquirers found that which exists by nature mainly in sensible things—in the elements, earth, air, fire, and water, and their compounds (Plato, *Laws*, 889 A sqq.); others denied existence by nature to the heaven, but allowed it to the world of animal life¹. More commonly, the natural was identified with the necessary, as in the already quoted fragment of Euripides: or with that which is fixed and invariable (cp. *Eth. Nic.* 1. 1. 1094 b 14, τὰ δὲ καλὰ καὶ τὰ δίκαια . . . τοσαύτην ἔχει διαφορὰν καὶ πλάνην, ὥστε δοκεῖν νόμῳ μόνον εἶναι, φύσει δὲ μή): or the immemorial, not ‘made with hands’; as in *Diog. Laert.* 9. 45, ποιητὰ δὲ νόμιμα εἶναι (sc. ἔφασκεν ὁ Δημόκριτος), φύσει δὲ ἄτομα καὶ κενόν, and in the famous lines of the *Antigone* of Sophocles, which Aristotle quotes (*Rhet.* 1. 13. 1373 b 9 sqq.: cp. 15. 1375 a 32 sqq.), and understands as asserting existence by nature:—

Οὐ γάρ τι νῦν γε κἀχθές, ἀλλ’ αἰεί ποτε
 ζῇ τοῦτο, κούδεις οἶδεν ἐξ ὅτου φάνη:

or the true, as distinguished from that which seems true to the many (*Aristot. Soph. Elench.* 12. 173 a 15): or that which is universally or generally recognized: thus the sophist Hippias refused to recognize any laws as divinely authorized, except those which are everywhere accepted (*Xen. Mem.* 4. 4. 19; cp. the passages from Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* just quoted).

Plato would probably find the natural, above all, in that which participates in the Idea of Good; and Aristotle,

¹ Cp. *Aristot. de Part. An.* 1. 1. 641 b 20 sqq., οἱ δὲ τῶν μὲν ζώων ἑκάστον φύσει φασὶν εἶναι καὶ γενέσθαι, τὸν δ’ οὐρανὸν ἀπὸ τύχης καὶ τοῦ

αὐτομάτου τοιοῦτον συστήναι, ἐν ᾧ ἀπὸ τύχης καὶ ἀταξίας οὐδ’ ὅτιον φαίνεται.

following in the same path, finds the natural in that which is either a necessary condition of, or a direct contributor to, that which is best for the species—the specific, not the universal, end. The tests of primitiveness (τὸ εὐθὺς ἐκ γενετῆς, Pol. 1. 5. 1254 a 23 : τὸ ἀρχαῖον, Pol. 4 (7). 10. 1329 a 40 sqq.) and of generality of occurrence (τὸ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ) are also accepted by him. To ascertain what is natural, we are taught to ask what obtains in normal instances, what holds good of healthy and well-constituted subjects (Pol. 1. 5. 1254 a 36 sqq.). It is not from barbarians, but from Greeks that we learn the natural type of the State and household (Pol. 1. 2. 1252 a 34 sqq., φύσει μὲν οὖν . . . ἐν δὲ τοῖς βαρβάροις : cp. 6. 1255 a 33 sq.).

It is by showing that the State satisfies these tests that Aristotle is enabled to reassert its naturalness and its authority over the individual. Both had been impugned. The assertion that Right is not φύσει but νόμῳ led almost inevitably to a similar assertion with respect to the State, which represents a distribution of rights; and the effect of this view was to weaken the authority of the State over the individual. Some, indeed, like Callicles in the *Gorgias* of Plato, by implication allowed the State to be natural if it were in the hands of a man of transcendent ability and force of character, but this condition of things was the exception, not the rule.

Those who claimed that the State is not φύσει but νόμῳ did not necessarily imply that it owes its existence to a compact, though the two ideas do not lie far apart: they might mean only that its claims rest on general acceptance—that it is the traditional, received thing—that its authority is artificial, not based on Nature, but ‘of man’s devising,’ and that it need not have existed, if men had not chosen that it should. The phrase brought its origin, however, perilously near that of money (νόμισμα) or of law (νόμος), both of them things commonly conceived to rest on compact and to depend on it for acceptance and authority¹; and we

¹ Cp. Eth. Nic. 5. 8. 1133 a 28 sqq.: Pol. 1. 9. 1257 a 35. The soph- ist Hippias (Xen. Mem. 4. 4. 13) treated law as a kind of compact,

are not surprised to find Glaucon, who undertakes in the Republic to state the views of Thrasymachus, tracing the origin of law and justice to compact. His language implies that not only law but anything like legally regulated society originates in compact. There are, indeed, passages even in the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle in which social relations seem to be rested on contract: thus we read in Eth. Nic. 8. 14. 1161 b 13, αἱ δὲ πολιτικαὶ καὶ φυλετικαὶ καὶ συμπλοικαὶ καὶ δοσαι τοιαῦται (φιλαι) κοινωνικαῖς (φιλαις) ἐόικασι μᾶλλον· οἷον γὰρ καθ' ὁμολογίαν τινὰ φαίνονται εἶναι (cp. Eth. Nic. 9. 1. 1163 b 32 sqq. : Pol. 2. 2. 1261 a 30 sqq., passages on which some light is thrown by Rhet. 1. 15. 1376 b 11 sqq.). In the Politics, however, Aristotle not only contrasts law with compact (Pol. 3. 9. 1280 b 10), but seems everywhere to imply that the State neither came into being by way of compact nor is dependent on compact for its authority. It began in the blind impulses which first formed the household and broadened there into wider aims which nothing but the State could satisfy. It glided imperceptibly into existence, as men became successively aware of the various needs bound up with their nature. Men could not choose but form it, or some imperfect substitute for it. It is as much a necessity of human existence as food or fire. Its authority rests on the same basis as the authority of the father, not on consent, but on the constitution of human nature. Epicurus, on the contrary, 'insisted on an original compact between the individual members of society as the origin of its establishment¹,' and in so doing reasserted the doctrine ascribed by Glaucon to Thrasymachus in a slightly more unequivocal form².

in agreement with popular opinion (Aristot. Rhet. 1. 15. 1376 b 9), and asked, νόμους, ὧς Σώκρατες, πῶς ἂν τις ἡγήσαιο σπουδαῖον πρᾶγμα εἶναι ἢ τὸ πείθεσθαι αὐτοῖς, οὓς γε πολλὰκις αὐτοὶ οἱ θέμενοι ἀποδοκιμάσαντες μετατίθενται;

¹ Prof. Wallace, Epicureanism, p. 158.

² The doctrine of the origin of society in contract, when Epi-

curus at last distinctly put it forth, was put forth, not with the comparatively restricted aim of limiting monarchical authority, with which it has often been upheld in modern times, but with the far more revolutionary aim of throwing the State further into the background of human life by representing it as a thing of man's devising, not an imperious dic-

As the teaching of some of the Sophists had tended to impair the authority of the State, or to limit its functions to the protection of the individual from wrong, so the teaching of the Cynics led up to a denial that the wise man needs a State of his own other than the whole world. The doctrines of the Cynics, no less than those of these Sophists, are controverted in the opening chapters of the Politics. Even Plato, in one of his dialogues at all events, had failed, in Aristotle's opinion, to do full justice to the State and its claims. He had treated the City-State as a mere enlarged household, and had spoken as if the master of slaves, the head of a household, and the King or citizen-ruler of a State only differed in the number of those they ruled. It is primarily in correction of this doctrine, which is not indeed much in harmony with Plato's ordinary view of the comparative claims of State and household, and is perhaps rather Socratic than Platonic, that Aristotle traces, first the beginnings of the household, and then the rise of the household into the City-State. The inquiry, however, offers a convenient opportunity of refuting other and more serious errors—those of the Sophists and Cynics.

The genetic method which Aristotle follows in this inquiry may surprise those who remember that he lays down the principle elsewhere¹, that the genesis of a thing is to be explained by its nature or essence (*οὐσία*), not the nature of it by its genesis. It is, he says, because the thing is what it is, that it came into being as it did. If we want, therefore, to know what the State is, we must ask, it would seem, not the mode of its genesis, but rather its end. Yet he invites us, at the very outset of the Politics, to study the growth of the State *ab ovo* (*τὰ πράγματα φύόμενα*). His object, however, in this is not so much to ascertain what the State is as to prove that it exists by nature, and to show

tate of his nature. Epicurus, in fact, trod in the footsteps of the Sophists referred to in the text. But then he had a philosophical discipline to set in the place of the State, which they had not.

They struck down the traditional guide of human life without having anything to substitute for it.

¹ De Part. An. i. 1. 640a 13sq. (especially a 33-b 4): 642 a 31.

that it stands to the household as a whole stands to its part or as a full-grown plant stands to the seed from which it sprang.

In correction of the errors of Plato and others to which reference has been made, Aristotle first traces back the household to necessity and nature, and then shows that the State is a derivative of the household. It differs in species from the household, but yet it is akin to it and issues from it. He takes the two relations which make up the earliest form of the household, before, with the birth of children, a third is added, that of father and child, and he shows how they issue, not from deliberate choice, but from impulse and necessity—the relation of husband and wife from an impulse common to man with animals and plants, that of master and slave from the instinct of self-preservation. The household thus arises; and probably some of those who were most earnest in impugning the naturalness of the State accepted the household as natural. The sophist Hippias, at all events, regarded the law which enjoins reverence to parents as a law universally accepted and imposed by the gods (*Xen. Mem.* 4. 4. 20). But the State rises out of the household through the intermediate institution of the Village, which is properly a Clan-Village, and thus betrays its relation to the household. Already the Village supplies a wider range of wants than the household—ministers to some wants which are not mere daily wants; and the State does no more than proceed a little farther in the same path. The State itself originally exists for the sake of ministering to life, and only by degrees goes on to minister to noble living. Thus there is no traceable break in the rise of the State out of the household; the early State, like the household, is under kingly rule; and if the one is self-complete, while the other is not, if the one is the culmination, or full-grown form, of the other, there is but one movement, one aim—that of supplying human needs—underlying the whole process. The household cannot be natural and the State other than natural: what holds of the former must hold of the latter: if the household is

natural, *a fortiori* the State is so, for it is the completion of the household. We need not, however, trace the State back to the household, in order to prove that it is natural. It is by nature, because its end is the end of all natural things—that which is best (1252 b 34 sq.).

These facts already justify the assertion that man is a naturally political being, for we find that man is, as it were, started by nature on an inclined plane which carries him in the direction of the Best, and that thus a movement is initiated which cannot pause till it closes in the State: but he is a naturally political being for another reason also; he possesses the gift of language, which reflects a consciousness of the just and the unjust, the good and the bad, and it is this consciousness that serves as a basis for household and State; whereas even the most naturally social of the lower animals only possess voice, and voice expresses no more than a sense of pleasure and pain. In drawing this marked distinction between the sociality of man and that of gregarious animals, Aristotle probably aims at correcting the mistake, as he conceives it to be, of Plato, who had protested in the *Politicus* (262 A sqq.) against an abrupt distinction of ἀγελαιοτροφική in relation to man from ἀγελαιοτροφική in relation to other animals, explaining that one might just as well divide mankind into Hellenes and barbarians, or into Lydians and non-Lydians¹. If, then, at the outset we found Society traced to impulses shared by the lower animals, we now learn to regard the household and State as exclusively human institutions². We see also that the State

¹ He may possibly also have in his mind a passage of the *Laws* (680 E)—οἷς ἐπόμνηοι καθάπερ ὄρνιθες ἀγέλην μίαν ποιήσουσι, πατρονομούμενοι καὶ βασιλείαν πασῶν δικαιστάτην βασιλευόμενοι, which occurs in Plato's sketch of the origin of society. Plato strangely enough seems more inclined than Aristotle to reason from the lower animals to man (cp. *Pol.* 2. 5. 1264 b 4: and *Laws*, 713 D).

² It is indeed implied, *Pol.* 3. 9. 1280 a 32, that the πόλις might ex-

ist among the lower animals, if its end were τὸ ζῆν μόνον. Animals are said (*Eth. Nic.* 6. 13. 1144 b 4 sqq.: cp. *Eth. Nic.* 7. 1. 1145 a 25) to possess φυσικὴ ἀρετὴ (see also *Hist. An.* 8. 1. 589 a 1 sqq.). Some echo of *Pol.* 1. 2. 1253 a 9 sqq. is possibly traceable in Plutarch *de Amore Proles*, c. 3, a passage which may be based on, or contain extracts from, some composition of the great physician Erasistratus, who was a pupil of Theophrastus.

is not merely forced on man by his needs, but foreshadowed by his nature, and requisite to give full play to his faculties; that man bears marks of being intended for life in the State. The *ἀπολις*, if a man and not above or below humanity, is not only a man whose needs are incompletely satisfied, but also one whose faculties are without an adequate field for their exercise.

We might imagine that Aristotle would stop at this point, having now come to the end of the argument by which he seeks to establish that the State is by nature and that man is intended by nature for life in the State; but he goes on to assert that the State is prior in nature to the household and the individual. He argues that the individual, being incomplete without the State, is related to it as a part to a whole, and that the whole is prior in nature to its part. He makes no subsequent use of this principle¹; so that we can only conjecture why he lays stress upon it. He does so probably, partly because if the State and individual were both pronounced to be by nature and therefore to stand so far on an equality, the authority of the State over the individual would still be imperfectly restored, and its relative dignity imperfectly vindicated; partly in order to place in the strongest light the disparity of the household and the State, and therefore the contrast of the householder and the statesman. He goes on further to enforce the claims of the State by showing from what a depth of degradation the State saves man, and how great are the benefits it has conferred upon him. Without the State and the virtue it develops in man, man would be the worst of animals: with it he rises far above their level.

note
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interest

In Aristotle's view, the State is as essential to man's existence as the act of birth. For existence means complete existence, and without the State a man is a mere bundle of capacities for good or evil without the faculty (*φρόνησις καὶ ἀρετή*), for whose hand they were intended:

¹ It is not on the priority of the State to the individual, but on the fact of its relation to him resembling that of a whole to its part that he dwells in 5 (8). 1. 1337 a 27.

✓ he is, as it were, a helm without a helmsman—'nave senza nocchiero in gran tempesta.' Existence also means real living existence, not such an existence as that of the part after the whole is destroyed—as that of the hand or eye after life has left the body. The State is a condition of complete and real human existence—of existence in the full sense of the word: its place in the process of man's life is thus as assured as that of the act of birth, or of the taking of food. It matters not that whole races of men are doomed to remain half-grown and never to realize the City-State: we judge of what is natural for man by that which holds good of well-constituted natures. Man is a being marked out by nature for the gradual attainment of a definite limit of growth, and the State is the means of enabling him to do so. Man's duty to the State is no more a matter of compact than his duty to be virtuous. Compact is not needed as a basis for the authority of a State which fulfils the end of the State, nor can it lend authority to a State which does not do so.

The State does not come into being, in Aristotle's view, in derogation from, or limitation of, man's natural rights: on the contrary, it calls them into existence. It enunciates what is just (Pol. 1. 2. 1253 a 37, ἡ δὲ δικαιοσύνη πολιτικόν ἢ γὰρ δίκη πολιτικῆς κοινωνίας τάξις ἐστίν· ἡ δὲ δίκη τοῦ δικαίου κρείσσει): it is in the State, and with reference to its end, that men's rights are to be determined (Pol. 3. 12. 1282 b 14sq.). If persons outside a given State are recognized by those belonging to it as possessing rights—for example, rights to freedom or to be ruled not despotically but as freemen should be ruled, Aristotle would probably nevertheless say that rights in their origin are traceable to the internal relations of the State. Contrast Chrysippus, Περὶ Θεῶν (ap. Plutarch. de Stoicorum Repugn. c. 9)—οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶν εἰρεῖν τῆς δικαιοσύνης ἄλλην ἀρχὴν οὐδ' ἄλλην γένεσιν ἢ τὴν ἐκ τοῦ Διὸς καὶ τὴν ἐκ τῆς κοινῆς φύσεως. Finding the natural in the best form of the State, Aristotle has no call to imagine a state of nature antecedent to society, and involving risks which compel the formation of the State as a *pis aller*. The State

exists, according to him, because of the better elements in human nature, rather than because human nature is a compound of good and bad. The love of society and the perception of right and wrong implanted by nature in man, the impulse of self-perpetuation, the need of protection and sustenance, the higher needs that gradually assert themselves: these are the things to which the State owes its existence. Man is a being the satisfaction of whose material needs suggests and leads on to the satisfaction of higher needs. The rise of the State merely reflects man's destination to moral development. Kant, on the contrary, in his 'Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht,' traces the State to antagonisms resulting from the fact that men have both tendencies to social union and tendencies disruptive of it, both general sympathies and private interests¹.

The argument of Aristotle must probably have failed to convince the partisans of the opposite doctrine. Some of his opponents would reject his account of the functions of the State, and would confine them to the protection of men's rights: others might say that the picture he draws of the State is a picture of an ideal State very different from the State as it is, and that his defence of the State is consequently a defence of a State which is nowhere to be found: others would perhaps dispute the genesis of the State from the household, and make it out to be rather a thing of man's devising, and to be designed less for man's improvement, than his convenience.

For ourselves, the close historical connexion between the family relation and the State has been placed beyond doubt, though the intrinsic difference between the two institutions is more evident to us than to the Greeks, whose State was in many respects more like a household than our own. Aristotle indeed himself rightly rests the claims of the State rather on its adaptation to human nature and its incalculable services than on its succession to the household.

¹ Kant, Werke, 7. 321 sq. See Flint, Philosophy of History, 1. 391.
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Its authority, however, may be vindicated without seeking to prove that it is everything to man; or even that it is a product of nature. The word 'nature' means less to us than it did to the Greeks. On the other hand, so far as Aristotle's argument goes to show that the authority of the State is not based on consent, it possesses permanent importance.

Cicero (de Rep. 1. 24. 38) is sarcastic at the expense of some inquirers who had begun their political speculations in a similar fashion to Aristotle, though one or two of his expressions (e.g. 'quot modis quidque dicatur') make it doubtful whether he is thinking of Aristotle:—'Nec vero, inquit Africanus, ita disseram de re tam illustri tamque nota, ut ad illa elementa revolvar, quibus uti docti homines his in rebus solent, ut a prima congressione maris et feminae, deinde a progenie et cognatione ordiar, verbisque quid sit et quot modis quidque dicatur definiam saepius: apud prudentes enim homines et in maxima re publica summa cum gloria belli domique versatos quum loquar, non commitam ut sit illustrior illa ipsa res, de qua disputem, quam oratio mea.' He so states the primary cause of the formation of the State, as to give a greater prominence to man's natural sociality than to his needs: 'Coetus autem prima causa coeundi est non tam imbecillitas quam naturalis quaedam hominum quasi congregatio: non est enim singulare nec solivagum genus hoc' (Cic. de Rep. 1. 25. 39). Elsewhere, however, neglecting Aristotle's distinction between the cause of the original formation of the State and the cause of its existence¹, he makes τὸ εἶναι ζῆν the cause of its formation: 'Considerate nunc cetera quam sint provisa sapienter ad illam civium beate et honeste vivendi societatem: ea est enim prima causa coeundi et id hominibus effici ex re publica debet partim institutis, alia legibus' (de Rep. 4. 3. 3).

Bacon's account of the origin of society² is noticeable,

¹ Something not altogether unlike Cicero's statement appears, however, to be implied in Pol. 3. 6. 1278 b 21 sqq., and also, as a

friend has pointed out to me, in Eth. Nic. 8. 11. 1160 a 11 sqq.

² 'Argument of Sir F. Bacon, His Majesty's Solicitor-General,

both because it is obviously influenced by Aristotle's views, and because it does not trace society to a primitive compact. 'The first platform of monarchy,' he says, 'is that of a father, who governing over his wife by prerogative of sex, over his children by prerogative of age and because he is author unto them of being, and over his servants by prerogative of virtue and providence (for he that is able of body and improvident of mind is *natura servus*), is the very model of a king.' On this pattern the earliest society was constructed. 'The first original submission is paternity or patriarchy, which was, when a family growing so great, as it could not contain itself within one habitation, some branches of the descendants were forced to plant themselves into new families, which second families could not by a natural instinct and inclination, but bear a reverence and yield an obeisance to the eldest line of the ancient family from which they were derived.' Bacon adds, as secondary and later sources of monarchy, admiration of virtue or gratitude towards merit, gratitude for salvation in war, or enforced submission to a conqueror. 'All these four submissions are evident to be natural and more ancient than law.' 'All other commonwealths, monarchies only excepted, do subsist by a law precedent . . . but in monarchies, especially hereditary . . . the submission is more natural and simple, which afterwards by laws subsequent is perfected and made more formal, but it is grounded upon nature¹.' 'Nulla apud Baconem,' Friedländer remarks,

in the case of the Postnati of Scotland;' quoted by C. Friedländer, *De Francisci Baconis Verulamii doctrina politica*, p. 15.

¹ Bacon evidently intends to suggest that the claims of Monarchy are superior to those of other constitutions—an inference which Aristotle is far from drawing from its priority in point of time. 'While the Protestant writers on Natural Law persistently maintain that the State is a divine ordinance—while they incline to place the subject in the

same position with respect to his King as that which the child holds to the father whom he has had no part in selecting—while again they firmly assert the infeasible Majesty of the Head of the State, the Jesuit writers on the subject take a diametrically opposite view. They insist in the interest of the Church on the human origin of the State, on its origin in a primitive social compact, and infer from this that where the Prince shows himself unworthy of the power committed

'vestigia ficti illius, quem Hobbesius profert, status naturalis, qui bellum fuisse cogitatur omnium contra omnes; nulla vestigia pactorum illorum quibus homines se invicem obstrinxissent, occurrunt.'

Aristotle's
account of
the origin
of the
State.

It will be observed that, if Aristotle deals with the question of the origin of the State, he deals with it only incidentally, and in course of proving that the State exists by nature. We must not, therefore, expect from him more than a cursory treatment of the question.

Plato had twice sketched the origin of society—first in the Republic and again in the Laws; and his two accounts do not altogether coincide. He had traced its origin in the Republic¹ to man's need of the services of his fellows: he here starts with the single individual and shows how unable he would be to supply his own needs without the aid of at least four or five others, and how the efforts of this group of individuals would fail of full efficiency in the absence of a scheme for distributing and combining their labour. The interchange of the products of their industry is thus, according to this passage, the first and most characteristic fact of social life. In the Laws², however, while tracing the succession of constitutions from its starting-point, he incidentally develops another view of the origin of society. He had apparently noticed that the sites of ancient cities were often close under the slopes of high hills, still more ancient traces of habitation being found on the summits of these hills³; and these facts seemed

to him, the mandate he holds may be withdrawn from him' (J. E. Erdmann, *Geschichte der Philosophie*, I. 574). A Solicitor-General's argument in the time of James I, and especially an argument of Bacon as Solicitor-General, was, however, certain to be sufficiently monarchical in tone.

¹ Rep. 369 A sqq., *ἐὶ γυνομένην πόλιν θεασαίμεθα λόγῳ κ.τ.λ.* Plato's treatment of the subject in the Republic is no doubt, however,

more ideal and less historical than in the Laws. Perhaps indeed we could hardly expect him to trace the State back to the household in a dialogue in which the household was about to be abolished.

² B. 3, 676 A-682 B.

³ Or, very probably, he was merely building on Homer's description of the Cyclopes, which both Plato and Aristotle take as a picture of the earliest human society:—

to him to point to the further fact of a primitive deluge, the survivors of which began society afresh on the hill-tops, each household being ruled by the father and existing either independently or in combination with a few others. Why the survivors of the deluge should be found, when the curtain draws up, grouped in such small bodies, Plato does not explain. The next phase of society is a larger agglomeration of households, accompanied with a change of the site of the settlement to the foot of the hill-slope.

It is evident both from the general tenour of Aristotle's account of the origin of society, and from the repetition in it of incidental expressions used in this passage of the *Laws*¹, that he has this sketch before him in his own treatment of the subject. The deluge, indeed, is dropped out, and all the picturesque features of Plato's story: we lose also some instructive hints, such as the *aperçu* that the earliest men were hunters and herdsmen (*Laws*, 679 A); and the series of societies—household, clan-village, and city-State—is marshalled before us, stripped of historical detail and reduced to a somewhat bald outline. But Aristotle has seized the idea that society begins with the household, not with the group of producers to which the Republic traces it back, and he holds firmly to it. He adds, however, an account of the origin of the household—a subject which Plato had not touched. As we have seen, he traces this, not, like Locke, to the long infancy and long minority of the human being, which, but for wedlock, would impose an overwhelming burden on the mother, but

ἀλλ' οἷγ' ὑψηλῶν ὀρέων καίουσιν
κάρηνα,

ἐν σπέσσι γλαφυροῖσι.

Cp. *Laws*, 677 B.

¹ e.g. *Laws*, 681 A, τῶν οἰκήσεων
τούτων μειζόνων αὐξανόμενων ἐκ τῶν
ἐλαττόνων καὶ πρώτων—cp. *Pol.* I. 2.
1252 b 15, ἡ δ' ἐκ πλείονων οἰκῶν
κοινωνία πρώτη χρήσεως ἔτεκεν μὴ
ἡμέρου κόμῃ: *Laws*, 681 B, παί-
δας καὶ παίδων παῖδας—cp. *Pol.* I.

2. 1252 b 18: and *Laws*, 680 D-E,
μῶν οὖν οὐκ ἐκ τούτων (sc. δυνασ-
τεῖαι γίνονται) τῶν κατὰ μίαν οἰκῆσιν
καὶ κατὰ γένος διεσπαρμένων ὑπὸ
ἀπορίας τῆς ἐν ταῖς φθοραῖς, ἐν αἷς
τὸ πρεσβύτατον ἄρχει διὰ τὴν
ἀρχὴν αὐτοῖς ἐκ πατρὸς καὶ μητρὸς
γεγονέναι, οἷς ἐπόμενοι καθάπερ ὄρνι-
θες ἀγέλην μίαν ποιήσουσι, πατρο-
νομούμενοι καὶ βασιλείαν πασῶν
δικαιοτάτην βασιλευμένοι;

to certain powerful instincts, which hardly, perhaps, account for the permanence of the conjugal relation.

✓ We see that, in Aristotle's view, the State so far treads in the steps of the Household and Village, that it never ceases to be a common life, for this is implied in the term *κοινωνία*. A sundered and scattered citizen-body, like that of Rome, would not be to Aristotle a citizen-body at all. Mutual personal acquaintance (4 (7). 4. 1326 b 14 sqq.) was essential to the citizens for the discharge of their political duties; and besides, a common life (*τὸ σὺν(ῆν)*), though not enough of itself to constitute a State (3. 9. 1280 b 29 sqq.), is, in his opinion, a necessary condition of State-life. But though the State resembles the household and village in this particular, it develops virtues unknown or imperfectly known to them. Justice, in the true sense, first appears in the State.

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We have already seen that too much must not be expected from a sketch of the origin of society, which is introduced mainly to prove its naturalness, and does not profess to aim at exhaustiveness. It is, evidently, largely ideal. Each of the successive *κοινωνίαι* is represented in its correct and normal form. The confusion, common among barbarians, of the wife with the slave (1. 2. 1252 b 5 sq.) is just noticed and no more. No time is spent on such deviation-forms of the Household as that mentioned as prevalent in Persia (Eth. Nic. 8. 12. 1160 b 27), where the father uses his sons as slaves. The relation between master and slave is conceived as a relation in which each side finds its advantage. The retrospect thus acquires rather an ideal aspect. It is an historical retrospect, but the many erroneous types of each *κοινωνία* which have presented themselves are thrown on one side, and we take note only of the normal evolution. The gradual expansion of the solitary household into the clan-village and the city-State is an ideal picture, rather than an historically traceable fact. If Aristotle intends to imply that the household is coeval with the first origin of society, he omits to notice that society occasionally exists, as Hero-

dotus already knew, without the institution of marriage, even in its rudest polyandric form. Aristotle, again, traces the development of society without reference either to religion or to war, each of which has probably exercised a powerful influence upon it, even if they have not been the main factors in the movement.

Note
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If we doubt whether the household finds a place in the most rudimentary form of society, and therefore whether the starting-point of Aristotle's evolution is really the true starting-point, we need not hesitate to deny that the culmination of the process, as he conceives it, is really its culmination. He seems to close the social evolution long before its real termination. The city-State, as he depicts it, without a Church, without fully developed professions, with an imperfectly organized industrial and agricultural system and a merely parochial extent of territory, cannot be considered 'self-complete,' as he asserts it to be: perhaps, indeed, no single State can be held to be so. The *ἔθνος*, again, finds no place in this sketch of social development: Aristotle's view of it, indeed, does not seem to be wholly self-consistent. For though not only *βασιλεία*, which is one of the normal constitutions, but even *παμβασιλεία*, the most divine of them all, might exist in an *ἔθνος* or group of *ἔθνη* (Pol. 3. 14. 1285 b 31 sq.), the *ἔθνος* is pronounced to be self-complete only in respect of things necessary (*αὐτάρκης ἐν τοῖς ἀναγκαίοις*, 4 (7). 4. 1326 b 4), and also deficient in the 'differentiation' which marks the State (2. 2. 1261 a 27).

Two conclusions, especially, result from this inquiry: The *πόλις* the one, that the *πόλις* is the true subject of the investigations of Political Science; the other, that the *πόλις*, being a natural entity (*τῶν κατὰ φύσιν συνεστῶτων*), is not a thing to take any and every shape that the convenience of the individual may dictate, but, on the contrary, has a physiology of its own, and a natural structure of its own, which must be ascertained.

the culmination of human society and therefore the true subject of political study.

✓

The Greek language left Aristotle no alternative, save

to identify the πόλις with the State. The term, which was thus placed before him for analysis, was not a term like our word 'State,' vague in etymology and meaning and thus susceptible of any connotation. It came to him fresh from popular use and full of associations of a definite kind. Evidently it implied, in the first place, that a State without a city at its centre was not a State at all. It is true that the word πόλις is occasionally used in the sense of 'a country'¹; but it has nothing of the vagueness in this respect of the Latin word 'respublica.'

Another obvious inference from the word πόλις was that the State was something inclusive and all-comprehending. The word 'respublica,' on the contrary, implies a distinction between 'res publica' and 'res privata.' The Greek word made it easy to regard the State as the whole of which the individual was a part. It led to a view of human society as a whole: no line was drawn between the social and the political system: production, trade, science, religion were as much phenomena of the State as government. Πολιτική was held to regulate all human activities and to provide for their harmonious co-operation for a common end.

The word πόλις, again, tended to suggest a limit to the size of the State. The city, it would be felt, could not be indefinitely large, and therefore, as the State was a city, neither could the State. It implied, further, that the State involved a common social life (τὸ συζῆν); that a mere participation in a common government was not enough. It perhaps suggested the idea that the State was not an abstraction, existing apart from the human beings and the territory which made it up, but that it was a concrete thing hardly separable from its walls, its soil, its inhabitants, and, above all, its citizens. Aristotle, indeed, uses the word πόλις in conflicting senses. He often seems to use it so as to include all who exchange services of whatever kind within the State (e.g. Pol. 1. 3. 1253 b 2 sqq.: 2. 2. 1261 a 23: 3. 4. 1277 a 5 sqq., a passage which is perhaps only aporetic): more strictly, the πολῖται are the πόλις (δ (4).

¹ See Liddell and Scott, s. v.

11. 1295 b 25: 3. 6. 1279 a 21); and this appears to be his prevailing view (3. 1. 1274 b 41).

Lastly, the word implied, by its antithesis to the Household and the Village, that the State, though the highest, was not the only form of Society. To Hobbes the State is the earliest social unity. It was not so to Aristotle.

Aristotle assumes, in the very first sentence of the Politics, that the State is a *κοινωνία*¹. But what is a *κοινωνία*? We search in vain in Aristotle's writings for any systematic account of *κοινωνία*. As in the case of many other terms, we are left to make out the meaning he attaches to the word from a number of scattered passages which rather imply than state it. The subject of *κοινωνία* is touched upon by Aristotle, partly in the Nicomachean Ethics, partly in the Politics. The household, for instance, so far as it is a form of Friendship (*φιλία*), is treated in the Ethics. The virtues which go to the maintenance of a *κοινωνία* are described in the Ethics. In the Politics we have mostly to do with *κοινωνίαι* composed of rulers and ruled, and with the principles which determine the nature of the rule exercised. For there are *κοινωνίαι* which are not composed of rulers and ruled, as will shortly be seen. We seem to gather from the scattered data we possess that every *κοινωνία* must—

The πόλις
a κοινωνία,
and a
compound
Whole, a
σύνθετον.

1. Consist of at least two human beings diverse from each other (Eth. Nic. 5. 8. 1133a 16 sqq.): and these human beings must not stand to each other in the relation of instrument and end, for in that case there will not be enough in common between them. At least, this is the teaching of Pol. 4 (7). 8. 1328 a 21 sqq., and Eth. Nic. 8. 13. 1161 a 32 sqq.: yet the first book of the Politics asserts a *κοινωνία* between master and slave, which is a case of precisely that disparity. Perhaps the very unequal *κοινωνία*, like the unequal form of friendship, is to be regarded as a lower form of the thing, though not so low as wholly to forfeit the name.

¹ The word *κοινωνία* is hardly translatable in English. It is, as will be seen from the text, a far wider term than 'association.'

2. These human beings are regarded as possessing *ἀγαθά* and exchanging them: thus a *κοινωνία* is formed by a buyer and a seller, or by husband and wife. Beings who do not stand in need of anything or anybody do not form *κοινωνίαι*: thus the gods, whom the Stoics conceived as being in *κοινωνία* with men, cannot be so in Aristotle's view. The *ἀγαθά* exchanged, even if in truth so diverse as to be incommensurable, must be commensurable in relation to demand (Eth. Nic. 5. 8. 1133 b 18): their ratio will in a fully developed society be measured by money.

3. The two parties unite in a common action (*πρᾶξις*): see for illustrations Eth. Nic. 9. 12. 1172 a 3 sqq. Buyer and seller unite in exchanging. The *κοινωνοί* of a State unite in 'the best life of which they are capable' (Pol. 4 (7). 8. 1328 a 36): those of the best State in 'the actualization and perfect exercise of virtue' (38). This is the *κοινόν τι*, which the existence of the *κοινωνία* implies—a common aim (Eth. Nic. 8. 11. 1160 a 8 sqq.) and common action.

4. A passage here and there in the Ethics seems to imply a compact, tacit or other, between the parties to the *κοινωνία*. So in Eth. Nic. 8. 14. 1161 b 13 sq. we are told that 'Political Friendship' appears to rest on compact (*αἱ πολιτικαὶ καὶ φυλετικαὶ καὶ συμπολικοὶ καὶ ὅσαι τοιαῦται (φιλῆαι) κοινωνικαῖς (φιλῆαις) εἰσὶ καὶ μᾶλλον οἷον γὰρ καθ' ὁμολογίαν τινα φαίνονται εἶναι εἰς ταύτας δὲ τάξειεν ἂν τις καὶ τὴν ξενικήν*), while the friendship of relatives and comrades is held, on the contrary, not to rest on any such basis. There is nothing, however, to this effect in the Politics, where the State is distinctly traced to a root in the family relation.

If we examine the *ἀλλακτικὴ κοινωνία*, or union for exchange, we shall find all these features present. Buyer and seller combine to exchange certain commodities on certain terms with a view to their own advantage.

In a *κοινωνία* of this simple kind, however, we notice the absence of one feature which is conspicuously present in the *κοινωνίαι* which pass before us in the opening chapters of the Politics—the household, village, and State. In Trade no relation of rule and subjection is established between

the *κοινωνοί*¹. The parties to an union for exchange stand, as such, on one and the same level.

The State is thus not only a *κοινωνία*, but a *κοινωνία* consisting of rulers and ruled. It is a Whole composed of parts (1. 2. 1253 a 20: 4 (7). 8. 1328 a 21 sq.), not a *μίξις* or a *κρᾶσις* in which the mingled elements vanish, replaced by a new entity, the result of the mixture; still less is it a *σύμφυσις* (Pol. 2. 4. 1262 b 10 sq.): it is, on the contrary, a *σύνθεσις* (3. 3. 1276 b 6), an union in a compound form of uncompounded elements (*ἀσύνθετα*), which continue to subsist as elements or parts within the compound Whole. Being a Whole, the State is composed of dissimilars (2. 2. 1261 a 29), and includes within itself a ruling element and a ruled (1. 5. 1254 a 28 sq.). Its parts—and here its parts are taken to be the individuals composing it—stand to it in just the same relation as the parts of any other Whole do to that Whole (1. 2. 1253 a 26). The fact that the State is a Whole thus leads to various important inferences as to its nature.

Plato had drawn a close parallel between the State and the soul of the individual human being, but had not explained how this resemblance comes to exist. Aristotle finds a parallel between the structure of the State and that of all *σύνθετα*; so that it resembles, according to him, not one single exceptional entity, but nine-tenths of existent things, and the analogy becomes more comprehensible. If Aristotle seems, in one passage (Pol. 1. 2. 1252 a 24), to speak of the State as the outcome of a process of growth, he does not apparently entertain the idea that this creates a special resemblance between it and a plant or animal—an 'organism,' as we term it. Still all Wholes,

¹ By using the expression οὐδ' ἄλλης κοινωνίας οὐδεμῶς ἐξ ἧς ἐν τι τὸ γένος (Pol. 4 (7). 8. 1328 a 25: cp. 1. 5. 1254 a 28), Aristotle seems to imply that there are *κοινωνίαι* which do not issue, like the State, in a Generic Unity, but if so, it is doubtful to what *κοινωνίαι* he refers. For the meaning of this term,

see Metaph. Δ. 6. 1016 a 24 sqq.: 1016 b 31 sqq. Just as men, horses, and dogs are one in kind, for they are all animals, so the members of a State are one in kind, for they are all *κοινωνοί*. One in kind, not merely one *ἀναλογία*: cp. Eth. Nic. 1. 4. 1096 b 27.

and animals among them, are used occasionally to throw light on the structure of the State (e. g. 1. 5. 1254 a 2 sqq.). The individual man, composed of soul and body, beyond all other members of the class—not, as Plato thought, the soul of the individual—affords an instructive analogy to the State, for he is, like it, a moral agent (4 (7). 1. 1323 b 33 sq.). Still, even here the parallel is not complete; for the State is essentially a plurality of human beings (2. 5. 1263 b 36), and far more self-complete than the individual (2. 2. 1261 b 11). The State, however, as we have seen, resembles the individual in being a Whole constituted by nature.

To understand a thing, however, it is necessary to trace it to its four causes, and especially to discover its matter and its end.

We have thus ascertained the genus of things to which the State belongs, but we must ascertain much more than this about it, before we can claim to understand what the State is. Aristotle knew more clearly than any of his predecessors how much an answer to the old Socratic inquiry, what this or that thing is, involved. The definition of a thing is the statement of its causes: it involves the tracing out of all the causes which make it what it is: but, above all, it involves a knowledge of its end. To understand a thing is not to understand what it is made of, or what it looks like¹, but to understand its living operation; and if we are to understand this, we must, above all, know its end. It is thus and thus only that we penetrate into its inmost being. This holds of the State, as of other things, though, as we have already seen, Political Science does not speculate about the State with a purely speculative aim, but with the aim of regulating human action.

In every object not devoid of Matter, the source of its being, or cause, which first attracts attention, is the mate-

¹ Cp. de Part. An. 1. 1. 640 b 29 sqq., εἰ μὲν οὖν τῷ σχήματι καὶ τῷ χρώματι ἕκαστόν ἐστι τῶν τε ζῶων καὶ τῶν μορίων, ὁρθῶς ἂν Δημόκριτος λέγοι· φαίνεται γὰρ οὕτως ὑπολαβεῖν. φησὶ γοῦν παντὶ δηλὸν εἶναι οἷόν τι

τὴν μορφήν ἐστὶν ὁ ἄνθρωπος, ὡς ὄντος αὐτοῦ τῷ τε σχήματι καὶ τῷ χρώματι γνωρίμου· καίτοι καὶ ὁ τεθνεὺς ἔχει τὴν αὐτὴν τοῦ σχήματος μορφήν, ἀλλ' ὅμως οὐκ ἐστὶν ἄνθρωπος.

rial out of which it is made. *Ex nihilo nihil fit*. How this material came to exist, how the Potential was brought into being, Aristotle does not attempt to explain. It is evident that his account of Becoming leaves Matter unexplained: it deals only with the later stage of the process, not with its earliest moments. He held Matter, in fact, to be eternal. Starting, however, from this point, we see that, if we wish to refer a statue to its causes, the bronze or marble of which it is made takes a first place among them. Apart from this, it would not be in existence at all. "Ἐνα μὲν οὖν τρόπον αἴτιον λέγεται τὸ ἐξ οὗ γίνεταί τι ἐνυπάρχοντος, οἷον ὁ χαλκὸς τοῦ ἀνδριάντος καὶ ὁ ἀργυρὸς τῆς φιάλης, Phys. 2. 3. 194 b 23. In this case the material is material in our sense of the word—it is body: in other cases it is not so—in fact not sensible, but intelligible: cp. Metaph. Z. 10. 1036 a 8, ἡ δ' ὕλη ἀγνωστος καθ' αὐτήν· ὕλη δ' ἡ μὲν αἰσθητὴ ἐστίν ἡ δὲ νοητὴ, αἰσθητὴ μὲν οἷον χαλκὸς καὶ ξύλον καὶ ὄση κινήτῃ ὕλη, νοητὴ δὲ ἡ ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς ὑπάρχουσα μὴ ἢ αἰσθητά, οἷον τὰ μαθηματικά¹. But whether body or not, matter is always a *substratum* in things susceptible of change; cp. Metaph. H. 1. 1042 a 32, ὅτι δ' ἐστὶν οὐσία καὶ ἡ ὕλη, δῆλον· ἐν πάσαις γὰρ ταῖς ἀντικειμέναις μεταβολαῖς ἐστὶ τι τὸ ὑποκείμενον ταῖς μεταβολαῖς. Thus cold air becomes warm air or warm air becomes cold air: there is a transition from one contrary affection to another: but this, and any other change, implies the existence of a *tertium quid* in addition to 'cold' and 'warm,' a thing neither cold nor warm in itself, but capable of becoming cold or warm—this is 'air.' Air, then, is in this example the matter and *substratum* (ὕλη and ὑποκείμενον). 'Ἀνάγκη ἐπεῖναί τι τὸ μεταβάλλον εἰς τὴν ἐναντίωσιν· οὐ γὰρ τὰ ἐναντία μεταβάλλει, Metaph. Λ. 1. 1069 b 6. The characteristic, then, of matter is its capability of becoming this or that—its 'potentiality' (τὸ δυνάμει ὄν), in a word. 'Matter is the potential, imperfect, inchoate, which the supervening Form actualizes into the perfect and complete, a transition from half-reality to entire reality or act. The Potential is

¹ Quoted by Grote, Aristotle, 2. 185.

the undefined or indeterminate—what may be or what may not be—what is not yet actual, and may perhaps never become so, but is prepared to pass into actuality when the energizing principle comes to aid' (Grote, Aristotle, 2. 184). Aristotle's account of Matter varies from time to time, according as he finds himself obliged to read more or fewer attributes into the primitive οὐ οὐκ ἄνευ or ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ἀναγκαῖον. Taken at the lowest, this must possess a certain amount of spontaneous power—a capability of favouring by its suitability or marring by its defects the process from Potentiality to Actuality. Aristotle, however, as we have seen¹, occasionally treats it as almost an efficient cause. Indeed, as the πρώτη ὕλη and the ἐσχάτη ὕλη are both of them Matter, its nature must inevitably vary greatly.

Evidently, then, though Matter is for certain things an indispensable condition of their being, it is nevertheless insufficient by itself fully to account for their existence. Ἐκ γὰρ χαλκοῦ ἀνδριάντα γίγνεσθαι φάμεν, οὐ τὸν χαλκὸν ἀνδριάντα, Phys. 1. 7. 190 a 25. If bronze is to become a statue, the form of a statue must be impressed upon it. Thus (Phys. 2. 3. 194 b 26) ἄλλον [τρόπον αἰτία λέγεται] τὸ εἶδος καὶ τὸ παράδειγμα· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ὁ λόγος ὁ τοῦ τί ἦν εἶναι καὶ τὰ τούτου γένη (the kinds or genera under which the species and specific form falls). If a saw is to be a saw, it must not only have a correct Material Cause (be made of iron), but also assume a correct Form (have teeth). It is then that the Potential passes into Actuality. 'In this way of putting the antithesis, the Potential is not so much implicated with the Actual as merged and suppressed to make room for the Actual; it is as a half-grown passing into a full-grown; being itself essential as a preliminary stage in the order of logical generation. The three logical divisions—Matter, Form, and the resulting Compound or Concrete (τὸ σύνολον, τὸ συνειλημμένον)—are here compressed into two, the Potential and the Actualization thereof. Actuality (ἐνέργεια, ἐντελέχεια) coincides in meaning partly with the Form, partly with the resulting Compound; the Form being

¹ P. 17, where de Gen. An. 2. 6. 742 a 19 sqq. was referred to.

so much exalted, that the distinction between the two is almost effaced' (Grote, Aristotle, *ibid.*).

But, however we conceive the process by which Matter receives Form—whether as a growth of one into the other or as a combination of the two (*σύνθεσις*)—in either case a further power is necessary, whether to assist the growth or to effect the combination. This is the 'source of change' (*ὅθεν ἡ κίνησις*)—the efficient cause (Phys. 2. 3. 194 b 29 sqq., *ὅθεν ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς μεταβολῆς ἢ πρώτη ἢ τῆς ἡρεμήσεως, οἷον ὁ βουλευσας αἷτιος καὶ ὁ πατήρ τοῦ τέκνου καὶ ὅλως τὸ ποιοῦν τοῦ ποιουμένου καὶ τὸ μεταβάλλον τοῦ μεταβαλλομένου*). But what is the efficient cause of a thing? A house is built by a man: but then it is built by the man *qua* builder; and he is a builder so far as he is possessed of the art of building. "*Ἀνθρωπος οἰκοδομεῖ ὅτι οἰκοδόμος, ὁ δὲ οἰκοδόμος κατὰ τὴν οἰκοδομικὴν τοῦτο τοῖνυν πρότερον τὸ αἷτιον* (Phys. 2. 3. 195 b 23). The art of building, then, we find, is the efficient cause of the house. But then—still observing the same rule of following the chain of causation up to the highest cause (*δεῖ αἰεὶ τὸ αἷτιον ἐκάστου τὸ ἀκρότατον ζητεῖν*, Phys. 2. 3. 195 b 21)—the art of building a house is insight into the Form of a house, possession of the Form (*ἡ γὰρ τέχνη τὸ εἶδος*, Metaph. Z. 9. 1034 a 24): it is the presence in the mind of the conception, the type (*τὸ παράδειγμα*, Phys. 2. 3. 194 b 26): thus both in Nature and in Art like produces like, a man produces a man, a house a house, and so forth. We might even expect that Aristotle, like Plato (Zeller, *Gr. Ph.* 2. 1. 439. 3, 2nd edit.), would absorb the Efficient Cause wholly in the Formal, but this he does not do: a place is left by him for the efficient cause and a part for it to play (cp. de Gen. et Corr. 2. 9. 335 b 7 sqq., *δεῖ δὲ προσεῖναι καὶ τὴν τρίτην, ἣν ἅπαντες μὲν οὐκ ὀρῶσιν, λέγει δ' οὐδεὶς* (the efficient cause) . . . *εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἔστιν αἷτια τὰ εἶδη, διὰ τί οὐκ αἰεὶ γεννᾷ συνεχῶς, ἀλλὰ ποτὲ μὲν ποτὲ δ' οὐ, ὄντων καὶ τῶν εἰδῶν αἰεὶ καὶ τῶν μεθεκτικῶν* ;). Thus with him the art of building or the builder remains the efficient cause of the house, though we see that the Form must not only be ultimately im-

pressed on the Matter, but must be pre-existent to the whole operation.

Nor yet is it sufficient that the Form of the thing should be complete if it cannot fulfil the end for which it is designed. A hand is not a hand if it does not fulfil the end of a hand: a stone hand, for instance, is not a hand at all, except in name. Πάντα τῷ ἔργῳ ὄρισται καὶ τῇ δυνάμει, ὥστε μηκέτι τοιαῦτα ὄντα οὐ λεκτέον τὰ αὐτὰ εἶναι ἀλλ' ὁμώνυμα (Pol. 1. 2. 1253 a 23). It is in the end, and the end alone, that the whole evolution finds rest and completion. This is its term, and it is, if we look well into the matter, the deepest and most determining cause throughout the movement. Ὅμοιον δ' εἰσὶν τὸ λέγειν τὰ αἰτία ἐξ ἀνάγκης καὶν εἴ τις διὰ τὸ μαχαίριον οἶοιτο τὸ ὕδωρ ἐξεληλυθέναι μόνον τοῖς ὑδρωπιῶσιν, ἀλλ' οὐ διὰ τὸ ὑγιαίνειν οὐ ἔνεκα τὸ μαχαίριον ἔτεμεν (de Gen. An. 5. 8. 789 b 12). The End masters, as it were, every other agency—Form, Efficient Cause, Matter—and bends it to its service. It determines the Form the thing must assume: the saw is intended to saw—therefore it must have teeth (its Form). It sets in motion the efficient cause, the worker in iron and his tools. It also produces, or chooses, or adapts for its purpose, the material out of which the saw is to be made. It must be made of iron: why? Because its end is to saw. The End is thus, in truth, the Beginning. It is a fixed point at the commencement and termination of a process (ἐστὶ τὸ οὐ ἔνεκα ἐν τοῖς ἀκινήτοις, Metaph. Λ. 7. 1072 b 1). To seize and determine this fixed point is always possible, and till this has been done, the cause of the thing cannot be said to have been ascertained. Ἐπεὶ πλείους ὁρῶμεν αἰτίας περὶ τὴν γένεσιν τὴν φυσικὴν, οἷον τὴν τε οὐ ἔνεκα καὶ τὴν ὅθεν ἢ ἀρχὴ τῆς κινήσεως, διοριστέον καὶ περὶ τούτων ποῖα πρώτη καὶ δευτέρα πέφυκεν. φαίνεται δὲ πρώτη, ἣν λέγομεν ἔνεκά τινος· λόγος γὰρ οὗτος, ἀρχὴ δ' ὁ λόγος ὁμοίως ἐν τε τοῖς κατὰ τέχνην καὶ ἐν τοῖς φύσει συνεστηκόσιν· ἡ γὰρ τῇ διανοίᾳ ἢ τῇ αἰσθήσει ὁρισάμενος ὁ μὲν ἰατρὸς τὴν ὑγίειαν, ὁ δ' οἰκοδόμος τὴν οἰκίαν, ἀποδιδόασιν τοὺς λόγους καὶ τὰς αἰτίας οὐ

ποιουσιν ἐκάστου, καὶ διότι ποιητέον οὕτως (de Part. An. 1. 1. 639 b 11 sqq.)¹.

In the foregoing statement of a familiar doctrine Teichmüller's clear and concise exposition (Kunst; pp. 63-78) has been especially followed.

So nearly related, in Aristotle's view, are the formal, efficient, and final causes, that the four causes are often treated by him as, in fact, two only: e.g. de Part. An. 1. 1. 642 a 1, *εἰσὶν ἄρα δὴ αἰτίαι αὗται τό θ' οὐ ἕνεκα καὶ τὸ ἐξ ἀνάγκης*: Phys. 2. 8. 199 a 30, *ἐπεὶ ἡ φύσις διττή, ἡ μὲν ὡς ὕλη ἡ δ' ὡς μορφή, τέλος δ' αὕτη, τοῦ τέλους δ' ἕνεκα τᾶλλα, αὕτη ἂν εἴη ἡ αἰτία ἡ οὐ ἕνεκα*. We come back, then, to the Dualism of influences—Matter, and the Good or the End—which our examination of Necessity, Spontaneity, Nature, and Human Agency disclosed to us².

This doctrine, it will be observed, does more than merely enumerate and classify the agencies, whose operation makes a thing what it is: it asserts that everything into the composition of which matter enters, bears traces of a process, and it announces the law of this process—or motion, in the wide Aristotelian signification of the word—which is, that it begins in the Potential and ends in the Actual. The most diverse things can all of them be traced back to an *ἐξ οὗ*, or material cause: 'not only the statue to the metal of which it is formed, but the tree to seed, the conclusion to its premisses, moral virtue to desires implanted by nature, the octave to its component notes, these notes to the instrument which gives them utterance, words to syllables or sounds³': and the *ἐξ οὗ* is always the Potential.

¹ This does not exclude occasional assertions that '*scientiae natura ac virtus in formali potius quam in finali causa cognoscenda ponitur*' (Bonitz), such as that in Metaph. Z. 6. 1031 b 6, *ἐπιστήμη γὰρ ἐκάστου ἐστὶν ὅταν τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι ἐκείνῳ γινώμεν* (cp. 20). Contrast Metaph. A. 9. 992 a 29, *οὐδὲ δὴ ὅπερ ταῖς ἐπιστήμαις ὁρώμεν ὃν αἰτιον, διὸ καὶ πᾶς νοῦς καὶ πᾶσα φύσις ποιεῖ,*

οὐδὲ ταύτης τῆς αἰτίας ἣν φαμεν εἶναι μίαν τῶν ἀρχῶν, οὐδὲν ἀπεται τὰ εἶδη.

² Aristotle's theory of the four causes did not long remain unchallenged, for the Stoics recognized only two, the material and the efficient causes (Zeller, Stoics Epicureans and Sceptics, p. 136).

³ J. E. Erdmann, *Geschichte der Philosophie*, I. 125.

The Matter
of the
State.

If we now turn to the πόλις or City-State, we shall find that it also originates in an appropriate *ἐξ οὗ*, or material cause (Pol. 4 (7). 4. 1325 b 40 sqq.). It is not quite clear whether we are to reckon as part of its Matter, in addition to a population suitable in numbers and quality, a territory suitable in character and extent: but perhaps this may be Aristotle's meaning. The Matter of the State comprises not only things tangible and 'material' (in our sense of the word), such as the soil of the territory and the physical frames of the population, but also, as we see from a subsequent chapter (4 (7). 7), those gifts of mind and character (*τὸ ἐνθυμον, τὸ διανοητικόν*), which are there held to be characteristic of the Hellenic race, in contradistinction to other European races and to the races of Asia.

The End of
the State.

But to understand what the State normally is, we must ascertain its true End. Without a knowledge of the End of the State, we cannot decide what Matter it must start with, what external goods must be at its command and how they are to be distributed, what 'activities' it presupposes and to whom they are to be assigned—we cannot, in fact, take a single step in the exploration of the field of Political Science.

We see that to Aristotle the two central questions of Political Science were: 1. What is the end of the State—not the universal end of things, but the end of the thing we call a State? 2. What Matter and organization will enable it to realize this end?

The
method of
inquiry in
Politics to
which
Plato's phi-
losophical
principles
point.

The aim of Plato¹ had been less to explain the actual world, than to find a region of realities which would afford a firm foothold to Science. 'His whole philosophy is from the outset directed far less to the explanation of Becoming than to the consideration of Being: the concepts hypostasized in the Ideas represent to us primarily that which is permanent in the vicissitude of phenomena, not the causes

¹ I have followed Zeller mainly in this brief reference to the Platonic metaphysics, but I am aware

that the subject is still under investigation.

of that vicissitude. If Plato conceives them as living powers, this is only a concession forced from him by the facts of natural and spiritual life. But it is antagonistic to the main current of his system, and cannot be harmonized with his other theories respecting Ideas¹. He is thus led, in theory at all events², to throw aside much as unworthy of his study and greatly to contract the field to which he directs his scrutiny³. The phenomenon is merely a shadow (Rep. 515): it is to be used merely as a starting-point (Rep. 511 B, 508 D): Dialectic must keep as far as possible on the level of the Ideas and must limit to the utmost its contact with the sensible world (Rep. 511 B, 532 A: Phileb. 58 A). His effort is to reach 'what is purest' (τὸ καθαρώτατον) in each thing (Phileb. 55 C), to arrive at the abstract (Phileb. 56 D-E): thus the study of 'matters relating to the sensible world, its origin, its affections, and its action on other things' will be eschewed as concerned with things involved in a process of change (τὰ γιγνόμενα καὶ γενησόμενα καὶ γεγονότα, Phileb. 59 A); or else tolerated as 'a source of recreation not involving repentance' (Tim. 59 C, τάλλα δὲ τῶν τοιούτων οὐδὲν ποικίλον ἐστὶ διαλογίσασθαι τὴν τῶν εἰκότων μύθων μεταδιώκοντα ἰδέαν' ἣν ὅταν τις ἀναπαύσεως ἕνεκα τοὺς περὶ τῶν ὄντων αἰὲ κατατιθέμενος λόγους, τοὺς γενέσεως περὶ διαθεώμενος εἰκότας ἀμεταμέλητον ἡδονὴν κτᾶται, μέτριον ἂν ἐν τῷ βίῳ παιδιὰν καὶ φρόνιμον ποιῶιτο: cp. Tim. 29 C-D: Rep. 508 D). Plato seems even to regard this department of physical study as possessing less exactness (ἀκρίβεια) than Ethics and Politics: we may contrast, at least, his hesitating, almost apologetic, tone in the Timaeus (e.g. 29 C, 59 C) with his positiveness in the Republic and the Laws.

But to this view he could not adhere. He could not turn away from the phenomenal world, just at the moment when he had, as he thought, obtained a clue to its comprehension. He subjects the sphere of 'sensible things' to examina-

¹ Zeller, Plato, E. T. p. 269.

² 'Aristotle does not employ that purely conceptual method, which Plato inculcates on the philosopher, although he himself has

attempted it only in special instances and incompletely' (Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 173).

³ See Zeller, Plato, E. T., p. 147.

tion, and finds that the Ideas stand related to it as causes. Thus, in the *Meno* (98 A, cp. *Tim.* 51 D-E), the cognition of cause (*αἰτίας λογισμός*) is made the characteristic of Science: in the *Phaedo* the Ideas are viewed as 'the proper and only efficient causes of things' (Zeller, *Plato*, Eng. Tr. p. 262 sq.): and further, the Idea of Good is to Plato the highest efficient and the highest final cause (*Rep.* 508 C, 517 C: *Tim.* 28 C sq.: and *Phaedo* 97 B sqq., 100 B: *Rep.* 540). 'In Plato's mind the conception of knowledge and truth, the conception of objective reality or essence, and the conception of a systematic order or cosmos, alike implied the conception of a 'good,' which cannot be identified with any of them, but is the condition or logical *prius* of them all¹. Aristotle asserts, in a well-known passage (*Metaph.* A. 6. 988 a 8 sqq.: cp. A. 9. 991 a 20: 992 a 29), that Plato employed only two kinds of cause, the formal and the material, but, as Zeller has pointed out (*Plato*, p. 76), this does not appear to be altogether true. His treatment, however, of the efficient and final causes seems to leave much to be desired in respect of clearness and completeness. 'It was a difficult problem to conceive classes as self-existent substances; but it was far more difficult to endow these unchangeable entities with motion, life, and thought' (as appears to be done in *Soph.* 248 E); 'to conceive them as moved, and yet as invariable and not subject to Becoming; as powers, in spite of their absoluteness, operating in things' (Zeller, *Plato*, p. 268). So again, side by side with the Universal End, the Idea of Good, though far below it, we discern specific ends, or *ἔργα*, of individual things (e.g. *Rep.* 352 D sqq.): and if the connexion between the two is traceable², it hardly seems sufficiently

¹ Mr. R. L. Nettleship in 'Hellenica,' p. 176.

² 'A thing is what it is in virtue of its position in such an order. As in the physical organism the character of each organ depends upon its relation to the whole, and has no existence apart from that relation (*Rep.* 420 D); as in the

larger whole of the State each member only preserves his true individuality, so long as he takes his proper place in the organization of labour, and loses it when he ceases to do so (*Rep.* 420 E-421 A: cp. 417 B, 466 B); so in the universal order of existence each constituent not only is understood,

worked out. 'The teleology of Plato preserves in the main the external character of the Socratic view of Nature, though the end of Nature is no longer exclusively the welfare of men, but the Good, Beauty, Proportion, and Order. The natural world and the forces of Nature are thus referred to an end external to themselves' (Zeller, Plato, p. 340). Thus to him the causes of things were not their immanent tendencies, but entities external to them—the Ideas and, above all, the Idea of Good—which alone can be said fully to exist, and whose uncongenial union with Matter generated a world of secondary and derivative reality. Plato's view, in fact, is found to involve the existence of a third power—a World-Soul or a *δημιουργός*—to wed Ideas with Matter. It is, indeed, true that Matter itself is not, with Plato, wholly passive; for he recognizes in things 'a kind of existence that cannot be derived from the Idea' (Zeller, Plato, p. 333); a power which the Idea cannot wholly master, the power of Necessity immanent in Matter, which may co-operate with or thwart the Idea. Still, on the whole, the one cause stands to the other as the indispensable condition stands to the actual and operative cause, for such is the Idea. The true Atlas which holds the world together is the Idea (Phaedo, 99 C).

It is for this reason that the genuine lawgiver and ruler is the philosopher, whose gaze is fixed on 'ordered and unchanging things, neither wronging nor wronged by each other, but all keeping order and obedient to Reason,' and who has learnt from them lessons of a godlike orderliness and freedom from change. His business will be to look at 'that which is naturally just and noble and temperate' and then at the corresponding elements in man¹, to glance repeatedly from one to the other, and, mingling the two, to create by appropriate modes of life 'the true human image'²

but subsists, only so far as it remains true to its place in the order, and as that place is determined by the ruling principle, end, or "good" of the order, it is to this ultimately that it owes what it is' (Mr. R. L. Nettleship, 'Hellenica,' pp. 176-7).

¹ Stallbaum compares Rep. 597 B, *ἡ ἐν τῇ φύσει οὐσα κλίνη* and *ἣν ὁ τέκτων εἰργάσατο*: and Phaedo 103 B, *οὔτε τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν ἐναντίον οὔτε τὸ ἐν τῇ φύσει*.

² Prof. Jowett's Translation, 2. 335 (edit. 1).

(midway between the two?), 'taking a hint from that which Homer called divine and godlike in man: he will erase one feature and paint another in, till he has made human character as far as possible agreeable to God¹.'

The method to which Plato's philosophical principles point would seem to be open to objection on the following grounds:—

1. it gives less prominence than Aristotle's to the necessity of a careful and minute study of the concrete thing:

2. it affords less of definite guidance to the investigator. It fails to point out with equal clearness the path he is to follow: it is also less easy to say what contributes to the realization of the Idea of Good than what contributes to the realization of the specific end of a given thing, always supposing that that end can be determined:

3. it supplies no philosophical reason for allowing weight to the opinions of men possessing experience but devoid of philosophy:

4. in *Politics*, it points to the absolute rule of the few who know (i.e. have vision of the Ideas).

How far
is this
method
followed
by Plato?

How far does the method thus indicated appear to be employed in the political investigations of Plato? It is possible, with Zeller (*Plato*, p. 466), to find the central fact which determines the structure of the *Republic* in the principle that philosophers (or those who are conversant with the Ideas) are to rule: yet it is on a review of men's varied wants, and on a distribution of the task of supplying them in conformity with the principle of Division of Labour, that the organization of the State in three great classes—a point of critical importance—is made to rest (*Rep.* 369–376). The parallel of the soul of the individual human being also counts for much; nor is the example of

¹ See *Rep.* 500 B–501 C, esp. 501 B–C. I add the Greek, not feeling confident of the correctness of my own interpretation:—*ἔπειτα, οἶμαι, ἀπεργαζόμενοι πυκνὰ ἂν ἐκατέρωσσε ἀποβλέποιεν πρὸς τε τὸ φύσει δίκαιον καὶ καλὸν καὶ σῶφρον καὶ*

πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ πρὸς ἐκεῖνο αὐτὸ ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἐμποιοῖεν ξυμμιγνύντες τε καὶ κεραννύντες ἐκ τῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων τὸ ἀνδρείκελον, ἀπ' ἐκείνου τεκμαιρόμενοι, ὃ δὴ καὶ Ὀμηρὸς ἐκάλεσεν ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐγγιγνόμενον θεοειδές τε καὶ θεοείκελον.

the Lacedaemonian State without influence. The method actually followed in the Republic seems, therefore, to correspond only imperfectly with that announced by Plato¹. If this is true of the Republic, it is still more conspicuously true of the Laws. The State of the Laws evidences a closer attention to the facts of human nature, a fuller consciousness of its weaker side. The rulers must be less trusted and less autocratic—the ruled must be flattered with a semblance of political power. The specific end of the State—the production of virtue in its citizens—is more largely taken into account: institutions must tend to produce virtue, or they have no *raison d'être* (Laws, 770 D, 771 A). The best Hellenic experience is more fully drawn upon.

The method actually followed by Aristotle stands in a closer relation to his philosophical principles. To him the world is to be explained, not by the fact of a mysterious intermingling² of two strongly contrasted things, the non-existent and the existent, but by the rise of the semi-existent into the existent. What the world evidences is not a conjunction, but an universal process of growth. The lowest and earliest term of the process contains the potentiality of the highest and last: the evolution is homogeneous from beginning to end, and must be studied as a whole. In place of the non-existent and the existent, we have the Potential and the Actual, means and an end; and it is no longer possible to say that the one term of the process must be studied to the exclusion of the other. The end, again, being to Aristotle the specific end of the concrete thing, not an universal and extrinsic Idea, could only be ascertained, and its working traced, by means of a careful study of the concrete thing. When once identified, how-

The method to which Aristotle's philosophical principles point—ascertainment of the specific end.

¹ In the view of Mr. H. Jackson (*Journal of Philology*, No. 19, p. 149), the true, or highest, method is confessed by Plato both in the *Phaedo* (100 A sq.) and in the *Republic* (509 D sqq.) to be 'an unrealized aspiration.'

² The Stoics returned to the no-

tion of an intermingling (*κρᾶσις*) evidenced in the relation of the soul to the body, of property to subject-matter, of *φύσις* to *φύτρον*, of God to the world (Zeller, *Stoics*, E. T., p. 133, note 2), but to them the things intermingled were alike material.

ever, it afforded real guidance to the investigator¹. The process, further, was one which had been striving to realize itself in the past—with imperfect success, no doubt, in the sphere of things human (πολλὰ γὰρ φθορὰ καὶ λῦμαι ἀνθρώπων γίνονται, Eth. Nic. 10. 5. 1176a 20), but still the world, or at all events the Hellenic world, had not gone altogether astray. The Household had passed into the Village, and the Village into the City-State; and now it only remained to make the City-State all that it should be. It was not reserved for philosophy in the fourth century before Christ to impress for the first time the Idea on the phenomena of politics: what was needed was to assist Nature in achieving her own already half-executed design². Political Science is not called upon, as a *deus ex machina*, to bring passive matter to intermingle with the Ideas: on the contrary, it finds a natural process already in action, and its business is to study this process, to assist it and amend it. Aristotle's principle, in its application to Political Science, did not, indeed, amount to a metaphysical justification of History in general, or even of the History of the best-endowed race or races, but it suggested an acceptance of the best Greek experience, whether recorded in institutions or opinion, as the rough ore of truth, needing to be sifted and purged from dross, but capable of yielding, in skilful hands, much that was of permanent value.

To Aristotle the world of concrete existence was not

¹ Cp. Aristot. Eth. Nic. 1. 4. 1097a 8 sqq., ἀπορον δὲ καὶ τί ὠφελήσεται ὑφάντης ἢ τέκτων πρὸς τὴν αὐτοῦ τέχνην εἰδὼς αὐτὸ τὰγαθόν, ἢ πῶς λατρικώτερός ἢ στρατηγικώτερος ἔσται ὁ τὴν ἰδέαν αὐτὴν τεθεαμένος· φαίνεται μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲ τὴν ὑγίειαν οὕτως ἐπισκοπεῖν ὁ λατρός, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἀνθρώπου, μᾶλλον δ' ἴσως τὴν τοῦδε καθ' ἑκάστον γὰρ λατρεύει. On this, however, see Ramsauer's note on Eth. Nic. 1. 4. 1097a 12, who contrasts Rhet. 1. 2. 1356b 28, οὐδεμία δὲ τέχνη σκοπεῖ τὸ καθ' ἑκάστον, οἷον ἡ λατρικὴ τί Σακράτει τὸ ὑγιεινόν ἐστὶν ἡ Καλλία, ἀλλὰ τί τῷ τοιῷδε ἢ τοῖς

τοιούσδε (τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ ἔντεχνον, τὸ δὲ καθ' ἑκάστον ἀπειρον καὶ οὐκ ἐπιστητόν).

² Cp. 4 (7). 10. 1329b 25-35, where the argument is that the world and mankind have existed from everlasting, and that the business of the philosopher is not so much to discover something wholly new, as to accept what men have been obliged by necessity or enabled by leisure long ago to discover, and to add the finishing touch where anything has been overlooked. See also 2. 5. 1264a 1 sqq.

a mere world of 'copies,' or, at best, of derivative reality, from which one should escape and pass on as rapidly as possible to the world of complete reality; it was thoroughly real¹, if not the only reality², and deserved the closest study. That which Plato, starting from the Ideas, had viewed as a gratuitous or unexplained decadence, Aristotle, starting from the opposite pole, regards as an upward movement; an *ὁδὸς εἰς φύσιν*. Where Plato had traced a dilution or obscuration of real existence, Aristotle finds the process by which real existence is achieved. The world of change, which Plato approached with half-averted eyes, was exactly the subject to which Aristotle was most drawn, for he claimed to have discovered the law of all change. It was not to him in itself the most knowable of subjects, but it was perhaps that of which we know most. Physical study, for example, which Plato had been inclined to eschew, and which, in fact, occupies only a subordinate position in his writings, claimed a larger share of Aristotle's attention than any other subject; and the greater part of his works as we possess them has to do with this subject (Zeller, Plato, p. 146). It is not to him, as it had been to Plato, in comparison with the study of things eternally existent, a pastime or recreation, or 'a source of pleasure not involving repentance' (Tim. 59 C); it is a part of Theoretic Science, linked by this common title to Mathematics and the First Philosophy.

Aristotle had already taken an important step in extending and accentuating the recognition previously given by Plato to the Material Cause. Matter to him is something more than a subordinate power which may assist or impede,

¹ Cp. Categ. 5. 2 a 11, οὐσία δὲ ἐστὶν ἡ κυριώτατά τε καὶ πρώτως καὶ μάλιστα λεγομένη, ἢ μήτε καθ' ἵπο- κειμένου τινὸς λέγεται μήτ' ἐν ὑπο- κειμένῳ τινὶ ἐστὶν, οἷον ὁ τις ἄνθρωπος ἢ ὁ τις ἵππος, and see Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 305 sqq.

² Cp. Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 339: 'In addition to corporeal entities, Aristotle recognizes in the Deity,

the spirits of the spheres' (as to these, see Zeller, *ibid.* p. 455), 'and the rational part of the human soul incorporeal entities not encumbered with Matter, which we must likewise regard as individual entities.' See also Heyder, *Vergleichung der Aristot. und Hegel'schen Dialektik*, i. p. 186, n.

something more than a mere ἐξ οὗ, or οὗ οὐκ ἄνευ, or a mere Potential in a passive sense; it is the source not only of the accidental concomitants of a thing, but also of some which enter deeply into its essence and help to constitute its specific form, such as the difference of sex, the contrast of man and brute, the distinction of the transitory and variable from the eternal and invariable. It is, apparently, even the source of individuality in things falling under one and the same *infima species*, for it marks off Socrates from Callias. It is, above all, the source of the evolution, which, wherever change and movement find a place, carries the particular thing on to the realization of its specific end¹. It is susceptible of affection, and, it would seem, of affection for the highest of objects (for God 'causes motion as an object of love'—κινεῖ ὡς ἐρώμενον, *Metaph.* A. 7. 1072 b 3), though it reaches the highest only by realizing, as part of a Compound Whole (σύνολον), the specific end of that Compound Whole. Even the 'First Matter' (πρώτη ὕλη)—the furthest point to which we penetrate in stripping off attributes, the *substratum* in its most naked form—has something active in its Potentiality. Trace things back as far as we may, we come to nothing purely passive. Any defect in the composition of the Material Cause distorts the outcome of the evolution, without, however, depriving it of the reality which always attaches to the concrete thing, or justifying its neglect by the inquirer. In the *Politics*, as we have seen, the defective forms of the πόλις, if only the πόλις type is attained, are held to deserve most careful study.

It was, however, a far more important step to make the specific end the key to Science. But in what sense are things said to have a specific end? In the broadest and most general interpretation of the term, the specific end is that for the sake of which the species exists to which the thing belongs (τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα). But this phrase is susceptible of many meanings. We are told, for instance, in the *Politics*, that the worse exists always for the sake of the

¹ On the foregoing, see Zeller, *Gr. Ph.* 2. 2. 336–344.

better (*αἰεὶ τὸ χεῖρον τοῦ βελτιονός ἐστιν ἔνεκεν*, 4 (7). 14. 1333 a 21). This implies, not only that the worse elements in the individual thing exist for the sake of the better, but also that the thing itself exists for the sake of that which is better than it. So plants and animals exist for the sake of man (Pol. 1. 8. 1256 b 15 sqq.); and we seem to be on the high road to a purely external teleology¹, like that of Socrates, a creed which adds this to its other disadvantages, that the end it assumes throws no light on the nature of the thing. For how do we learn the nature of animals by learning that they exist for the sake of man? The prevailing view of Aristotle, however, is very different from this. He does not hold that man exists for the sake of the State, though the State is better than man, or for the sake of the heavenly bodies, though these are far diviner than man (Eth. Nic. 6. 7. 1141 a 34 sqq.), nor even for the sake of God. And so again, man is only in a sense the end of the things to which he is an end (*πὼς τέλος*, Phys. 2. 2. 194 a 35).

We obtain a clearer view of the true nature of the specific end, when we conceive it as the term of a movement. Movement exists and needs explanation: it becomes explainable if it has a term. There are four kinds of movement, or change—change in essence (generation and destruction), change in quantity (increase and diminution), change in quality (alteration), change in place (motion). Aristotle's theory implies a likeness between the terminal point of a movement and the aim of a change; and indeed a likeness between movement and the act of 'striving after' (*τὸ ἐφίεσθαι ἀγαθοῦ τινός*, Eth. Nic. 1. 1. 1094 a 2). Both analogies seem somewhat strained. If we ask, what is this terminal point to which each thing is supposed to move—which appears as the goal of movement, the aim in change, the object of desire—the answer is 'Actuality.' The Actualization of the Potential is always the end. In what does this consist? 'That is always most desirable

¹ See Eucken, *Methode der Aristot. Forschung*, pp. 83-7: p. 98, for the traces in Aristotle's writings of this point of view.

for every one which is the highest attainable by him' (Pol. 4 (7). 14. 1333 a 29): or, as we are elsewhere told, 'that which is special to each thing (*ἰδιον*) is the end for which it came into being' (de Gen. An. 2. 3. 736 b 4). The Potential becomes actualized, when the given thing is found to discharge its highest attainable function, or the function which is specially its own. Thus the end of the natural slave is to do the best thing he can do (Pol. 1. 5. 1254 b 17 sqq., *διάκεινται δὲ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ὅσων ἐστὶν ἔργον ἢ τοῦ σώματος χρῆσις, καὶ τοῦτ' ἔστ' ἀπ' αὐτῶν βέλτιστον*); and the same thing is true of the State. Aristotle, in fact, identifies 'that which is best for each thing' with 'the best which it can do' (*τὸ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ βέλτιστον*, or, as it is usually expressed, *τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον βέλτιστον*). The relation of the specific end to the Supreme End—God—is left obscure, but we gather that the true way to the latter lies through the realization of the former.

In this immense generalization, which views everything as having a single *raison d'être*, and this assignable by man, a thousand minor distinctions between things seem to vanish. The law holds of things inanimate and things animate—of movement (or change), of growth, of the action of brutes, of moral action, of thought. An end is viewed as equally an end, whether pursued unconsciously or consciously, by an inanimate object or by man, with an exercise of Moral Choice or without it. Moral action (*πρᾶξις*) and movement (*κίνησις*), though usually distinguished (e.g. Metaph. Θ. 6. 1048 b 21), agree in obeying this law.

We need not wonder that Aristotle himself feels the principle to be more applicable to some things than to others. As we go upward in Nature, the end discloses itself more distinctly (*ἀεὶ δὲ μᾶλλον δῆλον ἐπὶ τῶν ὑστέρων καὶ ὅλως ὅσα οἶον ὄργανα καὶ ἐνεκά του . . . ἦττον δ' ἐπὶ σαρκὸς καὶ ὁστοῦ τὰ τοιαῦτα δῆλα. ἔτι δ' ἐπὶ πυρὸς καὶ ὕδατος [καὶ] γῆς ἦττον* τὸ γὰρ οὐ ἐνεκα ἥκιστα ἐνταῦθα δῆλον ὅπου πλεῖστον τῆς ὕλης, Meteor. 4. 12. 389 b 29: *καὶ ἐν τοῖς φυτοῖς ἐνεστι τὸ ἐνεκά του, ἦττον δὲ διήρθρωται*, Phys. 2. 8. 199 b 9: both pas-

sages are referred to by Eucken, *Op. cit.*, p. 70). Compare the noble passage in the *Metaphysics* (A. 10. 1075 a 11 sqq.), πάντα δὲ συντέτακται πως, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὁμοίως, καὶ πλωτὰ καὶ πτηνὰ καὶ φυτὰ· καὶ οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει ὥστε μὴ εἶναι θατέρῳ πρὸς θάτερον μηδέν, ἀλλ' ἐστὶ τι· πρὸς μὲν γὰρ ἐν ἅπαντα συντέτακται, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἐν οἰκίᾳ τοῖς ἐλευθέροις ἥκιστα ἔξεστιν ὁ τι ἔτυχε ποιεῖν, ἀλλὰ πάντα ἢ τὰ πλείστα τέτακται, τοῖς δὲ ἀνδραπόδοις καὶ τοῖς θηρίοις μικρὸν τὸ εἰς τὸ κοινόν, τὸ δὲ πολὺ ὁ τι ἔτυχεν· τοιαύτη γὰρ ἐκάστου ἀρχὴ αὐτῶν ἢ φύσις ἐστίν. Even in organic life preferences of Nature can be traced not contributing to the end (*Eucken*, p. 79. 2); nor yet to the preservation of the particular animal or species (*ibid.* p. 83. 1, 3). If the end eludes us at the lower pole of the scale of being, can we trace it at the opposite pole? Has the Supreme End an end? And where the teleological relation most clearly manifests itself, we ask how it is that each object exists for only one, or one chief, end? Why has it not twenty ends, all on a level? Is it true, again, that the end of a thing is not the sum of the functions it fulfils, or ought to fulfil, but the highest of them only? And how is the highest to be identified?

We are here, however, concerned with Practical Science, and in Practical Science the teleological method may be more applicable than in relation to other subjects. It is obvious that the question, 'what a thing is for,' may be a far more fruitful question in relation to some things than to others. It may result in little when we raise it in relation to a plant or an animal, and be full of instruction when we raise it in relation to a State. 'In purely physical science there is not much temptation to assume the ulterior office' of deciding whether the ends pursued 'are such as ought to be pursued, and, if so, in what cases and to how great a length'; 'but those who treat of human nature and society invariably claim it; they always undertake to say, not merely what is, but what ought to be. To entitle them to do this, a complete doctrine of Teleology is indispensable¹.'

The teleological method in Politics, and the use made of it by Aristotle.

¹ J. S. Mill, *System of Logic*, Herbert Spencer's remarks in 2. 524 (ed. 3). See also Mr. *Mind* for Jan. 1881, p. 82 sqq.

It is necessary to know what the State is to do before we can decide what it ought to be.

Yet is it possible to prescribe a single end to the State—one invariable end at all times and in all places—or even one chief end? The difficulty is increased when Aristotle identifies the end of the State with the end of social existence, and that with the end of human action; for the vast question of the end of human life is thus cast like a barrier across the threshold of Politics. The method, again, by which he seeks to determine the end of the State seems hardly adequate to such a problem. We look in vain for a careful historical investigation into what the State *can* do: what it *tends* to do, is indirectly considered in the chapter (Pol. I. 2) which treats of the origin of society; but even this question can hardly be said to receive sufficient consideration. Yet these are points which should be investigated before we inquire what the State ought to do. Aristotle seems to rest his solution of this latter problem on Opinion (that of οἱ ἀκριβῶς θεωροῦντες, Pol. 3. 9. 1280 b 28), so far as he does not rest it on a rather ideal historical retrospect (Pol. I. 2). He himself sees that the true end of society only discloses itself after the State has existed a certain time, for at its first appearance its end is mere life, not good life; yet he believes that in his day experience was sufficiently complete to justify an absolute conclusion on the subject. In reality, however, his view of the end of the State stands in close connexion with his general conception of the end of organic life. Good life is the end of man in a higher degree than of animals and plants¹, and as the State is a collection of human beings, it must be the end of the State.

Even, however, when the end is ascertained, we are not in possession of a means of determining once for all the true structure of the State. The concrete interpretation of the

¹ Cp. de Part. An. 2. 10. 656 a 3 sqq., τὰ δὲ πρὸς τῷ ζῆν αἰσθησιν ἔχοντα πολυμορφότεραν ἔχει τὴν ιδέαν, καὶ τούτων ἕτερα πρὸ ἐτέρων μᾶλλον καὶ πολυχουστέραν, ὥσων μὴ

μόνον τοῦ ζῆν ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦ εὖ ζῆν ἢ φύσις μετεβλήθη τοιοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων γένος· ἡ γὰρ μόνον μετέχει τοῦ θεοῦ τῶν ἡμῖν γνωρίμων ζώων ἢ μάλιστα πάντων.

end may vary¹. One and the same end, again, may be reached by different paths under different circumstances. Aristotle, it is true, does not recognize this, for he conceives that the end which he assigns to the State can only be fully realized by a single type of social and political organization. But he allows that the instances are few in which the 'best State' can come into being (6 (4). 11. 1295 a 25 sqq.), and he seems to make but little use of the end of the State in his inquiries respecting the imperfect constitutions², under which, nevertheless, nine-tenths of those who reach the *πόλις* stage of society must expect to live. The durability of the constitution, rather than its favourableness to good life, seems here to be the aim he keeps in view. Nor can the institutions of even the best State be nakedly deduced from its end. The means of realizing the end (*τὰ πρὸς τὸ τέλος*)—in other words, the organization of the State—have to be otherwise ascertained. For this purpose, the 'social functions' (*ἐργα*) necessary to the *πόλις* are enumerated, and as it proves on inquiry that they ought not to be indiscriminately opened to all the denizens of the State, the creation of *γένη*—a term under which classes, trades, and departments of the State are included without distinction—follows of necessity³. In the whole inquiry it is evident that the institutions of actually existing societies, and especially of Hellenic societies, are present to Aristotle's mind, the End being used as a standard by which to correct the data thus gained. The End is kept in view in selecting the Matter of the State and in improving it by education and law: it serves as a measure of rights within the State, for the just is relative to the End (3. 9: 3. 12-13): it helps us to determine the true size of the State, and the limits within which the participation in *ἀγαθά* it implies is to be confined:

¹ Compare, for instance, Aristotle's interpretation of *τὸ εὖ ζῆν* with Cicero's (*de Rep.* 4. 3. 3: 5. 6. 8).

² So far at least as the Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Books (the old Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth) are

concerned, for the true end of the State is evidently often present to Aristotle's mind in his criticisms of the Lacedaemonian, Cretan, and Carthaginian constitutions.

³ *Pol.* 4 (7). 8-10.

it regulates the creation and accumulation of wealth ; but it will not supply the place of a knowledge of human nature, or of political experience, or of historical information.

The application of the teleological method by Aristotle is further qualified by an occasional resort to principles not special to Political, or even to Practical, Science. He not unfrequently accepts a kind of evidence which he terms 'the evidence of reasoning' (*ἡ τῶν λόγων πίστις*), and which is distinguished by him from proof based on principles special to a given science (*ἐκ τῶν οἰκείων ἀρχῶν*)¹, and from proof based on detailed knowledge and experience². He recognizes, in fact, more roads than one to the truth ; and thus, when in the *Politics* (4 (7). 4) he investigates the true size of the State, he finds that the evidence of reasoning—broad reasoning from the universal conditions of order (*τάξις*)—leads him to a true conclusion ; and indeed, not only the evidence of reasoning, but that of observed facts, and in particular, the fact that no reputedly well-constituted State is indefinitely large.

It is thus evident that the teleological method is not applied by Aristotle in its purity. He could not approach the problem, how best to adjust the State to its end, without a consciousness that the State is not an unique thing, or a thing capable of being severed from other things, and dealt with by itself. On the contrary, it belongs, in his view, to a whole class of things—the class of things into which Matter enters ; it is, consequently, subject to the play of Potentiality and Actuality : it is, further, a *κοινωνία* and a *κοινωνία* issuing in a Natural Whole. We are not, therefore, at liberty to determine the mode in which it is to achieve the end for which it exists, without reference to the

¹ e.g. de Gen. An. 2. 8. 747b 28, λέγω δὲ λογικὴν (ἀπόδειξιν) διὰ τοῦτο, ὅτι ὅσῳ καθόλου μᾶλλον, παρὰ τῶν οἰκείων ἐστὶν ἀρχῶν.

² e.g. de Gen. et Corr. 1. 2. 316a 5 sqq., αἰτίων δὲ τοῦ ἐπ' ἑλαττον δύνασθαι τὰ ὁμολογούμενα συνορᾶν ἢ ἀπειρία· διὸ ὅσοι ἐνφικῆ- κασι μᾶλλον ἐν τοῖς φυσικοῖς, μᾶλλον

δύνανται ὑποτίθεσθαι τοιαύτας ἀρχὰς αἱ ἐπὶ πολὺ δύνανται συνείρειν· οἱ δ' ἐκ τῶν πολλῶν λόγων ἀθεώρητοι τῶν ὑπαρχόντων ὄντες, πρὸς ὀλίγα βλέψαντες, ἀποφαίνονται ῥᾶον· ἴδοι δ' ἂν τις καὶ ἐκ τούτων ὅσον διαφέρουσιν οἱ φυσικῶς καὶ λογικῶς σκοποῦντες. See on this subject Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 171. 2.

general laws which govern all cases of genesis. We cannot deal with Political Science apart from the Science of Being and Becoming. Nor can we deal with it without the guidance of the best attainable Experience and Opinion. In well-constituted individuals and races, things tend to work themselves out right, and we must take the history and institutions of such races into account.

We see, therefore, that Aristotle approached the subject of Politics with some prepossessions: on the one hand, he brought to its study a metaphysical creed, which led him to expect the State to conform to the laws of structure and working which he traced in things in general; on the other, he was biassed in favour of Hellenic institutions. He was thus led on from the assertion of a single and invariable end for the State to the far more questionable doctrine, that the State can only achieve this end by the adoption of one unvarying type of structure, which it is possible to map out in considerable detail¹. Nor was the end which he assigned to the State one that was likely to suggest a satisfactory structure. The end of a thing is, in his view, as has been said, not the sum of the functions discharged by it, but the highest of them only. If that highest function can only be discharged by a part of the Whole, then that part becomes, in fact, the Whole. To it all other parts become mere means; they exist for it and are merely subsidiary to it. The State thus came to be, as we shall hereafter see, not only an union of unequals, which may very well be its character, but an union of classes which are mere means with a class which is related to them as their end. The mutual relation of the component elements of the State was thus distorted and denaturalised. Aristotle's 'best State' is exactly the kind of State to which a Teleology such as his pointed. The classes of which it is composed are remorselessly distributed into means and ends. Two thirds

¹ Cp. Eth. Nic. 2. 5. 1106 b 28, τὸ μὲν ἀμαρτάνειν πολλαχῶς ἐστίν (τὸ γὰρ κακὸν τοῦ ἀπείρου, ὡς οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι εἶκαζον, τὸ δ' ἀγαθὸν τοῦ πεπερασμένου), τὸ δὲ κατορθοῦν μονα-

χῶς. We need not here pause to consider, how far Aristotle's error, if such it is, has been repeated, even down to our own day.

of them fall under the former head, one third under the latter. Since, further, the particular type of social and political organization, which Aristotle held to be the only true one, was nowhere even approximately realized, a shadow of illegitimacy was cast on the actual State; it did not, perhaps it could not, fulfil the true end, or distribute social functions and social advantages in accordance with true justice or true expediency; and a doubt might well arise whether it possessed any real claim to the obedience of the citizen, or, at all events, to his active participation in its concerns. Its authority was weakened, and a sanction indirectly given to that detachment from politics, which Aristotle probably desired to combat¹, but which was the growing tendency of the age; and not only to detachment from politics, but to political indifference and disaffection.

On the other hand, his emphatic reference of the State to an end had its advantages. There had been a time when the State itself had been viewed as the end of human life²; and if Socrates, Xenophon, and Plato had already 'taught the existence of a virtue of man as man, not limited in its exercise to action on behalf of the State, and had treated the State only as a means for the realization of virtue, not as the ultimate moral end³,' Aristotle's more systematic reference of the State to an end was a welcome confirmation of their view. It seemed to provide a definite standard, the application of which would rob political inquiry of its arbitrariness and uncertainty, would supply it with a criterion of right and wrong, and raise men above those 'media axiomata,' among which in these subjects they

¹ We may perhaps infer this from the general tenour of the Politics. Aristotle not only insists that the individual is a part of the State (I. 2. 1253 a 18 sq.) and belongs to the State, not to himself (5 (8). I. 1337 a 27 sq.), and that the active virtues contribute to the enjoyment of leisure (4 (7). 15. 1334 a 16 sq.), but he also presses

the improvement of actual constitutions on the attention of political inquirers, and declares that this is as much the business of Political Science as the portraiture of an ideal State (6 (4). I. 1289 a 1 sq.).

² Zeller, Gr. Ph. I. 61 (4th edit.): cp. Plato, Meno 73 A: 73 C.

³ Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. I. 33 (ed. 2).

usually move. If a knowledge of the End was useful in departments of science where we cannot hope to modify phenomena but only to understand them, it was likely to be doubly so in Practical Science—a field in which imperfection seemed to arise more easily, and almost more legitimately, than elsewhere; where the material cause was more commonly defective or treacherous, where error or oversight was more fatal, and ‘deviation from the true path’ (*παρέκβασις*) was especially frequent¹; and where, at the same time, we might hope to effect amendment, for though the best State might lie beyond the reach of almost all, there were (so Aristotle held) fairly satisfactory forms of social and political organization, of which this could not be said. For one important lesson, at all events, we may probably thank Aristotle’s teleological treatment of Politics. It tended to negative in advance the many theories, which, from century to century, down to our own day, have claimed for some one social element—whether King, people, or Pope—an indefeasible right of sovereignty irrespective of contribution to the general welfare. Power falls of right, in Aristotle’s view, to those who, be they many or few, are qualified by intrinsic merit and command of material resources to contribute effectually to the end for which the State exists.

Aristotle’s error lay, not in seeking to discover the end of the State, for he was right in accounting this to be the first step in Political Science, but in imposing on it one unvarying end, in giving too narrow an interpretation to that end, and in holding that it could only be fully attained through one type of society.

¹ Communities are liable to *ἀρραρία* no less than individuals (Pol. 7 (5). 9. 1310a 18); and Political Science, in Aristotle’s hands, is evidently far more tolerant of the faultier constitutions than Ethical Science is of the faultier types of character. We have only to read the book of the Politics which treats of Revolutions, to see how

easily the constitution may slip from one form to another: the configuration of its territory, accident, as at Athens (Pol. 2. 12. 1274a 12), a want of vigilance on the part of the holders of power, facts in the past history of the State, may all avail to bring about a change.

The end
assigned by
Aristotle to
the πόλις
examined.

If we pass on to examine the end assigned by Aristotle to the πόλις, we shall find that here he diverges to a certain extent from the Socratic tradition, to which both Xenophon and Plato adhered. The office of the Statesman, according to Socrates, was to make the citizens better (Xen. Mem. 1. 2. 32: 2. 6. 13 sq.). Xenophon contrasts the ideal Persians of his romance, who 'seek to secure that the citizens of their State shall be as good as possible' (Cyrop. 1. 2. 5), with the Assyrians, whose State aimed at the production of wealth (ibid. 5. 2. 20). So again, Plato holds that the end of the πόλις is to make the citizens happy by making them virtuous¹. Aristotle describes the end of the πόλις somewhat differently: its end is not merely the production of virtue in its citizens, but the production of virtuous action; it not only makes men good and happy, but gives the action of men already good and happy its full natural scope and character. It produces virtue and develops virtuous action in those who are not yet virtuous, but its end is to afford the virtuous and happy a field for the exercise of their virtue and happiness. It comes into being 'for the sake of life,' but exists 'for the sake of good life'; or, if this is an end common to it with other things, it exists for the sake of noble action (τῶν καλῶν πράξεων), or still more definitely, for the sake of 'life perfect and complete in itself' (Pol. 3. 9. 1281 a 1). As the Christian is said to be 'complete in Christ²,' so the individual is said by Aristotle to be complete in the πόλις. Not completeness as a whole (for this includes 'completeness in respect of necessities' as well as 'completeness in respect of good life'), but completeness in respect of good life is the end of the πόλις. Its end is, however, sometimes stated to be 'noble action' (καλὰὶ πράξεις)—under which term, in the Politics (4 (7). 3. 1325 b 16 sqq.), though not in the Ethics (10. 7. 1177 a 21), the exercise of the speculative faculty is included. Aristotle, in fact, though he still stands firmly in the Politics by his view of the

¹ Gorg. 515 B: Laws 631 B: Zeller, Plato, E. T. p. 464, n. 12.
and other passages referred to by ² Coloss. 2. 10.

superiority of the virtues exercised in leisure, which include those concerned in speculation, shows nevertheless an inclination which he had not shown in the Ethics, to dwell on the features common to speculative and practical activity. In the Ethics they are parted by the interval which separates the divine in man from the human, and σοφία from φρόνησις. Aristotle is there, perhaps, still under the impressions which were present to his mind when he described the 'creative reason' (νοῦς ποιητικός) in the De Anima: he may have seen the matter in another light when he looked at it from the more social, less psychological point of view which prevails in the Politics.

It should be observed, however, that the end of the πόλις is not to promote good life in mankind generally, but only in those within its own pale who are capable of it; and also that the πόλις must not only set itself to foster good life, but all that is contributory thereto. The πόλις, it may be added, will not achieve good life or happiness, unless some or all of its members achieve it. The happiness of the Whole will be achieved through the happiness of its parts, and thus we find the happiness and even the pleasure of the individual more considered by Aristotle than by Plato. See (e.g.) Pol. 2. 5. 1263 b 5: 4 (7). 9. 1329 a 17 sqq.: 2. 5. 1264 b 17 sqq. The sense must further be noticed which Aristotle attaches to good life. He construes it as bound up with the pursuit of politics and philosophy. As we shall see, not all ages nor both sexes are held by him to be capable of rising to this kind of life; nor are all callings compatible with it.

Aristotle's account of the end of the πόλις, or City-State, involves three separate assertions:

(1) That the State is, or rather may be and should be, not only the negative condition, but the positive source of virtuous action in individuals:

(2) That it is an all-sufficient source of virtuous action (αὐτάρκης πρὸς τὸ εὖ ζῆν) in them:

(3) That virtuous action is its end.

Three propositions implied in Aristotle's account of the end of the πόλις.

* Examination of these propositions—the first.

(1) So far as the first of these assertions is implied in his view, Aristotle would not probably feel that he was departing in any degree from the best opinion current among his countrymen. The Hellenic State began in a group of tribes and clans, and was itself, like a tribe or clan, an unity based on common worship and consecrated by common festivals. It was thus a common life, as much as an union for protection against foes, or the redress of injuries, or the making of laws. The State was the centre and guide of social existence: Delphi early taught the citizen to worship the gods which the State directed him to worship and in the manner which the State prescribed: the institutions and the laws, written and unwritten, which every Greek felt had made him what he was, were traced back by popular belief to some lawgiver commissioned by the State. Even in barbarous communities, the laws, whether written or unwritten, were observed to be commonly directed to the production of military virtue¹; and the end to which their rude legislation was addressed was sought more scientifically and successfully by the laws of the Lacedaemonian State. The devotion of the Three Hundred at Thermopylae was an homage to law:

ᾧ ξεῖν', ἀγγέλλειν Λακεδαιμονίοις, ὅτι τῇδε
κείμεθα, τοῖς κείνων ῥήμασι πειθόμενοι².

Each little community, like Israel, drew its moral inspiration and its moral atmosphere from its laws. The State was 'the rock whence' each man 'was hewn' and 'the hole of the pit whence he was digged³.' Lysias had said: ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ οἶμαι πάσας τὰς πόλεις διὰ τοῦτο τοὺς νόμους τίθεσθαι, ἵνα, περὶ ὧν ἂν πραγμάτων ἀπορῶμεν, παρὰ τούτους ἐλθόντες σκεψώμεθα ὃ τι ἡμῖν ποιητέον ἐστίν⁴: and Aristotle takes it

¹ Pol. 4 (7). 2. 1324 b 5 sqq.

² Ῥήμασι is here explained as —νομίμοις. If this is the meaning, cp. Thuc. 1. 84. 3.

³ Probably the same thing might be traced in the early Teutonic community, and would have been still more easily traceable in it, if the Christian Church had not relieved the State of many

of its prerogatives. Rude early communities do not trouble themselves over-much to draw sharp distinctions between sin and crime.

⁴ Lys. 1. 35, quoted by L. Schmidt, *Ethik der alten Griechen*, 1: p. 199, who also refers to Demosth. 23. 141 (p. 202). See L. Schmidt's remarks on the above subject, pp. 198–203.

for granted that the aim of every lawgiver is to make men good: μαρτυρεῖ δὲ καὶ τὸ γινόμενον ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν· οἱ γὰρ νομοθέται τοὺς πολίτας ἐθίζοντες ποιοῦσιν ἀγαθοὺς, καὶ τὸ μὲν βούλημα παντὸς νομοθέτου τοῦτ' ἐστίν, ὅσοι δὲ μὴ εὖ αὐτὸ ποιοῦσιν, ἀμαρτάνουσιν· καὶ διαφέρει τούτῳ πολιτεία πολιτείας ἀγαθὴ φαύλης (Eth. Nic. 2. 1. 1103 b 2 sqq.)¹. But the influence of the Hellenic State asserted itself through other channels than that of the law, written or unwritten: both Isocrates and Aristotle dwell on the influence exercised by the example of the rulers of the State², and Plato (Rep. 492 A) contrasts the small effect produced by a few sophists in comparison with the influence on the individual of a whole people gathered in its assemblies or law-courts or theatres. The distinctive characteristic of a πόλις according to Aristotle—that which marks it off from an alliance—is to be found in the benevolent care of each citizen for the virtue of all belonging to the State (Pol. 3. 9. 1280 b 1 sqq.). In every way the saying of Simonides—Πόλις ἀνδρα διδάσκει³—held good. It is true that another view of the State had been put forward by the sophist Lycophron, who treated it as merely a 'security to the citizens against mutual wrong' (ἐγγυητὴς ἀλλήλοις τῶν δικαίων, Pol. 3. 9. 1280 b 10); and that the sophist Hippias, as has been said, acknowledged only those laws which are universally accepted to be divinely authorized: but we note in other sophists a tendency to accept as just whatever the strongest element in each State held to be for its own interest (Plato, Rep. 343), and thus to assert the ethical authority, not merely of a well-ordered State, but of any and every State in which the strongest element ruled.

No doubt, the Hellenic State had not always, or even generally, made full use of the position thus accorded to it: it failed, we are told, even to give its members a training

¹ The peculiarity of the Lacedaemonian lawgiver lay in this, that he sought to regulate the rearing and habits of his citizens (Eth. Nic. 10. 10. 1180 a 24 sqq.), not in his seeking to produce virtue. His aim was the same as that of

others, though his methods were more effectual.

² Aristot. Pol. 2. 11. 1273 a 39: Isocr. ad Nicocl. § 31: Areopag. § 22: Nicocl. § 37.

³ Plutarch, An seni sit gerenda respublica, c. 1.

appropriate to the constitution (Pol. 7 (5). 9. 1310 a 12 sqq.); and if it failed in this, we need not wonder that it failed, except in one or two places, to train them systematically to virtue (Eth. Nic. 10. 10. 1180 a 24 sqq.). Its laws were a chaos, directed to no special aim, or, if to any, to success in war (Pol. 4 (7). 2. 1324 b 5): its guidance of religion was imperfect, its chastisement of heresy fitful: it allowed education to fall into the hands of men who travelled from State to State, detached from State-allegiance, or who sought inspiration from sources other than the laws and traditions of the State¹. Its authority was still further impaired, or even made harmful, by falling into the hands first of one faction, and then of another (3. 3. 1276 a 8 sqq.). Yet those who questioned it were probably the few, rather than the many; and even Isocrates (de Antid. §§ 295-6) could claim that culture at Athens was virtually the product of the State. It was easy to forget how much in the Athenian character, for instance, was due to other than indigenous influences; how the philosophy of Athens, its metres and its music, its rhetoric and its triremes, and, above all, its Homer, came to it from outside. The springs that fed the moral and intellectual life of an Athenian were gathered from a wider area than that of the Athenian State.

It was on this foundation of common sentiment that the philosophers built up their conception of the office of the State. Plato, indeed, was not unaware that the State could not afford to rely exclusively on its own spiritual resources (Laws 950 A sq.: 951 A sqq.), though he subjects communications with other States to strict regulation: and if Aristotle speaks more emphatically of the self-completeness of the single State (e. g. Pol. 4 (7). 3. 1325 b 23 sq.), he can hardly have intended to go beyond Plato in this matter. Still both seem inclined to recur to the long-past time, if indeed there ever was such a time, when each Hellenic

¹ To Plato men seem to speak not without plausibility when they make out Circumstance to be the

real legislator of the State (Laws 709 A).

State was its own spiritual counsellor and oracle, not drawing life from the central stem of Hellas, but finding the 'light of the city' in its own law. The self-contained Lacedaemonian State was, notwithstanding Leuctra, the model constantly before the eyes of both. Why should not a nobler State of this kind be possible? They seem to have thought that moral influence was not a thing which could be expected to travel far from its source; the conception of a world-wide Church was alien to their ideas; men could not be spiritual guides to each other without knowing each other, without belonging to, and living in, one and the same city; nor could spiritual authority be effectual without coercive power behind it. Everything, in their view, pointed to the City-State. They forgot that it may be more within the power of the State to communicate what the Lacedaemonian State had communicated to its citizens than what they wished to be communicated to theirs. They did not ask themselves whether a State can make men philosophers, or give them moral wisdom, as easily as it can inspire a readiness to die for it.

We must remember that the moral life of a Greek community would not seem beyond the control of its authorities and its law: not only was it small, and its life passed mainly in public, but the popular mind had hardly perhaps as yet been stirred as deeply as it was stirred by the rise of Christianity under the Roman Empire, and by the Reformation and the French Revolution in later days. The forces with which the State has to deal seemed far more docile than they really are. Even Aristotle fails to comprehend the possibilities of popular enthusiasm. In his view, the masses are well content to be left to their daily struggle for a livelihood, and are little inclined to press for office, unless they are wronged or outraged, or unless they see that office is made a source of gain (7 (5). 8. 1308 b 34): their aim is rather profit than honour (8 (6). 4. 1318 b 16 sqq.). Passionate loyalty, or patriotism, or religious feeling, passionate enthusiasm for an idea of any kind, find no place in his notion of the popular mind.

The world had not yet drunk deep of the creeds which, more than aught else, have made men fanatics and robbed the lawgiver and the statesman of their command over things; nor did it then know much even of those non-religious popular movements ('national' movements, for example), which have so often proved beyond the control of statesmanship.

Aristotle, like Plato before him, thought he saw his way to making the influence of the State more of a reality. Let it be so organized as to become to the individual all that the popular voice assumed it to be already. Let it regulate man's existence from the cradle to the grave—regulate marriage and education, property, production and trade, art, poetry and religion. Statesmanship was not statesmanship unless it was equal to this overwhelming mission: the statesman must be capable of guiding, and indeed of leading, the whole culture of the community. It is thus that *πολιτική* is described as supreme over the sciences, as determining which are to exist within the State and which are not, as adjusting to her end the arts of war, of household management, of rhetoric, and prescribing through legislation what men ought to do and to abstain from doing (Eth. Nic. 1. 1. 1094 a 28–b 7).

The whole action of the State in relation to the individual is apparently conceived by Aristotle (except in the case of a *παμβασιλεία*) to be governed by law. He seems to be aware that there are some things which law is too general to regulate aright or indeed at all (Pol. 3. 15. 1286 a 24 sqq.)¹: but its limitations are hardly so present to him as they are to Plato in the Laws (e.g. 788 B: 807 E: 822 D), though it is true, on the other hand, that he looks to the educational influence of Law for much that Plato had sought in the Republic to achieve by laws abolishing the Household and Several Property (2. 5. 1263 b 37 sqq.). Law is a means not only of protecting men's rights, or of preventing or punishing criminal acts, but of promoting

¹ The writer of the Eudemian law our relations to friends (Eth. Ethics excepts from the sphere of Eud. 7. 1. 1235 a 2).

right action and developing virtue—of developing the right motive of action. We must not measure the operation of Law in the State by the operation of the law-court: law finds its true function in distributive rather than in corrective justice: it assigns to each individual his true position and work: it speaks through the constitution: it regulates the relation of the lower vocations to the higher: it regulates education, property, the household, citizenship, the daily life of the individual in the *syssitia* and festivals of the State. ‘Institutions,’ to use a modern word, are the product and creature of Law, and whatever they achieve—whatever, for example, such an institution as that of the monogamic household achieves—is the achievement of Law. In full accord with the popular view, Aristotle includes even ‘unwritten laws’ under Law and ascribes them to a legislator¹. Much, therefore, of what we term the influence of Public Opinion, so far at least as it rests on tradition and custom, would apparently be brought under the head of Law. Armed with this powerful weapon, *πολιτική* need not fear to undertake the immense mission assigned to her.

Aristotle’s conception of the office of the State unquestionably possesses elements of truth. It is true that the State exercises a vast moral influence on the individual, however narrowly it may construe its functions. The society of which a man forms a part contributes largely to the formation of his character. Mere temporary residence, for instance, in the United States is sufficient, as we say, to ‘Americanize’ the German or Irish immigrant, and the active discharge of a citizen’s duties must greatly deepen

¹ Cp. *Pol.* 8 (6). 5. 1319b 38, *ἐκ τούτων περᾶσθαι κατασκευάζειν τὴν ἀσφάλειαν, εὐλαβουμένους μὲν τὰ φθείροντα, τιθεμένους δὲ τοιούτους νόμους καὶ τοὺς ἀγράφους καὶ τοὺς γεγραμμένους κ. τ. λ.* Herein he follows Plato (*Polit.* 295 A, 298 D, *Laws* 793 B–C, referred to by L. Schmidt, *Ethik d. alten Griechen*, 1. 202). Contrast the language of Plato and Aristotle on this subject with that of Dio

Chrysostom, *Or.* 76. p. 648 M (quoted by C. F. Hermann, *Gr. Antiqu.* 2. § 1.9), *ἔστι δὲ τὸ ἔθος γνώμη μὲν τῶν χρωμένων κοινή, νόμος δὲ ἀγραφος ἔθους ἢ πόλεως . . . εὖρημα δὲ ἀνθρώπων οὐδενός, ἀλλὰ βίου καὶ χρόνου.* Aristotle himself occasionally uses expressions which distinguish *ἔθος* from *νόμοι* (e.g. *Pol.* 2. 5. 1263b 39, *τοῖς ἔθεσι καὶ τῇ φιλοσοφίᾳ καὶ τοῖς νόμοις*).

the impression. The small mass gravitates to the large mass: the individual accepts the point of view, the moral estimate of men and things, which he finds prevailing around him. This is the general rule, though Plato himself notices that the 'divine men whose acquaintance is beyond all price' (Laws 951 B: cp. Meno 99) spring up as much in ill-constituted States as in well-constituted ones, and it is evident that character cannot always be traceable to Society or the State, for otherwise how could a Socrates arise in the defective society of Athens? Even, however, if we admit to the fullest extent that the character of the individual in nine cases out of ten takes its impress from that of the society of which he is a part, the question still remains, how far, where that is so, the laws of the society have contributed to the character thus communicated. If it is possible to exaggerate the influence of the State on character, it is still more possible to exaggerate the influence of law and Statesmanship on character; and Aristotle's doctrine is not merely that morality insensibly adjusts itself to the State as the whole which it has to sustain and keep in healthy working, but that it is in a more positive way its product as being the offspring of its Law.

To a certain extent constitutions—for example, the democratic constitution of the United States—do reflect themselves in character. De Tocqueville and others have sufficiently proved this. Law does far more than protect men's persons and property, or even the whole sum of their rights: it would do so even if it designedly confined its aims within this limit. Even then it would incidentally develop a type of character (*ἦθος*), or at all events would modify in some degree the predominant motives of action. Laws such as that which enforces monogamy, or those which regulate the devolution of property, whatever the motive with which they may be imposed, exercise a powerful influence on character; they not only enforce certain outward acts, but they create dispositions. The members of a polygamic household are ethically different from the members of a monogamic household. If, again, as Aris-

totle holds, the State can devise and work a system of education which will not only develop the intelligence, but train the moral sympathies, the law by which it effects this will prove itself a moral influence of no ordinary kind.

But the influence of the lawgiver may be overrated. He contributes something to the character of the society for which he legislates, but does not circumstance or race contribute more? are not a thousand nameless influences more potent than he? It is the rarest thing in the world when some lawgiver—Mahomet, for example—subdues society to his will. Aristotle himself sees that the character of a community depends to a large extent on matters beyond the control of the legislator—the nature and situation of the territory, the initial qualities of the population, the turn fortune gives to its history. He did not, however, recognize all the causes which tend to limit the legislator's influence: he did not know how little religion, or science, or the distribution of wealth, or the relative prominence of particular occupations in a State can be controlled by law. However favourable the initial Matter of the State may be, it is only in the world's best moments, when some great Teacher has won men to him, that Law can assume the position which Aristotle assigns to it; and it is precisely at these moments that law and organization are least needed and least in place. When an idea is 'in the air' as a pervading influence, it does not need to be embodied in institutions; these arise later, and seek, usually in vain, to preserve for posterity something of its fugitive greatness. Aristotle¹ ascribes an extent of authority and influence to the Statesman which is hardly ever his, and also invests him with attributes of spiritual leadership which he hardly ever possesses. He is in part misled by the notion of a 'best State' immobile and exempt from change, or at all events travelling in a groove traced for it by its founder. He did not see that society lives by incessant renewal, and that the fresh ideas which reinvigorate it will seldom owe their birth to the statesmen

¹ Plato no doubt in the Republic went even further in this direction than Aristotle.

at its head. It is not to them that we look for the first word of Progress: we are content if they adopt and protect a movement in advance, when already originated by others. Still more is this true of Law. Law is usually the last to register an accomplished advance¹. Nor again must we set down to Law all that it regulates. It regulates the household; it may regulate the Church: but we need not assume that either of these institutions owes its existence, or its influence, to Law. There are beliefs (the belief in God, for example) which are not traceable with certainty to the influence of social life, much less to Law—they seem rather to be, as it were, self-sown—yet which have done as much, or more, for civilization than any others. Certainly, the Law cannot ‘prescribe what men ought to do and abstain from doing.’ Even in the best State, the lawgiver can hardly be the source of unwritten law. To us Aristotle seems to call the State to functions too spiritual for it. We know what law is and what statesmen are: we see the State constantly doing, not that which it holds to be right, but that which is dictated by political necessity—constantly studying in its policy its own security rather than the broad interests of morality, and while we quite agree that the State is in some sense a spiritual power, we hesitate to recognize in it the true and only adequate guide to right action or the appointed nursing-mother of science and philosophy.

The
second.

Still, to whatever extent we may conceive that Aristotle overrated the influence of the State, and especially of its Law, as positive sources of virtuous action, it seems clear that his view contains an element of truth. He was on less solid ground when he asserted that the State is all-

¹ Or indeed a decline. Plato sees this, as we shall find if we read his picture of the way in which a change in μουσικῆς τρόποι gradually affects society (Rep. 424 sqq.)—*ἡ παρανομία αὕτη . . . κατὰ μικρὸν εἰσοικισαμένη ἡρέμα*

ὑπορρεῖ πρὸς τὰ ἥθη τε καὶ τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα· ἐκ δὲ τούτων εἰς τὰ πρὸς ἀλλήλους ξυμβόλαια μείζων ἐκβαίνει· ἐκ δὲ δὴ τῶν ξυμβολαίων ἔρχεται ἐπὶ τοὺς νόμους καὶ πολιτείας.

sufficient for good life (*αὐτάρκης πρὸς τὸ εὖ ζῆν*)¹. Perhaps in making this assertion he is thinking only of the best State; still, as has been said, he seems to forget that the citizen of a Greek State was not a product of that State alone, but in part of influences originating in other States. The influence of the common festivals of Greece, of its poets, philosophers, and historians, overleapt the barriers between State and State, and Greece would not have been what it was, if civilizing influences originating outside the State had not, for the most part, been allowed full play. It is very probable that, notwithstanding his expressions with regard to the self-completeness of the State, Aristotle would willingly admit all salutary influences from outside, but he seems hardly as alive to the value of such influences as we should expect.

We next come to the question, is good life, in the The third. sense which Aristotle attaches to it of perfect and self-complete life, not only a thing which the State is capable of producing, but the end for which it exists?

If we take it for granted that one unvarying end is to be set before every State, whatever its environment or circumstances, there is much to be said in favour of Aristotle's conclusion. We may wish that he had construed the end of the State as the production not only in those within the State, but also in those outside it, of the maximum amount of virtuous activity attainable by them: yet the view that the State does not exist for the indefinite increase of its wealth or population or trade, or for conquest and empire, but that these aims are to be subordinated to considerations of moral and intellectual wellbeing, is one which has by no means lost its value or applicability at the present day.

Some may hold it to be too comfortable a doctrine, that the State, whose development often seems to us to follow laws of its own, not always, apparently, conducive to the

¹ He adds *ὡς ἕπος εἰπεῖν*, Pol. I. 2. 1252 b 28.

welfare or happiness of men, is really a thing to be shaped as may best suit men's moral and intellectual interests; and may think that if it subserves this aim, it does so in its ultimate tendencies and in the long run, rather than directly. We seem often to notice that institutions and classes, to which every statesman wishes well, disappear in the torrent of social change, unable for some reason or other to maintain their footing. We see the State half the champion, half the victim of some over-mastering idea which drives it onward, often to its own destruction. We see it existing, not for its own happiness, but to play some critical part in history—to 'wander in the gloomy walks of Fate.' Others, again, may feel that ends which Aristotle hardly notices—such as that of self-preservation—more largely influence the structure and action of the State, than the nobler end to which he subordinates them—the end of good life: and it may be true that this latter aim, though never lost sight of by the State, is commonly so thrown into the background by the difficulties which beset every State, as to be unable to assert itself with persistency and effect. Here, as elsewhere, he may have been misled by the mirage of an ideal State, exempt (*ex hypothesi*) from the embarrassments from which no State is in reality exempt. Others may insist that the chief duty of a State—the duty it can least afford to neglect—is the protection of men's life and property and freedom of action; or may urge that the moral and intellectual advancement of the members of a State is an end to the attainment of which the Statesman can directly contribute but little, and that, consequently, it can hardly be the end of the State. Others, again, may plead that different States may legitimately have different ends. The end which Aristotle sets before the State may be the highest, and yet a given State may be right in adjusting its organization to another end. The individual State—and this Aristotle forgets—is usually a member of a group, and should address itself to the work for which the characteristics of its territory and population fit it, leaving that which others can do better to be done by

them¹. It is not necessary that the civilization of each separate State should be absolutely complete. Occasionally, indeed, the circumstances of a State leave it no choice but to be predominantly military or commercial or industrial. Even in these cases, however, the spirit of Aristotle's teaching, if not its letter, may be observed. The State may do its utmost to secure that its legislation and its action shall be in the interest of civilization, rightly understood.

It is when Aristotle descends into detail and interprets good life as inseparable from the pursuit of politics or philosophy that we feel least inclined to agree with him. This doctrine of his forces him to view the less noble vocations as existing only for the sake of the highest. Good life is not, in his view, capable of realization in various degrees by all men; it is the appanage of certain vocations. There was nothing in his formula which compelled him to interpret it thus. He was misled, partly by the general sentiment of his race and age, which exaggerated the contrast of vocations; partly by his own Teleology, always too ready to classify things as means and ends.

We must not, however, forget that the conception of the office of the State which Plato and Aristotle were led to form was the expression of a profound social need. There was pressing need of a power capable of taking the spiritual direction of Greek society. In practice, the poets had long held spiritual sway, and Plato with perfect justice objected to them as religious and moral guides (e. g. *Laws* 801 B: 941 B): to such guides as he held many of the sophists to be, he objected still more: he longed, as is evident from page after page of the *Laws*², for an authoritative religious and moral revelation, such as that which the modern world possesses, and Greece and Rome did not: the City-State was to be the depositary of this revelation, and to do what the City-State alone could do; by

¹ 'If Great Britain has turned itself into a coal-shed and blacksmith's forge, it is for the behoof of mankind as well as its own' (*Times*, August 27, 1885).

² e. g. *Laws* 887 sq. The remark is one which I owe to Mr. Shadworth Hodgson, to whom it was suggested by a perusal of the *Laws*.

the regulation of marriage and education, by law, written and unwritten, coercive and suasive, it was to build up a people with whose very being the revelation would be interwoven and who would find in it the principle of their life. The distinction of Church and State, if the thought of it could ever have occurred to him, would probably have struck him as likely to imperil the spiritual influence for which he sought to find a place in society. It would do so, even if the Church were made supreme over the State—the only relation of the two powers which we can imagine him approving—for the Church even then would not have in its own hands the means of enforcing its teaching: and besides, the very distinction of matters spiritual from matters temporal would seem to him to imply forgetfulness of the fact that even the most temporal of temporal matters has spiritual issues of its own, and is in some sense a spiritual matter, to be dealt with on spiritual grounds.

Aristotle, with some variations, followed in Plato's footsteps. Their conception of the State interests us because it forms one of the earliest indications (outside Jewish history) of a feeling that society needs a spiritual authority: the subsequent rise of a Christian Church within the State is sure evidence that they did not err when they craved something more of organized spiritual influence than the actual Greek State offered. So far Plato and Aristotle were moving in the right direction. But when they sought to make the City-State an oracle of spiritual truth, and seemed to aim at providing every man with a kind of parochial Sinai, they greatly erred. If we are to have a Pope, we instinctively wish him to be Oecumenical. Men's conceptions of the office of the State may possibly have come to be somewhat more contracted than they should be, since it has been able to devolve a part of its burden on the Christian Church; and it may be true that if we were to imagine Christianity absent from the scene, it might be necessary for the State, its law and its authorities to play a different part: but even then it would hardly be to the City-State of Plato and Aristotle that

the world would entrust its spiritual fortunes. Its well-proportioned minuteness and Hellenic delicateness of articulation would alone suffice to rob it of its authority over modern minds, which ask for somewhat more of vastness and mystery.

One remark, however, applies to all attempts to determine the abstract end of the State. The thing which it is important that every State and nation should make perfectly clear to itself, is, not what the office of the State in general is, but what is the work which it is individually called to do. There can be little doubt that the work marked out by circumstances for the Greek race and for every Greek State was not only the realization of the maximum of good life, but also the diffusion of Hellenic civilization among the barbarians round about Hellas, and especially among those who bordered on its Northern frontier. The two aims were quite reconcilable, and the latter of them deserved recognition at Aristotle's hands. It seems, however, to have been little, if at all, present to his mind; and even in Alexander's it was probably an afterthought.

We have now arrived at our definition of the πόλις, for we have ascertained the *genus* to which it belongs, and have discovered its *differentia* in its end. It is a *κοινωνία* issuing in a Whole, and formed for the end of perfect and self-complete life.

A definition of the πόλις has now been arrived at: it is a *κοινωνία* issuing in a Whole and formed for the end of perfect and self-complete life. How must the πόλις be organized to attain its end? The answer given in the

The next question evidently will be—and here we face the central problem of Political Science, as understood by Aristotle—how must this *κοινωνία* be organized in order to fulfil this end? This is substantially the question that Aristotle puts to himself, though it frequently appears in other forms. He asks, for instance, in the First Book of the Politics, what organization of Slavery or of Supply is in accordance with Nature; and in the Third he discusses the question of the Supreme Authority from the point of view of Justice. These inquiries, however, ultimately pass into

portraiture of a 'best constitution'—merits and defects of this mode of dealing with the subject.

the other: the natural is that which contributes to the End, and the just cannot be determined without reference to the End.

The answer is given in the portraiture of a 'best constitution'.¹ Aristotle tacitly implies, that it is possible for the inquirer to discover once for all the form of *κοινωνία* best adapted for the attainment of the end, and, under certain not hopelessly unrealizable conditions, to bring it into existence.

It was not his view that the office of Political Science is simply to register the phenomena of society, and to refer them to their laws—to watch and to understand a process which defies modification—or to inquire what are the conditions which tend to predominate in the future, and to adjust society to them: it must work hand in hand with Ethics—ask of Ethics what type of character it should aim at producing, and then construct the State, if possible, in such a way as to produce it. The path of Political Science lies, in his view, rather through Ethics than through History. It is not enough to watch the tendencies of History and to accept what it brings. History is the record of a process which is partly for the best, and partly not—partly the work of Nature, partly of causes, such as Fortune, which may bring the opposite of the best. There is nothing fixed or infallibly beneficent about the historical process. When the City-State evolves itself out of the Household and Village, we trace the hand of Nature in History; but even in well-constituted races, the dominant tendency of things may be quite other than Natural. The tendency of constitutional development in Greece, for instance, so far from being in the direction of the best constitution, was in the direction of democracy². History, therefore, must be brought to the bar of Ethics, and its natural tendencies discriminated from the rest. Its outcome has a legitimate

¹ Plato had done more: he had thought himself called on to display in the *Critias* and the projected *Hermocrates* the 'actual working and manifestation' of

'the political scheme of which the Republic had described the constituent elements' (*Grote, Plato* 3. 302).

² *Pol.* 3. 15. 1286 b 20 sqq.

claim on our acceptance, only so far as it satisfies a teleological test. The ethical point of view must be our guiding light in the historical wilderness: it alone can enable us to choose the right path.

Holding, again, the belief that it is possible to assign one legitimate end to the State, whatever its circumstances, Aristotle also held that this end could be fully realized only through one form of social organization. He had not asked himself the question which Cicero was perhaps the first to ask¹, whether it is not beyond the power of any single inquirer to discover this one form. Cicero (*de Rep.* 2. 1. 1-3) ascribes to Cato the Censor the striking view, that the construction of a best State is beyond the power not only of any single individual, however able, but even of the united wisdom of humanity at any single moment of time, and can be accomplished only by the combined wisdom and good fortune (*de Rep.* 2. 16. 30) of a number of individuals spread over a series of generations and centuries, so that, according to him, a State glides (*de Rep.* 2. 16. 30: cp. 18. 33) into its 'perfect form' (*optimus status*) 'naturali quodam itinere et cursu.' In one respect, however, Aristotle is wiser than Cicero. Cicero apparently hopes to have an '*optimus status civitatis*' revealed to him in this way, which will be suitable to all possible communities. Aristotle is aware that his 'best constitution' can only be suitable to a few.

The quest of a 'best constitution' was a tradition of political inquiry in Greece, and Aristotle fully accepts it. The question, what constitution is the best, was apparently first raised in Greece by practical statesmen (*Aristot. Pol.* 2. 8. 1267 b 29): it was thus, perhaps, that Herodotus came to imagine a group of Persian grandees discussing the claims of monarchy, oligarchy, and democracy to be the best (*Hdt.* 3. 80 sqq.). It was a later idea that a combina-

¹ Cp. *de Rep.* 2. 11. 21: *nos vero videmus et te quidem ingressum ratione ad disputandum nova, quae nusquam est in Graecorum libris.* The germ of Cicero's view,

however, is no doubt to be found in the Greek conception of Time as the Discoverer, which Aristotle fully adopts (*Eth. Nic.* 1. 7. 1098 a 23: *Pol.* 2. 5. 1264 a 1 sqq.).

tion of all three, such as some thought they found in the Lacedaemonian constitution, was the best (Aristot. Pol. 2.6.1265b 33 sq.). When the question was taken up by men unversed in political life, like Hippodamus, fancy went farther afield. Plato was the first to find out that one may discover a 'best constitution' without in so doing discovering a generally available remedy for political ills. He saw, at all events in the later years of his life¹, that his earlier ideal of the Republic had been pitched too high for men, and was only suitable for 'gods or the sons of gods.' Aristotle went further in this direction, and studied the question why a given constitution is applicable to one community and not to another. Not only moral causes, but social or economical circumstances, or the character of the territory, may place a particular constitution beyond the reach of a particular community. The best constitution, for example, is unrealizable without exceptional virtue and exceptionally favourable circumstances (6 (4). 11. 1295 a 26). In sketching it, therefore, Aristotle is aware that he is doing what will be useful only to a few.

We may wonder that under these circumstances he made the portraiture of an ideal State the chief task of the Politics. He has not stated the reasons which led him to do so, and we can only guess what they were. Perhaps he found it hard to break with a well-established tradition of political inquiry. Apart from this, however, he would probably feel, that if the Politics was to 'complete' the Ethics, it must contain a sketch of the 'best constitution'—the constitution most favourable to virtue and happiness. He would also feel that if the 'best constitution' were only for the few, those few were the best. The *παιμβασιλεία* was the rarest, if the divinest, of possible forms; yet he describes it with the rest. To omit to tell the Statesman what sort of State he should construct when everything was in his favour would be to leave the best moments of Statesmanship without guidance. The main object of Political Science is to con-

¹ See Laws 739 D : 853 C : 691 C, collected by Susemihl (Sus.², Note 191). and other passages from the Laws

struct a State which will develope, not mar, man's nature—which will call forth virtuous action and form a fit home for virtue. The best State is the State; it is the only form which can in strictness be said to be the State as Nature willed it to be, the normal product undistorted by defects of character or fortune or legislative skill.

We can see that the practice of depicting a best State was not without its advantages. It taught the political inquirer not to rest content with suggesting isolated reforms, but to view them in relation to Society as a whole. It obliged him to construct a more or less consistent and coherent whole, in which each element should match the rest. Territory, national character, the economical and social system, the political organization, must all be such as to work together harmoniously for the common good. Nor could we in any other way have obtained so full a revelation in so small a compass of the political views of Plato and Aristotle.

Yet this practice was a misleading one. It accustomed the student of politics to imagine the legislator in a position which he practically never occupies—to imagine him with a *tabula rasa* before him, free to write on it whatever he pleases. It implied that the supreme task of Political Science is to construct a State 'in the air'—without a given historical past, without given environing circumstances. We can better understand Plato depicting a 'best State' than Aristotle, for Plato believed that in sketching the States of the Republic¹ and Laws he was sketching States not hopelessly beyond the reach of the actual States around him, but Aristotle knows that his best State is realizable only by a very few. His ideal is pitched too high for most States. His citizen-body is to consist of men of full virtue (*σπουδαῖοι ἀπλῶς*)², and they are to possess exactly the right

¹ No doubt, when he wrote the Laws, he had come to see that the State of the Republic made too great demands on human nature to be suitable to men.

² Pol. 4 (7). 13. 1332 a 32 sqq. Dio Chrysostom would seem to

have Aristotle's ideal State in view when he says (Or. 36. 443 M)—
ἀγαθὴν μὲν γὰρ ἐξ ἀπάντων ἀγαθῶν
πόλιν οὔτε τις γενομένην πρότερον
οἶδε θνητὴν οὔτε ποτὲ ὡς ἔσομένην
ὑσπερον ἀξιὸν διανοηθῆναι, πλὴν εἰ
μὴ θεῶν μακάρων κατ' οὐρανόν.

measure of external and bodily goods. Nor is his best State apparently conceived as likely to be of use as a guide to reformers of actual societies. When Aristotle turns to the task of making actual constitutions as tolerable as possible, we do not find that he makes much use of his sketch of a best constitution¹. Its value seems to be this, that it shows how much the State may be to men. It is the 'new garment,' not intended to be used for 'patching' an old one, but rather as a foil to it and to show what the State ought to be and naturally is.

The Cynics and Stoics were apparently the first to hit on the notion of an ideal State which might be superadded to the actual State, and which a man might regard as his true home, though he belonged also to an actual State²; and in a somewhat similar spirit Christianity taught men to look up to a 'kingdom of heaven,' to which the kingdoms of the world were to be as far as possible approximated by the Church. Aristotle's conception of the relation of the ideal State to the actual State is wholly different: the actual State seems to profit but little by the projection of the ideal State, which is apparently of use only to the fortunate few who are in a position to realize it.

The attempt to portray a 'best State,' again, led Aristotle to encumber the broad outlines of his political teaching with much transitory detail. Lessons of permanent value come thus to be mixed up in the Politics with recommendations of institutions like that of common meals, which the world has long outgrown. Every philosophy, and still more every political philosophy, is 'the child of its time,' and bears unmistakable marks of its origin, but the Greek method of portraying a best State made the ephemeral element in political inquiry larger than it need have been.

¹ In criticising the Lacedaemonian, Cretan, and Carthaginian constitutions he is careful to note any points in which they deviate from the *ἀρίστη τάξις*. But we hear little or nothing of the *ἀρίστη τάξις* in the Sixth,

Seventh and Eighth Books.

² To Marcus Aurelius, at all events, the actual State is as it were a household within the true or universal State (Comm. 3. 11. *πολίτην ὄντα πόλεως τῆς ἀνωτάτης, ἥς αἱ λοιπαὶ πόλεις ὡσπερ οἰκίαι εἰσὶν*).

One thing, however, is evident: the vision of an ideal State did not make Aristotle indifferent to the problems and difficulties of the actual State. The age which dreams of ideal States is often on the point of losing its interest in politics; but this was far from being the case with Aristotle, who is perhaps all the more unwearied in suggesting practicable amendments of the actual State¹, because he has learnt from the study of the best State how rarely it can be realized. We even seem to gather from his language in the *Politics* that the main service which Political Science can practically render to the world is that of limited amelioration. It cannot make things right, but it can make them bearable.

How, then, is the best State to be constituted?

How, then,
is the best
State to
be consti-
tuted? We
must first
ask fit
Matter of
Nature and
Fortune.

The beginnings of the State are in the hands of Nature and Fortune (4 (7). 13. 1331 b 41). These powers must supply the founder of the State with appropriate raw material; otherwise his labour will be in vain. This raw material (ἔλη, 4 (7). 4. 1325 b 40 sq.: *χορηγία πολιτική*, 1326 a 5: *χορηγία τυχερά*, 6 (4). 11. 1295 a 28) must be such as may be fashioned into a community seeking happiness rather in virtue than in external or even bodily goods. Place in the founder's hands the potentiality of a noble society—a population and a territory possessing the fit initial qualities—and he will call one forth in act. We shall later on study more closely the characteristics for which we must look in the primitive nucleus of the State, but a few of them may be at once noticed. The human beings composing it must, first, be neither too many nor too few: next, they must possess aptitudes not always found in combination—the spirited nature which gives warmth of heart and the will to be free, intelligence which gives organizing power. Singly, these qualities will not generate the best State. The territory must be just large enough to sustain them in a mode of life removed alike

¹ Pol. 6 (4). I. 1289 a 5 sqq.

from meanness and luxury; and it must be of such a nature as to aid the healthy development of the State—to favour, in fact, both freedom and organization, and make the community independent of foreign commerce.

Conditions of the formation of this Matter into a State:
1. Common locality; common life; common aim; common ethical creed expressed in a constitution.

The next thing is to vitalise this Matter into a State.

We have already seen that a *κοινωνία* is composed of dissimilar members united by a common aim and by common action. The same holds good of the State. The members of the State must participate in something, for otherwise the State would not be a *κοινωνία*: they must, to begin with, 'participate in locality'; they must inhabit one and the same spot¹. But they must have more in common than this. They must unite in common gatherings and live a common life (3. 9. 1280 b 13 sqq.). But, above all, they must have a common aim (4 (7). 8. 1328 a 25 sqq., esp. 35–37: 3. 13. 1284 a 2), and a common ethical creed—a common view as to what gives happiness (4 (7). 8. 1328 a 40, cp. 4 (7). 13. 1331 b 26 sqq.), whatever this view may be. As the constitution is regarded as embodying the life preferred by the State (6 (4). 11. 1295 a 40), the *κοινόν τι* which constitutes the *κοινωνία* is, in one passage, said to be the constitution (3. 3. 1276 b 2).

2. Differentiation. A State implies a distribution of functions and an exchange of service.

This is one characteristic of State-life: another is differentiation. The mere fact that the State begins in need implies differentiation even at its outset. That which brings the slave into society is not the need of another slave, but of a master. He is in quest, not of his like, but of his complement or correlative. Some things, again, cannot be enjoyed by all the members of the State at the same moment—political authority (*ἀρχή*), for instance (2. 2. 1261 a 32)—and hence arises the inevitable contrast of rulers and ruled. On the other hand, there are things which may or may not be left to common enjoyment. Plato had proposed in the Republic, that women, children, and property should be held in common (2. 1. 1261 a 2 sqq.). The same question of several allotment, or the reverse, may be raised as to the various 'activities' (*ἔργα*, 4 (7).

¹ Pol. 2. 1. 1260 b 40, καὶ πρῶτον ἀνάγκη τοῦ τύπου κοινωνεῖν.

8, or *πράξεις*), of which the State is a co-ordination. There is the work of the cultivator, the artisan, the soldier, the man of capital, the priest, the judge, the statesman. Here, again, the question arises, 'whether every one is to share in all these functions' (4 (7). 9. 1328 b 24): that is to say, whether every individual is to be cultivator, artisan, soldier, judge, and statesman at once, or whether we are to allow some of these vocations to be united in the hands of one and the same individual, and not the whole, or what arrangement is to be adopted. Democracy, which in its extreme form (8 (6). 4. 1319 b 2) drew no line between the artisan and the statesman¹, solved this question in one way: other constitutions in another. But if in some communities there will be less differentiation than in others, it will exist to some extent in all. It is not only the secret of efficient work, but in every whole the indispensable condition of its unity. Aristotle finds differentiation even in a bee-hive (*de Gen. An.* 3. 10. 760 b 7 sqq.). Not indeed that any and every scheme of differentiation will secure unity: to do so, it must be based on principles of justice; and, as has been said, the differentiated members, or the chief of them, must be animated by a common aim, must be men of full virtue (*σπουδαῖοι*)². We may compare the words of Milton in his '*Areopagitica*'³: 'Neither can every piece of the building be of one form; nay rather, the perfection consists in this, that out of many moderate varieties and brotherly dissimilarities that are not vastly disproportional, arises the goodly and the graceful symmetry that commends the whole pile and structure.' Milton, however, has differences of opinion here mainly in view, and these, if on vital points, would hardly be welcome in the Aristotelian, any more than in the Platonic State.

In adopting the principle that the unity of the State rests on differentiation, Aristotle returns in a measure to the conception of Pythagoras and Heraclitus of a harmony

¹ 4 (7). 9. 1328 b 32, *ἐν μὲν ταῖς δημοκρατίαις μετέχουσιν πάντες πάντων*.

² *Eth. Nic.* 9. 6. 1167 b 4 sqq.

³ *Prose Works* 2. 92, ed. Bohn.

resting on contrast, if not on seeming or actual conflict¹. Plato had not expressly done so, though the distinction of classes in his ideal Republic is apparently viewed by him as a condition of its unity. His conception of the world, indeed, often seems at variance with the idea of contrasted elements working in combination for the best: the element of Matter is in his view at best passive, and sometimes unruly and disturbing. Aristotle could adopt the idea with less of metaphysical inconsistency.

The Stoics, on the other hand, often speak as if the resemblance between men as rational beings were an adequate guarantee of political unity, and rest on this basis their great conception of a World-State². They were led, in fact, even to include the gods as citizens of the World-State. Aristotle rests the State both on the resemblances between its members and on their dissimilarities. But for the latter, they would be unable to satisfy each other's needs. The State implies an exchange of service by dissimilars. 'Aristotle,' says Auguste Comte³, 'laid down the true principle of every collective organism, when he described it as the distribution of functions and the combination' (rather the exchange) 'of labour.' Without exchange of service, mere similarity forms no basis for a State. There are, no doubt, other conditions of the existence of a State besides differentiation and resemblance—for instance, a care on the part of the citizens for each other's moral well-being⁴—but these are among its primary conditions.

Another remark of Comte's⁵ deserves to be mentioned here. 'The institution of Capital,' he says, 'forms the necessary basis of the Division of Labour, which in the dawn of true science was considered by Aristotle to be the

¹ Heraclitus, however, had spoken of *ἐναντία* (Eth. Eud. 7. 1. 1235 a 25 sqq.) where Aristotle speaks of *διαφέροντα*.

² Marcus Aurelius, Comm. 4. 4, *εἰ τὸ νοερὸν ἡμῖν κοινόν, καὶ ὁ λόγος καθ' ὃν λογικοὶ ἔσμεν κοινός· εἰ τοῦτο, καὶ ὁ προστακτικὸς τῶν ποιη-*

τέων, ἢ μή, λόγος κοινός· εἰ τοῦτο, καὶ ὁ νόμος κοινός· εἰ τοῦτο, πολῖται ἔσμεν· εἰ τοῦτο, πολιτεύματός τινος μετέχομεν· εἰ τοῦτο, ὁ κόσμος ὡσανεὶ πόλις ἐστί.

³ Social Statics, E. T. p. 234.

⁴ Pol. 3. 9. 1280 b 1 sqq.

⁵ Social Statics, E. T. p. 135.

great practical characteristic of social union. In order to allow each worker to devote himself to the exclusive production of one of the various indispensable materials of human life, the other necessary productions must first be independently accumulated, so as to allow the simultaneous satisfaction of all the personal wants by means of gift or exchange. A closer examination, therefore, shows that it is the formation of Capital which is the true source of the great moral and mental results which the greatest of philosophers attributed to the distribution of industrial tasks.'

We see then that while a certain amount of social differentiation is incidental to the State, it rests with the State to say how far it is to be carried. One State, for instance, will place the work of an artisan and that of a statesman in the same hands, while another will not.

The State is, in fact, a distributor. It distributes 'advantages' (*ἀγαθά*)¹: it distributes 'functions' (*ἔργα* or *πράξεις*)²: it makes possible by its distribution of advantages that exchange of services (*πράξεις*) which is the initial fact of society. Aristotle seldom, if ever, goes behind the services, the exchange of which constitutes society, to the rights which are implied in that exchange: still less has he realized the importance of such questions as 'what is a right?' or 'how do rights come into existence, and why?'. But if we follow his ideal sketch of the creation of the best State in the Fourth (old Seventh) Book, we shall find him allotting functions (c. 9) and possessions (*κτήσεις*, c. 9. 1329 a 17 sqq.) as the first step in its construction.

The principle on which the State makes this allot-

¹ Eth. Nic. 5. 1130 b 30, τῆς δὲ κατὰ μέρος δικαιοσύνης καὶ τοῦ κατ' αὐτὴν δίκαιου ἐν μὲν ἑστίν εἶδος τὸ ἐν ταῖς διανομαῖς τιμῆς ἢ χρημάτων ἢ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσα μεριστὰ τοῖς κοινωνοῦσι τῆς πολιτείας. Cp. Pol. 4 (7). 13. 1332 a 15 sq. where a distri-

bution of *κόλασις* and *τιμωρία* seems to be implied. The boundaries of distributive and corrective justice, and indeed also of justice in exchange, seem hardly to be definitely fixed.

² 4 (7). 9.

The distribution of advantages and functions within a State is regulated by its constitution, which should be just—i. e. should distribute them with a view to the true end of the State, and should take account of allelements which contribute to that end.

ment is expressed in its *πολιτεία*¹ or constitution, for this embodies the end which the community sets before itself as the end of its common life (Pol. 6 (4). I. 1289 a 15, *πολιτεία μὲν γὰρ ἐστὶ τάξις ταῖς πόλεσιν ἢ περὶ τὰς ἀρχάς, τίνα τρόπον νενέμηται καὶ τί τὸ κύριον τῆς πολιτείας καὶ τί τὸ τέλος ἐκάστης τῆς κοινωνίας ἐστὶ*)²: thus the constitution is said to be the course of life which the State marks out for itself (cp. 6 (4). II. 1295 a 40, *ἡ πολιτεία βίος τίς ἐστὶ πόλεως*, which is explained by Plutarch, *de Monarchia*, *Democratia*, et *Oligarchia*, c. 1, *καθάπερ γὰρ ἀνθρώπου βίοι πλεόνες, ἐστὶ καὶ δήμου πολιτεία βίος*). This course of life may be that which is really most preferable (4 (7). I. 1323 a 14 sq.), or it may be 'in a mean' in a sense other than that in which the best life is so (6 (4). II. 1295 a 37), or it may be still lower in the scale, a life in extremes (*καθ' ὑπερβολὴν ἢ ἑλλειψιν*).

When the constitution wins its rule of distribution from a correct appreciation of the end of the State and from a correct estimate of the relative contributions of different individuals to that end, it is said by Aristotle to be just. It must place both the functions and the advantages it has to distribute in the hands in which it is most conducive to the end of the State that they should be placed. Nature entrusts the instruments she has at her disposal to those who are capable of using them (*de Part. An.* 4. 10. 687 a 10,

¹ The *πόλις* is hardly a *πόλις*, if it is too large to have a *πολιτεία* (4 (7). 4. 1326 b 3), though it may have a *πολιτεία*—for instance, a *δυναστεία* or an extreme democracy or a tyranny—which scarcely deserves the name. This passage of the Fourth Book seems to treat the *ἔθνος* as hardly susceptible of a *πολιτεία*, though we gather from other passages that Kingship, and even *παμβασιλεία* (3. 14. 1285 b 32), may find a place in the *ἔθνος*.

² See *Sus.*, Note 466. Aristotle inherits his view of the nature of a *πολιτεία* from Plato and also from Isocrates. Isocrates regards the *πολιτεία* as distributing *ἀρχαί*

and *ἔργα* (*Areopag.* §§ 20–23): his Busiris, as the author of 'a constitution and laws,' distributes the population into distinct vocations (*Isocr. Busir.* § 15). He twice calls the *πολιτεία* the *ψυχὴ πόλεως* (*Areopag.* § 14: *Panath.* § 138). Like Prudence in the individual, it is the deliberative element in the State, guarding and preserving all good things and warding off ill: it is the model into accordance with which all laws, all advisers of the State (*οἱ ῥήτορες*), and all private men must be brought. Compare with this *Aristot. Pol.* 3. 4. 1276 b 30: 3. 11. 1282 b 10.

ἢ δὲ φύσις ἀεὶ διανέμει, καθάπερ ἄνθρωπος φρόνιμος, ἕκαστον τῷ δυναμένῳ χρῆσθαι), and the State should do the same.

Distributive justice—the term itself is not used in the *Politics*—is the primary virtue of a State and Constitution¹. A correct distribution of duties and advantages, and, above all, of political authority is essential, and no distribution can be correct which is not just. Cicero went even farther than Aristotle and brought justice into the very definition of the State (*de Rep.* 1. 25. 39, cp. *Augustin. de Civ. Dei*, 19. 21). In his view, the ‘deviation-forms’ of State, being unjust, are not ‘*respublicae*’ at all. A constitution may, indeed, be just without being the best constitution. The conditions of the best constitution are seldom present. It presupposes the rule of ‘virtue fully furnished with the means of virtuous action’ (*ἀρετῇ κεχορηγημένη*, 6 (4). 2. 1289 a 32).

It is thus in justice, and particularly in distributive justice, that Aristotle finds the true basis of the State. Distributive justice needs, indeed, to be completed by other kinds of justice: (1) by justice in exchange, which is occasionally conceived by Aristotle as not merely confined to the commercial relation (*ἀλλακτικῇ κοινωνίᾳ*) and the exchange of commodities, but as regulating even the interchange of offices between free and equal citizens², whereas elsewhere³ the distribution of offices is viewed as the sphere of distributive justice. It is especially in its more comprehensive sense that justice in exchange is said to be the secret of safety and union in States⁴.

(2) By corrective justice (*διορθωτικῇ*), the justice of the judge or juror, remedying a faulty exchange, and thus incidentally redressing crime, which Aristotle brings under this head⁵.

¹ Cp. *Eth. Eud.* 7. 9. 1241 b 13, αἱ δὲ πολιτεῖαι πᾶσαι δίκαιον τι εἶδος· κοινωνία γάρ, τὸ δὲ κοινὸν πᾶν διὰ τοῦ δίκαιον συνέστηκεν.

² *Pol.* 2. 2. 1261 a 30 sqq.

³ *Eth. Nic.* 5. 5. 1130 b 31.

⁴ *Pol.* 2. 2. 1261 a 30, τὸ ἴσον τὸ ἀντιπεπονθὸς σώζει τὰς πόλεις: *Eth. Nic.* 5. 8. 1132 b 33, τῷ ἀντι-

ποιεῖν ἀνάλογον συμμένει ἡ πόλις.

⁵ Is the function of the law-court conceived by Aristotle to be summed up in this? Is its task completed, when an unjust withdrawal of advantages allotted to an individual by Distributive Justice has been made good by a restoration at the expense of the

But both these forms of justice presuppose a correct original award to individuals, which must be maintained intact through all processes of exchange. It is the task of distributive justice to make this original award.

Distributive justice is not, indeed, the sole security for the cohesion and equilibrium of the State, for the natural passiveness of the masses will be a sufficient support for an oligarchy which abstains from insulting or plundering them (6 (4). 13. 1297 b 6 sq.) and from robbing the State (7 (5). 8. 1308 b 34 sqq.)¹, and democracies are made durable by mere populousness (8 (6). 6. 1321 a 1, τὰς μὲν οὖν δημοκρατίας ὅλως ἡ πολυανθρωπία σώζει· τοῦτο γὰρ ἀντίκειται πρὸς τὸ δίκαιον τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἀξίαν). But it is the best security: 'for if a constitution is to last, it should take its stand on equality proportioned to desert and on giving men their due' (7 (5). 7. 1307 a 26). A just constitution realizes the main condition of durability, which is that 'none of the parts of the State even desires a change in the constitution' (6 (4). 9. 1294 b 38 sqq.).

An attempt to effect an equipoise between contribution and requital is thus imposed on the State and its founder. It must, however, be borne in mind that, in the best State at all events, the motive by which the citizens are actuated is love of τὸ καλόν; and that if requital is secured to them, they do what they do irrespectively of the requital they receive.

List of
functions
to be dis-
tributed.

Before we proceed to consider what distribution of functions is correct, we must first obtain a list of the functions which have to be allotted, or, which is the same thing, of the γένη which are to discharge them.

offender? If so, the law-court of Aristotle seems hardly adjusted to his conception of the end of the State, which is the promotion of good life. We look for a spiritual court from him, and find only a temporal court somewhat narrowly conceived. Κολάσεις and τιμωρίαι are, however, contem-

plated (Pol. 4 (7). 13. 1332 a 11): and the corrective justice of the Fifth Book of the Ethics is not probably intended as a complete representation of the action of the law-court.

¹ The same thought is expressed by Isocrates, ad Nicocl. § 16.

Aristotle supplies us with two lists, which we will here set side by side :

A. Pol. 4 (7). 8. 1328 b 2 sqq.

1. γεωργοί
2. τεχνίται
3. τὸ μάχιμον
4. τὸ εὐπορον
5. ἱερεῖς
6. κριταὶ τῶν ἀναγκαίων καὶ
συμφερόντων
7. τὸ θητικόν (not enumerated in its place,
but incidentally mentioned as necessary
in c. 9. 1329 a 36)¹.

B. Pol. 6 (4). 4. 1290 b 40 sqq.

1. γεωργοί
2. τὸ βάνανσον
3. τὸ ἀγοραῖον
4. τὸ θητικόν
5. τὸ προσπολεμῆσον
6. τὸ δικαστικόν
7. τὸ ταῖς οὐσίαις λειτουργοῦν²
8. τὸ δημιουργικόν (official class)
9. τὸ βουλευόμενον καὶ κρίνον περὶ τῶν δικαίων τοῖς ἀμφισβητοῦσι (where τὸ δικαστικόν is again mentioned by an evident slip).

The above are called *μέρη τῆς πόλεως*, 1290 b 38-40 : *μόρια τῆς πόλεως*, 1291 a 32.

Of these lists, list A is drawn up for use in the construction of the best State : list B is intended to account for the variety of constitutions by exhibiting the full variety of classes in a State. The latter is thus the more complete. In list A τὸ ἀγοραῖον and also τὸ δημιουργικόν are omitted : list B omits the class of priests. Both lists reflect the very imperfect industrial and professional development of Greek society : perhaps indeed they fail to do justice even to it. Instructors of youth and physicians are absent from both lists. We hear nothing of fishermen, though fishing is included in the First Book among the natural modes of obtaining food. Sailors, it is true, are expressly denied a place among the parts of the State (4 (7). 6. 1327 b 7 sqq.), and fishermen perhaps among them. The oarsmen of the triremes are to be recruited among the serfs or slaves who till the soil, and the crews of the trading vessels employed in bringing the produce of the territory to the port (4 (7).

¹ We are surprised to find *τεχνίται* and *θῆτες* existing in the best State, when in the First Book we find these vocations reckoned with the unnatural sort of *χρηματιστική*. The views there ex-

pressed on this subject seem, however, to be more uncompromising than those expressed elsewhere.

² Cp. Isocr. de Antid. § 145, τοὺς διακοσίους καὶ χιλίους τοὺς εἰσφέροντας καὶ λειτουργοῦντας.

5. 1327 a 7 sqq.) are probably to be obtained from the same source.

The lists recognize no distinction between trades (i.e. groups formed by similarity of occupation) and classes, or between either of these and organs of State-authority (e.g. the deliberative or judicial authority). All are brought under the comprehensive head of 'parts of the State'¹ (*μέρη τῆς πόλεως*), a term inherited by Aristotle from Plato, who includes under it (Rep. 552 A) 'horsemen, hoplites, traders, and artisans.' Terms to express the distinctions referred to had hardly as yet been developed, though we find the judicial, administrative, and deliberative organs of the State described (6 (4). 14) as *μόρια τῆς πολιτείας*. We learn from the same passage that it is on the constitution of these organs that the character of the *πολιτεία* depends (*ὧν ἔχόντων καλῶς ἀνάγκη τὴν πολιτείαν ἔχειν καλῶς καὶ τὰς πολιτείας ἀλλήλων διαφέρειν ἐν τῷ διαφέρειν ἕκαστον τούτων*, 1297 b 38 sq.)².

The problem is to organize these diverse elements in such a way as will accord with justice and prove conducive to the end of the State.

Are the lower functions to be committed to the same hands as the higher?

The first question for consideration is whether those who practise the lower social functions—husbandmen, artisans, day-labourers, and the like—are to be admitted to the higher social functions of legislation, administration, justice, and war. Most Greek States did admit them to these functions. Even in oligarchies, artisans were freely admitted to military service—they formed, it would seem, a large element in the forces of the allies of the Lacedaemonians³—and in all but the extremer forms of oligarchy, in which power went by birth⁴, the rich artisan⁵ or trader would be admitted to office. Many of the most famous early oligarchies of Greece—those of Aegina, Corinth, and Corcyra, for instance—were, like the Venetian, oligarchies of trade.

¹ This is so at least in Pol. 6 (4). 4. 1290 b 38-40: contrast however 4 (7). 8. 1328 a 21 sqq.

² With regard to Aristotle's use of the phrase *μέρος τῆς πόλεως* in

the Politics, see Appendix A.

³ Plutarch, Ages. c. 26.

⁴ 6 (4). 6. 1293 a 26 sqq.

⁵ 3. 5. 1278 a 21 sqq.

Democracy went further—it tended to give these classes political supremacy; and democracy was coming more and more to prevail in Greece, for cities were growing larger and large cities tended to democracy. No doubt, even in the extreme form of democracy—the first form, apparently, in many cases to admit artisans and day-labourers to office¹—persons directly concerned with what Aristotle terms ‘necessary functions’² would not commonly, in all probability, be either ‘State-orators’ (*ρήτορες*) or great executive officers of State; they would not often be strategi, for instance, at Athens: their power would rather be exercised collectively through the popular assembly and dicasteries. Still neither democracy nor oligarchy made a principle of interposing a barrier between the exercise of the minor social functions and the major. Even in the military city of Thebes the practice of the so-called ‘sordid arts’ or of retail trade only involved exclusion from office for ten years after retirement from business³.

The Lacedaemonian State and the States of Crete stood almost alone⁴ in ordering these matters differently. They set an example in relation to them which Plato and Aristotle held to be sound, but from which Greece tended every day to depart more widely. They ‘sorted’ the elements of the State, and forbade those who discharged the nobler social functions to meddle with the less noble.

Even in States which admitted the industrial and commercial classes to power, popular sentiment held trade and industry cheap. ‘Nowhere in Homer,’ says Büch-senschütz⁵, ‘is contempt for any useful occupation ex-

Social estimate of agriculture, trade, and industry current in ancient Greece.

¹ 3. 4. 1277 b 2: cp. 2. 12. 1274 a 18. This is not wonderful, considering that at one time those of the *βάρυτοι τεχνίται* who were not slaves were mostly of alien origin, and that even in Aristotle’s day a majority of them continued to be either slaves or aliens, 3. 5. 1278 a 6.

² Wealthy employers of slaves in manufacture, like Cleon, are of course not here referred to.

³ 3. 5. 1278 a 25: 8 (6). 7. 1321 a 26 sqq.

⁴ In some military States the citizens were forbidden to practise the *βάρυτοι τέχναι* (Xen. Oecon. 4. 3).

⁵ Besitz und Erwerb, p. 258. It is doubtful, however, how far the Homeric pictures reflect the early social life of Greece Proper, at all events as a whole. Plato says in the Laws (680 C) that the mode of life Homer depicts is Ionic.

pressed.' But a change of feeling came, he thinks, at the epoch of the great migrations. 'The ruling class, in possession of wide domains and disposing freely of the labour of the subject populations and of the purchased slaves whose numbers begin from this time forward to increase, withdrew from all occupations connected with the supply of daily wants, and by leaving labour of this kind exclusively to the subject races stamped it as unworthy of a freeman. Accordingly, it is in States which maintained in some degree intact the traditions of that epoch—in the Lacedaemonian State and that of Thespieae, for instance—that we find these occupations forbidden to the citizen.' It was, on the other hand, in maritime and commercial cities like Corinth—the first, according to Thucydides, to 'cleave to the sea'—that handicrafts were least despised¹. The oligarchies of early Greece, however, were less often oligarchies of trade than oligarchies of knights and warriors, and the prejudices of the oligarchs may well have spread to the average citizen. The attempts of the tyrants to relegate their subjects from the city to the country², to make peasants of them, and to divert their attention from politics to the useful arts may have had a contrary effect to that intended. But the prevailing scorn for trade and industry was probably more largely due to the wide diffusion of military aptitude and efficiency which came with the rise of the hoplite system of warfare, and which was so important a factor in the successful resistance of Greece to Persia.

Agriculture stood at the head of the lower occupations. In this, the healthiest, if not the oldest, of them, the drawbacks were absent which told against so many others. The work of the cultivator was not work merely for the body, like that of the day-labourer: it called for alert intelligence, for foresight and knowledge; it did not impair the physique like the sedentary arts; the keenness for gain, which was held to be incidental to the occupation of the

¹ Thuc. 1. 13: Hdt. 2. 167.

² Pol. 7 (5). 10. 1311 a 13: 7 (5).
11. 1313 b 20 sqq.: and see C. F.

Hermann, Gr. Antiqq. 3. § 41.
14.



merchant and retail tradesman, was thought to be less marked here; above all, agriculture produced no inaptitude for arms. Thus the Peloponnesians tilled the soil with their own hands¹: the *αὐτουργός* was to Euripides the true safeguard of the State²: Philopoemen combined farming with politics³. Yet there were two opinions even about agriculture, for while Tanagra was a town of cultivators⁴, Thespieae held agriculture, no less than handicraft, to be a pursuit unworthy of freemen⁵. So one of Menander's characters says:

Ἐν τοῖς πολεμίοις [πολεμικοῖς?] ὑπερέχειν τὸν ἄνδρα δεῖ,
τὸ γὰρ γεωργεῖν ἔργον ἐστὶν οἰκέτου⁶.

Other pursuits, which demanded far more skill, capacity, and capital, but which were less favourable to military aptitude, were held in much lower estimation. The merchant (*ἐμπορος*) who purchased in the cheapest market a cargo which he conveyed, in a hired vessel or his own, for sale in the dearest, needed a thorough knowledge of the varying requirements of the different ports of the Greek world: yet, whatever may have been his position in trading cities such as Corcyra, Byzantium, Corinth, or the Pontic colonies, his vocation was for the most part abandoned at Athens to *metoeci*⁷, citizens of good position

¹ Thuc. i. 141.

² Eurip. *Orest.* 892 (Bothe).

³ Plut. *Philop.* c. 4, *πρωὶ ἀναστὰς καὶ συνεφαψάμενος ἔργου τοῖς ἀμπελουργοῦσιν ἢ βοηλατοῦσιν αὐτὸς εἰς πόλιν ἀπῆει καὶ περὶ τὰ δημόσια τοῖς φίλοις καὶ τοῖς ἀρχουσι συνησχολεῖτο.*

⁴ Büchschütz, p. 297.

⁵ *Ibid.* p. 258.

⁶ Inc. Fab. *Frag.* xcvi. ed. Didot, quoted by Büchschütz, p. 258 n. 4.

⁷ Thus Aristotle assumes that merchants will be *ἐν ἄλλοις τετραμμένοι νόμοις*, 4 (7). 6. 1327 a 14: cp. Isocr. *de Pace*, § 21, *ὁψόμεθα δὲ τὴν πόλιν διπλάσιαν μὲν ἢ νῦν τὰς προσόδους λαμβάνουσαν, μεστὴν δὲ γιγνομένην ἐμπόρων καὶ ξένων καὶ μετοί-*

κων, ὃν νῦν ἐρήμη καθίστηκεν—a passage which mentions *ἐμποροι* in connexion with aliens, and also indicates that even at Athens the numbers of these classes varied from time to time considerably. In its judgment of *ἐμποροι* Greek feeling would probably somewhat differ from Roman. 'While the Romans disdained retail trade and manual labour, they had not the same dislike for commercial enterprise upon a larger scale' (Capes, *Early Empire*, p. 194). Still it is evident from Rhet. ad Alex. 3. 1424 a 28 sq. that the *ναύκληροι*, a section of the class of *ἐμποροι*, were more favoured by the writer than the *ἀγοραῖοι*.

preferring not to embark in commerce themselves, but only to lend money to merchants¹.

The body of *τεχνῖται*, again, included in its upper ranks sculptors, painters, architects, musicians, and singers of genius², some of whom, at all events, would possess a wide acquaintance with men and things in Greece, might be the favoured companions of tyrants (Pol. 7 (5). 11. 1314 b 3), or might even aspire to make a figure as philosophers (Plato, Rep. 495 C). Of the latter Hippodamus of Miletus was perhaps an instance³. Yet, according to Plutarch (Pericl. c. 2), 'no well-constituted (*εὐφύης*) Greek youth after viewing the Zeus at Olympia or the Hera of Argos would wish to be Phidias or Polycletus, their authors'; and Lucian (Somn. c. 9) puts the same remark in the mouth of Culture (*Παιδεία*), adding that no one would desire to be accounted 'a sordid craftsman living by manual labour.' The stigma, indeed, might be escaped, if the work was done, not for pay, but out of patriotism: so Polygnotus, we are told, 'was no mere ordinary craftsman, nor did he paint the portico for hire: he worked without reward, emulous to add to the splendour of the city⁴.'

¹ Büchschenschütz, p. 510.

² Phidias is called a *τεχνίτης*, Strabo, p. 353: Praxiteles, *ibid.* p. 410: Parrhasius the painter is classed among *οἱ τὰς τέχνας ἔχοντες*, Xen. Mem. 3. 10. 1. Aristotle, however, in one passage, recognizes a distinction between arts which must exist of necessity and arts which contribute to luxury or *τὸ καλῶς ζῆν* (Pol. 6 (4). 4. 1291 a 2).

³ Socrates himself was said by some to have worked at his craft of sculpture before he became a philosopher, far as the thought of Socrates is from the mind of Plato in the passage referred to. A group on the Acropolis (three draped Graces) was imagined to be from his hand (see Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. 1. 44. 4, ed. 2).

⁴ Plut. Cim. c. 4: the passages quoted are given by C. F. Her-

mann, Gr. Antiqq. 3. § 41. 15. We shall all approve the alleged reply of Albert Dürer to the Emperor Maximilian. 'The Emperor, in the attempt to draw something himself, found the chalk perpetually break in his hands, while Dürer had no such interruption; on which Maximilian asked Albert Dürer how it came that his chalk did not break, and the painter answered, smiling, "Most gracious Emperor, I should be sorry your Majesty were as skilled in this respect as I" (*Quart. Rev.* Oct. 1879, p. 404). The story, however, like many other good ones, is an adaptation from the Greek, for a similar anecdote is told of Philip of Macedon (Plut. Reg. et Imperat. Apophthegmata—Philippi patris Alexandri 29, 179 B). Cp. also Plato, Laws 769 B.



If occupations of this kind were held to be so little honourable, we need not ask what was the position of the useful arts. The handicrafts which fall under this head are very dissimilar to each other in character. Not all of them would be either sedentary or prejudicial to health. If the smith, working at a forge in a hot climate, suffered in health, the same could not be said of the mason or bricklayer, who wrought in the open air: yet no distinction seems to have been made between these trades and those of the carpenter, cook, shoemaker, dyer, and weaver, which might fairly be accounted sedentary¹. Sedentary or not, those who practised them (and agriculturists no less, Pol. 4 (7). 9. 1328 b 41) were held to be forced by the necessity of the case to devote their whole time to their craft, and thus to lose that leisure which Socrates said was the sister of *ἐλευθερία* (Ael. V. H. 10. 14). Their work also involved that 'living at the disposal of another,' which was a mark of slavery (cp. Rhet. 1. 9. 1367 a 31, καὶ τὸ μηδεμίαν ἐργάζεσθαι βάνανσον τέχνην [σημεῖον τῶν ἐπαινουμένων]: ἐλευθέρου γὰρ τὸ μὴ πρὸς ἄλλον ζῆν: Pol. 5 (8). 2. 1337 b 17: 1. 13. 1260 a 33).

Still public sentiment at Athens favoured the artisan class more than the trading class (τὸ ἀγοραῖον) or the day-labourers (τὸ θητικόν). Many more citizens would be found among the former than among the latter (Büchschütz, p. 344-5, p. 511). A retail tradesman was often a resident-alien (Demosth. c. Eubulid. 30-34, referred to by Büchschütz, p. 511: yet see Xen. Mem. 3. 7. 6). The artisans probably sold their own manufactures to a large extent; and this must have contracted the dealings of the trading class strictly so called. The Peiræus was perhaps their headquarters: at Athens much selling seems to have been done in temporary booths in the agora, probably in part by persons who came in from the country with their produce. The shops even at Pompeii 'indicate that the tribe of shopkeepers was very inferior in wealth and comfort to that of our own time and country' (Dyer's Pompeii, p. 302).

¹ See Xen. Oecon. 4. 2: cp. Plato, Rep. 495 D: Eurip. fragm. 636, Nauck.

The position of the *θήs*, or hired day-labourer (*μισθωτός*), on the other hand, was all that extreme poverty could make it. If the most slave-like of occupations were those in which the bodily powers were most called into play (Pol. i. 11. 1258 b 38), then there was little to choose between the life of a day-labourer and that of a slave. The class of day-labourers was, however, one in which impoverished freemen often took refuge (Büchsenschütz, p. 344 sq.), mainly no doubt because the work done by this class required no previous training.

It is worthy of notice that the Greek estimate of these occupations passed with their civilization to the Jews, as we learn from the remarkable passage in Ecclesiasticus on the subject (38. 24-34). Here it is the want of leisure which is held to unfit these classes for high positions, and agriculture fares no better than the trades of the smith, potter, and carpenter¹.

There is little need to seek far for the origin of a feeling which has existed more or less in most ages and countries, occasionally indeed in an even less discriminating form and with less excuse than in Greece, and considerable traces of which, to say the least, are observable among ourselves. If Schiller has said²,

‘Euch, ihr Götter, gehört der Kaufmann : Güter zu suchen
Geht er, doch an sein Schiff knüpfet das Gute sich an,’

¹ A kindlier feeling for labour appears in connexion with the worship of Saturn and Ops, or rather their Greek equivalents (see Philochor. Fr. 13—Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. i. p. 386 : ‘Philochorus Saturno et Opi primum in Attica statuisset aram Cecropem dicit, eosque deos pro Jove Terraque coluisse, instituisseque ut patres familiarum et frugibus et fructibus jam coactis passim cum servis vincerentur, cum quibus patientiam laboris in colendo rure toleraverant : delectari enim deum honore servorum contemplatu la-

boris’). The feeling survived in old-fashioned regions like Arcadia, where slaves and masters gathered at entertainments round one table (Theopomp. Fr. 243). Seneca commends this kindly behaviour in his 47th Epistle, and advises a discreet observance of it. It is interesting to notice that the sceptic Pyrrho, who prided himself on his ‘indifference’ (*ἀδιαφορία*), drove pigs to market and sold them, or swept out his house with his own hands (Diog. Laert. 9. 66).

² In his poem, ‘Der Kaufmann.’

Hobbes is credited with the saying that 'the only glory of a tradesman is to grow exceedingly rich by the wisdom of buying and selling¹'; and Bacon, who holds that 'sedentary and within-door arts and delicate manufactures that require rather the finger than the arm have in their nature a contrariety to a military disposition,' advises States 'to leave those arts chiefly to strangers, which for that purpose are the more easily to be received².'

In ancient Greece, it is significant to observe, the feeling was strongest in the more military States³; but slavery, no doubt, contributed to lower the dignity of work performed to the order and for the convenience of another. To do manual work⁴, even if the work were not sedentary and unfavourable to health or bodily strength, and especially to do manual work for pay, was to put oneself in a subservient relation⁵, not only unfavourable to the independence and incompatible with the leisure of a freeman, but also the probable source of a mean and sordid spirit. Industrial and commercial life was thus held to begin by robbing the physique of strength or grace, and to end by degrading the character. We must remember that in the social life of Greece the spirit of trade was probably often presented to view in its narrowest and least attractive form and in sharp contrast to striking examples of public virtue. The inculcated occupations were mostly occupations engrafted on the primitive pursuits of Greek life, and were to a large extent, as they had been from the first, practised by aliens

¹ I cannot give the reference to Hobbes' Works: the passage is quoted in a note in Pope's Works, vol. 2. p. 243 (ed. 1767) on the well-known couplet (Moral Essays, Epist. 1)—

'Boastful and rough, your first son is a 'squire;
The next a tradesman, meek and much a liar.'

² Essay 29, Of the true greatness of Kingdoms and Estates (Works, 6. 448-9), referred to by C. Friedländer, de Francisci Baconis Doctrina Politica, p. 78.

Bacon, however, does not feel the same objection to the crafts of the smith, mason, and carpenter, which he here terms 'strong and manly arts.'

³ Xen. Oecon. 4. 3.

⁴ So closely was the idea of *βαναυρία* connected with *χειρουργία* that even learning to play on a musical instrument was accounted *βαναυρία*—an exaggeration corrected by Aristotle, Pol. 5 (8). 6. 1340 b 40 sqq.

⁵ Cp. *διακονία*, Plato, Laws 919 D.

and even Asiatics¹. The mixture, or rather the intermingling, of races had already gone far, at Athens at all events; indeed, the more unchanging were men's ways and aptitudes in antiquity, the more necessary was the aid of some extraneous race or races to do what the indigenous population could not, or would not do². Not only foreigners, but also slaves were largely employed on work of this kind, and free industrial labour was both lowered in estimation and cheapened by the competition of slave-labour. The autochthonous Athenian, or the descendant of immigrant Dorian conquerors looked down with not always ill-grounded contempt on the foreign and perhaps Asiatic artisan or trader, who would often differ but little in external appearance from a slave³, and would be engaged on work often done by slaves.

So far, indeed, as this prepossession against industry and trade kept in check the eagerness for gain, which was one element in the Greek character, it exerted a favourable influence. A time came when the Greeks ranked the handicrafts higher, but it was at the expense of nobler, though less lucrative, vocations⁴. There is a real difference of ethical level between some vocations and others, though amidst the growing industrialism of our own day we may sometimes be tempted to forget this.

If the popular estimate of the industrial and trading

¹ Cp. Xen. de Vectig. 2. 3, *Λυδοὶ καὶ Φρύγες καὶ Σύροι καὶ ἄλλοι παντοδαποὶ βάρβαροι πολλοὶ γὰρ τοιοῦτοι τῶν μετοίκων.*

² The same tendency to call in extraneous aid in some departments of industry is noticeable in modern Europe. Since 1850, according to a paper by M. Leroy-Beaulieu in *L'Économiste Français* (referred to in the *Times* of Feb. 8, 1883), the number of foreigners resident in France has grown at an increasing rate. It increased between 1851 and 1861 at the rate of 12,000 annually, but between 1876 and 1881 at the annual rate of 40,000. M. Leroy-Beaulieu

appears to think that these immigrants often undertake rough work which French workmen gladly leave to others. In England and the United States the increase of the Irish population serves the same end.

³ [Xen.] Rep. Ath. 1. 10, *ἐσθῆτα γὰρ οὐδὲν βελτίω ἔχει ὁ δῆμος αὐτόθι ἢ οἱ δοῦλοι*; and see C. F. Hermann, Gr. Antiq. 3. § 13. 19.

⁴ Cp. Athen. Deipn. 1. 34, p. 19 b (quoted by Hermann, Gr. Antiq. 3. § 42. 15), *τὰς γὰρ βαναύσους τέχνας Ἕλληνες ὕστερον περὶ πλείστου μᾶλλον ἐποιούντο ἢ τὰς κατὰ παιδείαν γινόμενας ἐπινοίας.*

classes did not everywhere rise with their elevation in the political scale, and if, as not unfrequently happens, the political change was not accompanied by a corresponding change in social sentiment, a correction of the general feeling on the subject was hardly to be looked for from the philosophers. Already in the apologue of Protagoras (Plato, *Protag.* 321) the contrast of the 'wisdom necessary for the support of life' and 'political wisdom' appears, and we learn how insufficient is the former for the well-being of a State without the latter. Dionysodorus and Euthydemus, indeed, in the *Euthydemus* of Plato claim that a money-making life is quite compatible with the acquisition of the kind of wisdom they imparted¹; but then this kind of wisdom was not worth much.

Opinions
of Socrates,
Xenophon,
and Plato.

Socrates, though, in conformity with Athenian opinion², he seems to have held that in case of need there was nothing unbefitting in the practice of a trade³, is represented in a conversation with Euthydemus, whom possibly he did not care to shock, as acquiescing in the ordinary Greek assumption that craftsmen such as smiths and shoemakers are, as a rule, slavish (*ἀνδραποδῶδεις*), and know nothing of 'things noble and good and just' (*Xen. Mem.* 4. 2. 22). He probably felt that leisure was more conducive to the indescribable characteristic which the Greeks called *ἐλευθερία* (*Ael. V. H.* 10. 14), as it certainly was more conducive to the pursuit of knowledge in the colloquial Socratic fashion.

Xenophon drew a marked distinction between agriculture, which he panegyricizes (*Oecon.* cc. 5-6: cp. c. 15), and the handicrafts, which he condemns (*Oecon.* 4. 2). His praises

¹ *Euthydem.* 304 C, οὐτε φύσιν οὐδ' ἡλικίαν ἐξείργειν οὐδεμίαν—δὲ καὶ σοὶ μάλιστα προσήκει ἀκούσαι, ὅτι οὐδὲ τοῦ χρηματίζεσθαι φατον διακωλύειν οὐδέν—μὴ οὐ παραλαβείν ὀντινοῦν εὐπετῶς τὴν σφετέραν σοφίαν.

² *Thuc.* 2. 40.

³ *Xen. Mem.* 2. 7. 3 sqq. He was, indeed, charged with impressing on his disciples the lesson of Hesiod—

ἔργον δ' οὐδὲν δυνείδος, ἀεργεῖν δὲ τ' δυνείδος,

in the sense that they should do anything, however unjust or disgraceful, for gain (*Xen. Mem.* 1. 2. 56 sqq.). This is corrected by Xenophon (*ibid.*), and by Critias himself, who was supposed to be a product of this kind of teaching, in the *Charmides* of Plato (*Charm.* 163 B-C).

of the former include both the actual tilling of the soil and the management of a farm (Oecon. 5). In this enthusiasm for agriculture he departs to some extent, we may notice, from his model the Lacedaemonian State, which forbade it to its citizens (Plato, Rep. 547 D)¹.

Plato has glimpses of a more favourable view of handicraft and even of retail trade. Thus, in Symp. 209 A, Phileb. 55 C sqq. (cited by Zeller, Plato, E. T. p. 222), he finds in the handicraft arts an early stage of philosophy, and is led, in fact, to range carpentering above music as more largely partaking in number and more exact (Phileb. 56 C). So again in the Laws he holds that retail trade has nothing intrinsically harmful about it (918 B); the retailer is a benefactor to his species, in so far as he measures by means of coin the comparative value of different commodities and sets them in a proportionate relation to each other; the hired labourer, the innkeeper do the same; indeed (918 D-E), if, which Heaven forbid, some one were to compel the very best men or women to act for a while as retail traders, we should learn to regard retail trade and kindred pursuits in the light of a mother or a nurse, and recognize how deserving they are of love and acceptance². It is a relation of this kind that he designs in the Republic between his third class (τὸ χρηματιστικόν) and the two higher classes. The third class, no less than the remaining two, were to be citizens, and not only so, but the source of pay and sustenance (μισθοδοταὶ καὶ τροφεῖς) to the rest; they were to be their brothers (Rep. 415 A); they are joined with the military class in a common obedience to the first or ruling class, and thus the two lower classes are together called τὸ ἀρχομένω in contradistinction to τὸ ἀρχον (Rep. 442 D). In the same way, though each of the two upper classes has a virtue of its own, temperance and justice are possessed by the third class, and apparently in a complete form; the possible transference of members from one class

¹ The same contrast of feeling appears between Cicero (de Offic. 1. 42. 151) and Sallust (de Conj. Catil. 4: see Jacobs ad loc.).

² Cp. Menand. Fragm. Inc. Fab. 279 (p. 80 Didot):
ἐλευθέρως δούλευε, δούλος οὐκ ἔσει.

to another, in itself, softens the contrast between them. Moreover, the third class were, it would seem, to own the lands they tilled subject to a contribution for the maintenance of the other classes. The first sign, in fact, of the decline of the ideal Republic is said to appear in a conflict between its classes or races, the result of which is that severalty of property is introduced within its upper section, and the gold and silver races enslave their friends and maintainers whose freedom they had before respected, and make of them subjects and servants (Rep. 547 B-C). It is probably by design that Plato (Rep. 552 A) allows the title of 'part of the State,' the application of which was afterwards narrowed by Aristotle, to the commercial and artisan classes (*χρηματισταί, δημιουργοί*) no less than to 'horsemen and hoplites.' In the view of the former, in fact, the third class answered to a part of the soul¹, while in that of Aristotle the natural slave stands to the citizen as the body to the soul, and the whole class which has to do with 'necessary work,' whether free or slave, is related to the citizen-body merely as an instrument, or means, is related to the end it subserves; it stands outside the State, forming in strictness no part of it. It is true, however, that the title of citizen, which Plato concedes to the members of his third class (*χρηματιστικοί*), carries with it no share in political power, for he excludes this class from office, both military and civil. Indeed, in one passage of the Ninth book of the Republic (590 C-D), perhaps the source from which Aristotle derived his theory of natural slavery, he admits, notwithstanding what he has said in the passage from the Eighth (547 B-C) referred to above, that when 'the Best is weak within a man, so that he is unable to control the creatures within him and has to court them'—when he has not 'the divine principle of wisdom abiding in him,' but needs a ruling principle outside himself, then 'in order that he may be under the same rule as the best of men, we say that he ought to be the slave of that best of men, inasmuch as the latter has the divine ruling principle

¹ Τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν.

indwelling in him'; so that in a case like this slavery is expedient and just, and may find a place even within the ideal Republic. It may be doubted, however, whether he would have held with Aristotle that all those 'whose function is the use of the body, and this is the best that they can do' (Pol. 1. 5. 1254 b 17), are in need of an extraneous ruling principle—whether, in fact, to Plato the natural slave is not the morally weak or bad man, rather than the man of *thews* and *sinews* who is only fit for manual work¹.

In the *Laws*, perhaps because the type of society is lower, the relation between the governing class and the classes concerned with these lower occupations is otherwise conceived. They lose even the name of citizen, and become a dependent—in some cases, an enslaved—body. Those of them who are slaves have not the consolation of being slaves to 'the best of men' as in the Republic, for the citizens of the State described in the *Laws* are not an ideal or heroic class, like the guardians of the Republic, or the citizens of Aristotle's best State. Even agriculture, except perhaps in the sense of superintendence (*Laws* 842 D: cp. 806 D-E) is forbidden to the citizens; much more other occupations of an industrial or commercial nature (*Laws* 806 D-E: 741 E: 846 D: 919 D: 842 D). Plato's reason for these prohibitions is partly that the citizen has quite enough to do without practising any other art than his own (*Laws* 846 D-E, 807 C); partly, that *βαναυσία* warps the character of the freeman (*Laws* 741 E); even the very best men (*οἱ πανταχῇ ἀριστοί*, *Laws* 918 E), though in their hands vocations like that of the retail trader would assume a helpful and kindly aspect, suffer profanation by having to do with them (918 D). In the *Laws*, unlike the Republic, the industrial and commercial classes exist for the sake of the ruling class, stand wholly outside the State, and are adjusted in number and position to the needs of their social superiors. In this respect the society sketched in the *Laws* serves as a model for the 'best State' of

¹ Cp. Plato *Polit.* 309 A, τοὺς δ' ἐν ἀμαθίᾳ τ' αὐτὸ καὶ ταπεινότητι πολλῇ κυλινδουμένους εἰς τὸ δουλικὸν ἵπο-ζεύγνυσσι γένος.

Aristotle; there is, however, this important difference, that the citizens of Aristotle's State are not only men of ideal excellence living an ideal life, dependence on whom might be a source of pride and moral advantage, but also are charged with the duty of caring for the virtue of their slaves at any rate, if not of other members of the subordinate classes; while the citizens in the Laws are not conceived as attaining to the same ethical level, nor have they apparently a similar duty imposed upon them. But then the Laws is admittedly a sketch of a second-rate society.

Throughout Aristotle's treatment of this subject and also of slavery, it must be borne in mind that he has in view an ideal State, in which the citizen-body is composed of men of full virtue (*σπουδαῖοι ἀπλῶς*). If it is well for the artisan to accept a lowly position and for the slave to be even enslaved, it is so because the men on whom they are thus made dependent are men of noble character and high capacity, spending their lives in an arduous exercise of virtue, through serving whom they rise to an ethical level they could not otherwise attain. It is the 'best State' (or, at all events an 'aristocratic' State, *Pol.* 3. 5. 1278 a 18), that 'will not make the artisan a citizen' (3. 5. 1278 a 8): the less elevated and more attainable constitution described in the Eleventh Chapter of the Sixth (the old Fourth) Book (*ἡ κοινοτάτη πολιτεία—ἡ διὰ τῶν μέσων*) would not probably refuse a share of power to artisans (3. 5. 1278 a 24) or other well-to-do members of the industrial and commercial classes.

Aristotle fully accepts the traditional estimate of 'the sordid occupations' (*βάνανσα ἔργα*), and perhaps his account of them gives additional definiteness to the conception of *βανανσία*. 'We must set down as sordid,' he says (*Pol.* 5 (8). 2. 1337 b 8 sqq.), 'any work or art or study which makes freemen unfit for the active exercise of virtue either in body or character or intelligence': the 'sordid arts' deteriorate the body, and 'trades plied for hire' (*μισθαρνικαί*

View of
Aristotle.

ἐργασίαι—a term of uncertain comprehension)—make the mind unfree (ἄσυχολον) and abject (ταπεινήν). Βαναυσία, however, he adds, is not confined to the practice of ‘sordid occupations,’ for an over-exact study of some sciences not in themselves unworthy of a freeman—according to Susemihl (Sus.², Note 982), Gymnastic, Music, Drawing, and Painting are among the sciences meant—produces the same effect and deserves the same name¹. But again, work of an unfree nature may be relieved of this stigma, if it is done not in the service of another, but for one’s own sake or for the sake of friends or for the sake of virtue (δι’ ἀρετήν)². So in the Rhetoric (1. 9. 1367 a 31) it is implied that the βάνανσος, unlike the freeman, lives ‘for the convenience of another’ (πρὸς ἄλλον)³. The freeman (Metaph. A. 2. 982 b 25) is ‘he who exists for his own sake and not that of another⁴.’ Both the life of the artisan and the life of the shopkeeper are forbidden to the citizens of Aristotle’s best State (Pol. 4 (7). 9. 1328 b 37 sqq.), ‘for those lives are ignoble and unfavourable to virtue⁵.’ This is not said of agriculture, which is, however, excluded on the ground that leisure is necessary both for the development of virtue and for political activity (1329 a 1). The life of a farmer is a life of incessant occupation in the country, which forbids even frequent attendance at the meetings of the popular assembly

¹ Thus the Indians of the territory of Musicanus were praised by the Cynic Onesicritus for not carrying the sciences (except medicine) to a high point of minute accuracy (Strabo 701, μὴ ἀκριβοῦν δὲ τὰς ἐπιστήμας πλὴν ἱατρικῆς).

² Cp. 5 (8). 6. 1341 b 10, ἐν ταύτῃ (sc. τῇ πρὸς τοὺς ἀγῶνας παιδείᾳ) γὰρ ὁ πράττων οὐ τῆς αὐτοῦ μεταχειρίζεται χάριν ἀρετῆς, ἀλλὰ τῆς τῶν ἀκούοντων ἡδονῆς, καὶ ταύτης φορτικῆς· διόπερ οὐ τῶν ἐλευθέρων κρίνομεν εἶναι τὴν ἐργασίαν ἀλλὰ θητικώτεραν· καὶ βαναύσους δὴ συμβαίνει γίνεσθαι. See also the story told of Antisthenes by Plutarch, Reipubl. Gerend. Praecepta, c. 15, and Plutarch’s addition to it.

³ His actions are διακομikai, like

those of the slave, 3. 4. 1277 a 36 sqq., with whom he is here for the moment identified.

⁴ Thus it is the characteristic of the μεγάλῳψυχος, πρὸς ἄλλον μὴ δύνασθαι (τὴν ἀλλ’ ἢ πρὸς φίλον (Eth. Nic. 4. 8. 1124 b 31).

⁵ Their very friendship was of the interested kind which rests on utility (Eth. Nic. 8. 7. 1158 a 21, ἡ δὲ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον φιλία ἀγοραίων). Aristotle does not mention, though the fact may well have been present to his mind, that it was the determination with which these classes pressed their claims to complete political equality that was fast making democracy the prevailing constitution in Greece.

(8 (6). 4. 1318 b 11 sqq.), much more anything like systematic political action. Aristotle's view of agriculture differs, in fact, so much from that put forward by Xenophon in the *Oeconomicus*, that he praises the States which marked off the military class from the cultivating class (4 (7). 10. 1329 a 40 sqq.), whereas Xenophon, like the Romans later, viewed the work of the peasant as an excellent preparation for the life of a soldier. Aristotle, with whom Plato appears to concur, may have held that the peasant would have but little leisure, except in winter, for the constant gymnastic practice on which the efficiency of a hoplite must have depended far more than that of a modern soldier, or he may have desired to reserve the military service of the State for those who would in after years be its rulers; but he does not explain the grounds of his view, in which he had been anticipated, not only, as has been said, by Plato, but also by Hippodamus (Pol. 2. 8. 1267 b 32).

It is from a different point of view that the various vocations falling under the Science of Supply are classified in the First Book, as natural or the contrary. They are here distinguished, not according to their effect on the agent, but according to their intrinsic conformity to the design of Nature. Measured by this standard, agriculture, the tending of animals, hunting, fishing, and the like stand on a very different level to the vocations of the artisan, day-labourer, merchant, and retail dealer. Even in the First Book, however, we are told (c. 11. 1258 b 10), that the practice of the very best of them is unworthy of a freeman¹. 'Necessary functions' as a whole, whether natural or otherwise, appear so far to be liable to objection on two grounds: (1) they are unfavourable to the development of virtue and stand in the way of higher things: (2) they are practised for the convenience of another. Aristotle has, however, other reasons for his low estimate of them. They are 'necessary' (*ἀναγκαῖαι*), not 'noble' (*καλὰ*). Necessary, in the first place, because concerned with things necessary for life, for that which provides things necessary is itself necessary. Aristotle marks off 'necessary' from 'noble' functions.

¹ If I am right in thus interpreting this passage.

Necessary, again, as being an indispensable condition of 'noble' action—action which is desirable for its own sake and not for the sake of something else (*τὸ καθ' αὐτὸ αἰρετόν*). Thus the word *ἀναγκαῖον* is used in contradistinction to *αἰρετόν καθ' αὐτό*, Eth. Nic. 7. 6. 1147 b 24, 29: it is used in connexion with *τούτου ἕνεκεν* and in contrast to *οὗ ἕνεκεν καὶ βέλτιον*, de Part. An. 3. 10. 672 b 23, and so in Pol. 5 (8). 3. 1338 a 13 we find some subjects of study marked off as 'desirable for their own sake' from others which are described as 'necessary, and desirable for the sake of something else.' Thus, just as the *βάνανσος* is held to exist for the sake of another man, all 'necessary functions'—not those of the *βάνανσος* only—are for the sake of other forms of activity which are desirable for their own sake. Hence the frequent contrast of the necessary and the noble, which indeed Aristotle inherited from Plato¹, though Plato is not perhaps equally faithful to this distinction as a standard for measuring the relative excellence of various paths in life.

It is not that, in Aristotle's view, these pursuits are not compatible with a certain type and level of virtue. They are, indeed, unfavourable to virtue of the higher kind (*ὑπερναντίοι πρὸς ἀρετήν*, 1328 b 40), but the slave, at all events, must possess some of the homelier virtues (industry and temperance, for instance, Pol. 1. 13. 1260 a 34), if he is to do his work well. Still the fraction of moral virtue which falls to the lot of the slave is not enough to give him any share in happiness (*εὐδαιμονία*), which presupposes a certain complex of attributes quite beyond his reach (cp. 4 (7). 9. 1328 b 33 sqq.). This view of happiness, if held by Plato, is not pressed by him to the same extent: he nowhere says that the third class in his Republic will not share in the general happiness of the State, whereas to Aristotle the free artisan or day-labourer seems to be still further removed from happiness than the slave, who shares the

¹ Cp. Plato, Rep. 493 C, *τὰ ἀναγκαῖα δίκαια καλοῖ καὶ καλὰ, τὴν δὲ τοῦ ἀναγκαίου καὶ ἀγαθοῦ φύσιν, ὅσον*

διαφέρει τῷ ὄντι, μήτε ἑωρακὸς εἶη μήτε ἄλλω δυνατὸς δεῖξαι.

society of a master able to raise him to the level of virtue which he is capable of attaining.

Over against the large group of vocations concerned with 'necessary work,' Aristotle ranges those concerned with 'noble work.' What pursuits exactly fall under the latter head, we fail to learn in any detail. Politics and philosophy, if not practised for gain, evidently do so (Pol. I. 7. 1255 b 36). A soldier's life does so too, though it is abandoned to those who are still under the age which qualifies for offices of State (4 (7). 9. 1329 a 2 sqq.): it is 'noble,' but it is not the supreme end (4 (7). 2. 1325 a 6). The management of a household, also, ranks as 'noble work,' though there are perhaps relations in life higher than the relation to wife or child, just as the care of wife or child is a higher thing than the care of slaves, which again is higher than the care of property (1. 13. 1259 b 18). The duties of a guardian or of an executor would rank, probably, with those of a householder. The cases of the poet, historian, and biographer, and generally of the writer, seem to escape consideration; but Aristotle can hardly intend an unfavourable judgment. Comedy, however, stands at a far lower level than tragedy or epic poetry; to witness a tragedy or to listen to music is a noble use of leisure (*διαγωγή*). The composition of music and even the writing of a tragedy are tasks which would hardly fall within the province of a true citizen, if done for pay. Instruction in 'noble work,' not rendered for pay, appears to rank among the chief duties of the father and the citizen. The work of the professional sculptor, painter, architect, musician, or physician, if done for pay, would probably be accounted unworthy of the citizen; indeed, the acquisition of skill of this kind, apart altogether from the terms of its exercise, would entail a closeness of application unbecoming a freeman (5 (8). 2. 1337 b 15 sqq.).

Aristotle's first step, then, was to distinguish necessary from noble work. His next was to insist that, in the best State at all events, they must be placed in different hands. Necessary functions must not be assigned to natures capable

Necessary and noble functions to be placed in different hands.

of noble functions, nor must the latter be assigned to natures only capable of the former.

It is easy to see why the higher functions should not be entrusted to the lower natures¹, but why should not necessary functions be shared in by those capable of noble ones? If this arrangement were adopted, the State would not need the presence of lower natures within its borders, while the higher need only be called on to give up a part of their time to necessary work. The reasons which weigh with Aristotle seem to be that—

1. The principle of entrusting one function only to one agent (*ἐν πρὸς ἓν*) should be observed, except where the functions are such as can be discharged without reciprocal embarrassment, which does not hold of necessary and noble functions.

2. Happiness does not lie wholly in the motive: a man is not happy, if he does necessary work even from the highest motive (*τοῦ καλοῦ ἕνεκα*): happiness lies partly in motive, partly in the character of the action, which must itself belong to the class of noble actions (*πράξεις αἰρεταὶ καθ' αὐτάς*). It may be said that if eating, drinking, and sleeping are necessary functions, it is not possible altogether to release the higher natures from functions of this kind, but this is not present to Aristotle's mind. Aristotle defined happiness not as a habit (*ἔξις*), like Plato and the Platonists², but as an activity (*ἐνέργεια* or *χρήσις*, Pol. 4 (7). 13. 1332 a 9), and the more he insisted on this, the more important the subject-matter of the activity became. A life spent even in the distribution of 'things good under special circumstances' (*τὰ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως καλά*)—

¹ On the principle expressed in de Part. An. 4. 10. 687 a 10, ἡ φύσις αἰεὶ διανέμει, καθάπερ ἄνθρωπος φρόνιμος, ἕκαστον τῷ δυνάμει χρῆσθαι. The same illustration from αὐλοὶ is used in this passage as in the discussion on the distribution of power in the State, Pol. 3. 12. 1282 b 31 sq.

² Cp. Clem. Strom. 418 D (quoted by Zeller, Plato, E. T. p. 579,

n. 62): *Σπεύσιππος τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν φησὶν ἔξιν εἶναι τελείαν ἐν τοῖς κατὰ φύσιν ἔχουσιν· ἡ ἔξιν ἀγαθῶν. Contrast the emphatic statement (Pol. 4 (7). 13. 1332 a 7): *φαιμέν δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἠθικοῖς, εἴ τι τῶν λόγων ἐκείνων ὄφελος, ἐνέργειαν εἶναι (sc. τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν) καὶ χρῆσιν ἀρετῆς τελείαν, καὶ ταύτην οὐκ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ἀλλ' ἀπλῶς.**

in the infliction, for instance, of just punishment beneficial to the offender—would not be a life of full happiness (4 (7). 13. 1332 a 10 sqq.); much less would a life spent in necessary work be so.

3. Even Plato, though he held that in the hands of the best men retail trade would assume a new aspect, and be recognized as a work of charity and beneficence, shrank from the idea of allowing them to meddle with such work¹; and Aristotle holds that most functions of a necessary kind are *per se* enfeebling in their effect on the character. Even the learning of some arts, not in themselves unbefitting freemen, to the full professional limit of exactness made a man βάναντος in Aristotle's opinion.

4. That which is appropriate (τὸ πρέπον) is always kept in view in the Politics (e.g. Pol. 5 (8). 7. 1342 b 33); and it would be a solecism to give any share in the lower functions to the higher natures.

It follows that a separate class or classes must exist in the State devoted to the discharge of the lower functions, and that the human beings employed for this purpose must be capable of nothing higher—otherwise there will be an infraction of justice, both wrong in itself and fatal to the harmony of the State. Aristotle does not appear to point out, in what we have of the Politics, the measures by which he proposes to secure that natures shall not be pronounced to be fit only for necessary work, which better rearing or training, or more favourable circumstances might possibly raise to the higher level. He seems also hardly conscious of the sadness of the view that the existence in adequate numbers of natures fit only for the lower functions is essential to the realization of the highest type of human society. If all men were capable of becoming men of full excellence (σπουδαῖοι ἀπλῶς), the 'best State' could not exist. The attainment by the higher natures of their true level has its accompanying shadow; it involves and implies the existence of lower natures who must remain beneath

¹ Laws 918 D, δ μήποτε γίγνοιτο οὐδ' ἔσται.

them. The State at its best breaks society into two sharply contrasted grades—those who can live for the highest ends and those who cannot; the parting of the one from the other is the first and most indispensable step towards its realization. It is of course true that the lower grade would, *ex hypothesi*, gain nothing by being called to the discharge of noble functions, and that it rises to a higher level of virtue and pleasure, when linked to the higher grade, than it could otherwise achieve.

Position in
the State
assigned
by Aristotle to the
classes
concerned
with necessary
functions.

The relation of the classes discharging necessary functions to those discharging noble functions, as will readily be foreseen, can only be a dependent one. The latter fulfil the end of the State; they consequently are the State. The former exist within the State, because otherwise the latter could not exist; their existence is an unwelcome necessity. What numerical proportion these classes are to bear to the classes which form the State, we do not distinctly learn; but no more of them must find a place in the State than is necessary for the purposes of the higher grade. Those of them who are slaves must be recruited from populations submissive enough to accept a dependent position without giving trouble. It may be asked why all are not made slaves, public or private. The answer is twofold. The slave by nature is conceived as one whose intelligence is of the lowest type and whose value lies in his thews and sinews, whereas the merchant or the artisan needs intellectual qualifications of a higher kind. The slave is also viewed, especially in the chapters where the naturalness of slavery is discussed, as in the main an instrument of the household¹, whereas the artisan or the merchant could hardly be treated as an appendage of the household.

The position of the classes concerned with necessary work, except indeed the slaves, seems to be but little studied in

¹ Though Aristotle provides for the existence of public slaves in his best State (4 (7). 10. 1330a 30: cp. 2. 7. 1267 b 16), and includes in his definition of wealth *χρήματα χρήσιμα εἰς κοινωνίαν πόλεως*, 1. 8. 1256 b 29, he, at first at

all events, treats the slave as an animate instrument of the household and the chattel of a *δουλοπότης* (1. 3. 1253 b 1 sqq.). Aristotle refuses to follow Phaleas in making the *τεχνίται* public slaves (2. 7. 1267 b 13 sqq.).

what we possess of the Politics. We hear nothing of any provision for their education. In the picture of household life which is given us, the householder is conceived as belonging to the superior grade to which alone citizenship is accorded. No non-citizen is to own land in the best State. Not only are the classes in question excluded from office and from membership of the assembly and the dicasteries, but they are assigned a separate market-place, distinct from that of the citizens, while those of them who are merchants reside at the port. Unlike the slaves, who are brought within the household and consequently within the range of the ideal householder's influence, they are apparently abandoned to the deteriorating influences of necessary work without any counteracting safeguard.

Aristotle regards the State at its best as an union of men who are heart and soul purposed and qualified to live the highest life, and whose co-operation rests, not on force or fear, but on that temper of mind as its condition. The State is not fully a State whose members do right with any after-thought or secondary aim; they must love virtue and practise it for its own sake, not for the sake of the external goods it brings. It is useless and wrong to admit those to membership who cannot fulfil these conditions, and this is the case with those whose initial unfitness is increased by the practice of the lower kind of work. They cannot share in the common aim of living the highest life, or in the capacity for common action of the highest kind, both of which the best State presupposes. Not only, indeed, are they not to share in ruling, but the State is not to be ruled in their interest, except so far as this cannot be neglected without injury to the citizens¹.

Remarks
on Aris-
totle's view
and the
considera-
tions which
led him to
adopt it.

Aristotle's conception of happiness and his conception of

¹ The common advantage (*τὸ κοινὴν συμφέρον*) which a State should study is the common advantage of the citizens (cp. 3. 13. 1283 b 40, *τὸ δ' ὁρθὸν ληπτέον ἴσως· τὸ δ' ἴσως ὁρθὸν πρὸς τὸ τῆς πόλεως ὅλης συμφέρον καὶ πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν τὸ*

τῶν πολιτῶν), and that of other classes, only so far as their advantage is bound up with that of the citizens (3. 6. 1278 b 32 sq.). This is here said expressly of the slave; whether it holds also of the *τεχνίτης, θής*, etc., we are not told.

κοινωνία forced him to find in the classes which live for noble work the sole sharers in the true life of the State: what then could he say but that these were the State, and that if the Statesman is to rule for the benefit of the State, he must rule for their benefit? It must, however, be borne in mind that this holds good only of the best constitution; it is only where the citizens are men of full human excellence (*σπουδαῖοι ἀπλῶς*), and actually living the highest human life, that the doctrine applies. If the Few 'inherit the earth,' the Few, it must be remembered, are to live an arduous life of moral and intellectual greatness, toilsome though happy. Not a life of self-sacrifice for the sake of others, like that of Plato's guardians, for they live for themselves, and no other life would be so full for them of happiness and pleasure; nor an ascetic life, for besides the happiness and pleasure of the highest life, they are to possess its due external conditions and to share in the occasional recreation and relaxation which human nature demands; but a life making great demands on human energy, self-mastery, and intellect. Would the supply of the material necessities of men living a life of this kind be indeed a vocation unworthy of the lower natures? Is it an unsatisfactory destiny for such natures to be caught into the train of some heroic character and to be raised by his aid to the highest level attainable by them¹? Perhaps not: but we feel that their subordinate position in the State should be the result of their original inferiority rather than of their participation in necessary functions. It is one thing, too, to follow the lead of a heroic class as freemen, though subordinate, and quite another to accept a relation of absolute dependence and even slavery. It is, besides, true that Aristotle provides no means for making the most that can be made of these classes, or indeed of any individuals belonging to them who are equal to higher things; so far as we can judge from what remains

¹ 'I can see my dear father's life in some measure as the sunk pillar on which mine was to rise and be built,' says Carlyle in his

Reminiscences (i. 65); and Aristotle designs the life of these subordinated classes to serve a somewhat similar purpose.

to us of the Politics, he drops the arrangements which Plato had devised for the purpose of raising those who deserve it to a higher place in the State, and removing to a lower place natures ill-adapted to the higher.

The contrast of necessary and noble work is too sharply drawn by Aristotle: it is, besides, incorrectly drawn; and the effect of men's vocation on their character is also over-rated. What a man is, cannot always be measured by the social functions which he is fit to discharge. To exclude the hardy peasant from the military service of the State was surely a mistake; and it can hardly have been necessary to forbid his access to all official functions, however humble. Aristotle will not allow him even to be a 'Warden of the Woods' (ὕλωρός). His best State reminds us of Menander's lines:

"Ὡσπερ τῶν χορῶν
οὐ πάντες ᾄδουσ', ἀλλ' ἀφωνοὶ δύο τινές
ἢ τρεῖς παρεστήκασιν πάντων ἔσχατοι
εἰς τὸν ἀριθμὸν· καὶ τοῦθ' ὁμοίως πως ἔχει·
χώραν κατέχουσι, ζῶσι δ' οἷς ἔστιν βίος¹.

The individuals excluded by Aristotle, indeed, are not idle, or, in his view, cumberers of the ground, but essential conditions of the existence of the State.

Modern inquirers, while still drawing a distinction between the one class of vocations and the other, draw it in a less unqualified way. Thus to Hegel the activities which fall under the head of 'social life' (Gesellschaft) are marked off from those of political life by their primary aim being private, if their result is the general advantage. In industry or trade the individual acts for his own interest, and if at the same moment he in effect acts for the general advantage, this is no part of his aim². In this sphere the Whole and its interest asserts itself as a Necessity or Compelling Force. Yet it does assert itself. For with the development of trade and industry comes the Division of Labour, which

¹ Menand. *Ἐπίκληρος*, Fr. 1 (p. 17, ed. Didot).

² Compare Mr. Herbert Spencer's contrast between industrial

and governmental organization (*Fortnightly Review*, Dec. 1. 1880, p. 683).

while it facilitates supply and increases skill, also binds men closer to their fellows and makes each individual more dependent on the rest. Classes spring up, which gather men into large unities based on similarity of vocation, and impress on them the interest of the Whole. From this point of view the supposed antagonism of trade and industry to the higher life is softened down. These vocations present themselves rather as a not uncongenial preparatory stage. Our common life in the State ceases to seem marred and spoilt by the unwelcome participation of classes, alien in function to the general purpose of the State, but yet indispensable to its existence. The State comes to present the aspect of a self-consistent unity; its higher and lower elements no longer stand to each other in a relation of strong antithesis; one end and purpose is supreme throughout the whole. The bisected State of Aristotle is replaced by a 'city at unity with itself.'

It was not, however, entirely by considerations special to the πολιτικὴ ἐπιστήμη that Aristotle was led to his conception of the true social structure of the perfect State. More passages than one in the Politics imply that the phenomena of the State do but repeat the phenomena of the whole class of things to which the State belongs. If we find in the State the contrast of ruler and ruled, it is in part because this contrast is a constant phenomenon in every Whole composed of a plurality of members, whether continuous or discrete (I. 5. 1254 a 28 sq.). So again, the State belongs to the class of 'natural compounds' (τὰ κατὰ φύσιν συνεστῶτα, 4 (7). 8. 1328 a 21), and Aristotle's study of this class of things prepared him to find a decided inequality to be the law of the State. Not only in the State, but in all natural compounds, the Whole is dependent for its existence on things which nevertheless are no part of it, and which stand to it in the relation of means to end. Thus, a house (for Aristotle takes his example from an object which does not strictly belong to the class of natural compounds) cannot exist without a builder and

instruments of building; yet these are no part of the house. And so the State cannot exist without property, and property is both animate and inanimate; yet even animate property is not a part of the State. In an animal, again (de Gen. An. 2. 6. 742 a 28 sqq.), we can distinguish three things: (1) the Whole (*τὸ ὅλον*), which is here conceived as the end or *οὐ ἐνεκα*: (2) the moving and generating principle, which is both part of the end, being a part of the Whole, and also a means to the existence of the Whole (or the attainment of the end): (3) 'parts which are useful to the Whole as instruments for certain purposes' (*τὰ ὀργανικὰ τούτοις μέρη πρὸς ἐνίας χρήσεις*). So in the human body (742 b 16 sqq.), 'the lower half exists for the sake of the upper half, and is neither a part of the End nor its generating source.' It is for the sake of the flesh that all the other homogeneous parts of an animal (bone, skin, sinew, bloodvessels, hair, etc.) exist (de Part. An. 2. 8. 653 b 30 sqq.). In any object into which Matter enters there is 'the fashioning element' (*τὸ δημιουργοῦν*), and there is Matter (de Gen. An. 1. 18. 723 b 29: 2. 4. 738 b 20). In the soul as in everything else there are two contrasted parts—the 'passive reason' (*νοῦς παθητικός*), answering to Matter, and the 'creative reason' (*νοῦς ποιητικός*, *ὁ πάντα ποιῶν*, de An. 3. 5. 430 a 10 sqq.). This duality runs through the entire universe of things (430 a 10). In an egg no less than in an animal or a State, two contrasted parts can be discerned—'that which is the principle of growth' (*ὅθεν ἡ ἀρχή*), and 'that which supplies nutriment' (*ὅθεν ἡ τροφή*, de Gen. An. 3. 1. 751 b 22). The same thing appears in a beehive (de Gen. An. 3. 10. 760 b 7 sqq., *εὖ δὲ καὶ τὸ τοὺς βασιλεῖς ὥσπερ πεποιημένους ἐπὶ τέκνωσιν ἔσω μένειν, ἀφειμένους τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἔργων, καὶ μέγεθος δὲ ἔχειν, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τεκνοποιτῶν συστάτος τοῦ σώματος αὐτῶν· τοὺς τε κηφήνας ἀργοὺς ἄτ' οὐδὲν ἔχοντας ὄπλον πρὸς τὸ διαμάχεσθαι περὶ τῆς τροφῆς καὶ διὰ τὴν βραδυτήτα τὴν τοῦ σώματος· αἱ δὲ μέλιτται μέσαι τὸ μέγεθος εἰσιν ἀμφοῖν (χρήσιμοι γὰρ οὕτω πρὸς τὴν ἐργασίαν), καὶ ἐργάτιδες, ὥς καὶ τέκνα τρέφουσαι καὶ πατέρας*). Steps and gradations

within the State reflect the universal tendency to order (*τάξις*) in things which conform to Nature (de Gen. An. 3. 10. 760 a 31).

To Aristotle the study of nature meant the discrimination between the Conditionally Necessary and the Good—between the operation of the Material and the operation of the Final Cause. To distinguish what is necessary from what is noble—to mark off, for instance, the rule of a master over slaves from the rule of a citizen over his fellow-citizens, or of a king over his subjects—was as incumbent on the statesman as on the philosopher. If the State is not to exalt means into ends, it must know what vocations are necessary and what are noble.

Exclusion
of women
from political
functions in the
best State
taken for
granted.

The exclusion of women (and of course children) from political functions in the best State, unlike that of the classes concerned with necessary work, is taken for granted by Aristotle without discussion, notwithstanding that Plato had come to a different conclusion with respect to women. His silence on the subject is the more noticeable, inasmuch as he argues at length against Plato's abrogation (in the Republic) of the household and several property. The true place for women is tacitly taken to be the household, where indeed their service is indispensable (2. 5. 1264 b 1). Women possess the faculty of moral deliberation, but in a form in which it is not always capable of making itself obeyed¹; it is therefore in subordinate co-operation with the ideal head of the household, that the female character best realizes the type of virtue which belongs to it (1. 13. 1260 a 20 sq.). This being the view of Aristotle, we might have expected that in his argument against Plato in defence of the household (Pol. 2. 1-4), the interest of women in its preservation and the loss they would incur through its abolition would be more conspicuously noticed. They are probably included among those who would be less cared for in the absence of the institution (2. 3. 1261 b 33), but no express reference is made to their interest in its main-

¹ Pol. 1. 13. 1260a 13, τὸ δὲ θῆλυ ἔχει μὲν [τὸ βουλευτικόν], ἀλλ' ἄκυρον.

tenance. The exclusion of women from citizenship in the best State follows necessarily from the hypothesis that in it all citizens will be possessed of full virtue and happiness. Women have their share of virtue and enjoyment, but they are not held to possess the full virtue of a good man, which is required of all citizens there, nor consequently happiness (*εὐδαιμονία*).

If we ask to whom, if not to citizens, necessary functions are to be assigned, the answer is that a separate population, distinct from that which we sought at starting from Nature and Fortune (p. 89) to serve as the raw material of the State, must be called in for the discharge of these functions. The cultivators of the soil will either be slaves, and consequently men of that low degree of intelligence which slavery, as Aristotle conceives it, presupposes, or else a dependent class non-Hellenic by extraction and not dissimilar from slaves (4 (7). 10. 1330 a 25 sqq.). The same class will serve as oarsmen in the triremes of the State (4 (7). 6. 1327 b 11 sqq.). There will thus be a considerable non-Hellenic element in the best State of Aristotle; its 'economic substructure,' if so we may term it, will be formed to a large extent of non-Hellenic materials. In this Aristotle departs, no doubt designedly, from Lacedaemonian precedents, for the subordinate working and trading populations of the Lacedaemonian State were Hellenic. The model he follows seems to be rather that of the more commercial States of Greece, the lower places in whose social systems were filled with aliens and imported slaves. Here the dependent classes were more under control and less formidable, and the infraction of justice was less¹. An interchange of population had long been going forward on the coasts of the Aegean and the Euxine, resulting in the introduction of a non-Hellenic element within Hellenic communities for purposes of trade and labour, while Hellenes settled in the

The 'economic substructure' of Aristotle's State to be largely formed of non-Hellenic materials.

¹ Cp. Levit. 25. 44: 'Both thy bondmen and thy bondmaids which thou shalt have shall be of the heathen that are round about you; of them shall ye buy bondmen and bondmaids.'

wild regions round about Greece, and implanted the first germs of civilization¹. The scheme of Aristotle's best State involves a similar division of functions between the Hellene and the non-Hellene, though the alien element in it would be far more carefully controlled, kept apart, and limited in amount.

We see that the lower section of society—which in modern States includes perhaps four-fifths of the total population, though its relative numbers would no doubt be far less in the best State of Aristotle—is to form in extraction and character the strongest possible contrast to the upper section. It is designed to be submissive and serviceable; its vocation is to obey, rather than to co-operate with its superiors. Aristotle has apparently forgotten how often war, or disease, or famine made great gaps in the ranks of the citizens of Greek States, which could only be filled by drafts from the dependent classes, free or slave, for certainly the lower section of his State would be quite unsuited to recruit the ranks of the higher.

It is not, however, enough to sever the citizens of the State from necessary work:

Aristotle's commission of 'necessary work'² to a class thus constituted is, however, only a first step to a purgation of the commercial and industrial life of the State. The Science of Supply³, which had degenerated into a Science of Profit, must be recalled to a sense of its true limits and

¹ Thus the low estimate of trade and industry, which prevailed among Greeks and Romans, helped in some degree to mingle races which might otherwise have held apart. Nothing would probably strike a modern observer more, if he could be transported to the streets of ancient Athens or to those of any other Greek city where resident aliens and imported slaves were numerous, than the magnitude of the Oriental and barbarian element of its population. In many parts of the Peloponnese, no doubt, the case was very different. Observe Aristotle's acceptance of this state of things as

a matter of course (4 (7). 4. 1326 a 18, ἀναγκαῖον γὰρ ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἴσως ὑπάρχειν καὶ δούλων ἀριθμὸν πολλῶν καὶ μετοίκων καὶ ξένων).

² Aristotle, we note, includes the work of the τεχνίτης and θῆς under the term ἀναγκαῖαι πράξεις, though not under the sound form of χρηματιστική. Ἀναγκαῖος, however, as thus used, is little more than a negative of καλός.

³ I use the term 'Science' in relation both to χρηματιστική and to οἰκονομική, but the former is probably in strictness an Art or Productive Science, the latter a Practical Science, like πολιτική.

methods: measures must be taken to ensure that the lower social activities shall not overgrow and stifle the higher, and to still the unquiet and inventive spirit of gain, which springs from a misconception of the end of human life. Aristotle's wish is that as little 'necessary activity' as possible, and as much 'noble activity' as possible, shall find a place in his State. It is one of the functions of the Science of Household Management (*οικονομία* or *οικονομική*) to effect this by exercising a control over the Science of Supply. The household must be placed under the authority of a head who knows that the quest of commodities should be kept within the limits which the interests of virtue and happiness (*τὸ εὖ ζῆν*) impose.

the Science of Supply (*χρηματιστική*) must be purged, and recalled to a sense of its true limits and methods: it must be marked off from the Science of Household Management (*οικονομική*) and placed under its control.

He arrives at this conclusion by a long discussion of the question, how the Science of Supply (*χρηματιστική*) stands to the Science of Household Management (I. 3. 1253 b 12: 8. 1256 a 1 sqq.)—a question, at first sight, of purely scientific interest, but which is made the starting-point of a sweeping social reform. Some had held the Science of Supply to be the main element in Household Science (I. 3. 1253 b 13), while others had gone so far as to identify the two (1253 b 12), thus merging the head of the household in the provider of commodities. Who these were who went so far as to forget the husband and parent in the bread-winner, we do not know.

Aristotle, on the other hand, feels bound to ask whether the Science of Supply is a part of Household Science at all. He had, indeed, incidentally taken this for granted in an early chapter of the Politics (I. 3. 1253 b 12), but later on (I. 8. 1256 a 3 sq.), he seems inclined to recede from this hasty admission, for he suggests the question whether, after all, the former is not merely auxiliary (*ὑπηρετική*) to the latter. He asks, further, whether it is not the business of Household Science to use rather than to acquire. If this is so, it cannot be identical with the Science of Supply, whose object is to acquire; and we may doubt whether the latter science is not too distinct from the former to be even a part of it.

Aristotle's
theory of
the Science
of Supply:
its sound
and
unsound
forms.

The first thing, however, is to ask what the Science of Supply is. Its business is to 'consider whence property may be acquired.' But then there are more kinds than one of property. One of them is food: is agriculture, then, or any other science connected with the acquisition of food, a part of the Science of Supply? Aristotle reviews the various modes of acquiring food—the pastoral, that of hunting, and that of agriculture—and the combinations of them to which men resort. These methods of acquiring food, he continues, have recourse for the purpose of sustenance to objects designed by nature to be so used—designed for the purpose just as much as milk is designed for the sustenance of the newborn animal, or as other provisions of a similar nature are designed to serve the same end. Plants and animals are to the adult what milk is to the infant—the provision of Nature for his support. We know them to be so designed, for otherwise they would exist for no purpose whatever (*μάρην*, 1256 b 21), and this is never the case with products of Nature. Nature has made plants for the use of animals, and the lower animals for the use of man, not merely indeed as food, but also to supply him with raiment and other commodities. We may even go farther and say that not only the capture of animals by hunting, but also the capture of men who, though designed by nature for slavery, are unwilling to be slaves, is a natural mode of acquiring commodities, and that consequently war, the means by which this is effected, falls, in one of its forms, within the natural form of the Science of Supply. But plants and animals cannot exist except on, or in, earth and water (1. 10. 1258 a 23); therefore Nature must provide earth and water, and from these man must obtain the commodities he needs¹. Here Aristotle falls back on the teaching of Socrates, as recorded by Xenophon (Mem. 4. 3. 5-6)².

¹ Aristotle seems to forget that slaves, though *κτήματα*, can hardly be said to be obtained from earth and water.

² Dicaearchus, the pupil of Aris-

totle, seems in his sketch of the development of human society to have gone back, like Plato (Polit. 271 C sqq.), to an 'age of Cronus,' 'quum viverent homines ex illis

One form of the Science of Supply, then, is naturally a part¹ of the Science of Household Management, for either it must exist, or the latter Science must itself provide that commodities shall be forthcoming necessary for life and useful for human society in household and State. Commodities of this nature constitute true wealth, for this kind of wealth is not open to the charge which has been preferred against wealth, that it does not belong to the class of 'things subject to a limit' (*τὰ πεπερασμένα*).

There is, however, another form of the Science of Supply, which is not natural. It arises thus:—Every article of property may be employed in one or other of two ways; it may be used or it may be exchanged. Both uses are natural. Exchange is perfectly natural, so far as it is used for the supply of the wants of the two parties to the exchange. The articles exchanged must, however, be used by the parties, or be intended to be used by them. This seems to be implied in Aristotle's language, and his principle evidently excludes an intermediary who buys to sell again. A perfectly legitimate step was taken when money was invented to facilitate exchange between distant or comparatively distant parties. It was, however, the invention of money—a commodity which invited by its

rebus quae inviolata ultro ferret terra.' This mode of existence was to him alone 'natural,' the pastoral life coming next in order of time and marking a decline, inasmuch as it brought with it the slaughter of animals for food, and also war: last of all, men took to agriculture (*Dicaearch.* *Fragm.* 1-5: Müller, *Fr. Hist. Gr.* 2. 230 sqq.). To Aristotle, on the contrary, the earliest age of the world is an age of Cyclopes, not an age of Cronus, and the pastoral and agricultural modes of life are equally natural. He would probably agree that the pastoral life is historically prior to the agricultural (*cp. Pol.* 4 (7). 10. 1329 b 14, if this passage is from Aristotle's pen: the life of the Cyclopes is

also represented by Homer as pastoral).

We see that *Dicaearchus*, like *Theophrastus*, had come to entertain objections to the slaughter of harmless animals for food which are quite strange to Aristotle (see as to *Theophrastus*, *Bernays*, *Theophrastos über Frömmigkeit*).

Some Indian races were believed by *Herodotus* to subsist after a fashion which even *Dicaearchus* would admit to be natural (*Hdt.* 3. 100).

¹ Later on, this conclusion turns out to be only provisional, for we are taught to regard even the sound form of the Science of Supply as in strictness rather subsidiary to, than a part of, Household Science.

compactness its own indefinite increase, that carried exchange beyond the natural function of its earlier days—the provision for man's needs—and developed the other form of the Science of Supply, the mercantile form (τὸ καπηλικόν). This form errs in two ways: (1) it wins produce, not from earth and water, but from the process of exchange, or in other words, from fellow-men (ἀπ' ἀλλήλων): (2) its aim is not the supply of men's needs, but the acquisition of an indefinite amount of money; consequently, wealth loses for it the limited character which makes it natural. In fact, its procedure, if we analyse this still further, betrays a wrong conception of the end of life, which it conceives either as the mere preservation of existence (τὸ ζῆν), or if as good life, good life in the mistaken sense of bodily enjoyment¹. This is the form assumed by the Science of Supply, when it is abandoned to itself and not controlled by Household Science, which knows the true end of life and should impress it on the Science of Supply.

Comments
on this
theory.

Aristotle apparently objects not merely to commercial dealing conducted with a view to unlimited gain, but to all commercial dealing in which the parties do not come together in order to provide themselves with articles for their own use. His principle might, indeed, be construed to involve an objection to commercial dealing in which the parties seek to provide themselves with articles not really necessary to life or to good life; but into this further question he does not go. The use of things for purposes for which nature did not intend them—the error as to the end of life which makes the indefinite heaping up of money an object of desire: these are the main grounds on which

¹ Aristotle finds it hard to understand the χρηματιστικὸς βίος (cp. Eth. Nic. I. 3. 1096 a 5): and Plutarch speaks in the same way, Vita Catonis Censoris, c. 18, οὕτως ὁ τοῦ πλούτου ζῆλος οὐδενὶ πάθει φυσικῶ συννημμένος ἐκ τῆς ὀχλώδους καὶ θυραίου δόξης ἐπεισώδιός ἐστιν. Obviously a desire for unlimited gain may exist where there is

neither any irrational anxiety as to subsistence nor any craving for sensual pleasure. Plato has a good passage (Rep. 330 C) on the love of money in men who have not inherited but acquired wealth. They love it not only for its usefulness, but also as a man loves his child—as being their own creation.

he censures the unsound form of the Science of Supply. The first objection applies especially to usury; for it is even more unnatural to make the barren metal breed money, than to win it from the process of exchange. Aristotle, it should be added, is conscious that other social functions besides that of exchange may be exercised with a view to unlimited gain—those, for example, of the general or the physician (1. 9. 1258 a 8 sqq.). The same thing might of course be said of agriculture.

He misinterprets the work of the intermediary between producers who purchases, not because he needs the thing for his own consumption or use, but in order to resell, and whose profit is in reality payment for a social service, not something filched from his neighbour¹. It may well be true that there are elements in the organization of commerce and modes of commercial operation which represent no social service²; it might also be a gain to the world if commerce were confined within the limits which considerations of good life impose; but as to this Aristotle does not observe that some States may with advantage to themselves and to other States extend their production and exchange of products beyond the limit of their own needs, or, in other words, may trade and manufacture for other communities which are less favourably situated for carrying on trade and manufactures³.

His principle that land and water are the true sources of wealth leads him a step further in c. 11⁴, where he ranges among unsound sources of Supply labour rendered for

¹ Plato had, as we have seen, construed the social function of *καπηλεία* in a truer way (Laws 918 B-E).

² E.g. the practice of 'cornering,' which 'consists in buying up so much of a commodity as gives the buyers command over the market for that particular commodity' (*Times*, June 26, 1883). Aristotle seems to regard *καπηλική χρηματιστική* as being little else than systematic cornering.

³ He, in fact, forbids his best State to trade for others (4 (7). 6. 1327 a 27, *αὐτῇ γὰρ ἐμπορικῇν, ἀλλ' οὐ τοῖς ἄλλοις, δεῖ εἶναι τὴν πόλιν*).

⁴ In this chapter also he places the cutting of timber and quarrying or mining in a class apart as partaking both of the natural and the unnatural Science of Supply—which is strange, as he recognizes the use of Nature's products not only for food, but for other services to man.

wages (μισθαρνία)—in other words, the acquisition of money through placing at the service of others for pay (i.e. exchanging) bodily or mental aptitudes. It is not easy to see why a man should not be allowed to exchange his labour, just as much as the produce of his vines, for any commodities he requires, even on Aristotle's own principle (ὅσον γὰρ ἱκανὸν αὐτοῖς, ἀναγκαῖον ἦν ποιείσθαι τὴν ἀλλαγὴν, 1. 9. 1257 a 18). There need not be in 'labouring for hire' any such desire for an indefinite amount of coin as Aristotle connects with the unsound form of the Science of Supply. In the Ninth Book of the Nicomachean Ethics (9. 1. 1164 a 22 sqq.) the receipt of money from pupils appears to be contemplated and not objected to¹. In the Fourth (the old Seventh) Book of the Politics (4 (7). 8. 1328 b 20 sq.: cp. 9. 1329 a 35) artisans and day-labourers (who are said to practise 'working for hire,' 1. 11. 1258 b 25) are held to be necessary to the State. He seems to have been lured back for the moment in the First Book of the Politics to an old doctrine of Socrates, which Plato had also accepted, though only in a cursory way and with a slight modification². Aristotle, we must remember, has

¹ Compare the doctrine of the Epicurean Philodemus as to the best source of κτητική (Philodem. de Virtutibus et Vitiis, lib. ix.: see Schömann, Opusc. 3. 240, whose completion of the text is followed): πρῶτον δὲ καὶ κάλλιστον ἀπὸ λόγων φιλοσόφων ἀνδράσιν δεκτικοῖς μεταδιδόμενον (μεταδιδομένων?) ἀντιμεταλαμβάνειν εὐχαριστό[τατα, οἷα] μετὰ σεβασμοῦ παντελῶς ἐγένετο Ἐπικούρῳ λόγων δὲ ἀληθινῶν καὶ ἀφιλονεικῶν καὶ συλλήβδην εἰπεῖν ἀταράχων [εἰπεῖ] τό γε διὰ σοφιστικῶν καὶ ἀγωνιστικῶν οὐδὲν ἐστὶ βέλτιον τοῦ διὰ δημοκρατικῶν καὶ συκοφαντικῶν. For the views of the Stoics as to the legitimate forms of κτητική, see Zeller, Stoics, E. T. p. 269 n. Columella (de Re Rustica, praefatio, § 10) comes to the conclusion—'superest unum genus liberale et ingenium rei familiaris augendae

quod ex agricolatione contingit.'

² Cp. Laws 842 C, ἐκ γῆς γὰρ καὶ ἐκ θαλάττης τοῖς πλείστοις τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἐστὶ κατεσκευασμένα τὰ περὶ τὴν τροφήν· τοῦτοις δὲ ('but for my citizens') μόνον ἐκ γῆς. Except in this respect, Plato approves of much the same sources of supply as Aristotle. His citizens in the Laws are to be γεωργοὶ καὶ νομαῖς καὶ μελιττουργοί (842 D, a passage which perhaps suggested Pol. 1. 11. 1258 b 12–20), and to have nothing to do with ναυκληρικὰ καὶ ἐμπορικὰ καὶ καπηλευτικὰ καὶ πανδοκεύσεις καὶ τελωνικά καὶ μεταλλείας (contrast Pol. 1. 11. 1258 b 27 sq.) καὶ δανεισμοὶ καὶ ἐπίτοκοι τόκοι. Cp. also Menexen. 237 E sqq. Theophrastus held similar language about the earth, if Bernays is right (Theophrastus über Frömmigkeit, p. 92) in ascribing Porphyry. de Abstin. 2. 32 to him. We

here the ideal State in view; he does not seem in the Ethics to impose these limits on 'getting.' There is no hint, at any rate, in the account of the 'liberal man' there given, that his 'getting' (*λῆψις*) will conform to the standard here laid down. He will not be, like the man who lives only for gain (*ὁ ἀσχροκερδής*), a lender of small sums at usurious interest, or the keeper of a house of ill-fame, nor will he be a gambler, or a thief, or a robber (Eth. Nic. 4. 3. 1121 b 31 sqq.: 1122 a 7): on the contrary, 'he will win an income from legitimate sources, such as property of his own, and will regard the winning of an income, not as a noble thing, but as a necessity, if he is to have the means of giving' (1120 a 34). Not a word is said of his abstaining from lending money at moderate interest. Aristotle's language, in fact, implies that it is not illiberal to do this.

We now know what the Science of Supply properly is, and are in a position to settle its relation to Household Science. Even its sound form is not in strictness a part of Household Science: it is rather its condition—one of those *ὧν οὐκ ἄνευ* which form no part of the thing whose existence they make possible¹. What it provides, Household Science uses. If the Science of Supply does much for Household Science, this in its turn does much for it—imposes a limit on its efforts and adjusts them to the true end. Household Science has higher functions to discharge in regulating the relations of husband and wife, father and child, but one of its functions is to act as the intermediary by whose agency the end of the State is impressed on the business of Supply. But for it, the Science of Supply might resort to false sources and false methods of supply, and fail to pause when the amount has been obtained which is most favourable to good life. Household Science is possessed of the true end of human life—is an ethical science, which the other is not.

find similar expressions in Oecon. 1. 2. 1343 b 1.

¹ The question raised in 1. 8. 1256 a 5, whether the Science of

Supply provides 'instruments' (*ὄργανα*) or Matter (*ὑλη*), or both, is not distinctly settled.

It is subordinate to πολιτική (Eth. Nic. I. I. 1094 b 2), if it is not, indeed, a part of the political section of πολιτική (Eth. Nic. 6. 8. 1141 b 31); in any case, its principles are in accord with those of πολιτική, from which it differs in the sphere of its action, not in aim.

One might, indeed, ask—seeing that the State, no less than the household, may mistake the true nature of the Science of Supply and obtain commodities from improper sources and to an unlimited extent—why the so-called Household Science is viewed as connected especially, if not exclusively, with the household; why it is not the concern of the statesman at least as much as the householder; why economy is not public as well as private. If the eleventh chapter of the First Book of the Politics is genuine, this question had already occurred to Aristotle (see 1259 a 21 sqq.). It is clear, however, from the so-called Second Book of the Oeconomics, that the side of Household Science which relates to the State had come to receive more attention by the time it was written.

Aristotle's
aims in this
inquiry.

Aristotle's aim evidently is, in the first place, to lead back the Science of Supply to nature. He had not, however, fully worked out his conception of nature, or freed it from inconsistency and obscurity. He reckons as natural, on the one hand, whatever contributes to that which is best for the given species—in the case of man, whatever contributes to good life; and if he had held to this point of view, he might have arrived at the broad and sound conclusion that trade and the other modes of Supply whose legitimacy is in question are natural, if and so far as they contribute to the end of the State (i.e. to civilization rightly understood). But then he also regards as natural that which is coeval with birth (I. 5. 1254 a 23), primitive, ancient (cp. 4 (7). 10. 1329 a 40 sqq.); that which is 'given by nature herself' (I. 8. 1256 b 7); that which conforms to the primordial law of zoological sustenance, which prescribes that sustenance is to be won from 'the residue of the substance from which the creature springs' (I. 10. 1258 a 36)—in the case of man, from earth and water; and again the necessary. From

these points of view, commerce in its more developed form and labouring for hire are both of them regarded as contrary to nature.

If Aristotle had consistently adhered to the view that the primitive is the natural, we might have found him denying the naturalness of the City-State in comparison with the household¹, and of the pursuit of good life in comparison with that of mere life. But this he fortunately does not do. His examination of the relative justifiability of the various methods by which human wants are supplied is an exception to his general treatment of political and social questions; a standard is applied which is quite other than the standard usually applied—the end of the State. The attempt to trace in the mode by which the nascent or infant animal is sustained the type of all natural sustenance seems especially fanciful².

He has, however, a further aim—to show that even the sound and natural form of the Science of Supply is not in strictness a part of Household Science³, but a dependent science which accepts its guidance. It is true that just as the householder has to see that the members of his household enjoy health, so it is his business to see that they possess a due supply of necessary and useful commodities; but it is the business of the physician to produce health in them, and it is the business of the Science of Supply in league with nature, not of Household Science, to produce those commodities. Not only did the current view of householding, with which Aristotle himself seems occasionally to fall in (e.g. *Pol.* 3. 4. 1277 b 24 : *Eth. Nic.* 1. 1. 1094 a 9 : cp. *Oecon.* 1. 1. 1343 a 8), teach a different lesson,

¹ He seems to approach this view in *Eth. Nic.* 8. 14. 1162 a 16 sqq.

² It is just possible that this censure of *καπηλική χρηματιστική* was penned during the period (330–326 B.C. : Schäfer, Demosthenes 3. 2. 339) when, owing, as was thought, to the arts of the corn-merchants or the devices of huckstering officials in Egypt, corn

was extremely scarce and dear at Athens. But popular feeling always ran high against the corn-dealers, as we see from Lysias' oration against them.

³ The Stoics appear to have distinguished between *οικονομική* and *χρηματιστική* no less than Aristotle (*Stob. Ecl. Eth.* 2. 6. 6 : p. 51 Meineke).

but writers like Xenophon had put the contrary opinion in the mouth of Socrates (Xen. Oecon. c. 6. 4: cp. c. 7. 15, and c. 11. 9) and others (Xen. Cyrop. 8. 2. 23, οὐ τοὺς πλείστα ἔχοντας καὶ φυλάττοντας πλείστα εὐδαιμονεστάτους ἡγοῦμαι . . . ἀλλ' ὅς ἂν κτᾶσθαι τε πλείστα δύνηται σὺν τῷ δικαίῳ, καὶ χρῆσθαι δὲ πλείστοις σὺν τῷ καλῷ, τοῦτον ἐγὼ εὐδαιμονέστατον νομίζω)¹. Plato, however, had already declared against the unlimited pursuit of wealth (Rep. 591 D-E): οὐκοῦν, εἶπον, καὶ τὴν ἐν τῇ τῶν χρημάτων κτήσει ξύναξιν τε καὶ ξυμφωνίαν; καὶ τὸν ὄγκον τοῦ πλήθους οὐκ ἐκπληττόμενος ὑπὸ τοῦ τῶν πολλῶν μακαρισμοῦ ἄπειρον αὐξήσει, ἀπέραντα κακὰ ἔχων; οὐκ οἶομαι, ἔφη. 'Ἀλλ' ἀποβλέπων γε, εἶπον, πρὸς τὴν ἐν αὐτῷ πολιτείαν καὶ φυλάττων μὴ τι παρακινῇ αὐτοῦ τῶν ἐκεῖ διὰ πλῆθος οὐσίας ἢ δι' ὀλιγότητα, οὕτω κυβερνῶν προσθήσει καὶ ἀναλώσει τῆς οὐσίας καθ' ὅσον ἂν οἶός τ' ᾖ². With this Aristotle would agree, but he adds that acquiring lies, in strictness, altogether outside the province of the head of the household, as such, and that his function is to use the commodities, for the provision of which the Science of Supply is responsible, though even this is not his highest function, which lies rather in the government of persons, and especially of free persons, than in the care for, or use of things. Xenophon had already made it one of the duties of the head of the household to seek to teach his slaves justice (Oecon. c. 14. 4): Aristotle makes it his main duty to develope in all the members of the household all the virtue of which they are capable.

The householder, as Aristotle conceives him, is by no means to be indifferent whether the household under his charge does or does not possess an adequate supply of things useful and necessary for good life: on the contrary, he is to see that this is forthcoming; but further than this he is not to go in quest of commodities. He certainly will not hold, with Cato the Censor, whose ideas

¹ It should be noticed, however, that in the short treatise on the Lacedaemonian constitution Xenophon praises Lycurgus for his discouragement of money-making

(c. 7).

² Cp. Laws 870 A, ἡ τῶν χρημάτων τῆς ἀπλήστου καὶ ἀπείρου κτήσεως ἔρωτας μυρίου ἐντίκτουςα δύναμις.

on household management were as clearly pronounced as on public affairs, 'that the man truly wonderful and godlike and fit to be registered in the lists of glory, was he, by whose accounts it should at last appear that he had more than doubled what he had received from his ancestors¹'; nor would he 'labour with his domestics, and afterwards sit down with them, and eat the same kind of bread and drink of the same wine²'; nor would it be said of him with truth, that he 'amassed a great deal and used but little³'. Aristotle would have found more to praise in Cato's untiring care for his son's due nurture and education, though he himself would commit the education of boys, when past a certain age, to the common schools of the State.

The limitations which Aristotle imposes on the Science of Supply remind us of a reflection of Wordsworth's in the Eighth Book of the *Excursion* :—

'I rejoice,
Measuring the force of those gigantic powers,
That by the thinking mind have been compelled
To serve the will of feeble-bodied man ;
For with the sense of admiration blends
The animating hope that time may come
When, strengthened, yet not dazzled, by the might
Of this dominion over nature gained,
Men of all lands shall exercise the same
In due proportion to their country's need ;
Learning, though late, that all true glory rests,
All praise, all safety, and all happiness,
Upon the moral law.'

Aristotle, however, goes far beyond Wordsworth, though the latter forgets no less than the former that the accumulation of capital in one country beyond its needs may well be useful in aiding the material and moral development of other communities. It can hardly have been true of commerce even in Aristotle's day, that it had passed far beyond its sound original function of supplying men's needs into an ingenious artificial contrivance which served only the pur-

¹ Plutarch, *Cato Censor* c. 21
(Langhorne's translation).

² *Ibid.* c. 3.

³ *Ibid.*, *Comparison of Cato and Aristides*, c. 4.

pose of enriching its practitioners indefinitely at the expense of each other or of other men ; but, at any rate, his censure of labour for hire and of lending money at interest is wholly mistaken. So far as he asserts the principle that commodities are made for man, not man for the multiplication of commodities—that the pursuit of wealth, which so easily masters and moulds society to its purpose, is to be governed by the true interests of civilization, or, as Wordsworth says, ‘ the moral law,’ he is on solid ground ; but in his application of this principle, and indeed in his combination of it with others of more doubtful authority, he has been led into error. We may trace, perhaps, in the background the influence of prejudices which he shared with his age and nation, and which made a dispassionate examination of this subject unusually difficult for him. He appears to understand better the true nature of Wealth than the laws of its production or the office of Capital. Political Economy almost originated with him, and the clearness of his economical vision in some directions is balanced by blindness in others. He is besides too much inclined to cut all societies after the same pattern. Some States seem marked out by nature for industry and commerce, others for agriculture ; and the world would be a loser if one and the same career were enforced on all.

Status of those concerned with necessary work—some to be free, some to be slaves.

So far we have studied the classes concerned with trade and production in the best State of Aristotle rather with respect to the source from which they are to be recruited, the services they are to render, and the limitations under which they are to act, than with respect to their place in the State-system, or the connexion between them and the other agencies of the State. We possess, indeed, but few data as to a large section of these classes—that which comprises the merchant (*ἐμπορος*), the artisan, the day-labourer, the shopkeeper¹. On the other hand, the cultivator of the soil and the domestic attendant have their

¹ How near all *χερῆρες*, and among them the *βάναντος τεχνίτης*, come to slaves, we see from 3. 4. 1277 a 37 sqq.

lot pretty clearly marked out. They are to be slaves—not all of them, indeed, private slaves, for the territory of the State is to be divided into two parts—whether equal or not, we are not told—the one to be retained in the hands of the State, and itself subdivided into two sections, devoted respectively to the maintenance of the worship of the gods and to the supply of the public meal-tables; the other to be allotted to individuals in several ownership. Both parts are to be cultivated by slaves; the public land by public, the private by private slaves. Dependent serfs (*περλοικοι*) of barbarian origin might be employed in the cultivation of the soil; but it was better to give this function to slaves (4 (7). 10. 1330 a 25 sq.).

We observe, when we turn to the examination of the legitimacy of slavery contained in the First Book, that it is treated as entirely a domestic institution. The case of public slaves is left wholly out of consideration. It is not till the chapter on Phaleas in the Second Book (2. 7. 1267 b 16 sq.) that we get any hint of the arrangement adopted in the Fourth (the old Seventh) Book.

We do not know with certainty who were the impugners of the naturalness and justice of the institution of slavery referred to by Aristotle (1. 3. 1253 b 20 sq.)¹. The distinction between nature and convention, which their view presupposes, is one recognized by many schools. A Sophist may well have struck the first blow. Some Sophists, indeed, denied that the Naturally Just exists; for them all right was based on convention only; but those who held this view cannot be referred to here, for in this passage we evidently have to do with men who accepted the existence of a Natural Justice, which slavery contravened. Others, however, did not go so far; and it may well be that in the general reference of existing institutions, and indeed of social order

Slavery—
its natural-
ness and
justice
impugned
by some
inquirers.

¹ Were they the same as those who are mentioned in 4 (7). 2. 1324 a 35, as maintaining that the exercise of despotic rule over

neighbours involves the greatest injustice, while the exercise of *πολιτική ἀρχή* over others interferes with the ruler's felicity?

as a whole, to custom and tradition, or even compact, as opposed to nature, which marks the Sophistic epoch, the institution of slavery did not escape without challenge. The Sophist Lycophron denied the reality of the distinction between the noble and the ill-born¹, a distinction nearly related to that between slave and free (Pol. I. 6. 1255 a 32 sqq.). Gorgias praised Rhetoric as the best of all arts in words that remind us of Aristotle's language here—because it 'made all other things its slaves, not by compulsion, but of their own free will' (Plato, Phileb. 58 A-B). The Cynics, again, might be referred to, were it not that they were more given to asserting the 'indifference' of positive institutions than to attacking them². We can trace among the followers of the Cynic Diogenes, however, one opponent of slavery—Onesicritus, who accompanied the Oriental expedition of Alexander; for Strabo (15. p. 710), in mentioning an authority who affirmed that the Indians had no slaves, adds—'but Onesicritus alleges that this was the case only in the territory of Musicanus, and regards the absence of slavery as an excellent thing: he finds, in fact, many other excellent institutions in that region and describes it as especially well-ordered.' It appears from Strabo, p. 701, that in the part of India referred to, it was the custom for the young to render similar services to those elsewhere rendered by serfs, such as the Cretan Aphantiotae and the Helots of the Lacedaemonian State.

Apart, however, from the movement of philosophical opinion, much had happened, and was happening every day in Greece, to suggest doubts in the minds of men respecting the institution. Dio Chrysostom (Or. 15. 239 M) refers to the many Athenians who, in consequence of the defeat at Syracuse, had to serve as slaves in Sicily and the

¹ Aristot. Fragm. 82. 1490 a 10.

² Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. 1. 230 (2nd edit.): cp. 208. 8: 238. 5, where the language of Antisthenes and Diogenes seems to imply that the wise man is not only not a natural slave, but not a slave at all.

Diogenes, we are told, was especially given to distinguishing between τὰ κατὰ νόμον and τὰ κατὰ φύσιν (Diog. Laert. 6. 71): so far as this goes, therefore, he might be referred to here.

Peloponnese, and to the case of the Messenians (242 M), who after long years of slavery became again free citizens; and he notices how narrowly the whole body of slaves at Athens missed enfranchisement, when the Athenians offered them freedom after Chaeroneia on condition of their serving against Macedon, and would have given it if the war had continued (240 M). It was just the facility of the transition from slavery to freedom, and from freedom to slavery, and the dependence of men's status on accident and superior force and the will of men (cp. Eth. Nic. 5. 8. 1133 a 30: Xen. Mem. 4. 4. 14), that would give rise to the view that it was based on convention, not nature. A fragment from the Ἀγχίσης of Anaxandrides (Meineke, *Fragm. Com. Graec.* 3. 162) gives expression to what must have been a common feeling:—

Οὐκ ἔστι δούλων, ὧ γὰρ, οὐδαμοῦ πόλις,
τύχη δὲ πάντα μεταφέρει τὰ σώματα,
πολλοὶ δὲ νῦν μὲν εἰσιν οὐκ ἐλεύθεροι,
εἰς ταῦριον δὲ Σουνιείς, εἴτ' εἰς τρίτην
ἀγορᾷ κέχρηται· τὸν γὰρ οἶακα στρέφει
δαίμων ἐκάστω.

So again Philemon, *Fr.* 39 (Meineke, *Fragm. Com. Graec.* 4. 47):—

Κἂν δοῦλος ᾗ τις, σάρκα τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχει,
φύσει γὰρ οὐδεὶς δοῦλος ἐγενήθη ποτέ·
ἢ δ' αὖ τύχη τὸ σῶμα κατεδουλώσατο.

According, again, to the Scholiast on Aristot. *Rhet.* 1. 13, the saying 'God made all men free: nature has made no man a slave' (ἐλευθέρους ἀφῆκε πάντας θεός· οὐδένα δούλον ἢ φύσις πεποίηκεν) occurred in the 'Messenian Oration' of the orator Alcidas. It is, perhaps, to these words of Alcidas that Aristotle refers in the passage we are considering (1. 3. 1253 b 20)¹. It is certain, at all events, that

¹ So think Henkel (*Studien*, p. 124, n. 11) and Susemihl. Zeller, however, thinks (*Gr. Ph.* 1. 1007. 2) that Aristotle is not 'referring to Alcidas specially' in this passage of the *Politics*: he holds

that though Alcidas may well have used in this oration the expression ascribed to him by the Scholiast, he can hardly have gone so far as to assail the institution of slavery, when seeking to

the restoration of Messenia to independence must have brought the question prominently before men's minds. Many who did not go so far as to impugn the naturalness of the institution as a whole, appear to have contested the justice of enslavement through war. Thus Callicratidas, when pressed on the capture of Methymna to sell the citizens as slaves, declared that, while he was in command, no Greek should be enslaved if he could help it, though he nevertheless sold the Athenian garrison as slaves the day after (Xen. Hell. 1. 6. 14-15). Agesilaus gave utterance to similar sentiments (Xen. Ages. 7. 6)¹. Epaminondas and Pelopidas are said by Plutarch to have enslaved no captured cities (Pelop. et Marcell. Inter se Compar. c. 1, Μάρκελλος μὲν ἐν πολλαῖς πόλεσιν ὑποχειρίοις γενομέναις σφαγὰς ἐποίησεν, Ἐπαμεινώνδας δὲ καὶ Πελοπίδας οὐδένα πώποτε κρατήσαντες ἀπέκτειναν οὐδὲ πόλεις ἡνδραποδίσαντο). The severities of this nature practised by Philip of Macedon indicate, therefore, a decided retrogression in international policy.

Even those who defended enslavement through war did so only in a qualified way, for they condemned the enslavement of Greeks through war (1. 6. 1255 a 21 sqq.). Enslavement for debt had been abolished at Athens by Solon², though elsewhere it may have been legal³. The law itself both at Athens and in other States drew a tacit distinction between the slave by birth (ὁ φύσει δοῦλος γενόμενος) and the slave not descended from slave-parents by making the former incapable of becoming a citizen (Dio Chrys. Or. 15. 239 M)⁴. Dio Chrysostom, in his Fifteenth Oration, mentions a general feeling that the slave by birth was a slave in the truest sense, but then he goes on to reason

win from the Lacedaemonians the recognition of Messenian independence. As to the oration in question, see Vahlen, *der Rhetor Alkidamas*, p. 14 sqq.

¹ Plato declares against the enslavement of Greeks in wars between one Greek State and another (Rep. 471 A).

² It survived in a single case only (C. F. Hermann, *Gr. Antiqq.* 3. § 58. 15).

³ Ibid. § 58. 20.

⁴ There seems to have been a special name for the slave by birth, or *δουλέκδουλος*. He was called *σίνδρων* (Athen. Deipn. 267 C).

that slaves by birth are descended from those who have been enslaved through war, and that this form of slavery, 'the oldest and that which has given birth to all the rest'¹, is 'very weak in point of justice' (242 M); and thus he arrives at the conclusion (243 M) that the true slave is the man who is unfree and servile in soul—a conclusion possibly suggested by Aristotle's examination of the subject, though arrived at in a different way.

If we add that the form which slavery assumed in the Lacedaemonian State gave rise to an especial amount of debate (Plato, *Laws* 776 C), we shall see that the institution was undergoing a rigorous examination, in the course of which one form of it after another was being weighed in the balance and found wanting, and that first enslavement for debt, then the enslavement of Greeks², then enslavement through war, were successively being eliminated, so that a total condemnation of the institution might well seem to be at hand. Hence a careful investigation of its true basis, such as that which Aristotle made, was especially timely.

Both Xenophon and Plato furnished him with some hints on the subject. Xenophon had insisted that rule should, if possible, be so exercised as to win willing obedience from the ruled, and had shown how the master might be a means of developing virtue in his slaves. Plato had, in one and the same dialogue (the *Republic*), made it a distinguishing feature of the ideal State not to enslave the class which provided it with necessary or useful commodities (τὸ χρηματιστικόν)³, and also pointed to the man in whom there is a natural weakness of the higher principle as a

Reinvestigation of the basis of slavery by Aristotle.

¹ He overlooks the fact that slavery originating in voluntary surrender and slavery for debt could not be said to have developed out of war.

² Cp. *Levit.* 25. 44: 'Both thy bondmen and thy bondmaids which thou shalt have shall be of the heathen that are round about you; of them shall ye buy bondmen and bondmaids.' I have already quoted this passage

for another purpose.

³ *Rep.* 547 C. This class (the third) is probably conceived as Hellenic, like the two higher classes, and the fact that it is not a slave-class in the ideal State of the *Republic* does not necessarily imply the non-existence of slavery in this State: on the contrary, slavery is here and there tacitly implied to exist in it (e.g. *Rep.* 549 A).

being designed by nature to be enslaved to another who can supply that deficiency (Rep. 590 C-D: cp. Polit. 309 A). This view of the institution, which, as has been remarked, probably suggested Aristotle's doctrine of natural slavery, seems, however, to be lost sight of in the Laws, where little, if any, attention appears to be paid to the ethical interests of the slave.

Aristotle
defends,
but reforms
slavery.

It is on these foundations that Aristotle builds. He consents to retain the institution in his best State on condition of a complete reform, which would restore the willingness of the relation by making it advantageous both to master and slave. Natural slavery presupposed, according to him, not only a low intellectual level in the slave, but high moral and intellectual excellence in the master. The *raison d'être* of slavery was to make a noble life possible for the master, and if the master could not, or did not, live such a life, slavery failed to achieve the end of its existence. Aristotle would not have been satisfied to incorporate in his best State a relation which, though necessary, was not advantageous to both the parties to it. Indeed, it is less on the social necessity of slavery than on the benefits which it confers on master and slave, that he insists. Thus, while he argues in the First Book (1. 4. 1253 b 23 sqq.) that the slave is a necessity to Household Science, he allows in the Fourth (the old Seventh) the substitution of serfs for slaves, so far as the cultivation of the soil is concerned (4 (7). 10. 1330 a 25 sqq.). The necessity of slavery to ancient society has perhaps been somewhat overrated. 'Coloni' seem to have served its purpose in the later days of the Roman Empire as well as slaves. The submissiveness of the 'hewers of wood and drawers of water' was the important thing, and this was rather a matter of nationality than of civil status. If they were not submissive, we know from a variety of instances that the status of slavery was but a poor security for their obedience or tranquillity.

Aristotle has already in the Second Chapter of the First

Book recognized as the constituent elements of the household the relations of husband and wife and master and slave, and treated the one relation as equally necessary and natural with the other, the master's intelligence and the slave's bodily strength being mutually complementary and indispensable, just as the union of male and female is necessary for the purpose of reproduction. The naturalness of slavery is thus already established, and it may be asked why the question should be again taken up in c. 3. The answer probably is, that in c. 2 Aristotle deals with the question of slavery only in course of proving the naturalness of the State, and that in conformity with his usual practice he is not content to dispense with a special examination of this particular question apart from all others, which he conducts wholly without reference to the result already hastily reached.

In tracing the course of the investigation respecting slavery in c. 3 (1253 b 14 sqq.), it must be borne in mind that Aristotle is testing not one opinion but two—not alone the view of those who asserted that slavery is contrary to nature (which is the more interesting of the two contentions to us), but also the view of the Platonic Socrates, who had said that rule over slaves is a science and identical with the rule of the householder, statesman, and king. It is thus as much his purpose to show that the rule over slaves is nothing exalted—and this he shows by his definition of the slave (c. 4. 1253 b 23–1254 a 17) and by occasional hints later on (1254 a 24 sqq.: 1255 b 33 sqq.)—as that there is a natural kind of slavery.

His first inquiry is, what is the nature and function of the slave?—his next, is such a being forthcoming? He deals with the former question first, and starts from two propositions, which for the moment he assumes as true, though he will later on see reason to modify them—1. that Property is a part of the Household: 2. that the Science of acquiring property (in the sense of things necessary for living and living well) is a part of the Science of Household Management (*οἰκονομία*). He then proceeds to say that just as arts with

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some single definite end stand in need of instruments for the accomplishment of that end, so does Household Science, though it is not, strictly speaking, an Art, and its end is broader. The slave, he goes on to show, is one of the animate instruments which Household Science needs and an article of household property, but he is an exceptional kind of instrument, an instrument prior to other instruments, and an instrument of action, not of production; and being an article of property, he stands to his master in a peculiarly close relation—he is a part of him and wholly his.

The next question is—is any human being so constituted by nature? As nature always does that which is best for each thing and that which is just, this question resolves itself into another—is any human being in existence for whom it is best and also just that he should be placed in this position? We have here a question of fact, and one would have expected it to be answered by a direct appeal to facts, and by that alone. But Aristotle says (5. 1254 a 20), that it is one which it is not difficult to answer, whether by process of reasoning ($\tau\tilde{\omega}\ \lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omega$), or by noting actual facts ($\tau\acute{\alpha}\ \gamma\iota\nu\acute{o}\mu\epsilon\nu\alpha$). The thing both must be, if something quite contrary to analogy is not to take place, and it also, as a matter of fact, is.

Ruling and being ruled is not only a necessary but an advantageous thing; and in some cases a destination for the one position or the other appears immediately on birth. A ruling element and a ruled appears wherever a Whole proceeds from the union of a plurality of elements; and thus it is not surprising that there are many different kinds of ruling and ruled elements, varying in excellence according to the function which ruler and ruled unite to discharge. We need not reject slavery as unnatural, because we do not rank the relation of master and slave with the rule of the householder, or the statesman, or the king. We can trace a kind of rule even in things inanimate; we can trace ruling and ruled elements in an animal; here we find both the despotic and the political form of rule, the rule of the soul over the body being of the former kind, that of

the rational over the appetitive part being of the latter; and in both cases, the relation is natural and advantageous. The same thing appears in the relation of man to the other animals. The tame are better than the wild, and it is advantageous to them to be ruled by man; what holds of the better, however, is natural. So again, the male sex is naturally stronger than the female; consequently, the male rules, the female is ruled. The same thing holds between one human being and another, irrespective of sex. The naturalness of rule does not depend on its being of the highest type, but on its adjustment to the interval between ruler and ruled. If there are human beings who are as far inferior to others as the body is to the soul, or as the lower animals are to man, then the relation of rule which obtains between soul and body, and man and other animals, will be properly applicable to them and will be natural and for their good. This is the case with human beings whose best function is the use of the body. They are fit only to belong to another; they are but little above the lower animals: the only psychological difference between them and the lower animals is that they can listen to reason, though they have it not, whereas animals follow passion. In use and, where Nature succeeds in her aim, in bodily aspect, they differ little from tame animals; their strength and their stoop are points of resemblance. In their case slavery is advantageous to the slave and just.

The question then arises, how it is that so many deny the justice and therefore the naturalness of slavery. The reason is that there is a kind of slavery which rests only on convention. A law exists, not based on Nature, but only on agreement, which confers on victors in war a property in the vanquished and all they possess. The justice of this law is impugned by many who occupy themselves with law; and it is true that it cannot be seriously defended except on the ground that superiority in force implies superiority in virtue. This is the common premiss from which the disputants on either side must start, if their arguments are to have any weight; and it is on superiority of virtue that

Aristotle bases natural slavery. His view is confirmed by the tacit agreement of the disputants on this point and on this point only. But there is another view put forward. Some claim that this kind of slavery is just, simply because it is allowed by law. To them the legal is the just. But then the particular application of the law may not be just, for the war may have been begun unjustly, or again persons may be enslaved in this way who are incapable of becoming slaves, like the heaven-descended Hecuba. And this would be admitted by these inquirers. Thus, by this path also we arrive at the conclusion that the true test of just freedom and just slavery is to be found in relative goodness and badness. Aristotle, in fact, finds his view of slavery confirmed by Common Opinion; but instead of basing Natural Slavery, as most did, on the extraction of the persons enslaved, or the circumstances of their enslavement, he bases it on their nature and the nature of their enslavers.

We see that the objections to slavery current in Aristotle's day were objections based on its alleged unfairness to the slave rather than on the interest of the community. That the captive taken in war should be enslaved seemed hard to many, especially if he were a Greek: the right to enslave was too exorbitant a privilege to be granted to those who could only boast a superiority of force; if this was the basis of the right, it had no more to say for itself than tyranny¹, which met with universal condemnation. Others passed the same criticism on the whole institution of slavery, however it originated. Force and injustice lay at its root. Thus slavery was attacked, not on the ground of its social or economical inexpediency, but on the ground of justice and the right of human beings to have their interests considered, and not to be forced to be parties to an one-sided bargain².

Aristotle's defence of slavery and his reform of it are

¹ Cp. Pol. 7 (5). 10. 1313a 9, ἀν δὲ δι' ἀπάτης ἀρξῇ τις ἢ βίας, ἥδη δοκεῖ τοῦτο εἶναι τυραννίς.

² Compare the use of δουλεία, Eth. Nic. 5. 8. 1133a 1: and δοῦλος, Pol. 2. 12. 1274a 18.

designed to meet objections of this nature. He is too fully convinced of the expediency of the remodelled institution in the interest of the slave to make any point of its indispensability to society; on this he touches only incidentally while seeking to ascertain the definition of the slave. To learn what a slave is and then to ask whether there are those to whom such a position brings advantage, is all that is necessary for the full treatment of the question of the naturalness of slavery. If the slave is a gainer, society, it is taken for granted, cannot be a loser. Aristotle's object is to show that slavery, rightly constituted, is not an one-sided bargain for the slave at all. The natural slave has not that part of the soul (*τὸ βουλευτικόν*), which is necessary to make moral virtue complete. He gains, therefore, by being linked to some controlling force possessing that which he lacks. Aristotle does not pause to examine whether this defect of nature could be mended by education; he implies, however, that it could not. The human being designed by nature for slavery, unlike the brute, can apprehend and listen to reason, but he does not possess reason (1. 5. 1254 b 22)¹. Yet he possesses a kind of moral virtue—the kind which enables him to do his work in subordination to his master—the moral virtue, in fact, of a subordinate confined to humble functions, and itself of a humble type. How any form of moral virtue can subsist in the absence of the deliberative faculty, Aristotle does not explain, nor how the use of the body is the best that comes of the slave (*τὸ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ βέλτιστον*, 1. 5. 1254 b 18), if virtuous action is not beyond him. There are, indeed, other indications that it was not possible for Aristotle wholly to reconcile the two aspects of the slave, as a man and as an instrument or article of property. In the First Book of the

¹ Though Aristotle's tone in this passage in regard to the distance between man and brute differs much from his tone in a previous chapter of the same book (1. 2. 1253 a 9 sqq.), he says nothing here that conflicts with

what he has said there. He had there allowed to men in contrast with brutes a perception of the good and bad, the just and unjust, and here he allows even to the natural slave a perception of reason.

Politics the slave, though the mere animate chattel of his master, is nevertheless conceived as forming a *κοινωνία* with him (cp. 1. 2. 1252 b 9, *τούτων τῶν δύο κοινωνιῶν*: 1. 5. 1254 a 29, *ἐν τῇ κοινῳ*: 1. 13. 1260 a 40, *κοινωνὸς ζῶης*), and as united to him by a dependent friendship (1. 6. 1255 b 13); but in the Fourth (the old Seventh) Property, and consequently, it would seem, the slave, is implied to be no part of the household (4 (7). 8. 1328 a 28 sqq.)¹, and *κοινωνία* appears to be pronounced impossible between those whose aim is the best life and those who have no such aim, unless indeed the *κοινωνία* of the State is alone here referred to. The distinction between the slave *qua* slave and the slave *qua* human being, which, whether it be a satisfactory distinction or not, serves in the Nicomachean Ethics to make the contradictions inherent in the position of the slave a little less glaring, does not appear to be used in the Politics. The same inconsistency is evident, if we examine Aristotle's conception of the office of the master in relation to his slave. He is charged in the First Book with the task of developing in the slave all the moral virtue of which he is capable, and thus the relation between them is adjusted to the aim of good life, and becomes a relation not unworthy of the husband and father or unfit to find a place in the household and the State; but then we find in the Third Book that the aim of the master in his rule over the slave is primarily his own advantage and only accidentally that of the slave. If this is so, and the slave feels it to be so, one may doubt whether the affectionate reverence and sense of common interest, which Aristotle hopes to create in the mind of the slave, would be found in reality to exist, however high the character of the master might be, and however great the moral benefits conferred by him. Aristotle's arguments may perhaps prove that a human being of the stamp of his 'natural slave' should be subjected to a strict rule; they do not prove that he should be made an article of property.

¹ Aristotle is here insisting on the contrast between the higher and lower elements of the State,

whereas in the First Book he is making the most he can of the position of the slave.

The ambiguity of the word *δεσπόζειν*, which was used to denote both the relation of an absolute ruler to his subjects and that of a proprietor to his property, concealed from his view the vast difference between the two propositions. From absolute rule (*δεσποτική ἀρχή*) to ownership (*δεσποτεία*) is a great and momentous step. We may feel that his 'natural slave' would be all the better for being ruled by a man of full virtue (*σπουδαῖος ἀπλῶς*), but not for being his chattel¹.

Aristotle approached the subject under the influence of a scientific reaction both against the views of those who, like some of the Sophists, were inclined to challenge the claims of every existing institution, and against the views of those who, like Plato, had dealt very freely with some institutions of great importance. His bias was in favour of accepting and amending the institutions to which the collective experience of his race had given birth, rather than sweeping them away. He pleaded against Plato for the continued existence of the parental and conjugal relations, and he was led on to find good in the relation of master and slave.

He deserves, however, to be remembered rather as the author of a suggestion for the reformation of slavery than as the defender of the institution. The slavery he defends is an ideal slavery which can exist only where the master is intellectually and morally as high as the slave is low. Aristotle would find in the Greek society of his own day as many slave-owners who had no business to own slaves as slaves who had no business to be enslaved. His theory of slavery implies, if followed out to its results, the illegitimacy of the relation of master and slave in a large proportion of the cases in which it existed. In how many instances

¹ The Stoics appear to have distinguished slavery in the sense of subjection from slavery in the sense of possession and subjection—Diog. Laert. 7. 122, *εἶναι δὲ καὶ ἄλλην δουλείαν* (besides the *ἐρσο facto* slavery of the bad) *τὴν ἐν ὑποτάξει, καὶ τρίτην τὴν ἐν κτήσει τε καὶ*

ὑποτάξει, ἣ ἀντιτίθεται ἡ δεσποτεία, φαύλη οὖσα καὶ αὐτῇ. Aristotle regards the *δεσποτική ἐπιστήμη* as *φαύλη*, but hardly *δεσποτεία*, when exercised over natural slaves. It is natural and a means of virtue to the slave, and would hardly be said by him to be *φαύλη*.

would not the master, if judged by his rules, be found unfit to be a master and the slave unfit to be a slave! This would be so even in Greece; among the barbarians, if we may judge from a passage in the First Book (1. 2. 1252 b 6), natural slavery could not exist, for there that which is marked out by nature for rule (τὸ φύσει ἄρχον) is wanting. The limitations Aristotle imposed on slavery would probably attract more attention and comment from most of his contemporaries than his recognition of slavery subject to those limitations. He confined it to a relatively small class of human beings—to those whose vocation was rude physical labour, the exercise of mere muscle and sinew. Human beings fit for no higher work than that—whether Greek or barbarian, and they would commonly be barbarians—were to be slaves. His plan seems to be to limit the incidence of slavery rather than to lighten its yoke. He allows, though reluctantly, the substitution of serfs (περλοικοι) for slaves in agriculture. He recommends that all slaves shall have the hope of freedom held out to them, as a reward for good conduct¹ (4 (7). 10. 1330 a 32 sq.), but we are not distinctly told whether the master is to have the right of manumission, nor do we learn whether he is to have the right to sell, or bequeath, or give away the slave. There is no indication, however, that Aristotle was inclined to depart greatly from the general practice of Greece in relation to the rights of the master over the slave.

All the economical objections to slavery would apply to the reorganization of it which Aristotle designed. Agriculture would not prosper in the hands of slaves. Indeed, in recommending that the cultivators of the soil in his best State should be slaves, Aristotle extended slavery to a class which in contemporary Greece was frequently free. On the other hand, we must bear in mind that he proposes to limit the number of the slaves in a State to that which is imperatively requisite for its well-

¹ Yet obviously a natural slave would *ex hypothesi* lose by being set free: we infer, therefore, but are not distinctly told, that a

natural slave can be fitted by slavery for the enjoyment of freedom.

being, just as he applies the same limit to Property and 'instruments' and 'necessary work' generally; that he brings even the slaves of the farm within the household (except of course such as are public slaves), herein true to the old-fashioned conception of the slave as *οἰκέτης*¹; and that he is against the employment as slaves, not merely of those who are not natural slaves, but also of members of courageous and high-spirited races, like those which inhabited the barbarous portions of Europe. Thrace, for instance, would probably be no longer drawn upon for slaves, and many fine races would escape degradation². The free population would thus have no cause to feel that they were oppressing a body of men who deserved, or at least wished, to be free. They would have been saved the consciousness of injustice, the terror, suspicion, and consequent tendency to cruelty which comes of such a situation—results with which Greece was familiar in the instance of the Lacedaemonian State. The adoption of Aristotle's reform would have left but few Hellenic slaves, no slaves possessed of capacity, none certainly of that gifted or learned sort of which we hear much in Greece and still more in the Roman Empire³. It is curious, indeed, to notice that Theophrastus, the disciple of Aristotle, had a slave of philosophical capacity: 'sed et Theophrasti Peripatetici servus Pompylus, et Zenonis Stoici servus qui Persaeus vocatus est, et Epicuri cui nomen Mys fuit, philosophi non incelebres vixerunt' (Gell. 2. 18, quoted by Menage on Diog. Laert. 10. 3). But, if this Pompylus is the Pompylus

¹ Cp. Seneca, Epist. 47: ne illud quidem videtis quam omnem invidiam majores nostri dominis, omnem contumeliam servis detraxerint? Dominum patrem familiae appellaverunt; servos (quod etiam in mimis adhuc durat) familiares.

² There is a striking description in Strabo (p. 224) of the conduct of some refractory Corsican slaves, which shows that in these European races mere

'brutishness' (*τὸ θηριώδες καὶ τὸ βοσκηματώδες*) was no security for willing slavery.

³ Some of these learned slaves discharged an useful function in Roman society, for they were largely employed in copying MSS. 'The place of the press in our literature was taken by the slaves' (Schmidt, *Denk- und Glaubensfreiheit*, p. 119, quoted by Guhl and Koner, *Life of the Greeks and Romans*, E. T., p. 529).

mentioned in Theophrastus' will (Diog. Laert. 5. 54), he is there referred to as 'for a long time past free.' Theophrastus had not retained as a slave one who was in no sense a natural slave. The system of keeping skilled slaves for the profit to be got from their work (C. F. Hermann, *Gr. Antiqq.* 3. § 13) would vanish with the unsound form of the Science of Supply. The class of slaves, by losing all its intelligent members, would well nigh lose all chance of influencing or corrupting the free population. The position of the free labourer or artisan would still be lower, as it always is, than in a society where slavery does not exist; but slavery would do far less harm in a community like the best State of Aristotle, sound in tone and studiously secured against its influence, than it did in most Greek States.

Aristotle was probably not aware how much evil and misery would be caused in the slave-producing regions of Asia and Africa by the wars which he sanctions for the purpose of capturing natural slaves¹. Nothing can have tended more to demoralize barbarian society in the countries round about Greece than the demand for slaves in Greece itself, and it may well be doubted whether the moral influence even of Aristotle's ideal householder on the slave would have been an adequate compensation for the perennial disturbance and degradation of the races from which slaves were to be sought. On the other hand, Aristotle's reform would have done much to soften the customs of war waged between Hellenes, or between Hellenes and civilized non-Hellenes. The indiscriminate enslavement of the population of cities taken by storm would cease. Only those who were natural slaves would be enslaved; the rest would be ransomed. Wars of one Greek State with another, or of Greeks with some non-Hellenic States would have entailed hardly any enslavement. The many Greek cities which after the time of Aristotle experienced this fate would have escaped. The decrease of population in Greece, which became more and more

¹ 1. 8. 1256 b 23 sqq.: 4 (7). 14. 1334 a 2.

marked as time went on¹, had probably already begun in Aristotle's day; and one of its causes, at all events, would have been removed if enslavement through war had been abandoned in the case of those who were not slaves by nature. The ransom of captives in war was, it is true, already permitted in most cases; it was not, however, in all, and the lesson which Aristotle taught was one which none needed to learn more than Philip of Macedon. Potidaea and Olynthus with the neighbouring Chalcidian cities endured enslavement at his hands². If Stageira was destroyed by Philip and its inhabitants sold as slaves (Plutarch, Alexander c. 7), its fate may well have been present to Aristotle's mind in this discussion. Epirus was permanently ruined by the enslavement of 150,000 of its population after the subjugation of Perseus by Rome. It is evident that in his investigation of the subject of slavery Aristotle raised questions of vital importance to the future of Greece.

We may wish that he had dispensed altogether with slavery in his State. If he does not do so, the reason is that while he sees rude manual labour to be necessary to society, and holds such labour cheap, he also holds that the worker must not be too good for his work, on pain of being deteriorated by it, and that the humble type of worker appropriate to work of this kind must find a suitable social niche ready for his reception, in which whatever good there is in him may be developed. That Aristotle's premisses did not logically compel him to make a worker of this type the property of a master, we have already seen.

In the result, slavery long escaped both abolition and reform. There was much in Stoicism that might have led to a condemnation of slavery. The idea of the natural

Slow decadence of Slavery.

¹ See Thirlwall, *History of Greece*, 8. 460-7.

² See A. Schäfer, *Demosth.* 2. 40. See also Polyb. 8. 11, where Polybius complains that Theopompus, after praising Philip as

the greatest man Greece had ever produced, went on to depict him as most vicious, and 'as having enslaved and captured through treason with fraud and violence more cities than any other man.'

equality of men was familiar to many adherents of the school. The Stoics drew a stronger line of demarcation than Aristotle had drawn between man and the lower animals. They did not probably rate the influence of a man's vocation on his character, or its importance as a source of happiness, as high as Aristotle. Cleanthes was not the less a 'wise man' for his labours as a 'drawer of water.' Slaves were, therefore, no longer necessary to save the higher natures from deterioration; and slavery lost its Aristotelian *raison d'être*. The wise man's virtue and happiness were not at the mercy of social conditions; they were the fruit of conviction and self-discipline rather than of social arrangements. The Stoics did not absolutely teach that the structure of society was an indifferent matter, for they had their preferences on the subject—their favourite constitutions and the like; but the general tendency of their teaching, was, in contrast to that of Plato, to trace virtue, which, like Socrates, they identified with knowledge, to philosophical training apart from social habituation and State guidance¹. Epicureanism ranked slavery, with wealth and poverty, among the things

Quorum

Adventu manet incolumis natura abituque :
Haec solitei sumus, ut par est, eventa vocare².

Christianity itself, whatever its ultimate tendency, long made it its aim rather to mitigate, than to put an end to, the institution. Its earliest view is expressed in the words—'Let every man abide in the same calling, wherein he was called. Art thou called being a servant? care not for it; but if thou mayest be made free, use it rather. For he that is called in the Lord, being a servant, is the Lord's freedman: likewise also, he that is called being free is Christ's servant. Ye are bought with a price; be not ye the servants of men³.' 'Servants, obey in all things your masters according

¹ Cp. Cic. Acad. Post. i. 10. 38 (quoted by Zeller, Stoics, E.T., p. 238): cumque superiores non omnem virtutem in ratione esse dicerent, sed quasdam virtutes

natura aut more perfectas, hic (Zeno) omnes in ratione ponebat.

² Lucr. i. 456.

³ 1 Cor. 7. 20-23.

to the flesh, not with eye-service as men-pleasers, but in singleness of heart, fearing God; and whatsoever ye do, do it heartily as to the Lord and not unto men; knowing that of the Lord ye shall receive the reward of the inheritance, for ye serve the Lord Jesus Christ. But he that doeth wrong shall receive for the wrong which he hath done; and there is no respect of persons¹. The master and the slave were thus alike required to do their duty—the master, inasmuch as he also had ‘a Master in heaven’ (Col. 4. 1.): the slave, inasmuch as he was the servant of Christ. Between the slave, who was ‘the Lord’s freedman,’ and the master, who was Christ’s servant, a spiritual, though not a social, equality was thus established, and if this did not apply to slaves who were not Christians, at all events a door of approach was thrown open to all. As time went on, however, and slave after slave was admitted to Orders in the Christian Church, the whole class of slaves probably gained somewhat in general estimation; and though sees and monasteries felt no scruple in exercising proprietary rights over slaves, they did much, in conformity with St. Paul’s injunction, to set the example of a milder treatment of them; till the abbot Theodore Studita, who died in 826, condemned in his will the owning of slaves by monks or monasteries on the ground that the slave no less than the freeman is made in the image of God, and the synod of Enham in 1009 forbade the sale of Christians as slaves because Christ had redeemed slaves as well as freemen by the shedding of His blood². Long ere this, serfage had, for secular reasons, taken the place of predial slavery in the Roman Empire: still the institution has lingered on into modern times. ‘So recently as the reign of James the Second, political prisoners of our own kith and kin were sold as slaves to toil and die in the tropics of the

¹ Col. 3. 22-5.

² See on this subject Schiller, *Lehre des Aristoteles von der Sklaverei*, pp. 1-3, from whom the above facts are taken. A fuller treatment of the subject will

be found in Wallon, *Histoire de l’Esclavage*, tome 3: see especially p. 409 sqq. As to this provision of Theodore Studita’s will, see Finlay, *Byzantine Empire*, i. 261 (ed. 2).

West Indies. The maids of honour of the Court of James the Second (not 200 years ago) received presents of Englishmen condemned for treasonable offences¹. Locke would seem to accept slavery in his *Treatise on Civil Government*². 'There is another sort of servants,' he says, 'which by a peculiar name we call slaves, who being captives taken in a just war, are by the right of nature subjected to the absolute dominion and arbitrary power of their masters. These men, having, as I say, forfeited their lives and with it their liberties, and lost their estates, and being, in the state of slavery, not capable of any property, cannot in that state be considered as any part of civil society, the chief end whereof is the preservation of property.' In this view he goes beyond Aristotle, who is far from accounting as natural slaves all 'captives taken in a just war.'

Plato's scheme of a community in women and children, and also in property, rejected by Aristotle: his grounds for rejecting it considered.

The slave is a member of the household and also an object of property; and the transition is natural from the part to the whole, from the slave to the Household and Property. And here we find Aristotle overtly impugning the teaching of Plato without the preliminary apologies of the well-known chapter in the *Nicomachean Ethics*. It was perhaps impossible for him even nominally to father the Theory of Ideas on Socrates as here he does the Platonic Communism³. His rehabilitation of the Household and of the right of Several Property is certainly more successful than his attempted rehabilitation of Slavery.

Plato had sought in the *Republic*, for the sake of unity of feeling among the members of his State, to extend the sphere of 'the common' to the utmost possible limit. He had noticed that when some piece of good or ill fortune befel individual members of an ordinarily constituted State,

¹ Sir S. Baker, Rede Lecture on Slavery and the Slave Trade, *Macmillan's Magazine*, July, 1874, p. 187.

² 2. § 85.

³ *Pol.* 2. cc. 1-6 *passim*. Contrast the most doubtfully authentic

part of c. 12 of the same book—*Πλάτωνος δ' ἡ τε τῶν γυναικῶν καὶ παίδων καὶ τῆς οὐσίας κοινότης κ.τ.λ.* (1274 b 9). In 2. 7. 1266 b 5 sq. certain provisions in the Laws are ascribed to Plato, and not to the Athenian Stranger.

some of their fellows sympathized with them, while others did not; and he seems to have ascribed this disharmony of feeling to the existence of separate households and separate rights of property¹. Carry the element of 'community' further till the distinction of *meum* and *tuum* ceased to exist in relation to women, children, and property, and the whole society would feel as one man. This was the end he had in view. If in the Republic he appears to confine his communistic scheme to the upper section of his State², he affirms in the Laws with the utmost emphasis that the best form of the State is that in which the saying, 'Friends have all things in common,' holds of the entire State in the highest possible degree; in which women, children, and property are common, and 'the private and individual is altogether banished from life, and things which are by nature private such as eyes, and ears, and hands, have become common, and in some way see and hear and act in common, and all men express praise and blame, and feel joy and sorrow, on the same occasions,' and the laws do their best to make the State as much one as possible³. It is evident from this passage that to Plato the society in which the household and several property do not exist offers the true type of social organization, though for some reason he applies his principle in the Republic only to the upper section of the State. His view apparently is that if the upper section of the State is so organized as to be at one with itself, then the whole State will be so too (cp. Rep. 545 D, ἡ τὸδε μὲν ἀπλοῦν ὅτι πᾶσα πολιτεία μεταβάλλει ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἔχοντος τὰς ἀρχάς, ὅταν ἐν αὐτῷ τούτῳ στάσις ἐγγένηται; ὁμοιοῦντος δέ, κἂν πάνυ ὀλίγον ᾖ, ἀδύνατον κινή-

¹ Rep. 462-3.

² His aim is, in the Third Book of the Republic, to secure that 'the guardians shall be as good as possible and shall not wrong the other citizens' (3. 416 C): in the Fifth it is rather to secure the harmony of the whole State by securing the internal harmony of the guardians (5. 465 B, *τούτων μὴ ἐν ἐαυτοῖς μὴ στασιαζόντων, οὐδὲν*

δεινὸν μὴ ποτε ἢ ἄλλη πόλις πρὸς τούτους ἢ πρὸς ἀλλήλους διχοστατήσῃ). The latter aim is far more prominently put forward than the other, and it is that with which Aristotle is pre-occupied. It is clearly implied in Tim. 18 B that the plan of Communism applies only to the upper section.

³ Laws 739 B-D (Prof. Jowett's translation 4. 258).

θῆναι;). Throughout the Republic, in fact, he seems to avoid spending time over the arrangements respecting the third class, and to treat this class as of little moment (Rep. 421 A).

Most modern forms of communism—those in which there is community of property without community of women and children—would in no way satisfy Plato. It is the existence of the household to which he especially objects; he would object to it, even if the household were supported out of a common stock¹. My wife—my children—my relatives—my clan, phratry, or tribe—to these terms used in any exclusive sense he objects. He retains the words 'father,' 'son,' 'brother,' but expands their application, so that all exclusiveness of meaning would practically pass from them. He seems to hope that relationship would thus be rendered powerless for harm. 'The guardians,' he claims (Rep. 464 D), 'will be free from those quarrels of which property, or children, or relations are the occasion.' His language here evidently betrays a consciousness that all causes of disharmony would not be removed, and it is obvious that even in the ideal State of Plato a guardian would feel the misfortunes of a friend far more than those of one who was not a friend.

Aristotle, however, does not pause, as he might have done, to point out that Plato's remedy for sectional feeling is after all only a partial one, even from his own point of view. He argues the question on its merits, which is, no doubt, the most instructive way of treating it.

His objections to the scheme of a community in women and children seem to be, in the main, the following:—

(1) He questions the end which Plato set before the State; and this on two grounds—

A. The State cannot be made as completely one as the individual, or it can be so, only at the cost of its own existence. The State is held together, not by contrivances

¹ This is the tenour of his language in the Republic; in the Politicus, however, he speaks of marriage and common offspring,

as among, not indeed the divine, but the human guarantees of union for States (310 B).

for impressing on it the sort of unity which obtains in the individual, but by justice and virtue in its members (2. 2. 1261 a 30: cp. 2. 5. 1263 b 36 sq.), which must be called into existence by the lawgiver. Whether Aristotle quite appreciates the meaning with which Plato used the expression, 'the maximum unity of the State'—whether he is right in conceiving Plato to use it in a sense conflicting with the inevitable plurality in number and diversity in kind of the individuals composing the State, is another question. A little later on, as we shall see, he rightly construes Plato's 'unity' as equivalent to 'unanimity.'

B. Not the maximum of unity, but the maximum of self-completeness is the true end of the State. Here, again, we feel that unanimity in no way conflicts with self-completeness, though we also feel that Aristotle's dictum is a profound one, and more far-reaching than he was perhaps himself aware. It explains how the large national State of modern times has come to take the place of the small city-State of antiquity.

(2) He questions the means which Plato adopts to secure his end. Plato's citizens will indeed say 'mine' and 'not mine' of the same thing (*ἄμα*), but they will so speak collectively, not individually. When, for instance, all say of the same child 'this is my child,' they will only mean 'this is my child in a collective sense,' not 'this is my own child.' That is all that the scheme will secure, and that in no way contributes to unanimity (*οὐδὲν ὁμοιοητικόν*). We note that here Aristotle understands the 'unity' spoken of by Plato as equivalent to 'unanimity' (*ὁμόνοια*), whereas in the preceding argument he had treated it as equivalent to mathematical unity¹.

(3) Leaving on one side the question of end and means, Aristotle goes on to advance other objections² to the

¹ We also note that Aristotle's only illustration of 'all saying "mine" and "not mine" of the same thing' is taken from children, whereas it would seem from Rep. 462-3 that Plato is thinking

rather of events, joyful or the reverse, occurring to members of the community.

² See Cicero's apparent reproduction of them in de Rep. 4. 5. 5.

scheme of a community in women and children. It will diminish the amount of care and attention given to them¹, for things held in common receive less attention than things held in severalty, and here too the very number of common children, and the citizen's uncertainty what individuals really stand in this relation to him, will add to the difficulty. It will also diminish 'closeness of connexion' (*οικειότης*) within the State, and make affection (*φιλία*) weak and watery; it will relieve relatives of their duties to each other and lessen the chance of their getting help from each other; it will leave no room for the exercise of temperance (*σωφροσύνη*), in relation at least to women (Pol. 2. 5. 1263 b 9). Certain religious and moral difficulties are also raised—such as the probability of incest, parricide, etc., occurring between relatives not known by each other to be relatives², and no expiations (*λύσεις*) being forthcoming, as in similar cases at present³. Nor will Aristotle admit the practicability of effectually concealing relationship, which will be betrayed by likeness, and also by the revelations of those who are charged by the State with the transfer of children from one class to another.

Aristotle does not apply to the proposal of a community in women and children one criticism which he passes on that of a community in property—that it will take away a source of pleasure—though this argument might certainly be here too urged with truth, and no one would feel its truth more than Aristotle⁴. In many of the criticisms which he does make there is much weight. It is probably true that warmth of affection would be impaired in a society which, though nominally united by ties of relationship, would practically be an 'unitized' society. It is of course also true that things held in common receive less

¹ Cp. Eth. Nic. 10. 10. 1180b 11 sq.

² Plato probably hopes to prevent this by the regulations as to relationship, Rep. 461 D, which, however, would fail of their effect where the exact age was unknown.

³ The thing was known to occur

already: cp. Clem. Alex. Paed. 3. 3. p. 265 Potter (quoted by Marquardt, Röm. Alterth. 7. 1. 81. 6), *παιδὶ πορνεύσαντι καὶ μαχλώσαις θυγατράσιν ἀγνοήσαντες πολλάκις μίγνυνται πατέρες, οὐ μεμνημένοι τῶν ἐκτεθέντων παιδίων.*

⁴ Eth. Nic. 8. 14. 1162 a 24.

attention than things not so held. Yet Aristotle himself proposes that the State shall own land and slaves, and that the education of boys shall be managed by State-officers as a matter of common concern. He does not explain how it is that in these matters he has no fear of 'neglect' occurring.

It is remarkable that the defence of the Household against Plato in the Second Book contains no reference to the statement of the First Book that the Household exists by nature, though one would have thought that if this is a fact, it ought to be decisive. The claims of the Household are rested in the First Book partly on its necessity, partly on its value as a source of virtue and good life in women, children, and slaves. If in the Second Book Aristotle adds a reference to its services in promoting affection in the State, the new point of view is suggested to him by Plato's error in considering it a source of discord. The value of Relationship apart from the Household is a topic that emerges only in the Second Book¹.

Aristotle's criticisms on the plan of a community of property are not very dissimilar from his criticisms on the plan of a community in women and children. He evidently feels, however, that there is more to be said for the former than the latter². He wholly rejects the one, while he allows that the other has certain advantages³. But

¹ Aristotle approaches very near to, but does not perhaps actually use, an argument used by Burke in his *Reflections on the Revolution in France* (Works, 2. 467 Bohn). 'We begin our public affections in our families. No cold relation is a zealous citizen. We pass on to our neighbourhoods and our habitual provincial connexions. These are inns and resting-places... The love to the whole is not extinguished by this subordinate partiality. Perhaps it is a sort of elemental training to those higher and more large regards.'

² Cp. Cic. de Rep. 4. 5. 5: de patrimoniis tolerabile est, licet sit injustum; nec enim aut obesse cuiquam debet, si sua industria plus habet, aut prodesse, si sua culpa minus. Sed, ut dixi, potest aliquo modo ferri. Etiamne conjuges, etiamne liberi communes erunt?

³ 2. 5. 1263 a 24, ἔξει γὰρ τὸ ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων ἀγαθόν· λέγω δὲ τὸ ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων τὸ ἐκ τοῦ κοινῆς εἶναι τὰς κτήσεις καὶ τὸ ἐκ τοῦ ἰδίας. He probably means that community of property would exclude the possibility of absolute want.

then these advantages can be secured in a less objectionable way. For there are many objections to a community of property. First, it involves that community in all things human (*ἀνθρωπικὰ πάντα*), down to the smallest matters and matters of everyday recurrence, which more than anything else tries men's temper and leads to quarrels¹; next, it sacrifices that increase of efficiency, which results when men are set to work at that which is their own (*πρὸς ἴδιον ἐκάστου προσεδρεύοντος*, 1263 a 28)². It thus effects at a great cost what can be effected at no cost at all; for the legislator, as the example of the Lacedaemonian and other States proves, can produce in the minds of his citizens a readiness to make that which is severally owned available in use to others; and if he does this, he has done all that community of property can do. A third disadvantage is that there is a loss of pleasure when men are deprived of the right of calling something their own³; the pleasure is lost that results from the gratification of that natural and universal love of self which is only censured when it is excessive, and also the pleasure that results from aiding and gratifying friends.

At this point (1263 b 7) Aristotle passes from criticisms applicable to community of property only to others which apply to both forms of communism, and we see from his language (1263 b 7, *τοῖς λίαν ἐν ποιοῦσι τὴν πόλιν*), how closely his objections to communism are connected with the attempt to intensify overmuch the unity of the State. The State is a *κοινωνία*, but it should not be a *κοινωνία* in all things human, in everything that can possibly be shared (2. 1. 1261 a 2 sq.): the common element in a State, we learn elsewhere, is, above all, a constitution (3. 3. 1276 b

¹ It is thus that small matters are often the occasion of civil disturbance (7 (5). 4. 1303 b 17).

² 'Sir W. Siemens said that if any invention lay in the gutter, it should be given to a separate owner, that he might have an interest in its furtherance and

development' (Letter of B. in *Times*, Jan. 23, 1884).

³ Est aliquid quocunque loco, quocunque recessu, Unius sese dominum fecisse lacertae.

Juv. 3. 230.

1 sq.), and a common constitution means a common plan of life (6 (4). 11. 1295 a 40: cp. 4 (7). 8. 1328 a 35).

A few remarks, applicable to communism in both its forms, wind up Aristotle's discussion of the subject. Its superficial promise of peace is an illusion. If much that is evil would disappear with severalty of property, much that is good would also be lost. Life would not be worth living in Plato's State (1263 b 29). It was the choice of a false end for the State—the utmost possible unity—that led Socrates astray. The State must not be made 'one' at the cost of its essential characteristic of 'plurality' (*πληθος*); the unifying agency must be education. After an appeal to the evidence of history¹ against Plato's scheme, Aristotle adds that Plato would find, if he made the experiment, that a State cannot be brought into existence without tribal and other divisions incompatible with a too strictly constituted unity. The State, it is implied, is not a mathematical unit, but a Whole consisting of differentiated parts held together by virtue. Not the maximum of unity in the sense of community in everything, but virtue, is the end at which the legislator should aim. Unity will come with virtue, not otherwise. This is the burden of the chapters on Communism. It is evident that Aristotle's argument against Communism is primarily an argument against 'unitarian' Communism, though many of his objections apply to the Communism with which we are familiar.

Some of them would be more in place if Aristotle himself recognized no common property in his State. His shrewd anticipation of social discord in societies where property is held in common, seems hardly to be borne out by experience, if we may judge by recorded or existing cases of common ownership. To his argument that pro-

¹ Though Aristotle takes notice of various forms of Communism, or approximate Communism, in relation to land and its produce, prevailing among certain barbarian races, he is not aware how important a part the modified

Communism of the Village Community has played in the history of mankind; still less is he acquainted with the story of its general, though gradual, rejection and abandonment.

prietary right ('the magic of property,' as we say) increases the care devoted to things, it may be added that it stimulates industry by the hope which it holds forth of an assured reward. A communistic society could not appeal to hope to the same extent. The argument that some pleasures, and opportunities for the exercise of some virtues, would cease to exist in a communistic society, is deserving of notice. The test of the satisfactoriness of institutions in the Laws of Plato had been their favourableness to virtue (705 E: 770 C-771 A: 836 D): it is interesting to observe that Aristotle takes pleasure also into account¹. The question, indeed, may be raised, whether the mere fact that an institution is productive of pleasure, or of particular kinds of virtue, is decisive in its favour. May we not fairly ask for proof that it is productive of more pleasure or more virtue, than of the opposites to pleasure and virtue, or of more pleasure or virtue than would exist without it? Bull-fighting is no doubt productive of some kinds of virtue; yet is this a decisive argument in its favour²? We discern, however, in the background of Aristotle's reasoning a principle of importance—that the institutions of the State should satisfy the permanent and universal tendencies of human nature: it seems to be implied that these tendencies are sure to be sound, if kept within due bounds (1263 a 41 sq.). The legislator must recognize and accept them, and find a place for them in his scheme; he must not try to eradicate them. The State is intended to fulfil man's nature, not to do violence to it; and just as the nature of the individual must be respected, so must the nature of the State. No attempt must be made to impress on it an uncongenial degree of unity. The industrial value of the institution of several property—the part it has played and is playing in the subjugation of Nature by man—is, of course, not dwelt on by Aristotle.

¹ In the same spirit he makes the pleasurable-ness of music an argument in its favour (5 (8). 5. 1339 b 25 sqq.).

² It may also be argued that

though certain forms of virtue might disappear under a Communistic *régime*, they might be replaced by others of equal or greater worth.

What is present to his mind is the influence of the institution on the individual, not on the fortunes of the race. The same defect appears in his view of the State, which he holds to exist, not in any degree for the benefit of mankind, but solely for the benefit of its members. So again, it is less the industrial, than the political and ethical, bearings of Communism that are present to his mind. Workers in modern societies sigh for some relief from crushing industrial competition and often seek it in Communism, but excessive competition is a social ailment of which Aristotle is altogether unconscious.

Nor does he anywhere recognize the undoubted element of truth contained in Plato's rejection of the Household and Several Property. He seems to hold that there are no drawbacks connected with either institution, which a correct system of rearing and education, acting on well-constituted natures, is not fully capable of obviating. His arguments against community of property, again, though directed against its fitness to form the base of an entire social system, are so unqualified that they might be employed against its use in minor societies within a State. It may well be, however, that Plato's error lay, not so much in his belief in the possibility and advantageousness of an union in which the individual life should be lost and merged in that of the whole, but rather in his setting it forth as the standard to which political society ought to conform, if possible, everywhere. The *régime* which is out of place in a State may be salutary in a monastic community.

It should be noticed also that the proprietary right which Aristotle defends is the bare right of several property, apart from the right of inheritance, which stands equally in need of explanation and defence. And then again, while he defends the institution of several property, he is apparently in favour of limiting the amount held by individuals, and he marks out with some care the ways in which property is to be acquired and used. We note, further, that in his best State the right of owning land is confined to the citizens—

men who have received a careful moral training and are likely to use it aright. Aristotle is as little an unqualified defender of the right of several property as he is of Slavery.

The question of Communism has never been discussed with a closer reference to the end for which human society exists. Communism is held by Aristotle to spoil and impoverish human life, to rob men of opportunities of virtuous activity and harmless enjoyment, and thus to diminish happiness: this is his main reason for rejecting it. In effect, he rests the institutions of the Household and Several Property on their true basis—their value to man as a means to perfect life, or, in modern language, as a means of civilization.

Sketch of
the Greek
household
as Plato
and Aris-
totle found
it.

Aristotle, then, declares in favour of the Household. The Greek household does not, however, escape without some modification at his hands. It will be best first to cast a hasty glance at the Greek household as Aristotle found it, before we go on to study his conception of what it ought to be.

In the view of the Greeks, a man's first duty to his household was to perpetuate it by marriage. The gods of the family must not lose their worship; the ranks of the clan (*γένος*), phratry, tribe, and State must not be thinned. Indeed, the begetting of offspring was, for the father himself, a means of immortal existence¹. Views of this kind may often have been a source of over-population, and thus of pauperism and even of political danger, in ancient Greece, for the prejudices of the Greeks made the practice of many branches of industry and trade distasteful to them, while emigration involved the loss of the valuable rights of a citizen. It is easy to understand how the poorer citizens, in States in which they were the masters, often came to quarter themselves on the public revenues to a considerable extent. It is easy, again, to understand how the exposure of children,

¹ Cp. Plato, *Laws* 721 B-C : 773 E : and Aristot. *de Gen. An.* 2. 2. 731 b 31 sqq. See Stall-

baum's note on the first named passage.

and especially of female children, was not uncommon; and how at length, at Athens, Antipater found that out of 21,000 citizens only 9000 possessed property in excess of the value of 2000 drachmas¹. The first problem, then, in reference to the household was how to adjust its rate of reproduction to the interests of the community.

Another common view as to the household made the main function of its head the increase of its substance. Many, as we have seen, almost or altogether identified the Science of Supply with the Science of Household Management, and Xenophon in the *Oeconomicus* had gone so far as to put this view into the mouth of Socrates. Οὐκοῦν, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, ἐπιστήμης μὲν τινος ἔδοξεν ἡμῖν ὄνομα εἶναι ἡ οἰκονομία· ἡ δὲ ἐπιστήμη αὕτη ἐφαίνεται, ἥ οἴκους δύνανται αὐξάνειν ἀνθρώποι· οἶκος δὲ ἡμῖν ἐφαίνεται ὅπερ κτήσις ἡ σύμπασα (Xen. *Oecon.* 6. 4). It is true that Xenophon is here rather interpreting the word *οἰκονομία* than attempting to determine which of the functions of the head of the household is the highest and most truly characteristic; elsewhere he fully recognizes the educational responsibilities of the parent (*Oecon.* 7. 12). Still he not only tolerates but commends that unlimited quest of wealth which Aristotle condemns—at any rate he does so, when an unselfish and liberal use is made of what is acquired. His Cyrus says in the *Cyropaedia* (8. 2. 20 sqq.): ἀλλ' εἰμὶ ἀπληστος καὶ γὰρ ὥσπερ οἱ ἄλλοι χρημάτων· τῇδὲ γὰρ μέντοι διαφέρειν μοι δοκῶ τῶν πλείστων, ὅτι οἱ μὲν, ἐπειδὴ τῶν ἀρκούντων περιττὰ κτήσονται, τὰ μὲν αὐτῶν κατορύττουσι, τὰ δὲ κατασῆπουσι, τὰ δὲ . . . φυλάττοντες πράγματα ἔχουσιν . . . ἐγὼ δ' ὑπηρετῶ μὲν τοῖς θεοῖς καὶ δρέγομαι αἰεὶ πλείονων· ἐπειδὴ δὲ κτήσωμαι, ἂν ἴδω περιττὰ ὄντα τῶν ἐμοὶ ἀρκούντων, τούτοις τὰς τ' ἐνδείας τῶν φίλων ἐξακοῦμαι, καὶ πλουτίζων καὶ εὐεργετῶν ἀνθρώπους εὖνοιαν ἐξ αὐτῶν κτῶμαι καὶ φιλίαν, καὶ ἐκ τούτων καρποῦμαι ἀσφάλειαν καὶ εὐκλειαν².

¹ Diod. 18. 18.

² See L. Schmidt, *Ethik der alten Griechen*, 2. 380, who compares Xen. *Oecon.* 11. 9. The passage quoted in the text makes it abundantly clear that Cyrus'

object in acquiring is to give away; some of his friends, in fact, say of him (*Cyrop.* 8. 4. 31)—οὐχ ὁ Κύρου τρόπος τοιοῦτος οἷος χρηματίζεσθαι, ἀλλὰ διδοῦς μᾶλλον ἢ κτῶμενος ἥδεσθαι: and Cyrus says

Apart, however, from prepossessions as to the main function of the household, its constituent relations, those of husband and wife, father and child, master and slave, tended to vary considerably. It was only, indeed, in barbarian communities that the wife was commonly the slave (Pol. 1. 2. 1252 b 5), or else the tyrant (2. 9. 1269 b 24 sq.), of her husband, or that the father's authority over his son became a despotism (Eth. Nic. 8. 12. 1160 b 27, *ἐν Πέρσαις δ' ἡ τοῦ πατρὸς τυραννικὴ χρῶνται γὰρ ὡς δούλοις τοῖς υἱέσιν*); yet even in Greek States these relations were far from being the same under different constitutions or even in different classes of society. In oligarchies the sons and wives of the ruling class were greatly over-indulged (7 (5). 9. 1310 a 22: 6 (4). 15. 1300 a 7); in the tyranny and extreme democracy the 'domination of women and over-indulgence of slaves' (*γυναικοκρατία καὶ δούλων ἀνεσις*, 7 (5). 11. 1313 b 32 sq.) are said to prevail¹: at Sparta also, though for quite other reasons, women were over-powerful (2. 9. 1269 b 31), and the large dowries which were the natural concomitant of this state of things added in their turn to the evil. In households of the poorer class, again, the wife and children were necessarily employed as attendants (*ἀκόλουθοι*), no slaves being kept (8 (6). 8. 1323 a 5); and here the wife could not possibly be confined to the house (6 (4). 15. 1300 a 6). The whole aspect of the household consequently altered.

In the average household of the better class at Athens, the wife was often married at the age of fourteen or fifteen (Xen. Oecon. 7. 5), after a maidenhood spent in the recesses of her father's house, from which, in the city at all events, she only rarely emerged²; robbed as a girl of her due share of air and exercise, white-complexioned beside her sunburnt father and brothers who spent their lives in the open air, or even beside women and girls of the poorer class, delicate in comparison with the strong-limbed maidens

himself to his friends (ibid. 8. 4. 36)—*ταῦτα, ὦ ἄνδρες, ἅπαντα δεῖ ὑμᾶς οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ἐμὰ ἡγεῖσθαι ἢ καὶ ὑμέτερα κ.τ.λ.*

¹ Cp. Plato, Rep. 563 B.

² In Lysias c. Sim. c. 6, the daughters of the speaker's sister had been so quietly and decorously brought up that they blushed even to be seen by their relations!

of Sparta ; taught to weave and to command her appetite¹, and perhaps also to read, write, and cipher², but necessarily relying much on her husband (as we see from Xenophon's *Oeconomicus*) for any real assistance in the development of her character and intelligence. The natural quickness of the race, however, would make a little experience go a long way.

In matters of property, the Attic law was not unkind to females, for though the sons alone inherited where sons there were, daughters often received liberal portions or dowers, and these remained available for their support³, if on the death of the husband the widow preferred to leave his house, which she sometimes did even when there were children of the marriage⁴, while, if she did not, she had a claim for alimony on her sons⁵. The dower was also returned by the husband, if he put away his wife. The husband, on receiving it at the time of the marriage, gave the family of his bride some tangible security for it⁶, the revenues of which he continued to receive, though he must no doubt have been unable to alienate it without their consent. As the husband could divorce his wife at a moment's notice

¹ Xen. *Oecon.* 7. 6.

² Xenophon makes no mention of Ischomachus' wife having been taught these things, but *Oecon.* 9. 10 (a passage to which Mr. Evelyn Abbott has drawn my attention) seems to imply that she could at any rate read an inventory. Göll (*Kulturbilder* 3. 328) holds that girls' education did just reach this point. 'Kept out of the way of all public instruction, and pent within doors which seldom opened for them, the girls learnt from their mothers and nurses the arts of spinning, weaving, and sewing, and that of cookery in its higher forms, adding to these accomplishments at the utmost a rudimentary knowledge of reading and writing.' Perhaps they were not always taught reading and writing, for we find Theophrastus insisting that girls should be taught

these subjects, though not beyond the limit of household exigencies (*Zeller, Gr. Ph.* 2. 2. 864. 3).

³ The dower in this case reverted to the *κύριος* of the wife, and he was bound to support her.

⁴ *Demosth. in Boeot. de Dote* p. 1010. The remarriage of widows appears to have been common at Athens. Plato recommends, on the contrary, that 'when a man dies leaving a sufficient number of children, the mother of his children shall remain with them and bring them up,' unless 'she appears to be too young to remain fitly unmarried' (*Laws* 930 C).

⁵ [*Demosth.*] in *Phaenipp.* p. 1047.

⁶ Where the dowry was large, this cannot have been possible unless the bridegroom had at least equal means.

by simply turning her out of the house, dowers were almost a necessity of married life at Athens. The position of a dowerless wife was so precarious that it was little better than that of a concubine. But then the system of dowers, no doubt, gave additional facilities to divorce, and when the dowry was considerable, the wife was commonly thought to be likely to be overbearing and the husband to be unduly subservient (Plato, *Laws* 774 C). For this and other reasons Plato thinks it best to abolish dowries (*Laws* 742 C : 774 C sq.), and to reserve the right of divorce for the State (*Laws* 929 E sqq.).

The dowry system, as practised at Athens, and very probably in Greece generally¹, evidently tended to maintain a connexion between the wife and her father's family; her entrance into her husband's house was not irrevocable, and Dionysius of Halicarnassus has good ground for the contrast which he draws² between Greek wedlock and wedlock as he describes it in the earlier days of Rome, when both dower and wife passed irrevocably to the husband, marriage being indissoluble, and the dower not reclaimable by action at law. The wife, in fact, in early Rome became once for all a member of her husband's family, 'a complete participant both in property and sacred rites' (*κοινωνὸς πάντων χρημάτων τε καὶ ἱερῶν*), and inherited from her husband just as a daughter would.

After marriage, the care of the children, the supervision of the slaves, and the general management of a household in which much that we buy was probably made at home, would leave but little spare time to the wife. She would now be freer to pass the threshold of the house, accompanied, no doubt, by one or more female slaves—would appear at marriage feasts and the family gatherings which answered to our christenings, take part in funeral processions, and be present at some State festivals, especially at festivals confined to her sex. But the husband would be

¹ Dionysius of Halicarnassus (*Ant. Rom.* 2. 25) seems to have the Greek household in view

generally, and not to be thinking of the Attic household only.

² *Ant. Rom.* 2. 25.

much away from home during the day¹, and both for this reason and because the only servants were slaves, it was well that the wife should leave the house but little—indeed, apart from this, the proper place for the wife was felt to be the home. Many women seem to have hugged their fetters; Plato speaks of the sex in the *Laws* (781 A, C) as loving darkness and seclusion, and anticipates some difficulty in prevailing on women to come forth into the light of day. The poorer sort of women were comparatively free from these disabilities, and it was a social distinction to be subject to them. The men, with their heads full of politics and war, would feel that if they were themselves not domestic in their tastes, others must be so for them, and that the indoor life of Greek women was the natural complement of the outdoor life of Greek husbands and fathers; but the race was too aspiring to do full justice to a woman's life, especially after the improvement in male education and the increase in the interest of Greek politics which mark the fifth century before Christ. It was seldom that Greek wives, elsewhere than in the Lacedaemonian State (*Pol.* 2. 9. 1269 b 31), invaded the men's domain and made their influence felt in the political field, though tyrannies and extreme democracies seem sometimes to have found it worth their while to court their good will (7 (5). 11. 1313 b 32 sqq.); more often they consoled themselves by indulging in religious enthusiasm², to the dismay of men like Menander's Misogynist, who complains (*Misog.* fr. 4 and 5):

Ἐπιτρίβουσιν ἡμᾶς οἱ θεοὶ
μάλιστα τοὺς γήμαντας· αἰεὶ γάρ τινα
ἄγειν ἑορτὴν ἐστ' ἀνάγκη,

¹ Xen. *Oecon.* 3. 12, ἔστιν ὅτε ἀλλωτῶν σπουδαίων πλείω ἐπιτρέπεις ἢ τῇ γυναικί; Οὐδενί, ἔφη. "Ἔστι δὲ ὅτε ἐλάσσονα διαλέγῃ ἢ τῇ γυναικί; Εἰ δὲ μή, οὐ πολλοῖς γε, ἔφη.

² Cp. Plato, *Laws* 909 E; Plutarch, *Praecept. Conjug.* c. 19. Plutarch's picture of the interior of a γυναικωνίτις is not a very cheerful one—ἔπειτα καὶ ψευδὸς ἔστι τὸ εὐθυμεῖν τοὺς μὴ πολλὰ

πράσσοντας· ἔδει γὰρ εὐθυμοτέρας εἶναι γυναῖκας ἀνδρῶν, οἰκουρίᾳ τὰ πολλὰ συνούσας· νυνὶ δὲ ὁ μὲν βορέας διὰ παρθενικῆς ἀπαλόχροος οὐ διάησιν, ὥς φησιν Ἡσίοδος· λύπαι δὲ καὶ ταραχαὶ καὶ κακοθυμίαι διὰ ζήλοτυπίας καὶ δεισιδαιμονίας καὶ φιλοτιμίας καὶ κενῶν δοξῶν, ὅσας οὐκ ἂν εἴποι τις, εἰς τὴν γυναικωνίτιν ὑπορρέουσιν (*De Tranq. Animi*, c. 2).

and again :

Ἐθύμεν δὲ πεντάκις τῆς ἡμέρας,
ἐκυμβάλισον δ' ἑπτὰ θεράπαινοι κύκλω·
αἱ δ' ὠλόλυζον.

On the other hand, the wife had often to complain of her husband's unfaithfulness, which escaped with little censure in a society based on slavery¹. If we may judge, however, from Aristotle's testimony to the prevalence of 'feminine ascendancy' and the 'over-indulgence of women' in extreme democracies, which is borne out by that of Plato (Rep. 563 B: cp. Laws 774 C), the Athenian wife was as often the oppressor as the oppressed. It was the fashion to give considerable dowries², and consequently the wife had her husband a good deal in her power, for a divorce entailed the withdrawal, not only from him, but also apparently from the children, of revenues which they could in many cases ill afford to lose. A change in the position of the wife may well have come about, as L. Schmidt points out³, in the period which commences with Alexander, when the loss of political freedom contributed with other causes to divert men's minds in some degree from politics and to give increased prominence to family life. The old traditions would also be less powerful in the great new cities, which now became the most conspicuous centres of Greek life⁴.

As to the relation of parent and child, Dionysius of Halicarnassus tells us that in Greece 'children were often guilty of unseemly conduct to their fathers⁵'; he is not satisfied with the temporary authority which was all that Greek custom conceded to the father, ceasing with the second year after puberty or at marriage or with enrolment

¹ See L. Schmidt, 2. 194 sqq. Even Plutarch's language on this point is not quite what we should expect (Conj. Praec. c. 16).

² See Boeckh, Public Economy of Athens, E. T. pp. 483 and 514.
³ 2. 426.

⁴ L. Schmidt contrasts the freedom with which Gorgo and

Praxinoë, in the 15th Idyll of Theocritus, find their way about Alexandria, with Athenian custom (2. 427).

⁵ Ant. Rom. 2. 26, πολλά ἐν Ἑλλήσιν ὑπὸ τέκνων εἰς πατέρας ἀσχημονεῖται. Compare Plato, Rep. 562 E.

in the public registers, nor again with the comparatively moderate penalties for disobedience which Greek law permitted the father to inflict, such as expulsion from the home or disinheritance. He prefers a fuller paternal authority, more nearly resembling the Roman *patria potestas*. Greek law, it is true, regarded the father rather as 'the natural guardian and administrator of the common property of the household¹,' than as its absolute owner, but the powers it conferred on him were not perhaps insufficient, and the remedy was probably to be sought in an improvement of the training of the parents, and especially of the mother, and in making her more of a spiritual force in the household. Loved and honoured she was already :

Οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδὲν μητρὸς ἡδίων τέκνοισ'
ἐρᾶτε μητρός, παῖδες, ὥς οὐκ ἔστ' ἔρως
τοιούτος ἄλλος, οἷος ἡδίων ἐρᾶν,

says one of Euripides' characters in a fragment of the *Erechtheus* preserved by Stobaeus (Floril. 79. 4); but another says,

'Αλλ' ἴστ', ἐμοὶ μὲν οὗτος οὐκ ἔσται νόμος
τὸ μὴ οὔ σε, μήτερ, προσφιλῇ νέμειν ἀεὶ
καὶ τοῦ δικαίου καὶ τόκων τῶν σῶν χάριν
στέργω δὲ τὸν φύσαντα τῶν πάντων βροτῶν
μάλισθ' ὀρίζω τοῦτο, καὶ σὺ μὴ φθόνει,
κείνου γὰρ ἐξέβλαστον οὐδ' ἂν εἰς ἀνὴρ
γυναικὸς αὐδήσειεν, ἀλλὰ τοῦ πατρός².

And thus, while Xenophon, in his kindly *Oeconomicus*, fully recognizes her as the colleague of the father in the education of the children³, the writer of the (so-called) first

¹ C. F. Hermann, Gr. Antiqq. 3. § 11. The Attic father had, however, the right to renounce his son by proclamation through a herald and so to disinherit him—a right which Plato in the *Laws* makes over to the whole kith and kin on the father's proposition (928-9); and his unchecked power of gift would be an additional security for his authority over his children. Plato's reform of the paternal

renunciation anticipates in some degree the change in the law, which, in Lucian's day, permitted the renounced son to appeal against his father's decision to a dicastery (see Lucian's *Ἀποκηρυττόμενος*, c. 8).

² Stob. Floril. 79. 27.

³ *Oecon.* 7. 12. Plato in the *Laws* is for adding to the powers of the mother: see Stallbaum's note on *Laws* 774 E.

book of the *Oeconomics* falsely attributed to Aristotle, thoughtful as he is, appears to leave her only the function of rearing the child, and to claim for the father the task of educating it (*Oecon.* 1. 3. 1344 a 7). On the whole, she was hardly one of the heads of the household (except when the accident of a great dowry made her too potent), and its only real head was for a large part of the day an absentee. The gentler influence for good in the household is often not the least powerful, but it had no proper place made for it in Greece. Greek civilization did not give women an adequate training, or call for enough from them: these were more serious faults than its contraction of their rights or of their freedom. The most glaring defects of the actual Greek household, in Aristotle's view, were, however, probably the insufficient preparation of its head for his functions and its 'Cyclopic' freedom from State-guidance (*Eth. Nic.* 10. 10. 1180 a 24 sqq.). Each household was allowed to make of itself exactly what it liked, and to train its subordinate members in its own way, as if it did not matter to the State what training they received.

It was unfortunate that in the Lacedaemonian State, in which women appear to have been least controlled and most powerful, they were, in the view of Aristotle at all events, worst. Lycurgus was believed to have tried to train the Lacedaemonian women in the same hardy habits as the men, but to have been foiled by their resistance¹: at any rate, their life was in complete contrast to that of the men—luxurious and abandoned to every kind of vice (*Pol.* 2. 9. 1269 b 22). Aristotle does not distinctly mention the fact that they shared in youth the gymnastic training of the boys, but he may well be referring to it when he implies that they were trained to be 'fearless'

¹ *Pol.* 2. 9. 1270 a 6 sq.: cp. Plato, *Laws* 781 A, εἰς αὐτὸ τοῦ νομοθέτου. Both Xenophon (*de Rep. Lac.* 1. 3-4) and Plato (*Laws* 806 A) speak of the girls of this State as receiving a gymnastic training—Plato, indeed, adds that they were also trained in 'music'

(μουσική)—but this does not prevent the latter from regarding the women (with Aristotle) as 'unregulated by law,' the result being that 'many laxities had crept in (πολλὰ παρέρπει) which law might have mended' (*Laws* 781 A).

(*θρασύτης*, 1269 b 35); their fearlessness, however, he says, was of no use in household life, and broke down in war, as their conduct during the Theban invasion of Laconia showed. On the other hand, the Lacedaemonians, like many other military races, were very submissive to feminine influence; they gave their daughters large dowries, which the law left it in their power to do; nor did the State retain any control over the disposal of orphan heiresses in marriage. The result was that wealth came to be concentrated in a few hands, that the number of proprietors and also of citizens dwindled, and that the greed for wealth, which was a feature of the Lacedaemonian character, was intensified in the few remaining citizens by the desire to provide the women with the means of lavish living. So great, in fact, was the power of the women that their influence made itself felt even in the administration of the shortlived Lacedaemonian empire.

Aristotle's criticism of the institutions of this State in relation to women illustrates his remark (I. 13. 1260 b 15 sq.) as to the importance of training women to virtue, and to the kind of virtue most in accordance with the given constitution, for in this instance the defects of the women were among the causes which led to the deterioration of the men and the enfeeblement of the State. He seems to imply that the women should have been trained to temperance, and their habits of life better regulated. Whether he wished that women should have any further intellectual training than Greek women usually enjoyed in his day, we do not know; but he seems to have been in favour of giving them, probably through the medium of their fathers and husbands, some sort of moral education and also of regulating their habits of life within the household. The Lacedaemonian household, he evidently feels, was more actively prejudicial than any other form of the household known to Greece¹.

¹ Plutarch's lives of Agis and Cleomenes refer to a generation a century later than that of which

Aristotle speaks, but they show that the wealth and power of the Lacedaemonian women remained

Plato abolishes the household in the Republic and reconstructs it in the Laws, leaving it even there only a somewhat shadowy existence.

We may now turn to the question, how Plato and Aristotle respectively deal with the Household. In the Republic, as we have already seen, Plato abolished the household. In the Laws he retains it, but makes considerable changes in its arrangements, some of which are improvements, while others, such as the institution of public meal-tables for women and girls no less than for men and boys, would have impaired its intimacy and probably its influence. His plan, stated briefly, is to set not only women but also girls free from their enforced seclusion, and to call them forth into the light of day; to educate girls in much the same way as boys, though after six years of age apart from them¹; to open office in the State to women, or, at all events, any offices for which they have a special fitness; to admit them in some degree even to military service; to postpone the age of marriage in the case of girls, so that they may be the fitter to be mothers; to forbid dowries, both as tending to place wife and husband in a false relation to each other and as leading to the union of fortunes and the over-enrichment of a few; to treat marriage as instituted less for the comfort or pleasure of the individuals composing the household, than for the end of providing the State with offspring fit in mind and body to become its citizens; and to make succession to the citizens'

unbroken up to that time, and so far bear out Aristotle's account; they reveal to us, however, some noble characters among them, not unworthy of the influence they possessed, and 'spiritual forces' in the fullest sense of the word. These lives are probably based on the history of Phylarchus, who took the side of Cleomenes and the Lacedaemonians against Aratus and the Achaeans (Polyb. 2. 56), and was perhaps somewhat given to writing for effect; but there may well have been women at Sparta to whom Aristotle's general judgment would not apply, both in his days and later.

¹ Both sexes are to be trained

in the following studies, taken successively: — Riding, military exercises, and the use of warlike weapons; wrestling, dancing under arms, recitation, and singing; reading and writing, the use of the lyre, the rudiments of arithmetic, geometry, and astronomy. Plato knows, however, that the male and female character are not the same (802 D-E), and he will have different songs composed for the two sexes: males are to learn songs expressive of τὸ μεγαλοπρεπές καὶ τὸ πρὸς τὴν ἀνδρείαν ῥέπον, females songs in which τὸ κόσμον καὶ σῶφρον predominates.

lots of land follow the rule of Unigeniture, in order that these may remain undivided, permission being given to the father to choose the son who is to succeed him, and care being taken that the other sons shall not want¹. Plato's language in *Laws* 909 D sqq. is wide enough to include the abolition of the domestic worship of Hestia at the household hearth and of other household gods: *ἱερὰ μὲν εἰς ἐν ἰδίαις οἰκίαις ἐκτίσθω· θύειν δ' ὅταν ἐπὶ νοῦν ἦν τινί, πρὸς τὰ δημόσια ἴτω θύσων, καὶ τοῖς ἱερεῦσιν τε καὶ ἱεραῖς ἐγχειρίζτω τὰ θύματα, οἷς ἀγνεία τούτων ἐπιμελής· συνενξάσθω δὲ αὐτός τε καὶ ὃς ἂν ἐθέλῃ μετ' αὐτοῦ ξυνεύχεσθαι*. He appears to make the public places for sacrifice the only places for sacrifice, and the public priests and priestesses the only sacrificers. But this is not probably his intention, for in other passages of the *Laws* he evidently contemplates the continued existence of private rites (717 B: 785 A): his wish is to prevent the household becoming what it seems often to have been, the secret nursery of superstitious worships (909 E: 910 B); he probably does not mean to meddle with old-established cults, like those of Hestia and Zeus *ἐρκεῖος* or *ἐφέστιος*.

Plato is eager to flood the recesses of the Greek household with the light of day, and partly with this end in view institutes public meals not only for the men and boys but also for the women and girls (*ξυσσίτια δὲ κατεσκευασμένα εἴη χωρὶς μὲν τὰ τῶν ἀνδρῶν, ἐγγὺς δ' ἐχόμενα τὰ τῶν αὐτοῖς οἰκείων, παίδων τε ἅμα θηλειῶν καὶ τῶν μητέρων αὐταῖς*, 806 E)². The members of the household described in the *Laws* would apparently be but little alone with each other, and not probably often at home except at night, for their meals would be taken in the public halls, the women and girls sitting apart from the men and boys³. The household

¹ Plutarch (*Comment. in Hesiod.* c. 20) attributes a similar preference for Unigeniture to Lycurgus—*μήποτε δέ, φησὶν ὁ Πλούταρχος, καὶ Πλάτων ἐπεταὶ τῷ Ἡσιόδῳ καὶ Ξενοκράτῃ καὶ Λυκούργῳ πρὸ τούτων· οἱ πάντες φέροντο δεῖν ἓνα κληρονόμον καταλιπεῖν*.

² It is curious that Plato takes

no notice of the architectural arrangements of the Greek dwelling-house, which reflected so conspicuously the contrast between male and female life. One would have expected him to insist on its reconstruction.

³ Sir T. More adopts in his *Utopia* the plan of common

would thus cease to be a body of persons supplied from a common store of their own (*δμοσίπνοι*), and the relations of husband and wife and of parent and child would probably suffer some relaxation. Plato's pretty ideal picture (*Laws* 931 A) of the parents seated by the hearth like sacred statues among children who half worship them would perhaps hardly be realized in so scattered an unity as the household of the *Laws*. The State appears to take upon itself not only the physical and intellectual, but also the moral training of young and old, and to leave little for the household to do, except indeed to bring 'fools' into the world and 'suckle' them¹. It would seem to escape abolition only to be condemned to a somewhat shadowy existence.

Aristotle's
view of the
household
and its true
organiza-
tion.

With Aristotle's views as to the true organization of the household we are only imperfectly acquainted. We get many separate glimpses of them, but no continuous and systematic statement. He glances at its structure in the Fifth Book of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, and again in the Eighth Book; but Justice is the subject with which he is more immediately concerned in the former book, and Friendship in the latter. In the First Book of the *Politics* the question before him is not so much what is the true constitution of the household as who is the true householder; and we penetrate into the subject only far enough to ascertain the true relation of the head of the household to wife, child, and slave. Even this topic is not fully treated, and cannot be so till the constitution is dealt with (i. 13. 1260 b 8 sqq.). In the Second Book we are as much

meals, but ranges men and women along opposite sides of the same table (*Utopia*, lib. ii. p. 90, ed. Bas. 1518).

¹ Even mere babies of three years old, girls and boys alike, are to gather at the village-temples, and to be formed into *ἀγῆλαι* for games, under the control of women appointed by the State (*Laws*

794 A). They are not even to play in families or under their mother's eye, when once over three. In fact, as mothers in the State of the *Laws* were to engage in the same pursuits as men and to take their meals at public meal-tables, some arrangement of this kind was almost necessary.

concerned with the family relation as with the household, and the whole question is approached from a different point of view. Then there is a chapter or two in the Fourth Book on the age of marriage and the management of young children. We have also the so-called First Book of the *Oeconomics*, which can hardly have been written by Aristotle, and the *νόμοι ἀνδρὸς καὶ γαμετῆς* preserved only in a Latin translation (Val. Rose, *Aristoteles Pseudepigraphus*, p. 644 sqq.), of the Greek original of which the same thing may be said. On the two latter documents, therefore, we cannot venture to rely. It is not, however, difficult to trace the general tendency of Aristotle's views.

According to him, the household, like the State, comes into being for one end and exists for another. It begins in the impulses of reproduction and self-preservation, perhaps also in the impulse of sociality (*ἀνθρώπος γὰρ τῇ φύσει συνδυαστικὸν μᾶλλον ἢ πολιτικόν*, *Eth. Nic.* 8, 14. 1162 a 17); but, when thus brought into existence, it rises above these aims and exists for better things. It is not a mere means of recruiting the population; still less is it a mere means of heaping up wealth. If in the *De Generatione Animalium* (2. 1. 731 b 31 sqq.) Aristotle regards reproduction as the path, for men no less than other animals, to immortality, this point of view disappears in the *Politics*. The household is, in its definitive form, a sort of younger sister of the State; good life is its aim, no less than it is that of the State; it is, like the State, a *κοινωνία*, though a less comprehensive and less noble *κοινωνία*; it is at once a group of friends, a body of rulers and ruled, and a school of moral training. It is a group of friends, ruled by the head of the household for their good, and especially for their growth in virtue; varying in the degree of their inequality, but all unequal, and some not even 'proportionately equal.' For the child and the slave are hardly subjects of right, and the latter is in strictness no member of the *κοινωνία*. This varying inequality among the components of the household—this variation of the distance at which they respectively stand from the head—is a characteristic feature of the society,

and Aristotle insists on nothing so much as that these differences must be respected in its organization. The wife is not to be ruled as the child, nor the child as the slave.

The tendency of the household is to inequality, that of the State to equality, absolute or proportionate (Pol. 6 (4). 11. 1295 b 25, *βούλεται δέ γε ἡ πόλις ἐξ ἴσων εἶναι καὶ ὁμοίων ὅτι μάλιστα*). The household is ruled by a king, whereas the rule of a king is of rare occurrence in the fully developed State¹. The household is at once a less self-complete (2. 2. 1261 b 12), and a more intimate, society than the State. In it everything is common (1. 9. 1257 a 21): not so in the State. On the other hand, the household resembles the State in not existing for some narrow or transitory end, but as an aid to human life (Eth. Nic. 8. 14. 1162 a 20 sq.: cp. 8. 11. 1160 a 14-25). It is in the household that the future citizens of the State first see the light (Pol. 1. 13. 1260 b 19) and receive their earliest training, which often exercises a decisive influence on their subsequent life²; it is here that women and slaves find the moral guidance they need. Obedience here is rendered all the more willingly for being rendered to a relative and a benefactor (Eth. Nic. 10. 10. 1180 b 5); and persons and things are all the better attended to for being attended to individually (1180 b 7). The household lightens the burden of the State by taking off its hands, to some extent at all events, the care of women, children, and slaves; and if on the principle that 'the better the persons ruled, the better is the rule exercised' (Pol. 1. 5. 1254 a 25), the rule

¹ Marquardt (Handbuch der Römischen Alterthümer, 7. 1. 1) attributes to the Romans the feeling that 'not only is the Family a condition of the State, but the constitution of the Family is also the basis and the prototype of the constitution of the State.' Aristotle would admit this of the early State, but not of the State in its definitive form. Even the rule of the husband over the wife, though

a πολιτικὴ ἀρχή—which cannot be said of the rule over children or slaves—differs in some respects from most types of πολιτικὴ ἀρχή (Pol. 1. 12. 1259 b 4).

² The sixteenth and seventeenth chapters of the Fourth Book of the Politics show what importance Aristotle, following in the steps of Plato (Laws 765 E), attached to the earliest epoch of human existence and even to its embryo stage.

of the household stands on a lower level than that of the State, in which rule is exercised over citizens, it is nevertheless fit work, in Aristotle's opinion, for the man of full virtue (*σπουδαῖος*).

Aristotle omits to treat of some important questions in relation to marriage. He does not pause to prove that the household should be a monogamic household, but takes this for granted. We do not learn his views as to divorce; he does not mention the subject of prohibited degrees of relationship. We must remember that we are not in possession of his whole mind. On the other hand, he raises questions which seem rather startling to us. Are men and women of any and every age, if only of adult years, to be allowed to marry, and, again, to become parents¹? Greek inquirers, with their characteristic combination of logic and audacity, insisted that the interests of the State made a negative answer necessary². The Lacedaemonian State required that marriage should take place in the prime of physical vigour on both sides (*Xen. Rep. Lac.* i. 6), and both Plato and Aristotle fix an age for marriage. The former, in the *Republic*, allows unions (marriage does not exist) to take place between men from 25 to 55 years of age and women from 20 to 40 (*Rep.* 460 E). In the *Laws* the arrangement is that a man is to marry not earlier than 25 (772 D) or 30 (721 A: 785 B), and not later than 35—a woman not

Aristotle, like Plato before him, requires the State to fix limits of age for marriage.

¹ The question does not seem to have been raised whether a hereditary disease or predisposition to disease should be a bar to marriage.

² Mr. Mahaffy observes, with much truth (*Old Greek Education*, p. 117 sq.), that 'there is no valid reason why the physical production of the race should not receive infinitely more attention than it does, within the bounds of our present social arrangements. . . . If even now there are civilized countries and classes of people who openly profess prudential reasons as the best for marrying, it will only require a

better education of public opinion to enable men to advance to the position that the physical and mental vigour of the resulting children is a motive to be consciously considered in the selection.' Plato and Aristotle, it is true, went a step farther: they were not content with advising their citizens to keep these considerations in view, but recommended that the State should see that they did so. See on this subject Prof. Jowett's interesting remarks in his *Introduction to Plato's Republic* (Translation of Plato, 3. 168, ed. 2).

earlier than 16¹ or later than 20; and that the begetting of children is to continue only for 10 years (784 B). This latter period would thus close at least ten years earlier than in the Republic; but the reason of this is that in the Republic the interests of the State are secured by giving the magistrates an absolute control over unions (cp. Rep. 460 A, τὸ δὲ πλῆθος τῶν γάμων ἐπὶ τοῖς ἄρχουσι ποιήσομεν, ἵν' ὥς μάλιστα διασώζωσι τὸν αὐτὸν ἀριθμὸν τῶν ἀνδρῶν).

Considerations kept in view by Aristotle in relation to this matter.

Plato's main aims in dealing with this subject appear to be to save both the family and the State from the evils connected with over-population and to secure a healthy and vigorous progeny. Aristotle thinks that other considerations also need to be taken into account. He recommends a difference of 20 years between the ages of husband and wife, or, more precisely, the difference between the ages of 37 and 18. One of his reasons for this recommendation is that the procreative powers of women cease at 50, twenty years before those of men, and that if account is not taken of this fact, the harmony of the union may be impaired by inequalities in this respect. The disadvantages which attend a too great nearness or difference of age between the father and the child will also be avoided. For the children, if born, as may naturally be expected, at no long interval after marriage, will be reaching years of discretion while their father is still vigorous and able to help them; nor will their return for the care taken of them in childhood come too late to be of any use²; while, on the other hand, they will not be near enough in age to their father to lose reverence for him or to embarrass his management of the household. The father, it is evident, will be just

¹ 785 B. Susemihl (Note 940) notices that the age of 18 is mentioned in 833 D. For Hesiod's counsel on this subject, see Opp. et Dies, 695 sqq.

² Plutarch (de Amore Proles, c. 4) laments the fate of most fathers in dying before their children have done great deeds, or even attained their full moral stature—ἀνθρώπου

δὲ ἡ μὲν ἐκτροφὴ πολύπονος, ἡ δὲ αὔξησης βραδεία· τῆς δὲ ἀρετῆς μακρὰν οὖσης, προαποθνήσκουσιν οἱ πλείστοι πατέρες· οὐκ ἐπεῖδὲ τὴν Σαλαμίνα Νεοκλῆς τὴν Θεμιστοκλέους, οὐδὲ τὸν Εὐρυμέδοντα Μιλτιάδης τὸν Κίμωνος, οὐδὲ ἤκουσε Περικλέους Ξάνθιππος δημηγοροῦντος, οὐδὲ Ἀρίστων Πλάτωνος φιλοσοφοῦντος, κ.τ.λ.

beginning to need help when his children are ready to give it, and thus neither mutual helpfulness nor parental control will be sacrificed. The household will be firmly knit together by mutual needs and the interchange of service, and will be a scene of harmony instead of discord, for it will be based on the common advantage (*τὸ κοινῇ συμφέρον*). Another gain will be that the father will be well stricken in years and the sons just at the commencement of their prime (30 years of age, *Rhet.* 2. 14. 1390 b 9 sq.), when the latter take the place of the former (*Pol.* 4 (7). 16. 1335 a 32-35). Above all, these ages give the best prospect of well-developed offspring, likely to produce children of the male sex. The physical well-being of husband and wife is also thus consulted. It seems to have been a common opinion that, in the case of the male, over-early marriage was prejudicial to physical growth, while in that of the female, it added to the perils of labour and involved some moral risks besides (1335 a 22)¹.

We see that Aristotle, in dealing with this subject, keeps other aims in view, besides those which were present to the mind of Plato—the well-being of husband and wife, their full harmony, the establishment of a due relation of helpfulness and respect between the father and the child. His remarks are fresh and interesting; they call attention to points which often escape notice, and evidence a thoughtful study of the facts of household life. Montaigne says (*Essais*, Livre 2. ch. 8: vol. 2. p. 179, Charpentier): ‘je me mariay à trente-trois ans, et loue l’opinion de trente-cinq, qu’on dict estre d’Aristote’: and a little further on (p. 180), ‘un gentilhomme qui a trente-cinq ans, il n’est pas temps qu’il face place à son fils qui en a vingt’: and again, ‘il ne nous faudroit pas marier si jeunes, que nostre aage vienne quasi à se confondre avecques l’aage de nos enfants’ (p. 178). We see that difficulties as to the succession (*διαδοχή*) of the children were familiar enough to him. All will approve

¹ We know from Aristoxenus ascribed to Pythagoras in the (*Fr.* 20: Müller, *Fr. Hist. Gr.* 2. Pythagorean school. 278), that this was an opinion

Aristotle's postponement of the female age of marriage to 18 ; but we shall hardly admit that the disparity of years between husband and wife need be as great as he thinks : obviously a man does not require to be nearly 40 years older than his eldest child to possess a due authority over his children. Lasaulx (*Ehe bei den Griechen*, p. 60, n. 190) quotes a vigorous utterance of W. von Humboldt to the effect that an ideal union begins for both husband and wife in comparative youth ; that husband and wife should pass the days of their youth together and have common memories of the most enjoyable period of human life¹. Still, even if we think that Aristotle has not hit upon the ideally best age for the husband and father, it remains true that he should neither be too near in age to his children nor too far removed from them. It was natural, that, resting as he does far the larger part of the weight of the household on the father's shoulders, Aristotle should attach special importance to his maturity in mind and body. According to him, the acme of man's physical development is reached between 30 and 35, the acme of mental development not till 49². This accounts for his choosing a somewhat late age ; but he may also have remembered that, till about the time he names, his citizens would be much occupied with military duties hardly perhaps compatible with married life.

Τερνύονται
to cease
after 17
years of
married
life.

He is not, however, content with merely fixing an age for marriage. Like Plato, he sees that parents may be too old to give birth to a vigorous offspring³, and he requires

¹ 'The freshness of youth is the true foundation of happy wedlock (*die wahre Grundlage der Ehe*). I do not for a moment say that the happiness of wedlock ceases with youth ; what I say is that husband and wife should carry into later life the memory of a youth enjoyed together, if their happiness is to be perfect, and not to lose the distinguishing characteristic of wedded bliss' (*Briefe an eine Freundin*, 2, p. 176). We are conscious here of a touch

of sentiment which is altogether modern.

² Aristot. *Rhet.* 2. 14. 1390 b 9 sqq. : cp. Solon, *Fragm.* 27. Solon places marriage in the fifth septennial period of man's life (aet. 28-35), the physical acme in the fourth, the mental in the seventh and eighth (aet. 42-56). Plato (*Rep.* 460 E-461 A) makes the years between 25 and 55 the *ἀκμή σώματος τε καὶ φρονήσεως*.

³ We are little accustomed to look at these things from Aris-

that after seventeen years of married life (when the husband is 54 years old and the wife 35), the married couple shall cease to become parents (4 (7). 16. 1335 b 26 sqq.). Plato had named in the Laws an even shorter term—ten years. Aristotle thus divides the period of marriage into two epochs—the epoch of *τεκνοποιία* and that in which no children are to be brought into the world.

Nor does he stop even here. He names, in conformity with Greek custom¹, the winter-season as the best for contracting marriage, and insists that a limit must be set to the begetting of children even during the seventeen years' term (1335 b 21 sq.), so that the begetting of more than a certain number shall be prohibited (2. 6. 1265 b 6 sq.). It may be thought, he hints (1335 b 21 sq.), that infractions of this rule will occur, and that the only possible remedy for them will be the exposure of the surplus children; but this is not so²: he apparently regards the exposure of living children as not 'holy' (*ὅσιον*)³, and suggests in preference abortion at an early stage of pregnancy. The practice of abortion had already been sanctioned by Plato in the Republic (461 C) without this limitation, in the event of unions outside the legal limits of age proving fruitful; and in case of its failure, exposure. Aristotle appears to be more opposed to exposure and to abortion in advanced

Only a certain number of children to be begotten during the 17 years: means by which this rule is to be enforced.

tole's point of view, and I know not whether any physiologist has inquired statistically, what limits of age in the parents seem most favourable to vigorous offspring.

¹ Not Attic only, apparently, for he refers to the practice of *οἱ πολλοί* (1335 a 37). The month Gamelion (January–February) was the marriage-month at Athens. See Hist. An. 5. 8. 542 a 26–b 1. Plutarch is pleased with animals for pairing at one particular season only, and that the most favourable (de Amore Prolis c. 2). Pythagoras had prescribed the winter (Diog. Laert. 8. 9: Diod. 10. 9. 3).

² I follow the interpretation of

1335 b 21 sqq. given by C. F. Hermann (Gr. Antiqq. 3. § 11. 8):—'but not, on the ground of an over-great number of children, if there is a regulation against an over-great number, to expose children.'

³ Except in the case of defective offspring (*πεπηρωμένον*, 1335 b 20). Compare with 1335 b 23–26, de Gen. An. 5. 1. 778 b 32 sqq.: Eth. Nic. 9. 9. 1170 a 16. See Thonissen, Droit Pénal de la république athénienne, p. 258, on the question whether abortion was a crime by Attic law. It seems to have been common among slave-mothers (Dio Chrys. Or. 15. 237 M).

stages of pregnancy than Plato. On the other hand, Plato does not appear to authorize abortion, as Aristotle does, in the case of unions within the prescribed limits of age. It is also to be remarked that he drops these provisions in the *Laws*.

Aristotle's object evidently is to avoid both exposure and abortion, but he regards the latter, if effected at an early period of pregnancy, as unobjectionable in comparison with the former, which he prohibits in all cases but one, that of an imperfect growth. It would have been a great gain to the ancient world to be rid of infanticide, which Polybius 'specifies among the causes of the dwindling numbers of the Greeks¹,' but whether this result was not too dearly purchased at the cost of permitting abortion may well be doubted. It may easily be imagined how often the process prescribed by Aristotle would probably be resorted to in a State which delayed the marriage of all males till the age of 37, and which confined the begetting of children to a period of seventeen or eighteen years.

Aims of
Aristotle
in relation
to these
matters.

Aristotle evidently feels, even more strongly than Plato, the necessity of preventing the household from becoming a source of over-population and pauperism. He is not satisfied with the arrangements in the *Laws* on the subject of population (*Pol.* 2. 6. 1265 a 38 sqq.). Plato's plan of Unigeniture makes it more than ever essential that there shall not be too many sons in a household; and yet he takes insufficient means to secure this result. Hence the extraordinary strictness of Aristotle's regulations on the subject. He will not even trust to the remedy of founding a colony, which Plato keeps in view (*Laws* 740 E): the prevention of over-population is better than its cure. Yet the world has gained much by the foundation of Greek colonies, and these could not have existed if there had not been a surplus population to people them. Aristotle seems to forget, in his care for the internal harmony of his best State, that a large part even of the then known surface of the earth was unoccupied, and that, if

¹ Capes, *Early Roman Empire*, p. 205. See Polyb. 37. 9. 7.

it was not peopled in time from the civilized world, it might, as it afterwards did, receive immigrants likely to be formidable to civilization. He is familiar enough with the view that the State should be constituted for the advantage, not of a section of its citizens, but of the whole; that the Greek State and the Greek race had a duty to fulfil to the world outside, he is no more aware than any of his contemporaries.

Another aim which Aristotle has before him in dealing with the household, is that of making it the nursery of a race healthy and vigorous in mind and body. Much can be done within it to make or mar the physique of the future citizen (1334 b 29), and to render it what for the sake of the character (1334 b 25 sqq.) we should desire it to be, or the reverse. We know from the *Nicomachean Ethics* how closely moral virtue is connected with the passions, and these with the body (*Eth. Nic.* 10. 8. 1178 a 14). He also makes it his object (and here, as we have seen, he was in a less degree anticipated by Plato) to secure order, harmony, and mutual helpfulness within the household. But he no doubt also remembers that the city-State must not exceed a certain size, and desires to prevent its population outgrowing the limits imposed by him in the Fourth Book.

We have already noticed some of the arrangements which he adopts with a view to the well-being of the household, but he evidently finds the main security for its well-being in the character of its head. The husband and father, in Aristotle's ideal household, is not only of mature age, but one whose happy natural endowment of an union of intelligence, spirit, and affectionateness (4 (7). 7. 1327 b 29 sqq.) has had full justice done to it by rearing and education, whose childhood and youth have been spent amid ennobling influences, and who has undergone both the rude discipline of a military life and the full scientific training of a philosopher. His wife will not have received the varied education which Plato designed for girls no less than boys, but she will have been trained in the virtues

The head of the ideal household of Aristotle in his relation to his wife, children, and slaves.

which fit her to be his help-mate and right hand for household matters (Pol. 1. 13. 1260 a 21 sq.), and he will make of her a not unequal comrade: to his children he will be a kind of god, a full head and shoulders above them, and rightly so, for the father is a king, not the elder brother of his children¹ (Pol. 1. 12. 1259 b 10-17). His life will not be what Montaigne calls 'une vie questuaire.' He will have learnt to obtain the commodities necessary for the use of his household from natural sources and in natural ways, and to rest content with just that amount of them which is the essential condition of a satisfactory life, counting the provision of inanimate property and the care for it a matter of less moment than the care of slaves, and this again a small matter in comparison with the rule over wife and children and the development of their virtue. He will entrust the education of his boys after the age of seven to the officers of the State, and will leave the full command of the internal affairs of the house to his wife, making this her province in which she is to be supreme, except so far as the moral training of children and slaves is concerned, for this is to be his own affair. We may doubt whether his frequent absence on public business and at the *syssitia*, where he will take his meals, would not make it difficult for him to watch over his family—whether it would not interfere with that closeness of the household relation, on which Aristotle himself remarks (1. 2. 1252 b 14, οἶκος . . . οὗς Χαρώνδας μὲν καλεῖ ὁμοσιπύους, Ἐπιμενίδης δὲ ὁ Κρήης ὁμοκάπους).

¹ Contrast the relation of Charles James Fox to his father. 'As long as Charles would treat him like an elder brother (a point on which the lad indulged him without infringing on the strictest filial respect, or abating an atom of that eager and minute dutifulness which he exhibited in all his personal relations) he was welcome to do as he pleased with his own time and his father's money' (G. O. Trevelyan, Early

History of C. J. Fox, p. 289). The household as Carlyle knew it in his early years (Reminiscences, p. 55) comes nearer to the Aristotelian type, but is still very different. It is noticeable that Aristotle describes his *παμβασιλεία*, in which the king is of transcendent virtue and greatness in comparison with his willing subjects, as *τεταγμένη κατὰ τὴν οἰκονομικὴν* (Pol. 3. 14. 1285 b 31).

His relation to his wife is the best relation in the household, and, except that between brothers and sisters, the least unequal one—the relation in which justice fills the largest place (Eth. Nic. 5. 10. 1134 b 15 sq.); for it is a weak point in the household that its relations are mostly so unequal as to rest less on right than on love. The head of the household will discriminate his relation to his wife from his relation to his children, and that again from his relation to his slaves. There are some things which the wife can do better than he can (Eth. Nic. 8. 12. 1160 b 32 sqq.: cp. 8. 14. 1162 a 22 sq.), and which he will be wise to hand over to her: the advantage of wedlock lies in its making a common stock of contrasted aptitudes (1162 a 23): at least this is its utilitarian side, for it has another; it may become not only a friendship for utility and for pleasure, but also a friendship of the highest type—a friendship for virtue (Eth. Nic. 8. 14. 1162 a 24 sqq.)¹. It may not perhaps attain to the moral level of a friendship between two men of full virtue (*σπουδαῖοι*)—Aristotle would hardly be a Greek if he thought it did—but then it is a form of friendship and something more—a co-operative union of especial closeness and permanence for the highest ends. Man and wife are not only ‘friends,’ but sharers in a common work.

The wife, however, will be ‘silent’ before her husband, no less than the children before their father (Pol. 1. 13. 1260 a 28 sq.); in other words, will refrain from opposing him, so long, we conclude, as he does not encroach upon her domain. Plutarch, in whose time the wife counted for more in the household, still retains in his *Conjugal Precepts* the doctrine of conjugal silence (cc. 31, 32: c. 37), but makes it rather a silence to strangers, and a readiness to allow the husband to speak for her, than a silence before him. Adultery on the part of either husband or wife is

¹ There is nothing in the *Politics* inconsistent with this, though the use of the word *ὑπερτερική* of the virtue of the wife (Pol. 1. 13. 1260 a 21 sq.) might seem to

imply a general and not a partial subordination on her part. The division of spheres between husband and wife is, however, implied in Pol. 2. 5. 1264 b 2.

to be visited with condign punishment during the period of τεκνοποιία, and to be treated as disgraceful throughout the whole term of marriage (4 (7). 16. 1335 b 38 sqq.). If the authenticity of the fragment on the relations of husband and wife, which we possess in a Latin translation, were less doubtful¹, a few touches might be added from that source. It makes the wife supreme over all that passes within the house, reserving to the husband the right of deciding who are to be allowed to cross its threshold, and even the right of conducting all negotiations for the marriage of the children²: it draws largely on Homer to show with what reverence and respect the husband should treat his wife; they will be rivals in working for the good of the household, each in a special sphere, and this will be the only rivalry between them.

The relation of a father to his child—that of mother and child is not counted among the three constituent relations of the household enumerated in Pol. 1. 3. 1253 b 5 sq.—is, as has been said, regarded by Aristotle as resembling that of a king to his subjects. The language of Eth. Nic. 5. 10. 1134 b 8 sqq., indeed, treats the child up to a certain age—*ὥς ἂν ᾗ πηλίκον καὶ μὴ χωρισθῇ*—as ‘part and parcel’ of his father, and, one would think, hardly distinct enough from him to be even his ‘subject’; yet we learn in Eth. Nic. 8. 8. 1158 b 21 sqq. that not only is their relation one of friendship, but that the friendship between them,

¹ ‘Quid quod hunc ipsum librum ab Aristotele quidem quam maxime alienum, Perictionae autem libro *περὶ γυναικὸς ἀρμονίας* (Stob. flor. 85, 19, cui similes sunt Phintys et Pempelus, Platonis hic leges excubens, cf. Ocellus c. 4) et methodo qui praeceptoris est et sententiis et ut credo aetate similem, latina versione servatum Aretinus videtur recepisse’ (Val. Rose, de Aristot. librorum ordine et auctoritate, p. 61). L. Schmidt, on the other hand, accepts the Latin fragment as embodying ‘important remains in a greatly

altered form’ of Aristotle’s work on this subject (Ethik d. alten Griechen, 2. 187). The composition of the treatise from which this translation was made may well have been suggested to some follower of Aristotle by Eth. Nic. 8. 14. 1162 a 29 sq., and Pol. 1. 13. 1260 b 8 sqq., just as that of the so-called Second Book of the Oeconomics was probably suggested by Pol. 1. 11. 1259 a 3.

² They are conducted by the two fathers in Terence’s *Andria*, 3. 3. 6-42.

though unequal, may be 'durable and based on virtue, when the children render to their parents what is due to those who gave them being, and parents to sons what is due to children.' Aristotle's whole conception of youth perhaps accentuates its contrast with manhood; he does not follow out in detail the variations of the filial relation at different ages; he probably conceived it as ceasing to exist when the child attained years of discretion (cp. Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 2. 26). In describing the relation of father and child as a kingly relation, his object is to contrast it, on the one hand, with the rule of the husband over the wife, which is like that of one citizen over another, except that there is no interchange of rule (Pol. 1. 12. 1259 b 1 sq.)¹, and on the other with the despotic rule of the master over the slave. In the two former relations rule is exercised for the advantage of the ruled or of both parties, whereas in the last it is exercised primarily for the advantage of the ruler and accidentally only for the advantage of the ruled (Pol. 3. 6. 1278 b 32-1279 a 8). The master is, however (Pol. 1. 13), to make his rule over the slave a source of moral improvement to him—a means of placing him in contact with that rationality which he does not himself possess (Pol. 1. 13. 1260 b 5: 1. 5. 1254 b 22). He must not, therefore, in his relations with his slaves, confine himself, as Plato would have him do, to the language of blank command, but must also use that of admonition. Slaves should be encouraged to behave well by the prospect of receiving their freedom as a reward for good conduct (4 (7). 10. 1330 a 31 sq.). Aristotle intended to deal fully with the subject of the treatment of slaves, but does not do so in what we have of the Politics (4 (7). 10. 1330 a 31).

The differences between Aristotle's ideal household and

¹ Eth. Nic. 8. 12. 1160 b 32, γὰρ ὁ ἀνὴρ ἀρχει καὶ περὶ ταῦτα ἁ
 ἀνδρὸς δὲ καὶ γυναῖκος (κοινωνία) δεῖ τὸν ἄνδρα ὅσα δὲ γυναῖκι ἀρμόζει,
 ἀριστοκρατικῇ φαίνεται· κατ' ἀξίαν ἐκείνη ἀποδίδωσιν.

The ideal household of Aristotle contrasted with the average Athenian household.

the average Athenian household seem to be mainly these. It would be endowed with an adequate, and not more than adequate, measure of worldly goods, and thus be equally removed from the over-wealthy type in which obedience was unknown (Pol. 6 (4). 11. 1295b 13-18), and from the over-poor type in which the wife and children had to supply the place of slaves (8 (6). 8. 1323a 5); its predominant aim would be the increase of virtue, not the increase of wealth; its head would be older and better prepared for his duties; his supremacy would not be usurped by his wife, while, on the other hand, his relation to her would be more equal and friendly than was often the case at Athens, and adultery on his part would be more severely dealt with; his married life would be largely controlled by the law in his own interest and in that of his wife and children, no less than in that of the State; his functions as head of the household would be exercised more or less under the control of the *γυναικονόμοι* and *παιδονόμοι* appointed by the State, just as they were probably exercised in the early days of Athens under some control from the Council of the Areopagus¹; he would not be allowed to choose for himself what kind of education should be given to his sons, but would have to send them to the public schools of the State from the age of seven onwards. Lastly, he would be even more of an absentee from the home during the day-time than the average Attic husband, for he would take his meals at the public meal-tables².

¹ *Gynaeconomi* existed at Athens, their existence, however, dating in Boeckh's opinion from the administration of Demetrius Phalereus (Dict. of Antiquities s. v.: Gilbert, Griech. Staatsalterth. 1. 154): if this was so, their introduction may have been due to Aristotle's commendation of the institution, like other points in the *régime* of Demetrius Phalereus. Cicero disapproves of it: *nec vero mulieribus praefectus praeponatur qui apud Graecos creari solet, sed*

sit censor qui viros doceat moderari uxoribus (Cic. de Rep. 4. 6. 6). Dionysius of Halicarnassus claims that the authority of the Roman censor, unlike that of any magistrate at Athens or Sparta, penetrated within the household. See the striking fragment from the *Antiquitates Romanae* (20. 13), where he depicts the way in which the household was controlled by this great office of State. Aristotle could not have asked more.

² Aristotle's remark at the close

Aristotle is evidently strongly impressed with the importance of the household. The children it brings into the world are the future citizens of the State, and it may easily saddle the State with an over-numerous or unsatisfactory progeny. It has to do with the future citizen in the earliest and most impressible years of life, years during which the character receives its permanent bent. Hence it is that Aristotle commits it to the charge of a head of mature age, worth, and capacity, and not content with that, subjects his rule to the supervision of State-officers. It is impossible to say that the course he takes is not a logical course, even if we may think that it would be better to leave the head of the household more freedom and responsibility.

The household, however, as he conceives it, is far from being a mere shadow, like that of the Laws; it is a real home, for though its head will often be absent, and though his action is in part regulated by the State, he is charged with the moral guidance of wife, child, and slave, and is evidently credited with the power to do much for their growth in virtue. The mere fact that the household needs to be adjusted to the constitution of the State shows that it is to be a reality.

On one important subject connected with the organization of the household, that of divorce, we have no express intimation of Aristotle's views. Plato in the Laws (929 E sqq.) allows of divorce for incompatibility of temper, though not without the intervention of the State, but his whole conception of the household implies the view that wedlock is normally a life-long union. This is still more true of Aristotle. Locke thinks that 'there is reason to inquire why the compact of marriage, where pro-

of the First Book that the virtue of husband and wife and father and child, and the way in which they should consort with each other, cannot be definitively depicted, nor the right standard in these things indicated, until they have been considered in

connexion with the various political constitutions to which the household must be adjusted, prepares us for a systematic study of the organization of the household relations under each constitution, which we do not find undertaken in the Politics.

creation and education are secured and inheritance taken care for, may not be made determinable either by consent or at a certain time, or upon certain conditions, as well as any other voluntary compacts, there being no necessity in the nature of the thing nor to the ends of it, that it should always be for life¹. Aristotle would probably reply, that the wife needs her husband's protecting care and affection to the last, that the relation of husband and wife is a relation of friendship, which deserves to be kept in being whether the interests of the children require its continuance or not, and that the husband and wife in their old age might, if parted, lose the aid of their grown-up children. The dissolution of an ill-matched or unsatisfactory union would, nevertheless, be probably recognized by him as occasionally necessary.

Aristotle
and the
clan, phra-
try, and
tribe.

In modern communities the household has long come to be the only recognized society based on the tie of blood. Among ourselves even the 'conseil de famille' is unknown to the law. But there was once a time when the household was only one of a number of similar societies. The clan, the phratry, and the tribe stood at its side, larger, though less intimate, unities of the same type. It might be thought to rest on no surer basis than they. History has taught us otherwise. Time has spared the household, but the clan, tribe, and phratry have long passed away. They found themselves assailed both from within and from without. The individual outgrew them and shook himself free from them; armed with adoptive and testamentary power, men were able, if they chose, to defeat the succession-rights of the clan; the rise of classes and parties in the State tended to break them up; religious change was fatal to their religious basis. Nor was the State probably sorry to substitute purely local unions for societies which cherished immemorial traditions of independence and hierarchical pride². Assailed by the individual and

¹ Civil Government, 2. § 81.

² We learn from Aristotle (7

(5). 4. 1304 a 35) that the tribe was sometimes a prime mover in

the State at the same time, it is no wonder that these societies succumbed, while the household, which went counter to neither, survived.

To Aristotle, however, the clan (*γένος*), phratry, and tribe were still indispensable elements in the State¹, though he says but little about them. The clan, indeed, with him assumes the local form of the village (*Pol.* 1. 2. 1252 b 16 sq.), just as at Athens it had passed into the deme in many cases; but in that form it is treated as existing by nature and as a permanent element in the State. If the household aids in the maintenance of good feeling and good fellowship among the members of the community, so do the tribe, phratry, and clan (2. 4. 1262 a 12: cp. 3. 9. 1280 b 33, 40). What other social functions these unities were to fulfil in Aristotle's State, we do not learn in what we have of the *Politics*.

We need not dwell on the many points of contrast which distinguish the household as Aristotle conceives it from the household of modern times. One remark, however, may be made on this subject. To Aristotle the head of the household is the one source from which all its spiritual influences appear to proceed. The wife contributes services which she is better fitted to render than any one else, but there is no sign that her husband is to derive any moral stimulus or guidance from her².

Contrast between the Aristotelian conception of the household and modern conceptions of it.

στάσις. He notices (8 (6). 4. 1319 b 19 sqq.) the bold and remarkable steps by which Cleisthenes at Athens put an end to the previously existing associations, and sought to bring men together and to break down the distinctions of worship and grouping which held them apart. In the Peloponnesus the clans seem to have been long the mainstay of oligarchy, and the only way to diminish their power was to gather a number of villages (i.e. clans) into a considerable city. The creation of Megalopolis,

for instance, would tell, and was doubtless intended by Epaminondas to tell, in favour of democracy and against the Lacedaemonians.

¹ *Pol.* 2. 5. 1264 a 6 sq.

² Even in *Eth. Nic.* 8. 14. 1162 a 25 sq. all that is said is that a friendship for virtue—the highest type of friendship—may exist between husband and wife, if they are good, for each has virtue and the husband may feel pleasure in the wife's virtue. But then we are told in the *Politics* (1. 13. 1260 a 21) that the wife's virtue is subordinate and minis-

Aristotle would hardly say with Trendelenburg¹ that 'the two parties (husband and wife) stand in need of each other, in order by their union to elevate and ennoble their individual lives.' The view of Comte that the function of the household is 'to cultivate to the highest point the influence of woman over man²,' would of course be utterly incomprehensible to him.

Aristotle's teaching as to Property—its due amount and the true mode of acquiring and using it.

Just as, after defending the household, Aristotle sketches an ideal household which differs much from the household as it actually existed, so after defending the right of several property, he lays down principles as to the acquisition and use of property which leave proprietary right and proprietary duty, so far at least as the citizens of the State are concerned³, a very different thing from what he found them.

The ideal household, as we have already seen, is not to be maintained in communistic fashion out of a public stock, but is to have a definite area of land assigned to it from which the householder is to win the means of subsistence for his household, or rather to have them won for him. Its extent will be such as to favour a mode of life at once temperate and liberal. A due supply of the goods of fortune—for Aristotle follows the traditional use of the Greek language in treating fortune as the source of wealth (e.g. 4 (7). I. 1323 b 27)⁴—is a condition of some kinds of virtuous action and a condition of happiness (4 (7). I. 1332 a 10–29). Virtue must be possessed of an adequate supply

terial (*ὕπηρετική*), and that the deliberative element in her nature is unable to assert itself with effect (1260 a 13). Aristotle was well aware of the contrast of character in men and women (see, for instance, *Hist. An.* 9. I. 608 a 35–b 16), whether we think that he draws the contrast correctly or not.

¹ *Naturrecht*, § 123.

² *Social Statics*, E.T., p. 171.

³ The ownership of land is to be confined to citizens (*Pol.* 4

(7). 9. 1329 a 17 sqq.); but the artisans and day-labourers who are to find a place in the best State, must be intended to hold property, though we hear no more of their proprietary rights than we do of the organization of the households in which we must suppose them to live.

⁴ Contrast the language used in 4 (7). I. 1323 a 40, *ὁρῶντας ὅτι κτῶνται καὶ φυλάττουσιν, οὐ τὰς ἀρετὰς τοῖς ἐκτός, ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνα ταύ- τας.*

of external and bodily goods, if it is to rise into happiness; it needs instruments (*ὄργανα*) just as a harpist needs a good lyre (1332 a 25). Plato had designed for his citizens in the Laws a simply 'temperate' life (737 D): Aristotle objects to this description as rather vague and open to misinterpretation (2. 6. 1265 a 28 sqq.); it might, he thinks, be construed to point to a pinched, hard existence, which is not what he would himself approve. He is not, like Milton, an encomiast of that 'spare Fast,' which, according to the poet,

'Oft with gods doth diet,
And hears the Muses in a ring
Aye round about God's altar sing':

but he is still less in sympathy with those who found in luxury a school of valour and greatness of mind¹. Aristotle connected with extreme wealth and luxury unwillingness to submit to be ruled, or to rest content with anything short of absolute rule, just as he connected incapacity for ruling and for aught but servile subjection with extreme poverty (Pol. 6 (4). 11. 1295 b 13)². The life of his citizens is to strike a happy mean between the two extremes. The ideal distribution of property is thus, in Aristotle's view, that in which every citizen has enough for virtue and happiness, and none have more³. His acceptance of the institu-

¹ Heracleides Ponticus appears to have said in his popular work on Pleasure—*ἀπαντες γοῦν οἱ τὴν ἡδονὴν τιμῶντες καὶ τρυφᾶν προηρημένοι μεγαλόψυχοι καὶ μεγαλοπρεπεῖς εἰσιν, ὡς Πέρσαι καὶ Μῆδοι*—'μαλιστα γὰρ τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων τὴν ἡδονὴν οὐτοὶ καὶ τὸ τρυφᾶν τιμῶσιν, ἀνδρείοτατοι καὶ μεγαλοψυχότατοι τῶν βαρβάρων ὄντες' (Müller, *Fr. Hist. Gr.* 2. 200 n.). The paradox is reproduced by Agatharchides, a Peripatetic of the second century before Christ, who says of the Aetolians—*Αἰτωλοὶ τοσοῦτον τῶν λοιπῶν ἐτοιμότερον ἔχουσι πρὸς θάνατον, ὅσῳ περ καὶ ζῆν πολυτελέως* [καὶ] *ἐκτενέστερον ζητοῦσι τῶν ἄλλων* (ap. Athen. Deipn. 12. 33. 527 b).

² Luxury meant more to the

Greeks than it means to us; it was in their view closely allied with *ὑβρις* and not unconnected with political untrustworthiness: cp. Plutarch, *Lycurg.* c. 13, *ὅπερ γὰρ ὕστερον Ἐπαμεινώνδαν εἰπεῖν λέγουσιν ἐπὶ τῆς αὐτοῦ τραπέζης, ὡς τὸ τοιοῦτον ἀριστον οὐ χωρεῖ προδοσίαν, τοῦτο πρῶτος ἐνόησε Λυκούργος*. The Greeks always conceived the 'tyrant' to be not only fond of unlimited power, but generally unlimited in his desires (Plato, *Rep.* 573 A sqq.: Theopomp. *Fr.* 129, 204).

³ Compare the saying of Gibbon (*Decline and Fall*, c. 2): 'It might perhaps be more conducive to the virtue as well as happiness of mankind, if all possessed the ne-

tion of several property is not indeed expressly coupled with this limitation and equalization of its amount; still we note that he deprecates those extremes of wealth and poverty which have in practice proved the almost inseparable concomitants of this institution. When he allows a place to wealth among the necessary elements of the State (4 (7). 8. 1328 b 22: cp. 6 (4). 4. 1291 a 33), we must suppose that he has in his mind moderate, not great, wealth.

The virtues connected with property have to do both with its acquisition and with its use, but with the latter more than with the former (*Eth. Nic.* 4. 1. 1120 a 8 sqq.). As we have seen, Aristotle accentuates the distinction between Household Science and the Science of Supply: it is the householder's duty rather to see that the commodities necessary or useful to the household are forthcoming, than himself to take part in acquiring them, just as it is his business to see that the members of his household enjoy health, though he leaves it to the physician to produce it. His householder is to be neither improvident nor a lover of gain. Aristotle seems, as we have noticed, scarcely to admit that the love of money is as primary an instinct of human nature as the love of pleasure; he sometimes resolves the former into the latter. He desires that the landowners of his ideal State shall be men whose main pre-occupation it will be to rule over their households, to rule and be ruled as citizens of the State, and to engage in philosophical speculation, and who will gladly delegate to others the task of acquiring the commodities necessary for the support of their households—men who, without forgetting to secure that these commodities shall be forthcoming, will count the care of property less noble than the exercise of rule over the members of the household, and who will make it in use available for others. Plato had already said in his *Laws* (740 A) that the possessors of the various lots are to feel that their lots are each of them the common

cessaries and none the superfluities of life.' Aristotle, however, speaks only of his ideal citizens,

and allows them a good deal more than the bare 'necessaries of life.'

property of the whole State (*κοινὴν τῆς πόλεως ξυμπάσης*); but the expression *κοινὴ χρῆσις* is apparently adopted by Aristotle from Isocrates' ideal picture of Athens under the sway of the Areopagus (Areopag. § 35), and it gives increased definiteness to the doctrine¹. Aristotle had in his mind the open-handed fellowship of Pythagorean friends, and, still more, the Communistic ideal of Plato, and he seeks while retaining in his State the right of several property, to ensure that it shall not imperil the 'public-heartedness' of his citizens or the sense of brotherhood in the community. The Xenophontic Cyrus, who recommends the acquisition by just means of as much as possible in order that the acquirer may have the more to use nobly², took a different view; but the stress which Xenophon, no less than Plato and Aristotle, lays on the duty of using property aright, deserves especial attention in these days, in which, as L. Schmidt says, 'one of the most important tasks the peoples of Europe have before them is to moralize in an increasing degree the institution of private property' (*Ethik der alten Griechen*, 2. 390)³. Gorgias had said of Cimon that he 'acquired in order to use and used in order to be honoured' (Plutarch, Cimon, c. 10): Aristotle's ideal householder is to value property for this, that it makes possible a life of virtuous activity and happiness, and to desire no more than contributes to this end; and he is to use it, not with the view of reaping honour, but in such a way as to give full expression to his virtue and friendliness of heart.

¹ Xenophon himself had, as we have seen, put into the mouth of his hero Cyrus words which express the Pythagorean doctrine *κοινὰ τὰ φίλων—ταῦτα, ἔφη, ὦ ἄνδρες, ἅπαντα δεῖ ὑμᾶς οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ἐμὰ ἡγεῖσθαι ἢ καὶ ὑμέτερα* (Cyrup. 8. 4. 36). He is addressing his friends. But to make what one has the common property of oneself and one's friends is not the same thing as making it the common

property of all citizens.

² See L. Schmidt, 2. 380, who refers to Xen. Cyrop. 8. 2. 20-23. Cp. also Plutarch, Cimon c. 10, *Κριτίας δὲ τῶν τριάκοντα γενόμενος ἐν ταῖς ἐλεγκταῖς εὐχεταί*

Πλοῦτον μὲν Σκοπαδῶν, μεγαλοφροσύνην δὲ Κίμωνος, νίκας δ' Ἀρκεσίλα τοῦ Λακεδαιμονίου.

³ The readers of Comte's Positive Polity will be familiar with language to the same effect.

The Greeks were probably far more open-handed in their use of property than the Romans of the Republic. Polybius, at any rate, after describing the munificence of Scipio, adds (32. 12)—‘now an act of this kind would be not unreasonably thought noble everywhere, but at Rome it was positively marvellous, for there no one of his free will gives any one anything whatever belonging to him.’ Not every rich Athenian, indeed, like Cimon, threw his fields and gardens open to the passer-by, and allowed all men freely to take of their produce, or kept open house, or gave the garments from the backs of his slaves to poor men whom he met in the streets—far from it—but many gave dowries to the daughters of impoverished citizens, or paid funeral expenses, or ransomed captives, or subscribed to *ἐπαροι* for the relief of friends in distress¹. Aristotle would probably find as much to amend in the methods of the private charity of his day as he did in those of its public charity (8 (6). 5. 1320 a 29 sqq.): still he gives high praise to the liberality with which the Spartans treated each other, and the rich of Tarentum treated the poor (1320 b 9 sqq.: 2. 5. 1263 a 30 sqq.). He demands, however, of his ideal proprietor far more than this. He expects him not only to be free-handed in giving, but also to allow others much freedom in using that which he does not give away².

We do not know even in outline what powers of dealing with his property were to be possessed by the proprietor in Aristotle's State. The lot of land, indeed, as Susemihl points out³, he apparently intends to be inalienable and

¹ See Schmidt, 2. 387–8, from whom I take these facts.

² Friedländer points out (Sittengeschichte Roms 3. 98) that ‘the rich and great of the Roman Empire were expected not only to use their surplus revenues for the relief of poverty—a purpose especially served by the institution of clientship—but also to allow the poor to share freely in their enjoyments, and to place within

their reach advantages and gratifications of all kinds, from which they are for the most part excluded in the modern world.’ It is not, however, the munificence and open-handedness of a *grand seigneur* that Aristotle asks of his ideal proprietor, but a readiness to place whatever he possesses at the disposal of others, whether equals or inferiors.

³ Sus.², Einleitung, p. 26.

indivisible¹, and to descend to one son only. Would he allow the father to choose this son, as Plato did? Does he intend, again, like Plato, to abolish dowries? It would seem from 2. 9. 1270 a 25, that he would either abolish them or limit their amount. In default of children, is the proprietor to be allowed to adopt an heir? What powers, again, is he to possess over property other than the lot? Is the law, that property is to pass by inheritance and not by gift, which Aristotle recommends to oligarchies (7 (5). 8. 1309 a 23) as the best means of diffusing and equalizing property, to be adopted in the best State also? It would be easy to mention other points, as to which we are not fully informed.

So far we have had to do with preliminary matters. We have been sketching the organization of Supply and of the Household under the best constitution; we have not yet studied the central subject of Political Science, the political as distinguished from the industrial and household life of the best State. The constitution of the State, we started by saying, allots advantages and functions, and we have seen to whom the best constitution will allot the functions connected with the supply of necessities and also those connected with the Household: we have not yet seen to whom it will allot the higher functions, and among them political functions.

The investigations of the First Book of the Politics have hitherto been our main guide, and the First Book treats the subjects with which it deals from the point of view of Nature, which cannot be far from that of the best constitution. It asks, who is the natural slave, what is the natural form of the Science of Supply, who is the true householder; and it is precisely under the guidance of Nature that Aristotle constructs the best constitution (see c. g. 4 (7). 14.

¹ We may probably infer this from the arrangements respecting the land made in 4 (7). 10. 1330 a 14 sqq. We also find that Aristotle approves (2. 9. 1270 a 19)

of the discouragement by Lycurgus of the sale of land, and regrets that he did not impose some checks on gift and bequest.

Transition from the industrial and household life of the State to its political life.

Preliminary lessons learnt in the Second Book.

1332 b 35 sq.). It is true of Political Science, as it is true of Art, that it 'partly brings the work of Nature to completion, partly imitates Nature' (Phys. 2. 8. 199 a 15). The Second Book still keeps the ideal point of view in sight (cp. 2. 1. 1260 b 27 sqq.), though, like the First Book and indeed the whole treatise, it seeks to draw attention, not only to 'that which is normal and correct,' but also to 'that which is useful' (cp. 1. 3. 1253 b 15 sq.). Apparently critical and negative, it really is something more: it so conducts its review of constitutions as to suggest by its indication of their defects the true principles on which society should be organized. It thus forms a good introduction to the sketch of the best constitution in the Fourth Book, and its teaching is in full harmony with the teaching of that part of the Politics. A brief reference to its main conclusions will illustrate this.

The State, we learn, though a *κοινωνία*, is not a *κοινωνία* in everything that can be shared, but only in those things which can be shared with advantage to virtue and to friendship; self-completeness, not the maximum of unity, is the aim which should be kept in view in constructing it; its institutions should satisfy, not run counter to, that moderate and reasonable love of self which nature has implanted in man; education is the truest and most wholesome means of promoting harmony in the State, for it does not lessen, like some other specifics, the opportunities of virtuous action, but on the contrary produces virtue, which is the secret of concord; and again, if a State is to be happy, some part at any rate of its population must be in possession of happiness, for if no part of it is happy, it cannot be happy as a whole. Aristotle keeps this last principle in view in constituting his ideal citizen-body. He surrounds its members with the means of virtuous and happy activity, and makes their happiness give happiness to the State.

From the criticism on Phaleas of Chalcedon we learn not to expect too much from legislation equalizing landed property, apart from an improvement in the moral tone of

the community. The equalization of landed property, or even of property in general, which Phaleas forgot to equalize, is an insufficient preventive by itself of civil discord (*στάσις*). To make it effective for this purpose, a limit must be imposed on reproduction, properties must not only be equalized but made of that amount which is most favourable to virtue, and the laws of the State must secure to each man an education which will moderate his desires. Equality of property will not do much to prevent civil disturbance originating among the Many, but it will wholly fail to touch movements caused by a desire for superior distinction on the part of the Few. It will, at the utmost, only remove one cause for the commission of wrong (*ἀδικία*)—absolute want of the necessities of life; but men commit wrong even when their immediate necessities are fully supplied, for the sake of the gratification which they derive from superfluities, and it is thus that the greatest wrongs come to be committed. If these wrongs are to be prevented, men must be taught to be temperate, and to seek even ‘painless pleasure,’ not in forms which presuppose power over their fellows, but in philosophy, which derives the pleasure it confers from sources lying wholly within ourselves. Nor must the amount of wealth which it is desirable that the members of the State should possess, be settled without reference to the security of the State from external perils. Phaleas confines his attention to dangers arising within the State. On the whole—it is thus that Aristotle sums up one of the most successful of his criticisms—equality of property will be of some avail in preventing civil discord, but not of much, for it will not pacify the more aspiring spirits, nor will it in the long run satisfy the Many, for these live for the satisfaction of desire, which is in its nature unlimited, and soon tire of the ‘two obols,’ which were enough for them at first. The only real security against internal perils is to make the better natures indisposed to commit injustice, and to see that the worse are at once too weak in numbers to do so, and are not provoked to it by wrong. The criticism on Phaleas, then,

like that on Plato, arrives at the conclusion that education is the best guarantee for concord in the State; and it points to an education favourable at once to morality and philosophical aptitude, coinciding fully with the fourteenth and fifteenth chapters of the Fourth Book (compare, for instance, 1334 a 28-34).

Aristotle's division of the land of his ideal State into public and private land was perhaps suggested by a provision in the constitution of Hippodamus, though Aristotle does not use the public land for the maintenance of the soldiers of the State. He anticipated Aristotle also in the distinction of the military from the agricultural class.

From the Lacedaemonian State Aristotle learnt much, though rather in the way of warning than of example. He learnt the necessity of organizing the slave-system of his State with care; he learnt not to leave the life of the women unregulated, nor property very unequally distributed; the citizen's lot of land should be inalienable by sale or gift, and indivisible, and a check should be placed on the increase of population. The *syssitia* should be put on an improved footing, so that no citizen need cease to be a citizen for want of the means of paying his contribution to them. It was a good point in the Lacedaemonian constitution, that all elements of the State—kings, upper classes, and people—found something in it to satisfy them, and Aristotle would not disturb the popular basis of the ephorate, but he would reform the mode by which ephors were elected, so as to get better men, would not allow them to act as judges in important trials without any laws to guide them, and would make the supreme control which they exercised over other magistracies something different from what it was. Membership of the senate, again, should not be for life, for the mind grows old as well as the body. The arrangements respecting the senate are designedly such as to stimulate a love of distinction, which is unwise, for it is one of the main sources of wrong-doing. The way in which senators are selected is unsatisfactory, and the same thing may also be said of the

kings. The Lacedaemonian lawgiver aims at producing one kind of virtue only, military virtue, which finds no employment in leisure, and therefore was of little use to the community when victory had been won, and its wars were over (cp. 4 (7). 14. 1333 a 15-15. 1334 b 5); and, which is worse, he teaches his citizens to value virtue as a means to external goods, or in other words, to value these more than virtue.

The upshot of the whole chapter is, that in the Lacedaemonian State we find a small and dwindling body of citizens, surrounded by hostile Hellenic slaves; trained only for war, not for pacific rule, and taught to count wealth and distinction greater goods than even the military virtue they prize; organized ill both in State and in household, for not only are their rulers selected by an unsatisfactory method, and often superannuated or inferior, though charged with great responsibilities, but the hard life imposed on the citizens stands in strong contrast to the disorderly lives of their wives. We shall find that Aristotle takes pains in constructing his State to avoid every one of the defects which he here signalizes.

From Crete he learns less, but he learns the true use of the public land (2. 10. 1272 a 17 sq. : cp. 4 (7). 10. 1330 a 11 sq.), a better organization of the *syssitia* than the Lacedaemonian, and the necessity that law and not human caprice shall be supreme, if a real constitution, or indeed a real State, is to exist. In the Carthaginian as in the Lacedaemonian State he finds that all classes of society are content with their position—a rare circumstance in Greece—but that the contentment of the Carthaginian people with their political lot is based, not, like that of the Lacedaemonian, on a participation in one of the great offices of state, but on their share in the advantages derivable from the imperial position of Carthage, and consequently rests on a less secure basis. The Carthaginian constitution also was too ready to admit wealth to a share of the homage which is due to virtue, and thus tended to mislead the popular judgment and to teach it to give more

honour to external goods than they deserve. Besides, to make the two greatest magistracies purchaseable was to imperil the good government of the State.

We see, however, that under both the Carthaginian and the Lacedaemonian constitutions virtue tended to fill a larger place in the government and life of the State than under most others, and that it will be Aristotle's aim so to organize his best State and its education as completely to realize the ideal which these two constitutions vaguely and not very successfully 'felt after.'

Third
Book of
the Poli-
tics—dis-
tribution
of rights of
citizenship
and of rule.

We pass at this point from the Second to the Third Book of the Politics, from the criticism of certain proposed or existing constitutions to an attempt to determine how the rights of citizenship and of rule—in other words, the higher social activities—should be distributed by the constitution; and Aristotle's plan appears to be, first to discuss how a normal (*δρθή*), or just, constitution will distribute them, next to set forth how they will be distributed in the best State¹. The distribution of these functions, as distinguished from the lower or necessary ones, is, in fact, usually stated to be not merely the chief, but the only problem which the constitution has to solve. So we read (Pol. 6 (4). 1. 1289 a 15 sqq.: cp. 3. 6. 1278 b 8 sqq.)—*πολιτεία μὲν γάρ ἐστι τάξις ταῖς πόλεσιν ἢ περὶ τὰς ἀρχάς, τίνα τρόπον νενέμνται, καὶ τί τὸ κύριον τῆς πολιτείας καὶ τί τὸ τέλος ἐκάστης τῆς κοινωνίας ἐστίν*. It is the course taken by the constitution in this matter that determines its character: constitutions differ because they allot the right of ruling, or in other words supreme authority in the State, to different persons or groups of persons. It is evident, however, if we refer to passages such as 2. 6. 1264 b 31 sqq., that the constitution

¹ We seem to observe a similar transition in Plato's Republic, for at the beginning of the fifth book, Socrates, looking back at the State sketched in the second, third, and fourth, says: *ἀγαθὴν μὲν τοίνυν τὴν τοιαύτην πόλιν τε καὶ*

πολιτείαν καὶ ὀρθὴν καλῶ καὶ ἀνδρα τὸν τοιοῦτον, κακὰς δὲ τὰς ἄλλας καὶ ἡμαρτημένας, κ.τ.λ. In the fifth and later books, on the other hand, we are conscious of some heightening of the ideal.

also regulates, or may regulate, the whole position of the classes concerned with 'necessary functions,' the position of women, and the educational organization of the State. It is thus that the little treatise of Xenophon which bears the title *Λακεδαιμονίων πολιτεία*, concerns itself as much with the 'pursuits of the Spartans' (c. 1. init.), their 'mode of life' (c. 5), their enforced abstinence from money-making (c. 7), as with the political organization of the State. Still the policy which a constitution follows in all these matters will be determined by the course it takes with regard to the central subject of its competence.

Here we commence that which was to a Greek the central inquiry of Political Science. The Greeks ascribed to the constitution a far-reaching ethical influence. Demosthenes repeats the saying of an earlier orator¹, that the laws are regarded by all good men as 'the mind and will of the State' (*τρόποι τῆς πόλεως*), and we have already seen (above, p. 94, note 2), how Isocrates speaks of the constitution. To Plato and Aristotle the constitution is a powerful influence for good or evil: it is only in the best State, says the latter, that the virtue of the good man and the virtue of the citizen coincide, whence it follows that constitutions other than the best require for their maintenance some other kind of virtue than that of the good man. In the vaster States of to-day opinion and manners are slower to reflect the tendency of the constitution: in the small city-States of ancient Greece they readily took its colour². It was thus that in the view of the Greeks every

Importance attached by the Greeks to the constitution: the constitution the 'mode of life chosen by the State'—influence ascribed to it over the life and character of those living under it.

¹ Ο γὰρ εἰπεῖν τινὰ φασιν ἐν ὑμῖν, ἀληθὲς εἶναι μοι δοκεῖ, ὅτι τοὺς νόμους πάντες ὑπελήφασιν, ὅσοι σωφρονοῦσι, τρόπους τῆς πόλεως εἶναι (Demosth. adv. Timocr. c. 210, quoted by A. Schaefer, Demosthenes i. 293. 1). Cp. Aeschin. adv. Timarch. § 4, and Plato, Rep. 544 D.

² Cases no doubt occurred in which the sentiments and habits of society were not adjusted to the constitution, as we learn from

a remarkable passage of the Politics (6 (4). 5. 1292 b 11-21); but the language of Aristotle implies that this disharmony was commonly only temporary, and occurred for the most part when the authors of a revolution after effecting a constitutional change did not at once proceed to alter the pre-existing laws, but contented themselves for a time (*τὰ πρῶτα*) with the bare possession

constitution had an accompanying *ἦθος*, which made itself felt in all the relations of life. Each constitutional form exercised a moulding influence on virtue; the good citizen was a different being in an oligarchy, a democracy, and an aristocracy. Each constitution embodied a scheme of life, and tended, consciously or not, to bring the lives of those living under it into harmony with its particular scheme. If the law provides that the highest offices in the State shall be purchaseable or confines them to wealthy men, it inspires *ipso facto* a respect for wealth in the citizens (2. 11. 1273 a 35 sqq.). Thus Plato and Aristotle are true to Greek feeling when they speak of the constitution as a 'life' (*βίος*), or 'the imitation of a life' (*μίμησις βίου*)¹. Expressions not very dissimilar have been used by modern writers who have studied the change produced in France and in Europe by the French Revolution. 'The plain fact is,' says a writer in the *Saturday Review* (July 8, 1882, p. 57), 'that the ideas of '89 involved not so much a new departure in politics—like (e.g.) the English Revolution of a century earlier, or the almost contemporary American one—as a new method of interpreting life altogether, or, as De Maistre expressed it "a new religion²."' Aristotle would trace a similar change

of power. Contrast the promptness with which Timoleon after his victory over the tyrants proceeded to recast the laws, even those relating to contracts, in a democratic sense (Diod. 16. 70).

¹ Cp. Plato, Laws 817 B, *πᾶσα . . . ἡμῖν ἡ πολιτεία ξυνέστηκε μίμησις τοῦ καλλίστου καὶ ἀρίστου βίου*: Aristot. Pol. 6 (4). 11. 1295 a 40, *ἡ πολιτεία βίος τις ἐστὶ πόλεως*: 4 (7). 1. 1323 a 14, *περὶ πολιτείας ἀρίστης τὸν μέλλοντα ποιήσασθαι τὴν προσήκουσαν ζήτησιν ἀνάγκη διορίσασθαι πρῶτον, τίς ἀρετώτατος βίος*: 4 (7). 8. 1328 a 41, *ἄλλον γὰρ τρόπον καὶ δι' ἄλλων ἕκαστοι τοῦτο* (sc. *εὐδαιμονίαν*) *θηρεύοντες τοὺς τε βίους ἐτέροις ποιοῦνται καὶ τὰς πολιτείας*. Thus too the State, which is said to be a *κοινωνία* of citizens in a constitution in 3. 3. 1276 b 1 sq., is described in 3. 9. 1280 b 40 as ἡ

γενῶν καὶ καμῶν κοινωνία ζωῆς τελείας καὶ αὐτάρκους. Plato is made to say in Epist. 5. 321 D, *ἔστι γὰρ δὴ τις φωνὴ τῶν πολιτειῶν ἐκάστης, καθάπερ ἐστι τῶν ζώων*, κ.τ.λ.

² Compare Burke, *Thoughts on French Affairs* (Works 3. 350, Bohn): 'the present Revolution in France seems to me . . . to bear little resemblance or analogy to any of those which have been brought about in Europe upon principles merely political. *It is a revolution of doctrine and theoretic dogma*. It has a much greater resemblance to those changes which have been made upon religious grounds, in which a spirit of proselytism makes an essential part. The last revolution of doctrine and theory which has happened in Europe, is the Reformation.'

in every transition from one constitution to another. We are familiar enough with the fact that some homogeneity of opinion and character is essential in those who are to work harmoniously together as fellow-citizens of the same State. 'Our ideal of life is not the Irish ideal, our standard of duty is not theirs' (*Times*, Dec. 25, 1883); to this in part the friction between the two sections of the United Kingdom is sometimes set down. 'The mischief to be dealt with is that a nation united under one government and living on a narrow and strictly limited area is at this moment dangerously heterogeneous in its tastes, habits, and general ways of regarding life' (*Times*, May 29, 1884).

It is not surprising that Aristotle found the identity of the State in its constitution (3. 3. 1276 b 9). It was perhaps in part because changes of constitution meant so much, that they were so frequent in ancient Greece and so keenly fought over. To be an oligarch living under a democratic constitution, or *vice versa*, must have been a painful experience and one from which most men were glad to escape as soon as possible.

Plato and Aristotle may perhaps rate the influence of the constitution too high, but it is a merit in them, that they never lose sight, as many modern inquirers have done, of the full significance of the State and its organization. They see it to be an ethical influence for good or ill.

The question how many different ways there are of allotting supreme authority was one which popular opinion in Greece found no difficulty in answering. According to the prevailing view, there were only three possible constitutions—monarchy, oligarchy, and democracy—the rule of one man, or a few, or the many¹. Under monarchy

The popular classification of constitutions.

¹ So Herodotus (3. 80-82); Aeschines (adv. Timarch. § 4), who reckons *τυραννίς* in the place of monarchy; the eulogists of the Lacedaemonian constitution in Aristot. Pol. 2. 6. 1265 b 33 sqq.; Isocrates (Panath. § 132), who, however, admits two forms of each, a better and a worse; cf. πολλοί, according to Plato, Laws 714 B; Plutarch, de Monarchia et Democratia et Oligarchia, c. 3. Kingship and Tyranny were probably often confounded in common parlance: cp. Philochor. fragm. 5 (Müller, Fragm. Hist.

would fall the two forms, Kingship and Tyranny: aristocracy, or the government of the best, would either be considered as identical with oligarchy (Thuc. 6. 39: cp. Aristot. Pol. 6 (4). 8. 1293 b 36 sqq.), or as a species of it (Isocr. Panath. § 132: Aristot. Pol. 6 (4). 3. 1290 a 16). Some, however, made aristocracy a constitution by itself, thus counting four (Pol. 6 (4). 7. 1293 a 35 sqq.: Rhet. 1. 8. 1365 b 29), while others brought all constitutions under two heads, oligarchy and democracy. Others, again, made up four constitutions by adding to monarchy, oligarchy, and democracy a form compounded of all three, which they also held to be the best (Pol. 2. 6. 1265 b 33 sqq.). This was an idea which had a great future before it.

Principles
of Socrates
and Plato.

The philosophers were not content with a classification of constitutions resting on this numerical basis. A constitution was to them an ethical force, and it was by their ethical consequences that constitutions were to be classified. Thus the classification which Xenophon ascribes to Socrates implied that constitutions should be distinguished, not by the number of the depositaries of power, but by their attributes and by the character of their rule. He marked off Kingship from Tyranny, rule being exercised in the former constitution over willing subjects and in accordance with law, not so in the latter; he distinguished aristocracy as the form in which offices are filled 'from the ranks of those who fulfil the behests of the law' (*ἐκ τῶν τὰ νόμιμα ἐπιτελούντων*: cp. Aristot. Rhet. 1. 8. 1365 b 34 sq.), plutocracy as that in which there is a property qualification for office, democracy as that in which office is open to all (Xen. Mem. 4. 6. 12). He also held that the true king or statesman is marked off from the counterfeit by the possession of knowledge, but he does not appear to have adjusted his classification of constitutions to this view.

Plato adopts different classifications in different dia-

Gr. I. 385), οἱ οὖν Ἀθήνησι ῥήτορες, ἔχουσι τοὺς βασιλέας τυράννους καὶ ὡς ἐν δημοκρατίᾳ πολιτευόμενοι, ἔθες λείν.

logues. He seems in the *Politicus*, as Susemihl remarks¹, to be building on a Socratic foundation; his best State, according to this dialogue, is that in which a single sovereign possessed of Science rules: next below this come Monarchy governed by Law, Aristocracy (in other words, Oligarchy governed by Law), and Democracy governed by Law: below (in order of merit) stand Democracy unrestrained by Law, the corresponding Oligarchy, and Tyranny (*Polit.* 302 B sqq.).

In the *Republic* the Kingship and Aristocracy of philosophers ruling uncontrolled by Law stand together at the summit: next in order, we have a 'timocracy,' such as the Lacedaemonian or Cretan constitution: next come, ranged in order of demerit, Oligarchy, Democracy², and Tyranny: the intermediate stratum of constitutions governed by Law, which is so prominent in the *Politicus*, here disappears³.

In the *Laws*, however, it reappears in the shape of the constitution of that dialogue, which takes its place next to the ideal State of the *Republic* and above the Lacedaemonian and Cretan forms. But in this constitution we trace not merely the element of legality, but the equally important principle of mixture. Restraint is exercised not only by law, but by the simultaneous representation in the government of various principles, which check each other and give law a chance of holding its own. It will be observed that Plato applies the term Aristocracy both to the ideal rule of philosophers and to the Oligarchy governed by Law—an use of the term which leaves traces of itself, as we shall see, in Aristotle's account of constitutions.

Plato, it is evident, worked out the view implied in Socrates' classification of constitutions, that they are to be distinguished, not so much by the number as by the

¹ *Sus.*², Note 533.

² Thus while in the *Republic* Democracy is ranked below Oligarchy, in the *Politicus*, when without law, it stands above Oligarchy without law.

³ According to Aristotle (*Pol.*

6 (4). 7. 1293 b 1), Plato in the *Republic* recognizes only four constitutions—monarchy, oligarchy, democracy, and aristocracy. Does Aristotle reckon Plato's 'timocracy' under the head of aristocracy?

character of the depositaries of power, or by the nature of their rule. Each constitution thus represents a different view with regard to the attributes which the ruler should possess: this was perhaps suggested to him by the analogy that he holds to exist between the soul of the individual and the State, which leads him to imagine five types of human character running parallel with the five constitutions. As each constitution corresponded, in his view, to a character, it was natural to conclude that the difference between constitutions is a moral difference, like the difference between characters.

Views of Aristotle as to the classification of constitutions: they develop progressively as we advance in the Third Book, and as we pass from the Third to the Sixth.

No subject is more frequently discussed by Aristotle than the question how it is that there are more constitutions than one and how many there are; and the views he expresses on this subject are by no means entirely self-consistent¹.

Plato had not distinctly asked himself what are the causes which determine the constitution of a State, but he would appear to hold that the main cause is a variation in the character of the citizens. The descent from the ideal Republic, at all events, down the scale of imperfect forms keeps pace with and is brought about by a deterioration of character. In the *Politics* this view survives side by side with others with which it is not explicitly reconciled.

We will take first the discussion of the question which we find in the Third Book. Aristotle begins by accepting provisionally the popular distinction between constitutions which give supreme authority to the One, the Few, or the Many; but each of these, we learn, may study the common good or the good of the depositary or depositaries of power only. We have thus six constitutions—Kingship, Aristocracy, Polity, in which the One, Few, or Many

¹ See *Pol.* 3. 7. 1279 a 22 sqq.: 4 (7). 8. 1328 a 40 sq.: 4 (7). 9. 1328 b 29 sq.: 6 (4). 3-4: 7 (5). 1. 1301 a 25 sqq. On Aristotle's classification of constitutions the

interesting essay of Teichmüller, 'Die Aristotelische Eintheilung der Verfassungsformen' (St. Petersburg, 1859), is well worth reading.

govern for the general advantage, and Tyranny, Oligarchy, and Democracy¹, in which the One, Few, or Many govern for their own advantage. The three former are normal (*ὀρθαί*) constitutions: the three latter are deviation-forms (*παρεκβάσεις*). The deviation-forms contravene the aim with which the State was originally formed and for which it exists—the aim of the common advantage (3. 6. 1278 b 21). The kind of rule which obtains in all of them is similar to that which a master exercises over his slaves (*δεσποτική ἀρχή*)—in other words, rule is exercised in them, primarily at all events, for the good of the ruler.

The distinction thus drawn between normal constitutions and deviation-forms was not invented by Aristotle. It is evident from Pol. 3. 3. 1276 a 10–13 that the contrast between ‘constitutions for the common good’ and ‘constitutions not for the common good, but based on force’ was familiar enough to the Greeks, though the tendency (no doubt Athens is referred to) was to confine the latter designation to oligarchies and tyrannies, whereas Aristotle holds that democracies should also be brought under this head. Plato uses the very same term—‘normal constitution’ (*ὀρθή πολιτεία*)—in the Republic, Politicus, and Laws. In the Republic, he claims that the ideal State there described, whether it appears in the form of a Kingship or an Aristocracy, is the only truly normal constitution (Rep. 449 A); and so again in the Politicus he makes the possession of Science by the ruling authority the test of a normal constitution (292 A sqq.)². In the Laws, however, we find the germ of the distinction drawn by Aristotle

¹ Aristotle, as a writer in the *Guardian* (Jan. 27, 1886) points out, always regards *δημοκρατία* as a *παρέκβασις*, and calls the normal constitution of which it is the deviation-form by the name of *πολιτεία*, while Polybius, on the contrary, uses *δημοκρατία* in a favourable sense and calls its perversion *ὀχλοκρατία*. Aristotle seems to have found the term *πολιτεία* used in his own day to

designate constitutions which were at one time known as ‘democracies’ (Pol. 6 (4.) 13. 1297 b 24).

² The question is here asked, τί οὖν; οἰόμεθά τινα τούτων τῶν πολιτειῶν ὀρθὴν εἶναι τοῖς τοῖς ὁροῖς ὁρισθείσαν, ἐνὶ καὶ ὀλίγοις καὶ πολλοῖς καὶ πλούτῳ καὶ πενίᾳ καὶ τῷ βίαιῳ καὶ ἐκουσίῳ καὶ μετὰ γραμμάτων καὶ ἀνευ νόμων ζυμβαίνουσιν γίγνεσθαι;

between the two kinds of constitution: cp. Laws 715 B, ταύτας δῆπου φαμέν ἡμεῖς νῦν οὐτ' εἶναι πολιτείας οὐτ' ὀρθοὺς νόμους, ὅσοι μὴ ξυμπάσης τῆς πόλεως ἕνεκα τοῦ κοινοῦ ἐτέθησαν· οἱ δ' ἕνεκα τινῶν, στασιωτείας, ἀλλ' οὐ πολιτείας¹, τούτους φαμέν, καὶ τὰ τούτων δίκαια ἃ φασιν εἶναι μάτην εἰρηῇσθαι. But Aristotle does not deny to the deviation-forms the name of constitutions, so far as they are governed by law (6 (4). 4. 1292 a 30 sqq.), and he allows a partial validity to the notion of justice on which they rest (3. 9. 1280 a 9). Nor does he agree with the view of Plato in the Politicus (293 A) that 'normal rule' (ὀρθὴ ἀρχή) can only be looked for from one man or two, or at all events a very few. Thus he recognizes the Polity as a normal constitution. Plato's two tests of 'that which is normal'—science in the ruler and the aim of the common good—do not, we notice, lie far apart (cp. Polit. 296 E sqq., and especially the words ὥσπερ ὁ κυβερνήτης τὸ τῆς νεῶς καὶ ναυτῶν ἀεὶ ξυμφέρων παραφυλάττων), and thus Aristotle himself treats the rule exercised by science as exercised, in fact, for the advantage of the ruled (Pol. 3. 6. 1278 b 40 sqq.). The distinction between governments which rule for the common good and governments which rule for the advantage of the rulers appears also in the De Pace of Isocrates (§ 91).

The principle involved in this distinction, however commonplace it may seem to us, was rightly made by these inquirers a cardinal point of Political Science². Political

¹ Cicero goes perhaps a little further, and not only denies these constitutions the name of 'constitutions,' but denies the name of 'respublica' to States which do not aim at the common good, for his definition of 'respublica' (De Rep. 1. 25. 39) is 'res populi, populus autem non omnis hominum coetus quoquo modo congregatus, sed coetus multitudinis juris consensu et utilitatis communione sociatus.' But what name would he give to the States, if such there are, which are not 'respublicae'?

² It must be confessed that Aristotle goes far to mar the prin-

ciple when he confines the 'common advantage' which the constitution is to study to the common advantage of the citizens (3. 13. 1283 b 40), for he thus makes his requirement one which any oligarchy that chose to limit the number of the citizens might satisfy. He probably, however, had a democracy in view, and there the principle even in this form would be valuable. We note that Xenophon makes Cambyses charge Cyrus not to rule his Persians ἐπὶ πλεονεξίᾳ, as the nations dependent on Persia are ruled (Cyrop. 8. 5. 24).

controversialists have spent their efforts for centuries in the search for some indefeasible sovereign—Emperor, Pope, or People. Aristotle's doctrine is, that the true supreme authority is the One, the Few, or the Many, who can rule for the common good.

So far we have only the beginnings of a classification of constitutions: we have marked off the normal constitutions from the deviation-forms, but how are the three former, or again the three latter, to be distinguished from each other? As to the deviation-forms, Aristotle corrects at once the definitions of oligarchy and democracy which he has given: oligarchy is not the constitution in which the few rule for their own advantage, but that in which the rich rule for their own advantage; and so again in democracy it is not the many, but the poor, that hold sway and rule for their own advantage. The contrast between the holders of power in the two constitutions thus becomes, not a numerical, but a qualitative contrast. The account given of the remaining deviation-form (tyranny), however, remains unaltered; and as to the normal constitutions, we are allowed for the moment to conclude that the distinction between them is only a numerical one, except that we are warned (3. 7. 1279 a 39 sqq.) that the many who rule in a polity will not possess full virtue. But the succeeding discussions of the Third Book add a new point of contrast between the two classes of constitution. That which is for the common good is identified by Aristotle at the commencement of the Twelfth Chapter (1282 b 17) with that which is just, and thus we find that the deviation-forms are not only wrong in the aim of their rule, but are the outcome of injustice, for they mistake that which is partially just for the absolutely just (3. 13. 1283 a 26 sqq.). They sin not only against the common good but also against justice. We learn more clearly than ever that the difference between the two classes of constitution is a moral difference¹. Even, indeed, within

¹ In Eth. Nic. 8. 13. 1161 a 30 sqq., ὁρθὰ πολιτεῖναι and παρεκθάσει is another point of contrast between noticed: in the latter there is

the normal constitutions a moral difference discloses itself: the Absolute Kingship (*παμβασιλεία*) and the ideal Aristocracy are found to represent the 'rule of virtue fully provided with external means with a view to the most perfect and desirable life' (3. 18. 1288 a 32-37 : cp. 6 (4). 2. 1289 a 32), and to be, in reality, a single form (6 (4). 3. 1290 a 24), standing at the head of the list of constitutions as the 'most normal constitution' (*ὀρθοτάτη πολιτεία*, 6 (4). 8. 1293 b 25), while the Polity is a deviation from this, and the deviation-forms hitherto so termed are deviations twice removed from the ideal original. This at least is the teaching of the Sixth Book. In that book the six constitutions are no longer ranged three against three, as in the Third: on the contrary, they succeed each other on a descending scale arranged on an ethical basis, very much like the descending scale in the Republic. Aristotle has here, in fact, apparently almost come round to the view of Plato, that the only really normal constitution is the Ideal Kingship or Aristocracy.

The best State in its two forms is thus not merely the best, but the most normal of the normal States: it is the State as Nature designed it to be. The others are failures. The earlier classification of constitutions into two contrasted groups of three has been reconsidered, with the result of clearing our views of the nature of each constitution, and also of placing the two ideal forms on a pinnacle by themselves.

We have gained fresh light as to the nature of the various constitutions as we have advanced from one chapter to another of the Third Book, and still more on passing from the Third to the Sixth.

As to Kingship, we learn that it is not enough to constitute a true Kingship that the single ruler should rule for the common good: he must possess a great superiority over those he rules in virtue and resources (*ἀρετῇ κεχορηγη-*

nothing common between ruler and ruled; they are not united by a common aim for the common

good: cp. Pol. 4 (7). 8. 1328 a 25 sqq.

μένη)¹. This is, in fact, the case in the Absolute Kingship (παμβασιλεία), and the Kingship which is subject to law is not really a separate constitution, for it may find a place in any and every constitution (3. 16. 1287 a 3 sqq.).

So again, Aristocracy is not simply a form in which a few rule for the common good, but one in which these few are men of full virtue (ἀπλῶς σπουδαῖοι), and possessed of a full complement of external means (6 (4). 2. 1289 a 32: 4 (7). 13. 1332 a 32), or in which the virtue of man and citizen coincide (6 (4). 7. 1293 b 5). The name, however, is also applied to constitutions which combine a recognition of the claims of the people and of the rich (6 (4). 8. 1294 a 24), or of the people only (6 (4). 7. 1293 b 16), with a recognition of the claims of virtue; or even, if the text is not corrupt or interpolated, to constitutions which, resembling a Polity, approach Oligarchy more nearly than the polity does (6 (4). 7. 1293 b 20). It should be observed that in these less genuine Aristocracies the virtue recognized is not that recognized by the true Aristocracy (the virtue of the good man), but 'virtue relative to the constitution' (6 (4). 7. 1293 b 5 sqq.).

So again, the Polity is not marked off merely by the aim with which its rulers rule: we learn, in fact, at the outset that the citizen-body in it will possess an imperfect type of virtue—military virtue²: the class which will be supreme in the Polity will be the hoplite class (3. 7. 1279 b 2), or, as we are told later, a mixture of the well-to-do and the poor (6 (4). 8. 1294 a 22), in which the 'moderately wealthy' (μέσοι) are strong (6 (4). 11).

We have already seen how much modification the original account of Democracy and Oligarchy receives immediately after it is given.

Thus the first description and classification of constitu-

¹ Cp. Pol. 3. 15. 1286 a 5: Eth. Nic. 8. 12. 1160 b 3 (where for κληρωτὸς βασιλεύς, cp. Plato, Polit. 290 E, τῷ λαχόντι βασιλεί).

² The fact that virtue, though of an imperfect kind, is recognized

in the Polity seems occasionally to be lost sight of, as for instance in 6 (4). 7. 1293 b 10, where it is implied that in a Polity virtue will not be the deciding consideration in elections to office.

tions (3. 7) is not only a mere outline, but it is tentative and provisional. A closer study of them reveals to us that they differ among themselves, not only in the aim and nature of the rule exercised in them, but in the qualities of the rulers, or in other words, the attributes to which they award supreme power. When once we apply this standard, the ideal Kingship and Aristocracy present the aspect of a single constitution, for they both award power to 'virtue fully furnished with external means'; and below them, the so-called Aristocracies, the Polity, Democracy, Oligarchy, and Tyranny are readily distinguishable from each other.

We arrive, in fact, at the following list of constitutions, each finding the characteristic by which it is defined (*ὅρος*) in the attribute, or group of attributes, to which it awards power:—

παμβασιλεία, true ἀριστοκρατία	ὅρος	ἀρετὴ κεχορηγημένη
so-called ἀριστοκρατία	„	ἀρετὴ, πλοῦτος, ἐλευθερία, οἱ ἀρετὴ, δῆμος
πολιτεία	„	πλοῦτος, ἐλευθερία
δημοκρατία	„	ἐλευθερία
ὀλιγαρχία	„	πλοῦτος.

What the *ὅρος* of Tyranny is, we do not learn, though its end is said to be, like that of oligarchy, wealth (7 (5). 10. 1311 a 10): it is, indeed, hardly a constitution.

Aristotle's
account of
the causes
of consti-
tutional
diversity.

We naturally ask how it happens that all actually existing constitutions diverge more or less from the true type—how it is that the best constitution in its two forms is not also the only existing constitution. This is a question which Aristotle answers in more ways than one.

His first answer is that the character and ethical level of a community determine its constitution. Thus the best constitution presupposes a certain degree and kind of virtue: the life lived in it is one for which most men are not adapted (6 (4). 11. 1295 a 25 sqq.). Plato had already traced constitutions to character (Rep. 544 D), and Aristotle echoes this view (Pol. 5 (8). 1. 1337 a 14, τὸ ἦθος τῆς πολιτείας

ἐκάστης τὸ οἰκεῖον καὶ φυλάττειν εἴωθε τὴν πολιτείαν καὶ καθίστησιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς, οἷον τὸ μὲν δημοκρατικὸν δημοκρατίαν, τὸ δ' ὀλιγαρχικὸν ὀλιγαρχίαν· ἀεὶ δὲ τὸ βέλτιστον ἦθος βελτίονος αἰτιον πολιτείας). The constitution expresses the creed of the community with regard to the life it should live, or, in other words, with regard to the sources of happiness (4 (7). 8. 1328 a 40 sq.). The laws embody the rule of life accepted by the State—a rule to which it may be unfaithful under pressure of temptation, just as the individual may (εἴπερ γὰρ ἐστὶν ἐφ' ἐνὸς ἀκρασία, ἐστὶ καὶ ἐπὶ πόλεως, 7 (5). 9. 1310 a 18). Some constitutions admit to power classes which seek happiness in things not really productive of it (4 (7). 8. 1328 a 40 sq.: cp. 4 (7). 9. 1328 b 29 sq.: 6 (4). 3. 1290 a 3 sq.)¹. This view, however, seems not to be fully worked out, and the existence of more constitutions than one is commonly traced by Aristotle to a mistake, not as to the sources of happiness, but as to what is just. The less satisfactory constitutions are regarded on either hypothesis as the result of error (ἀμάρτημα, 7 (5). 1. 1301 a 25 sqq.: cp. 3. 9. 1280 a 9 sqq.), whether this error relates to the sources of happiness or to that which is just. If we take the latter view, the error is that of men, who, being judges in their own case (1280 a 14), not unnaturally err as to the extent of their claims: indeed, there is really some basis of justice for the claims they make. The claim of democracy is that those who are on an equality with the rest in one thing (ἐλευθερία) shall be accounted equal in all (i.e. shall receive an equal amount of the advantages distributable by the State)²: that of oligarchy is that those who are unequal in one respect (wealth) shall receive an unequal amount in the distribution.

So far the diversity of constitutions has been referred by

¹ The democratic classes would seek it in freedom, which they interpret as government by a majority and absence of control (8 (6). 2. 1317 a 40 sqq.): the oligarchical classes in wealth and birth.

² It does not seem to be quite

true that Greek democracy expected absolute equality in all advantages distributable by the State; we do not find, for instance, that all offices were filled by lot even in the extreme democracy.

Aristotle to differences of ethical creed or varying versions of justice. But already in the foregoing, differences of creed have been connected with differences of class: some classes, we have been told, seek happiness in things not really productive of it, and their admission to power varies and vitiates the constitution.

In the Sixth and Eighth Books of the Politics constitutional variation is referred, not to ethical, but to social differences. It is referred to the preponderance in the community of a given social element (*ποσόν* or *ποιόν*, 6 (4). 12. 1296 b 17 sqq.), or of particular classes or occupations, or to the distribution of property, or again to variations in the 'parts of the State' (*μέρη πόλεως*) and the combinations formed out of them. A populous city swarming with artisans and traders, and still more a populous seaport, full of fishermen like Tarentum and Byzantium, or of trireme-oarsmen like the Peiraeus, or of merchant-sailors like Aegina and Chios, was the natural home of democratic feeling (6 (4). 4. 1291 b 20 sqq.). The extreme oligarchy, on the other hand, found its natural home in communities seated in great levels suitable for the action of cavalry (like those of Thessaly), whose safety depended on their cavalry, and where the richest class were consequently held in especial honour, while the more moderate type of oligarchy would exist where the safety of the State depended on the hoplites, and where the moderately well-to-do class, to which the hoplites mostly belonged, was strong (8 (6). 7. 1321 a 8 sqq.). The cause which ultimately determines the political organization of a community may thus often be the character of the territory, and we understand how it happens that much care is taken to secure a satisfactory territory for the best State (4 (7). cc. 5-6).

We see then that two distinct views of the causes of constitutional diversity find expression in different parts of the Politics, which Aristotle does not attempt to reconcile. They are not, however, perhaps irreconcilable, if we bear in mind the hints which we have already gathered from the Fourth Book that ethical and social differences

do not lie far apart. We can readily understand that in Aristotle's view the predominance in a society of a defective ethical creed or a wrong conception of justice is due to the predominance of classes which in the best State either do not exist or are relegated to obscurity.

Still the Sixth and Eighth Books place the sources of constitutional imperfection in a light in which they are not placed in other Books of the *Politics*. We learn from them that the excellence of a State may depend in the long run on accidents of its geography or history, or in other words, on the favour of Nature and Fortune, and that its ethical character does not depend wholly on itself, but in part on the social organization which circumstances dictate to it.

In tracing the constitution to social conditions, Aristotle gives explicit recognition to an important truth, which Plato had certainly not recognized with equal clearness, though the facts which pointed to it were familiar enough. The genesis of the constitution of a State was perhaps studied by Aristotle more closely and more successfully than it has been studied till recent times, for the 'social contract' theory, so long dominant in political science, tended to disguise the circumstances under which a State comes by its constitution. The pictures drawn under its influence of a people meeting together and selecting its government, as a man might select a house or an article of furniture, were of course consciously ideal, but they obscure our recognition of the fact which Aristotle had long ago pointed out, that the constitution of a State has its roots in what moderns term its social system.

Aristotle the first clearly to recognize the truth that the constitution of a State reflects to some extent its social conditions.

The question may, however, be asked—does a change of constitution, then, always imply a profound ethical or social change? Aristotle does not seem to have thought so. The book on Constitutional Change illustrates in every page, how misconduct on the part of the holders of power, or want of vigilance, or conduct arousing feelings of envy, panic, or contempt in the minds of those excluded

from power, or the presence of heterogeneous and incohesive elements in the citizen body, or even mere accident¹ may cause a change of constitution. Still these are only the occasions of change. They would be powerless for harm, if social contrasts, involving ethical ones, did not exist within the ranks of the community.

A conflict between the ideas of different classes of men as to what makes for happiness and is just—this is, in brief, Aristotle's account of the causes which have brought more constitutions than one into being. Each constitution has an *ἦθος* of its own and embodies a distinct view of life. The difference between them is not a mere numerical difference, but a difference of faith, a difference of character.

What is the value of Aristotle's classification?

If we ask what is the value of Aristotle's classification of constitutions, it must of course be at once conceded that its significance for us is impaired by the changes which have occurred since his day. He classifies the constitutions which he found existing in Greece and among the neighbouring barbarian peoples. He never ventures to imagine that other forms of Kingship or Oligarchy or Democracy than those he knows are possible, though of course this was the case. With the constitution of Rome he was, unfortunately, not acquainted. It is true that the cities of the Hellenic world, stretching as they did from Massalia to the Palus Maeotis, offered an immense variety of constitutions to the investigations of the political inquirer—a far greater variety, probably, than could be found in contemporary Italy—and that a distinct stimulus was thus imparted to the study of politics; but we feel that Plato and Aristotle deserved better constitutions to review and analyse than those of Greece.

And then again, the plan of classifying constitutions by their *ἔπος*—in other words, by the attribute or attributes which confer supreme power in each—stands and falls with

¹ Athens came to be an extreme democracy *ἀπὸ συμπτώματος* (2. 12. 1274 a 12).

the conception of the constitution as a 'life' (*βίος*)—as an ethical influence for good or evil. Aristotle's principle is—'things are made what they are by their function and their capability' (Pol. I. 2. 1253 a 23). How can it be right, he would ask, to class Kingship and Tyranny together, because one man rules in each, when they differ so greatly in *ἥθος* and ethical influence, or to distinguish between the Absolute Kingship and the true Aristocracy, both of which rest on 'fully equipped virtue'? We hardly, indeed, understand how he was able to bring under the common head of Democracy or Oligarchy the strongly contrasted sub-forms of each which he enumerates in the Sixth Book.

The old classification of constitutions by the number of the rulers in each has, however, held its ground down to our own day, partly, no doubt, because the ethical significance of constitutions is no longer as prominent to us as it was to Plato and Aristotle, partly because the numerical difference is at once a conspicuous, and a really important and instructive, difference between constitutions. Still the principle of classification adopted by Plato and Aristotle has the merit of directing attention to the *ἥθος* and aim of constitutions as distinguished from their letter: we learn from it to read the character of a State, not in the number of its rulers, but in its dominant principle, in the attribute—be it wealth, birth, virtue, or numbers, or a combination of two or more of these—to which it awards supreme authority, and ultimately in the structure of its social system and the mutual relation of its various social elements. If they erred in their principle of classification, it was from a wish to get to the heart of the matter¹.

We now pass to Aristotle's treatment of the question what a State should be, and especially what its constitution

The Third Book an introduc-

¹ Heracleides Ponticus seems to have applied the same principle to the classification of *ἀρμονίαι*, which Aristotle himself often regards as offering a parallel to

constitutions (e.g. Pol. 6 (4). 3. 1290 a 19 sqq.). Heracleides held that harmonies should be classified by *ἥθος* (Athen. Deipn. 624 c sqq., an interesting passage).

tion both to the inquiry as to the best constitution and to the study of constitutions generally. It traces the conditions of sound or normal government as a preliminary step to both these investigations.

should be ; for this will determine what its citizen-body and its supreme authority will be. This is the main subject of the Third Book of the Politics (cp. 3. 1. 1274 b 32-41 : 6. 1278 b 6 sq. : 10. 1281 a 11). There is much in the language of the First and Second Books to lead us to expect an immediate transition at the close of the Second to the subject of the best State and constitution, but Aristotle prefers to rise gradually to this subject through a series of discussions, which form, like the *ἀπορίαι* respecting music in the Fifth Book, a kind of prelude (*ἐνδόσιμον*, 5 (8). 5. 1339 a 13) striking the keynote of what is to follow, and which gradually conduct the inquirer from the study of the simplest element of the State, the citizen, upward to the study of the constitution, and through a variety of constitutions, first to the normal forms of constitution, and then to the best. The special task of the Third Book is thus to exhibit the broad conditions which every sound government must satisfy, and which the best constitution satisfies while it rises above them ; to build a satisfactory platform, or pedestal, on which to rear the structure of the best State, and to depict at once the contrast of the normal constitutions and the deviation-forms, and the transition from the normal constitutions to the best. It includes, in fact, something more than this, for its closing chapters bring the best constitution before us in one of its two forms, the Absolute Kingship. The Third Book stands at the parting of the ways, where the ideal and the more practicable forms of political organization separate ; it serves as an introduction to the study both of the more generally attainable constitutions described in the Sixth and Eighth Books and of the form of the best constitution described in the Fourth and Fifth.

The State consisting of citizens, the first question to be asked is —What is a citizen?

To learn what the State is, Aristotle resolves it into its component elements. He had done the same thing at the outset of the First Book, in order to discover the difference between the householder and the statesman. This time, however, the component elements of the State are taken to be, not households, but citizens: the State is a definite

number of citizens (πολιτῶν τι πλῆθος, 3. 1. 1274 b 41, explained in 1275 b 20 as πλῆθος πολιτῶν ἱκανὸν πρὸς αὐτάρκειαν ζωῆς). The State proper is here meant to be defined; not that broader State which includes women, children, non-citizens, and slaves—all, in fact, who exchange within its borders any sort of service—the πόλις referred to in 2. 9. 1269 b 14 sq., and said in that passage to fall into two sections, men and women.

What, then, is a citizen¹? An Athenian would probably answer by pointing to the enactment carried by Aristophon in the famous year of Eucleides' archonship, which confined Athenian citizenship, in full conformity with the traditions of Solon and Pericles, to the children of Athenian parents—an enactment deprived of its retrospective operation by a decree moved shortly after by Nicomenes, but otherwise undisturbed, so that the law ran to this effect—μηδένα τῶν μετ' Εὐκλείδην ἄρχοντα μετέχειν τῆς πόλεως, ἂν μὴ ἄμφω τοὺς γονεάς ἀστοὺς ἐπιδείξηται, τοὺς δὲ πρὸ Εὐκλείδου ἀνξετάστους ἀφείσθαι². Others went further, and denied the name of citizen to any one who could not prove descent from more generations than one of citizens. It was thus that citizen descent for three generations, both on the father's side and on that of the mother, was required in the case of archons and priests³, and that in many colonies the descendants of

¹ One of the reasons which led Aristotle to make this question the starting-point of the inquiry as to the best constitution may well have been the fact that Plato had in the Republic made the χρηματιστικοί citizens of his ideal State. If he had studied the nature of the ideal citizen more closely, he might not have done so.

² See A. Schaefer, Demosthenes 1. 122 sqq., who thus reconciles the data as to Aristophon and Nicomenes. See also C. F. Hermann, Gr. Antiqq. 1. § 118.

³ See C. F. Hermann, Gr. Antiqq. 1. § 149. 6. 'Men not only felt confidence in the devotion to the State which they held

to be traditional in the old families, but also thought that the humiliations endured by non-citizens in consequence of the exclusiveness of the Attic law of citizenship could hardly fail to produce in their minds a bitter feeling, which was only too likely to be inherited by their descendants; we find, in fact, in an oration of Aeschines (3. 169) some expressions which are full of instruction on this subject' (L. Schmidt, Ethik d. alten Griechen, 2. 228). The origin of the regulation, indeed, may perhaps be sought in religious sentiment. It is worthy of notice that in [Xen.] Rep. Ath. 1. 2. the reading of the MSS. is οἱ πολῖται

the earliest immigrants formed a class apart and long monopolized power (6 (4). 4. 1290 b 11 sqq.)¹. As the Greek citizen often found himself for a long time together resident in States to which he did not belong, and whose members did not possess rights of inter-marriage in his own—whether as a cleruch, or an exile, or a mercenary soldier, or for purposes of trade or business—and might contract marriage during these periods of absence from home, or indeed while a resident in his native State, with one who was neither a fellow-citizen nor possessed of rights of inter-marriage, it is easy to see how a class would arise not of full citizen descent (τὸ μὴ ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων πολιτῶν ἐλευθέρων, 6 (4). 4. 1291 b 26)—a class to which even extreme democracies, like that of Athens, were not always kind, and which sometimes did not possess full rights of succession to property, even when citizenship was accorded to it². No doubt, a distinction would be drawn, in feeling, if not in law, between an union with an alien citizen and an union with a barbarian or slave³. Antisthenes, the founder of the Cynic School, which was the first to lay stress on the unity of the human race and to start the doctrine of a World-State, was, like several other great Athenians, the son of a barbarian mother, and there are indications in Diogenes Laertius' biography of him that he was conscious of the slight put on his birth. It was thus that the ideas of ἐλευθερία (free, or perhaps citizen, birth) and εὐγένεια (noble birth) came to lie so near together in the view of the Greeks. The free-born citizen

καὶ οἱ γενηαῖοι καὶ οἱ χρηστοί, though the editors commonly (*ex coniectura*) read οἱ ὅπλιται κ.τ.λ.

¹ 'It is possible that in the original formation of German society the eorl represented the first settler in the waste, while the ceorls sprang from descendants of the early settler who had in various ways forfeited their claim to a share in the original homestead, or more probably from

incomers into the village, who had since settled round it and been admitted to a share in the land and freedom of the community' (Green, *Making of England*, p. 178).

² C. F. Hermann, *Gr. Antiqq.* 1. § 118: 3. § 57. 2: 1. § 52. 5. They are called ξένοι in Pol. 3. 5. 1278a 26-28, but are distinguished in that passage from νόθοι.

³ Cp. 3. 5. 1278a 32.

and the noble were alike in this, that the circumstances of their birth made them what they were.

These strict views of citizenship were disposed of by the simple inquiry, how the citizen from whom descent was traced could be a citizen, if he was not descended from citizen ancestors; and a sharp saying of Gorgias was remembered, that the Demiurgi, or chief magistrates, of Larissa were 'demiurgi' (handicraftsmen) in every sense, for that they manufactured citizens of Larissa¹. Aristotle, himself a resident alien, makes short work of these old-fashioned fancies, and defines citizenship by the possession of certain rights, not by extraction.

A citizen, according to him, is one on whom the State has conferred 'a right to share in office, deliberative or judicial' (*ἀρχῆς βουλευτικῆς ἢ κριτικῆς*, 3. 1. 1275 b 18), whether he exercises this right singly as a magistrate of the State, or collectively as a member of a political body—an assembly, for example, or a dicastery. In popular parlance, probably, citizenship was not thus limited: see 4 (7). 13. 1332 a 33, where 'citizens who share in the constitution' are referred to, as though all citizens did not necessarily do so, and the passage continues—'and in our State all the citizens share in the constitution.' Plato had given the name of citizens to all comprised in the three classes of the Republic, though only the first of these classes possessed political authority²; but Aristotle's intention evidently is to connect citizenship, not with merely social functions, such as the supply of necessary com-

A citizen is one on whom the State has conferred rights of access to office, judicial or deliberative.

¹ See Sus.², Note 450, which explains the full proportions of the *bon mot*, unless, with Mr. Ridgeway (Camb. Philol. Trans., 2. 135 sqq.), we deny it to be 'double-barrelled.' The aim of Gorgias, in any case, was to make out that the citizen is the handicraftsman, not of nature, but of man.

² He sees, however, in the Laws (768 B), that *ὁ ἀκοινώνητος ὢν ἐξουσίας τοῦ συνδικάζειν ἡγείται τὸ παράπαν τῆς πόλεως οὐ μέτοχος*

εἶναι: cp. Aristot. Pol. 2. 12. 1274 a 15-18, where much the same thing is said of τὸ τὰς ἀρχὰς αἰρεῖσθαι καὶ εὐθύνειν, though, according to 8 (6). 4. 1318 b 21 sqq., something less than this sufficed the people in many States—indeed, if let alone and allowed to drudge and save, they would seem to have been commonly content with a merely nominal share of power (8 (6). 4. 1318 b 11 sqq.).

modities, nor even with military functions, apart from political, but with 'office, deliberative or judicial'.¹

To Aristotle, then, what makes a citizen is not the right to own land or to sue and be sued, or the right of inter-marriage, or other similar rights, the possession of which sufficed, in the view of the Greeks², to constitute a citizen, but the right to share, and opportunities of sharing, in the exercise of official authority. He who did not participate in the life of the State did not seem to him to deserve the name of a citizen, and the life of the State was political and speculative activity—'noble,' not 'necessary,' functions. Spinoza defines citizens as 'homines qui ex jure civili omnibus civitatis commodis gaudent' (Tractat. Pol. 3. 1). Aristotle defines them rather by their functions than their 'commoda.'

His principle that the State is a body of citizens, taken with his account of citizenship, evidently points to a more or less popular form of State. In an absolute monarchy, as Schömann remarks³, the king would be the only person possessing an underived right to rule, and therefore, if we construe Aristotle's view strictly, the only citizen; and a narrow oligarchy, in which a body (πληθος) of men possessed of the right to rule could hardly be said to exist, would also offend against his account of the State.

Are we
then to say,
when a
turn of the
political
wheel has

But then—Aristotle goes on to ask, after rapidly dismissing the account of citizenship which bases it on birth, and not on the grant of certain rights by the State—is it not an objection to this definition of it, that it obliges us

¹ The meaning of κρίσις (3. 1. 1275 a 23: cp. κριτικῆς, 1275 b 19), as Schömann has pointed out (Gr. Alterth. 1. 107. 3, ed. 2), must not be too strictly confined to judicial work, for not only does τὸ κρίνειν include the review of the official conduct of magistrates (3. 11. 1281 b 31 sqq.), but it seems sometimes to be used in a still wider sense, as in the phrase κριτὰς τῶν ἀναγκαίων καὶ συμφερόντων (4 (7). 6. 1328 b 22): indeed in 6 (4). 15. 1299a 26 it is used of magistracies,

and in 2. 11. 1273 a 11 of the popular assembly. Bernays, in fact, translates ἀρχῆς βουλευτικῆς ἢ κριτικῆς in 3. 1. 1275 b 18, 'ein beratendes oder entscheidendes Amt' (see also Schömann, *ubi supra*). Perhaps, however, the work of the judge (cp. 1275 a 26: b 13-17) is mainly referred to in the phrase ἀρχῆς κριτικῆς, as here used.

² Schömann, Gr. Alterth. 1. 107-8.

³ Gr. Alterth. 1. 107.

to admit any one to be a citizen, on whom some momentary turn of the political wheel may confer citizenship? Are the aliens and slave metoeci¹, whom Cleisthenes introduced into the tribes after the expulsion of the Pisistratidae, to be accounted citizens? His first answer is that this *ἀπορία* raises a question, not of fact, but of justice: he sees, however, that a further question may be raised, whether one who is not justly a citizen is a citizen at all. But he insists that these persons must be accounted citizens, if they have the rights of citizens, and as to the question of justice, that runs up into the question already raised (3. 1. 1274 b 34), whether they owe their citizenship to an act of the State or not. For democrats would not always allow the act of a preceding oligarchy or tyranny to bind a democracy coming after it, or to be taken as an act of the State. Aristotle is probably referring, as Thirlwall has remarked (*Hist. of Greece*, 4. 235: cp. 204), to a well-known case of this at Athens, referred to also by Isocrates (*Areopag.* § 68) and Demosthenes (in *Leptin.*

conferred these rights on slaves and aliens, persons presumably unfit to possess them, that the State has conferred them and that these men are citizens?

¹ Δοῦλοι μέτοικοι, 1275 b 37. I take μέτοικοι to be the substantive, δοῦλοι the adjective. If I am right in this, Aristotle appears to intend to distinguish between free metoeci and slave metoeci—that is, metoeci of servile status or origin. There would probably be many such in the class of metoeci, and no doubt it would be felt to be a far stronger measure to admit metoeci of this type to citizenship than free metoeci like Aristotle himself (cp. 3. 5. 1278 a 32 sq.). The word δοῦλος, according to Chrysippus (*Athen. Deipn.* 267 b), was sometimes used in a sense inclusive of freedmen, and some of these 'slave metoeci' may possibly have been freedmen: runaway slaves or slaves attached to a foreign master may, however, also be referred to. It would have been a stronger measure still to give citizenship to slaves of Athenian masters. But to give

citizenship to slaves of any kind stamped a man either as a tyrant (*Xen. Hell.* 7. 3. 8), or an extreme democrat (*ibid.* 2. 3. 48). If the true reading were, as has been suggested, ξένους καὶ δοῦλους καὶ μετοίκους, one would have expected the three substantives (as Thirlwall remarks, *Hist. of Greece*, 2. 74 n.) to be arranged in a different order (cp. 4 (7). 4. 1326 a 19). It is just possible that here, as elsewhere, two alternative readings (δοῦλους and μετοίκους) have together found their way into the text, but probably δοῦλους μετοίκους is correct. (Since the foregoing note was in print, I have observed that Bernays translates πολλοὺς . . . ξένους καὶ δοῦλους μετοίκους 'many aliens and freedmen (viele Insassen und Freigelassene).' See his *Translation*, p. 135, and his note in *Heraklit. Briefe*, p. 155, where he explains his view of the passage.)

This question leads to an inquiry as to the identity of the State, which is found to reside mainly in the constitution, the answer implied (but not given) being that these men are citizens by the act of the State, though hardly perhaps the same State as existed before.

c. 11 sq.), in which money had been lent by the Lacedaemonians to the oligarchical College of Ten to aid it in its struggle against the democrats under Thrasybulus, and the question was raised in the popular assembly, whether its repayment could be claimed from the restored democracy—whether, in fact, the State of Athens had contracted the loan. In this instance the sum was repaid by the State. Many, however, were disposed to contend, that oligarchies and tyrannies rested on force, and were not, like democracy, governments for the common good, and thus that their acts were not the acts of the State. Aristotle (1276 a 13) hints that the acts of a democracy would be just as impeachable on that score; but he passes on to consider a cognate question, what are the grounds on which we are to pronounce a πόλις to be the same or to have changed its identity. It will be noticed that the democrats just referred to did not claim that democratically governed Athens was a different State from oligarchically governed Athens: it was not on that ground that they repudiated the debt contracted by the oligarchy, but on the ground that the oligarchy was not the State. Aristotle does not accept this contention, and therefore prefers to argue the matter on a new basis. Is the πόλις the same, he asks, when its inhabitants have moved from the old site, and some of them live on one site, and others on another? This, he says, is a question of language: the word πόλις is used in more senses than one. Is a πόλις the same, so long as it is surrounded by the same walls? Why, a space surrounded by walls may be, as we see in the case of Babylon, so large as to be the abode of an ἔθνος, rather than a πόλις. Or is it the same so long as the stock of its inhabitants remains the same? No, the very same inhabitants, if differently combined, may become a different State, just as the same individuals may be successively formed into two or more different choruses. It is to the πολιτεία—the synthesis, not the individuals—that we must mainly look when we pronounce on the identity of the πόλις. But it does not follow, that when one constitu-

tion takes the place of another, or, in other words, when one πόλις is replaced by another, the new πόλις should refuse to fulfil the contracts of the old: whether it should do so, is a matter for separate consideration.

The conclusion suggested, though not drawn, for Aristotle has lost sight of the origin of the discussion in the nice investigation to which it has led him, is that the aliens made citizens by Cleisthenes are citizens by the act of the State, though perhaps not the same State as existed before the change of constitution: whether the State acted rightly in making them citizens or not, is a question on which further light is thrown in the succeeding chapters, and especially in c. 5.

When Aristotle finds the identity of the State mainly in the πολιτεία, his view is quite in harmony with his general conception of the importance of the πολιτεία as the expression of the end for which the State lives (6 (4). 1. 1289 a 15-18). Isocrates had said that the State is immortal (De Pace § 120, αἱ δὲ πόλεις διὰ τὴν ἀθανασίαν ὑπομένουσι καὶ τὰς παρὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ τὰς παρὰ τῶν θεῶν τιμωρίας). Cicero's view is not very different: 'itaque nullus interitus est reipublicae naturalis, ut hominis, in quo mors non modo necessaria est, verum etiam optanda persaepe: civitas autem, quum tollitur, deletur, exstinguitur, simile est quodam modo, ut parva magnis conferamus, ac si omnis hic mundus intereat et concidat' (de Rep. 3. 23. 34). Spinoza in his 'mortuo rege, obiit quodam modo civitas¹', seems to go farther than Aristotle. Locke (on Civil Government, 2. § 211) distinguishes between the dissolution of the society and the dissolution of the government. 'The usual and almost the only way whereby this union' in one politic society 'is dissolved, is the inroad of foreign force making a conquest upon them; for in that case, not being able to maintain and support themselves as one entire and independent body, the union belonging to that body, which consisted therein, must necessarily cease, and so every one return to the state he was in before, with

¹ Tractat. Pol. 7. 25.

a liberty to shift for himself and provide for his own safety, as he thinks fit, in some other society.' According to this, the Norman Conquest of England was the beginning of a new society. The question is more familiar to us in relation to the Church of England and the question of its continuity. A recent writer, whose book is reviewed in the *Saturday Review* for Dec. 9, 1882, holds that 'it is not either from Christ and his Apostles, nor yet from the period of the Reformation,' but from the passing of the Act of Uniformity in the reign of Charles the Second, 'that we must date the foundation of the present Established Church of England.' His reviewer dissents: 'the National Church no more ceased to exist when its bishops were expelled and its liturgy disused, a parochial church no more ceased to exist when a Presbyterian or an Anabaptist preacher was thrust upon it as its pastor, than the State or nation itself ceased to exist, when it was ruled by a Council of State or a Protector, instead of a King.' Whatever may be the merits of this controversy, we see that the question raised by Aristotle is still one on which debate is possible¹.

What is the virtue of the citizen? Is it the same as the virtue of the good man? Significance of this discussion.

Aristotle, however, passes on to discuss a more important question, to which the inquiries we have just noticed lead up. The question whether slaves and aliens are legitimate citizens naturally suggests the further question, what is the virtue of a citizen, and is it identical with the virtue of a good man? Aristotle will not deny the name of a citizen to any one whom the State has invested with certain powers, but he thinks it worth while to inquire what qualities the citizen ought to possess, and whether he is bound to possess all those which go to the making of a good man. The investigation as to the virtue of a citizen reminds us of the investigation in the First Book as to the virtue of women, children, and slaves; here as there the Socratic doctrine of the unity of virtue comes up for discussion.

¹ See De Witt's Jefferson, E. T. Jefferson's works bearing on questions of this kind are referred to. p. 154, where various passages of

There were many probably who thought that to be a good citizen (that is, an useful member of the State, whatever its constitution) was to be a good man (cp. Thuc. 2. 42. 2 sq.). On the other hand, Socrates had said that it was impossible to be a good citizen without moral goodness (Xen. Mem. 4. 2. 11, οὐχ οἶόν τέ γε ἄνευ δικαιοσύνης ἀγαθὸν πολίτην γενέσθαι: cp. 4. 6. 14). Teaching as he did the unity of the various virtues¹, it was natural that he should also identify the virtue of the good citizen and the good man, and thus we find Plato in the *Gorgias* (517 B-C) merging political in moral virtue, for he makes the virtue of a citizen consist in the moral improvement of his fellows, not in adding to the material defences of the State².

Aristotle's object is to show that neither of these views is correct, and also to put forth a third view, which combines all that is of value in them. He accepts the first of them to this extent, that he allows a kind of virtue even to the citizen of a deviation-form; on the other hand, he agrees with Socrates that the virtue of the good citizen is in one case (that of the 'ruling citizen' (πολιτικός) in the best constitution) identical with that of the good man. His wish is to do justice to all forms and degrees of citizen-virtue, and at the same time to show that its highest form is alone to be identified with that of the good man. Here, as elsewhere, he seeks to mediate between opposing views, and to extract from them whatever element of truth they contain.

He begins by asking in what the virtue of a citizen consists, and finds it, not in that in which it had commonly

¹ He was followed in this view by the Megarians (Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. 1. 184. 4, ed. 2), the Cynics (ibid. 2. 1. 221. 3-4), and the Eretrian school (ibid. 2. 1. 200. 5). There was a standing feud between the Megarian school and Aristotle. This school struck at the root of Aristotle's system by disputing the distinction of *δύναμις* and *ἐνέργεια* (Grote, Plato 3. 490: Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. 1. 183. 2, ed. 2). On Eubulides, one of the leaders of

this school in Aristotle's time, see A. Schaefer, Demosthenes 1. 295-6, who refers to Menage's note on Diog. Laert. 2. 109.

² Thucydides finds the characteristic of a good citizen in a desire to benefit his State (6. 9. 2: 6. 14. 1). Demosthenes speaks to somewhat the same effect (De Chers. cc. 68-72). Plato would quite approve, but then he would probably interpret this expression differently.

been taken to consist¹—the qualities which win success or advantage for the State—but in those which contribute to the maintenance of the existing constitution, whatever it may be. Just as the virtue of the child is relative to his father (*πρὸς τὸν ἡγούμενον*), and that of the slave to his master (*πρὸς τὸν δεσπότην*), so the virtue of the citizen is relative to the constitution (*πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν*). It follows that there must be many forms of the virtue of a citizen, for there are many constitutions, and the virtue which upholds one will not be the same as that which upholds another; but the virtue of a good man is always one and the same, for it is complete virtue. The virtue of a citizen cannot, therefore, in all constitutions be identical with the virtue of a good man.

Is it so even in the best constitution? No: for (1) the State even there cannot be wholly composed of men entirely alike; hence not of good men². But it must be composed of good citizens: hence the virtue of the citizen and the good man are not identical. (2) The State is composed of unequals, and the virtue of the leader of a chorus is not identical with that of the member who stands beside him. (The first of these arguments appears to be based on considerations of what is possible, and to be designed to show that the identity of the virtue of the citizen and the good man is impossible: the second appears to be designed to show that as a matter of fact, looking to the nature of the State, this identity does not exist.)

We see then that the absolute identity of the virtue of the citizen with that of the good man, which Socrates asserted to exist, does not exist, even in the best constitution. Even there the virtue of all citizens will not be identical with the virtue of the good man. But will the virtue of some citizens be so?

We commonly call the good ruler good and morally

¹ Xen. Mem. 4. 6. 14: 4. 2. 11.

² Aristotle seems to think otherwise in 4 (7). 13. 1332 a 36 sqq.: see Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 683. 4, who regards the view expressed

in the passage of the Third Book before us as merely dialectical or aporetic, and not Aristotle's definitive view.

wise, and the man capable of ruling (πολιτικός) must needs be morally wise [for moral wisdom (φρόνησις) and political wisdom (πολιτική) are identical]. Then again, it is a common view that the very education of the ruler must be altogether different from that of the ruled. Are we to say then that the virtue of the ruler is the same as that of the good man? In that case we should have found what we have been seeking—some citizens whose virtue is the same as that of the good man. Perhaps Jason felt that the virtue of a ruler is one thing and the virtue of a citizen (who is both ruler and ruled) another, for he said that 'it was starvation to him not to be a tyrant,' implying that he did not know how to be a private individual¹. But then we praise a man who is capable both of ruling and of being ruled, and the virtue of a citizen of repute is said to consist in a capacity for ruling and being ruled well. If then the virtue of the good man is that of a ruler only, and the virtue of a citizen includes both that of a ruler and that of one who is ruled, the two aptitudes which the citizen unites must be different in point of praiseworthiness (Aristotle hints that the citizen must in fact possess two different kinds of virtue). Since then we sometimes hold that a ruler and a person ruled should learn two distinct things and not the same thing, but that the citizen should know both what the ruler knows and what he who is ruled knows, and share both in ruling and being ruled, what follows from that is plain enough. We must first make it clear what kind of rule it is that the citizen should learn through being ruled to exercise. It is not the kind of rule which is exercised over slaves, or that which is concerned with necessities, but that which is exercised over

¹ It was Jason, probably, who used the argument referred to in 4 (7). 3. 1325 a 35, that a man ought to make himself supreme master of his State at any cost of evil-doing, inasmuch as it is only in that position that it is possible to perform the greatest number of

noble acts (cp. Rhet. 1. 12. 1373 a 25, and Plutarch, Praec. Reip. Gerend. c. 24: De Sanitate Tugendae, c. 22). Anacreon had sung of a queen Callicrete as ἐπισταμένη τυραννικά ([Plato], Theages 125 E).

men like the ruler and free (πολιτικὴ ἀρχή)¹. Having made this clear, we may draw the conclusion that the good citizen will possess two forms of virtue—the virtue which fits a man to rule as a citizen rules his fellow-citizens, and the virtue which fits a man to be ruled as citizens are ruled by their fellow-citizens. And we may go on and say the same of the virtue of the good man. This also will have two forms—the one that of the ruler, the other that of the ruled. The former is the complete form, for it alone includes φρόνησις.

Thus the virtue of the citizen in its fulness is identical with the virtue of the man in its fulness: so far Socrates was right in identifying the two, but he was not right in denying that there is such a thing as the virtue of a citizen apart from that of a man. On the contrary, the virtue of the citizen in many constitutions is distinct from that of the man, and even in the best it is only in some of the citizens—those who are capable of ruling—that the two coincide. How far the subordinate forms of the virtue of a citizen and of a man coincide in the best constitution, Aristotle does not say. In other constitutions they evidently will not coincide.

Aristotle perhaps has before him in this inquiry a passage in the Laws (643 D–644 B), where Plato asks what is the true aim of education, and finds that it is to produce a desire to become a ‘perfect citizen, knowing how both to rule and to be ruled with justice,’ or, in other words, to produce good men, for ‘those who are rightly educated may be said to become good men’ (644 A: compare also Laws 942 C). Aristotle quite agrees that this is the aim of education in the best State, but then he allows the existence of a form of citizen-virtue in the deviation-forms

¹ Aristotle perhaps wishes tacitly to correct the strong expressions of Plato, Laws 762 E, *δεῖ δὲ πάντ' ἀνδρα διανοεῖσθαι περὶ πάντων ἀνθρώπων, ὥς ὁ μὴ δουλεύσας οὐδ' ἀνδεσπότης γένοιτο ἄξιος ἐπαίγου, καὶ καλλωπίζεσθαι χρὴ τῷ καλῶς δου-*

λεῦσαι μᾶλλον ἢ τῷ καλῶς ἄρξαι κ.τ.λ. Plutarch repeats Plato's language in *Praecepta Reip.* Gerend. c. 12, *ὥς οὐδ' ἄρξαι καλῶς τοὺς μὴ πρότερον ὀρθῶς δουλεύσαντας, ἢ φησιν ὁ Πλάτων, δυναμένους.*

of State: thus he frequently insists that in them the citizens should receive an education suitable to the constitution.

These are the central lessons of the chapter, but its incidental teaching also is important. There were evidently those who regarded the virtue of the good man as concerned only with ruling. Themistocles had said, in his haughty letter of defence to the people of Athens, that 'he neither wished nor was fitted by nature to be ruled'¹; and Gorgias is made in the *Meno* of Plato to identify virtue with the ability to rule². But Aristotle insists that one form, though not the highest, of the virtue of the good man is concerned with being ruled, and that it is by learning how to be ruled (after the fashion of freemen) that the good man learns how to rule. Aristotle's conception of a good man is thus quite different from that of Gorgias. To obey is the beginning of virtue. Aristotle is here preparing the ground for the institutions of his best State, where this rule is followed (cp. 4 (7). 14. 1333 a 11 sq.).

On the other hand, there were those to whom political activity, and even political capacity, seemed no essential elements of virtue (4 (7). 3. 1325 a 18). This view also is tacitly corrected by Aristotle. He will not allow full virtue to exist where there is no capacity for rule. Thus the man of full virtue (*σπουδαῖος*) and the true statesman or king (*πολιτικός καὶ βασιλικός*) are identified (3. 18. 1288 b 1). *Φρόνησις* is a virtue peculiar to the ruler³. Already the Cynics and Cyrenaics—later on, other schools⁴—refused

¹ Plutarch, Themist. c. 23, διαβαλλόμενος γὰρ ὑπὸ τῶν ἐχθρῶν, πρὸς τοὺς πολίτας ἔγραψεν, ὡς ἀρχειν μὲν αἰεὶ ζητῶν, ἀρχεσθαι δὲ μὴ πεφυκὼς μηδὲ βουλόμενος, οὐκ ἂν ποτε βαρβάρους καὶ πολεμίοις αὐτὸν ἀποδόσθαι μετὰ τῆς Ἑλλάδος.

² *Meno* 73 C: ΣΩΚΡ. Ἐπειδὴ τοῖνυν ἡ αὐτὴ ἀρετὴ πάντων ἐστὶ, πειρῶ εἰπεῖν καὶ ἀγαμνησθῆναι, τί αὐτό φησι Γοργίας εἶναι καὶ σὺ μετ' ἐκείνου. ΜΕΝ. Τί ἄλλο γ' ἢ ἀρχειν

οἶόν τ' εἶναι τῶν ἀνθρώπων;—cp. *ibid.* 71 E, αὕτη ἐστὶν ἀνδρὸς ἀρετὴ, ἱκανὸν εἶναι τὰ τῆς πόλεως πράττειν (the answer of *Meno*), and 73 A.

³ Cp. 1. 13. 1260 a 17, διὸ τὸν μὲν ἀρχοντα τελείαν ἔχειν δεῖ τὴν ἡθικὴν ἀρετὴν (τὸ γὰρ ἔργον ἐστὶν ἀπλῶς τοῦ ἀρχιτέκτονος, ὃ δὲ λόγος ἀρχιτέκτων), τῶν δ' ἄλλων ἕκαστον, ὅσον ἐπιβάλλει αὐτοῖς.

⁴ The Stoics held that 'a philosopher who teaches and improves

to make governing or the capacity for governing a condition of virtue. Aristotle so far disconnects the two things as to allow the existence of a lower form of virtue in the case of persons who neither govern nor are capable of governing, but he makes *φρόνησις*, which includes a capacity for governing, essential to full virtue. Thus while he declines to deny all virtue whatever to those who are capable only of being ruled, he places the virtue of the good ruler on a pinnacle, as the characteristic excellence of the good man.

The whole inquiry illustrates the dependence of virtue on the constitution. The deviation-forms presuppose in their citizens a type of citizen-virtue, but an inferior type, and it is only in the best constitution that citizen-virtue rises into the full virtue of the good man. Here the ruling citizen, or statesman (*πολιτικός*), is identical with the man of full virtue (*σπουδαῖος*). The Fourth and Fifth Books of the Politics take this identification as the starting-point of their inquiries on the subject of education (4 (7). 14. 1333 a 11-16), and ask what education will produce men of full virtue, as the best way of discovering how to produce true statesmen.

Thus this chapter of the Third Book forms an important link in the inquiries of the Politics. It prepares us for the arrangement in the Fourth by which the younger men of the best State are not allowed to rule till they have learnt to obey, and have acquired the virtues of rulers through such subordination as befits freemen. How far its teaching agrees with that of 4 (7). 3, where it seems to be implied that a purely speculative life is an ideally complete one, is another question¹.

Are *βάναν-
σοι* (who do
not share
in office)
citizens?

Aristotle has now nearly done with the subject of the citizen, but before he leaves it, he notices and discusses one other *ἀπορία* with regard to it, arising out of the

his fellow-men benefits the State quite as much as a warrior, an administrator, or a civil functionary' (Zeller, Stoics Epicu-

reans and Sceptics, E. T. p. 305).

¹ See Appendix B as to some further points connected with this chapter.

account just given of the virtue of the citizen—partly, in all probability, because its discussion enables him to show that there are more forms of the citizen than one, and that the varieties of the citizen point to varieties of constitution, and thus leads up to the inquiries that follow: partly because he desires to draw attention to the fact that his definition of the citizen and of citizen-virtue does not hold good universally.

The ἀπορία is thus stated (3. 5. 1277 b 34)—πότερον πολίτης ἐστὶν ᾧ κοινωνεῖν ἔξεστιν ἀρχῆς, ἢ καὶ τοὺς βαναύσους πολίτας θετέον; The βάνανσοι have been said in the preceding chapter to be ‘persons ruled as slaves are ruled,’ and here it is assumed that they do not share in office¹. Hence they will not possess the virtue of a citizen, which consists of being capable both of ruling and being ruled as citizens rule citizens. Are they then citizens?

An inquiry on this subject discloses that some constitutions admit those concerned with ‘necessary work’ to citizenship, while others do not. The βάνανσος is so far a citizen that he is a citizen ‘under particular forms of constitution’ (ἐν τινι πολιτείᾳ)². He is often a citizen in oligarchies; and in many democracies not only is the βάνανσος a citizen, but even the alien and the bastard. This, however, occurs only in States in which genuine citizens have run short, and then only for a time, so that even these democracies recognize that some types of citizen are less authentic than others³.

The whole discussion makes it manifest that there are various types of citizen, and that the truest citizen (ὁ μάλιστα πολίτης) is he who shares in office. The account given in c. 4 of the virtue of a citizen is thus shown to be maintainable, even if it does not hold good of all who are anywhere made citizens, and the close connexion of cc. 4

¹ Cp. 2. 12. 1274 a 21, τὸ δὲ τέταρτον θητικόν, οἷς οὐδεμῶς ἀρχῆς μετέχον.

² Cp. ἐν τινι βασιλείᾳ, 3. 14. 1285 a 9.

³ It is quite in Aristotle’s man-

ner to distinguish between different kinds of citizens; he distinguishes in the First Book (1. 7. 1255 b 27 sqq.) between different kinds of slaves.

and 5 is evidenced by a recapitulation of the result of c. 4 added at the end of c. 5, the inquiries of the latter chapter having confirmed the conclusions of the former.

Aristotle had stated at the outset of the whole discussion (3. 1. 1275 a 34 sq.), that things which have to do with (or stand in relation to) objects differing in kind and in priority have little or nothing in common, and that constitutions, the object-matter to which the citizen is related, differ in kind and in priority; whence it follows that the citizen under one constitution is different from the citizen under another, and that we must not expect to find the various types of citizen possessing much in common¹. Wherever this is the case, no definition can be made to suit all the types of the thing equally well (1275 a 33).

The nature of citizenship proving to depend on the constitution, we naturally pass on to the constitution.

Throughout the inquiry as to the nature of the citizen, our attention has constantly been drawn to the importance of the constitution: the citizen, we are told, varies with the constitution—the identity of the State is mainly to be sought in the constitution; and the transition is natural from the subject of the citizen to that of the constitution. Aristotle, who is seldom content with incidental solutions

¹ Bernays (Aristoteles' Politik, p. 132) and Bonitz (Ind. 799 a 15 sqq.) differ as to the interpretation of the passage, 3. 1. 1275 a 34 sqq. The interpretation of the latter, who explains τὰ ὑποκείμενα (35) as 'singulae πολιτεῖαι, ad quas refertur πολίτου notio,' would seem to be in all probability the correct one, and has been followed in the text. What is said here of constitutions, is also, apparently, true of χρηματιστική and its forms (cp. 1. 11. 1258 b 20, τῆς μὲν οὖν οἰκιοτάτης χρηματιστικῆς ταῦτα μόρια καὶ πρῶτα), and of βασιλεία (3. 14. 1284 b 40 sqq.), and also of the ἀρετὴ πολίτου καὶ ἀνδρός (3. 4. 1277 b 18). We must bear in mind the caution given to the reader of treatises dealing with πολιτική at the commencement of the Ni-

comachean Ethics (1. 1. 1094 b 19 sqq.). But indeed in dealing with all subjects Aristotle has little confidence in broad general definitions: cp. De An. 2. 1. 412 b 4, εἰ δὲ τι κοινὸν ἐπὶ πάσης ψυχῆς δεῖ λέγειν, εἴη ἂν ἐντελέχεια ἡ πρώτη σώματος φυσικοῦ ὀργανικοῦ: 2. 3. 414 b 22, γένοιτο δ' ἂν καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν σχημάτων λόγος κοινός, δὲ ἐφαρμόσει μὲν πᾶσιν, ἴδιος δ' οὐδενός ἔσται σχήματος' ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ ταῖς εἰρημέναις ψυχαῖς' διὰ γελοῖον ζητεῖν τὸν κοινὸν λόγον καὶ ἐπὶ τούτων καὶ ἐφ' ἑτέρων, δὲ οὐδενός ἔσται τῶν ὄντων ἴδιος λόγος, οὐδὲ κατὰ τὸ οἰκεῖον καὶ ἀτομον εἶδος, ἀφέντας τὸν τοιοῦτον . . . ὥστε καθ' ἕκαστον ζητητέον, τίς ἐκάστου ψυχῆς, οἷον τίς φυτοῦ καὶ τίς ἀνθρώπου ἢ θηρίου.

of important questions, raises for discussion (c. 6) the question whether there are more constitutions than one, though in every one of the preceding chapters of the Third Book an affirmative answer had been implied. 'We must inquire,' he says, 'whether there are more than one, and if there are, how many and what they are, and what distinctions exist between them' (c. 6. 1278 b 6). A constitution, he goes on to say, is 'an ordering of the magistracies of a State, and especially of the supreme authority'¹; for in every State the governing individual or class (*πολίτευμα*) is supreme, and the constitution varies as this varies².

The first broad distinction between constitutions—that between normal constitutions and deviation-forms—comes into view, when we ask what is the purpose for which the State exists, and what is the kind of rule which should be exercised in a State. In answering the first of these two questions, Aristotle—though he repeats his previous assertion (1. 2. 1253 a 7), that man is a social being and seeks to live in society with his fellows³, even if he stands in no need of help from them—holds nevertheless that the State is formed to secure the general advantage, and to win for each individual as large a share of good life as he is capable of enjoying: not that men will not hold together in political society even if they gain from it less than this—if, for instance, they merely secure the continuance of a life not overlaid with suffering and annoyances. The State, we see, is a *κοινωνία* not only or chiefly designed for social

Distinction between normal constitutions and deviation-forms: Aristotle shows by a reference to the end of the State and by an inquiry as to the kind of rule which should be exercised over free persons, that normally government is for the common good.

¹ This seems to be the meaning of the words—ἔστι δὲ πολιτεία πόλεως τάξις τῶν τε ἄλλων ἀρχῶν καὶ μάλιστα τῆς κυρίας πάντων (3. 6. 1278 b 8): cp. τάξις ταῖς πόλεσιν ἢ περὶ τὰς ἀρχάς (6 (4). 1. 1289 a 15): ἢ τῶν ἀρχῶν τάξις (6 (4). 3. 1290 a 7): τῶν τὴν πόλιν οἰκούντων τάξις (3. 1. 1274 b 38).

² 3. 6. 1278 b 10, κύριον μὲν γὰρ πανταχοῦ τὸ πολίτευμα τῆς πόλεως, πολίτευμα δ' ἐστὶν ἢ πολιτεία: cp. 3. 7. 1279 a 25, ἐπεὶ δὲ πολιτεία μὲν

καὶ πολίτευμα σημαίνει ταῦτόν, πολίτευμα δ' ἐστὶ τὸ κύριον τῶν πόλεων, ἀνάγκη δ' εἶναι κύριον ἢ ἓνα ἢ ὀλίγους ἢ τοὺς πολλοὺς—from which passage it would seem that the πολίτευμα may be a single individual as well as a class, such as the Few or the Many.

³ See Cic. de Amicitia 23. 87; but Aristotle claims that man is not only a συνδυαστικόν but a πολιτικὸν ζῷον.

pleasure, like such unions as those of *θιασῶται* or *ἐρανισταί* (Eth. Nic. 8. 11. 1160 a 19: cp. Pol. 3. 9. 1280 b 35–1281 a 4), but if in some degree for pleasure, in a higher degree for advantage, and advantage not of a passing kind but extending over the whole life (Eth. Nic. 8. 11. 1160 a 21 sqq.). It combines in itself, like the conjugal relation, but in a higher degree, pleasure and advantage (Eth. Nic. 8. 14. 1162 a 24).

Aristotle answers the second question—what kind of rule should be exercised in a State—by distinguishing, as he had already done in c. 4 (1277 a 33 sqq.), the rule exercised over slaves from the rule exercised over free persons. Of the latter he takes as types the rule of the head of a household over wife and children, or that of the master of an art—a gymnastic-master or a ship-captain—over those whom he directs¹. This kind of rule is exercised primarily for the good of the ruled, for if the ruler has a share of the advantage, this comes to him accidentally (*κατὰ συμβεβηκός*); whereas the rule exercised by a master of slaves (*δεσποτική ἀρχή*) is exercised primarily for the good of the ruler, and accidentally only for the good of the ruled². That the rule exercised in a State belongs of right to the former category, may be inferred from the fact that when rulers and ruled are placed on a level, the former deriving no special benefit from ruling, men regard office as a public burden (*λειτουργία*, 1279 a 11) and claim to pass it from one to the other³. The mere fact of an interchange of rule being looked for under these circumstances shows that the State is normally for the common advantage, for if no interchange took place, and the rulers were always the same and ruled for the good of the ruled, they would be losers⁴. The general feeling that an inter-

¹ Compare the reasoning in Plato, Rep. 342 C.

² Plato, Rep. 343 B. Plato seems hardly to make this distinction as to *δεσποτική ἀρχή*, Rep. 345 D–E (*πάσαν ἀρχήν, καθ' ὅσον ἀρχή*).

³ Susemihl seems right in think-

ing that Aristotle has here Isocr. Areopag. § 24 sqq. in view.

⁴ Cp. Eth. Nic. 5. 10. 1134 a 35 sqq., *διὸ οὐκ ἐῷμεν ἀρχειν ἄνθρωπον, ἀλλὰ τὸν λόγον, ὅτι ἐαυτῷ τοῦτο ποιεῖ καὶ γίνεται τύραννος*· ἔστι δ' ὁ ἀρχῶν φύλαξ τοῦ δικαίου, εἰ δὲ τοῦ δικαίου, καὶ τοῦ ἴσου· ἐπεὶ δ' οὐδὲν αὐτῷ

change of rule is just where government is for the benefit of the governed, implies that the State exists for the common good.

The parallel between politics and the arts which Aristotle inherited from Socrates and Plato here suggests the inference that the relation between rulers and ruled so far resembles that between the master of an art and his pupils or assistants, as to be a relation primarily for the benefit of the side which receives, not that which gives, direction (cp. 4 (7). 2. 1324 b 29 sq., ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις ἐπιστήμαις τοῦτο ὀρώμεν· οὔτε γὰρ τοῦ λατροῦ οὔτε τοῦ κυβερνήτου ἔργον ἐστὶ τὸ ἡ πείσαι ἢ βιάσασθαι τοῦ μὲν τρὺς θεραπευομένους τοῦ δὲ τοὺς πλωτήρας); it serves here, therefore, as it also does in 6 (4). 1. 1288 b 10 sqq. and 3. 12. 1282 b 30, as the basis of an important doctrine, notwithstanding that elsewhere Aristotle is careful to point out some differences between politics and the arts; he holds πολιτική, in fact, to be a Practical Science, not a Productive Science or Art. Thus he recognizes that written rule, or law, is more in place in the practice of Politics than in the practice of an art (3. 16. 1287 a 33 sqq.), and that the parallel of the arts must not be used to justify a frequent change of laws (2. 8. 1269 a 19 sqq.). Nor is government to him a mere matter of scientific knowledge; it presupposes virtue and correct moral choice (3. 13. 1284 a 1 sq.).

Both of the questions raised have thus been answered in a way to show that rule such as that exercised by a master over his slaves (δεσποτική ἀρχή) is out of place in relation to the citizens of a State; it offends against the

πλέον εἶναι δοκεῖ, εἴπερ δίκαιος· οὐ γὰρ νέμει πλέον τοῦ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθοῦ αὐτῷ, εἰ μὴ πρὸς αὐτὸν ἀνάλογόν ἐστιν· διὸ ἑτέρῳ ποιεῖ· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἀλλότριον εἶναι φασιν ἀγαθὸν τὴν δικαιοσύνην . . . μισθὸς ἄρα τις δοτέος, τοῦτο δὲ τιμὴ καὶ γέρας· ὅφρ' δὲ μὴ ἱκανὰ τὰ τοιαῦτα, οὗτοι γίνονται τύραννοι. This agrees with Plato, Rep. 345 E. In the passage of the Politics before us, however, the μισθός is conceived to come in

the shape of a period of private life, during which some one else governs for the *quondam* ruler's advantage. It should be noticed that Aristotle does not necessarily accept as correct the popular impression that one who rules for the benefit of the ruled is a loser and needs compensation. The popular view is not his own, but it serves the purpose of his argument.

aim with which the State was instituted, and against the nature of all rule which rests on knowledge. Rule in the State should be for the common advantage of all the citizens, whether rulers or ruled; and thus we arrive at the conclusion that those constitutions which aim at the common advantage are normal (*ὀρθαί*), and those which aim at the advantage of the rulers only are deviation-forms. The State is a *κοινωνία* of freemen, and must be governed as such. It does not necessarily follow that in all normal forms of it there will be an interchange of rule, the ruled becoming rulers, and the rulers becoming the ruled, from time to time: this is so in most forms of the rule which citizens exercise over citizens (cp. I. 12. 1259 b 4), and particularly in the 'like and equal' type of society which was becoming increasingly common in the Greece of Aristotle's day, but not in the Kingship. Democratic opinion held this interchange to be essential to freedom (8 (6). 2. 1317 a 40-b 3), but Aristotle's view is that the governed are free when the government is exercised for their benefit. A freeman, according to him, is 'one who exists for his own sake and not for that of another' (Metaph. A. 2. 982 b 25: cp. Pol. 3. 4. 1277 b 5: 5 (8). 2. 1337 b 17 sqq.). A man may thus be a freeman without having a share in ruling. The true characteristic of a freeman is that his interest counts as a thing to be studied—that his life is lived for himself, not for another. He who is the instrument (*ὄργανον*) of another and fit for nothing better, and yet a man, is a slave (I. 4. 1254 a 14, *ὁ γὰρ μὴ αὐτοῦ φύσει ἀλλ' ἄλλου, ἄνθρωπος δέ, οὗτος φύσει δοῦλός ἐστιν*).

Six constitutions—
three normal, three
the reverse.

Aristotle thus obtains the broad classification of constitutions into normal forms and deviation-forms, and taking also into account the fact that the supreme authority in a State must needs be a single individual, or a few, or many¹,

¹ Aristotle is not careful at the outset of a discussion, when everything he says is tentative and provisional, to study absolute accuracy. See Ramsauer on Eth. Nic.

5. 3. 1129 b 15. So here he does not pause to remember that he means eventually to decide for the supremacy, not of any person or persons, but of *νόμοι κείμενοι*

he arrives at the conclusion that there are six constitutions, three for the common advantage (*ὄρθαι*) and three for the advantage of the rulers (*παρεκβάσεις*). It will be noticed, however, that at the end of the chapter (c. 7), the Few and Many in whose interest the oligarchy and democracy are said respectively to be ruled are identified with the rich and the poor (3. 7. 1279 b 7-9); and a chapter, the Eighth, necessarily follows, dealing with objections that may fairly be made to the definition given of oligarchy and democracy. The first is that if we take the numerical difference to be the essential thing, it follows that States in which many rich rule a few poor are democracies, and that States in which a few poor rule many rich are oligarchies, which is not a satisfactory conclusion. Then, if we make both differences essential, and refuse to consider that an oligarchy exists anywhere except where a few rich rule many poor, or a democracy except where many poor rule a few rich, we leave the forms of State to which reference has just been made altogether undescribed and unclassified. This is the second objection. It follows that the qualitative, not the numerical, difference is the essential one. The numerical difference between oligarchy and democracy is only accidental and may be reversed. It is the rule of the rich in their own interest that makes an oligarchy, and the rule of the poor in their own interest that makes a democracy.

Nature of Democracy and Oligarchy — their claims to be just constitutions analyzed, and rejected by a reference to the end of the State.

It was necessary to ascertain correctly what democracy and oligarchy are, before taking the next step, which is to state and examine the claims put forward on behalf of either constitution, and thus to win for the first time (c. 9) a closer view of what constitutes a State, and of the end for which the State exists.

Both oligarchs and democrats allege a basis in justice for the forms of constitution which they respectively favour, and not untruly; they take their stand on a principle which is in a degree just (*δίκαιόν τι*); but then they forget that it

ὄρθως (3. 11. 1282 b 1: cp. 3. 10. 1281 a 34), and that the su-
premacies of Law is a possible alternative.

falls short of absolute justice (τὸ κυρίως δίκαιον). 'They know in part and prophesy in part' (1281 a 8). There is, indeed, a difference between them, for while they agree in claiming that the things awarded by the State shall be awarded equally, they differ as to the persons to whom this equal award is to be made—the one side wishing to confine the benefit of it to those who are equal in wealth, the other claiming it for all who are equal in respect of free birth (ἐλευθερία)¹.

It has been already said (c. 6. 1278 b 17 sqq.) that the deviation-forms go counter to the end for which the State was originally formed, and this is now (1280 a 25) again brought up against them. Their advocates leave the decisive point untouched—they do not inquire for what end the State exists, yet this inquiry is really decisive of the whole matter. Aristotle proceeds to investigate this question, and here, as everywhere else, we must bear in mind that the subject of his investigations is the πόλις, or City-

¹ This appears to be the meaning of c. 9. 1280 a 9-25. In 3. 12. 1282 b 18 sqq. every one is said to agree that the just is the equal for the equal, but no one remembers to inquire, in what things men must be equal and unequal, if they are justly to claim equality and inequality in a distribution of power. In 7 (5). 1. 1301 b 28 sqq. both sides are said to agree that τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν ἴσον is ἀπλῶς δίκαιον, but to differ as to what constitutes τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν ἴσον—democrats holding that equality in a single thing constitutes absolute equality, and oligarchs, that inequality in a single thing constitutes absolute inequality. The three passages are not absolutely accordant, but they agree in laying stress on the importance of the question whether the claimants are really equal and unequal as they claim to be.

The word ἐλευθερία is commonly translated 'freedom' in 3. 9. 1280 a 24, but Bernays perhaps comes nearer to its meaning in his trans-

lation 'free birth.' Ἐλεύθερος and ἐλευθερία seem often to be used in relation to the circumstances of birth; cp. 3. 9. 1281 a 6, κατὰ μὲν ἐλευθερίαν καὶ γένος ἴσοις: 3. 13. 1283 a 33, οἱ δ' ἐλεύθεροι καὶ εὐγενεῖς ὡς ἑγγύς ἀλλήλων: 6 (4). 4. 1290 b 9 sqq. Ἐλευθερία may indeed occasionally mean something more than 'free birth'—in fact 'citizen birth'; cp. 6 (4). 4. 1291 b 26, τὸ μὴ ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων πολιτῶν ἐλεύθερον, and 1290 b 9, οὐτ' ὅν οἱ ἐλεύθεροι ὀλίγοι ὄντες πλειόνων καὶ μὴ ἐλευθέρων ἀρχῶσι (where οἱ ἐλεύθεροι are explained a little later to be οἱ διαφέροντες κατ' εὐγένειαν καὶ πρῶτοι κατασχόντες τὰς ἀποικίας). Ἐλεύθερος is sometimes used in contradistinction to ξένος (Plato Com., Ὑπέρβολος, fr. 3, 4: Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 2. 670). Antisthenes is said by Diogenes Laertius in one passage not to have been ἐκ δύο ἐλευθέρων Ἀθηναῖον (6. 1), and in another not to have been ἐκ δύο ἐλευθέρων (6. 4).

State. The πόλις exists not for the sake of the property of the participants, nor for the sake of bare life, nor, like an alliance, for protection from wrong, nor for protection in traffic and mutual dealings, but for the sake of good life (τὸ εὖ ζῆν). Our use of language, Aristotle urges, implies that a State exists only where there is a mutual care for virtue¹, where the character of each individual is no indifferent matter to the rest, or, in words used elsewhere, where men live with a view to the common advantage. The State, he implies, means a society where the individual lives for the whole. It involves something more than relations of exchange, or alliance, or co-operation against outrage; something more than residence in one and the same spot; something more than the links of marriage, of the phratry, of common sacrifices and gatherings for social intercourse²; it involves that to which these latter things are merely a means, an associated participation in a fully developed and complete existence, in a happy and noble life.

The farther inference is drawn, to clinch the case against oligarchy and democracy, that those who contribute more to a life of this nature have a better claim to political power than the representatives of wealth or free birth, the partisans, that is to say, of oligarchy and democracy (cp. 3. 13. 1283 a 23 sq.: 7 (5). 1. 1301 a 39 sq.: Plato, Laws 757 C). A comparative conclusion only, be it observed, for we shall find in the sequel that Aristotle does not concede even to a superiority in virtue, unless it is combined with an adequate provision of external goods, a right to predominance in the State.

We note here the first use of an expression—that of Aristotle's 'contributing to a κοινωνία' (ὅσοι συμβάλλονται πλείστον εἰς account of the principle on which political τὴν τοιαύτην κοινωνίαν, 1281 a 4)—which somewhat varies the account elsewhere given of the procedure of the State in

¹ Cp. Plato, Gorgias 517 B, ἀλλὰ γὰρ μεταβιβάζειν τὰς ἐπιθυμίας καὶ μὴ ἐπιτρέπειν, πείθοντες καὶ βιαζόμενοι ἐπὶ τοῦτο, ὅθεν ἐμελλον ἀμεινους ἔσεσθαι οἱ πολῖται, ὡς ἔπος εἰπείν, οὐδὲν τούτων διέφερον ἐκείνοι.

ὅπερ μόνον ἔργον ἐστὶν ἀγαθοῦ πολιτοῦ: Protag. 327 A sq.

² Plato is perhaps not really quite content with the life of his 'healthy State' (Rep. 372 B, ἡδέως ξυγόντες ἀλλήλοις).

power is to
be distri-
buted not
always
quite the
same.

distributing political power. Sometimes we gather that the State will give 'instruments' in proportion to capacity (c. 12. 1282 b 33, τῷ κατὰ τὸ ἔργον ὑπερέχοντι: cp. de Part. An. 4. 10. 687 a 10, ἡ δὲ φύσις ἀεὶ διανέμει, καθάπερ ἄνθρωπος φρόνιμος, ἕκαστον τῷ δυναμένῳ χρῆσθαι); sometimes that it gives them in proportion to the contribution made to the κοινωνία. The two principles do not lie far apart, but from the one point of view the grant of power is the payment of a debt, or rather resembles the distribution of a commercial company's dividend, the amount of which in the case of each recipient is proportionate to the funds contributed¹, so that power comes as a reward rather than as a burden, while from the other point of view power is given, like a tool, to him who can use it best. Aristotle seems sometimes to pass almost unconsciously from the one view to the other. His paramount doctrine, notwithstanding occasional deviations (e. g. 3. 6. 1279 a 8 sqq.), probably is, that to the good man political power, just like any other external good, is a good (cp. 4 (7). 13. 1332 a 21 sqq.), and affords great opportunities of noble action, if only it is fairly won and earned by adequate desert (4 (7). 3. 1325 b 3 sq.). We naturally infer that he will confine political power to the good, to whom it is alone a good, and give it to them in the degree which makes best for virtue; and, in fact, we find power in the hands of the good in both the forms of the best State (cp. 6 (4). 2. 1289 a 32, βούλεται γὰρ ἑκάτερα κατ' ἀρετὴν συνεστάναι κεχορηγημένην). But then the question arose—are wealth and free birth, which, as we shall see, he allows to be, as well as virtue, elements contributing to the end of the State, to be denied any share of power, if their possessors do not also possess virtue? This is the question discussed in 3. 13. 1283 a 42 sqq. Considerations of justice force from Aristotle the admission that a share of power must be conceded to them even under those circumstances. But what if the possession of power be detrimental to its holders in the absence of virtue? This difficulty seems not to have

¹ This view of the State, it had been put forward, as was appears from c. 9. 1280 a 27 sqq., natural, by partisans of oligarchy.

occurred to Aristotle. He usually approaches the question of the award of political power rather from the side of justice than from that of the ethical interest of the State or the individual, though, as has been said, the best State satisfies all these criteria¹. At all events, the point of view of justice is far the more prominent in the Third Book. In the book on Revolutions it is also especially prominent, for justice is the best security against revolution (*μόνον γὰρ μόνιμον τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν ἴσον καὶ τὸ ἔχειν τὰ αὐτῶν*, 7 (5). 7. 1307 a 26). Even in the Fourth Book, where the other point of view naturally comes more to the front, it is not absent. For instance, the assignment of military functions to the younger men and of political functions to the elder, rests in some degree on considerations of justice (cp. 4 (7). 9. 1329 a 16, *οὐκοῦν οὕτως ἀμφοῖν νενεμήσθαι συμφέρει καὶ δίκαιον εἶναι· ἔχει γὰρ αὕτη ἡ διαίρεσις τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν*). The just, in fact, and that which is for the common good are said to be identical (3. 12. 1282 b 17). But then, is the State sketched in 3. 13. 1283 a 42 sqq., or indeed any State but the best, truly just or for the common good? This question receives an answer, when we are told (6 (4). 8. 1293 b 25) that all constitutions but the best are deviations from the most normal constitution (*διημαρτήκασι τῆς ὀρθοτάτης πολιτείας*).

If we now gather together the conclusions with regard to the nature of the State to which the preceding inquiries have led us, they seem to be the following:—the State is a body of men, not too large or small (*πολιτῶν τι πλήθος*, 3. 1. 1274 b 41), collected in one spot (1280 b 30–1), possessing and exercising rights of trade and inter-marriage, joining in common festivals² and other forms of sociability (*τὸ συζῆν*), but above all, able and purposed to rule and be

Summary of the conclusions so far arrived at as to the nature of a State.

¹ Cp. 4 (7). 2. 1324 a 23, *ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι πολιτείαν ἀρίστην ταύτην καθ' ἣν τάξιν κἂν ὅστισοῦν ἄριστα πράττοι καὶ ζῆν μακαρίως, φανερόν ἐστιν*: 4. (7). 9. 1328 b 33, *ἐπεὶ δὲ τυγχάνομεν σκοποῦντες περὶ τῆς ἀρίστης πολιτείας, αὕτη δ' ἐστὶ*

καθ' ἣν ἡ πόλις ἂν εἴη μάλιστα εὐδαίμων.

² This recognition of festivals as an essential element in the State is characteristic enough. Perhaps the modern State has lost something in losing this bond of union.

ruled as freemen should rule and be ruled, i. e. with a view to the common advantage¹—or, in other words, so as to aid each other in the realization of a life, as Aristotle puts it, complete in every way²—and held together by participation in a constitution (3. 3. 1276 b 1–2) devised to make possible and promote an existence of this kind.

It is evidently no easy thing, in Aristotle's view, to be in a true sense a member of a State. Society truly so-called makes a great demand on human nature. The instinct of sociability, which man shares with some other animals, rises in him to a higher level than in them, for it rests on a perception of the good and bad, the just and unjust, the advantageous and disadvantageous (1. 2. 1253 a 15), but, even in the form in which man has it, it goes only a little way towards the making of a State. An aim for the common good must be added, then an intelligent comprehension of what is noble developed by a long course of training from childhood upward (4 (7). 15. 1334 b 25 sq.), then a steady purpose to live for this oneself and to promote a similar life in others; above all, the capacity, under which term is included not only adequate skill but adequate external means (*χορηγία*), to rule and be ruled, as freemen should rule and be ruled, for the attainment of these ends. It is plain that to be a true citizen one must be a man of full virtue (*σπουδαῖος*).

We see also that Aristotle's account of the State implies that there must exist within it a body (*πλῆθος*) of men competent to take, and taking, an active part in its government. Mere '*administrés*' are not citizens: the State is

¹ Aristotle does not appear to notice that rule must be exercised not merely for the common advantage of the existing generation, but for the advantage also of the unborn of future generations.

² Aristotle, as has been noticed already, distinguishes between *αὐτάρκεια τῶν ἀναγκαίων*, which even an *ἔθνος* possesses (4 (7). 4. 1326 b 4), and *αὐτάρκεια τοῦ εὖ ζῆν*. A *πόλις* must possess an adequate

number of citizens for both these ends (cp. 4 (7). 4. 1326 b 2 sqq., esp. 1326 b 7, though *αὐτάρκεια ζωῆς* is the expression used in 4 (7). 4. 1326 b 24: 3. 1. 1275 b 20). Even virtue will not make up for inadequate numbers, unless it is of a transcendent kind: cp. 3. 13. 1283 b 11, *ἢ τὸ ὀλίγοι πρὸς τὸ ἔργον δεῖ σκοπεῖν, εἰ δυνατοὶ διοικεῖν τὴν πόλιν ἢ τοσοῦτοι τὸ πλῆθος ὥστ' εἶναι πόλιν ἐξ αὐτῶν*.

a scene of collective effort, it is an union of co-operating equals, whose numbers must not, indeed, be over-great, but yet also must not be too small. It is only later that he reminds us that the appearance of a *παμβασιλεύς* on the scene, though most unlikely, is nevertheless possible, and that he finds a place in his theory for the *παμβασιλεία*, without, however, altering his original account of the State, which is not strictly wide enough to admit it. It was, indeed, hardly necessary for him to do so, for though, as we shall see, he holds that the best form of the State is that in which virtue fully provided with external means is possessed in an overwhelming degree by one or a few persons, and rule always remains in his or their hands, the conditions of this form were wholly unlikely to occur.

His account of the State also implies that it consists of those who can live its full life. Outside the citizen-body we find a fringe of dependents, necessary, indeed, to the existence of the State, but not brought within its inner circle, some free (women, children, artisans, labourers for hire) and others slaves. These are not, in strictness, a part of the State.

As yet the further characteristic of the State, that in every case save one—and this so rare as to be merely hypothetical—its working will be governed by Law, has not been added; the discussion of the next question, however, brings it under our notice. This question is, what is to be the supreme authority of the community (*τὸ κύριον τῆς πόλεως*)? Aristotle does not mean by *τὸ κύριον* what Austin means by 'sovereign,' for the supreme authority may, in the view of the former, be vested in law, not in any given 'persons'; he does not go behind law to the men who make it. To answer this question, he rapidly discusses (c. 10) the claims of a number of competitors for power, with the result that the supreme authority must be just¹, if only because otherwise the community will perish; yet

The question as to the place of Law in the State has so far not emerged: it emerges in connexion with the inquiry, what is to be the supreme authority of the State?

¹ Compare the saying of St. Augustine—'quid civitates sine iustitia nisi magna latrocinia?'

The answer to this inquiry is—laws normally constituted.

if supremacy is given to men of worth, who are usually but a few, or to one man of supreme worth, we are still met by the difficulty of reconciling the rest to their exclusion from power; and Aristotle falls back on the supremacy of law, as distinguished from that of a person or persons, who cannot be expected to be free, like law, from infirmities of character. But then, if the law be that of a deviation-form, an oligarchy or a democracy, its rule may be as bad as that of any person. 'Bad laws,' says Burke, 'are the worst sort of tyranny.'

Parenthe- tical recog- nition of the claims of the many, if not below a certain level of excellence, to a share in certain political rights which they can exercise collectively.

At this point Aristotle pauses to draw a lesson from the inquiry, before the moment for insisting on it has passed. He has already (c. 9) laid stress on the claims of virtue to power in the State, as against those of wealth or free birth, and his readers may well have gathered that he must favour a rule of the few Good (*ἐπιεικεῖς*). It is precisely this impression that he now wishes to correct. Even on the score of virtue the many, if they are not too degraded, have something to say for themselves. Plato had severely censured in the *Laws* (700 A-701 B) the tendency to what he terms a 'theatrocracy' (*θεατροκρατία*). It was, he says, in the theatre—

'When all its throats the gallery extends,
And all the thunder of the pit ascends'—

that the people first learnt to believe itself infallible, and to despise the judgment of the wise few (*τοῖς γεγονόσι περὶ παιδευσιν*, 700 C)—a lesson which they soon applied in matters of State. He rejects this popular supremacy both in the sphere of music and poetry¹ and in that of politics². It is evident from 1281 b 7 sq. and from the whole course of c. 11, that Aristotle does not agree with Plato in this.

¹ See *Laws* 670 B and the references given in Stallbaum's note.

² Plato's principle, in the *Gorgias* at all events, is 'cuique in sua arte credendum.' Cp. *Gorg.* 455 B, quoted by Engelhardt, *Loci Platonici quorum Aristoteles in*

conscribendis Politicis videtur memor fuisse, p. 15 : *ὅταν περὶ λατρῶν αἰρέσεως ἢ τῇ πόλει σύλλογος ἢ περὶ ναυπηγῶν ἢ περὶ ἄλλου τινὸς δημοῦργου ἔθνους, ἄλλο τι ἢ τότε ὁ ῥητορικὸς οὐ συμβουλευέσει; ὁ δὲ γὰρ ὅτι ἐν ἐκάστη αἰρέσει τὸν τεχνικώτατον δεῖ αἰρεῖσθαι κ.τ.λ.*

He did not hold that the rise of the drama or of Rhetoric¹ was to be deplored, or that neither deserved a place in a well-ordered State: tragedy is to him the highest form of poetry, and a boon to man; Rhetoric is necessary because the minds of the many are less easily influenced by strict philosophical reasoning than by arguments drawn from common opinion. In this matter, as in others, things had not gone so completely wrong as Plato thought. On the contrary, the views of men have a tendency to gravitate to the truth (Rhet. 1. 1. 1355 a 15 sq.: Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 243. 3). The wiser advocates of democracy had not claimed for popular gatherings an equal aptitude for all kinds of work. This is true, for instance, of Athenagoras, the leader of the popular party in the 'polity' (7 (5). 4. 1304 a 27) or 'aristocracy' (7 (5). 10. 1312 b 6-9), which existed at Syracuse till the defeat and capture of the Athenian armament led to its conversion into a democracy (1304 a 27). The utterance of Athenagoras on this subject (Thuc. 6. 39) apparently set the keynote of this Eleventh Chapter. Φήσει τις (he says) δημοκρατίαν οὔτε ξυνετὸν οὔτ' ἴσον εἶναι, τοὺς δὲ ἔχοντας τὰ χρήματα καὶ ἄρχειν ἄριστα βελτίστους. ἐγὼ δὲ φημι πρῶτα μὲν δῆμον ξύμπαν ὠνομάσθαι, ὀλιγαρχίαν δὲ μέρος, ἔπειτα φύλακας μὲν ἀρίστους εἶναι χρημάτων τοὺς πλουσίους, βουλευσαί δ' ἂν βέλτιστα τοὺς ξυνετούς, κρίναι δ' ἂν ἀκούσαντας ἄριστα τοὺς πολλούς, καὶ ταῦτα ὁμοίως καὶ κατὰ μέρη καὶ ξύμπαντα ἐν δημοκρατίᾳ ἰσομοιρεῖν. Aristotle is inclined to agree with the view here taken of the capabilities of the many, so far at all events as some subjects are concerned. It is interesting to find him expressing the view that the many are better judges of music and poetry than the few (1281 b 7)²; he is not, however, here speaking of an audience of artisans and day-labourers, whose defects of taste he recognizes (5 (8). 7. 1342 a 18 sq.), but of one

¹ As to Rhetoric, contrast Plato, Laws 937 D sqq. with Aristot. Rhet. 1. 1. 1355 a 20-b 7.

² It should be noticed, however, that in the Fifth Book (5 (8). 6.

1340 b 23) he says that it is out of the question, or at all events not easy, for those who have not learnt to play and sing to become good judges of music.

not below a certain social level¹. Whether he would praise the judgment of the Athenian people in these matters, many of whom were artisans and day-labourers, we do not know. Nowhere else were audiences so frequently gathered together to sit in judgment on dramas and choruses². When Goethe says³, 'Es bleibt immer gewiss, dieses so geehrte und verachtete Publikum betrügt sich über das Einzelne fast immer und über das Ganze fast nie,' he perhaps has rather the reading public in view than a theatre audience. Aristotle, however, goes on to admit that the people—always supposing them to be not below a certain level of merit—are capable critics of public service, when brought together in a body. A man of full virtue (*σπουδαῖος*), he says, may be surpassed by others in respect of each of the excellences whose combination makes him what he is⁴; his strength lies in his combination of virtues not necessarily singly present in a superlative degree. And something similar may be said of a large gathering of men. It is like a single individual possessed of many hands and feet and organs of sense, and many moral and intellectual faculties⁵. Aristotle forgets that bad qualities will

¹ He guards himself thus, possibly remembering a saying of Socrates—*πρὸς τὸ οὐκ ἀξιόλογον πλῆθος ἔφασκεν ὁμοιον εἶ τις τετραδραχμον ἐν ἀποδοκιμάζων τὸν ἐκ τῶν τοιοῦτων σωρὸν ὡς δόκιμον ἀποδέχοιτο* (Diog. Laert. 2. 34). We see from the use of *πλῆθος* in this passage what Aristotle probably means by *πάντα δῆμον* . . . *πάν πλῆθος* in 1281 b 16. He is not thinking so much of national differences, like that which existed between Boeotians and Athenians, as of differences of occupation (like that which distinguished the *γεωργικὸς δῆμος* from the *βάναιστος* or *ἀγοραῖος δῆμος*), or of social position (*ἐρ.* 8 (6). 4. 1319 a 38, *τοῦ κατὰ τὴν χώραν πλῆθους* : 1319 b 1, *τὸ χεῖρον αἰὲ πλῆθος χωρίζειν*).

² If the popular judgment in music prevailed, and was responsible for the degeneracy of the art

which Aristoxenus deplures in a charming passage (Fr. 90 : Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 2. 291), it can hardly have deserved much credit. Aristoxenus compares his own contemporaries, so far as the art of music is concerned, to the barbarized Paestans, who met once a year at a festival to mourn their loss of Hellenism, and to recall for a moment their old way of life.

³ Quoted by Henkel, *Studien*, p. 80 n. 'It is quite certain, that the Public, which we are so ready both to honour and to despise, is almost always under a delusion in its judgments as to particular points, but hardly ever as to the total result.'

⁴ This glimpse of the *σπουδαῖος* is interesting, and prepares us for the many-sidedness of the citizens of Aristotle's ideal State.

⁵ Aristotle evidently has Geryon

be thrown into the common stock no less than good ones; he forgets also the special liability of great gatherings of men to be mastered by feeling, especially in the discussion of political questions, which are far more provocative of feeling than artistic ones. His principle, again, would justify the inference that the larger the gathering is, the greater its capacity will be¹.

Aristotle is led, partly by these considerations, partly by considerations of political safety (οὐκ ἀσφαλές, 1281 b 26: φοβερόν, 29), to the conclusion that there is good ground for a compromise between the rich and the good on the one hand, and the many—in the sense of οἱ ἐλεύθεροι (1281 b 23)—on the other. The many are not fit to hold the highest magistracies; they are only fit for collective political functions, such as those of deliberating and judging (τὸ βουλευέσθαι καὶ κρίνειν, 1281 b 31). To these they may be admitted with advantage. Hence it is that some constitutions, that of Solon for instance, concede to the people the right of choosing magistrates and reviewing their official conduct, but not the right of holding office singly².

There were those, we know—for example, Socrates³—who held the master of an art to be the best hand both at judging how a work has been done and selecting the man to do it, but with this view—even taking the term ‘master of an art’ in its widest sense, so as to include not only the man of science (ὁ εἰδώς) and the practical worker (ὁ δημιουργός), but also the man who has had a general training on the subject (ὁ πεπαιδευμένος)—Aristotle does not agree. He feels, however, that the case of the many need not be wholly rested on the broad ground which he has

in his mind: cp. Plutarch, Reip. Gerend. Praec. c. 26, οὕτω γὰρ ἦν ὁ Γηρυόνης ζηλωτός, ἔχων σκέλη πολλὰ καὶ χεῖρας καὶ ὀφθαλμούς, εἰ πάντα μία ψυχὴ διώκει.

¹ See as to Aristotle's view on this subject Henkel, p. 80 n.: Sus.², Note 565^b.

² 1281 b 34, ἀρχεῖν δὲ κατὰ μόνας

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οὐκ ἰῶσιν, where Bonitz (Ind. 472 b 42) compares Hist. An. 9. 43. 629 a 33, λίχρον δ' ὃν καὶ πρὸς τὰ μαγειρεία καὶ τοὺς ἰχθύας καὶ τὴν τοιαύτην ἀπόλαυσιν κατὰ μόνας προσπέταται.

³ Xen. Mem. 1. 2. 49–50: 3. 5. 21 sqq.: 3. 9. 10 sqq. ‘Credendum cuique in sua arte.’

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taken up; they have another ground of claim, for they are the 'wearers of the shoe' and know best where it pinches. There are subjects on which the man who uses the product (*ὁ χρώμενος*) has more claim to be a good judge than the master of an art—subjects on which a mastery of the art is not essential to a right decision: the best critic of a banquet, for instance, is not the cook, but the guest¹. It is implied that the decision as to the merits of a statesman is one of these.

After this objection has been dealt with, however, another remains. Plato had insisted in the *Laws* (945 B sqq.) that the reviewing authority must be better than the magistracy reviewed², and had accordingly given the right of review in the State of the *Laws* to a specially constituted body, the priests of Apollo, not to the people. Aristotle probably has this arrangement in view in his defence (1282 a, 32 sqq.) of the Solonian distribution of power. His reply is that under it the reviewing authority *is* better than the magistracy reviewed, for the reviewing authority is the collective whole, not the individuals, mostly of little worth, of whom it is composed, and this, if in the given instance the people is not below a certain level, will be better, and indeed richer, than the One or Few to whom high offices are entrusted.

Having followed this line of inquiry thus far, Aristotle recurs to the discussion from which he had diverged, and recognizes that it had led to the result that law must be supreme—law not conceived in the interest of a section, but normal and correct (*νόμοι ὀρθῶς κείμενοι*, 3. 11. 1282 b 1 sqq.), adding that where owing to its necessary generality it cannot give detailed guidance, the ruler, whether one or many, must in these matters be supreme. The question, however, what 'laws normal and correct' are, still remains

¹ This saying, which was perhaps already proverbial, is echoed by Martial, *Epigr.* 9. 81, as is noticed by Sir G. C. Lewis (*Authority in Matters of Opinion*, pp. 184-5).

² Cp. *Eth. Nic.* 6. 13. 1143 b 33, πρὸς δὲ τοῦτοις ἀτροπον ἂν εἶναι δοξεῖεν, εἰ χείρων τῆς σοφίας οὐσα [ἢ φρόνησις] κυριώτερα αὐτῆς ἔσται.

for solution. To answer it, Aristotle calls to mind that 'good and just laws and good and just constitutions go together, but that the laws must be adjusted to the constitution, not the constitution to the laws¹: hence we may say that laws adjusted to the normal constitutions will be just, and those adjusted to the deviation-forms unjust.' With these words c. 11 closes.

Arrived at this point, we expect that the next question for discussion will be, what 'laws adjusted to the normal constitutions' are, but instead of distinctly raising this question, Aristotle proceeds to discuss a question which, as he says, 'affords an opportunity for aporetic inquiry, and is not without instructiveness for the political philosopher.' The question he refers to is one relating to the nature of Political Justice². The Twelfth Chapter, in fact, begins as follows—'but since in all sciences and arts the end is a good, and in the most sovereign of sciences—the Political Science—the greatest of goods is in an especial degree made the end, and since the just is the political good, and the just is no other than that which is for the common advantage³ [we shall do well to inquire what the just is]. Now all say that the just is the equal: yes, and all agree up to a certain point with the conclusion arrived at in the philosophical discussions in which ethical questions have been treated in detail, that justice implies not only a thing awarded, but also persons to whom it is awarded, and say that justice means the award of that which is equal to equals. But then comes the question—equals in what?' Equals in respect of any good thing we may chance to select—complexion, for instance, or size of body? The Ethiopians, according to Herodotus (3. 20), made the biggest and strongest man among them their king, and Plato had seemed to imply in a hasty sentence that such

What are normally constituted laws? Laws adjusted to the normal constitutions. Transition to the question, what the just is?—what attributes confer a just claim to a share in political power?

¹ Cp. 6 (4). 1. 1289a 13 sq.

² Bernays (*Aristoteles' Politik*, p. 172 n.) has expressed the opinion that the contents of cc. 12 and 13 were placed where

we find them, not by the hand of Aristotle, but by that of some later editor. On this question, see Appendix C.

³ Cp. Isocr. *Archid.* § 35.

things might be taken into consideration¹. Aristotle, on the contrary, says that in any distribution of 'instruments' (*ὄργανα*) the work to be done must be kept in view—that in a distribution of flutes, for instance, the best flute must be given not to the best-born or the handsomest, but to the most skilful flute-player. The contrary view, he says, would imply that all things which we call good are sufficiently one in kind to be reducible to a common measure and comparable the one with the other². Goods are really only comparable in respect of their contribution to a given work (*ἔργον*), and only goods which contribute to the same work can be compared with each other. 'The competitors for power must base their claims on the possession of things which really go to the making of a State' (1283 a 14). So that, if we draw up a rough list of competitors for political power, we shall find on it the well-born, the free-born, and the wealthy³, and to these we shall have to add those possessed of justice and of military excellence. All these possess attributes contributing either to the being or well-being of the State. Each of these groups has a certain claim, none of them an absolutely just or exclusive claim, to power. Even a constitution which gave exclusive supremacy to the virtuous would not be just, for it would give exclusive supremacy to one only of the elements which contribute to the work of the State⁴.

The normal constitution will recognize all elements

¹ Cp. Laws 744 B, where Plato enumerates not only *ἀρετὴ ἢ τε προγόνων καὶ ἢ αὐτοῦ* and *πλούτου χρήσις καὶ πενίας*, but also *σωμάτων ἰσχύες καὶ εὐμορφίαι*, as entitling to a larger share of honours and offices. In Laws 757 B–C, however, true, or geometrical, justice is said to take account only of virtue in its distribution of honours. But then we must remember that the State of the Laws is avowedly a second-best State, and not constructed wholly on ideal principles.

² Cp. Eth. Nic. 5. 8. 1133b 18, *τῇ μὲν οὖν ἀληθείᾳ ἀδύνατον τὰ τοσοῦτον διαφέροντα σύμμετρα γενέσθαι*,

πρὸς δὲ τὴν χρεῖαν ἐνδέχεται ἰκανῶς: and Eth. Nic. 9. 1. 1164 b 2 sqq.

³ In Eth. Nic. 4. 8. 1124a 20sqq. there is an account of the competing claimants for honour, which reminds us of this passage of the Politics. We gather that those who combine the three *ἀγαθὰ*—wealth, nobility, and virtue—have the best claim. Cp. Eth. Nic. 8. 12. 1160 b 3, where the *βασιλεὺς* is said to be *ὁ πᾶσι τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ὑπερέχων*.

⁴ Plato's language, Laws 757 C, is far more favourable to the claims of virtue. Geometrical (or true) justice, he says, *τιμὰς μίξσει μὲν πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἀεὶ μείζους, τοῖς δὲ*

The same would have to be said of one which gave exclusive supremacy to the many (*οἱ πολλοὺς*) on the grounds developed in the Eleventh Chapter.

What then must be done, supposing all these elements—the good, the rich, the noble, the many—to co-exist in one and the same community? Are we to give power to the good, supposing only that they are sufficient in number to form, or at least to govern, a State¹? But then there is a difficulty which affects all exclusive awards on the ground of superiority in this or that attribute. Each of the elements before us—the rich, the noble, the good, the many—is liable to have its claims defeated by those of a single individual richer or nobler or better than all the rest, or indeed by those of a mass of men of which this can be said. Our review of facts shows that none of these exclusive claims to supremacy on the ground of a bare superiority in one of the elements which contribute to the life of the State deserve to be accounted 'normal' (*ὁρθός*), or to find recognition in a normal constitution. We thus obtain an answer to the question raised at the end of c. 11 (1282 b 6), what are normally constituted laws, and whether they will be conceived in the interest of the better sort or the many (1283 b 35). They are, we find, laws designed for the common good of both; though there is one case in which all laws are out of place—that of the appearance of a *παμβασιλεύς*. When the good are not so superior as to outweigh in virtue the collective merit of the mass (*ὅταν συμβάλῃ τὸ λεχθέν*, 1283 b 39), then they must share power with the many. Some mixed constitution must be adopted, which will give to the good and to the many a proportionate share of power; and in determining the proportion which is to fall to the lot of

which contribute to the being and well-being of the State, not one of them only. A bare superiority in one only does not confer an exclusive right to supremacy.

Unless the virtue of the Good is so transcendent as to outweigh the collective merit of the Many, the Good,

τοῦναντίον ἔχουσιν ἀρετῆς τε καὶ παιδείας τὸ πρέπον ἐκατέροις ἀπονέμει κατὰ λόγον.

¹ This question is left unanswered, but the answer intended to be given to it may probably be gathered from the sentences which succeed. It is that, given a suffi-

cient superiority in virtue, no deficiency in the numbers of the virtuous is a bar to their claims: even a single individual, if more virtuous than all the rest of the community, has an irresistible claim to rule.

the Rich,
and the
Many must
divide
power be-
tween them
in the way
most con-
ducive to
the com-
mon good.

each, regard must be had to the advantage of the whole State and the common advantage of the citizens¹; 'and a citizen is, broadly, one who shares in ruling and being ruled, but he differs according to the particular constitution; under the best constitution he is one who is able and purposed to rule and be ruled with a view to a life of virtue' (1283 b 42 sqq.). We infer, then, that the best constitution will be so designed as to favour his pursuit of this end, and this we find to be the case if we compare the Fourth Book (4 (7). 2. 1324 a 23, *ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι πολιτεῖαν ἀρίστην ταύτην καθ' ἣν τάξιν κἀν ὁστισοῦν ἀριστα πράττοι καὶ ζῆν μακαρίως, φανερόν ἐστιν*).

If, how-
ever, one
man, or a
small
group of
men not
numerous
enough to
constitute
a city, is
forthcom-
ing, pos-
sessing this
transcend-
ent amount
of virtue,
then a case
for the Ab-
solute
Kingship
arises.

'But if,' Aristotle continues, 'there is in the community some one man, or some group of men not numerous enough to constitute a city, so pre-eminent in virtue that the virtue and political capacity of all the rest put together is not commensurable with theirs'—in other words, *ὅταν μὴ συμβάλῃ τὸ λεχθέν*—'this man or men,' notwithstanding their numerical paucity, 'must not be treated as a mere part of the State,' or called upon to share power with the rest and to submit to law, for to do so would be to do them injustice, and indeed would be ridiculous. This is shown to be the case by an appeal to the practice of the deviation-forms, which either put to death or ostracize any citizen who by reason of disproportionate wealth, or a disproportionate number of friends and adherents, or for any other cause, is formidable to the State. They do not expect such persons to obey the law; they get rid of them in one way or another. The normal constitutions have to face the same difficulty, and though they will try to prevent the case for the ostracism arising², they also may nevertheless be forced to resort to it; but then they will use the ostracism for the common good,

¹ 1283 b 40, *τὸ δ' ὀρθὸν ληπτέον ἵσως τὸ δ' ἴσως ὀρθὸν πρὸς τὸ τῆς πόλεως ὅλης συμφέρον καὶ πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν τὸ τῶν πολιτῶν*. It is not clear whether Aristotle conceives any difference to exist between

the advantage of the whole State and the common advantage of the citizens.

² Cp. 7 (5). 3. 1302 b 19: and Aristoph. *Ran.* 1357 sqq. as to Alcibiades.

not for the good of a section¹. But what is the best constitution to do, if an individual makes his appearance, transcendent, not in respect of wealth or the number of his friends, but in respect of virtue? Virtue is everything to the best constitution, and as it cannot expel such a being² or exercise rule over him, the only possible course, and also the natural course, is to make him a life-long king. This is extended (3. 17. 1288 a 15) to the case of a whole family (*γένος*) of such persons appearing in a State. The whole family will then become royal.

It will be noticed that the alternatives considered in this chapter do not exhaust the list of possible alternatives. The cases considered are only those in which a Few Good and the Many, or one pre-eminently good man and the Many, coexist in the same community, and the purpose of the inquiry is to show how in such cases power must be allotted. The One and the Few have an exclusive right to supremacy only when their excess of virtue is very great; in all other cases power must be shared. The case in which the good are sufficient in number to form a full complement of citizens is not considered; and this is the case which is assumed to exist in that form of the best State which is described in the Fourth Book. In this the good, the well-to-do, and the free-born are the same persons—in other words, the citizen-body is composed of men

The case, we observe, in which the good are sufficient in number to constitute a city is not here considered: this is the case assumed to exist in the Fourth Book, where all citizens are men of virtue.

¹ Cp. Plato Polit. 293 D, καὶ εἰάν τις ἀποκτινύντες τινὰς ἢ καὶ ἐκβάλλοντες καθαιρώσιν ἐπ' ἀγαθὴν τὴν πόλιν, εἴτε καὶ ἀποικίας οἶον σμήνη μελιττῶν ἐκπέμποντες ποι μικροτέραν ποιῶσιν, ἢ τινὰς ἐπεισαγόμενοι ποθεν ἄλλους ἔξωθεν, πολίτας ποιοῦντες, αὐτὴν αὖθις, ὥσπερ ἂν ἐπιστήμη καὶ τῷ δικαίῳ προσχρόμενοι, σώζοντες, ἐκ χειρόνος βελτίω ποιῶσι κατὰ δύναμιν, ταύτην τότε καὶ κατὰ τοὺς τοιοῦτους ὅρους ἡμῖν μόνην ὀρθὴν πολιτείαν εἶναι ῥητέον.

² Aristotle evidently remembers Heraclitus' indignant censure of

the Ephesians for their expulsion of Hermodorus: cp. Diog. Laert. 9. 2, καθάπτεται δὲ καὶ τῶν Ἐφεσίων ἐπὶ τῷ τὸν ἑταῖρον ἐκβαλεῖν Ἑρμόδωρον, ἐν οἷς φησιν· "Ἄξιον Ἐφεσίοις ἡβηδὸν ἀποθανεῖν πᾶσι καὶ τοῖς ἀνέβοις τὴν πόλιν καταλιπεῖν, οἷτινες Ἑρμόδωρον ἐωυτῶν ὀνήιστον ἐξέβαλον λέγοντες· ἡμέων μὴδὲ εἰς ὀνήιστος ἔστω· εἰ δὲ τις τοιοῦτος, ἄλλη τε καὶ μετ' ἄλλων, and Cicero's translation of the passage, Tusc. Disp. 5. 36. 105. See Bywater, Heracliti Ephesii Reliquiae, fragm. cxiv.

possessing virtue fully furnished with external means (*ἀρετὴν κεχορηγημένην*).

General conclusion—the normal constitution is not one and the same everywhere: it varies with the circumstances of the given case.

The conclusion, however, to which the whole discussion leads us is, that the decision what is the just or normal constitution in any given case must depend on the circumstances of that case—on the distribution of attributes conducive to the life of the State, and especially on the distribution of virtue—but that whatever allotment of power it makes will be for the common good, and that it will not give exclusive supremacy to One individual or a Few, except in the very rare case of their possessing an overwhelming superiority in virtue.

Far more often we shall find a small body of the better sort (*βελτίους*) confronted by a large body of the free-born, the former individually, the latter collectively superior, and in this case the normal constitution will be one which recognizes and rallies round it all elements conducive to the life of the State—wealth, free birth, virtue—and finds a place for each. All of them have claims: the State has need of all.

Already then we find a firm logical basis laid for that mixed constitution whose organization and nature will be more fully depicted in the Sixth Book. The mention of wealth, free birth, and virtue as the elements to be combined points perhaps rather to an aristocracy of the kind described in 6 (4). 7. 1293 b 14 than to a polity, for in a polity only wealth and free birth find recognition (6 (4). 8. 1294 a 19 sqq.). The mixed constitution of Aristotle, it is interesting to notice, is not necessarily a combination of all constitutions, like that mentioned in 2. 6. 1265 b 33 sqq., or that which his disciple Dicaearchus¹ and the Stoics of the third century before Christ², followed by Cicero and a host of others down to our own day, have agreed in extolling. It is not an union of Kingship, Aristocracy, and Democracy, for a King has no necessary place in it; it is rather a combination

¹ See Dicaearch. fragm. 23 242: Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 892. (Müller, Fragm. Hist. Graec. 2.

² Diog. Laert. 7. 131.

of social elements—virtue, wealth, free birth—than a combination of constitutions; it is a constitution which finds a place in the State for the good, the wealthy, and the many, and which rallies them all round it. It does justice to everything that contributes to the life of the State. Under its shadow the good, the wealthy, and the free-born work happily together, ruling and being ruled for the common good¹.

This is Aristotle's conception of the normal (not the best) State in the form which it most commonly assumes, and the pattern was one which Greece in his day especially needed to have held up for imitation. It has its value, however, even in our own times.

Plato had said in the *Politicus* (297 B), that 'no large body of persons, whoever they may be, can acquire the political science and govern a State with reason (*μετὰ νοῦ*), and that it is in connexion with a small and scanty body, or even a single individual, that we must look for the one normal constitution.' Even in the *Laws*, where he concedes a certain share of power to the people, he constantly surrounds his concession with safeguards which greatly reduce its value. The classes in which he places most faith are evidently those comprised in the first and second property-classes. Aristotle has somewhat more confidence in the judgment, on some political subjects at all events, of some, though not all, kinds of *demos*².

¹ We notice that Aristotle does not rest the claims of mixed government on the ground that a system of 'checks and balances' is necessary, but on grounds of justice: all elements contributing to the being and well-being of the State should receive due recognition in the award of supreme authority. Considerations of expediency, however, reinforce those of justice. A constitution of this kind is the safest, inasmuch as all elements of the State gladly combine to give it support. We see also that if Aristotle does not

believe in the divine right of the One or the Few, neither would he accept the doctrine of the sovereignty of the people, even in the limited sense of the sovereignty of the *ἐλεύθεροι*. Sovereignty rightfully rests with those who, contributing elements of importance to the life of the State, can and will rule for the general good.

² He strongly deprecates a pauper *demos* (8 (6). 5. 1320 a 32), and he much prefers an agricultural or pastoral *demos* to a *demos* of artisans or day-labourers or *ἀγοραῖοι* (8 (6). 4).

We see how great a part justice, and its equivalent the common good, play in determining the structure of the Aristotelian State. If the slave is a slave, it is because it is just and well for him and every one else, that he should be so. The same principle governs the assignment of citizen-rights and of supreme authority in the State. A State in which the best should rule by force would not satisfy Aristotle, even if they ruled for the best ends; there must be a willing co-operation of all, whether rulers or ruled, and this can only be secured through an universal conviction that an adequate place is found for everybody, and that no one's just claims are overlooked. Aristotle's principle is a salutary one, whatever we may think of his application of it. It is—let every element that contributes to the being and well-being of the State receive due recognition in its award of rights. The permanent value of this principle will best be seen if we study some instance of its infraction—for example, the *ancien régime* in France.

Justice and the common good the two-fold clue to the normal constitution.

We note also that the just being, in Aristotle's view, identical with that which is for the common good, he has both these clues to guide him in the construction of the State. Τὸ ὀρθὸν ληπτέον ἴσως· τὸ δ' ἴσως ὀρθὸν πρὸς τὸ τῆς πόλεως ὅλης συμφέρον καὶ πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν τὸ τῶν πολιτῶν (1283 b 40). Rights, it would seem, are to be measured by the common good.

It is, however, mainly by considerations of justice that Aristotle is guided in his construction of the State. Justice was to him the key to all constitutional problems; varying views of justice lay at the root of constitutional diversity and constitutional change. He saw that all the competing claimants for political power—democrats no less than oligarchs—appealed to justice in support of their claims. The champions of oligarchy seem occasionally to have used the argument that those who contribute ninety-nine hundredths of a common fund should not be placed on the same footing as those who contribute the remaining hundredth (3. 9. 1280 b 27 sqq.), and it was apparently from them that Aristotle learnt the view that political

power should be distributed among the members of a State in proportion to contribution. He holds, indeed, that account should be taken in the distribution of power, not of property only, but of everything that contributes to the being and well-being of a State. The free-born and the virtuous have as good a claim to a share of power as the wealthy. Still, though he amends the contention of the champions of oligarchy, he adopts it in the amended form.

It is an interesting question, whether his account of the principle on which political power should be distributed is correct. It places the matter at any rate in a distinct light, whereas, when similar questions arise among ourselves, and an appeal is made to considerations of justice, there is often a good deal of vagueness about the arguments used. Aristotle's view is that those who contribute to the common stock the attributes, material moral and intellectual, which are essential to the being and well-being of the State—whether (like the citizens of the best State) they individually possess the whole of them, or whether some possess one of them and others another, the rich, the free-born, and the virtuous forming distinct classes—ought in fairness, as a requital for their contribution, to be the citizens and rulers of the State. It is evident, however, that the award of supreme power to men thus endowed may be rested on another ground. The State may give it to them, not in requital for their contribution, but because it is for the common good that 'the tools' should be in the hands of 'those who can use them.' It may well be that the Common Good is a safer standard in questions of this kind than the Distributive Justice of Aristotle, and that the State is more likely to be successful in attaining the ends for which it exists, if it abstains from attempting to balance contribution and recompense, and is guided in its distribution of power simply by considerations of the Common Good. We may test the soundness of Aristotle's theory in some degree by the view which it leads him to take of Kingship. He finds himself, as we shall shortly

Is Aristotle's account of the principle on which political power should be distributed correct?

see, obliged to deny the legitimacy of Absolute Kingship in all cases but one—the case in which the Absolute King is an overwhelmingly important contributor to the State. Would it not have been better to say that the Absolute Kingship is only in place where it is essential to the well-being of the community?

We may, indeed, go further and ask whether the recognition of contribution, or even of capacity, is really justice—whether justice is not rather the recognition of desert. On this point some remarks of Mr. J. S. Mill (*Political Economy*, Book ii. c. 1. § 4) deserve to be quoted. ‘The proportioning of remuneration to work done,’ he says, ‘is really just, only in so far as the more or less of the work is a matter of choice: when it depends on natural difference of strength or capacity, this principle of remuneration is in itself an injustice: it is giving to those who have—assigning most to those who are already most favoured by nature.’ But is it possible for the State to sound the depths of human desert? And if it were possible, would it be well that the State should award the advantages at its disposal in accordance with desert? A man’s extraction, his training, or other circumstances beyond his control may be so bad that he deserves more credit for being only a thief and not a murderer, than another man deserves for being an useful member of society. Yet would not the State be acting a suicidal part, if it gave power to a man of this kind? It would seem that the only sort of justice which is capable of affording a basis to society is that which is recognized by Aristotle; yet is this really justice?

Transition
to King-
ship, which
is ex-
amined
first as be-
ing one of
the normal
constitu-
tions. Its
true form,

Aristotle has now answered the question raised at the commencement of c. 10—what ought to be the supreme authority of the State—and he passes on in c. 14 to examine the subject of Kingship, ‘for we say that this is one of the normal constitutions.’ His plan seems to be to study the normal constitutions first, perhaps on the principle mentioned in c. 7. 1279 a 23, where he says that ‘when

these have been described, the deviation-forms will be evident.' He reserves an examination of the polity, however, till he has analysed democracy and oligarchy, 'for its nature will be more evident, after these constitutions have been described' (6 (4). 8. 1293 b 22-33). There is no such reason for postponing the study of Kingship and the true Aristocracy.

the Absolute Kingship, distinguished from the rest.

The question is asked whether a State and country (καὶ πόλει καὶ χώρῃ, c. 14. 1284 b 38) which is to be well constituted may be placed with advantage under a Kingship, or whether some other constitution will be better for it, or whether again in some cases a Kingship will be in place and in others not. It is evident from 3. 16. 1287 a 10 sq. (cp. 3. 17. 1287 b 37 sqq.), that the question of the naturalness of Kingship had given rise to discussion. Isocrates, for instance, had spoken of it in one passage (Philip. § 107) as an institution uncongenial to Greeks, but indispensable to barbarians.

Aristotle evidently feels that this question cannot be discussed till the various forms of Kingship have been distinguished, and those which do not really come into consideration eliminated. He accordingly distinguishes five forms of Kingship, the extreme form at one end of the scale being the Laconian (ἡ Λακωνικὴ)—a mere Generalship for life—and that at the other being the form in which one man is 'supreme over everything, just as a nation (ἔθνος) or City-State is supreme over all public affairs—a form which agrees in type with household rule¹, for as household rule is a sort of Kingship over a household, so this type of Kingship is household rule over a City-State or over one or more nations.' We observe that the Absolute Kingship (παμβασιλεία) is evidently conceived by Aristotle as applicable not only to a City-State but also to an ἔθνος or a collection of ἔθνη. Of these two forms he dismisses the first-named as being rather an institution which may exist in

¹ 3. 14. 1285 b 31, τεταγμένη κατὰ τὴν οἰκονομικὴν: cp. Eth. Nic. 5. 5. 1130 b 18, ἡ μὲν οὖν κατὰ τὴν ὅλην ἀρετὴν τεταγμένη δικαιοσύνη καὶ

ἀδικία: Pol. 7 (5). 10. 1310 b 32, ἡ βασιλεία τέτακται κατὰ τὴν ἀριστοκρατίαν: and other references given in Bon. Ind. 748 b 18 sqq.

connexion with a variety of constitutions, than a distinct form of constitution. The other form, accordingly, remains for consideration.

Question of the expediency of Kingship discussed—is the rule of the best man or the rule of the best laws the more expedient?

As to this, the first question to be considered is, he says, whether it is more advantageous to be ruled by the best man or the best laws. This question had been already discussed by Plato in the *Politicus* (294 A–296 A) and in the *Laws* (874 E–875 D)¹. In the former passage Plato thus states his doctrine:—‘the legislative art is certainly in some sense an element in the art of kingly rule [and legislation is therefore a function of the king], but the best thing is that supreme authority should rest, not with the laws, but with the man who having wisdom is capable of kingly rule’ (294 A). No art (he urges) can lay down anything ‘simple and universal’ (ἀπλοῦν) as to things so shifting as men and their doings, at all events if it is to ordain what is best; yet this is what law tries to do, ‘like a stupid and wilful man, resolved not to allow anything to be done contrary to his appointment or any question to be asked, even if some fresh thing different from what he commanded should happen to be better for some individual².’ Then why (Plato asks) make laws at all? For just the same reason for which gymnastic trainers draw up a general rule for the exercises of those whom they are training. They do this, because they cannot possibly be at everybody’s elbow at every moment, ready to indicate the best thing to do. Imagine, for instance, a trainer going abroad and expecting to be a long time away—he will leave behind him written instructions for his pupils; but if he should happen to come back sooner than he

¹ This is pointed out by Mr. Jackson in his note on *Eth. Nic.* 5. 6. § 5. The comparative merits of the rule of law and the rule of an autocrat are discussed in a well-known passage of the *Supplices* of Euripides (389 sqq.) with an obvious intention to give the victory to Theseus, the representative of the former. Compare also Eurip. fr. 600 (Nauck),

τρόπος ἐστὶ χρηστός ἀσφαλέστερος νόμος
with 3. 16. 1287 b 6, ὥστε τῶν κατὰ γράμματα [νόμων] ἀνθρώπος ἀρχὼν ἀσφαλέστερος, ἀλλ’ οὐ τῶν κατὰ τὸ εἶδος.

² See Prof. Campbell, *Sophistes and Politicus* of Plato, p. 137–8, whose renderings I have mainly followed here.

intended, would he feel bound to follow those written instructions in his management of them, supposing some change were desirable? Undoubtedly not. The moral is that law is only a make-shift, that the best thing is the unceasing guidance and supervision of a true King, and that if law exists, it is essential that the King should be free to depart from it, wherever he can do so with advantage.

In the Laws (874 E sqq.) the same view is implied, but Plato is here more conscious how impossible it is for any mortal man to see that it is to his own interest, no less than to that of others, to study the common advantage rather than his own private advantage, or if he did so, to abide by this principle and to act on it throughout his life. Of genuine Reason, designed by nature to be free, there is not a particle anywhere, or, at least, not much (875 D); hence it is that we have to call on law to rule, though it looks only to that which is for the most part and cannot discern that which holds universally. Mankind must have laws and live in accordance with them—otherwise they will be no better than the most savage beasts (874 E)—but Law is only the second-best thing.

Aristotle evidently has the teaching of the Politicus in view in the aporetic analysis which he brings to bear on the question (1286 a 9 sqq.). Those who are for Kingship, he says, will object to law that it gives merely a general rule, and does not adjust its directions to the circumstances of the particular case. To exercise any art by written rule is foolish: even in Egypt, where the physicians are expected to treat their patients by stereotyped written rules, they are allowed to change the treatment after four days, if desirable. But then, if it is made an objection to law that it embodies a general principle, we must remember that the ruler also must possess the general principle, so that he is open to the same objection; indeed, in him it is exposed to the disturbing influence of emotion and passion, from which no human breast is free; it will consequently be less pure and less potent. It may, however, be rejoined that in

compensation for this the individual ruler will be able to deal better with the particular case than law could do.

Provisional conclusion arrived at in favour of a Law-giver-King, who makes laws, but reserves to himself the power to break them, where they deviate from the right.

These considerations evidently point to the advisability of adopting some arrangement, by which the One Best Man will promulgate laws which will be supreme except where they deviate from what is right¹. But then comes the question, is it better that these cases with which the law fails to deal aright should be dealt with by a single individual of surpassing excellence, and not by the whole body of citizens or by a less numerous body of men of full virtue (*σπουδαῖοι*)? The subject is discussed with a leaning to a conclusion in favour of these *σπουδαῖοι*. The reason why Kingship prevailed in early times was perhaps merely this, that in those days only a very few possessed virtue; when more came to do so, Aristocracy took its place². Besides, there is a special difficulty connected with the probability of the King, who is assumed to possess supreme power, passing his Kingship on to an unworthy child. There is also the difficulty that the King, being, not a body of men, but a solitary individual, and therefore needing to be supplied with the means of enforcing his will, must of necessity be supplied with a guard. This, however, may be got over.

But the subject which Aristotle intended to investigate was the King, who is supreme over everything and may act as he pleases, not he who is in part checked by

But Aristotle now awakes to the consciousness, or makes believe to do so, that in all this discussion of the rule of a Lawgiver-King he has been treating of a Kingship governed by Law—a *βασιλεία κατὰ νόμον*—for he has been criticising a Kingship in which law is supreme, at all events till it deviates from right (1286 a 23). The subject to be considered, however, is in reality the King who 'is supreme over everything and may act as he pleases' (c. 16. 1287 a 1), not he who is in part checked by law. What is to be said of his claims?

¹ Compare the provisional conclusion as to the relation of law to the ruler thrown out in c. 11. 1282 b 1 sqq.

² The theory of the succession of constitutions put forward here occurs in an entirely aporetic passage and does not necessarily

represent Aristotle's definitive view on the subject. In 6 (4). 13. 1297 b 16 sqq. the changes in constitutions are connected less with changes in the distribution of virtue than with changes in the art of war.

To this subject Aristotle addresses himself afresh, and the polemic against the rule of the One Best Man begins again with increased intensity, and in such a way as to disturb some arguments in favour of a ruler of this type, which had passed without objection in the previous discussion. Among men who are like each other it is contrary to nature and unjust to make one man supreme over everything; the proper arrangement in such a case is interchange of rule, which involves the existence of law. Then, again, no human being would be able to take cognisance of the details which the law is unable to regulate; hence the objection commonly made to the rule of the law applies also to the rule of the One Best Man: the law, however, does all that can be done to meet this difficulty, for it purposely trains the rulers to deal fairly and justly with these matters¹. The law has this merit, that it not only regulates but educates—educates men to supply its own inevitable defects². Besides, it permits and makes possible its own amendment. The rule of law is the rule of God and reason³: the rule of a man involves a part-rule of the brute which is present in every man, inasmuch as desire and anger are present in him. The parallel of the arts (which had been accepted before) does not hold. The master of an art—a physician, for instance—is seldom drawn by passion or partiality in a direction contrary to that which reason dictates, whereas the ruler has to deal with matters in which he may have a personal interest,

law. Is a King of this type an expedient institution?

¹ In 1287 a 25, ἀλλ' ἐπίτηδες παιδεύσας ὁ νόμος ἐφίστησι τὰ λοιπὰ τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ γνώμῃ κρίνειν καὶ διοικεῖν τοὺς ἀρχοντας, the terms of the Athenian juror's oath (περὶ μὲν ὧν νόμοι εἰσὶ, ψηφιεῖσθαι κατὰ τοὺς νόμους, περὶ δὲ ὧν μὴ εἰσὶ, γνώμῃ τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ, Poll. 8. 122, quoted by C. F. Hermann, Gr. Antiqq. 1. § 134. 10) are evidently present to Aristotle's recollection.

² Ἀλλὰ μὴν (1287 a 23: cp. 1287 a 41, b 8) appears to introduce a fresh objection made by the advocate of law to the rule of

a human being (ἄνθρωπος), even if he be the best of men (cp. ἄνθρωποι, 30). Some high authorities, however, and Bernays among them, take it as introducing an objection to the rule of law made by the advocate of the rule of an ἀριστος ἀνὴρ, to the effect that magistrates are of no use in supplying the deficiencies of law. The point is doubtful.

³ Aristotle probably has in his mind Plato's language, Laws 713 E-714 A.

and about which he is not dispassionate ; to him, therefore, the law may be useful as a standard representing the mean, by which he can shape his course. The argument against curing men by written rule and governing by written rule also applies only to one sort of law—written law ; unwritten law, which is the more authoritative sort, remains untouched by it. Then, again, the One Man cannot supervise everything ; he must therefore employ others ; and if he does so, why should not supreme authority be given to the whole number at once ? Besides, ‘several heads are better than one,’ especially after they have had the training of intellect and character which only law can give. Lastly, a king must govern with the help of friends¹, but friends are like and equal to each other ; supreme authority should therefore be given to the whole body.

Throughout this prolonged series of arguments against the rule of the One Best Man, Aristotle has remained quietly in the background. He has perhaps been not unwilling to have the considerations fully stated, which from a popular point of view (for this is naturally the prevailing point of view in an aporetic discussion) make against the absolute rule of the best man, unchecked by law—partly because the arguments of the Politicus needed to be met, though abandoned, or apparently abandoned, by Plato in the Laws, partly because he holds, unlike Plato, that one form of the best State is a State governed by law ; but now he steps in and closes the discussion by saying that all these arguments against the substitution of the rule of the One Best Man for that of law only hold good in certain cases ; they do not hold good where he is a man of transcendent excellence, and one whose excellence outweighs that of all the other persons in the State put together. ‘It is clear from what has been said,’ he remarks (3. 17. 1287 b 41 sqq.), ‘that, among those at any rate who are alike and equal, it is

The Absolute Kingship is in place under given circumstances—i. e. if the King's virtue is so transcendent as to exceed the collective virtue of all the rest.

¹ As to the φίλοι or ἐταῖροι of the Macedonian Kings—an important and recognized body of men—see P. Spitta, *De Amicorum qui vocantur in Mace-*

donum regno condicione, who refers among other passages to the following in Diodorus—16. 54. 4 : 17. 2. 5 : 17. 16. 1 : 17. 52. 7 : 17. 54. 3 : 17. 57. 1 : 17. 112. 3.

neither expedient nor just that a single individual should be supreme over all, whether laws do not exist and he himself is supreme, as being a law, or whether they do' (the hypothesis dealt with in 1286 a 21-b 40), 'and whether he is a good man ruling over good men, or a man not good ruling over not good men—aye, and even if he is superior to his subjects in virtue' (cp. Xen. Cyrop. 8. 1. 37), 'unless indeed he is superior in a certain degree' (i.e. to such an extent, that 'his virtue exceeds the virtue of all the rest put together,' 1288 a 17).

Aristotle's first object in this long inquiry is to show that the normal constitution, though always just and for the common advantage, is not in all cases the same, but varies according to the distribution in the given society of the elements which contribute to the being of the State, and especially of virtue. We learn from it that the principle provisionally laid down in c. 11 (1282 b 1)—that supreme authority in the State should be given to 'laws normally constituted,' or, in other words, to laws adjusted to the normal constitutions—is subject to one important exception; it only holds good when the State consists of men alike and equal or of those who are approximately alike and equal. It does not hold in cases where its observance would work injustice, and would be hostile to the general good, and indeed impossible and ridiculous. If a man of transcendent excellence¹ should appear in a State, one

In one case, then (that of the Absolute Kingship) the conclusion arrived at in the earlier part of the book that normally constituted laws are the true supreme authority, does not hold good.

¹ In 3. 13. 1284 a 6 the transcendent superiority referred to is said to be in virtue and πολιτικὴ δύναμις (cp. 4 (7). 3. 1325 b 10-14); but in 6 (4). 2. 1289 a 32 Kingship and the true Aristocracy are said βούλεσθαι κατ' ἀρετὴν συνεστάναι κεχωρηγημένην, and in Eth. Nic. 8. 12. 1160 b 3 we find a superiority not only in virtue but 'in all goods' ascribed to the king (οὐ γὰρ ἔστι βασιλεὺς ὁ μὴ αὐτάρκης καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ὑπερέχων). In Pol. 4 (7). 14. 1332 b 18 a transcendent superiority in bodily

endowments is added to the picture—a characteristically Greek thought inherited from Plato (Polit. 301 D-E)—for otherwise men's doubts of the transcendent qualities of the One Man might not be silenced and overpowered (cp. Pol. 1. 5. 1254 b 34 sqq.). It was the custom of the Ethiopian race, which the Greeks loved to imagine as especially noble (Maspero, Hist. ancienne des peuples de l'Orient, p. 535, ed. 2) to make the biggest and strongest man among them king (Hdt. 3. 20,

whose excellence outweighs that of all the rest put together, then the only thing that is right or expedient or possible is that his will should be gladly obeyed and that all other law should disappear. He must be the living law of the State; he must be what a father is in a household or Zeus in the universe. For the moment the State becomes all that the most ardent of hero-worshippers could wish it to be, only that Aristotle requires his Absolute King to possess, not merely transcendent capacity, but transcendent moral excellence. He does not seem to hold, with Plato in the *Laws*, that no mortal nature is fit to be invested with these immense powers; nor does he concede them to a man possessed of true knowledge and virtue, irrespectively of the extent of his superiority to his fellows: the Absolute King must not only be a man of transcendent virtue, but there must be an immense disparity between his virtue and that of his subjects. Plato had not dwelt with equal emphasis in the *Politicus* on the extent of this necessary disparity, though he undoubtedly implies that it will be great.

Aristotle's object in making this reservation in favour of the Absolute Kingship is to prevent the claims of Law clashing with those of justice and reason.

It is evident from the Fourth Book¹ that if Aristotle makes an exception to the supremacy of law in favour of the Absolute King, it is rather because his account of the State would otherwise be incomplete and open to objection, than because the appearance on the scene of such a being is at all probable. To have said that the supreme authority in every community must always be 'laws normally constituted' would have exposed him to a fatal rejoinder from the followers of Antisthenes². 'What,' they would have asked, 'do you really mean to claim obedience to law from a Heracles?' A scene or two from the *Bacchae* of Euripides would have been at once quoted, in

τὸν ἄν τῶν ἀστῶν κρίνωσι μέγιστόν τε εἶναι καὶ κατὰ τὸ μέγαθος ἔχειν τὴν ἰσχύν, τοῦτον ἀξιούσι βασιλεύειν).

C. 14. 1332 b 23, ἐπεὶ δὲ τοῦτ' οὐ ῥᾶδιον λαβεῖν, οὐδ' ἔστιν ὥσπερ ἐν Ἰνδοῖς φησὶ Σκύλαξ εἶναι τοὺς βασιλείας τοσοῦτον διαφέροντας τῶν ἀρχομένων: cp. 7 (5). 10. 1313 a 3 sqq., where Aristotle in noticing

the circumstance that no new kingships arose in his own day accounts for it by remarking that men were rarely then forthcoming who towered above their fellows sufficiently to deserve an 'office' so great and exalted.

² Cp. 3. 13. 1284 a 15 sqq.

which the fruitless attempt of the misguided King Pentheus to control and imprison the god Dionysus, and the fate which his folly brought upon him, are described in glorious verse.

But the object of Aristotle, or at all events the effect of his teaching on this subject, was not perhaps solely to prevent the infringement of the claims of a hypothetical *παμβασιλεύς* or Absolute King. The rights of the natural *παμβασιλεύς* were to be respected, but no one was a natural *παμβασιλεύς* who did not possess transcendent virtue and an immense superiority to everyone else belonging to the State. Only a man of this type could claim to be above law.

His doctrine of the Absolute Kingship, however, also implies that it is not in place in the absence of transcendent virtue. Salutory tendency of this teaching.

The age of Aristotle was one which needed this lesson. Kingship had grown in credit during the fourth century before Christ, in proportion as the defects of the free constitutions of Greece had become more apparent. Both Xenophon and Isocrates had sketched an ideal King as well as an ideal constitution¹. Xenophon describes with enthusiasm the born King whom men instinctively and willingly follow, as bees follow the queen-bee—who rules to make his subjects as virtuous as possible, and makes them so partly by example, partly by rewarding virtue and stimulating emulation, partly by close personal superintendence, like a ‘seeing Law²’; and we derive the impression from his writings, that though he had learnt from the Lacedaemonian State how much Law could do, especially in maintaining and enforcing a public system of education, not ending with youth but carried on to maturer years, he is, nevertheless, still more interested in the personal agencies which make for virtue, as indeed a disciple of Socrates might naturally be. Xenophon seems, in fact,

¹ ‘Isocrates, like Xenophon, depicted not only a perfect constitution, but also a perfect Prince, and described the qualities of a true ruler and king in his address to Nicocles and in his Evagoras, partly in a hortatory form, partly in the form of an encomium’ (Henkel, Studien, p. 155).

² See the references in Henkel, Studien, p. 142 sqq., and cp. Cyrop. 8. 1. 22, αἰσθάνεσθαι μὲν γὰρ ἔδoκει καὶ διὰ τοὺς γραφομένους νόμους βελτίους γιγνομένους ἀνθρώπους· τὸν δὲ ἀγαθὸν ἄρχοντα βλέποντα νόμον ἀνθρώποις ἐνόμισεν, ὅτι καὶ τάττειν ἱκανὸς ἐστὶ καὶ ὁρᾶν τὸν ἀτακτοῦντα καὶ κολάζειν.

to be divided between the respect for law which he inherited from Socrates and his enthusiasm for born rulers of men.

Isocrates, again, though he recognizes the educating influence of law¹, and allows it to be the source of the greatest benefits to human life², yet holds that there are other things better—Rhetoric, for example, which does not, like law, concern itself only with the internal condition of a State, but teaches men how to deal with problems affecting Greece as a whole³. In this spirit he tells Philip of Macedon⁴, that while other descendants of Heracles, men fast bound in the fetters of a constitution and of laws—he probably refers to the Lacedaemonian kings—will love only the city to which they belong, Philip should count the whole of Hellas as his country, and work for its advantage no less than for that of Macedon.

The Macedonian kingship under Philip, and still more under Alexander, was tending to outgrow its old constitutional limits⁵, and to pass into a form in which the king possessed almost divine prerogatives. A saying is ascribed to Philip by Stobaeus⁶, which shows how high a view he took of the rights of the throne. ‘The king,’ he said, ‘ought to remember that he is at once a man and the depositary of power godlike in extent, in order that he may aim at all things noble and divine, and yet speak with the voice of a human being.’ So again, Anaxarchus, the follower of Democritus, in the famous words which he addressed to Alexander after the murder of Cleitus, told him that the Great King could no more do wrong than Zeus himself⁷—we know not whether before or after the composition of the Politics. Aristotle felt quite differently. He had perhaps already, in his dialogue entitled ‘*Ἀλέξανδρος ἡ ὑπὲρ ἀποίκων* (or *ἀποικίων*), advised Alexander to exercise despotic sway only over the ‘bar-

¹ Ad Nicocl. §§ 2-3.

² De Antid. § 79.

³ De Antid. § 79: cp. §§ 271-280.

⁴ Philip. § 127.

⁵ See O. Abel, *Makedonien vor König Philipp*, p. 123 sqq.

⁶ Floril. 48. 21.

⁷ Arrian, *Exped. Alex.* 4. 9. 7.

barians,' and to deal with the Greeks as freemen deserving to be led (*ἡγεμονικῶς*)¹, and his advice was echoed in Alexander's presence by his imprudent relative and disciple Callisthenes². His effort to inculcate moderation of rule in relation to Greeks on the omnipotent Macedonian Monarchy is quite in harmony with the general tendency of his political teaching³, and was a real service to mankind. It was a time when the intoxication of empire and power, which seems to have mastered men's minds in antiquity more often than in modern days, and always with fatal results, was especially strong, and needed to be firmly checked⁴.

The thought which underlay both the conception of the Single Ruler in the Politicus and Aristotle's conception of the *παμβασιλεύς* was a natural one. It was this—was not the true type of human society that in which men surrender themselves to the guidance of some being or beings of superior race? 'We do not,' says Plato (*Laws*, 713 D), 'set oxen to rule over oxen, or goats over goats; a superior race rules them, that of men'; and so in the golden age of the reign of Cronus, demigods (*δαίμονες*) were set by him to rule over man, 'and they with great ease and pleasure to themselves, and no less to us, taking care of us

Naturalness of the idea that men should be ruled by beings higher than themselves.

¹ Fragm. Aristot. 81. 1489 b 27 sqq.

² Arrian, *Exped. Alex.* 4. 11. 8. The whole of this eleventh chapter shows how little Callisthenes (and Aristotle also in all probability) was prepared to concede divine honours to Alexander; and in Aristotle's conception the *παμβασιλεύς* is little less than a god (3. 13. 1284a 10). Theophrastus spoke of Callisthenes as having 'fallen in the way of a man of colossal power and good fortune, but one who knew not how to use prosperity aright' (*Cic. Tusc. Disp.* 3. 10. 21). There is no sign that Aristotle was at all more prepared than Theophrastus

to find a *παμβασιλεύς* in Alexander.

³ Cp. *Pol.* 4 (7). 2. 1325 a 11, *καὶ τοῦτο τῆς νομοθετικῆς ἐστὶν ἰδεῖν, εἰάν τις ἐπάρχωσι γειτνιώντες, ποῖα πρὸς τοῖους ἀσκητέον ἢ πῶς τοῖς καθήκουσι πρὸς ἐκάστους χρηστέον.*

⁴ Demetrius of Phalerum is said, not on very good authority however, to have advised Ptolemy King of Egypt to purchase and read the books written 'on the subject of Kingship and Government' (*περὶ βασιλείας καὶ ἡγεμονίας*): *ἀ γὰρ οἱ φίλοι τοῖς βασιλεύσιν οὐ θαρροῦσι παραινέειν, ταῦτα ἐν τοῖς βιβλίοις γέγραπται* (Plutarch (?), *Reg. et Imperat. Apophthegmata* —*Demetr. Phaler.*, p. 189 D).

and giving us peace and reverence and order and justice never failing¹,’ secured a life of concord and happiness to the tribes of men. ‘This tradition,’ he continues, ‘tells us, and tells us truly, that for cities of which some mortal and not God is the ruler, there is no escape from evils and toils’ (Laws, 713 E).

How natural this thought is, appears from its perhaps unconscious repetition in modern literature. ‘Here,’ says a reviewer, speaking of a work by Sir H. Holland², ‘we find the remark that whereas some of the lower animals are tamed and educated by man, man himself has no higher animal to educate him. “He alone is submitted to no superior being on the earth capable of thus controlling or perfecting his natural instincts, of cultivating his reason, or of creating new capacities or modes of action.” This is strictly true; yet in all organized communities the individual man is submitted to a superior control—namely, that of society and of social, as distinct from individual, ends of action; and the education of man in his individual character by man in his corporate or political character is really a far greater and more wonderful thing than the development of the half-human intelligence, wonderful as that is, of a well-bred and well-trained dog³.’ It is to this education by society that Plato points, when he goes on, in the same passage, to say that man must imitate the life which is said to have existed in the days of Cronus, and hearken to what we have of immortality within us, to the voice of Reason expressed in law (Laws, 714 A), seeing that the demigod rulers of Cronus are no longer forthcoming.

Aristotle, however, declines to say that the appearance on the scene of a ruler of this kind, or even of a family of such rulers, is impossible. Nay more, he holds that

¹ Prof. Jowett’s translation, 4. 234.

² ‘Fragmentary Papers on Science and other subjects,’ by Sir H. Holland, Bart. (Longmans, 1875), reviewed in the *Saturday Review* for March 20, 1875. The book itself is not known to me.

³ Compare the saying ‘homo homini deus.’ It should be noticed, however, that one race of men educates another, and that mankind owes at least as much to this source of civilization as to the action of a society on its members.

if this event happened, the 'truest and most divine' form of the State would be realized¹. But he also holds that its occurrence is in the highest degree improbable, and thus the best State which we find depicted in the Fourth Book is a State consisting of equal citizens. Occasionally, indeed, he speaks as if the State of free and equal citizens, whose relations are regulated not by the will of men but by law, were the true form of the State²; and in all probability his mind was under the influence of two conflicting views, that which he inherited from the Politicus and the Republic of Plato, and that which was more especially his own—the view that there is nothing in the supremacy of law which should make it out of place even in the best constitution.

It is questionable whether Aristotle is right in holding that there is but one form of real Kingship—the Absolute Kingship—and that Kingship governed by law is not, as Plato had made it in the Politicus, a separate form of constitution, but merely a great magistracy, such as might find a place in a variety of constitutions (3. 16. 1287 a 3 sqq.).

Aristotle's view that the Absolute Kingship is the only real form of Kingship criticised.

Some non-hereditary forms of Kingship according to law noticed by him—among them, that of the *aesymnete*³—may have in some degree resembled great offices like that to which Aristotle refers, when he speaks of a single individual being often made 'supreme over the administration' (*κύριος τῆς διοικήσεως*, 1287 a 6), and may perhaps

¹ Cp. 6 (4). 2. 1289 a 40, *τῆς πρώτης καὶ θειοτάτης*. The same view is expressed in 2. 2. 1261 a 29 sqq., where the State of free and equal citizens, interchanging rule, is said to reproduce approximately in its temporary distinction of rulers and ruled the deeper and permanent distinction of nature which prevails where, as is better, the same men constantly rule: cp. 4 (7). 14. 1332 b 21. Perhaps the epithet *θειοτάτη* conveys a delicate hint that the *παμβασίλεια*

is hardly an institution for men: cp. Eth. Nic. 7. 1. 1145 a 19, *τὴν ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς ἀρετὴν, ἥρωικὴν τινα καὶ θείαν*.

² Cp. 6 (4). 11. 1295 b 25, *βούλεται δὲ γε ἡ πόλις ἐξ ἴσων εἶναι καὶ ὁμοίων ὅτι μάλιστα*: 6 (4). 4. 1292 a 32, *ὅπου γὰρ μὴ νόμοι ἀρχουσιν, οὐκ ἔστι πολιτεία*: 2. 10. 1272 b 5, *ταῦτα δὲ πάντα βέλτιον γίνεσθαι κατὰ νόμον ἢ κατ' ἀνθρώπων βούλησιν*: οὐ γὰρ ἀσφαλὲς ὁ κανὼν.

³ 3. 14. 1285 b 25: cp. 7 (5). 10. 1313 a 10, *ἐν δὲ ταῖς κατὰ γένος βασιλείαις*.

have been not absolutely incompatible with democracy, in some at least of its forms, though it is hard to imagine their co-existence. But this cannot have been true of hereditary Kingships. Aristotle himself does not distinctly assert the contrary, but his attempt to confine the inquiry to two representative forms only, the Lacedaemonian and the Absolute Kingship (c. 15. 1285 b 33 sq.), evidently misleads him¹.

A King, and especially a hereditary King, even if he rules according to law, is a very different being from a magistrate with a wide competence. Our modern terminology, which counts as a Monarchy any government in which a King exists, however limited his powers, would seem to be more correct. The mere fact that a King finds a place in a constitution is sufficient to give it a special colour and to make it quite different from what it would otherwise have been. In the Lacedaemonian constitution, indeed, the powers of the King were so limited that it was perhaps rightly classed, not as a Kingship, but as an Aristocracy; and the so-called Kings at Carthage were hardly Kings in any real sense. But Kingship in accordance with law, in many of the forms in which it existed in Aristotle's day, fully deserved to be accounted a distinct form of Kingship and to find a place among varieties of constitution.

Aristotle's real feeling about Kingship apparently is, that in the absence of an immense disparity in excellence between the King and his subjects, it is not a just institution, nor can the willing obedience, which is its characteristic, exist. Τοῦτο μὲν οὖν ἀληθῶς ἴσως λέγουσιν, εἴπερ ὑπάρξει τοῖς ἀποστεροῦσι καὶ βιαζομένοις τὸ τῶν ὄντων αἰρετώτατον· ἀλλ' ἴσως οὐχ οἶόν τε ὑπάρχειν, ἀλλ' ὑποτίθενται τοῦτο ψεῦδος· οὐ γὰρ ἔτι καλὰς τὰς πράξεις ἐνδέχεται εἶναι τῷ μὴ διαφέροντι τοσοῦτον ὅσον ἀνὴρ γυναικὸς ἢ πατὴρ τέκνων ἢ δεσπότης δούλων (4 (7). 3. 1325 a 41 sqq.: cp. 7 (5). 10. 1313 a 3-10). But if this immense disparity exists,

¹ In calling the Lacedaemonian Kingship a 'generalship for life' (στρατηγία αἰδίου) and arguing (1287 a 4) that a 'generalship for

life' may exist in all forms of constitution, he seems to forget the hereditariness of the Lacedaemonian Kingship.

then law cannot exist. Aristotle, in fact, approaches the question of the structure of the State from the point of view of justice. Power must be proportioned to contribution.

'Kingship,' says Henkel¹, 'was in the whole Political Theory of antiquity only a form of Aristocracy, resting on no separate and independent basis of its own.' Erdmann expresses the modern view of the subject, when he says²: 'When men expect talent in a King, they forget that a King is not a high official: a high official, no doubt, cannot discharge his functions without the particular kind of talent required for their discharge. The things which a King chiefly needs to possess are love for his people, and the conscientiousness which will beget in him doubts of his own omniscience, and lead him to choose virtuous and capable ministers. When, as in the instance of Frederick the Second, these two characteristics are combined with a great mental superiority—a thing which occurs only once in a century—the highest standard is unquestionably attained.' Expediency, interpreted by experience, is a better guide in questions of constitutional organization than justice, as Aristotle understands it. Not a few Kings have received enthusiastic support from their subjects, and have made their rule a blessing to mankind, though they could claim no such transcendent superiority to those over whom they ruled as that which Aristotle requires in a King.

When we put together the various data as to the nature of the State with which the Third Book furnishes us, we shall find them somewhat contradictory. The State is 'a community of citizens sharing in a common constitution' (κοινωνία πολιτῶν πολιτείας, 3. 3. 1276 b 1): it is also 'a certain number of citizens' (πολιτῶν τι πλῆθος, 3. 1. 1274 b 41): is then the κοινωνία identical with the κοινωνοί? Then again, its identity is especially to be sought in the constitution (3. 3. 1276 b 10): this seems to imply that the State

Retrospective summary of the conclusions of the Third Book as to the nature of the State.

¹ Studien, p. 57.

² Vorlesungen über den Staat, p. 167.

is rather to be sought in the *σύνθεσις* than in the citizens, the *σύνθετα*; so that if the constitution lasts for centuries, the life of the State will far outlast that of the body of citizens (*πλήθος πολιτῶν*) with which it is occasionally identified¹, and if it lasts only a few months, the reverse will be the case. Elsewhere again (4 (7). 1. 1323 b 29–2. 1324 a 13), the State is described as a moral agent capable of virtue and happiness. Must it not, then, be a Person, as well as an aggregate or a *σύνθεσις* of persons²?

Still further, as we have already seen, the State is occasionally described as including not only citizens, but also women, children, and slaves (e.g. 1. 13. 1260 b 13 sqq.: 2. 9. 1269 b 14 sqq.: cp. 3. 4. 1277 a 5 sqq.); but here the term is used in a broader and more inclusive sense than elsewhere. Thus in the Fourth Book (c. 8. 1328 a 21 sqq.) only those are allowed to be ‘parts of the State’ who can live its full life and be *κοινωνοί*, and these are its citizens; so that we come back to the view that the State is to be identified with its citizens, or rather with the *κοινωνία* which they form, and does not include those who are not citizens, or (to use the words of the Fourth Book) that it is a *κοινωνία* of men like each other, existing for the sake of the best life to which they can attain (4 (7). 8. 1328 a 35).

The State at its best is thus, in Aristotle’s view, under ordinary conditions, a company or brotherhood of equal comrades, enjoying that ‘leisure from the quest of necessities’ (*σχολή τῶν ἀναγκαίων*) without which full virtue cannot exist, ‘able and purposed to rule and be ruled with a view to the life in accordance with virtue’; not necessarily equal absolutely, but proportionally equal—sufficiently equal to be commensurable, to live

¹ Unless indeed the word *πλήθος* contains the notion of perpetual renewal.

² As to these unreconciled contradictions, a plentiful crop of which usually comes to light whenever we make a careful study of Aristotle’s teaching on any

subject, see Heyder’s remarks (*Vergleichung der Aristotelischen und Hegel’schen Dialektik*, p. 179), quoted by Eucken, *Methode der Aristotelischen Forschung*, p. 43 n. They arise in part from Aristotle’s desire to do justice to all points of view.

for the same end, and to accept the control of a common body of law. At first sight the State, as Aristotle conceives it, presents the aspect of a body of friends, exceptionally numerous indeed, but tending as friends do, to be like and equal, and engaged in one and the same scheme of life—‘one equal temper of heroic hearts.’ Virtue, which is the secret of unity in friendship, is also the secret of unity in the State (Eth. Nic. 9. 6. 1167 b 2 sqq.). A body of friends, however, is not an unity in the same degree as a State; it need not, like the State, be composed of diverse elements; its members are not, like those of the State, divided into rulers and ruled, nor are their relations regulated by law; the essential characteristic of State-life is exchange of service, that of friendship common life and accordant feeling; the aim of friendship is especially ‘living together’ (τὸ συζῆν), an aim which, though presupposed in the State, is less its aim than ‘advantage’ (τὸ συμφέρον)¹; above all, in the case of the State, a Whole is formed which reacts upon its members and imparts completeness to them, and which is itself a moral agent, a Person, dealing with those outside it as well as with those within. The State, we see, is something more than a body of friends. It is also to be distinguished from a school, if only because in a school there is no interchange of service. It is not a Church, again, for its aims are more varied than those of a Church; it does not exist for the worship of God alone, or for the promotion of spiritual, as distinguished from intellectual, growth; its objects range from the provision of commodities to the full development of the whole man; it has a military force at its disposal; its ultimate aim is not, as Socrates, Xenophon, and Plato had said, the production of virtue, but rather the efflux of virtue in virtuous action, unimpeded and happy. So far from the State ceasing to be necessary, as the view of these inquirers might be construed to imply, when full virtue is already possessed by the citizens, it is not

¹ Eth. Nic. 9. 6. 1167 b 2: and Pol. 3. 9. 1280 b 35-40. Cp. also compare Eth. Nic. 9. 12. with Eth. Nic. 8. 11. 1160 a 8-30.

at its best except when all of them are men of full virtue. If it is itself the source of their virtue, partly through the material conditions with which it surrounds them, partly through the training and guidance which it imparts, it must nevertheless go further and develop their virtue in action; it must set on foot an exchange of mutual service rendered with a view to the common good; it must offer its citizens a Whole in which they can merge themselves as parts, rising thus to a nobler level and type of action than they could singly realize; it must be to them a sort of God¹, less remote, more helpful, more akin to them than the God of Aristotle—a Being in whom they lose themselves only to find themselves again.

Aristotle has not learnt that the State does not exist exclusively for the advantage of its members, but in part for that of the world outside it. To him it is a natural Whole, which in all normal cases grows up, as it were, round the individual, raising him to the full level of humanity and satisfying all his wants from the lowest to the highest; it exists for the sake of those within it, not for the sake of those outside. Its task is especially to satisfy man's highest needs, and we expect him to say that supreme power in it must be allotted to those who can so rule as to secure this result. He is led, however, by considerations of justice to award supreme power to those who contribute to its life in proportion to their contributions, and especially to those who possess 'virtue fully furnished with external means.'

It is because the State is so high a thing, that there are many who, in their own interest no less than in that of the whole, had better have nothing to do with its management. They cannot live its full life, and are rather in it than of it.

If Aristotle had said that the State exists not only for

¹ Aristotle, it is true, nowhere says this: still there is much in the *Politics* to suggest the idea to which Hobbes gave definite expression, when he spoke of

the State as 'that "mortal god," to whom we owe under the "immortal God" our peace and defence' (*Leviathan*, part 2, c. 17).

the realization of the highest quality of life, but also for the development in all within it of the best type of life of which they are capable, he would have made the elevation of the mass of men one of its ends. But this he hardly seems to do. It is true that the head of the household is charged with the moral improvement of the slave, but then we are elsewhere told that the slave is ruled for his own good only accidentally—primarily for that of his master. Still less is the State expected to concern itself with the moral interests of the artisan and day-labourer: this class seems to be wholly uncared for. If Aristotle's view of the office of the State is defective in this respect, it has, however, the merit, that it brings into prominence a truth which in our own day is often forgotten—that one of the aims of the State should be to aid in the realization of the highest type of life, and that this should be fully as much its aim as to help those who cannot attain to the highest type to advance as far towards it as they can. Civilization should grow in height as well as in breadth.

It is evident that to Aristotle the State is far less than it is to us an abstraction apart from, and distinguishable from, the individuals who belong to it¹; it is not a system of institutions, which, however it may change, retains its identity, while one generation after another finds shelter under it and passes away; it is not the house, but the human beings who live in it². From the modern point of

¹ Compare Lucian, Anacharsis c. 20, πόλιν γὰρ ἡμεῖς οὐ τὰ οἰκοδομήματα ἡγούμεθα εἶναι, οἷον τεῖχην καὶ ἱερὰ καὶ νεωσοίκους, ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ὥσπερ σῶμά τι ἐδραῖον καὶ ἀκίνητον ὑπάρχειν ἐς ὑποδοχὴν καὶ ἀσφάλειαν τῶν πολιτευομένων, τὸ δὲ πᾶν κῦρος ἐν τοῖς πολίταις τιθέμεθα· τοὺς γὰρ εἶναι τοὺς ἀναπληροῦντας καὶ διατάντοντας καὶ ἐπιτελοῦντας ἕκαστα καὶ φυλάττοντας, οἷον τι ἐν ἡμῖν ἐκάστω ἐστὶν ἡ ψυχὴ. τοῦτο δὲ τοῖνυν κατανοήσαντες ἐπιμελούμεθα μὲν, ὡς ὁρᾷς, καὶ τοῦ σώματος τῆς πόλεως κατακοσμοῦντες αὐτό, ὡς κάλλιστον ἡμῖν εἶη. . . μάλιστα δὲ καὶ ἐξ ἁπαντος τοῦτο προνοοῦμεν,

ὅπως οἱ πολῖται ἀγαθοὶ μὲν τὰς ψυχὰς, ἰσχυροὶ δὲ τὰ σώματα γίνονται κ.τ.λ.

² The nineteenth Article of the Church of England defines 'the visible Church of Christ' as 'a congregation of faithful men, in the which the pure Word of God is preached and the Sacraments duly ministered.' With regard to all definitions of a State or a Church as a number of individuals, it may be asked whether the notion of a succession of individuals does not enter into our conception of a State or Church. Would a mere aggregate of individuals, even

view it is rather a 'fabric,' and to a large extent an inherited fabric. Aristotle regards it as a Whole consisting of its citizens as parts, and if in one passage he finds its identity mainly in the constitution, he follows this thought no further. The view of Isocrates that the State is immortal he evidently does not hold. The notion of the historic continuity of the State belongs to a later time, though Aristotle is aware that the past of a State influences its present¹. The constitution of a State is to him less an outcome of its past than a reflection of contemporary facts—of the moral level and social composition of the community. In reality it is both.

Conflict of
the Abso-
lute King-
ship with
Aristotle's
general
account of
the State.

To one form, indeed, of the best State of Aristotle the foregoing account of the State does not apply. In the Absolute Kingship, the highest but also the least realizable of its forms, many of its usual features seem to disappear. The State in this form seems to fall into two sections, the Absolute King, and those he rules, one of which, the Absolute King, is not a part of the State at all (3. 13. 1284a 8). Is he then outside the State, and is the State constituted by his subjects alone? Or is he rather to be regarded as himself the State? But then the State will apparently cease to be a *κοινωνία*, for there will be only one *κοινωνός*. And on that hypothesis, what becomes of the principle that the State consists of persons differing in kind? or of the principle that it is an aggregate of individuals? If, on the other hand, the State is composed of the Absolute King and his subjects², what is his or their

though animated by a common aim, possessed of a common creed, and living the same kind of life, constitute a State or a Church, if some provision were not made for the perpetuation of the society by the admission of fresh members?

¹ Cp. Pol. 2. 12. 1274a 12 sqq., where the existence of an extreme democracy at Athens is traced to the circumstance that the mari-

time empire of Athens was originally won by the demos.

² This would seem to be Aristotle's view, if we examine the reasoning in 2. 2. 1261a 29 sqq., where the State is said to be composed of persons differing in kind—i.e. rulers and ruled—both when the same persons always rule and when, in consequence of the equality of the members of the State, rule is interchanged.

relation to it, if he is not a part of the State? Aristotle's admission of the Absolute Kingship as a possible form of the State seems altogether to conflict with his general account of the State. We do not learn why, if he is 'complete in himself' (Eth. Nic. 8. 12. 1160 b 3 sq.), the Absolute King should trouble himself to rule or to live in society at all.

Strongly, however, as the Absolute Kingship contrasts with what we may call the typical form of the State, one paramount feature of the latter still survives in it. It is a means of placing the individual in constant contact and connexion with Reason, here indeed represented not by Law but by the Absolute King—a means of realizing the highest and most complete human life. Thus, however altered the structure of the State may be, its end remains the same; and this would seem to be enough for Aristotle. The State may exist without Law¹, if only it secures to its members the highest quality of life. Plato had already allowed the ideal State sketched in his 'Republic' freely to assume the form either of a Kingship or of an Aristocracy², but then in neither form were the rulers to be fettered by Law. Aristotle finds room for the Absolute Kingship at some cost of consistency. He makes room for it, as he tells us (3. 13. 1284 b 32 : 3. 17. 1288 a 19 sqq.), because he has no choice: not only would no other course be just, but no other course is possible.

Aristotle had said towards the close of the discussion on Kingship (3. 17. 1287 b 37), that there are those who are marked out by nature and by considerations of justice and advantage to be ruled as a master rules his slaves, and others marked out for subjection to a king, and others for membership of a polity; and even in the midst of his

Under what circumstances are Kingship, Aristocracy, and Polity respectively in place?

¹ The view that a constitution implies the rule of Law is perhaps only said to be εἰλογος, and not absolutely adopted, in 6 (4). 4. 1292 a 30 sqq. The words are—εὐλόγως δὲ ἂν δόξαιεν ἐπιτιμᾶν ὁ φάσκων τὴν τοιαύτην εἶναι δημοκρα-

τίαν οὐ πολιτείαν· ὅπου γὰρ μὴ νόμοι ἄρχουσιν, οὐκ ἔστι πολιτεία.

² Rep. 445 D, ἐπονομασθεῖη δ' ἂν καὶ διχῇ· ἐγγενομένου μὲν γὰρ ἀνδρὸς ἑνὸς ἐν τοῖς ἄρχουσι διαφέροντος, βασιλεία ἂν κληθεῖη· πλειόνων δὲ ἀριστοκρατία.

anxiety to establish the necessity and justice of the Absolute Kingship under certain circumstances, he pauses to seize the opportunity of explaining (1288 a 6 sqq.) under what circumstances each of the normal constitutions is in place.

A people is a fit subject for Kingship, if it is so constituted as to produce (πέφυκε φέρειν¹, 1288 a 8) a family excelling in virtue and in capacity for political leadership. This is shortly after amended to the effect that if even a single individual of this character makes his appearance, he is deserving of Kingship.

A people is a fit subject for Aristocracy, if it is so constituted as to produce a body of individuals capable of being ruled as freemen should be ruled by men qualified for political leadership by virtue. It appears from c. 18. 1288 a 35, that under this form both rulers and ruled will be 'men excelling in virtue,' the former having the virtue which qualifies for rule tending to the highest quality of life, the latter having the virtue which qualifies for being ruled to that end.

A people is a fit subject for Polity, in which a body of individuals naturally springs up (πέφυκεν ἐγγίνεσθαι²), possessed of military excellence and capable of ruling and being ruled in accordance with a law distributing offices among the well-to-do in accordance with desert³.

The Third Book has mainly concerned itself with the normal constitutions, but we gain from it

So far—that is to say, down to the end of its last chapter but one—the Third Book has concerned itself mainly with the varieties of the 'normal constitution.' The normal constitution, we gather from it, is in all cases just and for the common advantage, and precisely because it is so, it is not in all cases the same. It varies as the social conditions vary; it awards supreme power accord-

¹ For φέρειν in this sense, cp. Plutarch, Dion c. 58, ἀλλ' εἰσικεν ἀληθῶς λέγεσθαι τὸ τὴν πόλιν ἐκείνην (Athens) φέρειν ἀνδρας ἀρετῇ τε τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς ἀρίστους καὶ κακίᾳ τοὺς φαύλους πονηροτάτους: Plato, Tim. 24 C-D; Damox. Inc. Fab. Fragm. (Meineke, Fragm. Com. Gr. 4.

536)—

Κῶος· θεοὺς γὰρ φαίνειθ' ἡ νῆσος φέρειν.

² For this expression, cp. Aristot. Fragm. 85. 1491 a 1, σπουδαίων δ' ἐστὶ γένος ἐν ᾧ πολλοὶ σπουδαῖοι πεφύκασιν ἐγγίνεσθαι.

³ See Appendix D.

ing to the distribution in the given community of the elements which contribute to the life of the State; here it will be a Kingship, there an Aristocracy, there a Polity.

occasional
glimpses of
the best
constitu-
tion.

But though the normal constitution is the main subject of the book, we catch, as it advances, clearer and clearer glimpses of the best constitution also. It may be well to note these indications and to bring them together.

The best State, we are told (c. 5. 1278 a 8), will not give citizenship to the βάνανσος. In the best State, again, a part at all events of the citizens—those of them who are ‘statesmen and who are charged, or fit to be charged, with the management of public affairs’—will possess the full virtue of the good man (σπουδαῖος ἀνὴρ, c. 5. 1278 b 2 sqq.: cp. c. 18. 1288 a 37 sq.); and thus the best State is apparently referred to as a State in the hands of men of full virtue (διὰ τῶν σπουδαίων ἀνδρῶν, c. 13. 1283 b 6), and in the same chapter the citizen of the best State is defined as ‘he who is able and purposed to rule and be ruled with a view to the life of virtue’ (1284 a 1). So far all the indications given us of the nature of the best State point to a State of equal σπουδαῖοι ruling and ruled by turns, but later in this chapter (the thirteenth) we learn that under certain circumstances the best State may be forced to assume the form of an Absolute Kingship, and the succeeding chapters even go on to inquire whether the Absolute Kingship is not really the best form of constitution (c. 15. 1286 a 7 sqq.: cp. 1286 b 22, εἰ δὲ δὴ τις ἄριστον θελή τὸ βασιλεύεσθαι ταῖς πόλεσιν). The answer is that the best constitution will assume the form of an Absolute Kingship or the more equal form of an Aristocracy of σπουδαῖοι, according to circumstances. It will be the former, if an individual or a family of surpassing excellence exists in the State; it will be the latter, if this surpassing excellence is possessed by a body of citizens capable of ruling or being ruled with a view to the most desirable life (c. 18. 1288 a 33 sqq.)¹.

¹ Not simply πρὸς τὸν βίον τὸν κατ’ ἀρετήν, as we had been told in c. 13. 1284 a 1 sqq.: however, even as far back as the ninth

We are thus gradually led in the Third Book to form a conception in outline of the nature of the best constitution in its two forms, Kingship and Aristocracy ; it remains for the Fourth Book to work this out in detail, and to show how the best State is to be brought into being and instituted (*τίνα πέφυκε γίνεσθαι τρόπον καὶ καθίστασθαι πῶς*, 3. 18. 1288 b 4). The Third Book forms an introduction to the study of all constitutions, but especially to the study of the best¹. The broad principles which it lays down with regard to the recognition of all elements contributing to the being and well-being of the State prepare us to find the books on the best State placing supremacy in the hands of a citizen-body possessing not only the intellectual and moral qualities necessary for rule, but also an adequate provision of external goods.

This book of the Politics, however, would have lost much of its interest and importance, if it had thrown light only on the best constitution. Perhaps its most marked characteristic is the prominence which it gives to the conception of justice. A sound constitution, it insists, is one which makes those supreme in the State whose supremacy is in the particular case just and for the common good.

Closing
chapter of
the Third
Book—
how far is
it in har-

It is time, however, to examine the last chapter of the Third Book (c. 18), in which a transition is made from the 'normal constitutions' to the best constitution and to the question, how the latter is to be brought into existence.

chapter (1280 b 34), the life of the true State is described as *ζωὴ τελεία καὶ αὐτάρκης*, a phrase which includes *αὐτάρχεια ἐν τοῖς ἀναγκαίοις* as well as in higher things.

¹ Krohn remarks (Zur Kritik Aristotelischer Schriften I. p. 30 n.): 'If one sought to bring what is cognate together, the Seventh and Eighth Books (old order) would have to follow the Second: the contents of the Third Book have no bearing on the fragmentary sketches which find a place in the Seventh.' It is quite true that

there is a close connexion between the Second and the old Seventh Book, but the contents of the Third Book have also a real bearing on the old Seventh. The fourth chapter of the Third Book, which establishes the fact that in the best State the virtue of the citizen and the man coincide, is, indeed, expressly recognized as the starting-point of the inquiry respecting the best State in the old Seventh (see 3. 18. 1288 a 37 and 4 (7). 14. 1333 a 11).

'The normal constitutions'—so it begins—'are three in number,' but which is the best of them? The best is that which is absolutely in the hands of the best men (*οἰκονομουμένη ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρίστων*, 1288 a 33: cp. 3. 14. 1285 b 31, *τεταγμένη κατὰ τὴν οἰκονομικήν*): it will therefore be either an Absolute Kingship, in which an individual or a family exists of surpassing virtue, or an Aristocracy, in which a body (*πλήθος*) of men of surpassing virtue exists, some of whom are capable of ruling and others of being ruled with a view to the most desirable life (*τὴν αἰρετωτάτην ζωὴν*, 1288 a 37). And how are these two forms, Absolute Kingship and Aristocracy, to be brought into existence? Aristotle appears to treat this question as identical with the question how men are to be produced fit for kingship or for the rule of citizens over fellow-citizens (*πολιτικοί*). He recalls the fact that he has shown that the citizen of the best State is identical with the good man; hence the education and habits which produce a good man will produce a man equal to these positions. (It is hardly necessary to interpose the remark, that the term 'good man' is an altogether inadequate equivalent for the Greek *σπουδαῖος ἀνὴρ*, by which is meant a man possessing that many-sided excellence, practical, speculative, and aesthetic, on which Aristotle has already dwelt in the Third Book (c. 11. 1281 b 10 sqq.)—above all, possessing *φρόνησις* and the virtues of leisure (4 (7). cc. 14, 15). Not an impeccable man, but a man mature and happily developed in character, mind, and body¹.)

We might expect that Aristotle would pass on at once to the question what institutions and education produce a *σπουδαῖος ἀνὴρ*, but this question is not actually entered on till the Thirteenth Chapter of the Fourth Book (1332 a 28 sqq.). He perhaps remembers that he has just said that the best State is that in which an Absolute King rules, or a 'body of men of surpassing virtue' rules and is ruled,

¹ Cp. Cic. Tusc. Disp. 5. 10. 28: *structos et ornatos tum sapientes quos dicam bonos, perspicuum est; omnibus enim virtutibus in-* *structos et ornatos tum sapientes tum viros bonos dicimus.*

πρὸς τὴν αἰρετωτάτην ζωὴν (3. 18. 1288 a 37), and that he must not leave the problem of the 'most desirable life' unsolved behind him. To this question, at any rate, he passes in the sentences with which the Third Book closes and the Fourth begins, and in the following way :

'The education and habits which produce a good man and those which produce a citizen-ruler and a king will be the same. And now that we have treated in detail of these matters (διωρισθέντων δὲ τούτων, 1288 b 2), we must attempt to speak about the best constitution, in what way it comes into being and how it is instituted¹. It is necessary, then, for any one who is to investigate the subject of the best constitution in an adequate way first to determine, what is the most desirable life' (αἰρετώτατος βίος, 4 (7). 1. 1323 a 15 : cp. αἰρετωτάτην ζωὴν, 3. 18. 1288 a 37). 'For,' he continues, 'while this is unknown to us, the best constitution must also be unknown to us, since those who enjoy the best constitution their circumstances enable them to attain will naturally fare best, unless things turn out quite contrary to expectation².'

Now, however we may explain it, there is certainly a want of 'callida junctura' here, to say the least. The reason which we expect to be given for the treatment of the question, what is the most desirable life, is that the best constitution has already been said to exist for the realization of the most desirable life (1288 a 37), but no reference is made to this ; on the contrary, a fresh reason is given and the continuity of the investigation seems need-

¹ This is the question with which the Fourth and Fifth Books are to deal, and the answer they give to it is, that some of the conditions of the best constitution must be asked of Fortune and Nature, but that for others the lawgiver is responsible (4 (7). 13. 1332 a 28 sqq.). It is especially the lawgiver's business to see that the education and institutions of the State are such as to produce σπουδαῖοι (1332 a 31 sqq.). We may note, as showing a certain similarity of

handling, the fact that in the Sixth Book the nature of the polity is first sketched, and then the question is asked—τίνα τρόπον γίνεται ἡ καλουμένη πολιτεία, καὶ πῶς αὐτὴν δεῖ καθιστάναι (6 (4). 9. 1294 a 30).

² The English language cannot fully express the reasoning latent in the Greek words—ἄριστα γὰρ πράττειν προσήκει τοὺς ἄριστα πολιτευομένους κ.τ.λ. It is a short step in the Greek from πολιτεύεσθαι to πράττειν.

lessly broken. We notice also that the last chapter of the Third Book prepares us for an inquiry not only into the mode in which a man fit to be a citizen-ruler over citizens (*πολιτικός*) is to be produced, but also into the mode in which a man capable of Kingship (*βασιλικός*) is to be produced, whereas in 4 (7). 14. 1332 b 12 sqq. true kings are said to be no longer obtainable, and in default of them an arrangement is adopted by which the ruled become rulers after a certain age, the education of the State being expressly so planned as to be suitable for men who are to be for the first part of their lives ruled and afterwards rulers, not for kings or men capable of Kingship who do nothing but rule. The Third Book also seems to imply that the education which produces the one type of ruler is the same as that which produces the other. If so, the Fourth Book appears to speak differently (cp. 4 (7). 14. 1332 b 15).

In addition to these discrepancies¹, of which it would be easy to make too much, we are undoubtedly conscious in entering on the Fourth Book of a certain change of tone, however we may account for it. Not only do expressions occur, such as *ἡμεῖς δὲ αὐτοῖς ἐροῦμεν* (c. 1. 1323 a 38)—*λεκτέον ἡμῖν πρὸς ἀμφοτέρους αὐτοὺς* (c. 3. 1325 a 17), for which we should vainly look in the Third Book², but the whole

¹ Another is, that while we are promised in the Third Book (c. 3. 1276 a 32) a discussion not only of the question of the proper size of the State, but also of the question whether it should be composed of one race (*ἔθνος*) or more than one, the latter subject appears to escape treatment in the Fourth Book, where we might naturally expect to find it dealt with, unless indeed we consider the promise to be fulfilled, or fulfilled in part, in the recommendations with respect to the slaves or serfs who are to till the soil (4 (7). 9. 1329 a 25 sqq.: 4 (7). 10. 1330 a 25 sqq.). Aristotle, however, probably refers in the Third Book

rather to the citizens; the interesting discussion of the subject in Plato's *Laws* (707 E–708 D) was no doubt present to his mind. Plato had there decided that not only Cretans, but also Peloponnesians (some of whom had once settled in Crete), would be welcome as settlers in the new Cretan city which he is founding. What Aristotle thinks on the subject may perhaps be gathered from *Pol.* 7 (5). 3. 1303 a 25 sqq.

² Similar expressions, however, occur here and there in the *Politics* (e.g. 2. 9. 1270 a 9, *ἀλλ' ἡμεῖς οὐ τοῦτο σκοποῦμεν*): cp. also *de An.* 1. 3. 406 b 22, *ἡμεῖς δ' ἐρωτήσομεν*.

conduct of the inquiry is different. This results, no doubt, in part from the temporary abandonment of the aporetic method of investigation which prevails throughout the Third Book; we have to do now, not with an inquirer on a level with others and joining with them in a tedious and circuitous search for truth, but with one who has sought and found, and if he still inquires, is never, even in appearance, far from a solution. The questions successively raised in the Fourth Book are discussed with a promptness and conciseness which carries us over a good deal of ground in a short space; digressions are frequently avoided by the postponement to another opportunity of discussions which might have led to them (e.g. 4 (7). 5. 1326 b 32 sqq.: 10. 1330 a 4, 1330 a 31 sq.: 16. 1335 b 2 sqq.: 17. 1336 b 24 sqq.). The object evidently is to carry on the construction of the best State rapidly and without interruption. Perhaps, however, there is nothing in this change of handling, which need create any difficulty, nor need we again make too much of certain apparent novelties of doctrine which attract our attention in the Fourth and Fifth Books. The most important of these is the account of *θεωρία* as a kind of *πράξις* (4 (7). 3. 1325 b 16 sqq.), for the recognition of the four cardinal virtues, which we seem to trace in 4 (7). 1. 1323 a 28 sq. and in 4 (7). 15. 1334 a 22 sqq., may perhaps be paralleled from other books of the Politics (see, for instance, 3. 4. 1277 b 16–27), while the account of *εὐδαιμονία* as a combination of *τὸ καλόν* and pleasure in 5 (8). 5. 1339 b 19 is supported by more passages than one of the Politics and the Nicomachean Ethics¹. The view of the Third Book that a ‘good man,’ and therefore a full citizen of the best State, must be capable of ruling (3. 5. 1278 b 3 sq.) can also perhaps be reconciled with the permission appa-

¹ Cp. Eth. Nic. 1. 9. 1098 b 23 sqq. We find the two aims of *τὸ καλόν* and *ἡδονή* ascribed together to the *σπουδαίος* in Eth. Nic. 9. 8. 1169 a 20–25, and *εὐδαιμονία* is said to be accompanied with

pleasure in Eth. Nic. 7. 12. 1152 b 6: 7. 14. 1153 b 14 sqq.: Pol. 5 (8). 3. 1338 a 5. See also the quotation from the comic poet Hegesippus in Athen. Deipn. 279 d.

rently given him in the Fourth Book (c. 3) to live a contemplative life, but Aristotle does not notice the discrepancy, and we are left to harmonize the two doctrines as best we can.

A high authority, Dr. F. Blass¹, has remarked on the rarity of *hiatus* in the Fifth Book. He observes that it is also of rare occurrence in the scanty fragments we possess of the dialogues of Aristotle, which were in all probability composed with a view to publication, and not merely for use within the School, and he argues that wherever we note this avoidance of *hiatus* in conjunction with a style of writing somewhat more popular and less technical than that of the extant productions of Aristotle usually is, we may reasonably suspect that we have to do with a composition intended for publication, or with one which includes matter derived from a work of that nature. He does not extend his remark to the Fourth Book, and we notice, in fact, more frequent instances of *hiatus* in it than in the Fifth. *Hiatus*, however, would appear to be rarer in the Fourth Book than in some other books of the Politics², and it may certainly be said that this book and the Fifth deal with subjects of especial interest to Aristotle's contemporaries, and deal

¹ See *Rhein. Mus.* 30, p. 481. '*Hiatus* is avoided in the Eighth' (i.e. Fifth) 'Book of the Politics with a strictness almost worthy of Isocrates. For though Aristotle allows of its occurrence, not only after *καί*, *ἦ*, and *εἰ*, but also after *μή* and after the article in its various forms—the latter being a laxity which is altogether at variance with the practice of Isocrates—he scarcely ever allows *hiatus* to occur in respect of short and elisable vowels, except in the case of pronouns, conjunctions, prepositions, and other small and frequently used words (herein following the very same rule as the most studied orations of Isocrates), nor does he regard a pause as a justification for *hiatus*. We need hardly alter more than six pas-

sages in this book of the Politics, in order to make its conformity to these rules complete.' It deserves notice that there is a difference between the two families of the MSS. of the Politics in this matter of *hiatus*, the second family occasionally avoiding it where the first do not; but the avoidance of *hiatus* in the Fifth Book is perhaps too general to be accounted for by the supposition that it is due to transcribers.

² I am indebted to an unpublished essay by Mr. R. Shute of Christ Church, Oxford, for this remark, and for the suggestion that the Fourth and Fifth Books may well have been an independent treatise designed for publication.

with them in a not over-technical way. It is very possible that materials derived from works intended for publication have been used more freely in these two books than in others; it is also possible, though less likely, that they were themselves written with a view to publication. The facts to which attention has been drawn may be accounted for in various ways, and some will attach more importance to them than others, but in any case there seems to be little reason for doubting that the two books were intended by Aristotle to form a part of the *Politics*. The relation in which they stand to the Second and Third Books appears to be too close to allow of any other supposition.

In constructing a best constitution—the task to which we now pass—the first step to be taken is to ascertain what is the most desirable life, for the best constitution must realize the most desirable life. What then is the most desirable life?

The opening words of the Fourth Book announce, in effect, that the end of the State—good life, or happiness, or (as in this passage) ‘the most desirable life’—is the clue to its structure. Aristotle, we see, is a teleologist in politics. He adds that nothing less than the most desirable life must be realized by the best State. Aristotle insists on this, because he held that Plato had failed in the *Republic* to realize the most desirable life (2. 5. 1264 b 15 sqq.)—nay, failed even to realize a life liveable by man (2. 5. 1263 b 29). Yet, in Aristotle’s view, the test of a constitution is to be found in the ‘life’ which it secures to its citizens. A constitution which does not secure them the most desirable life is not the best.

The first problem, therefore, to be solved is, what is the most desirable life. The opening chapters of the Fourth Book deal with this problem, and the solution here given serves as a guide throughout the whole process of constructing the best State. It is a life spent in the exercise of ‘virtue fully furnished with the external conditions of virtuous action’ (*ἀρετὴ κεχορηγημένη*). *Χορηγία* and *ἀρετή* are the two pillars on which the best State rests. Fortune, Nature, and a good lawgiver—these are the conditions of its realization (cp. 6 (4). 11. 1295 a 25–31).

If we ask, says Aristotle, what is the most desirable life, the first step to an answer is obvious enough. No one

would say that external goods and goods of the body are sufficient in the entire absence of goods of the soul¹. A man so devoid of courage that he fears the flies that pass him in the air, or so fond of eating and drinking as to be ready to eat and drink anything whatsoever, or so fond of money that he will kill his dearest friend for a farthing, or endowed with no more intelligence than a child or a lunatic, would not be pronounced happy by anybody. It is only when the question is raised, how much virtue, or how much wealth, or power, or renown is desirable, that a difference of opinion arises. Some will affirm that any quantity of virtue, however small, is sufficient. But 'we will tell them' that mere observation of the facts of human life will lead them to a different view. We see that men acquire and retain external goods by virtue, not virtue by external goods, and that those who are as well endowed as possible in respect of mind and character, and have only a moderate share of external goods², live a hap-

¹ This classification of goods was inherited by Aristotle from Plato, whether it originated with him or not (Zeller, *Gr. Ph.* 2. 1. 618. 1, ed. 2). Isocrates refers to τὰ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἀγαθὰ in de Pace, § 32. It is evidently open to much criticism, as a classification. Friends, we remark, are included among external goods (*Eth. Nic.* 9. 9. 1169 b 9); yet external goods are the product of Accident and Fortune (*Pol.* 4 (7). 1. 1323 b 27).

When Aristotle indicates that he 'uses' ἐξωτερικοὶ λόγοι in giving the account which he here gives of the most desirable life, he may be referring to some non-scientific writings or teachings either of his own (cp. *Eth. Eud.* 2. 1. 1218 b 33) or of others. In the latter case, he may be referring to Plato, *Laws* 726-9: 743 E sqq.: 697 B: *Rep.* 591 C sqq.: or to Isocrates de Pace, §§ 31-35: or even to Sappho, *Fragm.* 80 Bergk. Perhaps, however, it is more likely that he is referring to teaching of his own,

possibly to the teaching of the *περὶ πλούτου*, which seems to have been somewhat similar (see *Fragm.* 89. 1491 b 35 sqq.). We have already seen that in 1323 a 28 the virtues referred to are the four cardinal virtues, which, according to Zeller (*Gr. Ph.* 2. 1. 567, ed. 2), 'seem first to have been definitely marked out by Plato and by him only in his later years'; but this also holds of a later passage of the Fourth Book (c. 15. 1334 a 22 sqq.). It is not clear where the use of the ἐξωτερικοὶ λόγοι ceases; it may possibly do so in 1323 b 29, with the words διὰ τὴν τύχην εἶσιν. On this opening chapter of the Fourth Book the remarks of Bernays in his 'Dialogue des Aristoteles' (p. 69 sqq.) should be consulted, and also Vahlen, *Aristotelische Aufsätze*, 2.

² Aristotle probably has external goods such as 'wealth and power and renown' (1323 a 37) mainly in view, but τὰ ἐκτὸς ἀγαθὰ τῆς ψυχῆς (1323 b 27) include

pier life than those who are in the opposite case. And reasoning leads us to the same conclusion ; for the goods of the soul, unlike external goods, increase in utility with every increase in their amount—which shows that they are not means, but ends ; then again, virtue, which is the excellence of the soul, is as much more precious than wealth, which is the excellence of property (cp. I. 13. 1259 b 20), as the soul is more precious than property ; lastly, external goods are desirable for the sake of the soul, not the soul for the sake of external goods. Hence, the more a man has of virtue and of virtuous action, the larger is his share of the highest and most perfect goods, and the greater is his happiness. These arguments receive a final confirmation from a reference to the Divine Nature : God is happy because he is so constituted as to be happy ; his happiness does not flow from external goods. It is in this that happiness differs from prosperity ; the latter is the gift of fortune, but not the former, so far at least as it springs from virtue.

A life of 'virtue fully furnished with external means' being adjusted in amount to the requirements of virtuous action—is the most desirable both for individuals and for States.

So far we have been concerned with the individual, and have proved that his happiness is proportioned to the amount of his virtue and virtuous action. Similar arguments show that the same thing is true of a State. A State cannot fare well unless it acts well, and it cannot act well without virtue and moral prudence, and its courage and justice and prudence will be the same as those of the individual. So that we may state the result of our inquiry thus—'the best life both for individual and State is one of virtue conjoined with a sufficient amount of external and bodily goods to make virtuous action possible.' If any one questions this conclusion and does not agree with what has been said, Aristotle will go into the matter afterwards ; he cannot stay to do so now.

But though we have said that virtue is a necessary ingredient of the best life in the case both of the individual and

bodily goods also, and to him, no less than to Plato (Laws 728 E sqq.), the latter may be in excess:

a man may be too handsome or too strong (6 (4). 11. 1295 b 6 sqq.).

of the State, we have not yet determined whether happiness is the same in the two cases, or in other words, springs from the same source. The happiness of the individual, we have seen, springs from virtue, but is this true also of that of the State? This is an easily answered question, for however various may be men's views as to what constitutes happiness, all agree that its source is the same for State and individual.

The most desirable life, says Aristotle, is not that of a morally and intellectually feeble race living in the unlimited enjoyment of external and bodily goods, but that of a 'wise and understanding people,' endowed with them adequately for the practice of virtue, but not with more than is necessary for that end¹. The passage is interesting, if only from its evident sincerity; its vigour of expression is probably in part due to the fact that in that outspoken age and race there were many who not only practised but preached a life of pleasure or of money-getting, in addition to those who lived for power and distinction. In one of the tragedies which were ascribed to Diogenes the Cynic, the line

Θέλω τύχης σταλαγμόν ἢ φρενῶν πίθον

was put into the mouth of a votary of wealth, the other interlocutor, it would seem, rejoining—

Ῥαῖς φρενῶν μοι μᾶλλον ἢ βυθὸς τύχης²:

and Aristoxenus brings home to us the intolerant strength of conviction, with which an advocate of luxury from the court of Dionysius the Younger of Syracuse, admitted into the *τέμενος* or garden-precinct used by the Pytha-

¹ Compare the expression ascribed to him in Rutilius Lupus' abridged translation of a work by the later Gorgias—*σχῆμα διανοίας καὶ λέξεως*—'item Aristoteles dicitur dixisse: eius esse vitam beatissimam, cuius et fortunae sapientia et sapientiae fortuna suppeditet' (quoted by Heitz, die verlorenen Schriften des Aristo-

teles, p. 159). The teaching of Eth. Nic. 10. 9. 1179 a 1 sqq. is substantially the same as that of this passage of the Politics, and corrects the somewhat different language of Eth. Nic. 10. 8. 1178 b 1.

² Nauck, Trag. Graec. Fragm. pp. 628-9.

gorean Archytas and his disciples for their philosophic perambulations, insisted that a life of bodily pleasure was the only natural one, and that the virtues, from justice onward, were mere artificial conventions, conjured-up products of legislative skill. The King of Persia in his palace was to him the type of felicity¹.

We observe that Aristotle takes no notice here of those who, like the Cynics, held that external goods were not necessary to happiness². The antagonists whom he seeks to confute are evidently those who found happiness mainly in external and bodily goods. It should also be noted that, as the inquiry into the best State advances, the supply of external and bodily goods which it is held to need seems hardly to be limited to the bare amount 'necessary for a share in virtuous action': its citizens are spoken of, at all events, later on, as 'living in the enjoyment of every blessing,' and 'spending their leisure amidst an abundance of goods,' not otherwise than 'those who dwell, if the poets speak truly, in the islands of the Blest' (4 (7). 15. 1334 a 30, 33)³.

So far, the inquiry proceeds, we see our way without difficulty, but now two questions arise which call for consideration. One is whether for the individual a citizen's life spent in political relations with others, or the life of a non-citizen forming no active part of a State, is the more desirable. The other is, what constitution and organization of the State is the best, whether it is desirable for all, or only for most men, to take an active part in the State. The former question is beside the purpose of a political treatise, inasmuch as it relates to what is best for the individual: with the latter, on the contrary, we are directly concerned. Taking up this question, then, for consideration,

¹ Aristox. *Fragm.* 15 (Müller, *Fragm. Hist. Graec.* 2. 276). Men of his feather were common enough in the luxurious cities of Italy and Sicily (Plato, *Rep.* 404 D: *Ep.* 7. 326 B sq.). Archytas' answer is not given, but may be

divined from Cic. *de Senect.* c. 12.

² Compare also the view of Aristotle's contemporary, Xenocrates (*Xenocr. Fragm.* 60-63: Mullach, *Fr. Philos. Gr.* 3. 127).

³ Cp. 6 (4). 11. 1295 a 25 sqq.

we see at once that the best constitution is that under which anyone, be he who he may, would act and fare best and live happily—that it is, in fact, the constitution under which a life accompanied with virtue can best be lived; but then a question arises as to the concrete activities in which such a life should be spent. Thus the question which we have just discarded as ethical rather than political comes back upon us as one which the political inquirer cannot really avoid answering.

The further question, however, arises, in what activities such a life should be spent. Is a political and practical life the best or a life detached from affairs—a contemplative life, for example? An examination of conflicting views on this subject results in a conclusion in favour of a life of practical activity, but then this term

Is the political and practical life the more desirable, or one which is quit of all concern with external things (1324 a 27: cp. *ὁ τοῦ ἐλευθέρου βίος*, 1325 a 19)—a contemplative life, for instance, which some say is the only philosophic life? Our answer to this question is of importance, inasmuch as it must determine not only the direction we give to the life of the individual, but also the nature of the constitution. If we prefer the contemplative life, we may have to adjust the constitution to that end. Two views, as has been said, exist on the subject. Some object to the exercise of any rule over others as being, if despotic¹, unjust, and, if such as one citizen may exercise over another, involving hindrances to the ruler's felicity². Others hold that the political and practical life is alone worthy of a man, and that it gives scope to the exercise of all the virtues in an equal degree with the other. So far we have

¹ It must be remembered that *δεσποτική ἀρχή* properly means, not merely 'despotic' rule, but the kind of rule which a master exercises over his slaves. It is not, however, always possible to express this double meaning in English.

² Aristotle takes no account here of the view of the political life referred to in the Nicomachean Ethics (I. 3. 1095 b 23), according to which its aim was honour. Even in the Nicomachean Ethics, indeed, he tacitly dismisses this view and frequently implies that the statesman exists for the promotion of virtuous action and

happiness (e.g. 10. 7. 1177 b 14). Aristotle's object in the passage of the Politics before us seems to be to represent the political and the contemplative life as akin, both being rich in *καλὰ πράξεις*, whereas in the Nicomachean Ethics he had sharply distinguished *αἱ κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς πράξεις* from *ἡ τοῦ νοῦ ἐνέργεια* or *θεωρητική* (10. 7. 1177 b 19 sqq.). In both discussions, however, the contemplative life is viewed as *αὐτοτελές* in comparison with the political. The nature of the contemplative life at its best is depicted in the tenth book of the Nicomachean Ethics (c. 7).

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speculative
activity.

to do with men who accept a life of virtue as the true life ; but then there are those who say that a constitution adjusted to a career of despotic and tyrannical sway over others, whether with their good will or not, is the only happy one ; and they can plead that many States and nations in practice take their view. It is, however, assailable on many grounds, on that of legality, on the ground that it does not agree with the principles which govern the practice of other arts than that of politics, and on the ground that its supporters are for applying the principle only to others, not to themselves. Despotic sway should be exercised only over those who are destined by nature to be so ruled ; and it is possible for a State, if well constituted, to be perfectly happy which occupies an isolated situation, and whose constitution consequently cannot be designed for war or empire. War is noble (*καλόν*), but it is not the ultimate end ; the ultimate end is good life, to which war is but a means. The business of a lawgiver is to secure good life to his citizens, not empire, though the means by which he secures it will no doubt differ in different cases. If a State has neighbours, it will have to be constituted otherwise than if it has none (e.g. it will possess a fleet, c. 6. 1327 b 3 sqq.). Again, it may have neighbours who are fit subjects for despotic rule (like most States in Asia) ; or it may have neighbours who are fit subjects for hegemony (the usual case in Greece)¹.

Having disposed of this contention, Aristotle reverts to the two conflicting views previously mentioned, and says that each side is partially right. The life spent apart from politics is better than the despotic life, but it is an error to suppose that all rule is despotic, or to set inaction above action. Happiness is action, and the active exercise of justice and temperance is 'noble' (*καλόν*). To infer from this that

¹ Cp. Isocr. Philip. § 5, εἰ σὺ μὲν πεισθείης πλείονος ἀξίαν ἔσεσθαί σοι τήντης πόλεως φιλίαν ἢ τὰς προσόδους τὰς ἐξ Ἀμφιπόλεως γιγνομένας, ἡ δὲ πόλις δυνήθει καταμαθεῖν ὥς χρή τὰς μὲν τοιαύτας φεύγειν ἀποικίας αἱ τινες

τετράκισ ἢ πεντάκισ ἀπολωλέκασιν τοὺς ἐμπολιτευθέντας, ζητεῖν δ' ἐκείνους τοὺς τόπους τοὺς πόρρω μὲν κειμένους τῶν ἀρχεῖν δυναμένων, ἐγγὺς δὲ τῶν δουλεύειν εἰθισμένων, εἰς οἷόν περ Λακεδαιμόνιοι Κυρηναίους ἀπῆκισαν.

any one and every one should set to work to get possession of supreme power in the State would, however, be altogether mistaken. The exercise of supreme power is only 'noble' in the hands of those who have a just claim to rule, both on the ground of virtue and on that of political capacity. The best life, then, both for State and individual is the practical life; but the practical life need not be in relation to others. Mental processes, which are complete in themselves, and an end in themselves (*αἱ αὐτοτελεῖς καὶ αἱ αὐτῶν ἔνεκεν θεωρεῖται καὶ διανοήσεις*, 1325 b 20), are more truly practical (*πρακτικά*) than those which aim at something beyond, for well-doing (*εὐπραξία*) is the end¹, whence it follows that action of some kind is the end, and even in the case of action directed to a result external to itself, we commonly say that those act in the truest and fullest sense whose mental processes are those of a directing authority, and therefore most purely mental². Nay further, States situated by themselves and purposed to live in isolation need not live an inactive life (*ἀπρακτεῖν*)³ even in the ordinary sense of the word, for there will be a mutual interaction of their parts; and the same thing holds good of the individual⁴. Neither God nor the Universe, indeed, exercise any activities external to themselves (*ἐξωτερικὰ πράξεις*).

If we ask who were the disputants, between whom Aris-

¹ This was a Socratic tradition (Xen. Mem. 3. 9. 14-15).

² Contrast the language of Plato, *Polit.* 259 C-E; and compare the comments of Ulysses in Shakspeare's *Troilus and Cressida* (Act i, Scene 3) on those who 'esteem no act, but that of hand,' and undervalue

'the still and mental parts,
That do contrive how many hands
shall strike,
When fitness calls them on . . .
So that the ram that batters down
the wall,
For the great swing and rudeness
of his poise,

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They place before his hand that
made the engine,
Or those that with the fineness of
their souls
By reason guide his execution.'

³ *Τὸ ἀπρακτεῖν διὰ βίου* is said in *Eth. Nic.* 1. 3. 1095 b 33 to be incompatible with happiness.

⁴ Compare *Eth. Nic.* 9. 9. 1170 a 5, *μονῶτῃ μὲν οὖν χαλεπὸς ὁ βίος· οὐ γὰρ ῥάδιον καθ' αὐτὸν ἐνεργεῖν συνεχῶς, μεθ' ἑτέρων δὲ καὶ πρὸς ἄλλους ῥᾶον*: and 10. 7. 1177 a 32 sqq., where the *σοφός* is said to be better able to energeise by himself than the just or temperate or brave man.

X

Who were
the dis-
putants
between
whom Aris-
totle here
adjudi-
cates?

totle arbitrates in the passage of which we have just stated the drift, we shall find it easy to identify the eulogists of 'the despotic and tyrannical type of constitution¹.' Many of that tribe were to be found throughout Greece. The advocates of a life spent in constitutional rule, such as citizens may exercise over fellow-citizens, would also be numerous². But who were those who praised a life 'detached from all concern with external things—a contemplative life, which some say is the only philosophic life' (1324 a 27 sq.)? They seem to be the same with those mentioned in 1324 a 35 sq. as holding any rule exercised over others to be unjust, if despotic, and unfavourable to felicity, if constitutional, and also with those mentioned in 1325 a 18 sq. as pronouncing against the holding of political offices, and distinguishing the life of the 'free man' (ἐλεύθερος) from the political life. The description would in some respects apply to Aristippus, who made a point of withdrawal from political life, and this for the sake of εὐημερία—a word used by the school (Diog. Laert. 2. 89)—or as he expressed it, because he wished 'to live as easily and pleasantly as possible' (Xen. Mem. 2. 1. 9)³; but we do not know that he condemned all despotic rule as unjust⁴. Aristotle probably refers, among others, to Isocrates, who had not only discussed in the Ad Nicoclem (§ 4 sq.), 'whether the life of one who, though occupying a private station, acts like a man of worth, or the life of a

¹ Cp. Plato, Laws 890 A, ταῦτ' ἐστίν, ὧ φίλοι, ἅπαντα ἀνδρῶν σοφῶν παρὰ νέοις ἀνθρώποις, ἰδιωτῶν τε καὶ ποιητῶν, φασκόντων εἶναι τὸ δικαιοτάτον ὃ τί τις ἀν νικᾷ βιαζόμενος· ὅθεν ἀσέβειά τε ἀνθρώποις ἐμπίπτουσι νέοις, ὡς οὐκ ὄντων θεῶν οἴους ὁ νόμος προστάττει διανοεῖσθαι δεῖν, στάσεις τε διὰ ταῦτα, ἐλκόντων πρὸς τὸν κατὰ φύσιν ὀρθὸν βίον, ὅς ἐστι τῇ ἀληθείᾳ κρατοῦντα (ἦν τῶν ἄλλων καὶ μὴ δουλεύοντα ἐτέροις κατὰ νόμον).

² Theages, in the dialogue of that name ascribed to Plato, would 'wish' (εὐχάιμην ἄν) to be a tyrant as he would 'wish' to be a god, but all he seriously 'desires' is the wisdom which Themistocles,

Pericles, and Cimon possessed, who ruled their fellow-citizens not by force, like tyrants, but with their willing consent (125 E sq.).

³ Cp. Xen. Mem. 2. 1. 11, ἀλλ' ἐγὼ τοι, ἔφη ὁ Ἀριστιππος, οὐδὲ εἰς τὴν δουλείαν ἐμμενὸν τάττω, ἀλλ' εἶναι τίς μοι δοκεῖ μέση τούτων ὁδός, ἣν πειρώμαι βαδίζειν, οὔτε δι' ἀρχῆς οὔτε διὰ δουλείας, ἀλλὰ δι' ἐλευθερίας, ἥπερ μάλιστα πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν ἀγει.

⁴ We hear of Democritus also that he withdrew from magistracies to private life (Cic. de Oratore 3. 15. 56), but did he condemn despotic rule over others as unjust?

tyrant is to be preferred,' but had, in his Letter to the sons of the tyrant Jason (§ 11), declared for the former against the latter¹, and for office in states possessing constitutions (*ἐν ταῖς πολιτεαῖς*) rather than in monarchies, just as in the *De Antidosi* (§§ 145, 150) he admits and explains his own abstinence from office: *ταῦτα γὰρ συνεταξάμην οὐ διὰ πλοῦτον οὐδὲ δι' ὑπερφηανίαν οὐδὲ καταφρονῶν τῶν μὴ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἐμοὶ ζώντων, ἀλλὰ τὴν μὲν ἡσυχίαν καὶ τὴν ἀπραγμοσύνην ἀγαπῶν, μάλιστα δ' ὁρῶν τοὺς τοιοῦτους καὶ παρ' ὑμῖν καὶ παρὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις εὐδοκιμοῦντας, ἔπειτα τὸν βίον ἡδίω νομίσας εἶναι τοῦτον ἢ τὸν τῶν πολλὰ πραττόντων, ἔτι δὲ ταῖς διατριβαῖς ταῖς ἐμαῖς πεπωδέστερον, αἷς ἐξ ἀρχῆς κατεστησάμην* (§ 151: cp. §§ 227-9). We see from the charming sketch in the *Republic* (*Rep.* 549 B sqq.), how much a head of a household who took this view of life was usually despised for his want of ambition by his wife and slaves, and the speech of Callicles in the *Gorgias* (485 C sq.) expresses the same opinion in a more aggressive way—*ὅταν δὲ δὴ πρεσβύτερον ἴδω ἔτι φιλοσοφοῦντα καὶ μὴ ἀπαλλαττόμενον, πληγῶν μοι δοκεῖ ἤδη δεῖσθαι, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὗτος ὁ ἀνὴρ· ὃ γὰρ νῦν δὴ ἔλεγον, ὑπάρχει τούτῳ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, κὰν πάννυ εὐφυὴς ᾖ, ἀνάνδρῳ γενέσθαι φεύγοντι τὰ μέσα τῆς πόλεως καὶ τὰς ἀγοράς, ἐν αἷς ἔφη ὁ ποιητὴς τοὺς ἀνδρας ἀριπρεπεῖς γίγνεσθαι, καταδευκότι δὲ τὸν λοιπὸν βίον βιῶναι μετὰ μειρακίων ἐν γωνίᾳ τριῶν ἢ τεττάρων ψιθυρίζοντα, ἐλεύθερον δὲ καὶ μέγα καὶ ἱκανὸν μηδέποτε φθέγξασθαι*. A recent editor of Euripides remarks that he uses the word *ἡσυχαιὸς* to denote the character of a man of learning, and almost as equivalent to *σοφός*²; and thus in the *Supplices* of the same poet we find the soft life of a follower of the Muses contrasted with the hard outdoor life of riding and hunting, which makes men physically capable of doing good service to the State (*Suppl.* 855 sqq.: cp. *Plato*, *Rep.* 410 D). The fact that Pericles is represented by Thucydides as praising the Athenians for being seekers after knowledge without softness shows that the two characteristics were commonly thought to go

¹ Cp. 4 (7). 3. 1325 a 24.

² See Mr. Verrall's notes on Eurip. *Med.* 304, 808.

together. We might have expected that the careers of Epaminondas, Archytas, and Dion would have taught a different lesson, and have proved that an active life of political service was quite compatible with philosophical study; but the popular mind noted the general rule without taking sufficient account of these brilliant exceptions.

Aristotle seeks as usual to mediate between the rival doctrines and to arrive at a conclusion embodying all the truth contained in them without the error. He is for a many-sided life.

The rival views had this in common, that they each declared in favour of one kind of existence as the most desirable, and were for adjusting the institutions of the State exclusively to it. Aristotle is always glad, when he can find something to accept in all the opinions before him, and it is in this spirit that he does justice between the views which he examines here. Despotism is not to be made the aim of the constitution; but it is not, as Isocrates had implied in the *De Pace*¹, always out of place and bad; on the contrary, there are those who are designed by nature to be so ruled. There is, however, nothing great or glorious in thus ruling over them, and the indiscriminate exercise of despotic rule is simply wicked. To hold aloof from office and political activity and to spend one's life in pure contemplation is not the only course worthy of a philosopher, nor is it, on the other hand, to devote oneself to an inactive life. For those whose minds are busy with thoughts that are an end in themselves are active in the truest sense, and besides a life of this kind involves an internal inter-action of parts, which is in itself sufficient to exclude the idea of inactivity. We may therefore come to the conclusion that the best life is the practical life—the life of activity in accordance with virtue and the capacity for the highest kind of action (*ἡ πρακτικὴ δύναμις τῶν ἀρίστων*, 1325 b 11)—and yet hold that the truest form of it is the life which is spent in mental activity of the kind that is an end in itself—such a life, for instance, as the life of contemplation. It is in a life of this kind that the State finds its culmination—indeed, we infer that a speculative life suffices for

¹ § 142 sqq.

happiness without any admixture of political activity (1325 b 27)—but not a word is said by Aristotle against an union of the two lives. On the contrary, we gather later on that if a fit use of leisure is the supreme end of the State, the virtues which a fit use of leisure presupposes are not only those which find employment in leisure, but also those which find employment in periods of activity¹, so that both, it would seem, should be possessed by the citizens of the ideal State.

We see already that the life which Aristotle designs for his State is more many-sided than that life of arms and military exercise, the inadequacy of which had been proved by the successive failures of the Lacedaemonian and Theban States², and better ordered and more philosophic than that lived by the higher classes at Athens.

If we compare the passage in Plato's *Laws* on which Aristotle has modelled his own enumeration of the aims pursued by different States, we shall find both resemblances and differences. It is as follows (*Laws* 962 D–963 A):

A passage
in Plato's
Laws com-
pared.

ΑΘ. Νῦν δὴ μαθησόμεθα, ὅτι θαυμαστὸν οὐδὲν πλανᾶσθαι τὰ τῶν πόλεων νόμιμα, ὅτι πρὸς ἄλλο ἄλλη βλέπει τῶν νομοθεσιῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει ἐκάστη· καὶ τὰ μὲν πολλὰ οὐδὲν θαυμαστὸν τὸ τοῖς μὲν τὸν ὅρον εἶναι τῶν δικαίων, ὅπως ἄρξουσὶ τινες ἐν τῇ πόλει, εἴτ' οὖν βελτίους εἴτε χείρους τυγχάνουσιν ὄντες· τοῖς δ' ὅπως πλουτήσουσιν, εἴτ' οὖν δοῦλοί τινων ὄντες εἴτε καὶ μὴ· τῶν δ' ἡ προθυμία πρὸς τὸν ἐλεύθερον δὴ βίον ὠρμημένη· οἱ δὲ καὶ ξύνδου νομοθετοῦνται πρὸς ἀμφοῖν βλέποντες, ἐλεύθεροί τε ὅπως ἄλλων τε πόλεων ἔσονται δεσπόται· οἱ δὲ σοφώτατοι ὡς οἴονται πρὸς

¹ Cp. 4 (7). 15. 1334 a 16, χρήσι-
μοι δὲ τῶν ἀρετῶν εἰσὶ πρὸς τὴν
σχολὴν καὶ διαγωγὴν, ὧν τε ἐν τῇ
σχολῇ τὸ ἔργον καὶ ὧν ἐν τῇ ἀσχο-
λίᾳ.

² A striking passage quoted by
Strabo from Ephorus (Ephor.
Fragm. 67: Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr.
1. 254) will illustrate this: τὴν
μὲν οὖν χώραν (Boeotia) ἐπαινεῖ
("Ephoros) διὰ ταῦτα, καὶ φησι πρὸς
ἡγεμονίαν εὐφυνῶς ἔχειν· ἀγωγὴ δὲ
καὶ παιδεία μὴ χρησαμένους, ἐπεὶ
μηδὲ τοὺς αἰὶ προισταμένους αὐτῆς,

εἰ καὶ ποτε κατῴρθωσαν, ἐπὶ μακρὸν
τὸν χρόνον συμμεῖναι· καθάπερ
'Επαμεινώνδας ἰδείξε· τελευτήσαντος
γὰρ ἐκείνου τὴν ἡγεμονίαν ἀποβαλεῖν
εὐθὺς τοὺς Θηβαίους συνίβη, γευσά-
μενους αὐτῆς μόνον· αἰτίων δὲ εἶναι τὸ
λόγων καὶ ὁμιλίας τῆς πρὸς ἀνθρώπους
ὀλιγωρήσαι, μόνης δ' ἐπιμεληθῆναι
τῆς κατὰ πόλεμον ἀρετῆς. The
history of the Ottoman Turks
explains what Ephorus and Aris-
totle mean, though both Lacedae-
monians and Thebans were very
different from Turks.

ταῦτά τε καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ζύμπαντα, εἰς ἐν δὲ οὐδὲν διαφερόντως τετιμημένον ἔχοντες φράζειν, εἰς δὲ τὰλλ' αὐτοῖς δεῖ βλέπειν.

ΚΛ. Οὐκοῦν τό γ' ἡμέτερον, ὦ ξένε, ὀρθῶς ἂν εἴη πάλαι τιθέμενον; πρὸς γὰρ ἐν ἔφαμεν δεῖν ἀεὶ πάνθ' ἡμῖν τὰ τῶν νόμων βλέποντ' εἶναι, τοῦτο δ' ἀρετὴν που ξυνεχωροῦμεν πάνν ὀρθῶς λέγεσθαι¹.

Aristotle, we see, takes no notice of the view according to which wealth was the end of the State, to be secured even at the cost of freedom, if necessary, nor of that which saw everything in freedom², nor again of that which aimed at a combination of wealth, freedom, and empire; and his solution differs from that of Plato in substituting for virtue as the true aim of the State virtuous action and happiness. It is not surprising that in reference to a second-best State like that of the Laws, the question between the political life and the speculative life does not come up for solution: Plato had already dealt with this question in the Gorgias (500 sqq.) and the Republic. In the latter dialogue he asserts even more strongly than Aristotle the inferiority of the political to the philosophical life (519 D)—he seems almost to speak of the former as a necessary rather than a noble life (540 B)—but he will not hear of his philosophic guardians abjuring politics for philosophy (540 B). On this point he speaks more clearly than Aristotle.

Thucydides sets more store by empire than Aristotle.

Aristotle's indifference to empire and hegemony contrasts significantly with the language of Thucydides in his Introduction. To Thucydides the interest and the greatness of Greek History increase *pari passu* with the rise of great

¹ Isocrates had said (De Pace, § 19)—ἀρ' οὖν ἂν ἐξαρκέσειεν ἡμῖν, εἰ τὴν τε πόλιν ἀσφαλῶς οἰκοῖμεν καὶ τὰ περὶ τὸν βίον εὐπορώτεροι γιγνοίμεθα καὶ τὰ τε πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς ὁμονοοῖμεν καὶ παρὰ τοῖς Ἕλλησιν εὐδοκιμοῖμεν; ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ ἡγοῦμαι τοῦτων ὑπαρξάντων τελέως τὴν πόλιν εὐδαιμονήσειν. Dr. Johnson seems rather to have felt with Aristotle. "Sir, the happiness of London is not to be conceived but by those who have been in it. I will venture to say there is more

learning and science within the circumference of ten miles from where we sit, than in all the rest of the kingdom." Such was the dictum of Dr. Johnson, when he was seated with Boswell in the Mitre Tavern near Temple Bar' (Hare's Walks in London, I. xiii).

² Plato appears to use the words ὁ εὐθέρος βίος in this passage in a different sense from that in which Aristotle uses the phrase ὁ τοῦ εὐεθέρου βίος (1325 a 19).

hegemonies in Greece. One would almost say that it seems to him to be the mission of the State to stand at the head of a league and to be the mistress of the seas; at all events, States interest him most when they are massed in great groups and set huge armaments afloat. To Aristotle, on the contrary, a State without a dependent ally may be as fully all that a State should be as a State with a thousand (Pol. 4 (7). 2. 1324 b 41 sqq.: 3. 1325 b 23 sqq.). If the life which a State lives is of the due quality, it matters not whether it has relations with a single other State. It is obvious that the teaching of Aristotle on this point had a special applicability, whether he intended it or not, to the circumstances of Athens after the Social War, and especially after Chaeroneia. Her loss of dependent allies was no reason why she should cease to be a great State.

Aristotle's treatment of the subject would have been more satisfactory if he had not mixed together the questions, what is the best life for the individual and what is the best life for the State. The quest of empire by a State is hardly the same thing as the quest of tyrannical authority by an individual, and it is one thing for an individual to abstain from active political life and quite another for a State to stand aloof from all relations with other communities. Even if we hold his conclusions to be right, they are reached in a wrong way. But his object was to insist on the parallel between the State and the individual: both are moral agents and the rule of duty is the same for both. He even goes so far as to say that the virtues of both are the same, though it is obviously impossible that the account given in the Nicomachean Ethics of the temperance (*σωφροσύνη*) of the individual can hold in all respects of that of the State.

This is, however, a less important matter than the assertion that the State is no less bound than the individual human being to the exercise of moral and intellectual virtue. Aristotle's view is that, though the State

Remarks
on this
discussion.

is a greater and nobler and completer thing than the individual, it is, like him, a subject of virtue and happiness, and marked out by the facts of its nature for a life devoted to the attainment of both; it must be brave, just, temperate, prudent, and philosophic, because otherwise it will not fulfil its nature or its appointed end. Its obligation to practise virtue in all its forms is based, not on its duty to its members or to mankind, but rather on its intrinsic nature and destination to be happy.

No difference between the circumstances of the individual and the State is taken into consideration. The State is not to Aristotle, as to some later inquirers, under natural right, while the individual is under civil right. Civil right at its best is, on the contrary, in his view, identical with natural right. He does not even consider whether the fact that the State is the Whole, the individual a part of that Whole, affects the moral obligations under which they respectively rest—whether the Whole, having no larger unity to protect and care for it, and being a thing less easy to replace than the individuals composing it, may not reasonably take more account of its own preservation. We must bear in mind that Aristotle held the State bound to express in its constitution an ethical creed, and to bring the convictions of each of its members as far as possible into harmony with that creed. In fact, though he tacitly abandons the parallel which Plato draws in the *Republic* between the State and the soul of the individual human being, he still believes firmly in an analogy between individual and State and presses it too far.

We have now clearly before us the life which the best State is to live—a varied life of arms, politics, and philosophy—and the next question is, what preliminary equipment must be asked of Fortune on its behalf, in order that the efforts of the legislator in his special work, the production of virtue by laws and education (4 (7). 13. 1332 a 28-32), may not be wasted on ungenial soil or nullified by defects in the population and territory. For the States-

man, like the weaver or the shipbuilder or the master of any other art, must be furnished at the outset with appropriate material to work upon (4 (7). 4. 1325 b 40 sqq.). 'Under the head of the preliminary equipment of the State, we come first to the question, what should be the number and character of the individuals constituting it, and what should be the extent and character of the territory' (1326 a 5 sqq.).

We must ask of Fortune in the first place a people neither too scanty nor too numerous. Many will say that a State to be happy must be large, but, if so, it must be large in respect not of the merely instrumental and subsidiary classes—those concerned with necessary work—but in respect of those which are true parts of the State. It must be 'short in the stalk and full in the ear,' to put Aristotle's meaning briefly, if it is to be really a 'large State,' and not merely a populous one. And then again, experience tells us that exceedingly populous States can hardly be well-governed States, and this is confirmed by reasoning, for the ordering of an overwhelming multitude is work for God, not man, and what cannot be ordered well and beautifully cannot be so governed: beauty, in fact, is seldom found apart from a definite size and number. The most beautiful State is that which, while possessing magnitude, is not too large to be susceptible of order. Nay more, independently of all considerations of beauty, the very nature and function of the State imposes on it certain maximum and minimum limits of size¹. It needs to be self-complete, not only in respect of necessities, as is a nation (*ἔθνος*), but also in respect of things which contribute to the higher life; it needs to have a constitution;

The preliminary conditions of the State:
1. a people neither too scanty nor too numerous.

¹ Cp. Eth. Nic. 9. 10. 1170 b 29 sqq., τοὺς δὲ σπουδαίους πότερον πλείστους κατ' ἀριθμόν, ἢ ἔστι τι μέτρον καὶ φιλικού πληθους, ὥσπερ πόλεως; οὐτε γὰρ ἐκ δέκα ἀνθρώπων γένοιτ' ἂν πόλις, οὐτ' ἐκ δέκα μυριάδων ἔτι πόλις ἐστίν. τὸ δὲ ποσὸν οὐκ

ἔστιν ἴσως ἐν τι, ἀλλὰ πᾶν τὸ μεταξὺ τινῶν ὀρισμένων. καὶ φίλων δὴ ἔστι πλῆθος ὀρισμένον, καὶ ἴσως οἱ πλείστοι μεθ' ὧν ἂν δύναιτό τις συζῆν. The size of the State also, we note, is settled by fixing certain maximum and minimum limits.

and yet, if its population is excessively great, where will a general be found capable of acting as its commander¹, or a herald capable of reaching it with his voice? Thus, while the name of State is deserved by any community numerous enough for good life², and a State which transcends this limit may deserve to be called a larger State, there is a maximum which it must not overpass, on pain of ceasing to be a State altogether. This maximum is fixed by considerations of good government. The citizens must not be too numerous to be acquainted with each other, or how will they be able to fill the magistracies aright or to arrive at correct judicial decisions³? Besides, in an over-large citizen-body it is easy for the names of aliens to slip unobserved into the list of citizens. Aristotle accordingly fixes the ideal size of the State thus: 'the number of its citizens should be the largest possible with a view to completeness of life, provided only that it is not too large to be easily taken in at a view.' The phrase reminds us of the well-known passage in the Poetics, in which the plot of a tragedy is required to conform to certain limits of length, just as a beautiful animal must neither be too small nor too large—*ὥστε δεῖ καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν σωμάτων καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ζώων ἔχειν μὲν μέγεθος, τοῦτο δὲ εὐσύνοπτον εἶναι, οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν μύθων ἔχειν μὲν μήκος, τοῦτο δ' εὐμνημόνευτον εἶναι* (Poet. 7. 1450 b 34–1451 a 15); and the same requirement of 'magnitude that can be taken in at a view' is made with respect to a 'period' in composition (Rhet. 3. 9. 1409 a 36).

Plato had already said that the many would expect the happy State to be as large and rich as possible, and to possess as great an extent of empire as possible, but would also desire it to be as good as possible—herein demanding things mutually incompatible, for a State cannot be at once exceedingly rich and exceedingly good (Laws 742 D–

¹ Epaminondas, however, according to one account commanded in the Peloponnesus an army of 70,000 men (Plutarch, Ages. c. 31: Thirlwall, 5. 95).

² Plato had said (Rep. 369 D)

—*εἴη δ' ἂν ἡ γε ἀναγκαιοτάτη πόλις ἐκ τεττάρων ἢ πέντε ἀνδρῶν*. This Aristotle intends tacitly to correct.

³ A similar idea underlay the early conception of jury-trial (see Hallam, Middle Ages, c. 8, note 8).

743 A); he had also said that there is nothing better for a State than that its citizens should be known to one another, for otherwise men will not get their due either in respect of offices or justice (738 D-E); he had said, further, that the citizens must not be too numerous for the territory, or too few to repel the attacks of neighbouring States, and to help them when wronged (737 C-D). These passages contain the germ, though only the germ, of Aristotle's chapter; he has, however, also before him two passages from orations of Isocrates; one in which the Lacedaemonian king Archidamus recalls that the greatness of his State rests not on the size of the city or its populousness, but on the strict obedience rendered by the citizens to their rulers (Archid. § 81); the other, in which after allowing the vast services rendered by Athens both to its own citizens and to the Greeks generally, and the manifold pleasures of which it is the source, he dwells on one great drawback—*διὰ γὰρ τὸ μέγεθος καὶ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ἐνοικούντων οὐκ εὐσύνοπτός ἐστιν οὐδ' ἀκριβής, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ χειμάρρους, ὅπως ἂν ἕκαστον ὑπολαβοῦσα τύχη καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ τῶν πραγμάτων, οὕτω κατήνεγκε, καὶ δόξαν ἐνλοῖς τὴν ἐναντίαν τῆς προσηκούσης περιέθηκεν* (De Antid. §§ 171-2). Phocylides had already said, not without wisdom:—

Καὶ τότε Φωκυλίδου· πόλις ἐν σκοπέλφ κατὰ κόσμον
οἰκεῦσα σμικρὴ κρέσσων Νίνου ἀφραυνούσης¹.

In selecting an ideal territory, again, no less than in determining the size of the State, Aristotle keeps Plato's views before him (Laws 704 sqq.).

2. A territory of a given character.

He asks for a territory, not rugged indeed, like that of Plato, but, like his, of varied character, capable of raising produce of all kinds², and thus complete in itself, so that

¹ Bergk, Poet. Lyr. Gr. fr. 5.

² Cp. Plato, Laws 704 C, and the description of Egypt in the *Busiris* of Isocrates (§§ 12-14), which may well have suggested to Aristotle many of the characteristics he desires the territory of his best State to possess. How much the word *παντοφόρος* implies will

best be seen if we read in the *Antiquitates Romanae* of Dionysius of Halicarnassus (i. 36-37) the interesting passage in which he enumerates the immense variety of advantages possessed by the soil of Italy and the manifold services which it was capable of rendering to man. Dionysius, like Aristotle,

there shall be as little need as possible of imports or exports or of the classes occupied in importing or exporting. We may imagine it to comprise sunny slopes for the cultivation of the vine and olive, and rich levels for the production of corn. It must be sufficient in extent to support the citizen-population in a liberal, yet temperate mode of life, without their needing to sacrifice the leisure designed for them—a mode of life as far removed from the ‘wassailing’ ways of many Greek cities¹ as from the ascetic severity of Sparta. The territory must also be compact and well under the eye of the authorities, hard of entrance to foes², though easy of exit for the forces of the State; and the city, which, unlike that of Plato’s Laws³, is to be situated not very far from the sea-coast, must be placed so

prefers this variety of aptitude to the more monotonous merits of Egypt, Libya, and the Babylonian plain. Whether he was acquainted with this chapter of the Politics, we can hardly say. As to Italy, cp. Columella de Re Rustica 3. 8. 5. (quoted by Hehn, Kulturpflanzen, p. 394): his tamen exemplis nimirum admonemur curae mortalium obsequentissimam esse Italiam, quae paene totius orbis fruges adhibito studio colonorum ferre didicerit. It was precisely because most of the regions occupied by the Greek race were better suited for certain crops than for others, that it came to be the sea-faring and commercial race which it to a large extent was. Aristotle and Plato, wishing to make their ideal communities as little commercial as possible, asked for a territory capable of raising produce of all kinds.

¹ See Theopompus’ descriptions of life in the Chalcidian cities of the Thrace-ward region (Fr. 149): at Tarentum (Fr. 259, 260): at Athens (Fr. 238). Theopompus, however, is perhaps somewhat prejudiced. The reference in the seventh of the letters ascribed to Plato to the luxury of Italian and

Sicilian life has already been noted. Philip of Macedon, according to Theopompus, won his hold of Thessaly by nothing so much as by his readiness to fall in with the taste of the race for loose jovial revels and coarse riotous fun (Fr. 178). See also Timaeus’ description of life at Sybaris (Fr. 60: Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. i. 205).

² Compare Strabo’s account of Egypt (p. 819, cp. p. 803, ταύτη δὲ καὶ δυσείσβολός ἐστιν ἡ Αἴγυπτος ἐκ τῶν ἐωθινῶν τόπων τῶν κατὰ Φοινίκην καὶ τὴν Ἰουδαίαν). The same merit is ascribed by Socrates to Attica (Xen. Mem. 3. 5. 25, τοῦτο δ’, ἔφη, δὲ Περικλῆς, κατανεότη-
 κας, ὅτι προκείται τῆς χώρας ἡμῶν ὄρη
 μεγάλα καθήκοντα ἐπὶ τὴν Βοιωτίαν,
 δι’ ὧν εἰς τὴν χώραν εἰσοδοὶ στεναί
 τε καὶ προσάνταις εἰσὶ, καὶ ὅτι μέση
 διέζωσται ὄρεσιν ἐρυθμοῖς; καὶ μάλα,
 ἔφη). As to Laconia, see Xen. Hell. 6. 5. 24.

³ The central city of the State founded by Plato in the Laws was to be ten miles from the sea. More than one of the chief cities of Crete, in which island this State is supposed to be founded, were situate at about this distance from the sea (Strabo, p. 476).

favourably in relation both to the sea and to the territory¹, and also to the continent (1330 a 34) on or near which it lies, that the State will at once be well supplied with necessities, and also have all parts of its territory within easy reach of its forces. Security and plenty are the two objects to be kept in view (*ἀσφάλεια καὶ εὐπορία τῶν ἀναγκαίων*, 1327 a 19). Plato had withdrawn his city from the sea and set it down in the centre of the territory (Laws 745 B), because, though not unaware that a fleet is of value as a protection from foreign attack, he deliberately preferred that his State should take its chance of destruction, rather than that it should incur the moral degeneracy and constitutional deterioration which he held to be inseparable from strength at sea (Laws 707 A-D). Isocrates also had traced how maritime empire had corrupted and ruined not only the Athenian but also the Lacedaemonian State (De Pace, §§ 75-105), and had helped to set afloat the famous saying—*ἀρχὴ θαλάσσης ἀρχὴ κακῶν*². Aristotle, on the contrary, desires to be near the sea. He feels strongly—more strongly than Plato—the value of a maritime position both for the supply of commodities and for military strength, defensive and offensive—the fate of Plataea, Orchomenus, and Thebes, inland cities, and the narrow escape of Sparta (1330 b 34) were perhaps present to his mind, contrasted with the successful resistance of Byzantium and Perinthus to Philip³—and he also holds that the moral and constitutional drawbacks of nearness to the sea can be readily obviated. His city is to be placed at a short distance from the coast, like Athens, and to possess, not indeed a Peiraeus, an emporium for all

¹ Strabo notices the excellence of the communications of Alexandria with the interior of Egypt as well as with other countries; the Mareotic lake behind it brought it a far larger mass of imports than the sea in its front (p. 793).

² De Pace, § 101. On the other side of the question—the value of a *θαλασσοκρατία*—see

Wilamowitz, Philolog. Untersuchungen 4. 222, who refers to Athen. Deipn. 8. 334.

³ Compare also the remark of Dercyllidas to the partisans of the Lacedaemonians at Sestos (Xen. Hell. 4. 8. 5)—*καίτοι, ἔφη, ποῖον μὲν ἂν ἰσχυρότερον Σηστοῦ λάβοιτε χωρίον, ποῖον δὲ δυσπολιορκητότερον; ὃ καὶ νεῶν καὶ πεζῶν δέεται, εἰ μέλλει πολιορκηθῆσθαι*.

surrounding States, swarming with alien traffickers, but a modest port, adequate for the transmission of commodities from the territory or from other States, well guarded by walls to prevent its being seized by foes and used against the capital, and serving as a residence for the few alien merchants needed by the community, who might be, if necessary, strictly prohibited from entering the city¹. His State was to have, indeed, not only a port but a fleet, whose magnitude would depend on the nature of its policy; it would not, however, need on this account to have a mob of sailor-citizens (*ναυτικὸς ὄχλος*), as Plato supposed, to dominate and ruin its constitutional life (*Laws* 707 A), for the fleet could be manned by slaves or serfs, like that of Heracleia on the Euxine². Aristotle is evidently quite willing, on this understanding, to allow of even a large fleet.

3. A people
of a given
character.

As to the character which those who are to be the citizens (*τὸ πολιτικὸν πλῆθος*, 1327 b 18) of the best State should inherit from Nature, he asks, not for a population resembling in character the barbarous races of Europe³ and those of chilly regions generally⁴—full of spirit (*θυμός*)

¹ We may perhaps gather from Theopompus' account of Byzantium (*Fr.* 65), what democracy was like in a busy Greek seaport, thronged with traders, though we must bear in mind that his sympathies were the reverse of democratic. Rhodes, though a seaport, seems to have been a well-ordered State, and Massalia also. But Aristotle is probably thinking of the Peiraeus, the home of many foreign worships and the channel through which they found their way into Attica (*Haussoullier, Vie Municipale en Attique*, p. 189).

² According to Isocrates, indeed (*De Pace*, §§ 48, 79), the Athenian fleet at the time of the Peloponnesian War was manned by aliens gathered from the whole of Greece and by slaves. The idea of Aristotle had already occurred to Jason of Phrae (*Xen. Hell.* 6. 1. 11).

³ A distinction appears to be drawn in the passage referred to in the text (c. 7. 1327 b 20 sqq.) between *τὰ περὶ τὴν Εὐρώπην ἔθνη* and *τὸ τῶν Ἑλλήνων γένος*, which would seem to imply that Hellas was not regarded by its author as forming part of Europe. In *Phys.* 5. 1. 224 b 21, *καὶ εἰς τὴν Εὐρώπην, ὅτι μέρος αἱ Ἀθῆναι τῆς Εὐρώπης*, we find the contrary view expressed, but Prantl is inclined to consider these words as an interpolation, for reasons connected with the interpretation of the passage (see his critical note on it, p. 236 of his edition of the *Physics*).

⁴ So Plato (*Rep.* 435 E) ascribes the spirited type of character to 'the inhabitants of Thrace and Scythia, and generally to those who live in the Northward regions.'

and courage, but defective in intelligence and contriving skill (*διανοίας καὶ τέχνης*, 1327 b 24¹), and hence though free, for spirit is the source of independence (*ἀρχικὸν καὶ ἀήττητον*, 4 (7). 7. 1328 a 7: cp. *Eth. Nic.* 4. 11. 1126 b 1), destitute of constitutional organization (*ἀπολλίευντα*), and unequal to the exercise of supremacy over their neighbours²; nor again for an Asiatic population possessed of intelligence and ingenuity but wanting in spirit, and therefore tending to lose their freedom³; but for a Greek population with qualities answering to the mid-way geographical position of Greece, on the edge of Europe, yet bordering on Asia, and combining the two essential characteristics, spirit and intelligence. For though all Greek stocks did not possess this completeness of endowment, some falling short in the one direction and others in the other, it was, so Aristotle held, a general characteristic of the race to be strong in both ways⁴, with

¹ Grote (*History of Greece*, 12. 358 n.) explains the word *τέχνης* by 'powers of political combination,' but perhaps its meaning is wider (cp. *τεχνικώτερον*, *Pol.* 1. 9. 1257 b 4). Still the political art (3. 12. 1282 b 14-16) is one of the many which these races do not possess, and it is probably present among others to Aristotle's mind in this passage. The view is put forward in *Probl.* 14. 15. 910 a 26 sqq. that timid natures are more given to investigate, and therefore are wiser, than those of an opposite character (*διὰ τί οἱ ἐν τοῖς θερμοῖς τόποις σοφώτεροί εἰσιν ἢ ἐν τοῖς ψυχροῖς*; . . . *πανταχοῦ δὲ οἱ φοβούμενοι τῶν θαρρούντων μάλλον ἐπιχειροῦσι ζητεῖν, ὥστε καὶ εὐρίσκουσι μάλλον*: cp. also *Probl.* 14. 8. 909 b 9 sqq.: and 14. 16. 910 a 38). We learn from the *De Partibus Animalium*, that the same thinness and wateriness of the blood, which in moderation was thought to produce intelligence, in excess produces cowardice (*De Part. An.* 2. 4. 650 b 18 sqq.).

² For it is intelligence (*διάνοια*)

that confers the right to rule and the capacity to rule aright (*Pol.* 1. 2. 1252 a 31 sq.).

³ Plato's view of the Egyptian and Phoenician character is much the same (*Laws* 747 C). Compare also Plutarch, *De Vitioso Pudore*, c. 10, *πάντες οἱ τὴν Ἀσίαν κατοικοῦντες ἐνὶ δουλεύουσιν ἀνθρώπων διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι μίαν εἰπεῖν τὴν οὐ συλλαβήν*. Strabo repeats Nearchus' praises of the *φιλοτεχνία* of the Indians (p. 717) and, following Homer, ascribes a similar aptitude to the Phoenicians (p. 757). The Greek conception of the barbarians of the North, on the other hand, is illustrated by statues such as that of the dying Gaul (mis-called the dying Gladiator), and by heads of barbarians such as the well-known one in the British Museum. See also Seneca *de Ira*, 1. 11: 3. 3.

⁴ A similar *εὐκρασία* is traced by Aristotle in man as compared with the lower animals (*De Gen. An.* 2. 6. 744 a 30). So the west wind is pleasantest, partly because it is well-tempered (*εὐκρατος*): cp.

the result that it was not only free but under better political institutions than any other, and would even be competent to rule all other races, if amalgamated under one constitution. Unlike Plato, who had allowed spirit to find expression in one class of his Republic and intelligence in another, and had trusted for success to the co-operation of three classes, each possessed of only partial excellence¹, Aristotle holds that spirit and intelligence must meet in each individual citizen, if the State is to be the 'best State.' To make this requirement is indeed, in Aristotle's view, merely to insist on a type of character already realized by the Hellenic race.

We note, first, in reference to this interesting review of the varieties of national character as they broadly presented themselves to the mind of Aristotle, the fixity he ascribes to the main outlines of European and Asiatic character. This is quite in harmony with his general impression that the future has few new developments in store. In just the same way he is convinced that the hexameter is the only metre for an epic or any long poem (Poet. 24. 1459 b 31-1460 a 5). Isocrates, who had said in his Panegyric Oration (§ 50) that the name of Hellene had come to indicate a form of culture rather than extraction, could have taught him better. Aristotle's language appears, on the contrary, to imply that no race but the Hellenic has any chance of realizing the best State. We see, however, that if the division of mankind into Greeks and bar-

Probl. 26. 31. 943 b 23, ἡ πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι ἔχει τὴν τοῦ ἀέρος κράσιν; οὕτε γὰρ θερμὸς . . . οὔτε ψυχρὸς . . . ἀλλ' ἐν μεθορίῳ ἐπὶ τῶν ψυχρῶν καὶ θερμῶν πνευμάτων γειννῶν δὲ ἀμφοῖν τῆς δυνάμεως αὐτῶν κοινωνεῖ, διὸ καὶ εὐκρατὸς ἐστὶ καὶ πνεῖ ἕκαστος μάλιστα (Probl. 26. 31. 943 b 21 sqq.). The μέση ἀρμονία (the Dorian) is Greek (Pol. 5 (8). 7. 1342 b 14 sqq.).

¹ It should be noticed, however, that the highest class in the Republic consists of men who are not singled out and distinguished

from the second (or soldier) class, till they have attained the age of twenty, and have shown themselves worthy of further education and of advancement to the highest class (see Plato, Rep. 537 A sqq., and Sus.², Note 182). They also, like Aristotle's citizens, will have begun by being θυμοειδής and have left that stage behind. Still they commence their special education at the early age of twenty, and therefore are severed from the soldier-class much sooner than the citizens of Aristotle.

barians still holds its ground, notwithstanding Plato's censure of it in the *Politicus* (262 C sqq.), the barbarian world is falling apart (cp. Plato, *Rep.* 435 E) into two strongly contrasted halves—the barbarians of Europe and those of Asia, or perhaps more exactly, those of cold and those of hot climates—marked off from each other by profound differences of character. Something, therefore, has been gained, though justice has hardly been done to nations of Asiatic origin, such as the Carthaginian, which were certainly not wanting in 'spirit' and love of independence, and whose form of government is praised by Aristotle, or again to European races like the Itali of the tenth chapter, which possessed at least one institution valued by Aristotle (c. 10. 1329 b 5 sqq.)—to say nothing of the Romans and the Jews, with whom Aristotle was probably only imperfectly acquainted, if at all. The contrast of Europe and Asia still exists, though, thanks, in part, to Greece, we should no longer be correct in drawing it as Aristotle draws it. Europe has become the chief home of 'thought and contriving skill,' and, if Asia has fallen into the rear, the element of 'spirit' in its character has certainly been strengthened by Mahometanism.

Aristotle, knowing little of Rome and perhaps under-rating Carthage, overestimated the strength of the Greek race in comparison with that of others. Could the Greek race, united in one State, have conquered even Italy and Carthage, to say nothing of ruling them? Aristotle thought that it was equal to this task (1327 b 32)¹; and

¹ Mr. Eaton compares Hdt. 9. 2, where the Thebans advise Mardonius to create disunion in Greece by bribing its leading men—*κατὰ μὲν γὰρ τὸ ἰσχυρὸν Ἕλληνας ὁμοφρονέοντας, ὅπερ καὶ πάρος ταῦτα ἐγίνωσκον, χαλεπὰ εἶναι περιγίγνεσθαι καὶ ἅπασιν ἀνθρώποισι*. Justin, epitomising Trogus Pompeius, who here, no doubt, reproduced some Greek historian—Ephorus or Theopompus, very probably—speaks of Greece in

the earlier days of Philip of Macedon as 'etiam nunc et viribus et dignitate orbis terrarum principem' (*Hist. Phil. Epit.* 8. 4. 7)—an expression less strong than Aristotle's, but in the same vein. Aristotle may have derived the idea of 'the union of Greece under one constitution' from the policy of Philip at the Congress of Corinth, of which Justin thus speaks: 'ibi pacis legem universae Graeciae pro meritis singulorum civitatum

as to Macedon, he probably shared the opinion which his relative and disciple, Callisthenes, was imprudent enough to express, when, at a banquet of Macedonian leaders and in the presence of Alexander, he ascribed the victory of Macedon to the discords of Greece (Hermipp. Fragm. 49: Müller, *Fr. Hist. Graec.* 3. 47). Aristotle may have overestimated the strength of the Greek race, yet we must not forget that it was a great thing once for all to break, as he did, with the traditions of the popular ethnology of the day¹, which tended to idealize the races lying at the extreme limits of the known world—Hyperboreans, Scythians, Indians, Ethiopians, and the like—and boldly to say that the central race, the Greek, was in reality the noblest.

Distribu-
tion of
social
functions
(*πράξεις*).

Aristotle has now determined what initial equipment (*χορηγία*) or Matter (*ύλη*) to ask of Fortune for the best State, and his next step is (c. 8) to enumerate and place in the right hands the various *πράξεις*, or activities, the due discharge and exchange of which is essential to the life of a State.

He begins by drawing a strong distinction between what we may call the nucleus and the appendages of the State. In all natural wholes (*τὰ κατὰ φύσιν συνεστῶτα*), and therefore in the State, not all those things without which the whole cannot exist are parts of it. Parts must have some one thing in common, and so must *κοινωνοί*, whether their shares are equal or not. But when one element is the means and another the end—as, for instance, the art of the builder is the means, and the house the end—they cannot have the one thing in common which is necessary to make them parts of a single Whole. The house cannot exist without the art of the builder, but the house and the art of the builder do not form parts of a single Whole; they have nothing in common except that

statuit, consiliumque omnium veluti
unum senatum ex omnibus legit'
(*Hist. Phil. Epit.* 9. 5. 2).

¹ See Ephor. *Fragm.* 76 *sub fin.*:
Müller, *Fr. Hist. Gr.* 1. 257.

the builder makes and the house is made; they are only so far related to each other as that which acts upon a thing is related to the thing upon which it acts¹. So property, animate or inanimate, is necessary to the State, but no part of it, for the State is a society of men like to each other, and the one thing in common which holds them together is a common pursuit of the best attainable life. But as the best attainable life is the life of happiness, and happiness is an actualization and complete exercise of virtue, and as many cannot fully share in this life and others cannot share in it at all, we see how varieties of constitution necessarily arise. Aristotle perhaps remembers that some constitutions admitted to power not only those who could live the life of happiness, but in larger or smaller numbers those who could not live it. We infer, though Aristotle does not go on to draw this moral, that the best State will be careful not to admit to power any but those who can attain to virtue and happiness. A human being, for instance, who is fit for nothing higher than to be an animate article of property, must not be made a part of the best State.

After these introductory remarks, Aristotle proceeds to obtain (1328 b 2 sqq.) by a rapid review of society the list of elements or *γένη* necessary to a State to which reference has already been made (above, p. 97). He includes in his enumeration cultivators, handicraftsmen, a fighting class, a well-to-do class, priests, and men capable of deciding questions relating to things necessary and expedient for the State (*κριταὶ τῶν ἀναγκαίων καὶ συμφερόντων*)². We have already seen that he refuses to adopt the

List of necessary *γένη*: deliberative and judicial functions not to be given to artisans, traders, or cultivators, nor even to those who serve the State in war.

¹ How far this is, may be gathered from De Gen. et Corr. I. 7. 323 b 29 sqq., ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ οὐ τὸ τυχὸν πέφυκε πάσχειν καὶ ποιεῖν, ἀλλ' ὅσα ἢ ἐναντία ἐστὶν ἢ ἐναντίωσιν ἔχει, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὸ ποιοῦν καὶ τὸ πάσχον τῷ γένει μὲν ὁμοιον εἶναι καὶ ταῦτό, τῷ δ' εἶδει ἀνόμοιον καὶ ἐναντίον κ.τ.λ.

² For the distinction between things necessary and expedient,

cp. Pol. I. 5. 1254 a 22 : 4 (7). 14. 1333 a 32 : Polyb. 5. 49.6, δόξαντος δὲ τοῖς πολλοῖς Ἐπιγένοους ἀναγκαῖα τε καὶ συμφορώτερα λέγειν. Compare also Xen. Mem. 3. 6. 13, ἀλλ' ἐκείνου γέ τοι, ἔφη, οὐδ' ὅτι οὐκ ἡμέληκας, ἀλλ' ἔσκεψαι, πόσον χρόνον ἱκανός ἐστιν ὁ ἐκ τῆς χώρας γιγνόμενος σίτος διατρέφειν τὴν πόλιν, καὶ πόσου εἰς τὸν ἐνιαυτὸν προσδεῖται, ἵνα μὴ τοῦτου γε λάθῃ σέ ποτε ἢ πόλις ἐνδεής

democratic plan of allowing cultivators, traders, and handicraftsmen a share in deliberative and judicial functions. We pass, then, to the next class, the fighting class (τὸ μάχιμον). Are soldiers to be accorded these functions, or, in other words, are the functions of soldiering, on the one hand, and of deliberating and judging, on the other, to be placed in the same hands? Not at the same time: the same persons are to discharge both sets of functions, but successively. This is the course which justice and expediency and a regard for the safety of the State dictate. It would seem, however, from c. 9. 1329 a 30—ἐπεὶ δὲ διήρηται τὸ πολιτικὸν εἰς δύο μέρη, τοῦτ' ἐστὶ τὸ τε ὀπλιτικὸν καὶ τὸ βουλευτικόν—that the military order is accounted part of the citizen-body¹, not quite consistently with the definition of citizenship in the Third Book, which makes a share in deliberative and judicial office the note of the citizen.

Τὸ εὖπορον
to be the
citizen-
class.

Then we come to the well-to-do class (τὸ εὖπορον). Wealth is for the citizens, so that this class and the citizen-body must coincide. Plato in the Republic had not only included his third, or business, class (τὸ χρηματιστικόν) in the citizen-body, but had made this section of the citizen-body the owners of all the land. Aristotle insists that the citizens must be owners of the land, and that none must be citizens, or consequently own land, save those who possess virtue². Lastly, as to the priests. We must employ citizens to pay honour to the gods, and if we assign the priesthoods of the State to citizens who are too old for political service,

Priestly
functions
to be given
to ex-
rulers.

γενομένη, ἀλλ' εἰδὼς ἔχης ὑπὲρ τῶν ἀναγκαίων συμβουλευέων τῇ πόλει βοηθεῖν τε καὶ σώζειν αὐτήν: and Strabo, p. 235, οἱ παλαιοὶ μὲν τοῦ κάλλους τῆς Ῥώμης ὠλιγώρουν, πρὸς ἄλλοις μείζουσι καὶ ἀναγκαιοτέροις ὄντες.

¹ Yet we are told in c. 12. 1331 b 4, that 'the body of individuals composing the State (τὸ πλῆθος τῆς πόλεως) is divided into priests and magistrates,' and in c. 13. 1332 a 34 it is said that in the

best State of Aristotle 'all the citizens share in the constitution,' which the soldiers can hardly be said to do.

² It was a common saying in Greece that Plutus was blind, and Demetrius the Phalerean had added that his guide Fortune was blind also (Diog. Laert. 5. 82). In Aristotle's best State this would not be the case, for wealth would go to those who would use it aright.

we shall fitly provide both for the worship of the gods and for the repose of the aged.

Aristotle, then, decides in favour of dividing the State into *γένη*, and not only gives the functions of cultivators, handicraftsmen, and day-labourers to a class marked off from the military and governing classes, but also marks off the last-named class from the military class and the holders of priesthoods.

The distinction between some classes permanent, between others temporary. Advantages of this arrangement.

In all this he intentionally departs from the practice of the Athenian and other democracies, which made over deliberative and judicial functions not only to men concerned with necessary work, but also to men whose age, he held, unfitted them for their proper discharge. Aristotle's desire, on the contrary, is to reserve these functions for those who are unfitted for them neither by occupation nor by age—for men in the prime of their powers, neither too old nor too young. He has before him, on the one hand, the examples of Egypt and Crete (c. 10), where the tillers of the soil were marked off from the soldiers of the State; on the other, such utterances of popular wisdom as the line—

*Ἔργα νέων, βουλὰὶ δὲ μέσων, εὐχαὶ δὲ γερόντων*¹,

or the verses of Ion of Chios in praise of the Laconian State:—

*Οὐ γὰρ λόγοις Λάκαια πυργούται πόλις,
ἀλλ' εὖτ' Ἄρης νεοχμὸς ἐμπέσῃ στράτῳ,
βουλὴ μὲν ἄρχει, χεῖρ δ' ἐπεξεργάζεται*².

The powers of the popular assembly at Athens, it must be remembered, were not confined, like those of the people in most modern democracies, to the selection of the legislators and rulers of the State; it held in its hands the whole administration of affairs. It was no doubt largely made up of the persons whom Aristotle would disqualify

¹ See Leutsch and Schneidewin, *Paroemiogr. Gr.* 1. p. 436: 2. pp. 167, 419: and cp. Strabo, p. 675.

² Ion Chius, *Fragm.* 11 (Müller, *Fr. Hist. Gr.* 2. 49).

on grounds of occupation or of age. The contrast of the older and younger citizens, again, is one that often comes to the surface in Greek history¹.

Aristotle, who holds with Plato (Laws, 653 A) that *φρόνησις* comes only with years², wishes to reserve deliberative and judicial work for mature minds. Even, indeed, at Athens, though men became members of the assembly at the age of 20, they could not be elected to the Boulé or placed on dicasteries till they were 30, nor could they act as public arbitrators (*διαιτηταί*) if they were under 50. At Sparta membership of the assembly was withheld till 30 years of age were attained. On the other hand, the tenure of office by men in extreme old age, to which Aristotle and Plato both object, probably seldom occurred in democracies; it would be far more frequent in oligarchies, or in constitutions like the Lacedaemonian, under which many important positions were held for life.

To expect the military class—a class which has the power to maintain or overthrow at will the institutions of the State (1329 a 11)—to accept a position of permanent subjection, as Plato in the Republic expects it to do, is in Aristotle's opinion to expect too much: he provides, therefore, that it shall be transferred to the work of governing, when years and experience of being ruled have developed the virtues of the ruler. We shall thus, he holds, not only content a formidable class, but also secure good soldiers and good rulers. Youth is the age for war, deliberation is work for mature men³. In saying

¹ See the interesting story of the conflict between the older and younger citizens of Termessus in Pisidia (Diod. 18. 45-47: Thirlwall, 7. 233 sq.). The younger men forgot the interest of their city in their generous devotion to their leader, Alexander's general Alcetas; Aristotle would say that they showed *θυμός*, not *φρόνησις*. Thirlwall refers to a similar feud at Gortyna in Crete between the *πρεσβύτεροι* and *νεώτεροι* (Polyb. 4. 53), and adds—'In the siege of

Florence in 1530 we find the *giovani* and *vecchi* taking opposite sides'—referring to Varchi, Storia Fiorentina, l. xii. princ. The same division of opinion appears at Sparta (Thirlwall, 8. 142, 226).

² Cp. Eth. Nic. 2. 1. 1103a 15 sqq.

³ Charicles, one of the Thirty Tyrants, in reply to an inquiry of Socrates, up to what age men were to be accounted young, said—'Ὅσον περ χρόνου βουλευέιν οὐκ ἔξεστιν, ὥς οὐπω φρονίμοι αὖσι' μηδὲ σὺ διαλέγου νεώτεροις τριάκοντα

this, Aristotle does not, like those whom Ulysses criticises in the passage of Shakspeare's *Troilus and Cressida* to which we have already referred (above, p. 305, note), 'count wisdom as no member of the war,' if we understand by 'wisdom' military skill: what he denies to his 'younger men' is *φρόνησις*, a totally different thing. He wishes the citizen-rulers of his State to have been soldiers, but to be so no longer. Rule is not for the soldier. 'Cedant arma togæ.' The capacity for ruling is a totally different thing from the capacity for fighting. On the other hand, the State must place its soldiers in a position that will content them; otherwise its peace will be in peril.

The military organization of Aristotle's State would, however, apparently, be on a small scale. The number of his citizens cannot, it would seem from his language in 2. 6. 1265a 13 sqq., be intended nearly to reach that of the citizens in the State of the *Laws* (5040); yet even if we take their number to be 5000 and allow two sons to each, we should hardly obtain more than a moderate number within the military age. Plato and Aristotle, however, agree in this, that they desire their citizens to possess military aptitude and experience, and yet refuse to make military service the crowning pursuit of their life. They neither approve a State whose citizens shrink from military service and hand it over to mercenaries, like some States of the day (*Isocr. de Pace*, § 43 sqq.), nor yet a State like the Lacedæmonian, where military prowess was everything.

The employment of this force is subject to the limitations imposed by Aristotle on War. War, he says¹, adopting the view expressed by Plato in the *Laws* (628 E), is 'for the sake of peace'; but a little later,

ἐν τῷ (Xen. Mem. 1. 2. 35). But Plato counts men of 40 among *νέοι* (*Laws* 951 E); and Aristotle speaks not of *νέοι* but *νεώτεροι*. Susemihl, indeed, seems to think that Aristotle intended military service to be rendered up to the fiftieth year (*Sus.*³, *Einleitung*, p.

50), and it is true that in the Republic (539 E) men seem to be accounted *νέοι* up to that age. According to a writer in the *Times* (June 26, 1882) 'the age of 50 in a Turk is not far removed from dotage.'

¹ 4 (7). 14. 1333 a 35.

consciously or not, he seems somewhat to relax this limitation (4 (7). 14. 1333 b 38-1334 a 2), for he now allows of three aims in war:—1. self-defence against subjugation by others; 2. hegemony exercised for the benefit of the ruled, not indiscriminate despotic empire exercised over others, whether deservedly or not; 3. despotic authority over those who deserve to be so ruled¹. This enumeration omits wars waged in defence of allies, but it is wide enough to be accepted by any conqueror, however ambitious, who might be willing to adjust his methods of rule to the claims of the States subjugated by him.

As to the financial organization of his State, Aristotle says nothing in what we have of the *Politics*, though it is evident that the maintenance of a fleet would be impossible without a considerable revenue. A large revenue, indeed, was becoming every day more essential for military strength of any kind. States depending, as the Athenian and Lacedaemonian States had done and as Aristotle's State was to do, on purely citizen troops were coming to be out of date. Syracuse fought Carthage, and Carthage Syracuse, with forces partly citizen and partly mercenary. Macedon employed mercenaries as well as Macedonians. But the employment of mercenaries was costly. The relations of the leading States of Greece Proper with Persia in the fourth century B.C. illustrate the financial weakness of these States, but neither Plato nor Aristotle seem quite to have recognized their significance, though Aristotle shows by his remarks in the eleventh chapter of the First Book of the *Politics* that he was not unaware of the importance of the subject.

¹ Compare Cicero's account of the just causes of war (*de Rep.* 3. 23. 34-5): 'nullum bellum suscipi a civitate optima nisi aut pro fide aut pro salute.' A little further on, he adds—'extra ulciscendi aut propulsandorum hostium causam bellum geri iustum nullum potest,' which seems to

give a somewhat wider scope to war. As the remark immediately follows—'noster autem populus sociis defendendis terrarum iam omnium potitus est'—he is apparently ready to justify the wars which resulted in the world-wide rule of Rome.

The control of the State, we see, will rest in the hands of the citizens of mature age. These will also for the most part own the land and rule the households of the State, for the male citizen is not to marry till 37 years of age. They will be qualified to rule over freemen, for they will have had a long experience of being ruled. Their education and their period of military service will also have prepared them to fill their position aright. They will pass their years of maturity in political activity and philosophical speculation, after the fashion of Archytas at Tarentum; and when the vigour of their years is over, they will be withdrawn from these occupations, for the State might suffer from their infirmities, and they will then be eligible for the priesthood. Thus in Aristotle's scheme, one and the same individual is to take on himself successively the functions of soldier, statesman, and priest. We observe that both Plato and Aristotle fear to trust very old men with political power. The history of the Papacy may be quoted against them, perhaps not altogether conclusively; at any rate they are right as to the general rule.

The selection of superannuated citizens to serve as priests will be less surprising to us, if we bear in mind not only that priesthoods were commonly regarded in Greece in the light of dignified sinecures¹, but also that advanced age was held to be a recommendation for the office. 'The service of the gods was supposed to demand clean hands and in some degree a pure heart . . . Even celibacy was frequently required; but in many instances the same end was more wisely pursued by the selection either of the age in which the passions are yet dormant, or that in which they have subsided².' Aristotle chose the latter,

Remarks
on Aristotle's singular arrangement with respect to the priesthood.

¹ Cp. Isocr. ad Nicocl. § 6, ταύτης δὲ τῆς ἀνωμαλίας καὶ τῆς παραχῆς αἰτιὸν ἔστιν ὅτι τὴν βασιλείαν ὥσπερ ἱερωσύνην παντὸς ἀνδρὸς εἶναι νομίζουσιν, ὃ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων πραγμάτων μέγιστόν ἐστι καὶ πλείστης προνοίας δεόμενον. Aristotle also connects the sacrificial wor-

ship of the gods with relaxation (ἀνάπαυσις, Pol. 4 (7). 9. 1329 a 32: cp. Eth. Nic. 8. 11. 1160 a 24), and none have a better right to repose and relaxation than those whom he makes priests.

² Thirlwall, History of Greece, I. 204.

herein following the example of Plato in the *Laws* (759), where priests and priestesses are required to be not less than sixty years of age¹. Plutarch, on the other hand, wrote a treatise (*An Seni sit gerenda respublica*) in favour of old statesmen dying in harness, like Cato the Censor, one reason which weighs with him being the fear of their needing to descend from politics to less noble employments. He does not seem to be aware of Aristotle's suggestion, which would at all events have met this particular difficulty. Aristotle had perhaps noticed that in many cases the heroic kingship of Greece had subsided into a priesthood (*Pol.* 3. 14. 1285 b 16), and thought that the life of his magistrates might well close in the same way. His plan appears to imply a priesthood dedicated to priestly duties exclusively, not one adding to them, as was often the case in Greece², other occupations and interests. He did not probably intend to abolish priestesses: in Greece there were commonly as many female as male ministers of religion³. Priests would not in Aristotle's State possess as great an influence or occupy as paramount a position as that which Plato gives in the *Laws* to some members of the order (especially the priests of Apollo): in the *Politicus*, on the contrary, he is very decided in marking off their functions from those of statesmen (*Polit.* 290 C sqq.).

Principle
underlying
Aristotle's
distribution
of functions
in his best
State.

It must be remembered that in all this Aristotle has the ideal State in view. The principle which underlies his scheme of social and political organization is the adjustment of function to capacity⁴ and of 'instruments' to both. It is a sound one, whatever we may think of his application of it.

¹ Compare Dionysius of Halicarnassus' commendation of the regulations of Romulus with respect to the Roman priesthood (*Antiqq. Rom.* 2. 21). In the *Republic* (498 C) Plato recommends that men should make philosophy the main occupation of the last years of life, when there is no lon-

ger strength for political activity.

² Thirlwall, 1. 203.

³ Thirlwall, 1. 204.

⁴ In the Fourth Book functions appear to be distributed rather according to capacity than according to 'contribution' (4 (7). 9. 1329 a 8 sq.). The two things, however, do not lie far apart.

The happiest State, he holds, is that in which the highest things are willingly left to the highest and best prepared natures, in which a body of men exists in a position to live, and living, for all that is best and noblest in human life, and in which natures unable to live that life ask nothing better than to grow in virtue by aiding others to live it and accepting their rule¹. A body of citizens living the highest life that man can live, the source to those around them who cannot live that life of all the virtue of which they are capable—this is Aristotle's ideal of human society. It cannot, in his view, be realized unless Fortune and Nature second the efforts of the lawgiver, but the essential condition of the ideal State is 'a wise and understanding people,' and the best means of producing such a people is, subject to the favour of Fortune and Nature, a correct regulation of marriage, of the rearing of children, of education and social habits generally. The office of law and institutions and organization is to breed a virtuous people, not to supply its place, which indeed these agencies cannot do².

The tenth chapter falls into two parts (1329 a 40–b 35 and b 36–1330 a 33), the former of which will be considered in an Appendix³. The latter completes the subject of the territory and need not detain us long. That the land is to belong to the citizens, but that they are not to be its cultivators, we know already; we also know what should be its

Arrange-
ments for
the division
of the terri-
tory and
its cultiva-
tion.

¹ Some points of resemblance are traceable between this view, which is however put forward by Aristotle only as an ideal, and Carlyle's far more absolutely stated doctrine. "Well also," says Teufelsdröckh, "was it written by Theologians: a King rules by divine right. He carries in him an authority from God, or man will never give it him. Can I choose my own King? I can choose my own King Popinjay, and play what farce or tragedy I may with him: but he who is to

be my Ruler, whose will is to be higher than my will, was chosen for me in Heaven. Neither except in such Obedience to the Heaven-chosen is Freedom so much as conceivable" (Sartor Resartus, book 3, c. 7). But the differences between the two views far out-number the resemblances.

² Cp. 4 (7). 13. 1332 a 33, σπουδαία πόλις ἐστὶ τῷ τοῖς πολίταις τοῖς μετέχοντες τῆς πολιτείας εἶναι σπουδαίους: and Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 2. 24.

³ See Appendix E.

extent and character: it remains to settle how it is to be divided and what is to be the character of those who are to cultivate it.

Before any award of land is made to individuals, two public objects must be provided for—the due support of the worship of the gods¹, and the supply of the *syssitia* or common meals. There was nothing new in the assignment of land in a newly founded State for the former object, but it was only in Crete, so far as we know, that public land was employed for the support of the *syssitia* (2. 10. 1272 a 12–21). In the Lacedaemonian State each citizen was compelled to pay a contribution to the *syssitia*, on pain of ceasing to be a citizen, and this arrangement was found to thin the numbers of the citizen-body. For this reason, and perhaps for others, Aristotle prefers to employ public land for the purpose.

The remainder of the territory is to be made the property of individuals. Plato had already provided in the *Laws* that the lot assigned to each citizen should be in part on the frontier of the State, in part near its centre, and that each part of the lot should have a house upon it²; Aristotle takes up the suggestion, except as to the two houses (2. 6. 1265 b 24 sq.), and gives each of his citizens a

¹ Aristotle's full provision for the worship of the gods in his best State is deserving of notice. His own theology was far removed from the popular theology of Greece, and as Bernays thinks (*Theophrastos' Schrift über Frömmigkeit*, p. 12), barely left room for the practice of sacrifice; but the *Politics* takes for granted the maintenance even in the best State of the popular faith and the traditional worship. The temples are not only well endowed, but placed in a conspicuous position at the centre of the city; the priests who officiate in them are men who have grown old in the service of the State; the sacrifices they offer form rallying-points for the social life of the State (τὸ συζῆν, Pol. 3.

9. 1280 b 37: cp. *Athen. Deipn.* 36 c, 40 c–d), and means by which the citizens become known to each other. Even expiatory rites for homicide seem to be recognized by Aristotle (Pol. 2. 4. 1262 a 31); and the scoffs and jeers (τῶν ἀσέβων) traditional in certain worships are not interfered with (4 (7). 17. 1336 b 16). On all this see the remarks of Zeller (*Gr. Ph.* 2. 2. 796–7). No interpretation, indeed, of the Aristotelian theology, however rigid it might be, need exclude the kind of sacrifice in which honour is rendered to the Deity, whatever fate might befall those of prayer, thanksgiving, or expiation.

² *Laws* 745 E: 775 E.

piece of land on the frontier together with another piece nearer the city, in order that there may neither be those in his State who will hold the hostility of neighbouring States too cheap nor those who will dread it overmuch.

The cultivators are to be, if possible, slaves submissive in character and belonging to more than one stock¹, or else non-Hellenic serfs resembling them in nature. The danger arising from Hellenic serfs had been made evident by the experience of the Lacedaemonians, and it would seem that in Aristotle's opinion serfs should be sought elsewhere than among the barbarians of Europe, who are said to be 'full of spirit' (c. 7. 1327 b 24).

Aristotle, we note, though he is strongly in favour of the household, is also strongly in favour of *syssitia* or public meal-tables², perhaps a somewhat antagonistic institution. His *syssitia* are not merely *syssitia* of magistrates such as existed commonly throughout Greece³, but *syssitia* of citizens and the sons of citizens, from an early age upward—how early, we are not distinctly told—*syssitia* of the Lacedaemonian and Cretan type. We hear of 'syssitia of priests' (1331 b 5), 'syssitia of the most important magis-

The institution of *syssitia* adopted by Aristotle in its complete form—its recommendations.

¹ Like the Callicyrii, who at one time formed the slave-class at Syracuse, and whose name, according to Aristotle, signified the variety of their extraction (cp. Timaeus, *Fragm.* 56: Müller, *Fr. Hist. Gr.* 1. 204).

² Cp. c. 10. 1330 a 3 sq., *περὶ συσσιτίων τε συνδοκῆς πᾶσι χρήσιμον εἶναι ταῖς ἐν κατασκευασμέναις πόλεσιν ὑπάρχειν δι' ἣν δ' αἰτίαν συνδοκῆ καὶ ἡμῖν, ὕστερον ἐροῦμεν*. The reasons for his view would have been interesting, but they are not given in what we possess of the *Politics*.

³ 'The practice of bringing the highest magistrates of the State together at a common meal in the Prytaneum, and of inviting also any guest whom the community might desire to honour is not

specially Attic, but one which existed in all Greek States.' Athens retained this custom down to a late period of the Empire, 'though her citizens always remained strangers to the stiff and one-sided exaggeration of it, fatal in its tendencies to the household relation, which is exemplified in the *syssitia* of Dorian States' (R. Schoell, *die Speisung im Prytaneion zu Athen*, *Hermes* 6. 14 sqq.). *Syssitia* in this latter form, however, were not apparently confined to Doric States, for even if the Cretan *syssitia* were of Doric origin, which hardly seems to be Aristotle's opinion (2. 10. 1271 b 28 sq.), we hear of *syssitia* also in Boeotia (Plato, *Laws* 636 B: C. F. Hermann, *Gr. Antiqq.* 1. § 180. 10).

tracies' (1331 a' 25), syssitia of the soldiers or of the younger men (1331 a 22). It is not impossible that in Aristotle's State, unlike the Lacedaemonian, men of different ages were to belong to different syssitia, just as the gymnasia of the older men were to be distinct from those of the younger men (1331 a 37 sqq.). Some evils connected with the syssitia as organized at Sparta and elsewhere (Plato, *Laws* 636 A-B) would thus be avoided, but something also would be lost, for the young would lose an opportunity of learning from their elders. Still the main outlines of the Cretan and Lacedaemonian institution would be retained. A Lacedaemonian mess-table (*φιδίτιον*) consisted of fifteen¹ messmates, who filled vacancies in their number by choice. Each of these groups of fifteen, was, as may easily be conceived, a group of close friends, especially as they not only gathered at the same board, but fought side by side in war, so that their friendship was often tested, and its value proved, on the battlefield. They formed, in fact, a kind of military brotherhood, or household, and, as Aristotle points out (2. 5. 1264 a 6 sqq.), it was of little use for Plato to abolish the household and retain the syssition, as he does in the *Republic* (416 E: 458 C), if he wished to make all the citizens of his State equally dear to each other. The Spartan Megillus claims in the *Laws* (636 A) that the institution of syssitia was favourable both to courage and temperance. It must have given men a knowledge of one another and a confidence in one another which would hardly have existed without it; a generous rivalry no doubt sprang up both within the mess and between one mess and another; the State was better served, and there was a gain of pleasure to the individual. The mess-system also enabled the authorities to enforce frugality and sim-

¹ When Agis IV in his scheme of reform made the *φιδίτια* created by him large bodies comprising on an average 300 members, he would seem to have departed from the ancient model, though he may

very probably have subdivided these large unities into small messes. See Schömann, *Antiquitates Iuris Publici Graecorum*, p. 140. 10.

plicity at table, and it would be equally useful in maintaining Aristotle's more liberal standard of living.

Ancient societies were far richer in these minor organized groups than modern. Amongst ourselves, a man belongs to his family, his town, his party, his State; but a Greek belonged not only to these, but to a clan, a phratry, a deme, and in many States to a *συσσίτιον*, to say nothing of voluntary associations such as a *θλασος* or a philosophical school. The Greek race was more social, and social in a simpler and less elaborate way, than most modern races, and this was at once the cause and the effect of its defective development of the household. Greek States were full of enjoyable little gatherings, which tyrants feared and sought to put down (7 (5). II. 1313 a 41 sqq.), thus earning the undying hatred of a race which found the main charm of life rather in friendship than in the household relations.

Aristotle has now done with the territory and its cultivators, and his next step is to complete his picture of the city in the same way. His city is, we know already (p. 316 sq.), to be situate not too far from the sea, yet within easy reach of its territory and the continent generally; but these are not the only matters to be attended to in the choice of its site and its laying out. Health, military strength, suitability for the purposes of political life, and beauty¹, must all be kept in view. The secret of health is to be well circumstanced in respect of those things to whose influence we are most constantly exposed—water and air; and thus the city must not only be situate in a healthy region, but have a healthy aspect, and it must be well supplied with water². A good and unfailing supply of water is also

Picture of
Aristotle's
ideal city.

¹ Aristotle mentions (4 (7). II. 1330 a 36 sqq.) four points to be kept in view with respect to the internal arrangements of the city, but, characteristically enough, in his eager haste omits to specify the fourth, which would, however, seem to be beauty (*κόσμος*).

² 'The water-supply of Greek

towns was probably' often 'scanty enough' (Mahaffy, *Old Greek Education*, p. 31), so that this was an important suggestion. How far it was acted on, we know not; but Strabo tells us that Rome was the first city to set the example of a profuse provision of water (Strabo, p. 235, τῶν γὰρ Ἑλλήνων περὶ τὰς

a condition of military strength, and Aristotle evidently holds that military strength is to be studied as much as anything. His city reminds us in some respects of Athens, but Athens, though strong and defensible, can hardly be said to have been difficult of approach for foes (*δυσπρόσοδος*, 1330 b 3). It is to possess walls as skilfully built and as impregnable as the science of the day could make them¹, and within them the city is to be only in certain parts laid out with broad straight streets: parts of it are to be an intricate tangle of lanes, so that it may be defensible even after its walls have been penetrated², or else the houses are to be disposed in the fashion of a quincunx. The younger citizens will also be required to hold their *syssitia*, or some of them, on the walls.

Still Aristotle asks for something more than a 'maiden city,' impregnably strong. His city must be so laid out as to favour a rational political life, and to enable the ruling citizens to gather for work or converse without being jostled by an uncongenial throng of traffickers and artisans, or even coming into too close contact with the youth, whose place, as soldiers, will be upon the walls. Beauty again must not be lost sight of, and Aristotle's city will not fail in this respect. The houses must be disposed with sufficient regularity to satisfy the Greek idea of beauty in architecture, and the taste both of ancients and moderns would be gratified by the choice of a site near the citizens' agora for the foliage and shade and flowing streams of a gymnasium³. Aristotle's idea, in fact, seems to be to bring

κτίσεις εὐστοχῆσαι μάλιστα δοξάντων, ὅτι κάλλους ἐστοχάζοντο καὶ ἐρυμνότητος καὶ λιμένων καὶ χώρας εὐφροῦς, οὗτοι (the Romans) προὐνόησαν μάλιστα ὅν ὀλιγώρησαν ἐκείνοι, στρώσεως ὁδῶν καὶ ὑδάτων εἰσαγωγῆς καὶ ὑπονόμων τῶν δυναμένων ἐκκλύζειν τὰ λύματα τῆς πόλεως εἰς τὸν Τίβεριν). As to the water-supply of Antioch, see Mommsen, *Röm. Geschichte*, 5. 458.

¹ Aristotle discusses and rejects the opposite advice of Plato, *Laws* 778 D sqq.

² Aristotle here probably has in view the experience of Perinthus, when besieged by Philip of Macedon. Philip after a hard struggle made himself master of the city-wall, but only to find himself in face of a close array of houses rising tier over tier up the slope of the hill, and parted by narrow lanes, across which the besieged carried walls from house to house (Diod. 16. 76).

³ A statue of Eros near the Academy was thus inscribed

agora and gymnasium together, the haunts of politics and those of philosophy¹.

We must imagine, then, a city at about the same distance from the sea as Athens, and perhaps (though this we are not distinctly told²) linked like Athens by long walls to its port, a miniature Peiraeus; the city itself facing eastward like the centres of the worship of Aesculapius, Epidaureus and Cos, and like Croton, whose healthiness was proverbial³, for the sake, we are surprised to read, of a full exposure to the easterly winds⁴, or else sheltered from the north wind, so that it may have a mild climate in winter⁵; not placed by the side of a river, like Sparta and many Roman cities, but including in its site one or more strong positions (1330 b 21), and especially a conspicuous hill, perhaps scarped or precipitous like the Acropolis at

(Athen. Deipn. 609 d):

ποικιλομήχαν' ἔρως, σοὶ τὸνδ' ἰδρύ-
σατο βωμόν

Χάρμος ἐπὶ σκιεροῖς τέρμασι γυμ-
νασίου.

We are reminded of Waller's lines in his poem on St. James' Park: In such green palaces the first Kings reigned,

Slept in their shades and angels entertained;

With such old counsellors they did advise,

And by frequenting sacred groves grew wise.

¹ For in Aristotle's day the philosophic schools were commonly situated in or near gymnasia: cp. Quintil. 12. 2. 8 (quoted by C. F. Hermann, Gr. Antiqq. 3. § 36. 22): studia sapientiae . . . in porticus et gymnasia primum, mox in conventus scholarum seceserunt.

² Cp. c. 6. 1327 a 32-35. According to von Wilamowitz (Philolog. Untersuchungen, Heft 4. p. 200), the long walls between Athens and Peiraeus had wholly lost their defensive value by the time of Demetrius Poliorcetes, owing to the improvements in siege-artillery.

³ Aristotle, indeed, appears to desire his city not only to face, but to slope Eastward (4 (7). 11. 1330 a 38 sq.): how far the cities referred to in the text did so, I will not undertake to say. Strabo (p. 374) describes Epidaureus as 'facing the point at which the sun rises in summer': ὑγιέστερον Κρότωνος was a familiar proverb (Strabo, p. 262). Syracuse, though it also faced east, was more famous for wealth than health (Strabo, p. 269), probably because there were marshes near it. Alexandria was happily circumstanced in both respects (Strabo, p. 793).

⁴ See Sus.³, Note 845, and the references there given, to which may be added Plutarch de Curiositate c. 1, ὥσπερ τὴν ἐμὴν πατρίδα πρὸς ζέφυρον ἀνεμὸν κεκλιμένην καὶ τὸν ἥλιον ἐρεΐδοντα δεξιῇ ἀπὸ τοῦ Παρνασοῦ δεχομένην, ἐπὶ τὰς ἀνατολὰς τραπῆναι λέγουσιν ὑπὸ τοῦ Χαίρωνος. The east wind is spoken of as warm in Probl. 26. 31. 943 b 24.

⁵ Athens lay πρὸς μεσημβρίαν (Dio Chrys. Or. 6. 198 R). So did Gortyna in Crete (Bursian, Geographie von Griechenland 2. 564).

Athens, on which such temples as the law of the State or the Delphic oracle did not relegate elsewhere might be grouped, so as to be visible from afar¹, and beside them the halls for the common meals of the priests and the chief magistrates. Like every Greek city, it was to have a central open-air gathering-place for converse and discussion—a kind of ‘sensorium,’ the like of which does not exist in modern cities. Immediately beneath the hill just described will lie an agora for the use of citizens only, kept sacred not only from all buying and selling, but from the very presence of cultivators, traders, and artisans; and close beside it, as has already been noticed, not, as in the Athens of Aristotle’s day, in the outskirts of the city², a gymnasium—the gymnasium of the older men, which is to be distinct and separate from the gymnasium for the younger men. Aristotle evidently felt that it was necessary to place the gymnasia under strict supervision, for while magistrates are to be present in the gymnasium for the younger men, the gymnasium for the older men is to be situate in the very heart of the city, close beneath its central temples. It is interesting to notice that the gymnasium, which was a public playground combined with public baths—indeed, something more than this, for it was a place of preparation for the military service of the State—is viewed both by Plato and Aristotle as an indispensable adjunct to a city. Neither makes mention of a public library, an institution

¹ Cp. Paus. 9. 22, εὐδὲ μοι Ταναγραῖοι νομίσαι τὰ ἐς τοὺς θεοὺς μάλιστα δοκοῦσιν Ἑλλήνων, χωρὶς μὲν γὰρ αἱ οἰκίαι σφίσι, χωρὶς δὲ τὰ ἱερά ὑπὲρ αὐτὰς ἐν καθαρῷ τέ ἐστι καὶ ἐκτὸς ἀνθρώπων: and Vitruv. 1. 7. (both quoted by C. F. Hermann, Gr. Antiqq. 2. § 15. 3-4). See also Xen. Mem. 3. 8. 10, and note the epithet ἀπόψιον in the encomium on the Parthenon at Athens in Dicaearch. (?) de Graeciae Urbibus (Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 2. 254). ‘A visitor to the counties of Norfolk and Suffolk must be struck alike by the number, the beauty,

and the conspicuous positions of the church-towers. They answer one another, so to speak, from hill to hill’ (Letter in *Times*, Oct. 13, 1881).

² This important change is adopted from Plato, Laws 804 C. In Nicaea, built by Antigonus in B.C. 316, the gymnasium appears to have been situated in the centre of the city (Strabo, pp. 565-6). It seems to be within the walls in the city described by Dio Chrysostom in Or. 7. 233 R. See also 2 Macc. 4. 12.

reserved for the next generation. In a quite distinct situation, selected for its easiness of access both from the sea and from the territory, a market for buying and selling should be laid out, and here should be gathered the minor magistracies—those which have to do with men's business relations with one another* and with certain formal matters in relation to law-suits, and also those of the *agoranomi* and *astynomi*. Thus, even in their leisure-hours, by a plan adopted from Thessaly and already recommended by Xenophon (*Cyrop.* 1. 2. 3: 7. 5. 85¹), the citizens would be kept as much as possible apart from the classes concerned with production and trade. Each class would have, in fact, its appointed region: the citizens of full age would haunt the neighbourhood of the Acropolis, and the region near it; the younger men would keep watch and ward upon the walls, where many of them would even take their meals, or else be in their own gymnasium, which would not, probably, be far from the walls; the women would be at home, secluded somewhat more strictly than in democracies; the boys would be at school or in their gymnasia, the peasants on their farms, the traders and artisans at their places of business in the port or in the commercial quarter of the city. The various classes of society were each of them to have room to live their own life; the higher ones especially were not to be mixed up with or jostled by the lower. Aristotle's State is like his Kosmos, in which every element is assigned a place of its own, earth at the bottom, fire at the top, and water and air between them, as the relatively heavy and the relatively light². We are sensible of a reaction from the confusion of ranks, sexes, and ages, which is vividly described

¹ The Romans had two kinds of 'fora': 'some were exclusively devoted to commercial purposes and were real market-places, while others were places of meeting for the popular assembly and for the courts of justice: mercantile business, however, was not altogether excluded from the latter,'

which were sometimes called 'fora judicialia' (Smith, *Dict. of Antiquities*, art. Forum). Henkel (*Studien* 141. 22), following E. Curtius, remarks that the gathering-place (*Versammlungsraum*) of the Spartans was from the first quite distinct from the market.

² Zeller, *Gr. Ph.* 2. 2. 908.

by Plato (Rep. 562-3) as characteristic of an extreme democracy, where boys, he says, are prematurely old, and old men affect to be young. The people of Aristotle's State would be like the Spaniards of Clarendon, a people of 'honour and punctuality,' 'bred up in the observation of distances and order'.¹ Similar arrangements, Aristotle continues, are to be made throughout the territory. Just as the towers on the city-wall are to be places of watch and ward for the protection of the city, so there must be places of watch and ward for the Wardens of the Woods (ὕλωροι) and the Overseers of the country districts (ἀγρονόμοι), where they may hold their common meals; and there must also be temples dedicated to gods and heroes.

So far we have been dealing with matters in respect of which the favour of Fortune counts for almost everything: now we come to a matter in which more depends on the legislator—what is the citizen-body of the best State to be in character and circumstances?

At this point (end of c. 12. 1331 b 18) Aristotle turns with some impatience from details, the realization of which he feels after all depends on Fortune, to the constitution², and asks what should be the character of those who are to form the citizen-body of a happy and well-constituted State, just as he had already asked and answered (c. 10. 1329 b 39 sqq.) the same question as to the cultivators of the soil. It is here that the inquiry as to education begins, which extends to the close of the Fifth Book, and is not indeed completed in that book, as it has come down to us. No direct and immediate answer is given to the question now raised as to the citizen-body, but we gather from what follows that they must be men who are not debarred by any defect of nature or fortune from attaining happiness and who have received a correct training both of habit and of reason. It is best, however, to follow Aristotle's own treatment of the question he raises.

To win success in any enterprise, he says, it is necessary

¹ History of the Rebellion, Book xiii (vol. 6, p. 443, ed. 1839).

² C. 13. 1331 b 24, *περί δὲ τῆς πολιτείας αὐτῆς, ἐκ τίνων καὶ ἐκ ποίων δεῖ συνεστάναι τὴν μέλλουσαν ἔσεσθαι πόλιν μακαρίαν καὶ πολιτεύεσθαι καλῶς, λεκτέον*. Here *πολι-*

τεία is probably used in its usual sense of 'constitution' (cp. 1332 a 4), and not in the sense which it sometimes bears of 'universitas civium' (Bon. Ind. 612 b 10 sqq.), but the passage shows that the two meanings do not lie far apart.

both to aim at the true end, and to have at one's command the means to its attainment, for men fail of success by missing the one or the other or both; and this holds of the arts and sciences, for in practising them both the end and the course of action which leads to its attainment must be grasped (*κρατεῖσθαι*)¹. All agree in making happiness the end, but some are incapacitated for attaining it by defects of nature or fortune², and others, not being thus incapacitated, do not seek it aright. Now, as the business before us is to discover the best constitution, and the best constitution is that under which the State is as happy as possible, we are bound to understand what happiness is. In tracing its nature we are not in the least diverging from the path which a political treatise should follow. It is, as we have already said in the *Ethics* (*ἐν τοῖς ἠθικοῖς*)³, *ἐνέργεια καὶ χρῆσις ἀρετῆς τελεία*—a complete actualization and exercise of virtue—and this not 'conditionally' (*ἐξ ὑποθέσεως*), but 'absolutely' (*ἀπλῶς*): it is not an exercise of virtue under pressure of necessity, like that of the judge when he inflicts just punishment, for such an exercise of virtue is conversant with what is in itself an evil, though in the particular case and to the criminal it becomes a good, and it is only 'conditionally noble' or 'noble in a necessary way': the criminal who is punished and the State which punishes would be happier if nothing of the kind was necessary. Nor, again, is it such an exercise of virtue as occurs when a man of full virtue (*σπουδαῖος*) has to

The citizens must be happy, and if they are to be happy in the fullest sense, their exercise of virtue must be 'complete'—i.e. it must be in relation to things absolutely good, not to things conditionally good (that is, good under given circumstances, like punishment.)

¹ There is some ambiguity about the word *κρατεῖσθαι*, which is probably designed to mean something more than is expressed by *εὐρίσκειν* (1331 b 29)—not merely 'known,' but 'possessed'; so that the transition may be easy to a recognition of the fact that defects of nature or fortune, no less than an ignorance of the end and the means of attaining it, may make the attainment of happiness impossible. This fact is recognized in 1331 b 40 sq. The logical sequence of this part of the chapter would

have been better if the word *κρατεῖν* had been used in place of *εὐρίσκειν* in 1331 b 29.

² Cp. Plato, *Laws* 747 C, *εἰ δὲ μή, τὴν καλουμένην ἂν τις πανουργίαν ἀντὶ σοφίας ἀπεργασάμενος λάθοι, καθάπερ Αἰγυπτίους καὶ Φοίνικας καὶ πολλὰ ἕτερα ἀπεργασμένα γένη νῦν ἔστιν ἰδεῖν ὑπὸ τῆς τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιτηδευμάτων καὶ κτημάτων ἀνελευθερίας, εἴτε τις νομοθέτης αὐτοῖς φαῦλος ἂν γενόμενος ἐξεργάσατο τὰ τοιαῦτα, εἴτε χαλεπὴ τύχη προσπεσούσα εἴτε καὶ φύσις ἄλλη τις τοιαύτη.*

³ See Appendix F.

deal with poverty or disease or ill-fortune of any kind: on the contrary, it is an exercise of virtue in relation to 'things absolutely good' (τὰ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὰ)—the goods of fortune¹. The actions by which happiness is secured—those which are 'absolutely virtuous and noble'—are such as are conversant with 'absolute goods'; they are actions which 'create and generate goods'².

We now therefore know both the end and the course of action by which it is secured. The end is εὐδαιμονία—a word very imperfectly rendered by happiness—and the actions by which it is secured³ are virtuous actions conversant with absolute goods, and therefore absolutely virtuous and noble. The citizens of Aristotle's best State are to be at once actively virtuous and in the enjoyment of the goods of fortune. We had been told at the beginning of the book that a certain *quantum* of external and bodily goods, not a large one, is essential to happiness, because essential to the exercise of virtue: we learn now the further lesson that virtuous action does not become happy action, or even become 'absolutely virtuous and noble' (σπουδαία καὶ καλὴ ἀπλῶς), unless it is exercised on a certain object-matter, external and bodily goods—in other words, the goods of fortune. Fortune, therefore, is doubly a source of happiness, making virtuous action possible, and being the condition of its attaining its highest level, that of happy action. Both in the earlier part of the book and here Aristotle insists that there are two factors of happiness—virtuous action, and χορηγία which is the gift of fortune; but while in the earlier passage his aim is to

¹ This seems to be the meaning of the term here: cp. Eth. Nic. 5.2. 1129 b 1 sqq. In Eth. Nic. 1. 1. 1094 b 16 sqq., however, the virtue of ἀνδρεία seems to be included among ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὰ. Other passages will be found referred to, together with these, in Bon. Ind. 4 a 2 sqq.

² It appears from Seneca's Seventy-first Epistle, that even the followers of Plato denied full

happiness to the good man enduring tortures. 'Academici veteres beatum quidem esse etiam inter hos cruciatus fatentur, sed non ad perfectum nec ad plenum: quod nullo modo potest recipi. Nisi beatus est, in summo bono non est.' Aristotle declines to say that he is happy at all.

³ Αἱ πρὸς τὸ τέλος φέρουσαι πράξεις (1331 b 28).

magnify the share of virtue and virtuous action in the result at the expense of that of fortune, here he acknowledges more fully the importance of the other factor. Later on, indeed, he finds in the fact that happiness implies the exercise of virtue in relation to things absolutely good, the strongest ground for making the education of the citizens of the best State such as to call forth in them all the virtues, especially the highest, and to develop the whole man. Πολλῆς οὖν δεῖ δικαιοσύνης καὶ πολλῆς σωφροσύνης τοὺς ἀριστα δοκοῦντας πράττειν καὶ πάντων τῶν μακαρίζομένων ἀπολαύοντας, οἷον εἴ τινές εἰσιν, ὥσπερ οἱ ποιηταὶ φασιν, ἐν μακάρων νήσοις· μάλιστα γὰρ οὗτοι δεήσονται φιλοσοφίας καὶ σωφροσύνης καὶ δικαιοσύνης, ὅσῃ μᾶλλον σχολάζουσιν ἐν ἀφθονίᾳ τῶν τοιούτων ἀγαθῶν (c. 15. 1334 a 28-34).

Two things, then, are necessary for the attainment of happiness—the aid of fortune, and the science and correct moral judgment (ἐπιστήμη καὶ προαίρεσις) of a lawgiver who knows how virtue is produced. It is by making the citizens who share in the constitution—in our case, all the citizens—virtuous, that the State is made virtuous. And, if we take up again the question on the threshold of which we stood at the close of the Third Book (3. 18. 1288 a 39 sqq.) and ask how men are made virtuous, the answer is, by nature, habit, and reason¹. A man must be born (φύναί, whence φύσις) as a man and not any other animal, and with certain bodily and psychical qualities. What these are, Aristotle has described elsewhere. But nature often counts for little, for in the case of some animals it may easily be made better or worse by habit. Of the lower animals, indeed, most live as nature made them to live; a very few live by habit also; only man lives by reason in addition, for he alone possesses reason. So that in him nature, habit, and reason must harmonize, for reason is powerful enough to overrule both nature and habit. We see, then,

Two things then are necessary for the realization of a happy State—'absolute goods' and virtue. The first we must ask of Fortune: for the second the legislator is responsible. How then are men made virtuous? We return here to the question with which the Third Book closed. By nature,

¹ This was a view inherited by Aristotle from previous inquirers, and especially from Protagoras

(Fr. 8: Mullach, Fr. Philos. Gr. 2. 134), Socrates (Xen. Mem. 3. 9. 1), and Plato (Phaedrus 269 D).

habit, and reason, acting in harmony.

But is our education to be such as to produce men fitted only for ruling, or such as to produce men fitted first to be ruled and then to rule? We must aim at the latter result.

that if a man is to be made virtuous and happy, he must not only be favoured both by fortune and by nature, but be educated both through habit and through his reason.

But is our education to be such as will produce men fitted only to rule, or is it to be such as will produce men fitted first to be ruled and then to rule? It is better that the same men should always rule, but then, if they are to do so justly and if their supremacy is to be willingly accepted and to last, they must be as different in body and soul from those they rule as we imagine gods or heroes to be from men, or as Scylax says that the kings in India are from their subjects. But such men are not forthcoming. Hence, we must fall back on an interchange of rule. The ruled must be quieted by a prospect of ruling some day. It has been already mentioned how this is to be arranged. The distinction of rulers and ruled must be based on age: the ruled must be younger than the rulers, and must be able to look forward to succeeding them. The education we give our citizens must, therefore, be adjusted to this arrangement; it must be suitable for men who are first to be ruled and afterwards to rule. Not indeed to be ruled otherwise than freemen should be ruled—that is, for their benefit—for if it is true that they may probably sometimes be called on to render service which may seem to be of a humble kind, such service will be redeemed and made worthy of freemen by the end for which it is rendered.

But since he who is first to be a good subject and then a good ruler must, as we have seen, be a good man, we must seek to produce good men.

‘But since we affirm that the virtue of him who is at once citizen and ruler is the same as that of the best man, and that the same man ought to be ruled first and a ruler afterwards [so that all our citizens will be rulers sooner or later], the lawgiver’s business is to inquire how they are to be made good men and by practising what pursuits, and what is the end of the best life’—that is, what kind of action is the end, that connected with which part of the soul, with work or with leisure, with things necessary and useful or with things noble? The lawgiver, in fact, must get a clear view of the true aim (*σκοπός*, 1333 b 3), to the attainment of which his legislation is to be directed (cp.

Plato, *Laws* 962 A sqq.). He must ask what is the life of the 'best man,' what is the 'end of the best life,' for this is precisely what the framers of the constitutions most in repute and many writers on the subject of constitutions since their time have omitted to do, resting content with something short of the best (1333 b 5 sqq.).

In order to answer this question, Aristotle recalls, first, his accustomed division of the soul, so far as it is the seat of virtues in respect of which a good man is so denominated¹. One part of the soul possesses reason in itself, the other does not possess it in itself, but is capable of listening to reason: each has its own appropriate virtues. If we ask in which part the end is rather to be found, the answer is easy; it is to be found in the former. But this part, again, is divided into two—a part possessing practical, and a part possessing speculative reason; and these two parts must also be held to be of unequal worth, the latter having more to do with the end than the former; and the activities with which they are respectively concerned stand in the same relative order of desirability. Next, Aristotle recalls a division of 'life' (*βίος*)² into work (*ἀσχολία*) and leisure, war and peace³, and of things done (*τὰ πρακτά*) into things necessary and useful and things noble (*καλά*). Here, again, war is not the end but peace, work not the end but leisure, things necessary and useful not the end but things noble. The legislator must legislate with a view to call forth the activities of all the parts of the soul, but especially those which have most of the nature of ends; he must encourage the life of work and that of war, but still more the life of peace and leisure: things necessary and useful need to be attended to, but things noble still more. Education must seek to produce all the virtues, to fit men both for active work and for leisure, and to bring within their reach all kinds of goods, but the higher virtues, the higher life, and the nobler goods are to be made

Our education must develop the whole man, physical, moral, and intellectual, but the development of the lower element in man is to be adjusted to the ultimate development of that which is highest in him—the virtues moral and intellectual, which are essential to a right use of leisure.

¹ The nutritive part of the soul is omitted for the reason for which it is dismissed in *Eth. Nic.* I. 13. 1102 b 12—*ἐπειδὴ τῆς ἀνθρωπικῆς*

ἀρετῆς ἀμοιβὸν πέφυκεν.

² This is explained by *τοῦς βίους*, 1333 a 40.

³ Cp. I. 5. 1254 b 31.

its supreme end. It must be broad and must develop the whole man, but in its breadth it must not lose sight of the highest things.

It was because the State, which notwithstanding all its reverses was still held in most repute, followed an entirely different path, that Aristotle is careful to insist on this principle. The Lacedaemonian State had lived not for civilization, but for victory and empire, just as some modern communities live less for civilization than for wealth. It had sought happiness in empire, and empire in military virtue, and had found that it had missed even the path to empire. It had cultivated only one form of virtue, and that not only a low and utilitarian form, but one which, according to Aristotle, needs to be allied with the virtues which fit men to make a right use of leisure, if it is not to dissolve in time of peace. Leisure is the true end; but then the virtues necessary for a right use of leisure are not only those which find exercise in leisure, but also those which find exercise in active work. If necessities are to be forthcoming—and without them leisure is impossible—the qualities which win them, courage, endurance, temperance, must be forthcoming. Leisure, says the proverb, is not for slaves, and without these virtues men are no better than slaves. Courage and endurance, then, are demanded for active work, but intellectual aptitude (*φιλοσοφία*) for leisure, and temperance and justice both for work and leisure; and the State that is to be happy must possess all these virtues¹—the more so, as it is surrounded with the goods of fortune; for if

¹ If we bear in mind that the citizens of Aristotle's ideal State are to be *ἀπλῶς σπουδαῖοι*, and that the *σπουδαῖος* is one who unites in himself many different gifts and good qualities (3. 11. 1281 b 10 sqq.), we shall see reason to conclude, that when he speaks of the State possessing all the virtues, he means each citizen to do so as far as possible. This account of the true aim of education is intended, of course, to correct the one-sidedness of

the Lacedaemonian training, but it tells just as much against all systems which, like Stoicism and Puritanism, tend to develop something less than the whole man. The best test of civilization, however, is, in Aristotle's view, the degree in which the capability exists of making a right use of leisure, the 'leisure' of Aristotle being, it must be remembered, distinguished both from work and recreation (4 (7). 14. 1333 a 31 : 5 (8). 3. 1337 b 33 sqq.).

there is any time when it is especially discreditable not to be able to make a fit use of the goods of fortune, it is during leisure: our State, therefore, must, unlike the Lacedaemonian, seek happiness in the development, not of one virtue, but of all. A habit of intellectual inquiry, if so we may translate *φιλοσοφία*, must be present in its citizens, if only to give them occupation in leisure and to save them from rusting at such times.

A remark of Lotze's may be quoted to illustrate the contrast between this conception of education and that of our own day. 'The difference between the principles of this ancient education and our modern principles of education is rightly found in this, that to it the development of the aptitude (*Fertigkeit*) and the possession of it counted for more than the work for which it was used and the fruitfulness of that work in result. Every individual was to be made a model example of his species: the species itself had nothing else to do but to exist (*dazusein*) and to enjoy the use of its powers. . . . To this many-sided development, finding an end in itself (*in sich geschlossen*), the spirit of modern education is no doubt less kind; it sets a higher value than it justly should on range of concrete knowledge in comparison with a general aptitude for knowing—on productive specialized labour in comparison with the free exercise of all the powers—on professional effort working in a groove (*die Enge des bestimmten Berufs-strebens*) in comparison with an interest in human relations generally¹. There is much truth in this; but it should be borne in mind that if Aristotle insists on this combination of qualities in his citizens, he does so not so much for its own sake as because in its absence the State will suffer. If they have the energy and endurance which are needed for active work without the intellectual interests and aptitudes which are the 'salt of society' in days of peace and leisure, or without the justice and temperance

A remark
of Lotze's
quoted.

¹ *Mikrokosmos*, 3. 254, ed. 2. The whole passage from which the extract translated in the text is taken well deserves perusal.

which are of use both at the one time and the other, the State will fail of happiness; and it will do so no less, if, while possessing high intellectual qualities, they are without the minor gifts which are called for in active work. We hardly, however, hold it necessary, as Aristotle seems to do, that each citizen should unite in himself all these qualities, and be 'totus teres atque rotundus'—that the wheel should 'come full-circle' in each individual. But to Aristotle the σπουδαῖος is essentially ✓ a many-sided being. Just as he had demanded a happy combination of qualities (εὐκρασία) in the raw material of which his citizens are to be made, so he demands it in the finished product ¹.

How then
are men
such as we
have de-
scribed to
be pro-
duced?
We must
follow the
order of
develop-
ment—
train the
body first,
then the
appetites,
then the
reason:
but the
body must
be trained
as is best for

The question started at the commencement of c. 13 has now been answered. We know 'what should be the character of those who are to form the citizen-body of a happy and well-constituted State'; and all that remains is to discover how men of this type are to be produced. They are produced, as has been already said, by nature, habit, and reason. We have already sketched in outline, what nature must do for us, and the next question is, should education by habit precede or follow education by reason? The first process of human life, that of generation, is merely introductory to a further process, the development of mind and reason ². Both generation and education through habit must therefore be adjusted to the development of reason. We notice further that the body develops

¹ This many-sidedness and versatility was perhaps more often realized in antiquity than among ourselves. Roman generals of the best time were often lawyers, orators, and statesmen also: occasionally they were writers: sometimes they belonged to a philosophical school. On the other hand, poets seem to have been less often prose-writers also in antiquity than in modern times.

² Much light is thrown on the

difficult passage 4 (7). 15. 1334 b 12-15 by de Part. An. 2. 1. 646 a 30, πᾶν γὰρ τὸ γινόμενον ἐκ τίνος καὶ εἰς τι ποιεῖται τὴν γένεσιν, καὶ ἀπ' ἀρχῆς ἐπ' ἀρχὴν, ἀπὸ τῆς πρώτης κινούσης καὶ ἔχουσας ἤδη τινὰ φύσιν ἐπὶ τινὰ μορφήν ἢ τοιοῦτον ἄλλο τέλος. Cp. also de Anima 1. 3. 407 a 26, αἱ δ' ἀποδείξεις καὶ ἀπ' ἀρχῆς, καὶ ἔχουσιν πῶς τέλος τὸν συλλογισμὸν ἢ τὸ συμπέρασμα: and Eth. Nic. 10. 7. 1177 b 18.

before the soul, and the irrational part of the soul before the rational part: spirit (*θυμός*), the power to will (*βούλησις*), and desire (*ἐπιθυμία*) exist in the infant as soon as it is born, but deliberation (*λογισμός*) and reason (*νοῦς*) are of later growth. Education must follow the order of development: we must train the body first; then the appetites (*ὀρέξεις*), that is, the irrational part of the soul; then the rational part. But our training of the body must be adjusted to the development of correct appetites, and our training of the appetites to the development of reason (1334 b 27: cp. 15 sq.).

the correct development of the appetites, and the appetites as is best for the development of reason. ✓

To train the whole nature, but to train each part of it successively and in the order of its emergence, and to train each part with a view to the higher element which emerges next, and all with a view to the development of reason—this is the broad scheme of education which Aristotle lays down here. The lesson that in training the body our aims should be to develop the soul (that is, the likings and the reason), is still of value¹; and so is the lesson that the education of boyhood should be addressed rather to the likings and character than to the reason. Aristotle seems to hold that what can reasonably be expected of a boy is that he shall love and admire what is good and feel a distaste for what is bad—that is, that he shall feel rightly about persons and things. He sees that right feeling is not permanently an adequate guide in life, but he holds it to be the beginning of goodness. It needs to become reasoned, but this further step

¹ The athletic training given to boys in many Greek States was unfavourable to physical growth and beauty of form, while the Lacedaemonian training, though not open to this objection, was so severe and laborious as to be brutalizing (5 (8). 4. 1338 b 9 sqq.). Aristotle hopes to avoid both these errors. He forbids all laborious gymnastic exercise till three years after puberty (1339 a 4 sqq.). It is easy to imagine a sort of physical training which would not only

form a bad preparation for the hardships of war, but would also enfeeble the character and give a wrong direction to the likings. Plato had already spoken to the same effect as to the true aim of *γυμναστική* (Rep. 410 B-D: 591 C-D). Greece turned a deaf ear to the teaching of Plato and Aristotle on this subject, and became eventually a land in which athletes were everywhere to be found and soldiers nowhere (Mommson, Röm. Gesch. 5. 264-6, 324).

is only possible later on. Some germ of the deliberative faculty (*τὸ βουλευτικόν*) is to be found in boys (I. 13. 1260 a 13), but it is imperfect, and in education we should appeal to taste and feeling long before we appeal to reason. It is perhaps true, as has been said already, that Aristotle draws too sharp a contrast between boyhood and maturity; in this view, however, of the true aim of boyish education he is following Plato (Laws 653 A-C), who did not like the precocious boys and the juvenile old men of a democracy (Rep. 563 A).

The first step in education is the regulation of marriage. The rearing of infancy.

Quite in harmony with the principles just laid down, Aristotle's scheme of education begins with marriage. The regulation of marriage by the State is to him, as to Plato, the first step in education¹. He pays close attention to the management of pregnancy, to the rearing of the child, and to the earliest years of life, for he holds with Plato² that these earliest years go far to fix the character of the human being. The food of the infant, the movements which it is to be encouraged to make, the importance, on grounds both of health and of future military efficiency, of gently and gradually habituating it from the very first to bear cold—these are matters which can be attended to even during the earliest period of life. During the ensuing period closing with the age of five, movement is to be still more encouraged, especially by means of games which must not be vulgar (*ἀνελευθέρους*), or too laborious, or on the other hand too slack and easy, and should be imitative of the pursuits of later life³.

The management of children up to the age of five and from five to seven.

¹ Critias had already said (Fragm. 1: Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 2. 68)—*ἀρχομαι δέ τοι ἀπὸ γενετῆς ἀνθρώπου, πῶς ἂν βέλτιστος τὸ σῶμα γένοιτο καὶ ἰσχυρότατος, εἰ ὁ φυτεύων γυμνάζοιτο καὶ ἐσθίοι ἐρρωμένως καὶ τάλαιπωροίη τὸ σῶμα, καὶ ἡ μήτηρ τοῦ παιδίου τοῦ μέλλοντος ἔσεσθαι ἰσχυροὶ τὸ σῶμα καὶ γυμνάζοιτο*. Critias would seem to have adopted the views which prevailed among the Lacedaemonians on this subject (see the references in Müller's

note)—views which Aristotle apparently intends to combat in Pol. 4 (7). 16. 1335 b 5 sqq.

² Laws 765 E. They perhaps set down to faulty training in infancy much that was really due to heredity.

³ Plato had anticipated Aristotle in this (Laws 643 B). The heroes of Homer are described by Athenaeus (Deipn. 10 a) as 'preparing themselves in their sports for serious work.'

The stories and talk¹ which children are to hear at this age are to be such as to lead their thoughts in the direction of the work of after-years: the *παιδονόμοι* of the State are charged to see to this. It is a mistake to try, as some would do, to keep young children from struggling and crying: these things give them strength and aid the growth of the body; they are to infants what physical exercises are to those of less tender years. In all this, bodily growth has been a prominent consideration, but it is not the only one to be kept in view. Children are to be trained at home till seven years of age, not in the public infant-schools of Plato's Laws; but Aristotle requires his Superintendents of the youth (*παιδονόμοι*) to see that they are as little as possible in the company of slaves². He goes on to eliminate other corrupting influences to which Greek children were often exposed³; he banishes indecent language from his State, and especially from the presence of children⁴; he banishes also indecent pictures, statues, and tales, and forbids all below a certain age to witness 'iambi' or comedy. He seeks to make the young strangers to everything bad, and especially to everything that savours of vice or malice. He holds, with Plato (Rep. 378 E), that both in relation to men and things, we like that best with which we first come in contact (*πάντα στέρνομεν τὰ πρῶτα μᾶλλον*)—our likes and dislikes are largely formed in infancy. The first five years of life are those in which not only the physical health and strength, but

¹ *Λόγων καὶ μύθων*, 1336 a 30. The latter word suggests a religious element in infant education, and perhaps a revision of the myths used, similar to that which Plato undertakes in Rep. 377 A sqq.

² Aristotle seems to imply (1336 a 41) that, when from seven onwards they come to be educated away from the home, they will run less risk of contact with slaves. Plato regards the slave *παιδαγωγός*, who accompanied the Greek youth out of doors, as a necessary appendage (Laws 808 D): it is pos-

sible that Aristotle intends, with Lycurgus (Xen. Rep. Lac. 2. 1), to prohibit *παιδαγωγοί*.

³ Cp. Plato, Laws 729 B, a passage which is perhaps the source of the saying 'maxima debetur pueris reverentia.'

⁴ This was a point on which Xenocrates, the contemporary head of the Academy, especially insisted. He said that children needed ear-protectors more than pugilists did (Plutarch, de Recta Ratione Audiendi, c. 2).

also the tastes and character are apt to be made or marred. At five a step in advance is taken, and from this age to seven boys are encouraged to be spectators of the training of the older boys, and to familiarise themselves with the look of the exercises which they will shortly have to practise themselves¹.

At seven direct instruction is to begin. Education from seven to puberty and from puberty to twenty-one.

The age of seven, we see, marked in Aristotle's educational scheme the point at which direct instruction should begin—a view expressed in poems commonly attributed to Hesiod, but one which was much disputed after Aristotle's day²—and many Greeks, remembering Solon's division of human life into periods of seven years³, would expect to find him, in conformity with it, making the next educational period extend from seven to fourteen. Aristotle, however, prefers to follow 'the dividing-line which nature has drawn,' and to make, not any particular age, but the attainment of puberty⁴, which was commonly reckoned to fall about the sixteenth year⁵, the term of the next period, though the period after that is to close at twenty-one.

Commencement of the Fifth Book. Recurrence to the aporetic method. Three questions asked: 1. Should any systematic arrangements be adopted with respect to

Here at the threshold of the subject of education as distinguished from rearing (*τροφή*), Aristotle, conscious perhaps of its magnitude and of the need of starting from the level of popular impressions if he is to carry his readers with him, reverts to that full use of the aporetic method which marks the Third Book. He asks, first, whether any systematic arrangements are to be adopted respecting the education of the young: next, whether education should be managed by the State, or, as in most Greek States, left in private hands: lastly, what scheme of education should be adopted.

¹ Cp. Plato, Rep. 466 E sq.

² See Quintilian. Inst. El. i. 1, who mentions that Chrysippus would begin at three. The great Eratosthenes, however, agreed with Aristotle (Quintil. ibid.).

³ Solon, Fragm. 27.

⁴ So the law of Gortyna distinguished between the *ἀνήβος* and

the *ἡβίλων*. 'The distinction between them seems to rest, not on any fixed limit of age, but on the physical development of the individual' (Bücheler und Zitelmann, Das Recht von Gortyn, p. 60).

⁵ C. F. Hermann, Gr. Antiqq. i. § 121: Schäfer, Demosthenes, 3. 2. 22 sqq.

The first question is easily answered. The existing absence of system is injurious to the constitutions of Greek States, for it not only leaves them without the formed national character (*ἥθος*) which they need to support them, but precludes all chance of that improvement of the national character which is the beginning of constitutional improvement. Besides, some preparation is necessary for the practice of virtue, no less than for the exercise of an art. As to the second question, if the end of the State is one and the same for all its members, their education ought to be one and the same¹, and if so, both the management of this education and the pursuit of the studies it comprises should be 'public' (*κοινήν*); or, in other words, the management should be in the hands of the State, and the studies should be carried on, not privately and in independent groups, but in a public fashion and in common. Nor is it only because the studies will be the same that this should be so, but also because thus a public aim will be impressed on the education of the individual. The individual is a part of his State and belongs to his State, and this fact should be recognized in the organization of education².

¹ Aristotle's language both in the *Politics* (5 (8). 1. 1337 a 24) and in the *Nicomachean Ethics* (10. 10. 1180 a 28) seems to imply that, notwithstanding the general acceptance of three or four studies, the nature of the education which a boy received depended to a large extent on his father's caprice: one father might be all for utilitarianism in education, another might be more ambitious and send his son to some teacher of *τὰ πεπρωτά*: one might count the development of the character a more important thing than that of the intellect, while another might take the opposite view. Aristotle's object is that those who are to work together as members of the same State should be educated in the same way and educated together.

We are reminded of the aim of the framers of the Book of Common Prayer; who say—'and whereas heretofore there hath been great diversity in saying and singing in Churches within this realm, some following Salisbury use, some Hereford use, and some the use of Bangor, some of York, some of Lincoln; now from henceforth all the whole realm shall have but one use.'

² This argument for placing education in the hands of the State is interesting and not without force, though perhaps education in a large school is sufficient to give a boy that sense of being part of a whole which Aristotle wishes to develop in him. The rejoinder, however, is possible that it would not accustom him to the feeling that he is part of the State.

Conflict of opinion as to the true aim of education and the subjects to be taught.

The third question is one which will occupy us longer¹. 'There is no agreement as to the subjects to be taught: people are not agreed what studies are best either with a view to virtue or to the best life; and then there is a further question whether the aim should be the development of the character or the intellect². A reference to the actually prevailing system of education is highly suggestive of doubts, and it is by no means clear whether things useful for everyday life should be taught, or that which makes for virtue, or more out-of-the-way things³, for each of these courses has its advocates; and then again, there is no agreement as to what makes for virtue, since different persons understand virtue differently.'

This being the state of opinion, a good opportunity offered itself for a recourse to the aporetic method, and Aristotle's first step is to look about him for any firm bit of ground he can find. Everybody, he says, agrees that, of things useful for life, all such as are necessary must be taught, and also whatever does not produce *βαναυσία*, or, in other words, unfit the body or the mind for free pursuits. He adds, with an evident reference to the limitations which he intends to place on the study of music and gymnastic, that the risk of *βαναυσία* is not incurred only in the study of useful things: there are also liberal studies which may produce *βαναυσία*, if pursued in an over-exact way. It is

¹ It is one which it is the special function of *πολιτική* to settle. Cp. *Eth. Nic.* 1. 1. 1094 a 28, *τίνας γὰρ εἶναι χρὲν τῶν ἐπιστημῶν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι καὶ ποίας ἐκάστους μανθάνειν καὶ μέχρι τίνος, [ἡ πολιτικὴ] διατάσσει.*

² Aristotle has already settled that the ultimate aim in education is to be the development of the reason (4 (7). 15. 1334 b 15), but the point he wishes to bring out is the unsettled state of common opinion on the subject of education, and he does not pause to remember that he has already done something towards the solution of the problem.

³ *Τὰ περιττά*, 5 (8). 2. 1337 a 42, which may include a variety of things from the 'marvels of musical execution' (*τὰ θαυμάσια καὶ περιττά τῶν ἔργων*, ἃ νῦν ἐλήλυθεν εἰς τοὺς ἀγῶνας, ἐκ δὲ τῶν ἀγῶνων εἰς τὴν παιδείαν, 5 (8). 6. 1341 a 11) to the *κομψά* referred to by Euripides (3. 4. 1277 a 19), among which philosophy was perhaps included. Socrates had imposed limits on the study of geometry (*Xen. Mem.* 4. 7. 2, *γεωμετρίαν μέχρι μὲν τοῦτου δεῖν μανθάνειν ἔφη, ὥς ἱκανὸς τις γένοιτο, εἴ ποτε δεήσει, γῆν μέτρῳ ὀρθῶς ἢ παραλαβεῖν ἢ παραδοῦναι ἢ διανεῖμαι ἢ ἔργον ἀποδείξασθαι*).

the aim with which things are done, rather than the things themselves, that makes the difference. To do work not in itself liberal for one's own sake, or for the sake of friends, or with a view to virtue¹ brings no *βανανσία* with it. We have got then as far as this, that whatever is necessary for life must be studied, and that we must steer clear of *βανανσία*.

At this point Aristotle recalls to remembrance the studies generally accepted in Greece in the hope of gaining some further guidance in the construction of a scheme of education. There are, he says, three or four of them—*γράμματα* (reading and writing—Plato, *Laws* 810 B), *γυμναστική*, *μουσική*: to these some would add drawing². The study of the first and last of these may easily be defended on the ground of usefulness: reading, writing, and drawing are useful for many purposes; *γυμναστική*, again, helps to make men brave.

But what are we to say of *μουσική*? Nowadays most who study it do so for pleasure, but the aim of those who originally made it a part of education was to satisfy the striving of nature to find a means of spending leisure-time nobly³. And in this they were right, for if men should know both how to work and how to enjoy leisure aright, and leisure is closely connected with the end of life, while work is only a means to the end—so that leisure is more desirable than work—and if again it is easy to

Things necessary for life must be taught, but not so as to produce *βανανσία*. Four subjects commonly accepted—*γράμματα*, *γυμναστική*, *μουσική*, *γραφική*. Aristotle learns from an inquiry why *μουσική* was made a part of education by the ancients, that it is legitimate to employ

¹ Δι' ἀρετήν, 5 (8). 2. 1337 b 19: cp. c. 6. 1341 b 10, ἐν ταύτῃ γὰρ (i.e. ἐν τῇ πρὸς τοὺς ἀγῶνας παιδείᾳ) ὁ πρᾶττων οὐ τῆς αὐτοῦ μεταχειρίζεται χάριν ἀρετῆς, ἀλλὰ τῆς τῶν ἀκούοντων ἡδονῆς κ.τ.λ.

² The Athenian Stranger in the *Laws* is indifferent to the study of drawing (769 B).

³ Ephorus had said in the introduction to his history, that *μουσική* had been introduced ἐπ' ἀπάτῃ καὶ γοητείᾳ (Fragm. 1: Müller, *Fr. Hist. Gr.* 1. 234). Aristotle tacitly controverts this view here, just as he tacitly controverts

later on (5 (8). 4. 1338 b 13) a view current among the Lacedaemonians as to the best way of developing courage which Ephorus had commended (cp. Ephor. ap. Strab. p. 480, πρὸς δὲ τὸ μὴ δειλίαν ἀλλ' ἀνδρείαν κρατεῖν ἐκ παιδῶν ὅπλοις καὶ πόνοις συντρέφειν). That the motive with which the authors of the current scheme of Greek education had included *μουσική* in it was much discussed, we see from Athen. *Deipn.* 14. 626 f sqq.: Plutarch *de Musica*, c. 26: Polyb. 4. 20 sqq.: Plato, *Rep.* 410 B sqq.

studies in education which are not strictly necessary, but conduce to a right use of leisure.

spend leisure-time in the wrong pleasures, then it is evident that education tending to a right use of leisure is even more requisite than education preparatory to work, and that education of the former kind is an end in itself, while education of the latter kind is merely necessary and a means to something further. We have, then, the authority of these ancient and venerated sages for the conclusion that it is legitimate to go beyond the limit of mere necessity in the choice of subjects of education. One, at all events, of the recognized subjects was introduced, not because it was necessary or useful¹, but because it was liberal and noble (*ἐλευθερία καὶ καλή*)². We shall see later on, Aristotle adds, whether there are others on the same footing, and what they are, and how they are to be studied. He points out, however, at once, that even the more strictly useful studies, such as reading, writing, and drawing, deserve to be pursued on other grounds than those of mere utility.

Γυμναστική, however, must come first, for training must begin with the body: hence the boys of seven must be handed

The subject of *γυμναστική* naturally comes up next, and now Aristotle reverts to the boys of seven, the settlement of whose fate has been thrust aside pending the new inquiry. 'As the education of habit must precede that of reason, and the education of the body that of the mind, they must be handed over to *γυμναστική* and the sister art *παιδοτριβική*—to the former, in order that a certain habit of body may be developed in them; to the latter, in order that

¹ Democritus (Philodem. de Musica, 4. col. 36 : Kemke, p. 108) had insisted that music did not owe its origin to necessity, but came in as a superfluity (*ἐκ τοῦ περιεὺντος*, cp. Pol. 4 (7). 10. 1329 b 27 sqq.), and argued from this that it was of recent origin, things necessary being discovered first. The Cynics rejected the study of music as not only unnecessary but useless (Diog. Laert. 6. 73 : 6. 104) : good musicians, they said, often had souls out of tune (Diog. Laert. 6. 27). Aristotle agrees that it is not necessary, but holds that it is useful (5 (8). 5. 1339 b 30).

² It is easy to see how a reader, starting from the average level of Greek prejudice, would find himself gradually led on by this inquiry to more enlightened views of education, and how much of the traditional skill of a Socratic dialogue, though not its grace, has passed into Aristotle's handling of aporetic discussion. Antipater praised him for his persuasiveness (Plutarch, Alcib. et Coriol. compar. c. 3, *πρὸς τοῖς ἄλλοις ὁ ἀνὴρ καὶ τὸ πείθειν εἶχεν*). To a Greek the appeal to *οἱ ἀρχαῖοι* would be as convincing as it is the reverse to ourselves.

they may learn the needful physical exercises and accomplishments.¹

Aristotle would, however, reform γυμναστική. Some, he says, of the States which paid most attention to the education of the young gave them a physical training fit rather for professional athletes than for future citizens, fatal to beauty of form¹ and physical growth—fatal also, if we look back to another passage (4 (7). 16. 1335 b 5 sqq.), to fitness for political activity and to health and vigour². The Lacedaemonians also erred, though in a different way: their system produced, not gluttonous, sleepy athletes, but fierce, wild, wolf-like men, for courage, they held, went with this temper, which Aristotle denies³: the bravest men are not, he says, fierce but gentle; true courage, we learn in the Nicomachean Ethics (3. 11), goes with that love of τὸ καλόν, which marks the best type of manhood. Thus, even if the production of this one virtue, courage, were fit to be made the sole or chief end of γυμναστική, the Lacedaemonian State did not practise γυμναστική in the right way to produce it. In fact, by giving its sons an excessive gymnastic training and adding no sufficient instruction in necessary attainments, this State did that which it least wished to do—it made them βάνανσοι⁴, for

over first to γυμναστική and παιδο-τριβική. Γυμναστική, however, must be reformed.

¹ De Gen. An. 4. 3. 768 b 29-33.

² Euripides had said the same thing in the well-known fragment of his Autolycus (Fr. 284 Nauck), and Plato (Rep. 404 A): Epaminondas also (Plutarch, Reg. et Imperat. Apophth. p. 192 C-D, τῶν δὲ ὀπλιτῶν δὲν ἀπέφαιεν εἶναι τὸ σῶμα γεγυμνασμένοι οὐκ ἀθλητικῶς μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ στρατιωτικῶς διὸ καὶ τοῖς πολυσάρκοις ἐπολέμει). Philip of Macedon is reported to have compared the speeches of Demosthenes to soldiers and those of Isocrates to athletes ([Plutarch], Decem Oratorum Vitae, p. 845 D: see A. Schäfer's note, Demosthenes 1. 293, and Dict. of Greek and Roman Biography, art. Cleo-

chares). Thebes was as famous for its devotion to γυμναστική as Athens was the reverse (Diod. 17. 11. 4: Xen. Mem. 3. 5. 15), and it is perhaps to it that Aristotle here refers. The Thebans, however, were splendid soldiers, as may be seen from Diodorus' striking narrative of their ill-advised and fatal, but noble resistance to Alexander (Diod. 17. cc. 9-14).

³ Cp. Eth. Nic. 3. 11. 1116 b 24, where the courage of a wounded animal is distinguished from true courage, and Plato, Rep. 430 B.

⁴ Cp. [Plato], Eristae, 136 A-B. There was a proverb, ἐλευθεριώτερος Σπάρτης (Leutsch and Schneidewin, Paroemiographi Graeci, 1. 246: 2. 393).

it fitted them for the discharge of only one political function, and for that less well than other States, if we may judge by the defeats which the Lacedaemonians have suffered in the field, since they have had to contend with antagonists equally devoted to gymnastic training.

Thus Aristotle accepts *γυμναστική* on condition of being allowed to reform it. It must learn to take a truer view of its social function; it must increase men's physical strength without unfitting them for the public labours of a citizen or injuring the health; it must be so regulated as to be productive, not of mere fierceness, but of true courage, and not of courage only, for it must lay the foundation of a generalized excellence culminating in reason.

With this aim Aristotle refuses to impose on boys who have not yet arrived at puberty any but light and easy forms of physical training¹, and postpones apparently all other studies till after this epoch, at which *γυμναστική* is to be abandoned for three years, and the studies of reading and writing, drawing and music to be begun². These studies are to be dropped in their turn at the expiration of the three years' term, and now for the first time *γυμναστική* is to be studied in its sterner form with its accompaniments of severe labour and a special diet. As

¹ Contrast the view of Plato, Rep. 536 E: οἱ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ σώματος πόνοι βία πονούμενοι χεῖρον οὐδὲν τὸ σῶμα ἀπεργάζονται, ψυχῇ δὲ βίαιον οὐδὲν ἔμμενον μάθημα. Ἀληθῆ, ἔφη. Μὴ τοίνυν βία, εἶπον, ὦ ἀριστε, τοὺς παῖδας ἐν τοῖς μαθήμασιν, ἀλλὰ παίζοντας τρέφε. Aristotle says on the contrary (5. (8). 4. 1338 b 40)—μέχρι μὲν γὰρ ἡβῆς κουφότερα γυμνάσια προσοιστέον, τὴν βίαιον τροφήν καὶ τοὺς πρὸς ἀνάγκην πόνους ἀπεύργοντας, ἵνα μηδὲν ἐμπόδιον ᾖ πρὸς τὴν αὐξήσιν.

² Cp. 5 (8). 4. 1339 a 4, ὅταν δ' ἀφ' ἡβῆς ἔτη τρία πρὸς τοῖς ἄλλοις μαθήμασι γένωται. It is not distinctly said in this passage that other studies than that of gymnastic are to be delayed till puberty, but we learn in 1338 b 40 that

boys are to be trained in gymnastic in the period preceding puberty, and Aristotle's principle is that the simultaneous exaction of mental and bodily labour is a mistake (1339 a 7 sqq.). Zeller (Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 737. 4) thinks that philosophical (wissenschaftlich) teaching is included among the studies referred to in 1339 a 5, but perhaps we can hardly infer so much from the use of the word *διάνοια* in 1339 a 7, and Aristotle's principle seems rather to be to postpone the education of the reason, and to devote the years of youth to physical training and the training of the *ὁρέξεις*, though, no doubt, the *ὁρέξεις* are to be trained with a view to the ultimate development of reason.

before, so now, it is to be studied by itself, for the simultaneous exaction of mental and physical effort must be studiously avoided (5 (8). 4. 1339 a 7 sqq.)¹.

We note in Aristotle's reform of *γυμναστική* the same aim as we shall trace in his reform of the musical education of the citizen. Neither *γυμναστική* nor *μουσική* should be cultivated with a view to the attainment of technical skill or an one-sided excellence; the aim should rather be to lay the foundations of the broad excellence of the *σπουδαῖος*, a many-sided and evenly developed being, healthy and undistorted in body and mind.

At this point Aristotle recurs to the subject of music, with respect to which all that he has discovered is that those who first made a place for it in education did so to supply the evident need of mankind to possess a means of using leisure nobly (1337 b 29 sqq.). He will now push his inquiries about it a little farther, and the first question that arises is, what is its exact function or value, and with what view should we concern ourselves with it? It naturally occurs to us that he has already answered this question, and that it is with a view to occupation in leisure that music should be studied; but in fact all that he has said is that this was the aim of those who first introduced its study; we shall find as we go on that this is far from being the only purpose answered by music.

Is it, he asks, to be studied as a source of relaxation and recreation? Is it, like sleep or the convivial use of wine (*μέθη*), a thing not in itself connected with virtue² (*τῶν σπουδαίων*), but pleasant and a balm for care? Or

¹ Cp. Plato, Rep. 537 B. Yet a different view seems to be ascribed to Plato by Plutarch (de Tuenda Sanitate Praecepta, c. 25)—ὁρθῶς οὖν ὁ Πλάτων παρηγγεσε, μήτε σῶμα κινεῖν ἀνευ ψυχῆς μήτε ψυχὴν ἀνευ σώματος, ἀλλ' οἷόν τινα συνωρίδος ἰσορροπίαν διαφυλάττειν.

² *Σπουδαία* are connected with *ἐπαινετά* in Eth. Nic. 7.2. 1145 b 8:

Aristot. Fragm. 83. 1490 a 40: cp. also Eth. Nic. 1. 13. 1102b 7, ἀργία γάρ ἐστίν ὁ ὕπνος τῆς ψυχῆς, ἣ λέγεται σπουδαία καὶ φαύλη. The tests of τὸ σπουδαῖον, however, appear best from Eth. Nic. 7. 15. 1154 a 31 sqq.: 10. 6. 1177 a 3. In Xen. Mem. 4. 4. 14 the word is used in a broader and less technical sense.

does it act on the character, and contribute to virtue by creating through habituation the power of finding pleasure in the things in which we ought to find pleasure? Or is it good for the rational use of leisure and for intellectual aptitude (*διαγωγὴν καὶ φρόνησιν*)?

Its use in education can hardly be justified on the first and third grounds, for learning music is not recreation to boys, and the rational use of leisure is not for them. But it may be said that they learn in youth, in order to provide a recreation for themselves in manhood. But then why should they learn to sing and play themselves, for there is more recreation to be gained from following the king of Persia's example, and listening to first-rate professional players, than from playing and singing oneself, necessarily in a less excellent manner? If we can only get recreation from music by learning to play and sing in youth, must we not learn to cook in youth, in order to enjoy cookery in after-years? The same difficulty arises, if we take the view that music improves the character and tends to virtue, for the Lacedaemonians claim to be able to distinguish noble music from music of an opposite kind without having learned to sing or play in youth. And so again, if we account music a liberal occupation for leisure, we fail to discover why boys should be taught to sing or play, for Zeus, we know, finds employment in leisure in *listening to music*; he is never made by the poets to sing or play himself¹. In fact, we call men who sing and play *βάνανσοι*, and hold that the performance of music is unworthy of a man, unless he is in his cups or in sport.

Later on, we shall find that Aristotle sees a way of escape from these perplexities, and is able to clear away the doubts which he has started with regard to the Greek custom of learning in youth to sing and to play on some musical instrument². Boys, he will discover, are to learn

¹ An early poet, however, seems to have represented him as dancing: cp. Athen. Deipn. 22 C, *Εὐμηλος δὲ ὁ Κορίνθιος ἢ Ἀρκτίνος τὸν Δία ὀρχοῦμενόν που παράγει, λέγων*

*μέσσοισιν δ' ὀρχεῖτο πατὴρ ἀνδρῶν
τε θεῶν τε.*

² It was not universal. As we see, the Spartans did not commonly learn in youth to sing or play.

singing and playing, not in order to sing and play when they are men, but in order that, as boys, they may experience the full educating power of music—which cannot be experienced without practice in youth (1340 b 23), let the Lacedaemonians say what they may—and as men, may get all the good from music that it is capable of giving, by using it not only for recreation, but also for the purgation of the emotions (*κάθαρσις*) and for the employment of leisure (*διαγωγή*).

But, for all that appears at present, Aristotle's discussion of the question whether boys should be taught to sing and play has led only to the negative conclusion, that whatever the function of music may be, the practice seems hard of defence; and he drops the subject—he had slipped, indeed, into a discussion of it unawares—foreseeing that he will be in a better position to deal with it, when he has considered another question, started at the beginning of the fifth chapter (1339 a 14), what the function of music exactly is, and whether it is a means of education or recreation, or an intellectual occupation for leisure (*διαγωγή*).

There are plausible grounds, he says, for assigning to it all three functions. It is pleasure-giving, and therefore suitable both for recreation and for the rational use of leisure, for such an use of leisure should have in it something of pleasure, if

It is pleasant and a source of refreshment and recreation :

The sons of kings were taught riding and the art of war (3. 4. 1277 a 18), and in this spirit Themistocles prided himself on his ignorance of the lyre (Plutarch, Themist. c. 2 : Cic. Tusc. Disp. 1. 2. 4), and had his son Cleophantus made a 'famous horseman' (Plato, Meno 93 D). Pericles, on the contrary, learnt music of Damon (Plutarch, Pericl. c. 4). The Arcadians, as Polybius tells us in an interesting passage of his history (4. 20 sqq.), almost universally learnt to sing, which probably implies that they learnt also to play. The Thebans generally were devoted to the *αὐλός* (Plutarch, Pelop. c. 19), but Epaminondas used the harp (Cic. Tusc. Disp. 1. 2. 4). The

Cynics discountenanced all the generally accepted studies : cp. Diog. Laert. 6. 103-4, *παρατιοῦνται δὲ καὶ τὰ ἐγκύκλια μαθήματα γράμματα γοῦν μὴ μανθάνειν ἔφασκεν ὁ Ἀντισθένης τοὺς σὺνφρονας γενομένους, ἵνα μὴ διαστρέφοντο τοῖς ἄλλοις : περιαιρούσι δὲ καὶ γεωμετρίαν καὶ μουσικὴν καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα . . . Πρὸς τὸν ἐπιδεικνύοντα αὐτῷ μουσικὴν ἔφη (ὁ Διογένης), γνῶμαίς γὰρ ἀνδρῶν εὐ μὲν οἰκοῦνται πόλεις, εὐ δ' οἶκος, οὐ ψαλμοῖσι καὶ τερετίσμασιν.*

Aristotle also wishes to develop *γνώμη*, but he holds that in youth this is best accomplished indirectly through a training in *μουσική*.

It is both noble and pleasant, hence suitable for a rational use of leisure. It would be well, therefore, to teach the young music, if only for the sake of its future use in recreation and leisure.

Its use, however, as a source of pleasure and recreation is, perhaps, subordinate and accidental: its essential value lies rather in its power to influence the character.

also something of nobility. So that one might find in its pleasurable alone without going any further, a reason for teaching music to the young. For it is one of those harmlessly pleasurable things which not only contribute to the end of life (*εὐδαιμονία*), but also afford recreation after labour. And as men take recreation often, but are rarely in fruition of the end, there is utility in having the pleasures of music at our command for recreation. Indeed, men often make recreation the end of life, for the end has a kind of pleasure connected with it and so has recreation, and men in their quest of the pleasure of the end mistake the pleasure of recreation for it: there is, in fact, really a resemblance between the pleasure of recreation and the end, for both are desirable for nothing subsequent and beyond them; the pleasures of recreation are desirable by reason of past toil¹. Music then may be resorted to as affording the pleasures of recreation, and also for its utility as a means of refreshment after toil, but may it not be merely an accident of music to be serviceable in these ways? May not its essential nature be something higher², and ought we not to look for something more from it than that widely shared kind of pleasure, of which human beings of all ages and characters are susceptible? Is it not capable of acting on the character (*ἦθος*) and the soul? This would clearly be the case, if under its influence we assume this or that variety of character. That we do so, may be proved by pointing to the effect of the melodies of Olympus, the (perhaps mythical) Phrygian musician, in producing enthusiasm (*ἐνθουσιασμός*), or even to the effect of mere imitative sounds without tune or rhythm³. That music

¹ See *Sus.*³, Note 1038, who notices that in *Eth. Nic.* 10. 6. 1176 b 27 sqq., as Döring had remarked, a somewhat different view is expressed, and offers a reconciliation of the two passages.

² Just as in the *Nicomachean Ethics* the true nature of Friendship is found neither in its pleasurable nor in its utility,

but in the fact that it stands in a close relation to virtue, so here the same thing is shown to be true of Music.

³ 'Ut si quis voce etiam sine cantu et rhythmis iratum, exempli gratia, aut miserescentem imitetur, audientes solent eisdem affectibus commoveri' (*Sepulveda*, p. 253).

possesses the accidental quality of being pleasurable, is an additional argument in favour of its use in education, for virtue has to do with taking pleasure in the right things, and hence the very thing the youthful mind needs to be taught and habituated to do is to distinguish, and take pleasure in, noble characters and action¹. Now music brings before us in its melodies and rhythms more vividly than anything else can, images (*ὁμοιώματα*) of anger and gentleness, of courage and temperance and their opposites, and of every ethical state. To learn to feel pain and pleasure in reference to the musical image is to learn to feel in the same way about the original of which it is a reproduction. In things which appeal to other senses than the ear ethical suggestion is either entirely absent, as in the case of things we touch or taste², or it is not largely present, as in the case of objects of sight—I say not largely (Aristotle continues), for figures and colours are suggestive in this way, but not to any great extent, and all men possess a perception of their significance, whatever their age or worth or character³. They are also rather indications than images of ethical states, and indeed they are not so much indications of ethical states (*τῶν ἡθῶν*) or of anything connected with the soul, as indications given by the bodily frame under the influence of emotion (*ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν*)⁴. Still we need not deny statues and pictures all ethical influence⁵,

¹ Plato had said the same thing, as Aristotle remarks in the Nicomachean Ethics (2. 2. 1104 b 11 sq.). Ramsauer refers to Laws 653 A: Rep. 401, adding—'nec tamen ideo negandum brevius eiusdem dictum fortasse e scholis eius inter discipulos notum fuisse.'

² This solves the difficulty raised in 1339 a 39, why cookery has not just as good a claim to be studied in youth as music.

³ It is implied that a perception shared by slaves and children and worthless men cannot be one of a very elevated character (cp. c. 5. 1340 a 2 sqq. : c. 6. 1341 a 15 sqq.).

⁴ This would seem to be the

meaning of 1340 a 34, *καὶ ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ἐπὶ (or ἀπὸ) τοῦ σώματος ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν*, but these words have been interpreted in many different ways.

⁵ Plato probably agreed with Aristotle in 'estimating the practical influence of sculptors and architects upon the national character as less important than that of poets and musicians' (Mr. R. L. Nettleship, *Hellenica*, p. 117). He had, however, in the Republic (400 D-401 D) found images (*μμήματα*) of ethical characteristics, not only in music, but in the products of painting, weaving, building, and other arts. Aristotle

and so far as they possess any, it will be well for the young to be brought into contact rather with the works of artists who express moral character in their productions, such as Polygnotus, than with those of Pauson. But melodies need no help from anything else to reproduce, not merely to indicate, varieties of character, and this is clear from the impression they make on us, for melodies are connected with harmonies, and one harmony makes us feel quite differently from another: the mixo-Lybian harmony winds us up to a high-strung mood of lamentation, the more relaxed ones let us down to an easier state of mind, while the Doric harmony stands midway between these two extremes, and the Phrygian produces strong excitation of feeling. So too as to rhythms: some are quiet, others are suggestive of movement, and of the latter some are suggestive of vulgar, others of more noble movement. If music has this power, it must be used in the education of youth. It is indeed especially suitable for youth, for at that age we take willingly to nothing that has not sweetness. The soul seems also to have some kinship with harmonies and rhythms: many wise men call the soul a harmony, and others say that it possesses harmony.

As to learning to sing and play, it is not easy to become a good judge of music without having done so,

But should music be learnt by learning oneself to play and sing? It is not easy, whatever the Lacedaemonians may say (1339 b 2), to become a good judge of music¹ in any other way. The study of music will not make men *βάνανσοι*—on the contrary, it will be an aid to virtue—if they practise it only up to a certain point and up to a certain age, and use the right kind of instruments.

perhaps intends tacitly to correct this view in the passage analysed in the text. He seems to us hardly to do full justice to the capabilities of formative art, or indeed of stage-acting, to say nothing of gestures, looks, and the like, in respect of ethical influence. L. Schmidt holds (*Ethik der alten Griechen*, I. 207), that the Greek mind and heart received its strongest impressions through the

eye, and perhaps he is right in this, but ethical influence, in Aristotle's view, finds its way rather through the channel of the ear.

¹ Aristotle means by a good judge of music a man who adds to technical knowledge, or at all events the knowledge of the *παιδείων*, a capability of recognizing ennobling music and of distinguishing it from music of an opposite kind.

Anything like a professional study of music (*τεχνικὴ παιδεία*) must be avoided by those who are to become fit soldiers and citizens of the best State. They must carry the practice of music far enough to get above the level of that undeveloped musical taste which is common to all men and even to some of the lower animals¹; far enough to learn to take pleasure in noble—by which Aristotle means ennobling—music, but yet not to the point attained in professional competitions or to that of attempting the mechanical achievements, the fashion of which has passed from those competitions to education². We can have nothing to do with any form of musical study that will interfere with the military and political activity which is to come later in the lives of our citizens, or that will make the physique unfit for such work. As to the instruments to be used, pipes (*αὐλοί*) and all instruments suitable to professional *virtuosi*, such as the cithara, are to be prohibited. The *αὐλός* is not an ethical agent for the development of the character, but orgiastic for the excitation and purgation of emotion; it excludes the use of the voice³, and thus involves the loss of an element of education.

but the practice of music and singing must be confined to the years of youth, and must not be carried beyond a certain point: the instruments used must also be the right ones.

¹ Stags, mares, dolphins (Plutarch, *Symposiaca*, 7. 5. 2. 704 F). When Aristotle is said in this passage of Plutarch to have regarded the pleasures of sight and hearing as peculiar to man (*δοκεῖ δέ μοι μηδὲ Ἀριστοτέλης αἰτία δικαία τὰς περὶ θέαν καὶ ἀκρόασιν εὐπαθείας ἀπολύειν ἀκρασίας, ὥς μόνας ἀνθρωπικὰς οὐσας ταῖς δ' ἄλλαις καὶ τὰ θηρία φύσιν ἔχοντα χρῆσθαι καὶ κοινωνεῖν*), we must suppose that, if his opinion is correctly stated, he is speaking of their higher forms.

² This resembles the view expressed by one of the interlocutors in the *Erastae* ascribed to Plato (135 C–136 B). Here also we find how much reluctance there was to connect liberal education with anything approaching *χειρουργία* (135 B). The Cynic

Diogenes had spoken of the contests at the festivals of Dionysus as *μεγάλα θαύματα μωροῖς* (Diog. Laert. 6. 24).

³ This was one of Alcibiades' objections to the use of the *αὐλός*; he objected to it also on account of its distortion of the face and its consequent unsuitableness for a man of breeding. Cp. Plut. Alcib. c. 2, *ἐτι δὲ τὴν μὲν λύραν τῷ χρωμένῳ συμφθέγγεσθαι καὶ συνάδειν, τὸν δ' αὐλὸν ἐπιστομίζειν καὶ ἀποφράττειν ἕκαστον τὴν τε φωνὴν καὶ τὸν λόγον ἀφαιρούμενον*. "Αὐλείτωσαν οὖν," ἔφη, "Θηβαίων παῖδες, οὐ γὰρ ἴσασι διαλέγεσθαι ἡμῖν δὲ τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις, ὥς οἱ πατέρες λέγουσιν, ἀρχηγέτις Ἀθηνᾶ καὶ πατρώος Ἀπόλλων ἐστίν, ὧν ἡ μὲν ἔρριψε τὸν αὐλόν, ὁ δὲ καὶ τὸν αὐλητὴν ἐξέδειρε." Aristotle hints that the objection of Athene to the *αὐλός* was based

We have not yet, however, said (Aristotle continues, c. 7. 1341 b 19) whether all harmonies and rhythms should be used with a view to education or only some of them, nor whether the answer we give to this question will hold also for those who are learning to sing and play with an educational object, or, on the other hand, whether in their case the further question will not have to be considered, what is the relative educational value of rhythm and of melody, and whether music good in rhythm or good in melody should be preferred¹. Those who desire a full treatment of these questions must be referred to the works of those musicians and philosophical inquirers on the subject of musical education who have dealt with them: we can only treat of them in outline.

The melodies (*μέλῃ*) used in education must also be correctly chosen. Melodies are ethical, connected with action, or enthusiastic, each sort having an appropriate harmony of its own. With a view to education those harmonies which are most ethical are to be preferred,

Philosophers have divided melodies into three classes—ethical melodies (*ἠθικά*), those connected with action (*πρακτικά*), and those which stir enthusiasm (*ἐνθουσιαστικά*)—and have allotted a particular kind of harmony to each; and we have recognized that music should be used for many purposes—for education, for the purging of the emotions (*κάθαρσις*), for the intellectual use of leisure (*διαγωγή*), and for recreation. We shall accordingly find an use for all three kinds of harmonies, but we shall use with a view to education only those which are most ethical, and reserve the two other kinds for occasions when we listen to the performances of others, instead of playing ourselves. For though it might be thought that harmonies which arouse feelings of enthusiasm or fear or pity, and purge these emotions, are useful only to a few over-fraught spirits, this is not really so: all are more or less in need of music of this kind and relieved by it². The melodies also which

on graver grounds than its incidental distortion of a handsome face (1341 b 4 sqq.).

¹ It would seem, in fact, from the close of c. 7 (1342 b 29 sqq.), that boys learning to sing and play should practise harmonies like the Lydian, which are at once suitable to their tender age and

valuable for their educational effect, so that the educational value of a harmony is not the only thing to be considered in the choice of music to be practised by those learning to sing and play.

² Contrast Plato's view of the effect of poetry which calls forth

purge emotion are similarly productive of innocent pleasure. Melodies and harmonies of this nature may therefore be allowed to professional show-performers. Nay more, we must make provision for the inferior type of auditor which cannot fail to be found in a State in which artisans and day-labourers will have to exist; we must not leave these classes without musical entertainments and competitions suitable for their moments of recreation. For audiences of this kind the use of an inferior kind of music is allowable, but only for them. With a view to education the Doric harmony is to be used, and any other which those who have studied both philosophy and music may recommend. The Doric harmony is at once the quietest and the most expressive of manliness; it is also a mean between extremes, neither too high-strung in feeling nor too relaxed. The Phrygian harmony, which had met with approval from Plato in the Republic, is held by Aristotle to be unfit for use in education, as being nearly akin to the αἰλός and the dithyramb, and expressive of Bacchic excitement.

such as the Doric, though for the other purposes for which Music is useful—the purging of the emotions, the intellectual use of leisure, and recreation—the other kinds of harmony may be used.

A few other remarks follow, and then the Fifth Book breaks off without entering on the subject of rhythms, which had been announced for treatment.

The whole discussion shows how powerful was the influence of music on the Greek mind, and how closely its influence had been studied; 'ethical' melodies had been parted off from those which stimulated to action¹ and from those again which at once excited and purged

On Aristotle's view of Music and its uses.

strong emotion (Rep. 605 C sqq.). He regards it as simply weakening to the character, whereas Aristotle sees that both it (Poet. 6. 1449 b 27) and music of a similar kind have their use. On the other hand, in Laws 790 C-791 B, Plato goes far to anticipate the view of Aristotle, though it is rather to physical movement, or physical movement accompanied by music, than to music alone, that he appears to ascribe the soothing and calming influences of which he

speaks. If we may trust Aristoxenus, the notion of *κῆθασις* by music originated with the Pythagoreans (Aristox. Fr. 24: Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 2. 280, οἱ Πυθαγορικοί, ὡς ἔφη Ἀριστόξενος, καθάρσει ἐχρῶντο τοῦ μὲν σώματος διὰ τῆς λατρικῆς, τῆς δὲ ψυχῆς διὰ τῆς μουσικῆς).

¹ Oarsmen, reapers, and vine-dressers (Philodem. de Musica, 4. 8. 6 sqq.) found encouragement, when at work, in music, no doubt of this kind.

emotion, with a distinctness quite unfamiliar to ourselves. 'We only want a closer analysis to detect the same qualities in our own composers. Much of the best music we now hear is unduly exciting; it feeds vain longings, indefinite desires, sensuous regrets¹.' Aristotle, we see, is careful to keep the minds of the young out of the way of exciting or enervating music, and to use in their education quiet airs expressive of manly feeling. Not all the tunes, perhaps not all the hymn-tunes we use in the education of the young, would be approved by him.

He differs from Plato in recognizing a variety of legitimate uses for music. Plato had tolerated it in the Republic only so far as it contributes to virtue. Aristotle tries to see it in its whole relation to human life. It is a source of harmless pleasure and has legitimate claims to recognition on this ground². It is 'sweet after toil'—a pleasurable and restful recreation for the wearied. It is, like tragedy (Poet. 6. 1449 b 27), a means of freeing the 'o'er-fraught heart' from an excessive accumulation of emotion. In it, again, we have a means of making an intellectual use of leisure. It is, lastly, of use in forming the character. It brings before us, more vividly than the 'hints' (σημεία) of painting and sculpture, 'images' (ὁμοιώματα) of character and action, and if care is taken in the early years of life that the character and action reproduced in the music practised are good, it habituates the mind to the love of that which is good and noble and to a distaste for that which is not so. In order fully to understand the importance of the part assigned by Aristotle to music in the development of the σπουδαίος, we must bear in mind that to him, unlike some modern moralists, a man is not really virtuous unless he finds pleasure in the exercise of virtue. It is precisely this identification of the good and the pleasurable that music is the earliest means of producing.

¹ See Mr. Mahaffy, *Old Greek Education*, p. 73.

² He had said the same thing

of the institution of several property (2. 5. 1263 a 40 sqq.).

For each of these purposes Music has appropriate melodies, harmonies, and instruments. For education we must use only the most 'ethical' melodies, the Dorian harmony¹, and the lyre. But it does not follow that we must with Plato expel from the State all melodies, harmonies, and instruments, that are not fit for educational use. Aristotle goes so far as to allow, even in his best State, of the use, in public entertainments and competitions, of music suitable to the taste of auditors of an inferior type, feeling quite secure that his citizens will not be corrupted by it, for they will find it repulsive and not attractive to their well-trained taste. The music that will please them will be ennobling music; they will not need to be guarded as if they were children from every possibility of harm (cp. 4 (7). 17. 1336 b 21-23). Aristotle desires to give music, as he also desires to give tragedy and even comedy, its full natural verge and scope. He is more careful than Plato had been not to impoverish the life of his State, or to curtail its opportunities of making a rational use of leisure; he wishes its enjoyment of the goods of civilized existence to be full and complete.

Aristotle's scheme of education, in the form in which it has come down to us, closes abruptly without even completing the subject of music, for as to the rhythms which are to be used and as to the relative educational value of rhythm and tune we are left altogether in the dark, though we look for some treatment of both these subjects (cp. c. 7. 1341 b 24 sqq.). We hear nothing with regard to the use of poetry or dancing in education—subjects which Plato had considered at length—nor is anything said with regard to the use of prose-recitation, which Plato had recommended in the *Laws*. When the subject of Poetry comes to be treated in the *Poetics*, we find it treated not from a social or educational, but from a

On Aristotle's scheme of education.

¹ This rule appears to be so far commended in the case of boys modified in c. 7. 1342 b 29 sqq., learning to sing and play. that the Lydian harmony is re-

literary point of view. Above all, the inquiry breaks off before the culminating epoch of education is reached—that in which the reason is developed, not indirectly through the likings, but directly. Our latest glimpse of the youthful object of Aristotle's care is obtained at the moment when at the age of 19 or thereabouts he is committed for the first time to the tender mercies of the sterner form of *γυμναστική*, and left, we do not exactly know for what period, but probably till the age of 21, in the hands of the gymnastic trainer. We cannot tell whether Aristotle was about to follow the example of Plato¹ and to crown his scheme of early education with a long course of philosophical study, but some direct training of the reason was probably intended to begin at 21².

The main novelty in Aristotle's treatment of the subject of education, if we compare it with Plato's, seems to be his fuller and more reasoned adoption of the principle that its successive stages are to be adjusted to those of the physical and psychological development of the individual³—that the body, the appetites, and the reason are to be successively taken in hand as they successively develop, but that the training of the body should be such as to develop healthy appetites, and the training of the appetites such as to develop the reason. His scheme consequently differs from those of Plato⁴ in making gymnastic training of the right kind the main business of the earlier years of life, in

¹ Rep. 537 sqq.

² As Aristotle does not, like Plato, find the root of right conduct in speculative insight, but distinguishes the sources of *φρόνησις* and *σοφία*, it would have been interesting to know by what training of the reason he proposed to develop *φρόνησις*. Perhaps, if we were in possession of his views on this subject, we might find that in relation to it, no less than in his treatment of practical philosophy generally, he would adhere less closely than we might expect

to the principle laid down in the Nicomachean Ethics.

³ Plato had already said (Laws 653) that the tastes and disposition of boys must be trained before their reason is trained.

⁴ See Sus.³, Note 970, for a sketch of the schemes of education set forth by Plato in the Republic and Laws. Plato's scheme of education in the Republic is, it should be observed, intended for *φύλακες* and *ἀρχοντες*—Aristotle's for citizens generally.

beginning other training later—at puberty instead of the age of 10, as in the State of the Laws (809 E)—and in devoting only three years instead of six or more to ‘studies other than that of gymnastics’ (τοῖς ἄλλοις μαθήμασι, 5 (8). 4. 1339 a 4 sqq.).

They both, however, agree in the important view that school is a place for forming the tastes and giving a right direction to the appetites and likings, for inspiring a love of all that is noble and a distaste for that which is the reverse, rather than for pouring in knowledge or directly developing the reason, though Plato finds room before the age of 18 (which Aristotle cannot positively be said to do) for the beginnings of mathematical education. Hence it is that gymnastic and music are accepted by them as the main means of education in youth. Looking forward as they both perhaps did to a long course of education carried on till middle life¹, they did not need to make youth a time for the rapid acquisition of a mass of positive knowledge. They held that the main business of school-education is the formation of the tastes and character, and that the studies which are in place at school are studies adapted to this end². Music was pre-eminently such a study³. The Greek youth was evidently unused to

¹ This cannot be proved as to Aristotle, but it is very probable. If we feel instinctively inclined to reject the idea of an education such as that designed by Plato, which did not close, at any rate for the *élite*, till 35, we must bear in mind that the ancients not unfrequently became the pupils of instructors in rhetoric and philosophy at a ripe age, that Plato and Aristotle held years and experience to be needed for the study of some of the sciences, and that oral instruction came more naturally to many Greeks than the reading of books, all the more so that it was usually conjoined with conversational discussion.

² Plato speaks in one passage (Rep. 498 B) as if the main thing

in the case of boys were to secure a sound and healthy body—*μεν-ράκια μὲν ὄντα καὶ παῖδας μενρακιώδη παιδείαν καὶ φιλοσοφίαν [δεῖ] μεταχειρίζεσθαι, τῶν τε σωμάτων ἐν ᾧ βλαστάνει τε καὶ ἀνδρούται εὖ μάλα ἐπιμελείσθαι, ὑπηρεσίαν φιλοσοφίᾳ κτωμένους· προιούσης δὲ τῆς ἡλικίας, ἐν ᾗ ἡ ψυχὴ τελειοῦσθαι ἀρχεται, ἐπιτείνειν τὰ ἐκείνης γυμνάσια*. Plutarch, unlike Aristotle, would have children ‘accustomed from their earliest years to receive their lessons and instruction mingled with philosophic reason, that so they may come at last as kind and familiar friends to philosophy’ (de Recta Ratione Audiendi, c. 2).

³ The argument is occasionally used at the present day, that literature is preferable to physical

the hard intellectual efforts, which later ages with more or less success have sought to impose upon boys, and the attractiveness of music was a fact in its favour. It was attractive, and yet powerful as a means of imperceptibly winning the mind to virtue. A boy needs to be won to the side of virtue long before his reason can be appealed to, and this can be done through music. Music reproduces character, and one who has learnt in youth to love noble music will have learnt with the help of the musical image (*ῥυθμίς*) to love all that is noble in character and action. Premature attempts to make a boy understand why this or that is right are out of place: let him learn to love what is right first and wait till later to learn why it is so. Enough will have been done, if at twenty-one years of age he turns out to possess a robust, agile, and healthy physique, correct likings, and a disposition to which all that is ignoble is distasteful.

Aristotle's scheme of youthful education stands in marked contrast to that plan of encyclopaedic study which Milton sketches in his treatise on Education, and still more to the training which the late Mr. J. S. Mill appears to have received from his father. As its outcome at the age of twenty-one, we may imagine a bronzed and hardy youth, healthy in body and mind, lithe and active, able to bear hunger and hard physical labour, skilled in wrestling, running, and leaping, but also able to sing and play the lyre, not untouched by studies which awake in men the interests of civilized beings and prepare them for a right use of leisure in after-years, and though burdened with little knowledge, possessed of an educated sense of beauty and an ingrained love of what is noble and hatred of all that is the reverse. He would be more cultured and human than the best type of young Spartan, more physically vigorous and more reverential, though less intellectually developed, than the best type of young Athenian—a nascent soldier and servant of the State,

science and mathematics as a subject of youthful education, because of its influence on the character.

Plato and Aristotle use this argument in favour of music.

not, like most young Athenians of ability, a nascent orator. And as he would only be half-way through his education at an age at which many Greeks had finished theirs, he would be more conscious of his own immaturity. We feel at once how different he would be from the clever lads who swarmed at Athens, youths with an infinite capacity for picking holes and capable of saying something plausible on every subject under the sun.

The aim of Aristotle is to produce a man who will be capable of playing successively a number of different parts—of being first a soldier, and then a ruler or judge or philosopher, in his best State. He does not educate with a view to private life, or in the way most likely to develop one-sided genius, but rather with the aim of building up an *ensemble* of character suited to the ideal society and to the duties which it successively imposes on the citizen.

Education with us is so inseparable from instruction and the communication of knowledge, that we can hardly enter into a scheme which finds so little time in youth for serious intellectual study, and makes its main aim till the age of twenty-one the formation of the tastes and character—a matter which we deal with only indirectly. Aristotle declines to give a direct training to the intellect, till he has first laid a solid foundation of character. In his view the object of youthful education is to produce a being who will find his happiness in the exercise of the moral and intellectual virtues—to whom not only vice, but an over-estimate of external and bodily goods, will be distasteful—who will live for the noblest things that men can live for, simply because to do otherwise would be painful to him. No higher conception of the aim of education could well be formed, and we see every day how much character has to do even with purely intellectual achievements. Yet perhaps Aristotle delays unduly the cultivation of the intellect. We may doubt whether the youths who gathered round Socrates would have been content with a diet of *γυμναστική* and *μουσική*, till they reached the due official age—content to postpone all deeper problems and to silence

for a time the stirrings of reason. It has already been remarked that Aristotle seems occasionally to overrate the immaturity of youth and its contrast with manhood. But if he postpones the appeal to reason, it is in order that it may be all the more effectual when it is made. His view that no education is good which does not culminate in rationality—in a reasoned perception of truth, goodness, and beauty—that to be educated is to be in the best sense rational, is one which possesses permanent value.

To him as to Plato, the production of a fully and harmoniously developed man (*σπουδαῖος*) is the work of years, and the final result of a laborious and long-continued system of habituation¹, commencing in the regulation of marriage, and culminating in the development of the reason. Hence his sense of the importance of the social and political environment of the individual.

Sketch of
the history
of Greek
political
philosophy.

Our attempt to sketch the ideal State of Aristotle, so far as it is known to us, is now complete, but it remains to trace its genesis, and to view it in relation to previous ideals and to the results of earlier inquiry.

The aims
of early
Greek
legislators
and
political
inquirers.

The actual State, whether Greek or barbarian, Aristotle tells us, was little conscious of a distinct aim, but so far as an aim was impressed on its institutions, it was commonly that of supremacy and empire (*τὸ κρατεῖν*, 4 (7). 2. 1324 b 5 sqq.). He traced written laws or unwritten customs tending to this end at Carthage no less than in the Lacedaemonian and Cretan States—among the Persians of Asia no less than the Thracians, Macedonians, Scythians, Celts, and Iberians of Europe. We hear of writers on politics who took the same view, and glorified Lycurgus because he had taught those for whom he legislated 'to win empire over many by teaching them how to face perils' (4 (7). 14. 1333 b 16-21).

¹ Cp. Eth. Nic. 2. 1. 1103b 23, οὐ μικρόν οὖν διαφέρει τὸ οὕτως ἢ οὕτως

εὐθὺς ἐκ νέων ἐθίζεσθαι, ἀλλὰ πάν- πολὺν, μᾶλλον δὲ τὸ πᾶν.

Most authors of 'best constitutions,' however, appear to have followed a different path. They concerned themselves especially with questions relating to the distribution of property, holding that civil discord always arose in relation to property (2. 7. 1266 a 36 sqq.). They thus seem to have made the avoidance of civil discord (*στάσις*) their aim. It is true, of course, that internal harmony is a main condition of success in war, so that the two aims did not lie far apart¹.

They probably inherited their view of the importance of a due regulation of property from some of the earliest legislators of Greece—men, for instance, like Pheidon of Corinth (2. 6. 1265 b 12 sqq.). One main object of early legislation seems to have been the maintenance of the original number of lots of land. It is probable that the citizen-body in many early States, and especially in colonies and States founded on conquest, consisted only of those who owned one or more of the lots into which the territory was at the outset divided. We gather, at all events, that the plan followed at Aphytis, a city of the Thrace-ward region (8 (6). 4. 1319 a 14 sqq.), by which the owner of a fraction of one of the original lots was accounted a citizen, was an exceptional one. It is easy to see that a citizen-body thus composed was in a somewhat dangerous position. A large body of non-citizens was likely to grow up around this nucleus of privileged persons, and if, as no doubt frequently happened, the numbers of the privileged dwindled through the union of more lots than one in the same hands, the state of things which we find existing at an early date in many Greek States could hardly fail to arise. Power would be in the hands of a few families, girt round by a 'hungry people' creeping ever nigher. To keep power in their hands it was essential to maintain their numbers, and with this aim the owners of the lots were often forbidden to

¹ Another characteristic of ordinary speculation about law was its fragmentary character (Plato, *Laws* 630 E, οὐδ' ἄπερ οἱ τῶν νῦν εἶδη προτιθέμενοι ζητοῦσιν

οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἕκαστος ἐν χρεῖα γίγνηται, τοῦτο ζητεῖ νῦν παραθέμενος, ὁ μὲν τὰ περὶ τῶν κλήρων καὶ ἐπικλήρων, ὁ δὲ τῆς αἰκίας πέρι, ἄλλοι δὲ ἄλλα ἅττα μυρία τοιαῦτα).

alienate or mortgage them¹, the giving of dowries and the marriage of heiresses were strictly regulated, the possession of land in excess of a certain amount was made illegal, and power to adopt a son was often conceded. If war and famine and pestilence did not sufficiently reduce the numbers of the unenfranchised population, it was usually possible to fall back on the resource of founding a colony, or perhaps the perils of the governing class might be opportunely lessened by the growth of commerce and manufactures. We can readily understand how it happened that many States were glad to have a number of colonies connected with them, which served as outlets not only for their produce and their manufactures, but also for their surplus population. A further danger arose from the circumstance that the lots do not seem to have been necessarily, or perhaps even commonly, equal. Phaleas of Chalcedon is said to have been the first to propose legislation for the purpose of making them equal (2. 7. 1266a 39). His views were apparently put forth in the form of a 'best constitution,' but he trod in the steps of the early legislators to whom we have referred; at all events he hoped everything from the plan of giving every one the same amount of land.

Pythagoras
and Pytha-
goreanism.

Pythagoras² saw deeper and devised a remedy which proved, for a time at least, effectual. He seems to have been a citizen of Samos in the days when Samos was mistress of the seas, and is said, not improbably, to have emigrated to escape from the rule of Polycrates. Tyrants were foes to *ἐταπρία* (7 (5). II. 1313a 41), and an *ἐταπρία* was precisely what Pythagoras aimed at founding³. He

¹ According to Plato (Rep. 552 A sq. : cp. 556 A), this wholesome measure, as he considers it, was not commonly adopted in oligarchies, for the rich oligarchs in power would be unwilling to lose the chance of stripping spendthrifts of their possessions and thus growing richer themselves. He seems to regard it rather as congenial to a constitution like

the Lacedaemonian, which, as we know from Aristotle (Pol. 2. 9. 1270a 19), put a stigma both on the sale and on the purchase of patrimonies.

² It is not intended to suggest that Phaleas was prior in date to Pythagoras, which is far from likely. Nothing is known of the date of Phaleas.

³ Besides, the rule of a tyrant

carried his ascetic aims to a region which lived for material enjoyments. 'Among the Achaeans of South Italy,' says Mommsen¹, 'the spit was for ever turning on the hearth².' He appears to have found Croton in the hands of a limited body of citizens, whose power was waning, and to have given a new lease of life to the oligarchical constitution, not by methods such as those we have noticed, but by breathing a new and more ethical spirit into the rule of the Few. He sought out the best of the young nobles of Croton and other cities, taught them to live an ascetic life of temperance and friendship, and formed them into a brotherhood which ultimately brought not only Croton but several other cities of South Italy under its direction.

His originality consisted in this, that he was at once a philosopher, the founder of a religion, and the head of a brotherhood. No one quite like him appears ever to have existed in Greece. More lessons than one were to be learnt from his career. It proved, in the first place, that philosophers could 'be kings,' and that the dream of Plato was a dream that had once come true. Philosophy had once upon a time established her competence to rule, and would not easily forget that she had done so, or cease to make her voice heard in the politics of Greece. Occasionally, in fact, we find philosophers actually ruling in Greece. The saying ran that Thebes never flourished till it was ruled by philosophers (*Rhet.* 2. 23. 1398 b 18). The careers of Epaminondas, Archytas, Dion, and others showed that philosophers sometimes made noble rulers. More usually, however, we find philosophers the advisers of rulers, and this perhaps was their true function. In the

would be especially hateful to an ascetic like Pythagoras, if only because tyrants commonly lived luxurious lives.

¹ History of Rome, I. 143 E. T.

² His appearance at Croton may be compared to the appearance of Calvin at Geneva. When Calvin came to Geneva, it 'was apparently in a state of political, ecclesiastical, and moral decay . . . An unbridled

love of pleasure, a reckless wantonness, a licentious frivolity had taken possession of Genevan life, while the State was the plaything of intestine and foreign feuds . . . It was a commonwealth torn to pieces by party spirit, the independence of which was endangered' (*Häusser, Period of the Reformation*, I. 314 E.T.).

one way or the other, Greek philosophers found means of exercising political influence, and their influence was commonly an ennobling and moderating influence. It is, perhaps, because the spheres of philosophy and politics were so little held apart, that Plato and Aristotle conceive the problem of political philosophy in the practical way they do—that their aim is to come to the rescue of the Greek State, and to make it as much as possible what it ought to be.

The career of Pythagoras also showed how much could be done by education and by regulating men's habits of life. A whole group of States had been mastered by a handful of carefully trained nobles. If a sect could do so much, what might not a State do, which set to work in the same way!

Nor was this all. Plato was greatly influenced by the Pythagorean doctrines¹, and if Aristoxenus' account of them is not unduly coloured by his Peripateticism², we can trace their influence even in the Politics of Aristotle. We do not learn from Aristoxenus how the Pythagoreans connected their ethical and social teaching with the numerical basis of their Ontology, though a connexion may often be conjectured. They taught that 'there was no greater evil than the absence of rule (*ἀναρχία*): the secret of safety for man is to have somebody over him³.' Here we are reminded of a well-known passage of Plato's Laws (942 A sqq.). 'Men were to be full of reverence for gods and *δαίμονες*, and, after them, for their parents and the laws' (Aristox. Fragm. 19: cp. Plato, Laws 917 A). 'It was right to adhere to the ancestral laws of the State, even if they were a little inferior to others⁴.' Here they went even beyond Plato, whose desire for fixity of law did not induce him absolutely to prohibit all change (Laws 769 D: cp. 772 A-D). Aristotle perhaps has the Pythagorean

¹ See Prof. Lewis Campbell, Introduction to the Politics of Plato, p. xx. sqq.

² He seems to have been acquainted with some still surviving

members of the sect (Fragm. 12: Müller, Fragm. Hist. Graec. 2. 275).

³ Aristox. Fr. 18.

⁴ Aristox. Fr. 19.

doctrine in his mind in a passage of the Politics (2. 8. 1269 a 14 sqq.). 'The relation between rulers and ruled was thus conceived by them:—the rulers were not only to be men of knowledge, but loving to those they ruled, and the ruled were not only to be obedient but fond of their rulers¹. There was, it would seem, to be a 'harmony of contraries' in the State as in the Universe². Rulers and ruled were to be friends, and when Aristotle tells us that some found in 'good-will' the true basis of the relation between master and slave, he may be referring to the Pythagoreans. Order and proportion, limit and measure were to them the life-breath of virtue, and also of the State: here again was a doctrine which profoundly influenced later speculation. They had their views as to the begetting and education of children (Aristox. Fr. 18, 20); they commended a sparing diet; their enthusiasm for mathematics passed to Plato, their high estimate of gymnastic, and still higher estimate of music, passed not only to Plato but to Aristotle; their ascetic brotherhood was a brotherhood of close friends who freely shared all they had with each other, and may have served as the model for the class of guardians in Plato's Republic, besides helping to suggest to Aristotle that 'common use' of property which he recommends (cp. Diod. 10. 3. 5: 10. 4. 1). A saying ascribed by Aristoxenus to Pythagoras ran: *φυγαδευτέον πάση μηχανῇ καὶ περικοπτέον πυρὶ καὶ σιδήρῳ καὶ μηχαναῖς παντοίαις ἀπὸ μὲν σώματος νόσον, ἀπὸ δὲ ψυχῆς ἀμαθίαν, κοιλίας δὲ πολυτέλειαν, πόλεως δὲ στάσιν, οἴκου δὲ διχοφροσύνην, ὁμοῦ δὲ πάντων ἀμετρίαν* (Fragm. 8: Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 2. 273). Compare the turn of Plato's language in Laws 942 C, *τὴν δ' ἀναρχίαν ἐξαιρετέον ἐκ παντὸς τοῦ βίου ἀπάντων τῶν ἀνθρώπων τε καὶ τῶν ὑπ' ἀνθρώπους θηρίων*, and 739 C, *καὶ πάση μηχανῇ τὸ λεγόμενον ἴδιον πανταχόθεν ἐκ τοῦ βίου ἅπαν ἐξήρηται*. Their dogma of the metempsychosis seems to be unconnected with the rest of their tenets, but it supplied a fresh motive for virtue.

¹ Aristox. Fr. 18.

² Cp. Philolaus, Fragg. 3 (Mullach, Fr. Philos. Gr. 2. 1).

The ruling brotherhood appears to have been overthrown by a popular outbreak at Croton; it is, indeed, surprising that the ascendancy of a philosophical coterie should have been tolerated at all. But Pythagoreanism long survived this blow, and gave to Greece, in later days, two of its noblest statesmen, Epaminondas and Archytas: no other school could claim to have trained rulers equally great. In its original form Pythagoreanism was fatal to the authority of the State, for it set on foot a brotherhood whose power overrode the local authority of the separate States; and we notice that at this point Plato and Aristotle wholly diverge from Pythagorean traditions, for their principle always is to make the City-State the source of authority. But it is impossible not to see how much both of them, and especially Plato, owe to Pythagoreanism.

Hippodamus of Miletus.

When we pass from Pythagoras to Hippodamus of Miletus, we pass from a great personality whose work stood the test of a stormy time to the mere author of a shadowy ideal. Before the ideal of Hippodamus took shape, great events had happened. Persia had been driven back not only from Greece, but from the Aegean coast: perhaps the turning-point of Greek history had been passed, and the policy of Cimon had been vanquished by that of Pericles. Cimon's gallant attempt to hold together the two leading powers of the Greek world, the Athenian and Lacedaemonian States, may have already failed, and the Periclean scheme of an absolute democracy at Athens, outspoken antagonism to the Lacedaemonians, and a pronounced Imperialism in relation to the allies may have already triumphed over the policy of 'friendship among Greeks and war with the barbarians,' with fatal ultimate results to the unity of Greece and to the internal harmony of every Greek State. Hippodamus was largely employed by Pericles; he laid out the Peiraeus for him in broad rectangular streets, he built Thurii; but there are indications in his ideal that he can hardly have sympathised with the unmixed Periclean democracy.

He had one advantage over Pythagoras; his connexion with Athens placed him at the very centre of the Greek world. But he is not treated by Aristotle with much respect, and we know from the Republic that philosophers who began by being τεχνῖται were not favourably viewed by Plato (Rep. 495 C sq.). Like the sophist Hippias¹, he seems to have had crotchets about dress, and Aristotle, who takes account of the life of a philosopher in judging of his claims to authority², evidently thinks the less of Hippodamus for his eccentric fancies. He belonged to the brilliant and aspiring generation which immediately followed the Persian wars—a generation which threw itself with ardour into every department of study (πάσης ἡπτοντο μαθήσεως, 5 (8). 6. 1341 a 31)—and we find him described not only as a physical philosopher³, but also as the first man who without experience as a statesman attempted to express an opinion with respect to the best constitution.

His aim was not, like that of Phaleas, the mere avoidance of civil disturbance, but the founding of a well-ordered and powerful State. Aristotle seems to be struck with his threefold divisions of things, and to think him fanciful. The population, the territory, laws and lawsuits, verdicts of juries, subjects of administration, all, he thought, fell easily into three groups or sections. This feature may point to Pythagorean influences (cp. de Caelo, 1. 1. 268 a 10 sqq.)⁴, or it may reflect the influence of the philosophy of Ion of Chios⁵, if indeed Ion did not himself derive his 'triad'

¹ Plato, Hipp. Min. 368 B sqq.

² Cp. Eth. Nic. 10. 2. 1172 b 15 sq.: 1. 3. 1095 b 14 sq. Cp. also Rhet. ad Alex. 39. 1445 b 29 sqq.

³ The view is expressed in a fragment ascribed to the Pythagorean Archytas, that the nature of the Whole must be studied, if any department of it is to be studied successfully. Καλῶς μοι δοκοῦντι (οἱ περὶ Πυθαγόραν) τὸ περὶ τὰ μαθήματα διαγνῶναι, καὶ οὐδὲν ἀποπον ὀρθῶς αὐτῶς περὶ ἑκαστον θεωρεῖν. Περί γάρ τας τῶν ὅλων φύσιος καλῶς διαγνόντες, ἐμελλόν

καὶ περὶ τῶν κατὰ μέρος, οἷά ἐντι, ὀφείσθαι (Mullach, Fragm. Philos. Gr. 1. 564).

⁴ The carefulness of Hippodamus about oaths and his dread of perjury may also be indications of Pythagoreanism (Diod. 10. 9. 2).

⁵ The following passage from the Τριαγμός of Ion of Chios—perhaps its opening passage—has been preserved by Harpocration (s.v. "Ἴων"): ἀρχὴ δέ (ἦδε corr. Lobbeck, Agl. p. 722) μοι τοῦ λόγου. Πάντα τρία καὶ πλεόν τοῦδε πλεόν ἔλασσαν (καὶ οὔτε πλεόν οὔτε ἔλασσαν, corr.

theory from Pythagoras. Ion was a friend of Cimon, and opposed to Pericles and the extreme democratic party; he may very well have been a friend of his fellow-Ionian, Hippodamus. Hippodamus' division of the citizens into three classes—warriors, cultivators, and artisans—is quite opposed to democratic sentiment, for in democracies 'all men shared in all functions' (μετέχουσιν πάντες πάντων, 4 (7). 9. 1328 b 32); it savours rather of Egypt or the Lacedaemonian State. His laying out of the Peiraeus perhaps already reproduced the straight thoroughfares of Babylon. The military class was to be maintained from public land specially assigned to it, like the military caste in Egypt. He perhaps thought that cultivators and artisans made bad soldiers; at all events, he excluded them from the use of arms, though not from political rights, for they were to have a voice in the election of magistrates, and apparently, though this is not distinctly stated, to sit on dicasteries. We do not learn whether office was to be confined to members of the military class; Aristotle himself does not seem to have known how this was to be (1268 a 20), but, as he says, the two other classes can hardly have been eligible for the more important offices (1268 a 23). Aristotle's remark is evidently correct, that the cultivators, who bear no arms, and still more the artisans, who have neither arms nor land, would be at the mercy of the military class. If Hippodamus was against a popular army, he was also unfavourable to the democratic institution of the lot, for which he would in all cases substitute election. His dicasteries were to be controlled by an elective Supreme Court of old men, which would not, indeed, possess, as the

Bentl. Ep. ad Mill. p. 67) τούτων τριῶν. Ἐνὸς ἐκάστου ἀρετὴ τριῖς, σύνεσις καὶ κράτος καὶ τύχη. Cp. Isocr. de Antid. § 268, Ἴων δ' οὐ πλείω τριῶν (sc. τὸ πλῆθος εἶφη εἶναι τῶν δυνάτων). See Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 2. 49. Democritus also wrote a work called Τριτογένεια: τοῦτο δὲ ἐστὶν (adds Diogenes Laertius,

9. 46), οὗ τρία γίνονται ἐξ αὐτῆς (Pallas or Wisdom), ἃ πάντα τὰ ἀνθρώπινα συνέχει—namely, εὐλογία, σοφία, κράτος καὶ τύχη (see Zeller's note, Gr. Ph. 1. 831. 6, and the references he gives). The fancy seems to have been popular in that age.

Areopagus would seem at one time to have done at Athens, the right to supervise the administration of the State¹, but was nevertheless to have a power which the Areopagus had not—that of reversing and correcting the decisions of the dicasteries. It does not appear who were to say when these decisions were to be submitted to it for correction: all we are told is that they were to come before the Court, when they were not thought correct; we do not learn who was to judge of this. Perhaps the Court itself. In that case its position and power would be almost greater than that of the Areopagus. If, on the other hand, the scheme is to be construed as allowing an appeal from the dicasteries to the supreme court, this was an arrangement which found no parallel in the judicial procedure of Athens. Open appeals against decisions of dicasteries were not recognized there². Even Plato in the *Laws* (767–8: cp. 956) allows only of appeals from the judgment of the magistrates (768 A) or of the judges of the village and the tribe (956 C), not from the judgment of the people.

If the ideal scheme of Hippodamus was put forth in the high and palmy days of Athens, the fact is remarkable and reflects credit on his foresight, for he must have been already dissatisfied with the extreme democracy, one weak point in which—its dicasteries—he seems to have hit. It is not impossible that his scheme of a Court to control the dicasteries was suggested by his connexion as a Milesian with the dependent allies of Athens, whose sentiments as to the Athenian dicasteries may be gathered not only from Thucydides, but from the paper on the Athenian Constitution which finds a place among the writings of Xenophon.

His proposal that those who placed useful suggestions or discoveries at the service of the State should be rewarded was conceived in a more democratic spirit. A readiness to welcome valuable hints, whencesoever they might come, counted as a note of democracy (cp. Eurip. *Suppl.* 424 sqq.).

¹ Plutarch, Solon c. 19, ἐπίσκοπον πάντων καὶ φύλακα τῶν νόμων.

² C. F. Hermann, *Gr. Antiqq.* I. § 145.

Aristotle evidently fears that it would give a stimulus to legislative innovation and constitutional change.

Altogether the ideal constitution of Hippodamus bears traces of compromise and mixture. The possibility of a mixed government never occurs to Herodotus when he makes his Persian grandees discuss the comparative merits of monarchy, oligarchy, and democracy, but the scheme of Hippodamus is an effort, though perhaps a crude one, in that direction. His model would seem to be the Lacedaemonian State, if we may judge from his severance of the soldier-class from the cultivators and artisans, and from his institution of a Supreme Court of old men appointed by election; yet he appears to contemplate the existence of popular dicasteries, and he seeks to establish a more equal relation between his three classes than that which prevailed between Spartans, Perioeci, and Helots.

The eulogists and critics of the Athenian and Lacedaemonian States.

Many men of his generation were, unlike him, unqualified admirers of the Lacedaemonian State. Ion praised it in the well-known lines which have been already quoted (p. 325). It was a State, not of talk but of action and wisdom in action. It was a State whose life-breath was obedience to law. Law was the source even of the courage of its sons and of their alertness in battle¹. Its citizens acquired their great qualities by submitting to a course of laborious training. Submission to law and to the magistrates lay at the root of its greatness. Silence, obedience, endurance, the suppression of self—these were the qualities that made it what it was.

Even the warmest friends of the Lacedaemonian State at Athens, however, betrayed in their mode of life that they were far from resembling its citizens. Cimon would hardly have been at home at Sparta, and Xenophon must have been conscious that his literary gifts and his interest in philosophy drew an impassable barrier between him and the State which he so greatly admired. To measure the

¹ Thuc. 1. 84. 5: L. Schmidt, *Ethik d. alten Griechen*, 1. 174.

gulf which parted the Athenian ideal from the Lacedaemonian, we have only to read the Funeral Oration of Pericles in the record of Thucydides. In that eulogy of Athens there is a constant, though tacit, reference to her rival, and the feeling expressed is substantially this, that while the Lacedaemonian State purchased its greatness at an immense cost of civilization and elasticity of spirit, by keeping oratory and philosophy at a distance, by excluding aliens, by reserving politics and the higher interests of human life for the few, and by insisting on a gloomy and laborious training, Athens combined greatness as a State with a life rich in human interest, shared in by all, pleasurable, spontaneous, and unconstrained¹. The view of Aristotle was anticipated that the ideal State is that which enjoys 'the most desirable life'—that it is of the essence of the State to realize the highest quality of life. But Pericles held that all men, even those who toiled for their daily bread, might share and ought to share in the things that give greatness to human life. Rich and poor must work together for this end. Here was an ideal which testified to a far greater faith in human nature and in the possibilities of social life than any other Greek ideal known to us; and Thucydides perhaps hints a sense that it was too high-pitched and unsubstantial, when he passes on from it to an account of the plague².

The time was one rather of sanguine aspiration and varied genius than of firm faith, or full knowledge, or even settled opinion. Aristotle would reply to Pericles that if a

¹ Pindar would have said of Pericles' eulogy of Athens, that it omits to give the glory to God. Cp. Pyth. 8. 73 sqq. :

εἰ γάρ τις ἐσλὰ πέπται μὴ σὺν
μακρῷ πόνῳ,
πολλοῖς σοφὸς δοκεῖ πεδ' ἀφρόνων
βίον κορυσσόμεν ὀρθοβούλοις μα-
χαναῖς·
τὰ δ' οὐκ ἐπ' ἀνδράσι κείμεν· δαί-
μων δὲ παρίσχει,
ἄλλοτ' ἄλλον ὑπερθε βάλλων, ἄλλον
δ' ὑπὸ χειρῶν.

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² So again his record of the Melian Controversy immediately precedes his history of the Sicilian disaster. Thucydides keeps himself and his point of view, which was not that of extreme, but rather of qualified democracy (8. 97. 2), a good deal in the background, but his own contemporaries were probably far more conscious than we are in reading his history, that he was by no means a neutral in politics.

State was to be all he pictured Athens as being, its citizens must be men of full virtue (*σπουδαῖοι*), united by a common ethical belief, firmly held and followed in practice. Pericles had spoken of a 'fear of the laws,' but that was not enough¹. And then again, Aristotle would ask, what means did Athens take to secure the permanence of the 'spirit' (*τρόςος*) described by Pericles? Did Athens develope it by a well-considered course of education beginning in childhood? Nothing of the kind. Aristotle charges the Greek State with universally neglecting even to give its citizens an education suitable to the constitution (7 (5). 9. 1310 a 12 sqq.) and such as would contribute to its permanence.

The
Sophists.

The early physical philosophy of Greece had now well-nigh received its death-blow: the philosopher had become a sceptic and simultaneously a teacher of 'virtue,' or rhetoric, or both, wandering from city to city and infinitely more ubiquitous and influential than his more believing predecessors. The Protagoras of Plato describes how these great teachers moved through Greece, each of them followed in his wanderings by a train of devoted admirers and winning fresh recruits wherever he went.

The writings of the 'sophists,' as they are called, have perished or all but perished, and we are left to gather the nature of their teaching from the pages of their opponents, but it seems pretty clear that some of the most conspicuous men in the group of professional teachers which comes to the front in the latter half of the fifth century before Christ, brought the questioning spirit, which now prevailed in the treatment of physical and ontological questions, to bear on morals and politics.

The first effect of their teaching, indeed, was inspiring and stimulating. At a time when the 'good and well-descended men' (*ἐσθλοὶ ἀπ' ἐσθλῶν*) were still apt to claim a monopoly of virtue, men listened gladly to the offer which some of the sophists made to teach it to all²,

¹ Another weakness of Periclean Athens was that the resources which enabled it to live this glorious life were largely derived

from the tribute of the allies, but we cannot be sure that Aristotle was alive to this defect.

² See Schmidt, *Ethik der alten*

and to teach it in a few short weeks or months. There can be no question that they did the world a service by awakening intellectual interest and stimulating the natural eagerness of the Greek race to excel. There was something to be gained, no doubt, by sitting at the feet of a man of genius like Protagoras, however unsatisfactory his grasp of dialectic might seem to Socrates.

The teaching of the myth which Plato puts in his mouth is, indeed, quite in harmony with Greek traditional feeling, for it refers men to the State as the source of their virtue. Men learn to be just by living in a well-ordered Hellenic State and breathing its atmosphere. They learn justice first from parents and nurses, next from teachers of poetry, music, and gymnastic, lastly from the voice of the State speaking through its laws. We do not gather that the instructions of the sophist or teacher of rhetoric are absolutely necessary for its production. Justice is the inheritance of all members of a civilized community, and this is why the knowledge of what is just 'grows on every hedge¹'. Here was another comfortable doctrine, too comfortable perhaps to be true.

Plato agreed with Protagoras that justice (*αἰδώς καὶ δίκη*) is the uniting principle in the State (yes, he would add, and in the soul of the individual also), that all members of a State need to possess a sense of justice, and that in every society a process of education goes on which insensibly communicates to the individual the ideas of right and wrong current in the society, but then he does not hold that the ideas thus communicated are necessarily correct, or that all men living in Hellenic States have a true notion of justice. The theory of Protagoras not only pointed to democracy, but implied that a knowledge

Griechen, I. 158-162, whose work will be found here as elsewhere instructive. Isocrates makes some comments on this offer in his *Contra Sophistas*, and Plato refers to high promises of this kind in *Rep.* 518 B sq.

¹ Plato perhaps has Protago-

ras' myth in view in *Polit.* 299 C, οὐδὲν γὰρ δεῖν τῶν νόμων εἶναι σοφώτερον· οὐδένα γὰρ ἀγνοεῖν τό τε ἱατρικὸν καὶ τὸ ὑγεινὸν οὐδὲ τὸ κυβερνητικὸν καὶ ναυτικόν· ἐξεῖναι γὰρ τῷ βουλομένῳ μαρβάνειν γεγραμμένα καὶ πάτριά ἐστι κείμενα.

of what is just comes insensibly to men bred up in a civilized society, and that no special study or effort is essential for its acquisition. How mistaken this view was, is shown by the dialectical failure of Protagoras himself in the dialogue. For he turns out to be unable, notwithstanding all that he has said, to give a satisfactory account of virtue. Without dialectic the just cannot really be known. This is the point in which he is most at fault, though Plato would also probably dispute his identification of justice with the political art, and his assumption that the aim of human society is the preservation of the species. Still Protagoras is represented in this dialogue as holding law to be a source of virtue (324 A sqq.), and not a mere guarantee for the observance of men's rights, which some sophists held it to be. The myth, indeed, appears to imply that whatever any State teaches as justice is sure to have a tendency to hold society together. The teaching of the State is always sound. The justice it inculcates is always absolute or natural justice¹. A view ascribed to Protagoras in the *Theaetetus* (167 C) that whatever any State holds to be just is just for it, so long as it holds it to be just, betrays more consciousness of the possibilities of variation on the part of the State in this matter, but it still refers the individual to his State as the arbiter of justice, though only of a relative, not of an absolute justice.

Other
sophists.

Other sophists are more distinctly credited with opinions imperilling the authority of the State. They marked off the 'naturally just' from the 'conventionally just,' and found but little of the former in existence. It is evident that the Greeks had been in the habit of tracing the social arrangements under which they lived to sources so venerable—the will of the Gods or Nature—that they were conscious of a painful and demoralizing shock when

¹ 'Law appears in the myth of Protagoras as natural law: the later distinction between natural and positive law is unknown to the speaker' (Zeller, *Gr. Ph.* i. 1001).

they were told that many of them had only a conventional value. They liked to find the hand of God or Nature in the laws of their State, yet now they learnt that only the immutable is natural, and that most laws varied from State to State and from epoch to epoch. Hippias, as we have seen, allowed only those laws to be divine which are accepted everywhere (Xen. Mem. 4. 4. 19). Glaucon in the Republic, representing the doctrine of Thrasymachus (Rep. 358 E sqq.), goes further, and traces back *all* justice and law to a social compact¹, the object of which is to prevent one man from wronging another. Doing injustice, according to this view, is by nature good, and suffering injustice by nature evil, and the evil is greater than the good. As it is found to be impossible to get the good without the outbalancing evil, men tolerate justice as the lesser evil, and frame laws and agreements (*ξυνθήκας*) to exclude both the doing and the suffering of wrong. A cognate view is ascribed to the sophist Lycophron in the Politics (3. 9. 1280 b 10). We see that the theories of a primitive social compact and of the limitation of the functions of the State to the protection of men's rights took their origin at about the same time. To a Greek the authority of Law and the State would seem greatly impaired when it could no longer claim to rest on Nature. And then came the further question, how could a compact of this kind claim to hold good against the right of Force? If natural right existed at all, was it not identical with might? The State thus became a scramble for power, and the

¹ Cp. Laws 889 E, θεός, ὦ μακάριε, εἶναι πρῶτόν φασιν οἷοι τέχνη, οὐ φύσει, ἀλλὰ τισι νόμοις, καὶ τούτους ἄλλους ἄλλοις, ὅπη ἕκαστοι ἑαυτοῖσι συνωμολόγησαν νομοθετούμενοι· καὶ δὴ καὶ τὰ κατὰ φύσει μὲν ἄλλα εἶναι νόμῳ δὲ ἕτερα· τὰ δὲ δὴ δίκαια οὐδ' εἶναι τὸ παράπαν φύσει, ἀλλ' ἀμφισβητοῦντας διατελεῖν ἀλλήλοις καὶ μετατιθεμένους ἀεὶ ταῦτα· ἃ δ' ἂν μετὰθωγται καὶ ὅταν, τότε κύρια ἕκαστα εἶναι, γιγνόμενα τέχνη καὶ τοῖς νόμοις, ἀλλ' οὐ δὴ τινι φύσει. The way in which men come to

hold these views is thus explained in the Republic (479): men look only at 'the many beautiful and the many just,' not at 'the one just and beautiful,' which they cannot endure even to hear of, and they find that every one of these 'many beautiful' is easily made to appear also ugly, and each of the 'many just' unjust. The remedy for their scepticism is to become true philosophers and look to the Idea, which is ever the same.

forcible exercise of authority by the most powerful individual or group of individuals within it was accepted as normal and legitimate. In one State Democracy, in another Oligarchy, in another Tyranny had force on its side, and therefore the right to rule, so long at least as this was so. Tyranny was placed on a level with the two other constitutions, and the forcible empire of one State over others was justified on the same grounds.

The view that Might is Right is one that needs no sophist to set it afloat—indeed Pindar had incautiously used language which was construed as stating it¹—but now we find it ascribed not only to sophists and their adherents, but to philosophers like Democritus². The inquirers who expressed these views deserve the credit of being the first to recognize the fact that political supremacy gravitates to the side of superior Force. It is true, as Aristotle frequently remarks³, that the government of a State must have Force at its back, and it was well that attention should be drawn to the fact⁴. What they failed to see was, that while all governments must have Force behind them, the goodness or badness of a government, and therefore its claim to rule, depends on other considerations.

Doctrines of this kind would be especially popular and especially dangerous in Athens at the time of the Peloponnesian War. Athens was holding together by force a recalcitrant empire; she was engaged in a task repugnant to Greek feeling, which always favoured local autonomy; and here were men who justified what she was every day doing⁵. But then if they justified the exercise

¹ Plato, *Laws* 690 B: 714 E: *Gorg.* 484 B; and Stallbaum's notes.

² Stob. *Floril.* 47. 19, φύσει τὸ ἄρχειν οἰκίῳ τῷ κρείττονι. The expression, however, is rather vague and may possibly not bear this meaning.

³ E. g. 7 (5). 9. 1309 b 16, καὶ τὸ πολλάκις εἰρημένον μέγιστον στοιχείον, τὸ τηρεῖν ὅπως κρείττον ἔσται

τὸ βουλόμενον τὴν πολιτείαν πλῆθος τοῦ μὴ βουλομένου.

⁴ 'Physical force,' it has been said, 'however disguised, is the ultimate basis and sanction of all law.'

⁵ Isocrates looks back upon the time of the Peloponnesian War as a time of wide-spread folly and lust of tyranny at Athens: this is his view, at all events, in the

of sway over unwilling subjects, they also placed all governments which had Force at their back on one level: Tyranny and Oligarchy were the same to them as Democracy, and had a right to displace it, if they could prove that they possessed superior force. The new ideas were a double-edged weapon politically, and morally also they were very dangerous. For they traced that which was accounted just in each State to the voice of law, and law to the will of the stronger, so that the claims of morality rested only on the claim of the stronger to rule. To do right was to live like a slave for the advantage of the stronger: to do wrong, at any rate on a considerable scale, was evidence of a vigorous and masterful spirit, which well beseeemed a freeman (Rep. 344 C)¹.

The questions raised by the sophists were questions which needed to be raised, and many of the ideas they set afloat were ideas which had a great future before them, but it was unfortunate that they were promulgated at a moment when a social war was shaking society and morality to their foundations, and when a reign of force prevailed². The later reign of force which followed the death of Alexander was in some degree qualified by the ascendancy of great schools and great ethical teachers—Theophrastus, Xenocrates, Zeno of Citium—but now philosophy seemed to be in the anti-social camp. The advent of Socrates could not have been more timely.

In the view of earlier generations morality rested on law, and law on nature or the will of the Gods. The voice of

Oration De Pace (see §§ 75-94). In later days, he says, Athens came to the conclusion 'that it is not just for the stronger to rule over the weaker' (§ 69).

¹ The form which opinions of this nature assumed in the luxurious cities of South Italy and Sicily, to which temptation came in the form of a love of pleasure rather than power, may be gathered from the language of Polyarchus, 'surnamed the luxurious,' in the address to Archytas and his dis-

ciples which has already been mentioned (Aristox. Fr. 15: Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 2. 276: Athen. Deipn. 545 A sqq.).

² In mediaeval Europe, at the moment when the customary morality of feudal times was losing its power, the moral vigour of the world was opportunely restored by the Reformation and Puritanism. Greece, on the contrary, at a somewhat similar epoch in its development found itself in the hands of the sophists.

the State was the voice of God. But now a new view of the origin, nature, and functions of the State had been set forth. The State was the creation of a compact, or the outcome of Force—in either case, it was of purely human origin. It was too variable to be anything else. So far as it originated in compact, it was a *pis aller*—the lesser of two evils. If it was still held to be the fountain-head of men's conceptions of justice and temperance and other virtues, it followed that these virtues had no higher origin or sanction than the authority which gave them currency. But some held that the function of the State was simply to protect men's rights, not to make them virtuous.

It is evident that there is much in these views to interest the modern inquirer. We ask, why did not the defenders of the claims of morality cut it loose from the State altogether? Why did they not say—the State may be no more than you allow it to be, and yet the claims of morality may be as binding as ever? The theory of Hippias did suggest, as we have seen, that the common consent of men should take the place of the State as that which makes the just to be just. One thing at any rate was for the future impossible : no one could now accept the voice of the State to which he might happen to belong as an unerring oracle in questions of right and wrong. Was then the individual to be his own guide, aided only by any competent teachers whose help he could secure? Or was the State to be reformed, so as to serve as a guide to him? Either view might be taken. The latter was the one most in harmony with the traditions of Greek life, which rightly refused to sunder the individual from the whole to which he belonged. But the other view also won ground. The teaching of Socrates has, as we shall see, affinities with both ; it holds them both, as it were, in solution. It is only in the hands of his disciples that they become conscious of their own antagonism.

Socrates.

Many, no doubt, held that the collapse of belief could best be healed by an abandonment of philosophical speculation altogether, and a recurrence to that unquestioning

acceptance of the customary and the traditional which prevailed, or was believed to have prevailed, in earlier days; some perhaps envied the Lacedaemonian State for its deadness to thought, which was, however, soon found to have dangers of its own. Socrates, on the contrary, insisted that the true remedy lay not in an abandonment, but in an increased intensity of inquiry. Abandon, he said, any fields of inquiry in which knowledge is not possible, but bring a closer scrutiny to bear on those in which it is. Investigate by question and answer, not by long continuous deliverances: search for the definition of the thing you wish to understand.

In this spirit he asked 'what the State is' and 'what the Statesman is' (Xen. Mem. 1. 1. 16). We are not told in so many words what answer he gave to these questions, but his answer may be gathered from the general tenour of Xenophon's record. The State, he held, does not exist for the pleasure of the stronger, or merely for the protection of men's rights; it exists to make men better. Socrates said of the Thirty Tyrants, that 'it would be surprising if the herdsman of a herd of cattle, after thinning their numbers and making them worse in condition, should still claim to be a good herdsman, but it would be still more surprising if the ruler of a State under similar circumstances should claim to be a good ruler' (Xen. Mem. 1. 2. 32). 'The mere possession of a sceptre gives no claim to power, nor does election by chance persons (*τῶν τυχόντων*), nor the lot, nor the exercise of force or cunning, but knowledge only' (ibid. 3. 9. 10). Ruling means directing men what they ought to do, and being ruled obeying such direction; ruling and being ruled is not a thing apart, but one with which we are familiar in daily life; when we take a voyage, or when we are ill, we accept the rule of one who knows, the captain or the physician; why should we not do so in affairs of State (ibid. 3. 9. 11)? True, the representative of Force—the tyrant—may reject the guidance of reason, and even kill the wise man, but, if he does so, he will only ensure his own destruction (*πότερα γὰρ ἂν μᾶλλον*

οἷσι σώζεσθαι τὸν τοῦτο ποιῶντα ἢ οὕτω καὶ τάχιστ' ἂν ἀπολέσθαι; *ibid.* 3. 9. 12-13). *Vis consili experts mole ruit sua.* Yes: but then the 'consilium' which the ruler must needs possess for his own preservation is not necessarily the knowledge how to make men better, and this is, according to Socrates, the knowledge which makes a man a Statesman.

The myth of Protagoras had already implied that men learn virtue of the State, and this was no other than the traditional and accepted view. To Socrates, however, virtue is knowledge. The wisdom of the age, as we have seen, had been affirming it to be folly, and in asserting the contrary Socrates adopted the simplest means of at once emphasizing his own dissent, and appealing to an age which valued cleverness above everything else, in language which it could understand. Virtue, he said, is wisdom: it is vice that is folly (*Xen. Mem.* 3. 9. 4 *sqq.*: *Plato, Rep.* 351 A). His antagonists were met on their own ground. We infer that if the State makes men better, and virtue is knowledge, the State must communicate knowledge. It is not, however, clear how the State communicates knowledge in the Socratic sense—knowledge of the definitions of things, knowledge acquired through Dialectic. Nor does Socrates explain how it is that habituation is also a means of acquiring knowledge and virtue, though he clearly recognizes the fact (e.g. *Xen. Mem.* 3. 9. 1 *sqq.*). Of course, the larger the share ascribed to habituation in the production of virtue, the easier it is to regard virtue as the offspring of the State. If, on the other hand, Dialectic is the path to knowledge and virtue, virtue would seem to be due to agencies not necessarily presupposing the co-operation of the State. The Stoics, in fact, who reverted to the Socratic view of virtue as knowledge, denied that virtue acquired by exercise is virtue at all (*Zeller, Stoics Epicureans and Sceptics*, E. T. pp. 238-9), and consistently enough regarded the State rather as a field for the exercise of virtue than as its source.

The doctrine that the right to rule is conferred by know-

ledge was not likely to bring Socrates popularity. Its meaning, to begin with, was misconceived. He was credited, for instance, by his accuser with the view that any son to whom he had taught wisdom had the right to treat an untrained father as a lunatic and put him in bonds; nay, replies Xenophon, he taught that a lunatic father should be thus treated, but that an ignorant father should receive the instruction he needed (*Xen. Mem.* 1. 2. 49 sqq.). He was further charged with depreciating men's relatives in comparison with teachers of wisdom like himself: what he really taught, however, was that relatives whose claims to respect rested simply on relationship and not on service to their kin, deserved but little consideration (*ibid.* 1. 2. 51 sqq.). It is clear that the new doctrine brought Socrates into collision not only with democratic sentiment, but also with the ties of kinship. It is in order to correct erroneous impressions on this subject, that Xenophon describes how earnestly he insisted on the claims of the parental and fraternal relations (*Mem.* 2. 2-3). The *Memorabilia* is, in fact, an apologetic work, intended to recommend Socrates to ordinary Athenian opinion, and to show how false was the charge on which he was put to death, and this must be borne in mind in estimating the weight of its testimony. It remains true that the central principle of Socrates' teaching—the authority of the wise—might easily be misinterpreted as setting up the authority of the wise teacher against that of the wise parent, and even when interpreted aright, did tend to invalidate the authority of unwise parents, unwise rulers, and unwise laws. It was also easy for the outer world to confound the Socratic 'wisdom,' which was not only wisdom but virtue, with mere cleverness, and to suppose that Socrates meant to justify the claims of men like Critias to rule. In reality, the wise ruler, as Socrates conceives him, is a man of a wholly opposite type. He is no self-seeker, nor does he live for his own pleasure. Aristippus anticipates Adeimantus (*Rep.* 419 sqq.) when he asks Socrates in the *Memorabilia* of Xenophon (2. 1. 17)—ἀλλὰ γάρ, ὦ Σώκρατες, οἱ εἰς τὴν

βασιλικὴν τέχνην παιδευόμενοι ἣν δοκεῖς μοι σὺ νομίζειν εὐδαιμονίαν εἶναι, τί διαφέρουσι τῶν ἐξ ἀνάγκης κακοπαθούντων, εἰ γε πεινήσουσι καὶ διψήσουσι καὶ ῥιγώσουσι καὶ ἀγρυπνήσουσι καὶ τᾶλλα πάντα μοχθήσουσιν ἐκόντες ;

It is true, however, that this doctrine of the right of wisdom to rule did make in favour of the Few. The political art was not, as the myth of Protagoras alleged, given to all men belonging to civilized States, but like any other art, to those who set themselves to learn it. The reasoning of Socrates pointed directly to the rule of the few who know. Indeed, as knowledge meant to Socrates knowledge of the definition of a thing, a dialectical education was apparently essential to the ruler. One step more, and Socrates, we feel, would have found himself depicting an ideal in some respects similar to that which Plato depicts in the *Politicus*. This step he did not take. On the contrary, he identified the legal and the just, and explained that he meant by law whatever the citizens of a State agree to enact as embodying their views of what ought and ought not to be done (*Xen. Mem.* 4. 4. 12-13). He thus apparently treated the laws of all States as just, and his strict performance of his duties as a citizen of Athens shows that he did not regard any defects of the Athenian constitution as releasing him from his obligations to his State. If he permitted himself to dream of an ideal, his fancy wandered no farther afield than to the Athens of Solon (*Xen. Mem.* 3. 5. 14) and to the Lacedaemonian State (*ibid.* 4. 4. 15 sqq.: *Xen. Symp.* 8. 35, with which Henkel compares Plato, *Crito* 52 E). He praised the latter State for its obedience to law, which gave it a happy life in peace and irresistible strength in war, and for the unanimity of its citizens, which rose far above the level of a mere similarity of taste, and expressed itself in conformity to law (*Xen. Mem.* 4. 4. 15-16).

He was, in fact, too good a citizen to push his own theory to its consequences. His aim was twofold, like that of Aristotle after him ; he wished to show the State what it might

and ought to be, and he wished to restore the authority of the actual State. The State, he held, ought to be in the hands of those who know, if only for the reason that when men reject the rule of the wise, they suffer for so doing. For the true test of that which is right was not, in his view, universal consent, or immutability, or universal observance, but the fact that men lose by not practising it (Xen. Mem. 4. 4. 24: cp. 3. 9. 12-13). It was one thing, however, to claim authority for a State ruled by the wise, and another to re-establish the authority of the actual State. The Sophists had dealt the actual State a fatal blow. Even Aristotle's patient efforts to reform it failed to replace it in its primitive position as the guide of life. If Socrates in reasserting the claims of the State reasserted only the claims of a non-existent State, much the same thing may be said of Aristotle.

Socrates impaired rather than restored the authority of the actual State. He did not even show how the actual State could be improved. Where were 'those who know' to be found, and how could they be placed in power? His political teaching threw little light on the pressing question, how the State was to be made better¹, and yet at the same time it was irritating. Plato tells us (Rep. 488 B) that it was as much as a man's life was worth, in a society like that of Athens, merely to assert that the art of politics is communicable by teaching, and Socrates not only insisted on this, but held that what a man could not communicate to others, he did not know himself (Xen. Mem. 4. 6. 1). We need not wonder that he paid the penalty². Yet Socrates seems, unlike others after him, to have treated the art of politics as one which men of all classes and occupations might acquire. He is credited, indeed, with the saying that 'idleness is the sister of freedom,' but there is no indication that he held 'knowledge' to be incompatible with the practice of the lower occupations. Unlike Pythagoras and the Sophists, who had addressed them-

¹ It is true, however, that he laid stress on the importance of education (e.g. Xen. Mem. 4. 1. 3).

² Cp. Plato, Polit. 299 B sq.

selves to rich and noble youths, Socrates appealed to men of every grade. He practised his dialectic not only in the houses of rich men like Cephalus, but in the open market-place and in the workshop of the leather-cutter Simon. In doing so, he acted in the spirit of the Periclean ideal, according to which the highest interests of life were to be open to the poor as much as to the rich. Antisthenes, who belonged to the despised class of 'half-breeds' (*τὸ μὴ ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων πολιτῶν ἐλεύθερον*), was as fully his disciple as the patrician Plato. Even if Socrates held that Dialectic is a condition of political knowledge and of the right to rule—and this we are not distinctly told—he apparently held that skill in Dialectic is accessible to all. Plato and Aristotle, on the contrary, tend to detach the philosopher from 'necessary work.' The 'rule of the wise' consequently assumes a new aspect in their hands. If Plato in the Republic opens, as he does in a way open, philosophical training and the rule of the State to all ranks, he does so on the condition that no attempt shall be made to combine the higher with the lower occupations.

Plato.

While Socrates belongs to the age of the Peloponnesian War, and Aristotle to the disorganized epoch at which Macedon rose to greatness, after the Athenian, Lacedaemonian, and Theban States had successively failed to retain the supremacy which they had successively won, Plato belongs to the intermediate period of Lacedaemonian supremacy. He outlived Leuctra, it is true, by upwards of twenty years, but during the best years of his life he beheld the Lacedaemonian State either on the eve of its triumph over Athens or in full fruition of empire. He was probably about fourteen years of age when the disaster at Syracuse happened, and about fifty-six in the year of Leuctra. He may perhaps have been acquainted with Socrates for about seven years—the last seven years of Socrates' life, when he himself was between twenty-one and twenty-eight. He witnessed in youth the rise and fall of the Four Hundred at Athens, and saw the worst side of oligarchy under

the *régime* of the Thirty Tyrants. A little later, his great teacher was put to death by the restored democracy, and Plato is said to have left Athens with others of the school for ten or twelve years. Few men have lived through such experiences before the age of thirty. His alienation from all actual forms of government could not fail to be far greater than that of Socrates. Where was a satisfactory government to be found? Not in Democracy, or Oligarchy, or Tyranny. Not even in the Lacedaemonian State, for Plato's absorbing interest in philosophy and literature made it impossible for him to find his ideal there. Besides, the Sparta of Archidamus, which had won the admiration of Socrates, was now a thing of the past, and the less noble Sparta of Lysander had taken its place. Plato's sketch of the 'timocratical man' (Rep. 548 D sqq.) perhaps gives us a clue to his conception of the Spartan character:—

'He is not wholly unlike Glaucon, but more unyielding and less a votary of the Muses, though still their votary; fond of listening to talk or song, but no orator; he is gentle to freemen, though harsh and severe to slaves; very obedient to magistrates; fond of office and honour, but one who holds that a title to power is won by military and political achievements, not by oratory; fond of athletic exercise and hunting; a scorner of money in youth, but growing far otherwise as he becomes older, because he is without the surest safeguard of virtue—reason mingled with the study of μουσική (λόγος μουσικῇ κεκραμένος).'

The picture here drawn is the picture of a Hellene, though a Hellene of an exceptional type—farther removed, perhaps, from the Roman than from the Athenian, for he is a 'votary of the Muses,' and the love of personal distinction and pre-eminence has not been subdued in him to the same extent as in the Roman of the best days of the Republic; nor has he the Roman genius for law and legal government. He is, in fact, rather a soldier than a ruler; not sterner than the Roman, but wilder and fiercer, though also more Hellenic—lacking at once the patient skill which

laid the world at the feet of Rome and the wisdom to govern a conquered world aright.

The Spartan nature was harsh, narrow, imperfectly cultured, self-seeking, and Plato must have turned from it with pleasure to the recollection of Socrates, himself a Spartan in his powers of endurance, his simplicity of life, his scorn of ease and comfort, his devotion to his country, yet wholly unlike a Spartan in his intellectual greatness, his dialectical enthusiasm, his contempt for wealth and power, and his kindly zeal for the good of others. He became acquainted in his wanderings with another type of character—the Pythagorean—resembling the Socratic in its simplicity and self-mastery, but ascetic and fanciful, which Socrates never was, the musical and mathematical culture of the school passing, by a transition not infrequent in Greece, into religious mysticism. He would find the Pythagoreans full of faith in the power of education and the ordered life of a brotherhood of friends, convinced that States are made to be ruled by the wise, and not without recollections of a lost political ascendancy.

But if the Spartan type of character was defective, there was much to be learnt from the institutions of the Lacedaemonian State. Socrates, as we have seen, had not asked how his ideal 'man of knowledge' was to be produced or placed in a position to rule, but Lacedaemonian experience threw some light on this subject. The example of the Lacedaemonian State showed how much the State could do for virtue by systematic training from the earliest years and by the regulation of adult life, by freeing the best minds from ignoble cares and adjusting social functions to capacity, and by inculcating obedience to law and authority. Imagine a State that should set itself to produce, not a body of soldier-citizens, but a Pythagorean brotherhood of wise men; or, better still, a brotherhood of men possessing knowledge in the fullest sense of the word—men who have learnt to know things as they really are, to study, not shadows, but the reality, and to rule by the light of this better knowledge. In a State ruled by

such men, the Many would no longer snatch greedily at power; they would be well satisfied to confine themselves to the functions for which they are fitted and to surrender office into the hands of their betters; they would no longer need to be excluded from the State and enslaved, like the Helots; on the contrary, they would be the fellow-citizens of their rulers, linked to them by membership of a common State. Plato inherited from Socrates and from Pythagoras the conception of the State as an union of unequals, of protectors and protected, the wise and the ignorant. Let the protectors, Plato said, be what they should be, and the protected will know their own place, and the ideal of the State will be realized. It was thus that the conception of the ideal State of the Republic grew up in Plato's mind.

The opening conversations of the Republic reveal to us that the aim of the dialogue is fully as much ethical as political. They relate to the nature of justice, and place before us certain popular impressions on this subject, which it will be the object of the dialogue to correct. We see that in the view of many to be just was to live for the advantage of another and for the advantage of the stronger—a poor-spirited and slavish thing to do—while from a second point of view justice was a *pis aller*, not a good thing in itself, but merely the least of two evils. Plato seeks, on the contrary, to show that justice is in itself a good, and the most essential of goods, for it is the condition of unity and happiness, both in the soul of the individual human being and in the State¹. It also enables all the other virtues to exist and to accomplish their work (Rep. 433 B). It means, in fact, the execution by a part of a Whole of the work for which it is fit². In the just soul and State the

Sketch of
the political
teaching of the
Republic.

¹ Cp. Rep. 423 D, τοῦτο δ' ἐβούλετο δηλοῦν, ὅτι καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους πολίτας πρὸς ὃ τις πέφυκε, πρὸς τοῦτο ἔνα πρὸς ἓν ἕκαστον ἔργον δεῖ κομίζειν, ὅπως ἂν ἐν τῷ αὐτοῦ ἐπιτηδεύων ἕκαστος μὴ πολλοί, ἀλλὰ εἰς γίγνηται, καὶ οὕτω δὴ ξύμπασα ἡ πόλις μία φύηται, ἀλλὰ μὴ πολλάί.

² Socrates had already commended the quality which he terms εὐπραξία, and the justice of the Republic is not far removed from the Socratic εὐπραξία: cp. Xen. Mem. 3. 9. 14, τὸ δὲ μαθόντα τε καὶ μελετήσαντά τι εὖ ποιεῖν εὐπραξίαν νομίζω, καὶ οἱ τοῦτο ἐπιτηδεύοντες

lower elements do not usurp the work of the higher, the higher elements accept the co-operation of the lower.

The mode in which Plato arrives at this conclusion is altogether novel and significant. No one had yet employed the Science of Politics to throw light on the dark places of Ethics, but this is what Plato in effect does. He constructs an ideal State, in order to show what the true nature of justice is. Justice, he says (Rep. 434 E), can only be detected in a good State, and existing States are not good. The portraiture of a good State, according to him, will convey, not only political, but also ethical instruction, and dispel the ethical errors which were exercising so fatal an influence. A new importance was thus lent to political inquiry.

In constructing the 'good State' from which he hopes to learn so much, Plato follows out his favourite principle of specialization¹ with much persistence. There must be a class to till the soil, another to build, another to weave, and on similar grounds there must be a class to fight and a class to govern. The principle is Socratic, though Socrates does not seem to have pushed it to its consequences. Plato, on the contrary, does so, and finds himself led on to exclude the mass of men from the functions of defending and governing the State, and to reserve these functions for two separate and comparatively small classes. His reasoning is plausible, and it is not at first sight obvious why the work of governing should not, like that of house-building, be made over to a special class. There is no doubt that in the Greek State of Plato's time the soldier, the judge, and the statesman were all of them insufficiently professional. The interests of the State were then, to a far greater extent than they have ever been since, confided to persons neither specially trained nor specially excellent. Democracy gave power to every free-

δοκοῦσί μοι εὖ πράττειν· καὶ ἀρίσ-
τους δὲ καὶ θεοφιλεστάτους ἔφη εἶναι
ἐν μὲν γεωργίᾳ τοὺς τὰ γεωργικά εὖ
πράττοντας, ἐν δ' ἱατρείᾳ τοὺς τὰ ἱατρι-

κά, ἐν δὲ πολιτείᾳ τοὺς τὰ πολιτικά.
¹ Rep. 397 E, οὐκ ἔστι διπλοῦς
ἀνὴρ παρ' ἡμῖν οὐδὲ πολλαπλοῦς,
ἐπειδὴ ἕκαστος ἐν πράττει.

man, oligarchy gave power to the rich. Plato claimed that governing must be made over absolutely to a class which should do nothing but govern. Here we have the germ of the Republic. He learnt before he died that only the 'sons of Gods' could be trusted with the powers which he gave to the rulers of the Republic. In the Laws he does not give up the assimilation of the work of women and men, but he does give up the unchecked rule of a governing class. Aristotle allows unchecked power only to his *παμβασιλεύς*, a hypothetical being of superhuman excellence and capacity. He and he alone is emancipated from the restraints of law: even the ideal citizens of the Fourth Book of the Politics are subject to them.

The State, or rather city (*πόλις*), which comes into existence before our eyes in the Second Book of the dialogue, originates in men's needs, for Plato does not, like Aristotle, conceive of man as a naturally social being, or recognize (in the Republic at all events) the priority of ties of blood, such as those of the household. It begins in men's need to live¹, their need of food, lodging, and clothing. Its earliest members are the cultivator, the house-builder, the weaver, shoemaker, smith, and carpenter: four or five men of this stamp suffice to constitute a city, though a city of the barest kind (369 D). Here again Aristotle disagrees. The judge and the soldier are as essential ingredients in a city as the cultivator or artisan (Pol. 6 (4). 4. 1291 a 6 sqq.). Each man, Plato continues, follows a vocation of his own, both because he does his work better and more easily thus, and because men are born with different aptitudes (370 A-C). Herdsmen, merchants, retailers, day-labourers swell the population, and now our society is apparently complete (*τελέα*, 371 E). Plato dwells for a moment on the happy social life² of this baby State—a State too undeveloped to be the home of either virtue or vice, yet, if he is in earnest in 372 E, the State in its

¹ Rep. 369 D: cp. Aristot. Pol. I. 2. 1252 b 29, *γινωμένη μὲν οὖν τοῦ ζῆν ἐνεκεν*.

² 372 B, *ἡδέως ξυνόντες ἀλλήλοις*.

most genuine and healthy form; he dwells on its simple luxuries, its beds of leaves, its mainly vegetable diet¹, its praises of the Gods, its freedom from poverty and war, its innocence of soldiers and law-courts.

But he knows that men's desires are not easily confined within these healthy limits; they will ask for something more: new classes will be added—huntsmen (for Plato does not apparently, like Aristotle, regard hunting as one of the most primitive and natural pursuits), painters, sculptors, poets, actors, dancers, milliners, barbers, nurses, cooks, and finally swineherds. Then physicians will be necessary, and men's unlimited striving for wealth will give birth to war², the territory proving too small to satisfy the desires of its now numerous occupants. Then, and not till then, soldiers will be necessary, and they will have to be a separate class, if we are to be faithful to the principle which we adopted at the outset. Thus a body of guardians (*φύλακες*, 374 D) becomes essential.

To Aristotle the Republic must have seemed to start with a false conception of the State. It is, in his view, precisely the life of the classes which are wanting in the 'genuine and healthy' State of Plato—soldiers, judges, statesmen—that gives the State its value. They are to the rest what the soul is to the body (6 (4). 4. 1291 a 24 sqq.). Without them the State is not really a State. They do not exist to restore health to a 'feverish' society, but to live their own life, which is the true ideal of human life. The State should not be composed of a mass of traders and producers (*χρηματιστικοί*), protected and schooled by a handful of noble men, but of an adequately numerous

¹ Oxen will be used for ploughing and drawing, and their hides will serve together with the wool of sheep for raiment (370 D-E). Neither sheep nor oxen will apparently be used for food. Cheese, however, is an article of diet (372 C). Swine will not be kept (373 C). With all this Aristotle does not agree. Nature designed the other

animals to serve as food for man, as well as to supply him with clothing (Pol. I. 8. 1256 b 15 sqq.).

² Aristotle, on the contrary, holds that one kind of war at all events falls within the natural form of the Science of Supply, which does not make an unlimited amount of wealth its aim (Pol. I. 8. 1256 b 23 sqq.).

body of persons capable of living and purposed to live the best life.

The class of guardians are to be to the rest of the State what dogs are to a flock of sheep¹, at once protectors and guides. They must be 'philosophic and spirited and swift and strong' (376 C); they must be brave, truthful, temperate, not fond of money (386-391); and in order that they may possess all these qualities, they must receive a correct 'musical' and gymnastic training. Plato, like Aristotle after him, undertakes a reform of *μουσική* and *γυμναστική*, but his treatment of the subject is in many respects different from that of Aristotle. We notice, in the first place, that while Aristotle concerns himself in the Fifth Book of the Politics only with the musical side of *μουσική*, Plato treats it as including poetry, tune, and rhythm, and pays fully as much attention to the substance and form of its poetic element, as he does to its accompaniment of tune and rhythm (*ῥυθμοί*, 399 E), and to the question of the instruments which are to be used (399 C sqq.). Then again, we observe that the two inquirers approach the subject with different aims. The aim of Plato is to devise a scheme of education which will fit his guardians for the position assigned to them in his State: the aim of Aristotle is to produce a class of citizens capable of living the highest and most complete life. Thus Plato is naturally concerned for the most part with the value of *μουσική* as an ethical influence, whereas Aristotle is careful to point out in how many different ways it enriches human life. Plato admits *μουσική* without debate to a prominent place in his scheme of education: Aristotle debates its claims at some length, and learns by debating them how varied are its services to man. When the musical and gymnastic training of the guardians has been fully discussed, the further question arises, how are the rulers to be selected from the ranks of the guardians (412 B)? They must be older than the other guardians,

¹ Ultimately it is the class of dogs: the rulers are shepherds 'auxiliaries' who are likened to (440 D).

they must be wise and capable men (*φρόνιμοι, δυνατοί*), men who feel their interests to be bound up with those of the rest, and whose minds are therefore immovably set on doing that which is best for the whole State; they must be 'lovers of their State and vigilant in their care for it' (*φιλοπόλιδες*, 502 E : *κηδεμόνες τῆς πόλεως*, 412 C)¹. The ruler must be 'proof against illusion, must keep a strict guard over himself, and never forget the lessons of his "musical" training, but always bear himself well (*εὐσχήμων*), and, whatever happens to him, prove himself rhythmical and harmonious (*εὐρυθμος, εὐαρμωστος*, 3. 413 E)². He will be 'wise' (*σοφός*) in the sense of 'prudent in deliberation' (*εὐβουλος*), we learn in the Fourth Book (428)—he will possess that kind of science 'which deliberates with a view to the well-being, not of some particular thing in the State, but of the State as a whole, and considers how it should conduct itself, both in its internal relations and in its relations to other States' (428 C)³. Such will be the character of the 'complete guardians' (414 B); the younger guardians will be the 'auxiliaries' (*ἐπίκουροι*) carrying their decrees into execution. Below these two classes, the traders and producers (*χρηματιστικοί*) form a third, and the three classes together make up the State.

In order that there may be nothing to render the rulers and their auxiliaries otherwise than as good as possible, or to incline them to act wrongfully (*κακουργεῖν*) by the other citizens (3. 416 C), they must not possess any property of their own, not even a house or a treasury (*ταμίειον*)

¹ We are reminded of the Pythagorean dictum already referred to (above, p. 379), that 'rulers must not only be men of knowledge, but loving to those they rule' (cp. Rep. 412 D).

² If we turn to the Seventh Book (522 A), we shall find the training here prescribed treated as inadequate and other than that which produces philosophers. It is a mere training through habit and produces, not a knowledge of principles, but only an instinc-

tive grace of character (*εὐρυθμία, εὐαρμωστία*, 522 A). This is said of *μουσική*.

³ Compare Ephor. Fragm. 67 (Müller, Fragm. Hist. Gr. i. 254), where Ephorus, after noticing the shortness of the period during which the Thebans retained their ascendancy in Greece, adds—*αἴτιον δὲ εἶναι τὸ λόγων καὶ ὁμιλίας τῆς πρὸς ἀνθρώπους ὀλιγωρῆσαι, μόνης δ' ἐπιμεληθῆναι τῆς κατὰ πόλεμον ἀρετῆς*.

—treasuries, we learn in the Eighth Book (550 D), are the ruin of timocratic States like the Lacedaemonian—and they must receive year by year only just that amount of necessities which they need for their own use (416 D sq.); they must not possess or even use gold and silver, in the form of coin or in any other form. Once let them be owners of land, and houses, and coin, and they will pass their lives hating and hated by their fellow-citizens and in daily fear of violence (417 A sq.)¹. Later on, in the Fourth Book (423 E), a hint is dropped that, so far as these two classes are concerned, not only property but also women and children will be as far as possible, like the goods of friends, in common.

When Adeimantus remarks that the guardians will be more like a garrison of hired auxiliaries than citizens—pauper protectors of happy householders rather than themselves happy men, the Platonic Socrates in effect replies that if they live up to their position, there is no reason why they should not be the happiest members of the community. Their duties will be—to keep both wealth and poverty² away from the State; to preserve the unity of the State without unduly contracting its dimensions, so that it shall be neither over-small nor yet, like many large States, two States in one; to make such transfers from the trading and producing class to the class of guardians and *vice versa* as will secure that every one shall have the work to do for which he is fit, and thus that the State

¹ It has been already noticed (above, p. 159 note), that while here in the Third Book the reason why the two higher classes are to hold everything in common is that otherwise they may be tempted to wrong the rest of the citizens and to earn their hatred by so doing, Plato assigns another reason in the Fifth Book (464)—the prevention of disharmony in the ranks of the two higher classes: if the members of these classes are at one, he says (465 B), the other citizens are sure to be so too.

² Similarly in the soul the rational and spirited elements are to take charge of the appetitive element and to prevent its growing over-large and over-strong on a diet of bodily pleasure (4. 442 A); or rather (9. 571 E), to lull it to sleep by taking care that it has neither more nor less than its due share of nutriment, so that it may not trouble the best element of the soul by its joy or grief, but leave it to pursue its investigations in peace.

shall be one (423 D); but, above all, to attend to the rearing and education of the young—the children of the two upper classes are apparently referred to—and to see that this undergoes no change.

The State which has now been constructed is pronounced to be good and normal, and all others to be bad and aberrant from the normal type (5. 449 A): it is the best possible (4. 434 E), perfectly good (*τελέως ἀγαθή*, 4. 427 E). Justice must consequently exist within it; and after a short search it is identified, and found to be—both in the soul of the individual human being and in the State—the fulfilment by each part of its appropriate function (*τὰ αὐτοῦ πράττειν*).

So far the first four books of the Republic carry us, and even in them we seem to rise from time to time above the plane of Socratic thought. We are not, indeed, far from the Socratic point of view, when the wisdom which the rulers are required to possess is explained to be 'wisdom in deliberation' (*εὐβουλία*, 428 B), or a knowledge how the State should behave to itself and other States (428 C–D), though Socrates would have described the art of governing rather as a knowledge how to make men better. We feel ourselves further from the Socratic stand-point, however, when the ruler is required to know how to act so as to preserve the harmony of the parts of the State (443 E: cp. 442 C), for the conception of the State as a Whole composed of parts which need to work harmoniously together is rather Platonic or Pythagorean than Socratic. Right action, in Plato's view, is not the outcome simply of knowledge, but springs, in the case of an individual, from the co-operation of the parts of the soul—in the case of a State, from the co-operation of its elements. Not only must the ruling element of the soul possess knowledge, but it must be seconded by the spirited element, and even the lowest section must have virtue of a certain kind. And so in the State the virtue of the rulers must be supported by virtue in the second class and virtue in the third. There are irrational elements present both in the soul and in the State, which may be so constituted

as to refuse obedience to reason, and their co-operation is essential to a satisfactory result. In the State the third class—as in the soul the appetitive nature—is fully a member of the *κοινωνία*, though a subordinate member. The traders and producers (*χρηματιστικοί*) are citizens and parts of the Whole, so long as they do their part and refrain from meddling with the work of others. When they insist on ruling, as in an oligarchy or democracy, it is as if the appetitive element claimed supremacy in the soul.

The aspiration of Plato in the first four books of the Republic is for a State in which the mass of the citizens are content to live the life of production and trade for which alone they are fit, and look for protection and guidance to a comparatively small soldier-class specially trained to find in an educated sense of proportion and harmony the secret of courage and temperance, and saved from temptations to misrule by holding women, children, and property in common—a class which in its turn accepts the rule of its wisest members, men who consecrate their lives to the good of the State as a whole, and rule in such a way as to maintain the co-operation of the three classes, and yet, notwithstanding their pre-eminence in wisdom, regard the two other classes as fellow-citizens and brothers.

The interruption of Polemarchus and Adeimantus at the beginning of the Fifth Book forms, however, as has often been noticed, a turning-point in the course of the dialogue. Some¹ hold that the three books which intervene between the Fourth and Eighth, whatever the date of their composition, found no place in the original scheme of the dialogue, and are a subsequent addition. It is difficult, however, to suppose that the bold communistic proposals of the Republic were adopted without more discussion than they receive in the Third and Fourth Books, or that the assimilation of the occupations of men and women formed no part of the earlier draft; and we gather from a passing expres-

¹ Krohn has argued elaborately for this view in his instructive book, 'Der Platonische Staat' (Halle, 1876).

sion in the Third Book (416 B, τοῦτο μὲν οὐκ ἄξιον διῷσχυρίζεσθαι . . . τῆς ὀρθῆς παιδείας, ἣτις ποτὲ ἐστίν), that the Platonic Socrates is even then not absolutely certain that the whole truth has been uttered as to the best education for a guardian¹. So again, we find at the close of the same book, that the question of the selection of rulers and guardians (ἡ ἐκλογή καὶ κατάστασις τῶν ἀρχόντων τε καὶ φυλάκων) has as yet been dealt with only in outline (ὡς ἐν τύπῳ, μὴ δι' ἀκριβείας, 3. 414 A). Perhaps the interruption of Polemarchus and Adeimantus assures Socrates for the first time of the keen interest they take in the discussion—or perhaps it was necessary to avoid mixing up the search for justice with highly debatable matter, and to bring it to a close without unreasonable delay; at any rate, in the Fifth Book Socrates gives utterance to three great paradoxes in succession, of only one of which—the proposal of a communistic plan of life for the guardians—have we had even a hint before. The two others—the identification of the pursuits of the men and women of the guardian class, and the choice of carefully trained philosophers as rulers—are altogether new. The question how the constitution already described can be realized—how it is to be brought into existence—furnishes the occasion for the utterance of the last and greatest of the three paradoxes. It cannot be brought into being, till philosophers are kings, or kings become philosophers (5. 471 C: 472 E sqq.)². These are the lowest terms on which it can

¹ It should also be noticed that the Third Book (402) allows no man to be truly μουσικός, who has not learnt from his study of μουσική to discern the 'essential forms' (εἶδη) of temperance, courage, and other virtues, so that there would seem to be a philosophical element even in the study of μουσική, notwithstanding what we are told in 7. 522 A.

² If Themistius may be trusted, Aristotle dissented from Plato's doctrine that kings should be philosophers—φιλοσοφεῖν μὲν τῷ βασιλεῖ οὐχ ὅπως ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι φάσκων,

ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐμποδῶν, τὸ δὲ φιλοσοφεῖν αἰσιν ἀληθινῶς ἐντυγχάνειν εὐπειθῇ καὶ εὐήκοον (Aristot. Fragm. 79. 1489 b 8 sqq.). In the Fourth Book of the Politics, however, he seems to regard philosophy as the best security, in the case of citizen-rulers at all events, for the right use of leisure (4 (7). 15). He appears also to have recommended the study of philosophy in the Προτρεπτικός which he addressed to Themison, King of the Cyprians (Aristot. Fragm. 47. 1483 a 39: Heitz, die verlorenen Schriften des Aristoteles, p. 208).

be realized (cp. 473 B, *τίνας ἂν σμικροτάτου μεταβαλόντος ἔλθοι εἰς τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον τῆς πολιτείας πόλις*). The subject of the choice of rulers is now taken up again and considered afresh (τὸ δὲ τῶν ἀρχόντων ὥσπερ ἐξ ἀρχῆς μετελθεῖν δεῖ, 6. 502 E). It now appears that it is not enough for the ruler to have acquired an unerring sense of proportion and harmony in feeling and action (*εὐρυθμία, εὐαρμοστία*), an unshakeable devotion to the good of the State: he must be tested not only in labours and fears and pleasures, but in studies (503 D); the 'perfect guardian' is a philosopher (503 B), and we must take care that ours becomes one. He cannot do so unless he starts with great natural gifts—a tenacious memory, quickness to learn, breadth and elevation of mind, a gracious and measured nature (*ἔμμετρος καὶ εὐχαρις*, 486 D), an instinctive love of truth, justice, courage, and temperance (487 A). His keenness to get to the heart of things (*ἀλήθεια*, 490 A) is the central feature of his character and the source from which his moral excellence flows. Eager to pass beyond the shows of things to their inner reality, he presses on from the varying and manifold forms of the just (τὰ πολλὰ δίκαια) to its unmixed and unchanging essence or idea; he traces the just up to its source in the Idea of Good, which is also the source of all existence, and acquires from contact with that which truly exists (τὸ ὄντως ὄν)—the only sure source—a healthy and orderly character, temperance, courage, and the rest of the virtues (490 A–C). His virtue, unlike that of those who are only virtuous through habit (522 A : 619 C), has a firm foundation in knowledge. He has seen 'that which is just and beautiful and temperate' both as it exists by nature and as it exists among men (501 B), and has a 'divine pattern' in his soul to guide him in fashioning the State over which he rules and the characters of its citizens (500 C sqq.); no hand but his can make the State happy and dear to God (500 E sqq.). He is the true guardian, the true 'designer of constitutions' (*ζωγράφος*

Not a few Romans probably held for a future ruler (Suet. Nero, c. 52: Tac. Agric. c. 4).

πολιτειῶν, 500 E), the true 'saviour of the constitution' (502 D). Plato evidently has hopes that some son of a king or potentate (*δυναστεύς*) may arise, fit to be made a philosopher, at whose hands citizens would be willing to accept the constitution which he has described (502 A-B)¹. He feels, indeed, that the permanent presence of an element of this kind in the State is essential (497 C).

Thus rule is now given, not, as before, to men possessed of mere deliberative wisdom (*εὐβουλοὶ*), knowing how the State should behave to itself and to other States, but to men of high natural excellence trained in a long series of studies calculated to evoke thought and draw it in the direction of true Being. The creation of a class of this kind is not only the 'Open, Sesame' of the Republic—the condition of its being brought into existence—but also, it would seem, the condition of its satisfactory working, for Plato appears to hold that the permanent rulers of the State must be men of this type.

As early as the age of 20 (537 B), at the close of the period of pure gymnastic training, the youths who have shone most in their musical and gymnastic studies are parted from the rest and treated with special distinction, and have their attention called to the inter-connexion of the various branches of science and their relation to true Being. From this select body a further selection is made on the completion of the thirtieth year, and those are picked out and surrounded with especial honour who successfully undergo a dialectical test, and prove most capable of leaving sight and sense behind, and penetrating with sureness to that which truly exists. Five years are to be devoted by them to the exclusive study of Dialectic; fifteen more are to be given to the acquisition of practical experience in military commands and posts suitable for young men (*νέων ἀρχαί*, 539 E); and then at the age of 50 those who have survived all these tests and come out best both in practical work and in scientific study (*ἐν ἔργοις τε καὶ ἐπιστήμας*, 540 A)

¹ Dion, according to Plutarch bold constitutional innovations at (Dion, c. 53), attempted some Syracuse.

are to be bidden to lift up their eyes and look on that which is the source of light to all, the Idea of Good, and using it as a pattern, to order for the rest of their lives the State and private men and themselves, each ruling in turn¹. They will pass most of their time in philosophic pursuits, but when the proper season comes, they will not shrink from the disagreeables of a political life, but consent to govern from a feeling of duty to the State and as a thing rather necessary than noble or glorious (540 A-B).

It is under their auspices, and theirs only, that our ideal State can come into existence. Let men of this type, once in power, 'send off into the country all those who are over ten years of age' and 'train the remainder in their own ways of life, being those which we have described². Brought into being in this, the shortest and easiest, manner, our State will both itself enjoy happiness and be a blessing to the race in which it arises' (541 A). These are among the closing words of the Seventh Book.

Throughout the dialogue the question how the State is to be made at one with itself and happy seems to be even more prominent than the question how it is to be made to produce virtue. True, Plato asks (Rep. 456 E)—'Is there anything better for a State than that women and men as excellent as possible should be produced in it?'—but shortly after (462 A) he also asks: 'Can we name any greater evil for a State than that which tears it asunder and makes it many States in place of one, or any greater good than that which binds it together and makes it one?' Perhaps, indeed, the two things are hardly separable; it is virtue that gives unity to the State, unity that gives it virtue. But we feel that nothing comes home more to Plato than the disunion of all existing States (for even in the Lacc-

¹ Plato speaks of his ideal State as assuming the form of a Kingship or an Aristocracy, according as one of the rulers, or more, possesses transcendent excellence (4. 445 D): in the Ninth Book, however, it is called a βασιλευ-

μένη πόλις (576 D).

² This is evidently a softened version of the sentence which Heraclitus passed on the Ephesians for expelling Hermodorus (see Diog. Laert. 9. 2: and above, p. 263 note).

daemonian State (547 C) the two upper classes are at enmity with the third, which they have conquered in war), and that he has nothing more at heart than to make his State not two States but one (423 D). He shows infinite ingenuity in devising means for securing this end. His main reliance is placed on justice, or, in other words, the correct distinction of social function, but no care in the selection and education of the two upper classes will suffice, if they are not set free from the temptations which come with the possession of households and several property. Then the original sketch of the education of the rulers is revised: it is not enough that they should be trained to rhythm and harmony—they must have learnt virtue from contact with ‘that which really exists.’ They must have learnt that there is a life which is better than the life of a ruler, and come to the task of ruling with reluctance¹. No such class exists at present in any State; a wholly new class needs to be created. When it exists, men will not hesitate to accept its authority. If at present illegitimate claimants grasp at power, it is because the true rulers do not exist.

Plato holds up his ideal constitution not only as the best—which is all that Aristotle claims for his—but as the only normal form (449 A), realizable whenever and wherever a class of this kind can be brought into existence. The Eighth and Ninth Books illustrate the consequences of its depravation or absence². Power falls into worse and worse hands. The review of actual constitutions given in these books is

¹ Rep. 520 E, *εἰ μὲν βίον ἐξευρήσεις ἀμείνω τοῦ ἀρχειν τοῖς μέλλουσιν ἀρξέειν, ἔστι σοι δυνατὴ γενέσθαι πόλις εὖ οἰκουμένη*.

² There is much in them which carries our thoughts back rather to the Second, Third, and Fourth Books than to the Seventh. *Μουσική* to our surprise regains the credit which it had lost in the Seventh Book (522 A), where it is treated as a mere education of habit, not communicating science. In the Eighth Book, on the con-

trary, the decline from the ideal State begins with the rule of *ἀμουνότεροι φύλακες* (546 D), and reason mingled with *μουσική* (*λόγος μουσικῆ κεκραμένος*, 549 B: cp. 560 B) is declared to be the true preservative of virtue, the true qualification for rule. On the other hand, there are passages in the Ninth Book (e. g. 585 B sqq.: 586 A, *πρὸς τὸ ἀληθῶς ἄνω οὕτε ἀνέβλεψαν κ.τ.λ.*, cp. 7. 525 D) which are more in the spirit of the Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Books.

designed to show that all States other than that in which justice reigns are unhappy, and increasingly unhappy, the further they are removed from the ideal model, and it naturally places them before us in a sombre light. The Lacedaemonian State still retains a few features of the ideal community: the distinction of social functions (or justice) so far survives there that the soldier is marked off from the cultivator and trader; the old respect for magistrates, the old military habits of life, the old interest in *γυμναστική* also survive. But the third class has been enslaved, separate households and property have been introduced, the class of 'wise men' (*σοφοί*) has been corrupted and has lost its hold of power. The State is in the hands of men in whom the spirited element rules, contentious and ambitious men (*φιλόνηκτοι καὶ φιλότιμοι*, 551 A). The *régime* is one of perpetual war, and love of money has come in with the decline of communism.

In the oligarchy the money-getting spirit has won complete mastery. Rich men rule over spendthrifts whose purses they have drained: all but the rulers are poor (552 D). Functions are no longer distinguished; the soldier is also a cultivator or a trader. The oligarchical State is weak for war, for it is really two States—a State of the rich and a State of the poor—and it dares not arm its poor. It is in the oligarchy that the drone, stinged or stingless, or in other words, the idle spendthrift (564 B), is first engendered.

Democracy is rather the rule of the stinged drones than of the many. There are three classes in a democracy—the drones, stinged and stingless; rich money-making orderly men; and a large body of poor labouring men, who seldom assemble together, but are all-powerful when they do. The drones of a democracy are far more formidable than those of an oligarchy, being now admitted to office, and they plunder the rich for the benefit of the poor. This is one feature of a democracy; another is its excess of liberty. A democracy is organized anarchy. We do not learn why the supremacy of the third class (the *χρηματιστικοί*)

should be accompanied by this excessive impatience of control.

Anarchy leads by a natural reaction to tyranny¹. The people loves to have a champion; democracy commonly means the supremacy of an individual (565 C); and the champion easily passes into a tyrant. Many of the touches in Aristotle's well-known picture of tyranny will be found to have been drawn from Plato's sketch of the tyrant, if the two are compared.

Plato speaks throughout of oligarchy, democracy, and tyranny as if there were only one form of each, and that the most extreme form. He is naturally led by the aim he has in view to make the worst of each of these constitutions. We must not look for scientific exactness in these vigorous sketches, which have a perennial truth and value; Plato's aim is rather to show the misery of misrule than to trace with accuracy the path of constitutional change, or to reproduce every *nuance* of the various constitutions (Rep. 548 D). When Aristotle, at the close of his book on Political Change, brings his unrivalled knowledge of the facts of constitutional change in Greek States to bear on Plato's brilliant series of dissolving views, we feel that his matter-of-fact criticisms, however cogent they may be, are rather thrown away.

Remarks.

Socrates had not designed an ideal State, but simply pointed to the Lacedaemonian State or to Solonian Athens. Plato reverted to the old practice, and the fact that he did so indicates an increased dissatisfaction with the actual State. The Republic is written from 'the fullness of the heart'—with a keen sense of the need of moral and political reform; far more so than the Politicus, more so perhaps than even the Laws. Hence in part its boldness of touch, its breadth of treatment, and the novelty of the remedies it suggests.

Plato knows that moral and political improvement must

¹ Did Plato think that Athens would end in a tyranny?

go hand in hand, and thus while he seeks to persuade men of the happiness of virtue and the misery of vice, his criticism is especially directed to existing political institutions, which he thought had much to do with the moral shortcomings of the age. He spares much that is merely Hellenic and temporary, and rejects much that experience has shown to stand on a far firmer basis, much that many would say is broadly human and for all time. He is for a State of small extent with a city at its centre, for games and festivals and athletic contests, for State-control over religion—so far he follows Hellenic traditions. The institutions which he challenges are mostly not specially Hellenic, but the common property of all ages and countries—the household, the right of several property, the distinction between the occupations of men and women, the drama. He requires wealth and numbers to submit to a denial of the claims which they have at all times and everywhere made to political authority.

The faulty distribution of political rights in all existing Greek communities did much, in his view, to destroy the unity of the State, and to make the rise of the only class that could redeem it—the philosophic class—impossible and hopeless (497 A sqq.). The Greek States were ruled either by harsh soldiers, pugnacious and keen for personal distinction, like the Spartans, or by rapacious oligarchs, demagogues, or tyrants. The rule of the few meant the *exploitation* of the many by the rich. The rule of the many meant anarchy, political and moral, and the spoliation of the rich. The rule of the tyrant meant misery even to the tyrant himself.

The picture which Plato draws in the Republic of the political state of Greece is probably too dark, for we know from Aristotle's testimony that moderate forms of oligarchy and democracy did exist, and that the extreme form of democracy can hardly have found a place in many States (Aristot. Pol. 8 (6). 4. 1319 b 1 sqq.). Yet Aristotle himself dwells on the intolerance of compromise, the determination not to share power with others, but to crush them or be

crushed by them, which had come to prevail in men's minds (Pol. 6 (4). 11. 1296 a 40 sqq.).

Changes of character seemed to Plato to be needed in all ranks. The producing and trading classes must be just—that is, they must be content to do their own work without meddling with matters too high for them—and temperate—that is, they must be willing to accept the rule of their betters. If they were excluded from office, they were none the less citizens for that; they were citizens and members of the Whole¹, but that Whole must be 'vitalized,' if we may use the word, by two added classes—the one designed to fight, the other to rule. Far the larger part of the best State² was to be of very ordinary material, but it was to be headed with silver, and its tip was to be of the very purest gold. The fighting and ruling classes must be distinct—not identical, as Hippodamus had made them—and they must be educated in an altogether novel way and live an altogether novel kind of life. So far as they are concerned, the household and the right of several property must be abolished. Plato speaks, indeed, of an extension of the household tie, but the practical result of his proposals would be its abolition. So long as the guardian classes had wives and children and property of their own, they would not rule so as to win the love of the mass of the population, nor would they be united in feeling among themselves or a source of union to the rest. Private households and property were a fruitful source of litigation and disagreement (464 D), and we learn from a curious passage³, how keenly Plato felt the weariness of the task of caring for children and providing the wherewithal for the maintenance of a

¹ Cp. Rep. 552 A, μηδὲν ὄντα τῶν τῆς πόλεως μερῶν, μήτε χρηματιστὴν μήτε δημιουργὸν μήτε ἱππία μήτε ὀπλίτην.

² Rep. 428 E sq.: cp. 442 A, where the appetitive part of the soul, which corresponds to τὸ χρηματιστικόν in the State, is said to be the largest portion of it.

³ Rep. 465 C, τὰ γε μὴν μικρότατα τῶν κακῶν δι' ἀπρέπειαν ὁκνῶ

καὶ λέγειν ὃν ἀπηλλαγμένοι ἂν εἶεν, κολακείας τε πλουσιῶν, ἀπορίας τε καὶ ἀλγηδόνας ὅσας ἐν παιδοτροφίαις καὶ χρηματισμοῖς διὰ τροφὴν οἰκετῶν ἀναγκαίαν ἴσχουσι, τὰ μὲν δανειζόμενοι, τὰ δ' ἐξαρνούμενοι, τὰ δὲ πάντως ποριστάμενοι θέμενοι παρὰ γυναικῶν τε καὶ οἰκέτας, ταμιεύειν παραδύντες, ὅσα τε, ὦ φίλε, περὶ αὐτὰ καὶ οἷα πάσχουσι, δεῖλά τε δὴ καὶ ἀγεννῆ καὶ οὐκ ἀξία λέγειν.

household, though freedom from this burden is, he sees, a comparatively small matter. The proposal to assimilate the pursuits of women and men was probably suggested in part by the teaching of Socrates¹. Of course, the establishment of communism was thus facilitated, and the regulation of women's lives made more easy. The luxurious life of the women had done much to ruin the Lacedaemonian State, and Plato probably desired to prevent the same cause being fatal to his own ideal community.

Even these sweeping changes, however, would not suffice without an entire change in the education of the soldiers and rulers of the State. There was much that was wrong in the poetry and music which formed the most potent element in the education of the day. The poets sang of Gods who were the cause of evil to men, and who were deceivers and false. They sapped men's courage by their ill pictures of Hades, men's self-control by their wailings for the noble dead and their representations of excessive mirth. The true μουσική makes men brave, orderly, and temperate (424 E, *ἐννομοὶ καὶ σπουδαῖοι*)—correct in a thousand little matters which law cannot reach or touch (425 A–B). The State must keep an eye on all the arts, but especially on poetry and music, and see that they 'moralize their song' and teach men to know virtue in all its forms, and also vice in all its forms, as they know their alphabet (402 A–C). The drama is to be excluded. The education of those who are to rule is only to cease at the age of thirty-five, and in it all studies which lead the mind in the direction of true Being are to find a place—especially Mathematics and Dialectic. Contact with true Being and, above all, with the Idea of Good is the secret of complete virtue.

¹ Socrates had said (Xen. Symp. 2. 9) that the nature of women is not inferior to that of men, but only falls short of it in wisdom and strength (*γνώμης καὶ ἰσχύος*). The tendency of the Socratic doctrine of the unity of virtue was to discourage distinctions between the

virtue of men and the virtue of women, such as that implied in a saying of Gorgias (Fragm. 17 : Mullach, Fr. Philos. Gr. 2. 145), which Thucydides had tacitly amended in a famous sentence of one of his speeches (2. 45. 4).

Plato's hope is that if the State were once absolutely in the hands of rulers possessed of high natural gifts, yet saved from the corruption which ordinarily befel the possessor of such gifts, trained from their earliest years to be temperate, orderly, and gentle, as well as brave¹, devoted to the wellbeing of the State as a whole, and freed from all disturbing influences of relationship and property—rulers mature in age and experience, and knowing what goodness and temperance and justice are as only philosophers can know this—the political problem would be found to have been solved. Rulers of this type would not oppress the ruled, and their authority would be willingly accepted by all. Disunion would vanish, the State would be not two but one, and 'peace with virtue' would bring happiness².

The thought which underlies Plato's project of a State is that the mass of men are fit only for industrial or trading pursuits, and should leave the defence of the State to a small separate class, and the government of it to a still smaller class selected from the fighting class. Indeed, he thinks that the mass only grasps at political power when the holders of it are unworthy of their position. Let these be all they should be, and the common herd will gladly leave politics to them. There is a kernel of truth in this view, and Aristotle has said something not very dissimilar (e.g. *Pol.* 2. 7. 1267 b 5 sqq. : 7 (5). 8. 1308 b 34 sqq. : 8 (6). 4. 1318 b 11–1319 a 4). It is the organization of Plato's State in detail, that is so startling; the broad conceptions on which it rests may be so stated as to lose all appearance of paradox. If Plato had said that the main stress of ruling must be borne by

¹ Cp. Plato, *Politicus* 306.

² Spinoza says (*Tractat. Pol.* 5. 2): 'certum est quod seditiones, bella, legumque contemptio sive violatio non tam subditorum malitiae, quam pravo imperii statui imputanda sunt. . . . Si itaque in una civitate malitia magis regnat, pluraque peccata committuntur,

quam in alia, certum est id ex eo oriri, quod talis civitas non satis concordiae providerit, nec iura satis prudenter instituerit.' But he does not go so far as to say that internal harmony is out of the question in the absence of rulers of heroic or angelic mould.

a few well-selected, highly gifted, well-trained natures devoted to the common good and distracted by no private interests, knowing what is great and excellent in human life and ordering everything with a view to it, valuing goodness more than wealth or distinction or empire, and supported by the love of a people conscious of its own inferiority and content to till the soil, or trade, or fight, and to leave ruling to those who understand it—we should have recognized the substantial basis of truth which underlies his social ideal, and not have lost sight of it in marvelling at the strangeness of his machinery.

It is another question whether a State of this kind, composed to a large extent of men who are content to be ruled by others, and who neither take nor are fit to take any part in guiding the State to which they belong—who are, in fact, rather in the State than of it—is really the highest type of State that can be imagined. We may feel inclined to agree with Aristotle that it is not.

But the 'Republic' formed a turning-point in the history of Greek political philosophy, and gave it a direction which it was slow to lose. The political philosopher was to be no mere apathetic analyst of social phenomena, but the watchful physician of the State, unflinching in his diagnosis of its maladies and outspoken in pointing to the true remedy. The political philosophy of Greece would perhaps have gained in many ways, if its aim had been less practical. The broad, profound principles which it asserts would not have been buried in ephemeral detail. Its theoretical basis would have been more firm, more consistent, more fully thought out. But it would have lost something of 'actuality'; its authors would no longer claim our sympathy, as men keenly interested in the wellbeing of their race and eager to help it through its difficulties. They might perhaps be profounder anatomists of society, but they would hardly impress us to the same extent as good citizens concerned for the future of their country. The greatest master

Influence
of the Re-
public on
the
political
philosophy
of Aris-
totle.

of political inquiry that had yet appeared in Greece gave in the 'Republic' a clear intimation to his successors in that field, that Political Philosophy was to keep watch on the maladies of the age, and to try to heal them: the political philosopher in Greece was to be all and more than all that the prophet had been to another people. When Plato discovered that the remedies suggested in the Republic were impracticable, he wrote the Laws in the hope of doing better service to his generation, and was prepared even to depict a 'third State'; his intention was to be useful to his time and country, even if, as a matter of fact, his least ideal State was too ideal to be of much practical service to existing communities (Pol. 6 (4). 1. 1288 b 33 sqq.). It is from Plato that Aristotle inherits the practical aim of his Political Philosophy.

So again it is from Plato that Aristotle inherits the plan of depicting an ideal State, though, unlike Plato in the Republic, he does not claim that his 'best State' is universally applicable, or the only normal State. He inherits Plato's conception of *πολιτική* as ordering everything in the State—supreme over law, economy, rhetoric, and strategy, and also apparently over poetry and the arts, though Aristotle would leave to poetry and music a far greater freedom of development than Plato was prepared to allow them. To him, as to Plato, Scientific Knowledge is essential to the ruler, though of a different kind from that which Plato insisted that he should possess. He inherits Plato's view of the State as a Whole, whose parts must be adapted to each other and to the work they have to do, if the Whole is to prosper, though he criticises the co-ordination of parts in Plato's Republic as imperfect, and not such as to secure happiness either to the Whole or to its parts. He approves the view that the individual citizen ought to consider himself as belonging to the State and not to himself, though he holds that no sacrifice of the individual's happiness should be involved in this, whereas Plato's scheme involved, in his opinion, a sacrifice of this kind. Like Plato, again, he places trading, industrial,

and agricultural functions in other hands than those to which he entrusts the defence of the State, and also marks off the military class from that to which he assigns the duties of government. Both followed, or rather improved upon, the tradition of the Lacedaemonian State in this matter.

But if the 'Republic' has left many traces of its influence in the political philosophy of Aristotle, Aristotle is by no means prepared to accept the State depicted in it as the ideal State, even if he could regard the portraiture of an ideal State, or indeed of two or three of them, as an adequate treatment of Political Philosophy.

While Plato had regarded his State as realizable wherever a body of true philosophers, or even a single philosopher-king, could be brought into existence and entrusted with power, Aristotle admits that his best State can only be realized under quite exceptional circumstances—only where Fortune and Nature conspire with the lawgiver to bring it into being (6 (4). 11. 1295 a 25 sqq.). Plato himself, when he wrote the Laws, had come to see that he had taken too sanguine a view of human nature in the Republic, and had given to philosophic men powers which can only be given with safety to 'gods and the children of gods.' Aristotle saw far more clearly than Plato how seldom institutions of at all an ideal cast can be applicable to average communities, and hence it is that he takes far greater pains than Plato to show how even the least favoured community may improve its institutions and come to enjoy a tolerable political organization. He is far from holding his best constitution to be the only normal (*δρθή*) constitution. Every constitution is normal which is just and for the common good. The State is a thing that may legitimately assume a variety of forms. Some of these are better than others; the Absolute Kingship and the Aristocracy are better than the Polity. But even the deviation-forms have their better and worse types, and it is a great thing to have shown a deviation-form of the worst type how to become a deviation-form of a better type, or even how to become not too intolerable to last. Aristotle appears to set more store by tolerable

Points in which the political teaching of Aristotle diverged from that of the Republic. ✓

constitutions than Plato: to him the difference between a tolerable constitution and a bad one is immense. Even democrats, he feels, may be glad to learn how to construct a democracy that will last, and it is as much the business of Political Philosophy to tell them how to do this as to depict an ideal State.

But then Aristotle also thinks that Plato's State is not the best possible State. In the first place, he objects to Plato's organization of his three classes, as leaving the two upper classes in an insecure position. If the third class, he says (*Pol.* 2. 5. 1264 a 17), is to live a communistic life like the two others, it will have all the moral advantages which, according to Plato, accompany such a life; it will be too like the other classes to profit by their rule, as inferiors profit by the rule of superiors; indeed it will not submit to their rule, unless special precautions are taken. If, on the other hand (and this Aristotle had in an earlier passage—*c.* 4. 1262 a 40 sq.—rightly taken to be Plato's meaning), the third class is not to live a communistic life, but to have private households and rights of property like the rest of the world, then Plato's State will be just what he wishes it not to be—two States in one—for the two parts of its citizen-body will be living entirely different lives; one of them will be as it were a garrison, while the other will be the real citizens. So again, on this hypothesis, the third class will be fully exposed to all the drawbacks, such as litigation and squabbles, which are said by Plato to attach to private households and property; indeed, when Plato says that not many laws will be needed in his State, seeing how good an education he provides for it (*Rep.* 425 B sqq.), it must not be forgotten that he has provided only for the education of the two upper classes. Uneducated as it is, the third class will have the lands of the State in its hands, subject only to the payment to the two others of a portion of the produce; it will be more aspiring and unmanageable than the class of Helots in the Lacedaemonian State. If, on the other hand—a third supposition—Plato's plan is that the members of the third class shall

have lands of their own but women in common, other difficulties will arise.

At all events, the whole subject of the social and political status of the third class should have been fully treated, and their constitutional organization, their training, and the laws under which they are to live, should have been clearly set forth. For the existence of the society which the two upper classes form (*τὴν τῶν φυλάκων κοινωνίαν*, 1264 a 40) depends on the character of those who compose the third class. If this class is not as submissive and fitted for its position as it should be, the superstructure will collapse. In full accordance with the view here expressed, Aristotle commits in his Fourth Book the functions discharged by Plato's third class, not to Hellenes, but to non-Hellenes whose submissiveness can be relied on¹. So far from accord-
ing even a nominal citizenship to those who discharge 'necessary work' in his State, Aristotle makes many of them slaves.

Then again (he continues) in Plato's State the same persons always rule. This is the best arrangement in the abstract, no doubt², but then rulers can seldom be found possessing the commanding superiority, mental and physical (4 (7). 14. 1332 b 16 sqq.), which alone can justify this distribution of power, or make it agreeable to the ruled. The Absolute King of Aristotle is to do so, but evidently Aristotle does not expect Plato's first class to stand in the same relation of overwhelming superiority to those they rule as his Absolute King. If they do not do so, however, Plato's rulers will hardly win willing obedience from a spirited and warlike class, like his second class.

The very measure which Plato thinks would do most to bind the two upper classes together and to promote unity of feeling throughout their ranks—the abolition, so far as they are concerned, of the household and several property

¹ The *γεωργοί* of Aristotle's State, at all events, were to be non-Hellenic, if serfs (4 (7). 10. 1330 a 25 sqq.), and would probably be mainly so, if slaves. The *ἐμποροί*

are also *ξένοι*, which does not, however, necessarily imply that they are non-Hellenic.

² This opinion is expressed by Aristotle in Pol. 2. 2. 1261 a 37 sqq.

—would, in Aristotle's opinion, have the contrary effect. It would not be productive of concord and affection, but the reverse. Less care also would be bestowed on children and property, the pleasures of life would be diminished, and the State would be morally the poorer for the loss of opportunities for the exercise of some important virtues. The State exists to make men happy by giving full scope and play to all virtuous tendencies of human nature. Plato forgets this, when he takes the 'flower of his flock' and deprives them of all real relatives. He requires them to live without wives or daughters or sisters, without sons or brothers; they are not even to have the means of helping a friend in distress; he expects them, in fact, to live a life that cannot be lived by man (2. 5. 1263 b 29).

The initial failure of the Republic, however, is its failure to understand the true nature of the citizen. The citizen, as Aristotle is careful to show at the beginning of the Third Book, is a man who shares in deliberative and judicial office; he is a man who is capable, not only of being ruled, but of ruling. The members of Plato's second and third classes are excluded from all share in government and held to be unfit to rule; yet they are accounted citizens by Plato. It would be impossible to say of all the citizens of the Republic what Aristotle says of the citizen of the best State (3. 13. 1284 a 1), that 'they are able and purposed to rule and be ruled with a view to a life of virtue.' If Plato ascribes to his third class the virtues of temperance and justice, Aristotle holds that men in their position, when they possess these virtues, possess them in a form quite distinct from that in which they are possessed by the ideal citizen, for the justice and temperance they possess will be the sort of justice and temperance possessed by 'one who is ruled' (ὁ ἀρχόμενος)¹, whereas the citizen both rules and is ruled. Put in its simplest form, Aristotle's view is that the citizen of a State must have something more than mere passive virtue; he must be able to take a share in guiding its destinies, he must live its full life. Indeed, Aristotle

¹ Pol. 3. 4. 1277 b 18 sq.

would hardly allow that full *κοινωνία* exists between men so unequal as the members of the first and third classes of the Republic; yet, if full *κοινωνία* does not exist between them, how can they be fellow-citizens?

Nor is this all. Not only is Plato's best State encumbered with citizens who are not really citizens, but it fails to fulfil the first condition of a best State (4 (7). 1. 1323 a 14 sqq.)—it does not realize the most desirable life. The best State is what it is, not because it realizes the maximum of unity, nor even because it makes men virtuous better than any other¹, but because it realizes the highest quality of life—life of the fullest and completest kind (2. 2. 1261 b 10 sqq.). Its citizens must be happy—that is to say, they must have all qualifications, internal and external, for living, and be purposed to live, in the active exercise of all forms of virtue, moral and intellectual; their 'virtuous activity' must be that fully equipped and wholly unimpeded 'virtuous activity' to which alone Aristotle concedes the name of happiness; they must live a life in which the moral virtues work hand in hand with their nobler kin, the intellectual virtues. It is not possible for the State as a whole to live this life, unless some at least of its citizens do so; but where is the class in the Republic that lives it? Not the third class, not the second; not even the first, for this lacks the full provision of external goods which is essential for such a life, and besides, it seems to be intended to live rather for rule over its inferiors than for philosophy, which is to Aristotle the highest aim in life²—not even for rule over its likes, but for rule over inferiors. Yet the better the ruled, the better is the rule exercised (Pol. 1. 5. 1254 a 25, αἰὲν βελτίων ἢ ἀρχὴ ἢ τῶν βελτιόνων ἀρχομένων). Aristotle's dream is of a State, not composed of protectors and protected, nor even of 'guardians' alone or 'guardians fully provided with external means' alone, but of *σπονδαῖοι*—

¹ Πολιτικῇ, indeed, according to Aristotle (Eth. Nic. 1. 10. 1099b 29), not only makes the citizens virtuous, but also *πρακτικοὶ τῶν καλῶν*.

² Plato also speaks of the philosophic life as 'better' than the life of ruling (Rep. 520 E).

men of many-sided excellence, intensifying by their mutual relations as parts of a society each other's virtue and happiness, and doing all that can be done for women, children, and the social adjuncts, while they also possess external means in just that amount, neither more nor less, which will enable them to live a life of this kind. His ideal State is not a State of protectors and protected, but is one composed of fully-developed men, rejoicing in each other's manhood. The perfection of their life lies in the fact that they are a large company of *σπουδαῖοι*, not intermixed with any feebler elements. The best State is that which is all gold, not that which is tipped with gold¹. If we are to construct a best State, he seems to say, let us construct one which, while it is not impossible, shall be really the best. 'Ten just men' do not make a good State, any more than one swallow makes a summer. The secret of a State's excellence lies in the fact of its consisting of a large body of excellent citizens organized aright. Plato had sacrificed much that makes life worth having without realizing in any one of the three sections of his State the most desirable life.

A broad resemblance, however, exists between the political ideal of Aristotle and that of Plato.

Yet if we note the points in which these two ideals differ, we should also bear in mind their broad resemblance. Both Plato and Aristotle find the secret of political well-being in the supremacy of a rational love of *τὸ καλόν* over that craving for external goods which carried everything before it in their day, as it has carried everything before it since. The State, they hold, will never be all it might be until its rulers (Aristotle would say, its citizens) count wealth and even distinctions as nothing in comparison with *τὸ καλόν*—until justice and wisdom are more to them than fame or riches. Both in Aristotle's State and in Plato's, the motives which play so large a part in the State as we know it are to lose their power. The quest of wealth is permitted only to the third class of Plato's State,

¹ The inferior materials which Plato admits into the structure of his State are excluded from the

State by Aristotle, and expressly declared not to be among its 'parts.'

and even in their case only within certain limits (Rep. 421 E sq.): Aristotle hopes to bring all his citizens to see that wealth is but a means to higher things, and to abandon its unlimited and irrational pursuit. That love of praise and of distinctions which was the 'last infirmity' of the Greek mind was to be well controlled in both societies. In both the rulers rule well, not because they love wealth, or the praise of men, or social distinctions, not even because they are patriots and lovers of their country, but because they know and love τὸ καλόν, and because they would be unhappy if they did not rule well. They govern aright for the very same reason for which they act aright. Neither Plato's philosophic rulers nor Aristotle's citizens are impeccable, for they are human beings, and their likes perhaps already existed here and there; that which did not as yet exist was an organized body of such men—men in whom the element of desire is overshadowed and permeated by the element of reason. In Plato's State men not of this type would be excluded from power, though not from citizenship; in Aristotle's they would form no part of the citizen-body or the State. Both hold that wise laws will go for little if they do not produce by education and habituation 'wise and understanding' men, who will count wealth and distinction as dross in comparison with virtue. Plato is content if the rulers of the State are men of this stamp; Aristotle, with more consistency, requires that the whole citizen-body shall be so.

The organization of modern States is so elaborate, that we are apt to forget what Plato and Aristotle never forget, that as is the people, so is the State. Their teaching is that institutions are good for little in the absence of great qualities in the nation. Hence the importance which they attach to education and social habit. Modern States leave more to chance, but they are not unconscious of this truth. England knows perfectly well, that its wellbeing mainly depends on the preservation and multiplication of the nobler types of English character.

The
Politicus.

The Politicus, whatever its date¹, is concerned with the Statesman (*ὁ βασιλικὸς καὶ πολιτικός*, Polit. 311 C) and his art, rather than with the State, as indeed its title implies. It does not embarrass itself with an attempt to depict an ideal State, nor does it even inquire, like the Republic, how the true ruler is produced; it merely seeks to point him out, to show what he is and does, and to distinguish him from the false ruler—to part off *πολιτικοί* rightly so called from the ‘rout of Centaurs and Satyrs’ (303 C: cp. 292 D), who usurp the name in actual States. Even more than the Republic, it traverses ground already traversed by Socrates, who had inquired ‘who the Statesman is’ (Xen. Mem. 1. 1. 16), though he had not sketched an ideal State. But it deals with the question in an intentionally elaborate and cumbrous way, unlike that in which Socrates probably dealt with it, and the chief part in the conversation is taken by a ‘Stranger.’ In the Politicus we have to win our way to the political kernel through a husk of logic; and if it is true that in the Republic we approach Politics through Ethics, the two main topics of the Republic are infinitely nearer and more congenial to each other than the two main topics of the Politicus. The latter dialogue seems at least as much intended to illustrate an interesting logical process—that of disentangling the statesman’s art from the general mass of things—as to arrive at political truth. The dialectical interest and the political cross each other throughout the dialogue; each seems occasionally to overpower the other. Thus the first and highest object of it is said (Polit. 286 D) to be to ‘assert the great method of division according to species,’ and to ‘make those who take part in the inquiry better dialecticians² and more capable of expressing the truth of things’ (287 A). Elsewhere, however, Plato seems to be carried away by his interest in some political lesson—the folly, for instance, of regulating the practice of

¹ The refusal to divide mankind into Greeks and barbarians (Polit. 262 D) looks as if it was subsequent, not prior, to the totally different procedure in the

Fifth Book of the Republic (470 C–471 B).

² This was a frequent aim of Socrates (Xen. Mem. 4. 6. 1).

the political art by written rules, when other arts are not so fettered, or the need of harmonizing the two dispositions prominent among men—and then the dialectical interest falls into the background. The eliminative method of the dialogue sets the King or Statesman in strong contrast to unqualified pretenders to rule. The slave, the money-changer, the merchant, ship-owner, and retailer, the hired labourer, the herald and scribe, the diviner, the priest are successively warned off the statesman's province. Plato is sure in the *Politicus* (290 A) that day-labourers and wage-receivers, retailers and merchants will not claim to possess the political or kingly art; there is more chance of heralds, scribes, prophets, and priests doing so, to say nothing of the 'Centaurs' and 'Satyrs' who commonly bear rule (291 A-B). The fact that rule is in the hands of One or a Few or Many—of the rich or the poor—that it is imposed by force or willingly accepted—that it is exercised in subjection to written law or not so, has nothing to do with its legitimacy or illegitimacy (292 A)¹. Statesmanship is a science—ἐπιστήμη περὶ ἀνθρώπων ἀρχῆς, 292 D—a science to which few, perhaps in reality only one man in a community, can attain. The Statesman is not quite what a shepherd is to his flock, as Socrates said he was: he does not feed those over whom he rules, but rather tends and takes care of them. The comparison of Socrates comes nearer to reproducing the relation of ruler and ruled as it existed in the days of Cronus, than that which prevails now under the sway of Zeus. The test of the true ruler is that he rules with science and justice for men's good, preserving them and making them better (293 D: 297 A sq.).

At this point the listener, whose interruption reminds us of that of Polemarchus in the *Republic*, betrays his surprise at the proposal that the ruler should govern without law; and the defence of this paradox is one of the most

¹ Contrast Laws 832 B-D, τούτων (democracy, oligarchy, and tyranny) γὰρ δὴ πολιτεία μὲν οὐδεμία, στασιωτεία δὲ πᾶσαι λέγονται ἂν ὁρρότατα, ἐκόντων γὰρ ἐκούσα

οὐδεμία, ἀλλ' ἀκόντων ἐκούσα ἀρχεῖ σὺν αἰ τινι βίᾳ—comparing with this latter passage Cic. de Rep. 3. 29. 41: 3. 31. 43.

vigorous portions of the dialogue. The principle of a parallel between πολιτική and other arts lies at the root both of the Politicus¹ and the Republic, but a different lesson is drawn from it in the two dialogues; in the Republic the lesson of specialization, in the Politicus the lesson that the true ruler should not be fettered by law—one which had not been dwelt on in the Republic with equal emphasis or at equal length. But Plato admits that if a King possessed of the Kingly Science and ruling without law is not forthcoming, then the next best thing is Kingship with law, and so he carries us down a scale of States through Aristocracy with Law and Democracy with Law, to Democracy, Oligarchy, and Tyranny without it. Thus while the Politicus, like the Republic, exhibits a scale of States, it groups them more openly in an order of merit and classifies them more carefully: for instance, it distinguishes two forms of Democracy, while the Republic had known but one. The distinction between the two forms, however, is made to rest merely on the observance or non-observance of law, and so is that between Aristocracy and Oligarchy—an account of the matter which can hardly have satisfied Aristotle. Still the fact that a number of constitutions are indicated in this dialogue as tolerable make-shifts, in the absence of the best and only normal one, shows that Plato was increasingly sensible of the difficulty of realizing the latter, and also prepares us for the wider conception of the problem of political philosophy which we find in the Laws and in Aristotle's Politics.

Just as in the Republic the χρηματιστικοί are parts of the Whole and fellow-citizens of the ruling class, so in the Politicus the other arts are co-operators (συνεταίροι) with πολιτική. Yet even the personages who stand nearest to the Statesman—and the possessors of musical, rhetorical, military, and judicial science come far nearer to him than any others—are carefully marked off and distinguished from him at the close of the dialogue. The business of the Statesman is to take his stand high above the practitioners

¹ See e. g. Polit. 298.

of the other arts and to combine their efforts—to weave together all the forces at work in the State (πάντα συν-φαίνει τὰ κατὰ πόλιν, 305 E)—to wed courage with orderliness in the minds of the ruled, partly by means of education, partly by means of marriage, and to draw them together by instilling into their minds one common opinion as to what is just and unjust, good and evil.

The Politicus works out the Socratic principle of the rule of knowledge with an *ex cathedra* absoluteness which is absent in the Republic. The latter dialogue, while claiming unchecked rule for knowledge, half disarms criticism by pointing out how many noble qualities, moral and intellectual, must be present in one who possesses full knowledge, what a long and arduous training knowledge presupposes, and how great and profound a thing it is, piercing to the central source of Being; and again, how willingly men acquiesce in the rule of those who possess it. In the Politicus no attempt is made to meet the reader halfway on this subject, or to remove his hesitations and doubts: the knowledge for which the right to rule is claimed is merely the 'knowledge how to rule men,' the knowledge how to draw them together—a less august thing than the Science of Being which the Republic enthrones. It is in favour of the possessor of this kind of knowledge that we are called on to sacrifice Law and to accept the autocracy of an individual. Nowhere is the tendency of Plato's political teaching to an autocracy of the One or Few Wise more clearly revealed than in the Politicus. Aristotle, on the contrary, insisted that there is nothing in Law or in a numerous body of citizens interchanging rule, that is incompatible with the true ideal of the State.

We know not what interval of time separates the composition of the Laws from that of the Republic, nor do we know for certain whether the Politicus intervenes chronologically between the two. To some extent the Laws takes up the line of thought suggested in the Politicus. Already in the Politicus we trace a misgiving as to the practica-

Sketch of
the State
described
in the
Laws.

bility of the best constitution, for we find certain tolerable forms of constitution other than the best enumerated there; and in the *Politicus*, as in the *Laws*, we are taught to fall back on Law in the absence of the heaven-born rulers, who are always scarce and few; the teaching of the *Politicus* on particular points, again, is echoed in the *Laws* (compare, for example, *Polit.* 310 C sqq. with *Laws* 773 A-D). On the other hand, the stress laid in the *Laws* on the advantage of government by persuasion reminds us rather of the language of the Republic than of that of the *Politicus*¹, and no State resembling that of the *Laws* appears in the list of States given in the *Politicus*, for though the State of the *Laws* is a State under the rule of Law, it is not a Kingship, nor an Aristocracy, nor a Democracy; it is rather a mixture of the two latter constitutions with something of Plutocracy or Oligarchy.

There can be no doubt, however, that the dialogue is the work of Plato's old age²—an old age overflowing with interest in social and political legislation down to even its minutest details³, all the more so, perhaps, because Plato

¹ Read the criticism of the timocratic character—οὐχ ὑπὸ πειθοῦς ἀλλ' ὑπὸ βίας πεπαιδευμένοι, *Rep.* 548 B; and contrast *Polit.* 293 A, τοὺτους δέ γε, εἴαν τε ἐκόντων εἴαν τε ἀκόντων ἄρχωσι . . . νομιστέον κατὰ τέχνην ἡγνινοῦν ἀρχὴν ἀρχοντας.

² If it belongs, as Zeller thinks (*Plato E. T.* p. 548), to the last ten years of his life, it may have been written while his friend Dion was seeking to remodel the constitution of Syracuse on a somewhat similar plan, or after he had perished in the attempt (*B.C.* 353). *Ἐπενόει δὲ (ὁ Δίων) τὴν μὲν ἄκρατον δημοκρατίαν, ὥς οὐ πολιτείαν ἀλλὰ παντοπώλιον οὖσαν πολιτειῶν, κατὰ τὸν Πλάτωνα, κωλύειν (κολοῦειν?), Λακωνικὸν δέ τι καὶ Κρητικὸν σχῆμα μισγάμενος ἐκ δήμου καὶ βασιλείας ἀριστοκρατίαν ἔχον τὴν ἐπιστατοῦσαν καὶ βραβεύουσαν τὰ μέγιστα καθιστάναί καὶ κοσμεῖν, ὁρῶν καὶ τοὺς Κορινθίους ὀλιγαρχικώτερόν τε πολι-*

τευομένους καὶ μὴ πολλὰ τῶν κοινῶν ἐν τῷ δήμῳ πράττοντας (Plutarch, *Dion c.* 53).

The fact that Plato wrote that which is by far the longest of his dialogues when a very old man, may partly explain the inconsistencies and other defects which lead Ivo Bruns (in his work '*Plato's Gesetze*') to find considerable traces of another hand (that of Philippus of Opus, he thinks) in the dialogue. Some of these defects are so glaring that they would perhaps hardly have escaped a final revision by Plato, and it may be that this final revision was wanting. It is true that inconsistencies occur in dialogues of Plato which must be regarded as intact.

³ Thus Plato insists on householders rising early and not spending the whole night asleep (807 E sqq.: cp. *Hom. Il.* 2. 24)—on the

had taken no active part in the politics of his own State. He revels, in fact, in his own ingenuity and fertility of resource to such an extent, that the central ideas of the work run some risk of being lost under a mass of superincumbent detail. Old age, if it had deepened Plato's dogmatism and antipathy to change, adding a slight touch of superstition and some contempt for men and their concerns (803 B sqq. : 804 B), and rendering him somewhat readier to preach or to legislate than to inquire, had not entirely robbed him of his old love of banter, or made him an absolutist, a fanatic, or an ascetic ; it had, on the contrary, taught him that the world could get on better out of leading-strings than he had thought, and that to emancipate it in some degree would not necessarily lead to absolute ruin. Thus, while he is now more earnest than ever about Communism (for he says in the Laws that the best State is that in which no one has anything of his own¹, whereas in the Republic only the two upper classes have things in common), he has nevertheless learnt two important lessons : (1) that to give absolute authority even to the best and wisest of men is unsafe² ; (2) that the social elements of wealth and numbers will not tolerate an entire exclusion from power³. Some share of political right must therefore be accorded even to these elements ; and he now declines to trust a few gifted and highly trained natures with that absolute power which he had conceded to them in the Republic and the Politicus. How then is good government to be secured under these new conditions ? The answer of the dialogue is—by making the whole body of citizens as much as possible what they ought to be—men of measure and moderation (*μέτριοι*),

abandonment, at all events by soldiers, of all coverings for head and feet (942 D) — denounces change even in food (797 E)—declaims against the thoughtlessness of boys (808 D) etc.

¹ Laws 739.

² See the passages referred to by Susemihl (Sus.², Note 191) : Laws 739 A sqq., 807 B, 853 C,

874 E sqq., 691 C sq., 692 B sq., 713 C sq.

³ Plato even seems inclined, as we have already noticed, to recognize claims to power such as those of physical strength and beauty (Laws 744 B-C), which Aristotle rejects as not directly contributory to the end of the State (Pol. 3. 12. 1282 b 23 sqq.).

law-abiding, and religious—by relieving them of all lower functions, by saving them from the corrupting influence of extreme wealth and extreme poverty, by educating them and regulating their life, and also by securing that power shall fall into the hands of the most trustworthy among them, without however allowing unchecked authority to anyone. The citizens of the Laws are far more on an equality with each other than those of the Republic, but even in the Laws it is ultimately, as we shall see, only the Few who are thought by Plato to be fully capable of ruling. To be a citizen is not to him, as it is to Aristotle, to be capable of rule: more and more we discover, as we read further in the dialogue, that Plato still conceives society as an union of unequals, of protectors and protected. The ideal basis of human society to him is the reverence of the inferior for the superior; the ideal organization of society is that which prevailed in the days of Cronus, when men were ruled by gods. We still trace the influence of this ideal in the Laws, though Plato now feels that the rule of men over men cannot be safely assimilated to this model. Reverential submission to autocratic rulers cannot be the keystone of a purely human State; the ruled must in such a State reverence the Law. Law is here to be supreme, and reverence for law is to be more highly honoured than the greatest military services to the State (922 A): the State in which the law is obeyed is enthusiastically eulogized (715 D), though we find a confession elsewhere (875 C sq.: 966 C), that obedience to law is the second-best thing only, and the best a mind which knows and spontaneously cleaves to that which is just and for the common good.

The type of character which the citizen of the Laws is expected to realize is, accordingly, one apt for obedience to Law—a moderate or measured (*μέτριος*¹) and temperate (*σώφρων*) type. We hear so much of temperance, that the State of the Laws might well seem to be built on this foundation, as that of the Republic is built on justice. It is

¹ *Μετρίους* implies, among other things, freedom from all extravagant and violent desires (Rep. 572 B).

temperance that enables men to deal aright with pain and pleasure, to rest content with a limited authority, and to render a willing obedience to law, and not only to law in its compulsory, but also to law in its suasive form (νόμος ἀναγκαστικός—συμβουλευτικός, 930 B: 921 E)—for conformity to law through compulsion is distinguished from hearty acceptance of its persuasions or recommendations (ἐπαινοί, 730 B, 773 E: διδαχὴ καὶ νοουτέτησις, 788 A: ἐπιτήδευμα, 808 A). Obedience, however, must further be intelligent, for we find that obedience founded on unintelligent habit is unfavourably contrasted with obedience founded on intelligent comprehension (951 B). Temperance must, therefore, be crowned with moral prudence (φρόνησις), for this is the natural guide and complement of the other virtues (688 A sq.); our State must be built upon τὸ φρονεῖν καὶ τὸ σωφρονεῖν (712 A): nay, we learn, before the dialogue closes, that the supreme control, even in the State of the Laws, must rest with a few philosophical minds, able to discern the One in the Many and to trace the various virtues to their source in the Idea of Good (965 B sqq.). Thus, that approach to an equality among the citizens which we seemed at the outset to detect in the State of the Laws, as contrasted with that of the Republic, ultimately to a great extent disappears: we find that even among the magistrates of the State, while 'some walk by true opinion only,' others 'walk by wisdom' (φρόνησις, 632 C); some work at the studies prescribed by the law in an exact and scientific way (818 A), others do not. There is, however, one great difference between the position of philosophers in this State and in the Republic: here they not only rule in obedience to and as ministers of the law (ὑπηρέτας τοῖς νόμοις, 715 C), but they owe their position in part to the amount of their property, the goodwill of their fellow-citizens, or the chances of the lot, and they will have to render a strict account of their conduct in office.

Virtue in this State will be something far other than the lame and one-sided asceticism of the Lacedaemonians; it

will be based on a fuller experience of life; it will be capable of dealing aright not only with pain but also with pleasure; it will 'draw from the fountains of pain and pleasure, where and when and as much as it ought'¹. The virtue expected of a citizen of this State will indeed be more complete than that expected of any class in the Republic, except the highest. Virtue, however, will not by itself suffice: morality must become religious; behind and above the laws glimpses must be caught of something still higher (715 E sqq.: 762 E); not (for most of the citizens, at all events) the Idea of Good, but Gods—Gods loving righteousness and hating iniquity. A belief in good gods is evidently held to be for men of the stamp of the citizens of the Laws a more potent motive for right action than respect for Law, or even virtue itself. Virtue must rise into reverence for the gods, if this State is to prosper; a reverence based not so much on what they give as on what they are—on their kinship to that which is best in their worshippers, for if these are, as they should be, measured and orderly (*μέτριοι*), God is 'the measure of all things' (*ἀπάντων μέτρον*) and measured and orderly himself (716 C).

God is conceived by Plato in the Laws, not as the Idea of Good, as elsewhere, for here the Ideas retire into the background, but in the more personal and popular form of 'Soul allied with Reason,' the source of all rational and orderly movement in earth and heaven, the source of correct opinion and right conduct in man, no less than of the ordered movement of the heavenly bodies—nay more, the source of existence in all things (897–899). We are far here from the anthropomorphic, material gods of the popular religion, even though their names are still used by Plato. The distance between man and God has increased²: man must walk humbly with the superhuman Power of which he is the chattel or even the plaything. Yet elsewhere, by a far

¹ 636 D (Prof. Jowett's Translation, 4. 157).

² See Prof. Lewis Campbell,

Introduction to Plato's Statesman, p. xli, in his edition of the Sophistes and Politicus.

closer approach to the popular view¹, Plato speaks of the State as comprehending Zeus and Athene as participants in its constitution (*κοινωνοὶ πολιτείας*, Laws 921 C), so that when a citizen defrauds an artisan of the payment due to him, he breaks asunder the links between the State and the gods, its mighty co-partners². So fully is every relation in this State made to rest on religion.

Ethics, Politics, and Theology seem in the Laws to find a common basis in the idea of 'limit,' from which the transition to the idea of 'the tempered,' in character and government, is easy: we find τὸ ὁμαλὸν καὶ ξύμμετρον contrasted with τὸ ἄκρατον (773 A: cp. 773 D). Religion not founded on virtue is worthless: the bad cannot fittingly approach God, even by prayer (716 D sq.). Little is said in the Laws of the immortality of the soul³; nor is the doctrine needed, for the State is to be pervaded with the conviction that virtue is happiness, and that external goods are as nothing in comparison with virtue. It is through the diffusion of this conviction throughout all the members of the State that Plato hopes to secure that unity of feeling, the secret of which the Republic had sought in devotion to noble rulers, saved by their communistic life from temptations to forget the public interest. Now that power is no longer placed in the hands of a few, it becomes essential that the whole body of citizens shall be animated by the saving belief that virtue is happiness.

To these leading principles the political organization of the State is adjusted. In the absence of semi-divine rulers, the law must rule; but this need not involve a coercive type of rule, such as that objected to timocratic States like the Lacedaemonian and Cretan in the Republic (548 B). Persuasion should be mistress in the State, as it is in

¹ Cp. Xen. Hell. 6. 3. 6, Διοσκόροις τοῖν ὑμετέροιον πολίταιν.

² 921 C, εἰάν . . . λύη μεγάλης κοινωνίας, νόμος ὁ βοηθῶν ἔστω τῇ τῆς πόλεως ξυνδίσμῳ μετὰ θεῶν.

³ It is referred to in 959 B, and

the value of the doctrine of metempsychosis for the prevention of voluntary offences is recognized in 870 D sq., where this doctrine is said to be taught by οἱ ἐν ταῖς τελευταῖς περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐσπουδακότες.

the Universe (Tim. 48 A : 68 E : see Grote, Plato 3. 249 n.). Like physicians whose patients are freemen, the State addresses the reason by advice and exhortation: when this has been done in vain, then, and not till then, it adds the threats and penalties with which it cannot altogether dispense (823 A : 859 A). It assumes a more human, more paternal attitude than that of mere blank command. It seeks to win an intelligent conformity from those whom it addresses. It endeavours to imitate the methods of the generous and prudent human rulers whose place it takes¹.

In our survey of the State, we must begin with its territory. This is to be so situated that the city at its centre shall be ten miles from the sea; it is to be sufficient in extent to maintain the citizens in a 'temperate,' perhaps really in a somewhat meagre fashion; it is to be rather hilly than level, and varied in produce, though devoid of ship-timber. Imports will therefore be few, and exports also, and the State will be predominantly agricultural. It will have no fleet to ruin its national character and its constitution. Its city will be grouped round a central market-place surrounded by temples, close to which will stand the dicasteries and houses of the magistrates, and will be unwallled, though in a strong position, except so far as the plan on which the houses are erected renders them equivalent to a fortification. The population of the State should

¹ 'When Turgot came into full power as the minister of Lewis XVI he introduced the method of prefacing his edicts by an elaborate statement of the reasons on which their policy rested' (J. Morley, *Critical Miscellanies*, second series, p. 206). Plato's idea that the State should make its voice heard in accents of persuasion, and should not leave this mode of influencing men to unauthorized persons, such as orators, dramatic poets, or even actors (817 C), was novel and weighty. The office of the preacher was

little familiar to antiquity, and dawned only gradually even on the Hebrews. Preaching through the Statute-book was not, however, destined for the world's adoption. The rise of a Church satisfied in some respects Plato's craving for a gentler and more ratiocinative influence than that of threats and penalties. We note that Plato, though he excludes Forensic Rhetoric from the State (Laws 937 D sqq.), allows the State itself to call Rhetoric to its aid.

perhaps, on the whole, be drawn not from one single stock and one single city, but from more sources than one. It will come from all Crete, and of other Hellenes, Peloponnesians will be the most welcome. We must remember that Plato is founding a colony in Crete, and that Crete had already received Peloponnesian colonists.

The citizens must be sufficiently numerous for self-defence and for rendering aid to neighbours unjustly attacked. The exact number fixed upon (5040) is chosen mainly for its ready divisibility.

The next thing is to secure them against extreme poverty. Each citizen will have a lot of land sufficient, and not more than sufficient, for the sober maintenance of himself and his household¹. This is to be indivisible, whether by sale, inheritance, or testation, and inalienable. The lot is to be left to, or inherited by, one son, whom the owner, if he has more sons than one, may select: the other son or sons are to be adopted by childless owners. Daughters are to be given in marriage without dowry. If there are no sons, but only daughters, the same principle of the indivisibility of the lot is to hold (924 E). Only in one extreme case (856 C sq.)—a case little likely to occur—is crime to involve the confiscation of the lot by the State. The lot will thus be a constant minimum on which the poorest citizen can count, though it will not be possible to mortgage it. Plato hopes that these arrangements will secure the State against pauperism—in this Aristotle does not agree with him, and with good reason (Pol. 2. 6. 1265 a 39 sqq.)—or else that the evil may be cured by further measures (740 D–E). Each citizen is intended to hold an equivalent

¹ In reality, however, when the son and heir has married, which he is obliged to do before he is 35, and has a wife and children of his own, the lot will have to maintain two households, that of the father and that of the son. This Plato sees himself (775 E sqq.), but he perhaps counts on the father being by this time re-

lieved of his daughters by marriage, and of any other son by adoption. There is, however, the further difficulty that moveable property being allowed to increase up to a limit of five times the amount of property held by the poorest citizen, the security for sobriety of life sought in a limitation of the size of the lot vanishes.

amount of land, and no one will be richer than another by more than a five-fold proportion; it would be too much to enforce an absolute equality of property. The increase of wealth, however, is discouraged by the enactment that the coinage is to have no value outside the State, and by the prohibition of loans on interest; also by the prohibition of trade and handicrafts to the citizen. Citizens are not to find their vocation in money-getting. Rich husbands are to marry wives from poor families (773 C-D). The cost of funerals is regulated (958 C sqq.).

Each of the lots of land consists of two portions, one of them near the city, the other at some distance from it (745 C sqq.), with a house on each portion. On these lots the citizens will reside, but the lots at a distance from the city will commonly be occupied by the married sons of the citizens and their families (775 E sqq.), and the citizens themselves will for the most part, it would seem, be resident on the lots near the city.

The 5040 citizens fall into 12 local tribes (760), each tribe being as far as possible on an equality with the rest in respect of the agricultural value of its territory, and the central city is also divided into twelve parts (745 B sqq.). Each tribe is to receive consecration as a division of the State (*τὴν διανομὴν θειῶσαι*, 771 C-D), by being connected with a special god or son of a god, whom it is to honour with sacrificial gatherings (771 D). The tribe will thus be a well-realized unity, especially as it is also to be a military unit (755 E). So again, the agronomi are to be tribal (760), and each tribe is to have a dicastery of its own for judging suits between private individuals, though there is to be an appeal from it to the select judges (768). In the State of the Laws, as at Athens, the tribe would be an important subdivision of the State. In the Republic we hear nothing of the tribe, any more than of the phratry: the abolition of the household appears to carry with it that of the tribe and phratry, so far at least as the two upper classes are concerned, and on the organization of the third class Plato dwells but little.

Still more important than the tribal division, however, would seem to be the division into property-classes, in which an Attic model is evidently followed. It is this division, which, as we shall see, enables Plato to throw power into the hands of the *élite* of the better-to-do citizens, though why he should prefer to trust the higher property-classes with power in a State where the richest man can only be five times as rich as the poorest, where all citizens are alike forbidden to engage in trading and industrial pursuits, and where both rich and poor receive the same education and live the same simple life, is by no means clear. Probably he thinks that the richer man will have enjoyed more leisure, and be less open to pecuniary temptation. If, however, he distrusts the qualifications of those included in the lower property-classes, why should not all the citizens in his State possess the higher amount of property? He is free in founding a State to give them as much as he thinks best¹, and the *raison d'être* of the two lower property-classes is not obvious. Aristotle perhaps is conscious of this: at all events, in his best State all the citizens are designed to possess that amount of property which is conducive to virtuous action, and to a temperate, though liberal, mode of life.

In the State of the Laws, as in that of the Republic, women are to follow the same pursuits as men—a noticeable fact, for it indicates that Plato held this change to stand on a different footing from the communistic innovations of the Republic and the absolute rule of philosophers, both of which he abandons in the Laws, and not to be beyond the reach of a society such as that which he is now founding. He claims, indeed, in so many words, that the example of the Sauromatae on the Pontus proves its practicability (805 C). His wish is to bring women out into the light of day (781 C), and prevent them dragging the men down to their own level; hence *γυναικονόμοι* are naturally absent in this State,

¹ Perhaps, however, Plato hardly feels that he is altogether free, for he calls to mind (744 B) that some

of the settlers in the new State must necessarily bring with them more property than others.

their function being to keep women at home (Pol. 6 (4). 15. 1300 a 4 sq.). Women are to render military service and to be eligible for office (785 B), though not quite under the same conditions as men. It is not, indeed, clear that Plato intends all offices to be accessible to them; he may be speaking in the passage just referred to only of offices appropriated to women, like the one mentioned in 784 A (cp. 795 D). Nor is it said whether they are to serve in the assembly and dicasteries. There would apparently be nothing to exclude a woman from positions of this kind, if she succeeded to one of the lots of land. Must a woman succeed to a lot, in order to become eligible for offices not appropriated to her sex? If so, the assimilation of the occupations of women and men in this State is confined within narrow bounds, for women would rarely succeed to a lot. If, on the other hand, women, or indeed men, are eligible for office without being holders of a lot, the number of citizens will overpass the limit of 5040. Plato's intention, however, apparently is that none but holders of a lot shall be accounted citizens, or be included in the four property-classes, the condition of eligibility for office. In fact, the political rights of men whose fathers were still living would be much limited, and as a man might marry as early as twenty-five years of age (or according to another passage, thirty), he might have a son who would be excluded from citizenship for the first forty or fifty years of his life. Aristotle, perhaps, has this difficulty in view, when he postpones the age of marriage for men to 37 (4 (7). 16. 1335 a 28), adding that the son will thus succeed at the commencement of his best years of life, and when the father is well stricken in years.

If we turn to the constitutional organization of the State, we shall find that it is evidently devised with the view of throwing power into the hands of the best of the men of mature age belonging to the higher property-classes.

There is to be a popular assembly, but it will have little power. Attendance at its meetings is to be enforced only on the two higher property-classes, unless it should be other-

wise ordered on any particular occasion (764 A). Its duties, however, are not mentioned, and they cannot have been numerous; it was to have a share in the trial of offences against the State (767 E sqq.), and a voice in the almost impossible contingency of a change in the laws becoming absolutely necessary (772 D). Whether questions of peace, war, and alliance are to come before it, we are not told: the review of the conduct of magistrates during their term of office, which Solon entrusted to the assembly, is reserved for the priests of Apollo¹; even the right of electing to the more important magistracies is withheld from it². Its powers, therefore, will be but limited.

A Boulê also exists, though this was an institution which savoured of democracy (Pol. 8 (6). 8. 1323 a 9), but we hear little of its functions as a whole³. Most of its members, we are told (758 B), will be at home for the greater part of the year, attending to their own concerns. Important powers, however, are given to the sections of the Boulê, twelve in number, which successively watch over the State for a month, the members of each section being termed Prytaneis, as at Athens, during their month of office (755 E: 766 B: 953 C). Each of these sections in turn acts as 'guardian' of the community, serves as a kind of General Secretariate, deals with any internal disturbances that may arise, and, as the presiding authority of the State, convenes and dissolves all assemblies (756-8: cp. Pol. 8 (6). 8. 1322 b 12 sqq.). In all this it acts in conjunction with the magistracies. The members of the Boulê are to hold office for a year, and to be elected out of all four property-classes in equal proportions by an intricate scheme (756) practically

¹ The powers of the 'whole city' in this matter are apparently confined to the election of three citizens not under fifty years of age, who are to nominate the priests of Apollo.

² It elects the Nomophylakes (πᾶσα ἡ πόλις, 753 C), but only out

of a list of 300 names submitted to it by those who are serving or have served in war as horse-soldiers or hoplites, or in other words, its better-to-do members.

³ Some of them are referred to in 768 A and 850 B.

securing to the higher property-classes the greater voice in the election.

Passing on to the magistracies of the State, and confining our attention to the most important of them, we find a distinction drawn between war and military affairs on the one hand and the general supervision of the State on the other, the former being made over to the three strategi, while the latter falls to the 37 Nomophylakes, who must be men of over 50 years of age and who hold office till they attain the age of 70, but not after. Their election is to take place in an especially deliberate and methodical manner. Three hundred names are selected, after full consideration, by those who are serving or have served in war among the hoplites or cavalry—the lowest property-class, at any rate, would probably thus be excluded from taking part in the election—and out of these names the whole city chooses first 100, and then 37. Their duties are very varied, but appear to consist, generally, in watching over the behaviour of all belonging to the State and enforcing the observance of the laws. The Nomophylakes of Plato do not seem altogether to resemble the magistracy of that name which Aristotle more than once mentions as occurring in oligarchical (6 (4). 14. 1298 b 27 sqq.), or rather aristocratic, States (8 (6). 8. 1323 a 6 sqq.), for this seems to have been a magistracy answering in aristocracies to Probouli in oligarchies and to the Boulê in democracies, and probably its business was to see that projects of law or resolutions proposed for adoption did not contravene the laws. The functions of Plato's Nomophylakes were far more varied and extensive.

The important subject of education is reserved for a single magistrate, the superintendent of education, who is to hold office for five years, but he again is to be elected out of the Nomophylakes. All the magistracies of the State, except the Boulê and the Prytaneis, are to assemble in the temple of Apollo, and to select one of the Nomophylakes, consequently a man over fifty, who must also be

the father of legitimate sons or daughters, if not of both (765-6). This officer, however, is not empowered to devise a scheme of education, but only to administer the scheme drawn up by the founder of the State, which is to be as little subject to change as the rest of his legislation (772 A-D).

The judicial machinery of the State was to be organized on somewhat more popular principles. It was to be different in respect of private suits and of offences against the State. As to the former, litigants were first to try the arbitration of friends and neighbours, next to have recourse to courts of the village or tribe (767-8, cp. 956 B sqq.), if dissatisfied with the finding of the arbitrators, and last of all, if still discontented, to come before a court of select judges, named by all the officers of the State out of their own number. This court was not to be numerous, but it was to be public and to be annually renewed. The trial of offences against the State, on the other hand, must be begun and concluded before the people, for here all are wronged and all will expect to have a voice in the decision (768 A); but the serious examination of the charge is to be conducted by three high magistrates, or magistracies (768 A), to be agreed on by the parties. All cases of sacrilege of a capital character, however, are reserved for a dicastery composed of the Nomophylakes and the select judges (855 C), and the same rule applies to attempts to change the constitution by force and to cases of treason (*προδοσία*: 856-7). The judicial organization of the State seems then to be placed on a slightly, but only slightly, more popular footing than its administrative organization.

Civil, military, and judicial functions are thus lodged in different hands, though the Nomophylakes combine to some extent legislative, judicial, and administrative competence; but over all the magistracies of the State rises as a supreme authority of review, with power to examine the conduct of magistrates at the close of their term of office and to award praise or blame, distinction or punishment, the great society

of the priests of Apollo, withdrawn a little from the turmoil of affairs by their residence in a temple-precinct, and themselves not exempt from review at the hands of the select judges. Plato holds (945 B sqq.) that those with whom the power of review is lodged must be better than the magistrates reviewed¹, and that a neglect to observe this rule, as he adds in a remarkable passage (945 D), involves the destruction of the only possible security for the harmonious co-operation of the various parts of the State with a view to a single end, breaks up the accord of the magistracies, and shatters the unity of the State, till it perishes through faction.

Last of all, in the concluding pages of the dialogue, the lawgiver establishes the Nocturnal Council², an union of the oldest Nomophylakes, the priests of Apollo, and the superintendent and ex-superintendents of education, together with the best of those travelling commissioners for the inspection of other communities, whom the State will accredit after assuring itself of their worth (951 D-E: 961 A). This body of elderly men, for no member of it will be under fifty, is to bring to its deliberations an equal number of younger men between thirty and forty years of age selected for their recognized excellence, who are, under

¹ Aristotle, on the contrary, thinks, as has already been noticed (above, p. 254 sqq.), that in certain cases at all events, there is much to be said for a popular reviewing authority (Pol. 3. 11. 1281 a 40 sqq.), and argues that the Many, though individually inferior to the Few Good, may be collectively superior to them.

² The idea that wisdom comes with night was one familiar to the Greeks: compare (e.g.) the utterance of Olbius recorded in Plutarch's Life of Themistocles, c. 26 (cp. Leutsch and Schneidewin, Paroemiogr. Gr. 2. p. 25):

νυκτὶ φωνήν, νυκτὶ βουλήν, νυκτὶ
τὴν νίκην δίδου,
and the saying, νυκτός δέ τοι ὄξυ-

τέρη φρήν, as well as Eurip. Heraclid. 959:

καὶ πόλλ' ἔτικτον νυκτὶ συνθακῶν
αἰεί.

Plato is also a foe to unduly prolonged slumbers: cp. Laws 807 E sqq., and the lines of Homer (Il. 2. 24-5), which were present to Plato's mind—

Οὐ χρὴ παννύχιον εὖδειν βουλευφό-
ρον ἄνδρα,
φ' λαοὶ τ' ἐπιτετράφαται καὶ τόσσα
μέμηλεν.

We learn indeed in the passage of the Laws to which reference has just been made, that not merely rulers, but ordinary citizens and mistresses of households should wake early and sleep little.

the guidance of the elder members of the council, to make laws their study (951 E sqq.), to be the 'eyes' of the council as the seniors are its 'mind,' and to inform it of all that happens in the State (964 E sqq.). The council will thus consist of two orders, corresponding in some degree to the 'guardians' and 'auxiliaries' of the Republic, and will be enabled to 'save the State' (965 A) by teaching it its true aim, virtue and reason (962 B: 963 A). Its members will need for this purpose to receive a more careful training than the rest of the citizens; they must learn to see 'the one in the many,' the common element in the various virtues—learn to understand the real nature of all that is good and beautiful, and, above all, to know the Gods, as far as is possible for men (965 C sqq.), much as in the Republic the 'perfect guardians' learnt to know the Idea of Good.

Here, and here alone, the philosophical spirit is encouraged to assert itself and find a home; here the ordinary education of the State finds its crown and completion in philosophical study, which is, however, reserved for a very few select minds and delayed till the age of thirty.

The whole scheme of the State and its education appears Remarks. to be designed with a view to secure a willing and intelligent submissiveness to the laws—a temperate, orderly, sensible habit of mind, neither too eager nor too slow and cautious (773 sqq.), based on a feeling for measure and correct artistic taste, and still more on correct views of the true sources of happiness and the nature of the gods, content to accept a limited authority, and to give their due to age, wealth, and virtue, while these social elements in their turn are foremost in acknowledging the supremacy of the laws. Not fear, but orderliness and reverence are the mainspring of the whole—reverence for the voice of the law, which is none other than the voice of the gods (762 E); reverence crowned with intelligence, which in a few select natures placed at the summit of the State must rise into philosophy.

In the Laws, as in the Republic, the aim of Plato is to

call upon the State to do more for its citizens than it had yet done, and to be more to them than it had yet been. Why should the State, which depends for its existence on virtue, be so indifferent to its production? Plato had before his eyes the moral and political anarchy of contemporary Greece, and knowing that the days of mere customary morality were gone for ever, he felt that some authority was needed to revive and make rational the sense of right and wrong, and that the only authority capable of effecting this was a reconstituted State. He was the first to insist on this, and the strength of his position lay in the fact that his view of the true function of the State was, as has been said already, that to which all the traditions of Greece pointed, that which was engrained in the Greek conscience. The Greek mind was especially ready to be swayed by the voice of the community for good or for evil. The individual Greek was in an exceptional degree 'the child of his people'—one thing at Sparta, another at Athens, another at Thebes. The example of the Lacedaemonian State showed how much the State could effect if it dared to assert its authority. The State must, however, be reconstituted. Plato's first impulse had been to hand it over to a few carefully trained men of high natural worth and capacity, but his next was to recoil from that bold step; he now sought to diffuse throughout the whole citizen-body respect for law, pure religion, and the conviction that virtue is happiness, and to call for the active co-operation of all in the working of the State. But his heart seems to have failed him from the first, and we find him in the *Laws* over and over again reserving effective authority for the best men of the wealthier class, and giving the poorer citizens only the semblance of a share in power—'reverting,' in fact, as Aristotle says, 'to his earlier constitution,' but in a less pure form.

Still the great conception of a State systematically training the whole of a large body of citizens to virtue—not, as in the *Republic*, confining its educational activity to two small classes—had been once for all clearly put forward.

The State was no longer to be perverted into a mere creature of party—toiling 'in Gaza at the mill with slaves'—or to be barbarised by absorption in aims of conquest and empire; it must be readjusted to its true function—that of producing virtue. Plato claims to have kept this aim before him in framing every institution of the State of the Laws (705 E). He called on the State to do that which Church and State together have in later days, even at their best moments, failed to achieve. Socrates had already set this aim before the State, but he had not seen that an entire reconstitution of the State was necessary, before there could be any hope of realizing it. We may hold that even Plato's reconstitution was not far-reaching enough, if only because he failed to hit on the conception of a Church working in harmony with the State; we may further hold that it went wholly wrong in detail; but the broad fact remains that he was the first, if not to see that society ought to do much more than it did for the moral guidance of the individual, at all events to demand its reconstruction for that end.

The dialogue forms an epoch in Political Science in another way. It puts forward with more emphasis and more systematically than had ever been done before the conception of mixed government, which, familiar as it was already to Thucydides (6. 39: 8. 97), and possibly to Hippodamus of Miletus, or even to Solon, did not gain till the fourth century before Christ the accredited position in political speculation which it has never since entirely lost. Its increased prominence at this epoch was probably due in part to the prestige enjoyed by the Lacedaemonian State for a while after its triumph in the Peloponnesian War. Some recognized in the 'mixture of all constitutions,' which they traced in the Lacedaemonian constitution (Laws 712 D-E: Aristot. Pol. 2. 6. 1265 b 33 sqq.), the best type of mixed government. Plato, on the contrary, depicted a wholly different form of it in the Laws, where we look in vain for parallels to the Lacedaemonian kingship, ephorate, and senate: it would seem, there-

fore, that he did not hold with this view. There is, however, rather the appearance than the reality of mixed government in the *Laws*: what Plato has here at heart, is rather that the government of his State shall be sober, than that it shall be mixed; he allows a share of power to wealth and numbers, not because the State is the gainer by this, but because the opposite course is unsafe. The share of power allowed to numbers is, in fact, as we have seen, little more than nominal, and Aristotle's censure (*Pol.* 6 (4). 12. 1297 a 7 sqq.) of those who, in founding aristocracies or other constitutions, resorted to ingenious devices (*σοφίσματα*) to deceive the demos, was perhaps intended to apply to the constitution of the *Laws* amongst others. Supreme authority would here in reality rest with a small number of men over fifty years of age belonging to the higher property-classes. Plato never completely abandoned the view that in the normal State the rank and file of the citizens are to be taken in charge by the few. This view recurs in a softened form even in the *Laws*.

The life of the mass of the citizens could hardly be of a very attractive or active type, whatever Plato may say to the contrary (807 sqq.). The more important State-business would be managed for them by those few of the men over fifty years of age who would succeed to the great offices, and though it must be admitted that some considerable positions would be open to men below this age, they would commonly find their way to members of the higher property-classes, and being in many cases held for long terms, only to a few of these. The mass of the citizens would thus be relegated to private life, not indeed to what Aristotle calls 'necessary work,' but to the supervision of their households, if households can be said to exist where the women are required to take their meals at public meal-tables, and where the education of the children is entrusted to public officers; in reality, to the supervision of their slaves and their farms¹, on which, however, they are

¹ In the careful provision of a lot of land for every citizen we are conscious of some departure from the central dogma that virtue is

not apparently intended (806 D-E) to work with their own hands, to the celebration of festivals, the discharge of military service, the observance of the numerous laws of the State, and the maintenance of the tone of feeling prescribed by the legislator. The studies in which they are trained in youth (and these do not include any philosophy, or more of Greek literature than a small, though carefully selected, fragment) do not appear to be continued in their maturer years: forensic rhetoric is excluded from the State: little, if any, place seems to be found in their lives for literature or for any fine art, save that of music: only a few, after the age of thirty, become possessed of any philosophical knowledge, and these learn what they learn rather for purposes of government than for the sake of the subject itself. There appears to be no provision even for advanced mathematical study.

Aristotle's principle, on the contrary, is—we recognize the best State by its life. Do its citizens live a life which calls forth all that is best in their nature, gives full play to their noblest faculties, and satisfies their highest aims, and are the rest organized so as to aid them in living that life, each doing work adjusted to his capacity? Does everyone find himself 'in his element,' the whole society culminating in a body of *σπουδαῖοι* equipped to live, and helping each other in living, a life of political and speculative activity? The State of the Laws can hardly be said to answer to this aspiring ideal; its dominant characteristic is rather a religious *σωφροσύνη*.

Aristotle could scarcely rest satisfied with a State of this kind, especially when put forward as the best attainable by a community of *men*, unaided by divine or semi-divine fellow-citizens. To him it seemed neither the one thing nor the other—neither practicable nor ideal. Philosophy, he thought, could do better than this for Greek politics, and

sufficient for happiness, which is to be the most cherished article in the creed of every citizen of the State. If a certain amount of

property is so essential, then happiness would seem to depend in part on *χορηγία* in Plato's view no less than in that of Aristotle.

its last word must not be taken to have been spoken by Plato. Two States, at least, needed to take the place of the State of the Laws, if the Republic were indeed out of the question; one, a more ideal—the other, a more practicable State. The first is that which is incompletely sketched in the Fourth and Fifth Books of the *Politics*; the other is the constitution which rests on the moderately well-to-do class (*ἡ διὰ τῶν μέσων πολιτεία*¹).

Looking back, we see how much the study of *Politics* in Greece had gained from the increased earnestness of ethical inquiry.

If we glance back over the history of political inquiry in Greece, we shall see that but little progress was made till its relation to Ethics was brought out by the discussions which followed the advent of the sophists. It was then found that Ethics and *Politics* were closely connected. The new ethical views led to new views as to the State, and the effort to combat them threw fresh light not only on the nature of right, but also on that of the State. If natural right is the will of the stronger, then every form of the State which has Force on its side is legitimate: Tyranny is legitimate, and right may vary from State to State, or in the same State from year to year. The State may assume any form which the element for the moment strongest within it may choose to give it. If, again, natural right rests, not on Force, but on the general consent of mankind, then how little in the arrangements of society can claim to be naturally just. The case becomes worse, if natural right does not exist at all, and the just is based on nothing but convention.

The future of human society seemed to depend on the possibility of finding a firm and satisfactory basis for natural right. Socrates had in effect said that natural right is that which experience proves to redound to the advantage of the man who conforms to it in practice; but Plato was not satisfied till he had exhibited it as the source of health, unity, and happiness, not only in the soul of the individual,

¹ The Polity was, in fact, the type of constitution which, in Aristotle's view, Plato sought to realize in

the Laws, though not with much success (*Pol.* 2. 6. 1265 b 26 sq.).

but also in the normally constituted State. He was led into the field of Politics by his desire to restore the authority of right. Right is best studied in the ideal State of which it is the life-breath, just as a leaf is best studied in connexion with the tree on which it grows. The study of Ethics leads on to the study of Politics. We see best what justice is when we see it at work, and especially when we see it at work in the State. And if the study of the State reveals to us what justice is, it also reveals to us how virtue is brought into being. Plato is more alive than any one before him to the extent to which the individual is 'the child of his people.' It is only in a well-constituted State that even the best-endowed natures can grow up aright¹.

We need not wonder that to Plato the study of Politics stands in the closest relation to the study of Ethics, that he seems to consider no State worthy of close scrutiny which does not embody justice and make men good, and that his attitude to defective States is one of far less qualified antagonism than that of Aristotle. We see that he began the study of Politics with an ethical aim—the aim of rescuing justice and right from those who denied them a basis in nature.

Plato entered on the study of Politics with an ethical aim.

To Plato in the Republic the construction of the ideal State is more or less an episode in an ethical inquiry, and no time is lost over it. Armed with the one doctrine of the specialization of functions, and perhaps, though he traces the structure of the State before he proceeds to trace that of the soul, influenced in some degree by the psychological parallel, Plato feels himself able to proceed rapidly with his sketch of the true State. If we contrast Aristotle's procedure in the First and Third Books of the Politics, we shall see how much slower and more tentative it is. He begins with the simplest elements of the household and State, and inquires patiently into the nature of the *δεσποτικός*, the *χρηματιστικός*, and the *οικονομικός*, distinguishing the one

¹ Yet in the Laws (951 B), with characteristic elasticity, he says that 'divine men' are to be found as often in ill-ordered as in well-ordered States.

from the other, and then into the nature of the citizen, long before he attempts to determine the true structure of the State. In these investigations he never loses sight of current opinion and likes to find in it a dim forecast of the truth. Plato, on the contrary, starting from the fact that in actual societies justice was not to be found, naturally builds up a State in strong contrast to all existing States, for his State must be one in which justice may readily be detected and identified. The ideal State is not perhaps even to Plato simply the antithesis of the actual State, for one or two actual States had gone some way on the road to its realization. But his breach with the past is far more conspicuous than Aristotle's. Even where, as among the Lacedaemonians, some vestiges of the true State are discernible, the true ruling principle had not been called to power, the more civilizing influences of life were excluded, and the welfare of the State was forgotten in the pursuit of private ends. His attitude to the existing order of things was natural enough. Here was an 'impatient soul' whose personal experience had been bitter even in youth. Far as all personal reference recedes into the background in the best Greek literature of the best age, a few stray hints reveal to us even in the *Republic*, how deep an impression the fate of Socrates had made upon Plato's mind¹. Society in its actual form either corrupted the best men, or if it could not do so, deprived them of life. The fate of individual and State in his day was one and the same. In both, the lower elements triumphed over the higher, with the inevitable result of internal disunion and unhappiness. Indeed, the higher elements could hardly be said to exist, and the great problem was how to bring them into being. The State must be so organized as to develop within it a class of true philosophers, and this class must be placed in possession of absolute power. Reason must recover its supremacy both in the State and in the heart of the individual. In most great movements of reform the man to

¹ See (e. g.) *Rep.* 488 B : 361 B sq. : 409 C-D : 492 D.

whom 'all things here are out of joint' comes first, and some little time elapses before it is discovered that things have not gone as far astray as had been thought, that the new ideal has its roots in the past, and is that which 'prophets and kings desired to see.' The new teaching has to assume a militant and aggressive, perhaps even a fantastic and exaggerated, form before it gets a first hearing. The influence of Socrates and Plato might have been less, if the life of the one and the doctrines of the other had been less novel and striking.

But Plato, as we have seen, did not always maintain this uncompromising attitude. In the later days of his life, he came to see that his recoil from the actual State and his sense of homelessness in it had carried him too far, and had led him to trust his ideal rulers with powers which only semi-divine personages could be expected to use aright. Nor was he content with merely re-issuing the Republic with this amendment: he now sought not only to show men the genuine face of Justice, but to meet actual States half-way, and to set before them a model less difficult of imitation than the ideal State of the Republic. The impatient idealism of his earlier days had passed into a wish to be of use to his race in its difficulties. It was in this spirit that he wrote the Laws, and was prepared to carry compromise still further and to frame a 'third State,' but he seems never to have done so, and too much of the ideal spirit of the Republic survived, so Aristotle thought, in the Laws.

Plato had done much, but he had also left much for a successor to do in the field of political inquiry. The philosophical basis of his teaching on this subject needed to be made clearer and to be more systematically set forth; it needed to be reconsidered and amended; his conception of the State, its end and true organization, also needed to be revised. He was right, Aristotle thought, in seeking to make the State more to the individual than it had yet been. He was right in holding that the State should be a city-State and small—a common life as well as a common

Plato had done much for Political Science, but had also left much for a successor to do.

government. He was right in investing Political Science with supreme authority over the life of the individual and the arts and sciences dependent on it, and requiring it to rise to the level of the great position thus assigned to it. Above all, he was right in ascribing to Political Science (1) an ethical aim; (2) a practical purpose, and yet an ideal method. Whatever else it did, Political Science was bound to construct an ideal State. That it needed to do something further—to make itself useful to men by tracing the outline of a State easily workable by men—Plato had already implied. But he was as one who after setting out for a destination stops halfway on the road to it, for even the Laws gave little practical help to statesmen struggling with the problems and difficulties of Greek politics. Plato's political teaching required not only to be restated and amended, but also to be completed.

Something
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of investi-
gation.

Success in this enterprise was hardly possible without a new method. The political inquirer must begin at the beginning with the simplest elements of society and work methodically upwards, not ignoring current opinion or practice, but correcting its confusions with the aid of a distinct conception of the end of human life and of the State; he must make clear to himself and others the principles on which he proceeds; he must study the physiology and pathology of Society, the occasions and the profound causes of social change; he must master the technical side of Political Science, and be prepared to deal practically with the concrete problems of political organization as they present themselves every day—to construct an oligarchy, or a democracy, or a tyranny, so as to be as little hostile as possible to human wellbeing. His treatment of political questions must be more patient and detailed, must rest on a wider knowledge of the past, must be more reasoned and systematic. And if the deepest thoughts and highest aspirations of the political inquirer would still find utterance in the portraiture of a 'best State,' this best State will no longer be seriously proposed for adoption everywhere; it

will be a State *κατ' εὐχὴν*¹—an ideal representation of the acme of human society, realizable only when Nature and Fortune are in their most favourable mood. Neither its portraiture nor the portraiture of two or three less high-pitched ideals will exhaust the problem of Political Science: the political inquirer must pass on to grapple with the task of ameliorating actual institutions and making them tolerable.

Something was to be gained by a mere change of the form in which many members of the Socratic school had placed their ideas before the world². It was natural enough that the disciples of a converser should set forth their teaching in dialogues, and also that at Athens, where the dramatic spirit was so strong, philosophical literature should assume a dramatic form. Thucydides had already put his best thoughts in the mouth of some statesman or other. It was inevitable, however, that the two aims—the quest of truth and the quest of literary charm—should come more or less into collision. The language used in a dialogue must appeal to the reading world at large; it must be as little technical as possible, it must avoid the appearance of over-precision and pedantry. The course of the inquiry needs to be accommodated to the characters, and its depth will vary with their calibre. The toil of the way should be relieved by wit, sarcasm, irony, eloquence, conversational charm. Bright, genial remark, even if paradoxical (e.g. 'no man can be perfectly secure against wrong, unless he has become perfectly good'—Laws 829 A), or inconsistent with the general tenour of the views expressed (e.g. 'man is made to be the plaything of

¹ As to the meaning of this phrase, see the Theages ascribed to Plato 125 E–126 A, *εὐχάϊμην μὲν ἄν, οἶμαι, ἔγωγε τύραννος γενέσθαι μάλιστα μὲν πάντων ἀνθρώπων, εἰ δὲ μὴ, ὥς πλείστων . . . ἔτι δὲ γε ἴσως μᾶλλον θεὸς γενέσθαι· ἀλλ' οὐ τοῦτου ἔλεγον ἐπιθυμεῖν*. Aristotle, however, excludes aspirations for the impossible (Pol. 2. 6. 1265 a 17).

² See Heitz, *Die verlorenen Schriften des Aristoteles*, p. 141–5. Is it not probable that after Plato opened a school, one of his aims in writing dialogues was to show his pupils how discussion should be conducted? Xenophon (Mem. 4. 6. 1) is careful to describe, how Socrates *διαλεκτικωτέρους ἐποίει τοὺς συνόντας*.

God, and this is the best of him'—*Laws* 803 C), is always welcome. Long deliberative, half-baffled pauses have to be cut short. The investigation of historical fact, even a careful regard for historical truth, seems out of place in a gathering of friends. Like his kinsman the dramatist, the dialogue-writer makes use of myths, and if he uses history also, he will be apt to treat the latter with the same genial freedom as the former. Each dialogue, again, claims to be complete in itself. Each is too perfect an artistic whole to serve as a mere chapter in a statement of philosophical doctrine. In each there must be something fresh in the line of attack. Hence inconsistencies, which increase in number, if, as in Plato's case, the dialogues are written at intervals during the course of a long life. They naturally conflict with each other. Occasionally consistency is not maintained even within the limits of a single dialogue¹.

Thus the interpretation of Plato's meaning comes to demand a genius almost as subtle and sympathetic as his own. It is hard to distinguish how far an utterance reflects only the momentary mood of a speaker, or the attitude he chooses to adopt towards a given opponent, or the sentiment suggested by the dramatic situation. Plato had as it were imprisoned his philosophy in some beautiful semi-transparent material²; his revelation of it was tantalizingly incomplete. The greater its value, the greater the call for some intervention which would bring it forth into the full light of day. Plato, indeed, had taken some steps in this direction himself. In his later dialogues, whether from a decline of dramatic feeling or an increase of interest in positive doctrine, the conversation tends more and more to become a monologue; the Socratic aim of arousing thought is more and more lost sight of in the effort to communicate truth. Still the decisive step is not yet taken; the dialogue-form is not

¹ See Prof. Jowett's *Plato* 4.169* (ed. 1): 'so little power has Plato of harmonizing the results of his dialectics, or even of avoiding the most obvious contradictions.'

² As the sculptor Pauson (or Pason) had enclosed a figure of Hermes in a pellucid stone: cp. *Aristot. Metaph.* Θ. 8. 1050 a 19, and Bonitz' note.

abandoned. Even Aristotle wrote many dialogues, though he made the important change of reserving the part of chief interlocutor for himself. But much of his work was of a kind to which the dialogue was inapplicable. It was hardly possible, for instance, to state the results of his zoological investigations in a dialogue, and it was probably not merely in the interest of his pupils, or merely in works intended for their perusal, that he abandoned the Socratic manner of treatment. Nor was he apparently alone in so doing. In the *Academics* of Cicero (*Cic. Acad. Post.* i. 4. 17 sq.), we find the Academical speaker 'designating the dogmatic formulation of the system as a departure from the Socratic manner common to Aristotle and the contemporary Platonists' (Zeller, *Plato E. T.*, p. 565. 25).

It was a fortunate circumstance that Plato's philosophical inheritance passed to a successor sufficiently at one with him to maintain the continuity of speculation, and sufficiently independent to give a fresh impulse and direction to inquiry.

Plato's successor,
Aristotle.

We do not know the length of the interval which elapsed between the composition of the *Laws* and that of the *Politics*. We do not indeed know that all parts of the *Politics* were composed at or about the same time. The Fourth and Fifth Books may be severed by some interval of time from the first three, and the remaining three books may be later than the Fourth and Fifth, or again the book on Constitutional Changes may be earlier than the two books which immediately precede and follow it, as early perhaps as any book in the whole work. We cannot, indeed, always be certain that the contents of any one book (apart from any possible interpolations) date as a whole from the same epoch.

But whatever we conceive the length of the interval to have been, much had happened in the course of it. The career of Philip of Macedon was needed to make the failure of the free States of Greece quite manifest. It was not till 346 B. C. that Isocrates wrote his oration to Philip, in which

the full tale of Greek failure and disunion is told¹, and Plato died in 347 B.C. But the main change was in the man, not in the times.

Aristotle was so far in a better position than Plato to speak to Greece as a whole, that he was less closely connected with any one place in it. Plato was an Athenian of long descent: Aristotle was one of those who had been saved for philosophy by belonging to a small State; indeed, his city for some time lay in ruins, so that he was then, in the most literal sense, *ἀπολις διὰ τύχην*. He was not, like Plato, the citizen of an extreme democracy; he can hardly be said to have been a citizen at all, or to have lived the life of a citizen; he had not the passions of a citizen. He judges the Athenian democracy *ab extra*, unlike Thucydides, who had learnt its strength and weakness by living under it and taking part in its working. He was forty years at least younger than Plato, and belonged to a time when philosophy was coming to be more to men and politics less. He was not, like Plato, the first explorer of the field of Political Science, and had not the impatient, sweeping views of a first explorer. He was also naturally calmer and more circumspect than Plato, and came to the study of politics fresh from less exciting studies—studies which had trained him to accumulate facts and to weigh them patiently.

Sketch of
Aristotle's
life.

It seems a mistake to speak of Aristotle as a 'half-Greek.' Some great Greeks were so, but Aristotle was not. His father was a member of the long-descended *gens* of the Asclepiadae, and belonged to the Andrian colony of Stageira; his mother was of Chalcidian origin. His early life is involved in a good deal of obscurity, but whether he came to Athens and became Plato's pupil at the age of seventeen or later, he had been his pupil for a considerable time when Plato died in the year 347 B.C., and the days he thus spent at Athens no doubt left a permanent impress on his mind and character². On Plato's death Speusippus his

¹ Cp. Isocr. Philip. § 40, *οἶδα γὰρ ἀπάσας (τὰς πόλεις) ὁμαλισμένας ὑπὸ τῶν συμφορῶν*.

² Aristotle's early dialogue entitled *Eudemus* appears to have stood in a very close relation to

nephew succeeded to his school, and Aristotle quitted Athens with his friend Xenocrates, an attached disciple of Plato. Probably neither of them wished either to work under Speusippus or to open a rival school. Speusippus was considerably senior to both, besides being Plato's nephew. That Aristotle did not leave Athens in any spirit of antagonism to Plato seems proved by the fact that Xenocrates accompanied him. On leaving Athens he went not to Macedon¹, but to Atarneus, drawn thither by his old friendship for Hermias, and perhaps also by the connexion of Proxenus, the guardian of his youth, with the place. His pupil Theophrastus also belonged to Eresus in the neighbouring island of Lesbos. Hermias had been the pupil both of Plato and Aristotle at Athens, and hence both Aristotle and Xenocrates would be interested in him. He was engaged in an attempt to form a principality at the expense of Persia in this district, which afterwards became the centre of the kingdom of Pergamon. It is probable that he was an instrument of Philip of Macedon². Hermias had been a slave and was an eunuch and a tyrant, and the friendship of these philosophers for him was undoubtedly an offence to Greek prejudice. We need not attach too much importance to the well-known epigram of Theocritus of Chios³. Theocritus was a bitter democratic epigrammatist, and a fit foe for the bitter historian Theopompus, his contemporary and fellow-citizen: both made themselves intolerable to those with whom they had to do, and came to

the Phædo, and to have been highly Platonic both in form and contents (see Zeller, *Gr. Ph.* 2. 2. 59. 1).

¹ Stageira had been razed by Philip in the course of the Olynthian War, and was still in ruins.

² See Boeckh, *Hermias von Atarneus*, p. 143, who refers to [Demosth.] *Philipp.* 4. p. 139 *sub fin.*, a passage which a highly probable emendation in Ulpian 42 C connects with Hermias.

³ Ἐρμίῳ εὐνούχῳ τε καὶ Εὐβούλου τὸδε δούλου

μῆμα κενὸν κενόφρων θῆκεν
Ἀριστοτέλης
ὃς διὰ τὴν ἀκρατῇ γαστρίᾳ φύσιν
εἴλετο ναίειν
ἀντ' Ἀκαδημίας Βορβόρου ἐν
προχοαῖς (Euseb. *Praep.*
Evang. 15. 2).

According to Plutarch, the river at Pella was called Βόρβορος (de Exil. c. 10). Cp. Plato, *Rep.* 533 D, ἐν βορβόρῳ βαρβαρικῶ τινι τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ὄμμα κατορυγμένον ἢ ρέμα ἔλκει καὶ ἀνάγει ἄνω.

evil ends. A familiar distich of Sophocles, however, ran (Fr. 788 Nauck)—

Ὅστις γὰρ ὡς τύραννον ἐμπορεύεται,
κείνου ὅστι δούλος, κἂν ἐλεύθερος μύλῃ,

and we must remember that Socrates was said to have refused to visit Archelaus of Macedon, Scopas of Crannon, and Eurylochus of Larissa (Diog. Laert. 2. 25), that Euripides and Aristippus had not gained in repute by adopting a different course, and that the service of princes came to escape condemnation only in the Alexandrian period¹. The father of Aristotle, however, had been in the service of a king, and we need not wonder that Aristotle himself took a different view. We know from the Politics how he regarded the kind of slavery which is not by nature, and Hermias cannot have deserved to be a slave. Even Tyranny in his opinion had its better forms, and Hermias apparently ruled in conjunction with a group of friends: *Ἑρμίας καὶ οἱ ἑταῖροι* is the term employed throughout his treaty with the Erythraeans². We are reminded of the passage in the Politics (7 (5). II. 1313 b 29 sqq.), where Kingship is said to find safety in friends, while distrust of friends is characteristic of Tyranny.

Aristotle remained with Hermias for three years³, perhaps till the latter met his fate through Persian treachery⁴, and he seems to have felt a real enthusiasm for his character and career. We know from the Nicomachean Ethics that Aristotle combined a high estimate of the contemplative life with a high estimate of the pleasures of true friendship, and a noble conception of it. It was partly because the household relations are forms of friendship, that he argued so stoutly in defence of the household. His hymn, or

¹ Zeller, *Stoics Epicureans and Sceptics*, p. 269 n. Plutarch discusses the question in his *Philosopho esse cum principibus viris colloquendum*, and argues strongly in favour of bringing the philosopher and ruler into contact, as a disciple of Plato was likely to do.

² Boeckh, *ibid.* p. 151. See the treaty in Dittenberger, *Sylloge Inscr. Gr.* 1. p. 167.

³ Apollodorus ap. Diog. Laert. 3. 9.

⁴ So Strabo, p. 610, but see Boeckh, *Hermias* p. 142 sqq. and Zeller, *Gr. Ph.* 2. 2. 20.

scolion, to Virtue gave rise to comment, for, as Grote remarks (Aristotle i. 19), it introduced the name and exploits of Hermias, the tyrant, eunuch, and ex-slave, 'as the closing parallel and example in a list beginning with Herakles, the Dioskuri, Achilles, and Ajax.' It was untruly made out to be a paean to Hermias (Athen. Deipn. 696 a-b), and on this ground as well as on that of a sumptuous offering after his death, Aristotle was subsequently accused of paying him divine honours¹. The whole episode is interesting for the light which it casts on Aristotle's character. We see that the cool, circumspect, methodical philosopher was capable of enthusiastic devotion to his friends, and cared little whether his display of it brought him into conflict with ordinary Greek prejudice. We seem to discern in his nature a mixture of affectionateness and combativeness which is not unpleasing. Traces of a certain eagerness of spirit and pugnacity perhaps survive in his literary style. Sometimes we notice in his writings that one thought follows another so rapidly that the two, as it were, collide, and the strict grammatical construction suffers shipwreck. He is also fond of tacitly contradicting certain persons—Plato, for instance, and Isocrates. The feud we hear of between him and the latter must belong to his earlier period of Athenian residence, which ended with the death of Plato, for Isocrates was dead when he returned to Athens after Chaeroneia.

¹ Cp. Lucian, Eunuch. 9, *εἰς ὑπερβολὴν θαυμάσας* (δ' Ἀριστοτέλης) Ἑρμίαν τὸν εὐνούχον τὸν ἐκ τοῦ Ἀταρνέως τύραννον, ἄχρι τοῦ καὶ θύειν αὐτῷ κατὰ ταῦτα τοῖς θεοῖς. We learn from Diogenes (Diog. Laert. 5. 4: cp. Euseb. Praep. Evang. 15. 2. 5) that comments were also made on a similarly sumptuous sacrifice of Aristotle's in honour of his wife Pythias after her death—*ἔθνευ ὑπερχαίρων τῷ γυναικί, ὡς Ἀθηναῖοι τῇ Ἐλευσινίᾳ Δήμητρι*: see Boeckh, Hermias p. 147, who refers to these passages. The same feeling appears, though

in this case there was better ground for it, in the diatribe of Theopompus against Harpalus in his letter to Alexander (Theopomp. Fragm. 277: Müller, Hist. Gr. Fr. i. 325), and in the caution of Plato, Rep. 540 B, *μνημεῖα δ' αὐτοῖς* (his philosophic rulers) *καὶ θυσίας τὴν πόλιν δημοσίᾳ ποιεῖν, ἐὰν καὶ ἡ Πυθία ξυναναιρῇ, ὡς δαίμοσιν*· εἰ δὲ μή, ὡς εὐδαιμοσί τε καὶ θεῖοις. Compare also Duris ap. Plutarch. Lysandr. c. 18, (Λυσάνδρῳ) *πρώτῳ . . . Ἑλλήνων βωμοὺς αἱ πόλεις ἀνέστησαν ὡς θεῶ καὶ θυσίας ἔθυσαν*· εἰς πρῶτον δὲ παῖνες ἤσθησαν.

The death of Hermias left his niece and adopted daughter without a protector, and Aristotle married her, partly out of attachment to his memory, partly for her worth and unmerited misfortunes¹. He may have already left Hermias before he experienced this severely felt blow at the hands of Persia—a blow soon to be far more than repaid by his great pupil; at any rate we next hear of him at Mytilene; but in 343 or 342 B.C. he was summoned to Macedon to become the teacher of Alexander.

Philip of Macedon had perhaps come in contact with Pythagoreanism in the days when he resided as a youth at Thebes; Isocrates credits him with some tincture of philosophy²; and he is said to have owed to Plato's intervention in his favour with Perdiccas the principality, his possession of which at the critical moment enabled him to win the throne of Macedon³. Aristotle had probably already resided at Pella in his boyhood, for his father Nicomachus had lived at the court of Amyntas as his physician and friend. He may have already written several of his dialogues, and become known as a diligent reader and book-collector, habits rare even among philosophers at that time. But his selection as Alexander's teacher was probably rather due to his hereditary connexion with the Macedonian court, to his being not only a philosopher but also a student of rhetoric⁴, and, above all, to the fact that he possessed a full measure of Athenian culture without being an Athenian or alien to court-life. It is creditable to Philip that he selected for the work a man

¹ Strabo, p. 610: Aristocles ap. Euseb. Praep. Evang. 15. 2. 8-10, who however speaks of her as the sister and adopted daughter of Hermias.

² Philip. § 29.

³ Speusippus ap. Athen. Deipn. 506 e. See also Diog. Laert. 3. 40: A. Schäfer, Demosthenes 2. 37.

⁴ Cp. Cic. de Orat. 3. 35. 141: rerum cognitionem cum orationis exercitatione coniunxit. Neque vero hoc fugit sapien-

tissimum regem Philippum, qui hunc Alexandro filio doctorem accierit, a quo eodem ille et agendi acciperet praecepta et eloquendi. 'During the first sojourn of Aristotle in Athens, while he was still attached to and receiving instruction from Plato, he appears to have devoted himself more to rhetoric than to philosophy, and even to have given public lessons or lectures on rhetoric' (Grote, Aristotle 1. 32).

likely to be able to hold a comparatively independent position. The years that Aristotle had spent at Athens were a guarantee that he would be no mere echo of Macedonian feeling. His extraction and career might seem to mark him out as a link between Macedon and Hellenism. For three years, but only three, commencing when Alexander was about 13 years of age, he had an unbroken time for the education of his pupil. On attaining the age of 16, Alexander began to be employed in affairs of State, which can have left Aristotle only occasional opportunities of supervision.

It is hard to imagine him a resident at Pella during these years, if Philip's court was what Theopompus describes it, and if Philip was as hostile to men of orderly behaviour as Theopompus asserts¹. The descriptions of this historian—an outspoken witness, but one not on the whole unfriendly to Philip—lend some point to the surprise of Theocritus of Chios, that Aristotle should have been willing to exchange the Platonic Academy for Pella. A sacred precinct of the Nymphs (*νυμφαῖον*) existed at Mieza (a Macedonian city, which Zeller (Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 27. 4) follows Geier in placing in Emathia south-west of Pella), where even in Plutarch's days men pointed out stone seats and shady walks which were believed to have been at one time used by Aristotle (Plutarch, Alex. c. 7); and Plutarch seems to suppose that Alexander received his instruction here. Aristotle appears during his stay in the North to have induced Philip² to refound Stageira and to restore to it the remnant of its citizens, and we may be sure that he watched with intense interest the culmination of the king's fortunes at Chaeroneia. The death of Philip and accession of Alexander two years later (336 B.C.), together with the preparations for the Oriental campaign, would indicate to him that no reason existed any longer for his stay in Macedon, from which Alexander seemed likely to be absent some time. He may perhaps have preferred the milder climate of the South³. The

¹ See Theopomp. Fragm. 136, 178, 249, 298.

² See Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 25. 3.

³ It is thus that Blakesley

destruction of Thebes in 335 B.C. made Alexander's Asiatic expedition possible without imprudence¹, and was the most effective warning that could have been given to Athens and the rest of Greece. It now became possible for Aristotle to settle at Athens.

He wished to be at Athens, mainly, no doubt, because his philosophical views could not be effectually placed before the world in any other way. Xenocrates had now succeeded Speusippus at the Academy. Aristotle had been unwilling to found a rival school when Plato's death was still recent, and in competition with his senior Speusippus, the nephew of Plato. He does not seem to have felt the same reluctance in reference to Xenocrates. His divergence from Platonism may have increased in the interval. The Macedonian leaders were probably glad that he should be there. Antipater, who knew that Aristotle 'added to his other gifts that of persuasiveness²,' may well have been glad to send to Athens a man so capable of leading the best minds into peaceful paths. The *mot d'ordre* of the Macedonian party at Athens was 'peace³,' and a philosopher who taught that the end for which the State, no less than the individual, exists is to live nobly, finding happiness rather in the arts of peace than in those of war, that a State may be great

(Life of Aristotle p. 58), interprets 'the expression of Aristotle cited by Demetrius, de Elocutione, sec. 29, 155: *ἐγὼ ἐκ μὲν Ἀθηνῶν εἰς Στάγειρα ἦλθον διὰ τὸν βασιλέα τὸν μέγαν, ἐκ δὲ Σταγείρων εἰς Ἀθήνας διὰ τὸν χειμῶνα τὸν μέγαν.*' But, supposing that the fragment is authentic, the phrase *ὁ μέγας χειμῶν* may here simply mean 'the great storm,' as in Plato, *Protag.* 344 D, or again, if it means 'the great winter,' it may be used, as in *Aristot. Meteor.* I. 14. 352 a 31 (see *Ideler ad loc.*) in the technical sense of the winter of the 'great year,' in which the sun, moon, and planets assume a certain relative position in the heavens—a winter attended with torrents of rain. A 'great winter'

in this technical sense did probably occur in 342 B.C. (see Appendix G), but it is not easy to connect it with Aristotle's return to Athens seven years later.

¹ Alexander gained by terror that freedom to act in Asia which Isocrates thought could only be gained by winning the goodwill of Greece (*Philip.* §§ 86–8).

² Plutarch, *Alcibi. et Coriol. comparatio* c. 3.

³ See Bernays, *Phokion* p. 68, who refers to *Demosth. de Cor.* § 89, *τῆς νῦν εἰρήνης, ἣν οὗτοι κατὰ τῆς πατρίδος τηροῦσιν οἱ χρηστοί*: § 323, *ἐν οἷς ἀτυχεσάντων τῶν Ἑλλήνων εὐτύχησεν ἕτερος, ταῦτ' ἐπαινοῦσι καὶ ὅπως τὸν ἅπαντα χρόνον διαμενεῖ φασὶ δεῖν τηρεῖν.*

without being at the head of a hegemony or an empire, that the contemplative life is the highest, and that the aim of the political life is not party-triumph, or the quest of wealth and power, but the promotion in one's fellow-citizens of virtuous activity in all its forms, would exercise, it might be expected, a calming influence on men's minds, and give a new and better direction to their thoughts.

Aristotle may well have hoped to be of service both to Macedon and Greece. He probably long held—perhaps he did so to the last—that the interests of Macedon and Greece might be reconciled. Isocrates had already pressed Philip first to restore harmony between the four leading Powers of Greece—the Argives, Lacedaemonians, Thebans, and Athenians—and then to become its Agamemnon in a war against Persia—to be, not its tyrant dividing in order to govern (Philip. § 80) and plotting for selfish ends (§ 73 sqq.), but the leader of a confederacy, the common friend of all its States¹. Aristotle, in his turn, counselled Alexander to rule the Greeks as the head of a hegemony and only the barbarians as a despot². On the other hand, Greece was to place power in the hands of the *μέτροι*, its soundest and most rational class (6 (4). 11. 1295 b 1 sqq.). We thus find Aristotle, in effect, inculcating moderation on both sides.

The departure of Alexander for the East left the direction of affairs in Greece in the hands of Antipater, a man with whom Aristotle had more in common than with either Philip or Alexander. Antipater was probably some years

¹ The Philippus of Isocrates (346 B.C.) is an appeal to Philip to change his present unsatisfactory policy (§ 17: § 80), and to falsify his opponents' account of his designs (§ 73 sqq.). It reminds him of his Heraclid extraction, and urges that plots for the subjection of Greece which would be creditable to a king of Persia are quite out of place in a Heraclid (§§ 75-6). A certain distrust of Philip and a desire to point out

to him a 'more excellent way' are traceable throughout it. Age-laüs gave similar advice to Macedon at the Congress of Naupactus a hundred and thirty years later (Polyb. 5. 104: Prof. Freeman, *History of Federal Government* 1. p. 561).

² See the well-known passage in Plutarch's first oration 'de Alexandri seu virtute seu fortuna,' c. 6, and cp. Pol. 4 (7). 7. 1327 b 20 sqq.

older than Aristotle, but like him in moderation of tone and strong sober common sense. For the first time in the course of Greek history the hegemony of Greece rested with a man who, as the servant of a king, was neither an oligarch nor a democrat, and who could have no wish to press either oligarchy or democracy on the States of Greece. Is it possible that Aristotle is to some extent addressing Antipater, when he insists that one and the same constitution is not applicable to every State, that the form which suits one will not always suit another, and that the important thing is to ameliorate oligarchy and democracy where they must exist, and at the same time to point to some form of constitution at once satisfactory and generally applicable? There is no clear evidence of a design on Aristotle's part to influence the policy of Macedon, so that this surmise must remain a surmise. It is to all appearance wholly in the interest of Greece that he recommends the constitution which gives predominance to the moderately wealthy class (*ἡ διὰ τῶν μέσων πολιτεία*). Only one of those who had played a leading part in the affairs of Greece had encouraged the introduction of this form (6 (4). 11. 1296 a 38 sqq.). The reference is probably to Theramenes, whom we know (Plutarch, Nicias c. 2) that Aristotle grouped with Nicias and Thucydides the son of Melesias, as combining high worth and social position with a hereditary goodwill to the people. His inauspicious name is for obvious reasons suppressed. We find Theramenes striking the first blow at the power of the Four Hundred at Athens by insisting that 'it was high time to institute the Five Thousand in reality, and not in name' (Thuc. 8. 89. 2), and these Five Thousand were made, when he carried his point, to include all hoplites (*εἶναι δὲ αὐτῶν, ὅποσοι καὶ ὄπλα παρέχονται*, Thuc. 8. 97); they would thus comprise the *μέσοι* of Aristotle¹. Later

¹ It should be observed that this constitution, which gave political supremacy to the hoplites and put an end to the payment of

office-holders (including probably members of the assembly and dicasteries: see Classen *ad loc.*) meets with the approval of Thu-

on, in the struggle with Critias which proved fatal to him, Theramenes is still true to the same 'Left-Centre' policy. In that reply to Critias which won the *boulê* to his side, and which Critias could only parry by ordering his execution, he declares himself the foe of those who will have no democracy which does not go the full length of giving a share of power to slaves and to men so poor that they would sell their country for a drachma, no less than of those who approve no oligarchy which does not make a handful of men tyrants of the State. His opinion, he adds, was still the same as it had ever been, that supremacy in the State should rest with those who are able to serve it as knights and hoplites¹.

Aristotle expresses a similar view when he claims supremacy for the *μέσοι*, for we must not confound the *μέσοι* of a Greek State with the classes which we now-a-days group under the comprehensive term 'middle class.' They were the best-trained and most effective soldiers of the State; nor was this their only claim to power, for Aristotle describes them as being well-fitted both for ruling and being ruled, and therefore for the duties of citizenship, as swayed by reason rather than impulse, and exposed neither to the corrupting influence of extreme wealth nor to the equally ruinous effects of extreme poverty. They deserved to exercise a predominant influence in the State, and, wherever they were at all numerous, their military training as hoplites would enable them to do so. Aristotle may possibly have thought, though, as has been said, we have no evidence of the fact, that if the hegemony of Macedon were used to bring this class to power, it would be a blessing to Greece. Nothing could be worse than her

cydides, as it subsequently met with that of Aristotle. See Thuc. 8. 97, *καὶ οὐχ ἥκιστα δὴ τὸν πρῶτον χρόνον ἐπὶ γ' ἐμοῦ Ἀθηναῖοι φαίνονται εὖ πολιτεύσαντες* μετρία γὰρ ἦ τε ἐς τοὺς ὀλίγους καὶ ἐς τοὺς πολλοὺς *ἐξυγκρασις ἐγένετο, καὶ ἐκ πολλῶν τῶν πραγμάτων γενομένων τοῦτο πρῶτον ἀνήνεγκε τὴν πόλιν.*

¹ Xen. Hell. 2. 3. 48: cp. Plato, Laws 753 B. Men could not be hoplites unless they had not only means enough to furnish themselves with the arms appropriate to the hoplite, but also the leisure to practise the necessary exercises (Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 748. 7).

present faction-ridden condition, which was both morally and politically ruinous.

It is easy in reading the calm discussions of the *Politics* to forget the impression which Aristotle's political views must have made on his contemporaries, and especially on the Athenians amongst whom he lived. We do not know, indeed, how far the work was published in his lifetime, or how far the nature of its teaching was generally known to the citizens of Athens. Some knowledge of Aristotle's political views, however, must have been possessed even by those who did not belong to any philosophical school, and it is impossible to suppose that his recommendation of a transfer of power from the Many to the *μέσοι*, coming as it did from one who was deep in the confidence of Antipater, was not viewed with uneasiness and indignation. Ever since Chaeroneia the existence of the Athenian democracy had hung by a thread, and the change suggested by Aristotle in the hearing, as it were, of Antipater was a very feasible anti-democratic move. True, Aristotle's comments on the extreme form of democracy were no severer than those of Plato, and Plato had lived undisturbed at Athens to the last, but now the times were far more critical, and Plato had suggested no such dangerously easy change. Aristotle's less ideal political method had led him into questions of everyday politics, the treatment of which was attended with far more risk than the portraiture of any number of ideal States. We find him in one passage pointing out how to organize a tolerable kind of democracy, the important thing being 'to eliminate from the citizen-body the worse elements of the demos' (τὸ χεῖρον ἀεὶ πλῆθος χωρίζειν, 8 (6). 4. 1319 b 1): in another he recommends the constitution in which supremacy rests with men of moderate means (ἡ διὰ τῶν μέσων πολιτεία). A polity or moderate democracy had once existed at Athens during the poverty-stricken and desperate period which followed the fall of the Four Hundred, and Aristotle's advice was destined to be acted on in the very year of his death, when the new constitution which Antipater

forced on Athens, by confining political rights to those possessed of a qualification of 2000 drachmae, disfranchised 12,000 citizens out of 21,000, and drove many to accept the victor's offer of a residence in Thrace¹. The religious views, again, implied in the *Politics* would be extremely unsatisfactory to many pious Greeks. True, the gods are recognized and their worship provided for, but where in its pages would be found that recognition of their intervention in human affairs which we constantly notice in the writings of Xenophon? Xenophon traces the successes of the Thebans against the Lacedaemonians to the anger of the gods against a people which first swore that the cities of Greece should be autonomous, and then broke its oath by seizing the Cadmeia of Thebes (*Hell.* 5. 4. 1). He even ascribes to the influence of some superhuman power, bent on bringing the Lacedaemonian State to destruction, the mistaken decision of the Lacedaemonian assembly which resulted in the battle of Leuctra (*Hell.* 6. 4. 3, ἡδὲ γάρ, ὡς εἶοικε, τὸ δαιμόνιον ἤγεν). Plato had rebuked views of this kind (*Rep.* 379 A sqq.), but his innovations in religion were probably less repellent than the reticence and chilliness of Aristotle on the subject.

But in truth the mere fact of Aristotle's close connexion with Alexander and Antipater and with Macedonian agents such as Nicanor, would suffice to make his position at Athens precarious, quite apart from the unpopularity of his political and religious views. Xenocrates and the Academy seem to have held more aloof from Macedon. Already in 330 B.C., when three-fourths of the Peloponnesus rose under the Lacedaemonian King Agis against Antipater, to be crushed at a second Chaeroneia, and Aeschines shortly after, notwithstanding that defeat, failed in his prosecution of Ctesiphon and his attack on Demosthenes, Aristotle must have felt himself in the midst of foes. Another crisis occurred in 324 B.C. when Harpalus, the fugitive Mace-

¹ Diod. 18. 18. Long since the above was written, I have found my remark anticipated in Bernays'

Gesammelte Abhandlungen, i. 167.

donian satrap of Babylon, took refuge with his vast treasure at Athens, and claimed, though without success, protection against Alexander, who had now returned to Susa from his wanderings in the depths of Asia, and soon signalized his reappearance on the horizon of Greece by the ominous decree for the restoration of all exiles from Greek States, which Nicanor was ordered to make known to the Greeks assembled for the festival at Olympia. The restoration of exiles meant the restoration of all property taken from them, its re-transfer from its present to its former holders. Hitherto Alexander had sought to conciliate the Greek States, but the East was now conquered, and Macedonian supremacy was free to show itself in its true colours. Macedon evidently desired to have in each Greek State a body of men owing everything to it and therefore devoted to its interests¹, and it would stop short at no interference in the internal affairs of Greek States that was at all likely to contribute to this end.

Aristotle, it is clear, had connected himself with a Power which had failed to listen to his warning that Greeks must be ruled in a different way from Orientals. The conqueror of Asia had been exposed to the intoxicating homage of Orientals and familiarised with the subservient manners of the East, while still young and plastic in character. Even if he had approved the policy which Aristotle recommended to him, of making a distinction between his methods of rule in the case of Hellenes and Orientals, he was by this time incapable of the double attitude. His breach with Callisthenes, whom Aristotle had introduced to his service, had alienated him to some extent from Aristotle. Thus Aristotle was too good a friend of Macedon for the Athenians, too firm in the assertion of Hellenic dignity and self-respect for Alexander.

The crisis came when the news of Alexander's death (June, 323 B.C.) reached Athens. A storm of anti-Macedonian feeling arose, which spared Phocion but struck Aristotle. He was indicted for impiety on account of his

¹ Diod. 18. 8.

scolion to Hermias and the honours which he had rendered to his memory. Charges of this sort were weapons frequently used against political adversaries both at Athens and elsewhere¹, and we may be sure that his real offence was his intimacy and influence with Antipater, his connexion with Nicanor, the promulgator at Olympia of Alexander's decree, and his past connexion with the Macedonian Court. He retired before trial to Chalcis, which was a Macedonian stronghold² and was also connected with the Chalcidian cities of the Thrace-ward region from which he came (cp. Aristot. *Fragm.* 93. 1492 b 24 sqq.). He died at Chalcis in 322 B.C.

'Aristotle,' a great authority has said, 'had no attachment to Hellas as an organized system, autonomous, self-acting, with a Hellenic city as president; which attachment would have been considered by Perikles, Archidamus, and Epameinondas as one among the constituents indispensable to Hellenic patriotism³.' It would seem, however, from the *Politics* (4 (7). 7. 1327 b 29 sqq.), that he viewed the Greek race as the race best fitted to rule, and the πόλις (possibly under a *παμβασιλεύς*), not the *ἔθνος*, as the best depositary of power. Ideally, therefore, rule was, in his opinion, best placed in the hands of a well-constituted Hellenic City-State. So far as the rule of Macedon was not Hellenic, nor the rule of a City-State, it must have been unsatisfactory to him. But the actual City-State of Greece seemed to him very defective, and he certainly did not hold that the substitution of the Hellenic king of Macedon for Thebes, as the dominant power in Greece, was necessarily 'finis Graeciae.'

Aristotle's
relation to
Hellas and
to Macedon.

Some modern observers are inclined, while fully admitting the greatness of Demosthenes, to say that the boundary of Hellas was rather arbitrarily drawn when Macedon was left outside it, that the Macedonians were akin in language and religion to the Greeks⁴, that in these latter

¹ E.g. at Corcyra, Thuc. 3. 70. 5.

² Schäfer, Demosthenes 3. 35.

³ Grote, Aristotle 1. 14, note.

⁴ See O. Abel, Makedonien

days the Northern races were more vigorous and unspoilt than any others¹, and that looking to the rising greatness of Rome, it was important that Greece should not cut off from herself a promising kindred race, or shrink from accepting its lead² for no graver reason than that of an ethnological difference³. But Aristotle did not go so far as this. To him the Macedonians are still perhaps barbarians (4 (7). 2. 1324 b 15), though barbarians of a far nobler sort than those of Asia, and it is the Hellenes who have the best right to rule, in virtue of their well-balanced union of heart and intellect. We may conjecture, however, that he hoped that a 'modus vivendi' might be established between Macedon and Greece. Let Macedon be content to rule the Greeks subject to her as freemen should be ruled. Let Greece silence her factions and call to power those who would rule rationally and for the common good.

The 'logic of facts' did by degrees impose some degree of moderation both on Macedon and on Greece. The break-up of Alexander's empire, the rivalries of his successors, the descent of the Gauls on Macedon, the rise of rulers like the earlier Ptolemies and of governments like those of the

vor König Philipp p. 115 sqq. Bernays says (Phokion p. 74) that 'the differences of language were not greater than those which existed between Dorians and Ionians, and differences of religion were wholly absent'; but to this statement Gomperz (*Die Akademie und ihr vermeintlicher Philomacedonismus, Wiener Studien*, 1882, p. 117) opposes the view of Deecke (*Rhein. Mus.* 36, 577 and 596), who connects the Macedonian language with those of the Epirotic, Illyrian, Thracian, and Phrygian races, and regards this group of languages as 'occupying an intermediate position between the Iranian and the Greek.'

¹ See Mommsen, *History of Rome*, Book 3, c. 8 (E. T. vol. 2, p. 215). 'In steadfast resistance to the public enemy under whatever name, in unshaken fidelity to-

wards their native country and their hereditary government, and in persevering courage amidst the severest trials, no nation in ancient history bears so close a resemblance to the Roman people as the Macedonians' (p. 216).

² Greece eventually came to see this. See the remarkable speech of Agelaus of Naupactus (Polyb. 5. 104) and the remarks of Prof. Freeman upon it (*History of Federal Government* 1. 560 sqq.).

³ It is easy to see how fortunate a thing it was for Rome that no such contrast as that of Greek and barbarian formed part of her traditions. By insisting on regarding far the larger part of the Balkan peninsula as alien to her, Greece greatly added to the difficulty of uniting it to herself.

Achaean League, Rhodes, and the Pontic Heracleia, did tend in this direction. More perhaps might have been achieved if Greece had been wiser and less exhausted¹, and if Macedon had trusted less to garrisons and tyrants². Still it was much to have preached wisdom and moderation to an age in which conquerors and conquered were alike impatient of compromise.

We naturally expect to find in the teaching of the *Politics* clear traces of Aristotle's close connexion with Macedon. It would be natural that we should do so, even if the work was written before the battle of Chaeroneia: after it, one would have thought that some reference to the altered position of Greece would be unavoidable. Now the mention of Philip's death in the Seventh Book³ does not prove that the whole of the *Politics*, or even the immediate context, was written after that event, but it shows that if this was not so, Aristotle made at least one addition to that part of the work subsequently to the accession of Alexander, and we may reasonably infer that his political views remained unchanged at that date.

No reference, however, to the relation of Greece to Macedon appears in the *Politics*; the fact that a mighty power had suddenly arisen on her Northern frontier is absolutely ignored. For all that appears to the contrary in its pages, the *Politics* may have been written while Thebes was still the leading power. Not a particle of Aristotle's

¹ 'It is a great mistake to consider the political history of Greece as at an end, when she was once compelled to submit to the Macedonian yoke. . . . If she did not recover the position in which she stood when Philip mounted the throne of Macedon . . . it was chiefly because she wanted an eye to see her new position and relations, and a hand to collect, husband, and employ her remaining resources' (Thirlwall, *History of Greece* 7. 245).

'There was ground to believe' (in 318 B.C.) 'that the time might not be far distant, when the ruler of Macedonia might find an equal alliance with Greece necessary to his safety, and when it might even be desirable for her, that he should be a man of energy and talents like Cassander, rather than one so feeble and contemptible as Polysperchon' (ibid. 7. 263).

² Polyb. 9. 29: Prof. Freeman p. 232.

³ Pol. 7 (5). 10. 1311 b 1.

attention is diverted from the πόλις to the ἔθνος. The improvement of Greece is the central object of the work. It is the πόλις, not the ἔθνος, which Aristotle makes it his aim to reform¹. It is the πόλις that brings men completeness in respect of good life, as distinguished from completeness in respect of necessities. It is in Greece, not Macedon, that the future of human society is to be made or marred.

Aristotle writes as a Hellene and a disciple of Plato, not as one whom circumstances had more or less attached to the fortunes of Macedon. The great spirits of antiquity, and Aristotle among them, seem to draw their creed from sources too deep to be greatly affected by accidents such as that which had connected him with Macedon. He still follows in the track of his philosophical predecessors, and especially of Plato, with whom he stands in complete filiation. The object of the Politics is to carry on and complete the work that Plato had begun—the work of re-adapting the πόλις to the promotion of virtue and noble living. Aristotle's relation to Plato was the critical fact of his life, not his relation to Philip or Alexander. He broke much fresh ground, it is true; yet over great regions of thought he found a track already made by his predecessor: in fact, it is the close sequence of two minds of this calibre, and in this particular order², that forms the most exceptional feature of the history of Greek philosophy, and goes far to account for its greatness.

Contrast
of form
between
Plato's
writings
and those
in which
Aristotle's
philosophy

The first contrast which we note between the writings of Plato and Aristotle, as they have come down to us, is a contrast of form. This contrast would no doubt have been much softened, if the dialogues of Aristotle had been preserved to us, for we possess a few fragments of them which show, as indeed do some few passages in other writings of his, that

¹ History justified the leaning of Aristotle. The future rested not with the Macedonian ἔθνος, but with Carthage and Rome. On the other hand, it is true to say that Rome was what it was to

the world by becoming rather a nation than a city, and rather a World-State than a nation.

² Would as much have been achieved, if Aristotle had preceded Plato?

Aristotle could be eloquent if he chose. He may have continued to write dialogues even after his return to Athens, but the works with which we commonly connect his name are of an entirely different character. Whatever view we take of these works, whether we regard them as having to a large extent arisen out of lectures (which we may do without denying that Aristotle wrote them) or not, it is clear that they handle the subjects of which they treat quite differently from the dialogues of Plato: of Plato's lectures we possess no record.

All considerations of literary charm drop out of sight in them; the ascertainment of the truth comes to be the one aim of the inquiry. In place of the easy windings of the Platonic dialogue—flowing, one would say, it knows not whither, were it not that a subtle and hidden art governs its course—we have a careful mapping-out of the investigation into separate and successive inquiries, evidently arranged beforehand, not starting up even in appearance on the spur of the moment—the subject of each being announced with an angular formality before it is entered upon, and the whole series being pervaded by one uniform tone, so that the mind of the inquirer and that of the reader are steadily kept in one unvarying attitude of reasoning inquiry, without any intervals of eloquence or dramatic by-play to relieve the intentional monotony. The scientific spirit no longer feels itself bound to put itself under the protection of its elder sister, the literary spirit—no longer, like Teucer, hurls its shafts from beneath the shield of Ajax; it has reached years of emancipation and trusts to its own claims and deserts. Investigations relating to one and the same subject are no longer scattered over several writings, which need to be compared. While Plato had, for instance, never succeeded in reserving one whole dialogue for questions relating to the constitutional structure of the State and nothing else¹, Aristotle adheres closely to this one subject

¹ The Republic mingles together Ethics, Psychology, Metaphysics, and Politics; the Politicus

Logic and Politics; the Laws unites with the quest of the second-best constitution an attempt to

cal teaching is embodied.

throughout the *Politics*, and collects within the limits of a single work the main body of his political doctrine, so that it brings to a focus and treats in close connexion speculations spread over the *Republic*, the *Politicus*, and the *Laws* of Plato, to say nothing of other dialogues.

There is no longer any obstacle to the use of the most systematic and searching methods of inquiry. The careful ascertainment of historical fact is no longer out of place¹. Myth disappears; philosophy returns to the sober facts of history. Yet some virtues of the dialogue-form are preserved. From time to time, when a fit occasion presents itself—especially, it would seem, in introductory discussions², though we do not distinctly gather the principle on which the occasion is chosen—a question is proposed, and a dialogue-group formed; in other words an *ἀπορία* is discussed. The parties to the discussion are commonly anonymous, so that there is nothing to prepossess us in favour of this side or that. All dramatic interest has vanished: no interlocutor is more overbearing, or more inexperienced, or more skilful than his fellows. But the comparison of views, if less artistically managed, is quite as thorough and as fruitful of result. Two or more opinions, each with a grain of truth in it, are allowed to collide, till some reconciling principle issues from their collision which embodies the truth they contain without the error. Aristotle, who has studied throughout to preserve the impartiality of a Chairman³, accepts the result of the discussion. These aporetic debates thus form, as it were, easy paths by which we ascend from the plane of ordinary Hellenic opinion to the higher level of Aristotelian insight, carried upward rather

set forth in detail a system of *Laws*. 'In the *Phaedrus*, the *Republic*, the *Philebus*, the *Parmenides*, and the *Sophist*, we have observed the tendency of Plato to combine two or more subjects, or different aspects of the same subject, in a single dialogue' (Prof. Jowett, *Plato* 3. 543, ed. 1).

¹ The Second Book of the

Politics would have been impossible in a dialogue, and not less so the fulness of concrete inquiry and remark which we find in the Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Books.

² 5 (8). 5. 1339 a 11 sq.

³ Cp. *de Caelo*, I. 10. 279 b 11, *δεῖ διατηρᾶς ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀντιδίκους εἶναι τοὺς μέλλοντας τάληθές κρίνειν ἱκανῶς*.

by the force of facts than by any overt intervention of the philosopher.

There is still much in the *Politics* to remind us that we are reading a Greek and not a modern work. It is not at first sight easy to detect the connecting thread on which its successive inquiries are strung. The order in which they are arranged is not always the order in which a modern writer would have arranged them. Thus we have in the First Book a sketch of the Household as it ought to be, before the question comes up for solution in the Second, whether the Household has any claim to exist. A conclusion established by argument is sometimes not taken as established later on, but proved afresh, and occasionally by different arguments. We find the same question started for debate, and debated, more than once, even in one and the same *μέθοδος* or inquiry, and in cases where the text seems not to have been tampered with or disturbed. Sometimes this appears to be done with the view of eliciting some fresh lesson in connexion with the subject. Unreconciled contradictions are not uncommon, some of them perhaps due to the fact that the work is made up of three or four parts, not completely harmonized nor perhaps composed at the same time. Still Plato's rapid and constant changes of tone are absent, and the exposition is systematic and strict in comparison with his.

A new style and a new terminology came into existence with the new method. The fourth century before Christ was prolific in prose-styles. History and oratory were rapidly finding the style that best suited their purpose. Philosophy was now to do the like. Aristotle said of Plato's style, that it was half-way between poetry and prose¹. The style which Aristotle chose for the systematic exposition of his philosophy, though not, probably, for his dialogues, was altogether different. It is an easy,

Style of
Aristotle.

¹ Diog. Laert. 3. 37. The Greek language was successfully used for poetry for several cen-

turies before it began to be used for prose, and naturally acquired a bent which it was slow to lose.

unpretending style, almost conversational or epistolary in its freedom, yet never substantially inaccurate or seriously off its guard. It makes no pretension to literary grace; it does not scruple to use technical words, often borrowed from the everyday language of Greeks, but used in new and fixed senses. It very rarely rises into eloquence, hardly ever in the *Politics*, a little oftener in the zoological works and the *Metaphysics*. It has a rapid and eager movement; it is concise and elliptical, often hinting an argument in place of fully setting it forth; it is occasionally rough and slipshod; it seems, in fact, to expect in the reader some such quickness and delicacy of apprehension as grows up in societies of an intimate nature where a pregnant word or two suffices to convey a thought¹. Deliberation is its very life and being; nowhere does it seem to attain such a pace and swing as to exclude the interposition of a doubt or a conflicting fact; the assent is held oscillating so long, that when at last it is accorded, there is no feeling that any point of importance has escaped consideration. Anything that might throw the judgment off its balance, or interfere with a cool, circumspect, and dispassionate habit of investigation is carefully avoided.

Whatever may be the literary defects of Aristotle's style in his extant works, the extent to which Theophrastus and other disciples retain it is an evidence that it really supplied a philosophical need, and that there was a certain congeniality between the form which he chose for the exposition of his philosophy and its substance. The style of the Stoics and of Epicurus was apparently still further removed from that of ordinary literature.

Contrast of
substance
between
the political
teaching of Plato
and that of
Aristotle.

If we pass from the form to the matter of Aristotle's political philosophy, we shall notice an equally great contrast.

Plato had found real existence impugned on all sides. Not every one, indeed, went as far as Gorgias, who sought

¹ Cp. Eurip. Fragm. 967
(Nauck):

ἡ γὰρ σιωπὴ τοῖς σοφοῖς ἐστ'
ἀνέκτιστος.

to show that nothing has any real existence, but many held that only the sensible¹, or the necessary, or the invariable exists by nature. The more the field of full existence was narrowed, the more the field of possible knowledge was narrowed also. Plato's first and main aim had therefore been, as has already been noticed, to point to a really existent and knowable world, which he found in the world of Ideas. He did not, however, stop here; we have seen that he went on to seek in the Ideas the explanation of the phenomenal world. If the cure for scepticism was to look from the variable Many to the unchanging One, the next step must be to use the knowledge thus gained for the explanation of the Many and the amelioration of the Actual. The reassertion of Existence and of the possibility of knowledge led on to the assertion that a fixed standard exists to which the structure of the State must conform. This standard is the Idea. The true founder and ruler of States must look up from 'the many just' (*τὰ πολλὰ δίκαια*) to 'that which is essentially temperate and just and good' (*αὐτὸ τὸ σῶφρον καὶ δίκαιον καὶ ἀγαθόν*), and must then proceed to work these Ideas into the State with which he has to do. Plato sees that Experience is necessary to the ruler²; still his primary need is philosophy. If, in things political, earth and heaven ever come to mingle, it is through the philosopher. The world of social phenomena lies lost in its variability and semi-existence before him, and he calls it to full life by fixing his gaze on the Idea and remoulding society in its likeness. The philosopher is a kind of semi-divine demiurge: we feel for the moment that he is everything, and the material on which he works is nothing.

But this is not quite Plato's view. The Idea is not to Plato the sole source of existence, for, as we have seen³, he allows to things 'a kind of existence that cannot be derived from the Idea': thus a second power is revealed to us in the world, the power of Necessity immanent in Matter, which may co-operate with or thwart the Idea.

¹ Laws 889 A sqq.

² Rep. 539 E.

³ p. 53.

We infer, therefore, that the philosophic statesman can do little without favourable Matter, and if we do not hear much of this in the Republic, where we are taught rather to ascribe the unsatisfactoriness of things to the fact that no one has lifted his eyes to the Idea, Plato seems in the Laws more conscious of the insubordinate element in things. Men are not made of wax, to be moulded by the legislator at his pleasure (Laws 746): there are things which law cannot touch¹. He does not, however, go beyond attributing to things a power of resistance.

Aristotle ascribes more influence to Matter. Where Plato sees passivity or resistance, Aristotle sees a capacity of growth and the beginnings of a process. Things have an immanent bent in the direction of good, but they have also immanent tendencies which may warp them to evil. In morals and politics these latter tendencies appear to be especially active. It is only in the best races that a sense, however dim, of the goal and of the right path to it is present, and even in them it is clouded by all manner of confusions; nor is full knowledge enough: communities which possess it may be prevented by some unavoidable peculiarity of their social structure, originating perhaps in some accidental characteristic of the territory, from attaining the true end. What, then, is the business of the philosophic inquirer? It is to point out to those who are free from lets and hindrances the ideal end and method of political and social organization, and to assist the inherent tendency of things to go right; and where insuperable impediments exist, which is the more common case by far, to ascertain by a close and minute study of society as it is, what course is the best under the circumstances. In both departments of her work, Political Science will have the same aim in view—to secure rational government, in whatever degree this may be possible: so far Aristotle is at one with Plato; but Aristotle accepts and humours the tendencies that he finds present in the particular case to a far greater extent

¹ Laws 788, 807, 822. Something of this kind had already been said in the Republic.

than Plato. The problem of Political Science is no longer a single or twofold or threefold problem ; on the contrary, it breaks into a multitude of ramifications, and is as multi-plex as the Matter dealt with. Political Science must be flexible, must adapt itself freely to circumstances, if its existence is to be of any use to mankind. The study, as Aristotle understood it, gave full scope even to the astonishing combination of gifts which Aristotle possessed. His analytic and systematizing power, his marvellous mastery of facts, his historical faculty¹, his strong common sense, his knowledge of human nature, all found in it abundant occupation. The Politics is at once the portraiture of an ideal State and a Statesman's Manual.

Nor was this the only way in which Aristotle's Theory of Becoming influenced his political method. It afforded him a rational justification for a free use of the collective experience of the Greek race. For here, if anywhere, we might look to find the nearest approach to the normal and natural evolution of the State, though even here a constant reference to the end of human society was necessary to correct deviations. The interval between philosophy and 'the common sense of most' was thus bridged. In the field of Morals and Politics the insight of the philosopher is but a higher potency of the insight of the *φρόνιμος* of everyday life. The statesman is the man of full virtue. His business is not to reveal a new world, but to bring a stronger light to bear on everyday things. He should unite a thorough knowledge of the end of Man and the State, which is to Aristotle what a knowledge of the Ideas of Temperance and Justice and Goodness is to Plato, with a knowledge of the means by which it is to be attained, and this involves a close study of the facts of society. Aristotle's conception of 'Nature' (*φύσις*) perhaps led him to attach more weight to the outcome and leading features

¹ 'We use the expression, "Aristotle the historian," for our conviction is that the first prize after Thucydides in Greek histori-

cal writing falls of right to him' (A. Hug, *Studien aus dem classischen Alterthum* p. 56).

of Greek civilization than they altogether deserved. The same broad principle which underlies his defence of the household, of several property, of Tragedy and poetry generally, led him to defend slavery and to rest content with the existing position and education of the female sex. But it also involved the abandonment of that attitude of sweeping antagonism to the Actual which Plato at one time took up. Political Philosophy might well be content to bear itself as the child of its race and time; its business was rather to correct than to create anew.

We see, then, that the metaphysics of Aristotle pointed to a new conception of the problem and method of Political Science. But the difference between Plato's treatment of the subject and Aristotle's is no mere accident of their metaphysics; it reflects a thorough difference of character and aim. To Plato a more or less ideal view of politics probably seemed the only view worth taking. The question that interests him is what the State ought to be. The technical side of politics—the question, for instance, how a democracy is constituted, or even how it should be constituted so as to be durable—interests him hardly at all. He found the claims of Justice to be something more than a conventionality seriously impugned, and his aim was to raise her from the dust, and to show that her indwelling presence is that which makes both States and individuals happy. Politics is to him a more concrete sort of Ethics; we learn to know Justice and Temperance better by viewing them enshrined in a congenial State.

Plato seemed to Aristotle to have grappled with only one of the problems of Political Science, and to have failed to solve even that. He had constructed two ideal States, the second diverging to some extent from the first, but resting in reality on the same principle, the supremacy of the few wise. This supremacy was based in the Republic on the willing assent of the soldiers and landowners of the State; in the Laws on ingenious constitutional devices, by which the majority was deluded with a semblance of power. Aristotle held that neither basis was satisfactory, but his

main objection to Plato's ideal was that it failed to do that which the best State exists to do—it failed to realize the best and most desirable life.

He differs from Plato as to the nature of happiness. To Plato Justice is Happiness; Aristotle, on the contrary, holds that full happiness belongs only to those who possess all the virtues, including speculative excellence (*σοφία*), and who, besides, possess adequate external means, and that it implies not only virtue endowed with adequate external means, but life in accordance with it. That State is not the best in which all the citizens are not capable of living the best life and steadily purposed to live it. The best State is that in which the men of full virtue are not a mere handful, but the whole State, and are numerous enough to form a complete citizen-body—in which they have all the external conditions of the best life, and also adjunct dependent classes, not included in the citizen-body, to emancipate them from 'necessary work.' The best State is a brotherhood of men of full stature, intellectual and moral, animated by a common aim—the aim of living and helping each other to live the noblest life, active and speculative, that men can live. Aristotle purges the citizen-body of the feebler elements that Plato had left in it¹, and launches it on a fuller and more aspiring life. The State at its best exists, in his view, not for the protection of the weaker elements of its citizen-body—no weak elements must find a place within it—but for the full-pulsed life of the strong men of whom it is composed—for the unimpeded exercise of every noble human faculty. It exists, not that the wise may shelter the weak, though this they will do, but that the wise may live the life of the wise. No infraction of justice or of the common good must take place—the weak must be gainers by their share in the best State—but those who can live the true life must have the fullest opportunity of doing so. The State does not exist that they may minister to the common herd, and develope in them that imperfect type of virtue and

¹ In the Republic, at all events.

happiness of which alone they are capable, though this will be one of their cares; it exists that they may realize the best life possible to man; it is in their life that the State attains its true end.

It was a principle of Aristotle's Teleology that everything exists for the sake of the noblest work it can do and of the element which does it, and he could not refuse to apply this principle to the State. His view, of course, jars on modern feeling¹, but it is not difficult to see how he came to hold it.

His is in some respects a bolder and more ideal conception of the best State than Plato's, for it requires in the citizen a more varied combination of goods, and calls on him to live a life of perfect and many-sided manhood. But if Aristotle's Political Philosophy is in some respects more ideal than Plato's, it is also more practical. He sees that constitutions must be suitable to the communities to which they are applied, and that the best constitution, presupposing as it does an exceptional share of the favours of Nature and Fortune, is in nine cases out of ten inapplicable. Thus a new department needs to be added to Political inquiry. Hitherto Political Science had been so busy in creating new worlds that it had failed to map the rugged region through which the Statesman had actually to pick his way. He must no longer be left without guidance. He must be shown not only what is the best constitution, but what is the best constitution attainable in the particular case; he must further learn how to construct any given constitution², and how, when constructed, it can be made to last as long as possible; he must learn, still further, what constitution is at once satisfactory and attainable by most communities. The statesman, again, must cease to suppose that democracy and oligarchy have each of them only one

¹ Contrast with it the view of Condorcet, that 'all institutions ought to have for their aim the physical, intellectual, and moral amelioration of the poorest and most numerous class. This is the peo-

ple' (J. Morley, Rousseau 2. 190).

² Cp. Eth. Nic. I. II. 1101a 3, καθάπερ καὶ στρατηγὸν ἀγαθὸν τῷ παρόντι στρατοπέδῳ χρῆσθαι πολεμικώτατα, καὶ σκυτοτόμον ἐκ τῶν δοθέντων σκυτῶν κάλλιστον ὑπόδημα ποιεῖν.

form: the varieties of both these constitutions must be pointed out to him, and he must be taught in how many different ways these varieties can be conjoined; he will thus be enabled intelligently to repair and reinvigorate existing constitutions. Lastly, he must learn what laws are suitable to each constitution¹.

The Political Science of Aristotle, though still ethical in aim, concerns itself more largely with the technical side of politics than that of Plato. It concerns itself not only with the construction of an ideal State, but also with the improvement of the constitution and administration of the actual State; nay, it even undertakes to show how any given constitution, good or bad, is to be constructed; it points out how we are to construct an extreme oligarchy or democracy². Even here, however, the ethical point of view is not wholly lost sight of, for these constitutions must be constructed so as to last (8 (6). 5. 1319 b 33 sqq.), and they cannot last unless their worst features are removed or softened.

We seem to pass at the commencement of the Sixth Book into a wholly new department of political inquiry. An attempt is indeed made to soften the transition by representing the Sixth Book as taking up the unexecuted portion of the programme of the Third. The Third Book had enumerated six constitutions: two of these, Kingship and Aristocracy, have now, we are told, been dealt with, and it remains to treat of the four others. Some imperfect forms of Aristocracy, however, are described in the Sixth Book, and much is said about Kingship in the Seventh. Besides, the principle on which the enumeration of six constitutions in the Third Book was based is left far in the rear. We were there told that six constitutions exist because there are three possible supreme authorities (*κύρια*)—the One or the Few or the Many—and these three supreme authorities may govern in one or other of two

Contrast between the three concluding books of the Politics and the earlier ones.

¹ Pol. 6 (4). 1.

² 8 (6). 4. 1319 b 1 sqq.

different ways—either for their own advantage or for the advantage of the State. Even there, indeed, we learnt rather to rest the division of constitutions on their varying *ἔπος*—on the attribute to which they respectively award supremacy. But now the diversity of constitutions is made to rest on their varying combination of varying parts of a State.

We are conscious also in the Sixth and two following books of a change in the spirit of the inquiry. *Ἀπορίαι* well-nigh disappear. The discussions bristle with historical facts, and throughout them the aim of giving assistance to the practical statesman acquires a new prominence. It had not been wholly absent before, but now its presence is constantly felt. Political Science must know how to construct any constitution and how to amend existing constitutions; it must know how to furnish each constitution with laws appropriate to it; and it cannot know these things unless it has come to know how large is the number of constitutions—how many shades of each constitution exist. A minute technical study of each constitution and all its sub-forms thus becomes necessary. The Seventh Book even carries us into questions of administration, and shows how constitutions must be administered if they are to be durable.

The three books are evidently the work of a man thoroughly familiar with the Greek State—its varieties of organization, its administration, and its constitutional history—and adding to his thorough knowledge the skill to suggest improvements both of a broad and a minute kind. The ideal point of view is now thrown aside, and the conception of the end of the State, which had played so great a part in its ideal reconstruction, is hardly at all brought to bear on its amendment. We recognize an echo of the earlier teaching when the moderately well-to-do (*μέσοι*) are selected for rule because they are more rational than either the very rich or the very poor, and more capable both of ruling and being ruled as freemen should rule and be ruled. Aristotle, however, has done with the

ideal State; he now assumes a wholly different tone, and seeks to do all that can be done for the State not specially favoured by Nature and Fortune.

The books with which we have now to do are written with a breadth of view which no practical statesman could have approached, to say nothing of the constitutional and historical knowledge they display, which no one but the collector of 158 constitutions probably possessed. Their author evidently belongs to the school of Theramenes; he lays stress on doctrines on which we know that the more moderate wing of the popular party at Athens laid stress. One of the cardinal points of his political teaching was a cardinal point with Theramenes also—the principle that the well-wishers of a constitution must be stronger than its opponents, if the constitution is to stand¹, a principle which pointed to a somewhat broad-based constitution. But Theramenes was probably a stranger to the view that no single constitution is applicable everywhere, and that the social conditions of a State go far to determine its political constitution. He would have had neither the inclination nor the capacity to advise every form of constitution—not only the Polity, but Kingship, nay even Tyranny and the extreme forms of Democracy and Oligarchy—how to make the best of itself. If he had attempted to advise statesmen how to govern so as to avoid revolution, his teaching would probably have been far more unscrupulous and Machiavelian, and far less really wise, than the teaching of Aristotle in the Seventh Book. Even the extremest varieties of the deviation-forms are taught by Aristotle to be in their own interest as righteous as they can be. His advice to them, indeed, is sometimes open to the objection that it asks them in effect to cease to be what they are. Nor would Theramenes, or anybody but a philosopher with a strong faith in education, have pronounced the chief omission of the actual State to be its omission to produce in its citizens by training a character and behaviour suitable

¹ Compare Xen. *Hell.* 2. 3. Pol. 7 (5). 9. 1309 b 16 sq. : 8 (6). 19-20 : 2. 3. 42, 44 with Aristot. 6. 1320 b 25 sq.

to the constitution¹. Laws, Aristotle holds, require to be supported by an appropriate type of character (*ἥθος*), which does not spring up of itself, but needs to be produced by discipline and culture.

We feel that political inquiry has passed from the hands of idealists and partisans into those of one whose patience and grasp of detail have been matured in unimpassioned studies, and above all in the study of animate nature. Aristotle studies a constitution as he might study an animal, or perhaps with even more sympathetic care, for in politics he may hope to amend what he finds.

It would have been well for Greece if political inquiry had continued to follow the same quiet and fruitful path. But this, we shall find, was not to be.

Questions arising as to the programme of the contents of the last three books which seems to be given us in 6 (4). 2. 1289 b 12 sqq.

The following passage (6 (4). 2. 1289 b 12-26) seems to supply us with a programme of the remainder of the Politics:—*ἡμῖν δὲ πρῶτον μὲν διαιρετέον πόσαι διαφοραὶ τῶν πολιτειῶν, εἴπερ ἔστιν εἶδη πλείονα τῆς τε δημοκρατίας καὶ τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας, ἔπειτα τίς κοινοτάτη καὶ τίς αἰρετωτάτη μετὰ τὴν ἀρίστην πολιτείαν, κἂν εἴ τις ἄλλη τετύχηκεν ἀριστοκρατικὴ καὶ συνεστῶσα καλῶς, ἀλλὰ ταῖς πλείοταις ἀρμόττουσα πόλεσι, τίς ἔστιν, ἔπειτα καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τίς τίσιν αἰρετή (τάχα γὰρ τοῖς μὲν ἀναγκαῖα δημοκρατία μᾶλλον ὀλιγαρχίας, τοῖς δ' αὕτη μᾶλλον ἐκείνης), μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα, τίνα τρόπον δεῖ καθιστάναι τὸν βουλόμενον ταύτας τὰς πολιτείας, λέγω δὲ δημοκρατίας τε καθ' ἕκαστον εἶδος καὶ πάλιν ὀλιγαρχίας, τέλος δὲ πάντων τούτων ὅταν ποιησώμεθα συντόμως τὴν ἐνδεχομένην μνείαν, πειρατέον ἐπελθεῖν, τίνες φθοραὶ καὶ τίνες σωτηρίαι τῶν πολιτειῶν καὶ κοινῇ καὶ χωρὶς ἐκάστης, καὶ διὰ τίνας αἰτίας ταῦτα μάλιστα γίνεσθαι πέφυκεν.*

If we compare this enumeration of questions to be treated with the list of political problems with which the Sixth Book begins, we shall find that it omits all reference to one or two of them. Thus, though at the outset of the book we are told that one of the questions which the political inquirer has to consider is, what laws are the best

¹ Pol. 7 (5). 9. 1310 a 12 sqq.

and which are appropriate to each constitution¹, we are not prepared in the programme for any future treatment of this subject². Nor again is the programme in full harmony with the discussions which follow. We find in c. 9. 1294 a 30 sqq. an account of the way in which polities and aristocracies (cp. 1294 b 40 sq.) are to be constructed, though the programme does not prepare us for any treatment of this question; all that it promises us is an account of the way in which each variety of oligarchy and democracy is to be constructed. We also gather that this question will be treated before the question of the causes of change in constitutions and the means of preserving them is dealt with; but if this order is to be followed, we shall have to place the Eighth (or old Sixth) Book before the Seventh (or old Fifth), a course which we can hardly take without entangling ourselves in fresh difficulties.

Again, the programme hardly prepares us for the discussions which we find in the three concluding chapters of the Sixth Book, so far at all events as they relate to other constitutions than oligarchy and democracy. Nor again does the programme prepare us for the treatment of *συνδυασμοί*—constitutions combining an oligarchical deliberative and magisterial organization with an aristocratic judiciary, and the like—which we are promised at the outset of the Eighth Book, though the subject is not, in fact, dealt with in what we have of the Politics.

Some may suspect that this programme has been added by a later hand. It may be urged, however, on the other side, that an interpolator would probably have made it correspond better with the sequel, and that rigid precision is not much studied by Aristotle. It is not impossible, that here as elsewhere he may have been led in working out the subject to deviate somewhat from his announced

¹ Cp. 3. 15. 1286 a 5.

² The first four chapters of the Sixth Book, as will be pointed out elsewhere (see Appendix A), seem to be in a somewhat chaotic state, though it is not easy to say how

they came to be so. It is not therefore surprising that discrepancies should exist between the list of political problems given in the first chapter and the programme given in the second.

track. The Seventh Book may well be an independent treatise not originally planned to form a part of a larger work, but there are evident advantages to be gained by inserting it before, and not after, the question of the true mode of organizing democracies and oligarchies comes up for treatment. There is much in the Seventh Book to prepare us for the recommendations of the Eighth. The main aim in these recommendations is to secure that the constitution shall be durable (8 (6). 5. 1319 b 33 sq. : 6. 1320 b 30–1321 a 4). The secret of permanence both in oligarchies and in democracies, and especially in the former, is moderation—an avoidance of those abuses of power which alienate the rich in the one constitution and the poor in the other. The necessity of bearing in mind the lessons of the Seventh Book is, in fact, dwelt upon in a passage which is the less likely to be an interpolation, that it cannot easily be detached from the context in which we find it (8 (6). 5. 1319 b 37–1320 a 4).

Sketch of
the con-
tents of the
Sixth
Book :—
1. Many
varieties
both of
oligarchy
and demo-
cracy :
strong dis-
similarity
between
the mode-

It would carry us too far if we were to attempt here more than a rapid survey of the teaching of the last three books of the Politics.

The broad object which Aristotle has in view in the Sixth Book is to uproot the general impression that there are but two or three constitutions—monarchy, oligarchy, and democracy (6 (4). 8. 1294 a 25)—or at the outside four—these three and aristocracy (6 (4). 7. 1293 a 37 sq.)—and that oligarchy and democracy have each of them only one form¹. The statesman who allows himself to fall into

‘Demosthenes,’ says Hug (Studien aus dem classischen Alterthum p. 71), ‘in common with the practical statesmen of his time, treated Oligarchy and Monarchy (i.e. Tyranny) as constitutions similar in principle, and distinguished them sharply from Democracy. There are thus, according to him, virtually only two principal forms of constitution—Democracy and Oligarchy: Mon-

archy is merely an exaggerated form of Oligarchy. . . . This was the dominant view of the fourth century before Christ, so far as the current opinion of the time is concerned. It is connected with the notion which we often find expressed in the writings of Demosthenes and others, that Democracy is the constitution under which the laws rule, or at any rate should rule, while in Mon-

error as to the number of constitutions is, in Aristotle's opinion, lost. He fails to recognize the polity, and to see how different it is in spirit and aim from oligarchy and democracy; he fails to see how vastly superior some forms of oligarchy and democracy are to others, and he runs the risk of travestying each form and sub-form of constitution by giving it an inappropriate organization—by clothing a moderate oligarchy or democracy in the institutions of an extreme one, or *vice versa*. Aristotle's aim, however, probably was not only to save the designer of a State from committing constitutional solecisms, but to draw attention to the less defective varieties of the deviation-forms, and to remind his contemporaries that a democracy might be a democracy without being an extreme democracy.

It is thus that at the very outset of the book we find frequent assertions that there are many constitutions and many forms of oligarchy and democracy. There are as many different forms of constitution as there are possible combinations of possible forms of each of the parts of the State¹. Till the statesman knows how many different forms of oligarchy and democracy there are, he cannot improve existing constitutions, nor can he fit out each constitution with appropriate laws (c. 1. 1289 a 5-15). Each form of oligarchy and democracy reflects the predominance of a different supreme authority: in the moderate democracy, for instance, the cultivators have the predominance and generally those who possess a moderate amount of property, and it is not till 'revenues' (*πρόσοδοι*) are forthcoming from some source or other, which can be used to enable the poorest of the poor to take an active part in public affairs, that demo-

archy and Oligarchy the rulers attend only to their own convictions or caprice, laws being either non-existent or unobserved.' Aristotle combats the doctrine that there are but two constitutions, Oligarchy and Democracy, in 6(4). 3. 1290 a 11 sqq., and his teaching is that Oligarchy is not necessarily at all more lawless than Demo-

cracy: there are forms of each of these constitutions in which the laws are supreme, and also forms in which they are not so.

¹ On the third and fourth chapters, which seem to give two inconsistent accounts of the parts of the State, without distinctly substituting the one for the other, see Appendix A.

cracy becomes extreme. Thus the classes which have the upper hand in these two forms of democracy are quite different from one another. The same thing is then shown to hold of oligarchy also.

Aristotle's object seems to be to make it clear that the extreme oligarchy and democracy differ *toto caelo* from the moderate oligarchy and democracy, and are really more like Tyrannies than the constitution whose name they bear, and that the statesman would go altogether astray who, deceived by the common name and failing to take account of this difference, should organize a moderate democracy or oligarchy as an extreme democracy or oligarchy should be organized. If democracy means freedom and equality for all, then the moderate democracy is in a truer sense democracy than the extreme, for under it both rich and poor share in power (c. 4. 1291 b 31-1292 a 37). He also makes it clear, by connecting the extreme democracy with large cities and abundant revenues (1293 a 2 sq.), that it is only in place here and there. The same thing is shown to be true of the extreme oligarchy, for this also has its appropriate social conditions; it exists where cavalry is the most effective military force, for, in the mind of the Greek, cavalry presupposes a class of ἵπποτρόφοι, and the ἵπποτρόφοι of Greece were the wealthiest of its wealthy men.

Aristotle abstains for the moment from pressing his examination of oligarchy and democracy further. He is content to have distinguished the more moderate from the more extreme forms of each, and to have pointed out the circumstances under which the various forms arise. Plato had spoken in the Republic, as Aristotle remarks in a later book (7 (5). 12. 1316 b 25), as if there were only one form of oligarchy and one of democracy, and hence the care with which Aristotle insists on the fact that each has several forms. It is still a truth, and an important truth, that a democracy of wages-receiving labourers and artisans is a totally different thing from a democracy of small farming proprietors, and that a close hereditary oligarchy, in which the privileged class is very small, is a totally different

thing from an open oligarchy resting on a moderate property-qualification. So far as we can see, Aristotle was the first to call attention to these important facts.

He passes on in the Seventh Chapter from oligarchy and democracy to two other forms of constitution—the aristocracy, commonly so called, and the polity—the latter of which appears to have escaped the notice of those who sought to enumerate the various kinds of constitution (c. 7. 1293 a 40), though there were constitutions to which the name was commonly applied (6 (4). 8. 1293 b 34: 6 (4). 13. 1297 b 24). It is clear that in the ordinary use of language the term ‘aristocracy’ was applied to constitutions which Aristotle did not think worthy of the name. It was applied to combinations of oligarchy and democracy which inclined towards oligarchy, while combinations of oligarchy and democracy inclining towards democracy were called polities (6 (4). 8. 1293 b 34 sqq.: 7 (5). 7. 1307 a 15 sq.). Aristotle explains at some length in the Eighth Chapter of the Sixth Book how the term ‘aristocracy’ had come to be thus used¹, and argues that it ought properly to be reserved for constitutions which take account not only of wealth and numbers, oligarchy and democracy, but also of virtue, and that all constitutions which take account of wealth and numbers only should be called ‘polities.’ In strictness, indeed, the only constitution which, in his view, deserves to be called an aristocracy is that which he has described in the ‘first discussions’ (πρῶτοι λόγοι) of the Politics; still he sees that there are constitutions which pay some regard to virtue in elections to office, and that these need to be distinguished from oligarchies on the one hand and polities on the other; he will not therefore refuse them the name of aristocracies (6 (4). 7. 1293 b 1 sqq.). Nor does he even

2. Mixed constitutions:—
A. the ἀριστοκρατία improperly so called.

¹ How common was the confusion between ἀριστοκρατία (the rule of the best) and oligarchy—a confusion which still appears in our own use of the word ‘aristocracy’—may be seen from c. 12. 1297 a 7 sqq., where Aristotle

complains that even men whose intention was to found aristocratical constitutions resorted to sophistical devices (σοφίσματα) intended covertly to secure preponderance to the rich.

insist in the Seventh Chapter, notwithstanding what he says in the Eighth, on denying the name to those combinations of oligarchy and democracy inclining towards oligarchy, to which it was commonly conceded. Thus he reckons as aristocracies, in addition to the best constitution, not only those constitutions which, like the Carthaginian, take account of virtue, wealth, and numbers, or, like the Lacedaemonian, take account of virtue and numbers only, but also, though he places them lowest on the list (*τρίτον*, 1293 b 20), those combinations of wealth and numbers which incline towards oligarchy (1293 b 14 sqq.: cp. 7 (5). 7. 1307 a 10 sqq.). The aristocracy, we see, is, in all forms of it save the ideal form, a mixed constitution in the sense in which Aristotle uses the term. It is mixed, not because it divides power between king, nobles, and people, but because two or more of the social elements which can justly claim power in a State share power within it.

B. the
Polity.

Next, he turns to the polity, a mixture of wealth and numbers, or of oligarchy and democracy, and therefore better discussed now that oligarchy and democracy have been discussed than before. We have already seen that, in opposition to the common view, Aristotle prefers to regard as polities all mixed constitutions which take account only of wealth and numbers, and not of virtue, though he does not always adopt this classification, but occasionally (e.g. in 6 (4). 7. 1293 b 20 and 7 (5). 7. 1307 a 10 sqq.) falls in with the popular view on the subject.

Having now sufficiently marked off the polity from the aristocracy, Aristotle proceeds (c. 9) to ask, in what way the constitution which is known as a 'polity' comes into being, and how it should be instituted¹. Aristotle holds that the polity deserved more attention than it often received, and he makes it one main object of the Sixth Book to draw attention to this neglected constitution. He describes in detail the way in which it is instituted and organized. The

¹ Cp. c. 1. 1288 b 28, *δεῖ γὰρ μέν τινα τρόπον ἂν σώζοιτο πλεί-
καὶ τὴν δοθεῖσαν δύνασθαι θεωρεῖν στον χρόνον.*
ἐξ ἀρχῆς τε πῶς ἂν γένοιτο, καὶ γενο-

framer of a polity must effect a fusion of oligarchy and democracy. Sometimes he will adopt an institution from both, sometimes he will steer a midway course between them, sometimes he will borrow partly from the one, partly from the other. He may count himself successful, if the constitution framed by him can be called both a democracy and an oligarchy.

A short notice of Tyranny follows, which shows that even 3. Tyranny. Tyranny has more kinds than one; and now Aristotle is free to turn to the question which stands next in the programme. What is the best constitution for most States—
 for those which are not specially favoured by Nature and Fortune nor provided with an exceptionally good system of training? It is that which gives power neither to the very rich nor to the very poor, but to men of moderate means. Men thus situated are more ready than others to obey reason¹; they are capable both of ruling and being ruled, whereas the very rich from childhood upwards will not hear of being ruled, and the very poor are incapable of ruling and are as slavish as the others are masterful. A State of very rich and very poor men is a State of slave-owners and slaves, the former contemptuous, the latter envious; it has nothing of social friendship and unity². It

What is the best constitution for most States?

¹ The meaning of the words, *ἔτι δ' ἡκισθ' οὗτοι φυλαρχοῦσι καὶ βουλευχοῦσιν· ταῦτα δ' ἀμφοτέρω βλαβερά ταῖς πόλεσιν* (c. 11. 1295 b 12), is very doubtful, and they have therefore been passed over in the brief sketch given in the text of the contents of this chapter. Perhaps, however, if we read *φυλαρχοῦσι* (not *φυλαρχοῦσι*), some light is thrown on them by *Oecon.* 2. 1347 a 11, *οἷοι τε τριηραρχεῖν ἢ φυλαρχεῖν ἢ χορηγεῖν ἢ τινα εἰς ἐτέραν τοιαύτην λειτουργίαν ἡμελλόν δαπανᾶν*, where *φυλαρχεῖν* is probably used (see Götting's note, *Aristot. Econ.* p. 102) of persons undertaking the public burden of feasting their fellow-tribesmen (cp. *ἐσιτιάτωρ*, *ἐσιτίασις*). It is possible, therefore, if one may hazard the

suggestion, that Aristotle's meaning in the passage of the *Politics* before us is, that the moderately well-to-do class was little given to undertaking these costly and ruinous public burdens (*Eth. Nic.* 4. 5. 1122 b 19 sqq.), which he himself regards as detrimental to the State. The office of *βουλευχός* ('President of the Boule,' Gilbert, *Griech. Staatsalt.* 2. 123) may have been one of those mentioned in *Pol.* 8 (6). 7. 1321 a 31 sqq., to which the duty of giving great sacrificial feasts attached, and may have so far resembled that of the *ἐσιτιάτωρ*; perhaps, indeed, it was a still more costly office.

² Aristotle evidently has in his mind Plato, *Laws* 756 E, *ἡ μὲν αἵρεσις οὕτω γιγνομένη μέσων ἀνέχεται*

is the nature of the State, however, to be an union of likes and equals, and it succeeds best in being so where the men of moderate means are strong. Lastly, the moderately well-to-do class is the class which is least exposed to overthrow, for neither do those who belong to it covet the goods of others nor are their goods coveted by the needy¹.

Hence the best constitution is that which gives power to this class: the State is very fortunate whose citizens possess enough but not too much. This constitution is alone free from civil trouble (*στάσις*)², for it is the existence of a large moderately well-to-do class in large cities that makes them less liable to civil disturbance, and democracies are for the same reason safer and more durable than oligarchies. A democracy, in fact, is in peril, when this class is absent and the numbers of the poor are in excess. The reason why the constitution which gives power to men of moderate means is of rare occurrence is in part that the moderately well-to-do class is often small, in part that those who have attained a position of supremacy in Greece have hardly ever favoured its introduction: besides, men have everywhere now become so heated by a long continuance of party-conflict that they are indisposed to compromise; they will not share power with those of the opposite party; they prefer either to conquer or to submit.

What constitution is best under given circumstances (*τίς τίσιν αἰσπερή*)? If the cir-

There are, however, cases in which the constitution must be either a democracy or an oligarchy, the social balance declaring itself clearly in either one way or the other. What is to be done in these cases? We thus reach the next question in the programme. What constitution is

μοναρχικῆς καὶ δημοκρατικῆς πολιτείας, ἥς αἰεὶ δεῖ μεσευεῖν τὴν πολιτείαν· δοῦλοι γὰρ ἂν καὶ δεσπόται οὐκ ἂν ποτε γένοιτο φίλοι.

¹ The *μέσοι πολῖται* of Aristotle are, of course, not to be confounded with a modern 'middle class.' They are 'moderately well-to-do' people. Still we may compare with Aristotle's picture of the *μέσοι* James Mill's enthu-

siastic description of the middle class of a modern State in his Essay on Government (quoted by Lord Macaulay, Miscellaneous Writings I. 315).

² 6 (4). II. 1296 a 7, *μόνη γὰρ ἀστασίαστος*: contrast Plato, Rep. 464 D, where Plato says of those who have all things in common—*ὅθεν δὴ ὑπάρχει τοῖς ἀστασιαστοῖς εἶναι*.

most suitable to those who are specially situated (τίς πολι- cumstances
τεία τίσι καὶ πόλα συμφέρει πόλοις)? favour olig-
archy or
democracy,
how should
the law-
giver pro-
ceed? If
they favour
polity, how
should the
polity be
consti-
tuted?

The broad principle to be kept in view is this, that those who are in favour of the constitution must be stronger than those who are against it. Every State is made up of quality (free birth, wealth, education, noble birth) and quantity (numbers). Quality and quantity may be in different hands, and those who have the advantage in point of numbers may not surpass the few in this respect so much as they are surpassed by them in quality. In this case the conditions point to oligarchy, and one form or another of oligarchy will tend to prevail according to the nature and degree of the superiority possessed by the few. If, on the other hand, the few are more surpassed in numbers than they surpass the rest in quality, then the conditions point to democracy, and to that one of the various forms of democracy which answers to the variety of demos that happens to be in excess. Still in either case the legislator may and should win the men of moderate means to the side of the constitution. If the social conditions oblige him to found an oligarchy, he should keep them in view; if a democracy, he should constitute it so as to conciliate them.

So far we have had to do with the case of the rich or the poor possessing a decided social predominance, but now we will take the case of the men of moderate means being predominant. Wherever this class preponderates over rich and poor put together or over either of these classes singly, there the legislator is no longer forced to make his State a democracy or an oligarchy; he is free to establish a durable polity¹, for the rich will never combine

¹ 6 (4). 12. 1296 b 39, ἐνταῦθ' ἐνδέχεται πολιτείαν εἶναι μόνιμον. These words have usually been translated—'here it is possible for a durable constitution' (not Polity) 'to exist'; and this rendering may be correct, for democracy and oligarchy are elsewhere said not to be durable constitutions (7 (5). 1. 1302 a 4, οὐδεμία γὰρ μόνιμος

ἐκ τῶν τοιούτων πολιτειῶν); but we look for the mention of a definite form of constitution in this passage, for not only are democracy and oligarchy mentioned in the corresponding sentences, 1296 b 26, 32, but the question under consideration is, τίς πολιτεία τίσι συμφέρει (cp. 8 (6). 1. 1317 a 10, ποία μὲν οὖν δημοκρατία πρὸς ποίαν

with the poor against the moderately well-to-do. A constitution which gives power to this class is the fairest and most inclusive possible, for you cannot give rich and poor successive turns of office—they distrust each other too much—the only plan is to set up an arbitrating authority between them, and the midway class is the natural arbitrator¹.

The more wisely the polity is mixed, the more durable it will be. It is a mistake to do what many even of those whose intention is to found aristocratical constitutions do². They are not content with the error of giving too much power to the rich; they commit the further error of trying to deceive the demos. For false goods end sooner or later in real ills: the rich encroach, when the constitution gives them the upper hand (7 (5). 7. 1307 a 19), and their encroachments are more fatal to constitutions than those of the poor³. Men sought by means of these devices

ἀρμόττει πόλιν, ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ποία τῶν ὀλιγαρχικῶν ποίῳ πλήθει, καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν δὲ πολιτειῶν τίς συμφέρει τίσιν, εἴρηται πρότερον). On the whole, therefore, it seems likely that *πολιτεία* is used in 1296 b 40 in the more restricted sense of Polity.

¹ Cp. de An. 2. 11. 424 a 6, τὸ γὰρ μέσον κριτικόν· γίνεται γὰρ πρὸς ἑκάτερον αὐτῶν θάτερον τῶν ἄκρων. It is evidently because the relations of rich and poor in ancient Greece were very unfriendly and unsatisfactory, that Aristotle attaches so much importance to the influence of the moderately well-to-do class. Under other social conditions its value might well be less. Aristotle notices elsewhere (7 (5). 10. 1310 b 40 sqq.), that the institution of Kingship in its best moments served a similar purpose, doing justice between rich and poor and saving each of these classes from being wronged by the other. Monarchy has sometimes discharged this function in the history of modern Europe.

² Charondas is referred to a little further on, 1297 a 23. But perhaps Plato is also among those who are alluded to. In Laws 764 A he makes attendance at the assembly compulsory on the members of the first and second property-classes on pain of a fine of ten drachmae, but he imposes no fine for non-attendance on the members of the third and fourth property-classes, and leaves them free to attend or not, except when the rulers command the attendance of every one. We have here one of the *σοφίσματα* referred to by Aristotle (Pol. 6 (4). 13. 1297 a 17 sqq.). Contrast also the language of Plato in Rep. 459 C.

³ Contrast the saying which Menander puts into the mouth of one of his characters—

ἐμὲ δ' ἀδικεῖτω πλούσιος καὶ μὴ πένης·

ῥᾶον φέρειν γὰρ κριττόνων τυραννίδα

(Fab. Inc. Fragm. 68: Meineke, Fragm. Com. Gr. 4. 253).

covertly to discourage the participation of the poor in the popular assembly, in magistracies, in dicasteries, in the possession of heavy arms and the practice of military exercise. Democracies in their turn resorted to similar methods against the rich.

Clearly, if the polity is to be fairly compounded, measures favouring the participation of the rich in political life should be combined with measures favouring the participation of the poor, for thus all will have a share of power. The citizen-body, however, should consist of none but those possessing heavy arms¹; not that any definite and invariable property-qualification can be fixed; its amount must be the highest which will allow those who are enfranchised by the constitution to outnumber those who are not. The poor will be quiet enough, even though they do not share in office, if no one outrages or plunders them. A little kindly considerateness goes a long way with the poor. Thus they are apt to refuse to serve in time of war, if no promise of maintenance is made them, but, if maintenance is given, they serve cheerfully enough.

Those who have borne heavy arms may perhaps be included in the citizen-body, as well as those who are actually bearers of them: in Malis both classes formed part of the citizen-body, but only those actually serving could be elected to State offices.

If we look back to the earlier days of Greece—Aristotle is always careful to claim the sanction of antiquity for his proposals, when he can²—we shall find that in the time which succeeded the era of kingship political power rested with those who fought for the State—originally with the knights, for the knights were the most effective soldiers; then when cities grew larger (cp. 7 (5). 5. 1305 a 18 sq.) and the hoplites learnt better how to act together in organized bodies, the oligarchies were succeeded by what were once

¹ As the polity is evidently conceived to give rights to the poor as well as the rich, and therefore would seem to include poor men among its citizens, we must ap-

parently infer that poor men would be found even among the hoplites (cp. 8 (6). 7. 1321 a 12).

² Cp. 4 (7). 1329 a 40 sqq., and 8 (6). 4. 1318 b 6 sqq.

called democracies, but would now be called polities. The moral of this historical retrospect appears to be, that if we follow the example of the ancient State, and give power to the class which is most effective in war, we shall now give it to the moderately well-to-do class.

Aristotle, we see, feels that Oligarchy is really almost as much an anachronism in his own day as Kingship. He sides with Theramenes, not with Critias. Plato has far more faith in the rule of a few than Aristotle. Aristotle is more alive to the necessity that the rulers of a State should have force on their side. To him the rule even of the Few Wise must inevitably be an insecure rule, for it is not in human nature to be content to see power always in the same hands, unless indeed there is a vast and unmistakable disparity of excellence, and the scanty body of rulers is not only intellectually and morally, but even physically, far above the ruled¹. His principle is that the well-wishers of a constitution must be stronger than those who wish it ill; and this will not often be the case unless the holders of power are a fairly numerous body.

Reasons
which led
Aristotle
to advocate
the Polity.
Nature of
the extreme
democracy.

We shall best understand why Aristotle, like Theramenes and probably Thucydides before him, was in favour of the polity, if we bear in mind the characteristics of extreme democracy in Greece. In the extreme democracy—the example of Athens is naturally especially present to Aristotle's mind²—the assembly and dicasteries were everything, and their meetings consequently needed to be very frequent.

¹ 4 (7). 14. 1332 b 12 sqq. : cp. 2. 5. 1264 b 6 sqq.

² Democracies may well have existed more extreme than the Athenian, but it is hardly doubtful that, in Aristotle's opinion, most of the characteristics of a *τελευταία δημοκρατία* were traceable in that of Athens. We need not appeal in proof of this to the language of the last chapter of the Second Book of the Politics (1274 a 9 sqq.)—a chapter the authenticity of which is open to question—nor to the saying about

the Athenians ascribed to him in Diog. Laert. 5. 17, for it would seem from Pol. 6 (4). 4. 1292 a 7 that the *τελευταία δημοκρατία* existed wherever demagogues were found, and Aristotle can hardly have held that demagogues did not exist at Athens. It is true that the *γραφὴ παρανόμων* still subsisted there, so that the laws were nominally supreme, but it is questionable how far it was regarded by Aristotle as an effectual check upon the demagogues.

The better-to-do section of the citizens had property or business to attend to, and even if they resided in the city or near it, and were not often called away to a distance, would find it hard to spare the time to be present at meetings which recurred so frequently; hence the poorer citizens, who had no property to distract their attention, who were well content with the State-pay, and who were always on the spot, seem in practice to have furnished far the largest contingent to the assembly and dicasteries. Aristotle even speaks as if the rich often ceased to attend (6 (4). 6. 1293 a 7 sq.: 6 (4). 14. 1298 b 13 sqq.). They were not compelled to attend by law; they could ill spare the time from their business engagements; and the result was that the management of State-affairs was abandoned to a needy class led by demagogues. At Athens, in the earlier part of the Peloponnesian War, the assembly was probably very differently constituted, for the well-to-do class had not yet been thinned by the war (Pol. 7 (5). 3. 1303 a 8 sq.: Isocr. de Pace, § 88); but in the days of Plato and Aristotle most of the citizens seem to have been very poor. It is true that even then the Athenian assembly, like our own House of Commons, had great traditions; it was also still susceptible of kindly and generous impulses. We need only read the interesting comparison of the Athenian and Carthaginian democracies which we find in the Political Precepts of Plutarch (c. 3) to see this, for his remarks appear to apply both to the fourth and fifth centuries. We have no class among ourselves which corresponds at all to the poorest class of Athenian citizen—a class which, pauperised as it was, constantly sat in judgment on the plays and music and poetry of men of genius, hung on the lips of the best orators, and recognized even in its decline the greatness of Demosthenes and Menander.

Still it could not be well for a State that its supreme deliberative authority should be an immense and unwieldy gathering, largely composed of very poor men and guided by demagogues. The wonder is that the rich suffered as little as they did. In the days of the Athenian Empire the

contributions of the dependent allies served to diminish the demands upon them, and it was not probably till the latter part of the fifth century that the wealthier class felt the full pressure of State-burdens. Isocrates describes how in his youth men displayed their wealth, while in the later years of his life they were glad to conceal it¹. Perhaps if we read between the lines of Xenophon's essay *De Vectigalibus*, we shall see how desirous the rich were of pointing out means of increasing the State-revenue otherwise than at their own expense². The moderately well-to-do seem indeed to have suffered more than the wealthiest class, till Demosthenes interfered and re-adjusted the pressure of taxation. Some burdens, it is evident, were far more willingly borne than others: men seem to have been ready enough to undertake choregiae and other liturgies which brought them prominently before the public (7 (5). 8. 1309 a 17): the eisphora, on the other hand, was extremely unpopular (8 (6). 5. 1320 a 20). Ten times more bitterness of feeling, however, was produced in all probability by the occasional resort of the dicasteries to confiscation, than by any kind of taxation (8 (6). 5. 1320 a 4 sqq.). The paid dicast who lived by his calling was naturally tempted, when revenues from dependent allies or State-mines or similar sources fell short, to ensure his own subsistence by confiscating the property of some unpopular rich man for the benefit of the State. How often this occurred, we have no means of knowing, but the rich can never have felt absolutely secure at Athens. They seem, if we may trust Theopompus³, to have often lived self-indulgent, dissolute lives, for which they had the excuse that they were little more than ciphers in the State; and the poorer freemen who were its masters naturally enough followed in the track of their betters and demanded that the State should provide generously for their amusements. Demosthenes might galvanize a society of this kind into

¹ *De Antid.* § 159 sq.: *Areopag.* § 35. 40 and 6. 1.

² *Fr.* 238: cp. *Isocr. de Antid.*

³ See, for instance, *De Vect.* 4. § 286 sq.

life by his eloquence, but he could not restore its vanished energies. The Athenian people of his day still retained their intellectual acuteness and their quickness of perception, but political greatness is more a question of character than intelligence, and Demades was not far from the truth, when he described Athens as a mere shadow of her former self.

The extreme democracy, however, had other faults in the eyes of Aristotle than its treatment of the rich, and its habit of catering at their expense for the comfort and amusement of the poor. He held its worst fault to be its lawlessness. It destroyed the authority of the magistrates and the law, giving supremacy instead to the resolutions of the assembly, or in other words to the will of the demagogue and the humour of the moment. The State, he held, should be through its law the guide of man's life: the extreme democracy made it the mere creature of the momentary impulse of its members, and nullified its influence by insisting on every man being allowed to live as he pleased (8 (6). 2. 1317 b 10 sqq.: 7 (5). 9. 1310 a 25 sqq.).

The root of the evil, Aristotle thought, lay in the extreme poverty of the mass of the holders of power (8 (6). 5. 1320 a 33, *δεῖ τὸν ἀληθινῶς δημοτικὸν ὄραν ὅπως τὸ πλῆθος μὴ λίσαν ἄπορον ᾗ, τοῦτο γὰρ αἴτιον τοῦ μοχθηρὰν εἶναι τὴν δημοκρατίαν*), which obliged them to minister to their own needs and to consult their own interests with as little regard to law as possible. Hence Aristotle advises genuine friends of democracy to purge the citizen-body of its pauper-element by giving the pauperised classes a helping hand, starting them in trade or farming, and thus enabling them to improve their position by industry. The surest way, how-
The Polity.
 ever, to secure a sound constitution in which law would be supreme, and the magistrates would have real authority, was (wherever the social conditions were favourable) to institute a polity. Power must be given to those who would be neither too poor to possess self-respect nor rich enough to be overbearing. Such a class Aristotle found in

the moderately well-to-do or hoplite class. A citizen-body composed of the hoplites of the State would be neither too narrow and consequently insecure, nor too inclusive and consequently inferior.

The broad outline of the Polity is already traced in the Nicomachean Ethics (8. 12. 1160 a 31 sqq.), where the name of Timocracy is suggested as preferable to that of Polity, and in the Second Book of the Politics, where we are told that it is a midway form between oligarchy and democracy, and that the hoplite class form the citizen-body in it (Pol. 2. 6. 1265 b 26 sqq.), a class which, we elsewhere learn (8 (6). 7. 1321 a 12), belongs rather to the well-to-do than the poor. We are further told in the Third Book (c. 7) that the military citizen-body which is supreme in the polity rules for the common advantage, and in c. 17 that offices are 'distributed in it among the well-to-do according to desert,' which seems to imply that they are filled by election.

We obtain a far more detailed picture of the polity, however, if we put together the scattered notices of it which we find in the Sixth Book of the Politics.

The assembly of a polity, we gather, would not have a very great deal to do¹. Membership of it would be confined to those who possessed a moderate property-qualification (probably that implied in the possession of heavy arms), and it would have the right to decide questions of war and peace and to review the conduct of magistrates at the expiration of their term of office². It would differ from the assemblies of most democracies, and even from that of Solonian Athens, in resting on a property qualification³;

¹ We find this confirmed by Pol. 2. 11. 1273 a 4 sqq., where the Carthaginian constitution is criticised as giving the popular assembly more power than a polity should give it.

² If we adopt the reading ἀριστοκρατία ἢ πολιτεία in 6 (4). 14. 1298 b 7.

³ We hear of democracies in which there was a property qualification for office (6 (4). 4. 1291 b

39), but not often of democracies in which there was a property qualification for membership of the assembly. We see, however, from 6 (4). 9. 1294 b 3 sq. that there were democracies in which a property-qualification of this kind existed. It perhaps existed at Aphytis and in other agricultural democracies (8 (6). 4. 1319 a 14 sqq. : cp. 6 (4). 6. 1292 b 25 sqq.).

still we learn from a passage of the *Politics* (6 (4). 13. 1297 b 24) that the constitutions which were known as polities in Aristotle's day had in earlier times been called democracies. In the later form of democracy the assembly met often; in the polity its meetings would be rare, and it would have little temptation to set itself above the law.

The magistrates of a polity, on the other hand, would have considerable powers. None but citizens would be eligible for office, and the holders of office might, it would seem, be either elected or chosen by lot, or the two plans might be combined, or again some offices might be filled in the one way and others in the other. The plan by which successive sections of the citizen-body elected, suited well with a polity¹; and the election might be made out of all the citizens or only a part of them². It is evident that a polity would vary a good deal according to the mode in which its magistracies were filled. There would commonly perhaps be no separate property-qualification for office in a polity, though we hear of one polity in which a property-qualification for office existed, even after it had ceased to be 'a somewhat oligarchical kind of polity' (7 (5). 7. 1307 a 27 sqq.). The magistrates of a polity would probably be less wealthy than those of the moderate democracy (8 (6). 4. 1318 b 27 sqq.) or of Solonian Athens, for the polity is conceived to consist largely of men 'like and equal' (6 (4). 11. 1295 b 25 sqq.).

The judicial organization of a polity would be such as to give a share of power both to the rich and to the poor. Either some of its dicasteries would be differently organized from others, the jurors of one sort of dicastery being taken from the general body of citizens, and those of the other from a special part of the citizen-body, or the two classes of jurors

¹ The arrangement by which at Carthage one of the most important magistracies of the State was appointed by self-elected Pentarchies holding office for an exceptionally long term is said to be suitable rather to an oligarchy

than a polity (*Pol.* 2. 11. 1273 a 13 sqq.).

² See the passage 6 (4). 15. 1300 a 34 sqq.: it belongs, however, to a part of the Fifteenth Chapter the text of which is very uncertain.

would be combined in the same dicastery—the selection of jurors being made either by choice or lot or by the two methods combined. Measures would be taken to secure the presence of both rich and poor on the dicasteries, but there would be no very poor members, for the very poor class would be excluded from citizenship.

We see that the polity was not without some strikingly popular features: for instance, all magistrates might be appointed by lot, and the payment of jurors would be permissible if the rich were compelled by fine to serve on the dicasteries. Still the powers of the assembly were small and those of the magistrates large. Its most prominent characteristics, however, were its legality, its freedom from class-government, and the equality of its citizens. It was not a society of 'slave-owners and slaves' (δεσποτῶν καὶ δούλων πόλις), but of freemen and men 'alike and equal' (6 (4). 11. 1295 b 21 sqq.). It would differ in this from the moderate democracy and from the moderate oligarchy¹, and still more from such oligarchies as those of Larissa or Abydos (7 (5). 6. 1305 b 28 sqq.), where the magistrates were oligarchical grandees who owed their election to the people and thus needed to court its favour. Oligarchies such as that of the Pontic Heracleia (1305 b 34 sq.), where the dicasteries were at one time composed of those outside the governing class (πολίτευμα), would also probably be quite unlike a polity.

The State sketched by Plato in his *Laws* comes far nearer to the type of a polity than any of these; Aristotle says himself that it seemed meant for a polity (2. 6. 1265 b 26). But Plato has not Aristotle's confidence in the hoplite class: the power which he gives them with one hand he takes back with the other, and the best of the richer citizens are made the virtual rulers of the State. It is an oligarchical aristocracy rather than a polity of like and equal citizens.

The purer type of the so-called aristocracy, again, would differ from the polity in giving a larger recognition to the Good. It gave power, in Aristotelian language, to virtue,

¹ Nearly as this approached it (8 (6). 6. 1320 b 21).

wealth, and numbers, or to virtue and numbers: the polity gave power to wealth and numbers. Elsewhere, it is true, Aristotle implies that military virtue bears sway in the polity, so that here also virtue of a kind obtains recognition, but it is virtue of a humbler and more popular type than that which finds a place in an aristocracy. The heroic few would have less power in a polity than they had, for instance, in the Lacedaemonian State, when it was at its best. We can guess the probable character and policy of a polity from the description which Aristotle gives of the hoplite-citizens who would be its guiding spirits. The tone of public opinion in it would be neither hectoring nor servile, but self-respecting and orderly. Its citizens would be under no temptation to plunder the rich or to oppress those poorer than themselves, for they would sympathize with both classes. They would willingly accept the supremacy of law, which tended to be impaired where the very rich or the very poor had things their own way.

The class of moderately well-to-do men was probably less numerous in proportion to other classes in Greek States than it is in many modern States, for the professions were little developed, and trade was largely in the hands of resident aliens, but it was more military in character and might well be thought more capable of imposing its will on other classes. In discouraging the commercial and industrial spirit, Aristotle unconsciously did much to impede the development of the class which he favoured.

The polity must not be confused with another constitution which Aristotle frequently praises, and in which the few *ἐπικρατοὶς* who rule rest content with the honour that rule brings and leave gain to the Many, both sections of the State being thus satisfied and political equilibrium secured (Eth. Nic. 8. 16. 1163 b 5 sqq.: 9. 6. 1167 a 35 sqq.: Pol. 7 (5). 8. 1308 b 31 sqq.: 8 (6). 4. 1319 a 1 sqq.: 2. 7. 1267 b 5 sqq.). Under this form, and this form only, says Aristotle (7 (5). 8. 1308 b 38), is a combination of aristocracy and democracy possible; for, office bringing no gain but only honour, the Many will willingly abandon it to men of standing and

position (*γνώριμοι*), and the democratic measure of opening office to all may be resorted to, while nevertheless power will practically be in the hands of men of worth and capacity. A polity is not an union of a few *ἐπικρείς* and a passive Many, but a State of free and equal citizens.

The polity, however, is not applicable everywhere.

The polity, then, is most in place, and thrives best, in States where the moderately well-to-do are numerous. It is not equally applicable everywhere: some States are doomed by their social composition to be oligarchies and others democracies, and, more than this, to be oligarchies or democracies of a particular type, some moderate, others extreme. Hence it becomes one of the duties of Political Science to point out how each of the less satisfactory constitutions should be organized. The Seventh Book indeed goes further than this, for it also deals with the question how constitutions should be administered in order to be durable.

Contents of the remainder of the Sixth Book.

Aristotle, however, has not yet by any means done with the satisfactory constitutions: the last three chapters of the Sixth Book deal with all forms of constitution (except perhaps Kingship and Tyranny¹), and the Seventh Book deals with all forms without any exception. By the time we reach the threshold of these three chapters, we have learnt when each constitution is in place, and we have also learnt something about the structure of each, but we have not as yet penetrated into the minutiae of their organization. The last three chapters of the Sixth Book carry us for the first time deep into the *technique* of politics; we learn that the excellence of a constitution depends on the way in which its deliberative, judicial, and magisterial elements are organized, and that these are differently organized in every form and sub-form of constitution. Which mode of constituting them is appropriate in each case, Aristotle points out in detail.

The deliberative element.

His account of the various ways in which the deliberative element was organized in Greek States is especially significant and interesting. We see that the functions of the

¹ *Μοναρχία* is, however, referred to in c. 15. 1299 b 22.

deliberative extended not only to questions of peace and war and of alliance, or to questions of legislation, or the review of the conduct of magistrates, but also to the infliction of the punishments of death, exile, and confiscation, and that all these great powers might be confided to a single magistracy or distributed among a number of magistracies, or some might be given to magistrates and others to the whole body of citizens, or the whole body of citizens might be intrusted with all. The whole citizen-body, again, might be content to act in successive sections, or might exercise its power through the collective popular assembly, which would thus in its gathered thousands have to deal with delicate questions of criminal justice, no less than with broad political issues. This was the mode in which, according to Aristotle, the deliberative was organized in an extreme democracy. In an extreme oligarchy, on the other hand, all these high functions were concentrated in the hands of a small knot of hereditary oligarchs.

It is not wonderful that Aristotle should seek to amend these more advanced forms of deliberative organization. He advises the extreme democracy, which enabled the poor to attend the assembly by means of pay, also to enforce by penalties the attendance of the rich ; or to give deliberative authority to a body composed of members selected by election or lot in equal numbers from each tribe or section of the State ; or only to give pay to a portion of the poor sufficiently large to hold its own against the rich. Aristotle evidently feels that the numbers of the deliberative body in an extreme democracy made wise deliberation impossible. It would also seem from his account, as we have already noticed, that the rich often absented themselves from the deliberations of the popular assembly.

His advice to oligarchies, on the other hand, is to associate the people to some extent in their deliberations. Either certain persons should be chosen from the people by the authorities to join in deliberation, or deliberative power should be allowed to a popular assembly on the condition that no subjects shall be discussed except those

on which decrees have been proposed by a Board of Nomophylakes or Probouloi, or that the people shall vote either the resolutions placed before them by the authorities or nothing contrary to them; or again the popular assembly might be allowed only a consultative voice. He advises oligarchies to adopt the rule of making the voice of the people definitive in voting against any proposal, but not in giving an affirmative vote. The rule followed in polities should, in fact, be reversed, for in them the few had final authority in negating a proposal, while if they voted affirmatively, their vote had to be confirmed by the people.

The magis-
tracies.

Aristotle turns in the next chapter (the fifteenth) to the next of the three 'component elements of all constitutions'¹—the magistracies of the State. This element also may assume many different forms. The magistracies of a State may be few or many, they may differ in province and function, and also in term of tenure; their holders may be selected in different ways, and from and by different persons. 'In respect of all these matters the scientific student of politics ought to be able to point out with exactness, how many different arrangements are possible, and then to match each with the constitution to which it is appropriate, so as to make it clear what magistracies are suitable to each kind of constitution' (c. 15. 1299 a 12).

The first question is, what is a magistracy? A discussion follows which results in the conclusion that a magistrate is broadly one who has to deliberate on any matters, and to come to a decision, and issue orders, the last of these functions being more especially characteristic of a magistrate. This definition applies to all officers of State, but perhaps not to priests, though they are included under the head

¹ Μόρια τῶν πολιτειῶν πασῶν, c. 14. 1297 b 37. Bonitz (Ind. 612 b 13 sq.) takes πολιτεία here to mean 'universitas civium,' and it is true that what are here called μόρια τῶν πολιτειῶν are called μόρια τῶν πόλεων in 6 (4). 4. 1291 a 25. But we have μέρος τι τῆς

πολιτείας (explained by ἀρχήν τινα) in 7 (5). 1. 1301 b 18, and perhaps πολιτεία here bears its usual meaning. Μόρια is often used of things 'quae naturam alicuius rei constituunt ac distinguunt' (Bon. Ind. 473 b 55 sq.).

of magistrates in the Eighth Book (8 (6). 8. 1322 b 18 sqq.); on the other hand it clearly includes military and naval officers (cp. 8 (6). 8. 1322 a 34 sqq.). The 'giving of orders' which constitutes a magistrate must be taken to refer to public affairs only; otherwise the head of a household, or the manager of a farm or factory, would have to be accounted a magistrate.

Aristotle turns from this question, which is one rather of theoretical than practical interest, to the more pressing one, what magistracies are necessary, and what are not indeed necessary but of service, in a good constitution. It is desirable to ascertain this, for in small States magistracies have to be amalgamated, and it is well to know which magistracies belong to either class, in order that we may know which may be amalgamated and which may not (1299 b 10 sq.). Then again, we need to know what subjects should be given over to special magistrates with powers extending over the whole of the territory, and in what cases magistracies should be, not specialized, but local—that is to say, confined in authority to a particular district, but with full competence to deal with all matters arising in that district; and in what cases, again, it is better to give jurisdiction over particular classes of persons (e.g. women and children), and not over particular subjects of administration. Another point to be studied is, whether magistracies vary with the constitution (like the deliberative), or whether they do not. This is a question which Aristotle answers at once. They not only vary, but some magistracies are peculiar to particular constitutions and do not exist outside them.

Such then are the questions which arise as to magistracies, but Aristotle proposes to discuss only one of them at present—the mode in which their holders are selected. He enumerates with elaborate care all the possibilities of variation in this matter—variations in the persons who appoint, in those from whom the selection must be made, and in the way in which it is made—and then he points out which variety of organization is appropriate to each constitution. He adds the following words at the close of

the investigation: οἱ μὲν οὖν τρόποι τῶν περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς τοσοῦτοι τὸν ἀριθμὸν εἰσι, καὶ διήρηνται κατὰ τὰς πολιτείας οὕτως· τίνα δὲ τίσι συμφέρει καὶ πῶς δεῖ γίνεσθαι τὰς καταστάσεις, ἅμα ταῖς δυνάμεσι τῶν ἀρχῶν καὶ τίνας εἰσὶν, ἔσται φανερόν (1300 b 5 sqq.). Thus he would appear to reserve his treatment of the questions, what magistracies are suitable to particular communities, and in what manner magistracies ought to be filled¹—questions which he had marked out for discussion in c. 15. 1299 a 12—till he has studied the subject of the functions and nature of the various magistracies.

This subject is dealt with in the concluding chapter of the Eighth Book. Here Aristotle inquires (8 (6). 8. 1321 b 4 sqq.), how many and what magistracies should find a place in the State, and what should be their functions. We need to know this, he says, because a State cannot exist without those magistracies which are necessary, and cannot exist nobly without those which contribute to orderliness and seemliness of life. Besides, in small States it is necessary to amalgamate magistracies, and it is desirable to determine which should be amalgamated and which should not².

The result of Aristotle's investigation is a list of magistracies and of the subjects with which they deal, and a classification of magistracies in three classes—those which are most necessary, those which are necessary but of a more dignified character, and those which exist to secure seemliness and good order (εὐκοσμία).

We may probably infer from Aristotle's own statements that one of his aims in making this classification is to indicate that magistracies belonging to different grades ought not to be amalgamated. But he has other reasons besides this for distinguishing between necessary magistracies and higher ones. Access to magistracies belonging to the former category might often with advantage be con-

¹ If we refer to the previous chapter, we shall see that questions similar to those which he thus postpones, so far as they

refer to magistracies, have been treated in relation to the deliberative (c. 14. 1298 b 13 sqq.).

² Cp. 6 (4). 15. 1299 b 10 sqq.

ceded to those who would have to be excluded from magistracies belonging to the latter: thus in 8 (6). 6. 1320 b 24 the framer of a moderate oligarchy is advised to make the property-qualification for merely necessary magistracies lower than for more important ones: the supreme magistracies of the State, on the contrary, should be reserved for those privileged by the constitution (8 (6). 7. 1321 a 31: cp. 7 (5). 8. 1309 a 30 sq.). Aristotle is always, however, careful to mark off the necessary from the noble; it is in this spirit that he relegates to the 'necessary' (or commercial) agora in his ideal city certain magistracies belonging to the necessary class (4 (7). 12. 1331 b 6 sqq.). Still the question uppermost in his mind is that of the policy to be followed in the amalgamation of magistracies, and some of the most important passages of the last chapter of the Eighth Book seem to be those in which he points out, for the benefit of small States¹, that while there is no harm in their placing the charge of military affairs in the hands of a single magistracy (1322 a 38), and the same thing also holds of sacred functions (1322 b 22 sqq.), it would be a mistake to give the law-court which tries and condemns the invidious additional functions of executing the sentence and assuming the custody of prisoners—even these two functions, indeed, are better separated—and that it would also be a mistake not to part the magistracy which audits from those which administer the public money.

We expect that, having now studied the subject of the functions of magistracies, he will go on in conformity with his promise (6 (4). 15. 1300 b 7 sq.), to point out what is the best way of selecting those who are to fill them, but this he does not do². Some light is, however, thrown in the chapter before us (c. 8. 1322 b 37 sqq.) on the other

¹ This attention to the special difficulties of small city-States reminds us that Aristotle himself belonged to one. Many of the pupils for whom he wrote probably also belonged to small States; but irrespectively of this, his view always is that Political Science,

if it is to deserve the name, must be ready and able to show how the best is to be made of all sorts of circumstances.

² The Eighth Book is incomplete, as its closing words show—*περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἀρχῶν, ὡς ἐν τύπῳ, σχεδὸν εἴρηται περὶ πασῶν.*

question referred to in 1300 b 7 sq., 'what magistracies are suitable to particular communities,' and an answer is tacitly given to the question raised in the Sixth Book (c. 15. 1299 b 14 sqq.), what offices should be differentiated in respect of place, and what in respect of subjects or persons. The agoranomi, astynomi, and agronomi have special places under their control: other magistracies have to do with special subjects, and others again—for instance, the *γυναικονόμοι* and *παιδονόμοι*—have special classes of persons placed under their charge.

The judiciary.

The last chapter of the Sixth Book deals with the third and last of the elements of the constitution—the judiciary. It enumerates the various ways of constituting the judiciary known to the Greek State, and points out which are appropriate to each constitution.

We thus reach the end of a Book which more than any other in the *Politics* insists on thoroughness in the study of constitutions. The scientific student of politics must not only know under what conditions each form and sub-form of constitution is in place, but must know how the deliberative, the judicial, and the magisterial elements should be organized in each. He must know both the 'when' and the 'how' of each form and sub-form. No previous Greek composition had taken equal pains to throw light on the path of the practical statesman in Greece. The principle that the constitution of a State is dependent on its social conditions had probably never been enunciated with anything like equal clearness before, and there was perhaps at least as much novelty in the view that the scientific student of politics must be no dreamer of airy fancies, but versed in every detail of constitutional lore.

Sketch of the contents of the Seventh Book:—
1. Plato's account of the causes

The Seventh Book investigates the causes of change in constitutions and the means of preserving them. Plato had already had his attention drawn to the subject of constitutional change. In the Eighth and Ninth Books of the *Republic* he indulges for a moment in the dream that

his ideal State and ideal man have come into existence, and traces in imagination the successive steps by which the organization which secures internal harmony and happiness to each is first impaired and then absolutely overthrown, and Desire enthroned in the place of Reason. His vigorous series of sketches is mainly designed to teach the lesson, that the willing acceptance of the rule of Reason by the two lower elements of the State and the soul is the true source of happiness, and that the less there is of justice in a State or a soul, the less there is of happiness.

We need only read the conclusion of the Seventh Book of the *Politics* (1316 a 1 sqq.)¹ to see in how totally different a spirit Aristotle studies politics, especially in this part of his work. The Eighth and Ninth Books of the *Republic* are intended to support and enforce the central lesson of the dialogue; they are too full of 'tendency' to be coldly exact to history; they have nothing of Aristotle's zoological precision. Even if Plato had been capable of this, it would have been out of place in the *Republic*.

The *Republic*, we feel, has a great practical end in view—to recall the State and the individual to a right view of the importance and nature of Justice—and we can forgive it, if in its language on the subject of constitutional change it to a certain extent sacrifices historical accuracy. Aristotle, however, who is often a somewhat unsympathetic critic, loses sight of this, and bluntly enumerates the points in which Plato's account of the subject falls short. He felt,

¹ This passage is tacked on rather strangely at the close of the book, just after a summary of the subjects treated in it, and without any final summary of its contents to wind it up. It seems too characteristic of Aristotle not to be his, but it may be of a somewhat later date than the rest of the book. Its criticism of Plato is unusually blunt, outspoken, and decided. It is in this chapter that we find two statements about Carthage—that it is a democracy,

and that it was once under a tyranny—which it is difficult to reconcile with the account of Carthage in the Second Book. The Fifth Book, as we have it, closes in a very similar way with a criticism of certain views about Music expressed by the Platonic Socrates in the *Republic*. This criticism also, no less than that at the close of the Seventh, might easily be detached from the context in which it stands.

no doubt, the great practical importance of correct views respecting it, and we must also remember that this was one of the many fields of inquiry in which he had broken fresh ground, and that his natural combativeness was heightened by the eagerness of a first discoverer.

His objections to Plato's account of constitutional change are, briefly stated, the following. The cause which the Platonic Socrates gives for the change from the best constitution to a Timocracy like the Lacedaemonian is one common not only to all other constitutions but to the whole world of Becoming (*τῶν γινομένων πάντων*, 1316 a 13), whereas we need to study with reference to each constitution the causes of change special to it (*ἰδία*)¹. Then again, his whole account of constitutional changes presupposes that constitutions change into the form which is most akin to each. More often, they change into an opposite form². Then again, his series closes with tyranny. But does not tyranny change into any other constitution? Again, he speaks as if the change to oligarchy was always due to the holders of office becoming lovers of money, and as if the change to democracy was always due to well-to-do men becoming poor. The rise of oligarchy is rather due to a feeling among the rich that those who have nothing cannot fairly claim as much power as those who have much. And as to democracy, it may come into being without any one becoming poorer than he was before, if the numbers of the poor increase. It is only when some leading man becomes impoverished that constitutional change is apt to ensue, and then the change is not necessarily a change to democracy. There are many other causes besides impoverishment for the rise of democracy—the exclusion of the people from power, wrongful or humiliating treatment of them, and so forth. Lastly, no account is taken in the remarks of the Platonic Socrates on Constitutional Change

¹ Cp. I. 13. 1260 a 24, *δῆλον δὲ τοῦτο καὶ κατὰ μέρος μᾶλλον ἐπισκοποῦσιν*· καθόλου γὰρ οἱ λέγοντες ἐξαπατῶσιν ἑαυτούς.

² Contrast the teaching of Eth.

Nic. 8. 12. 1160 b 21, *μεταβάλλουσι μὲν οὖν μάλισθ' οὕτως αἱ πολιτεῖαι*· ἐλάχιστον γὰρ οὕτω καὶ ῥᾶστα μεταβαίνουσιν.

of the fact that there are more kinds of oligarchy and democracy than one¹.

The Seventh Book of the Politics addresses itself to the study of constitutional change with no homiletical aim, but as a scientific and historical problem. It proposes to inquire 'what things lead to change in constitutions and how many, and what is their nature, and in what ways each constitution is brought to destruction, and into what forms each form mostly changes, and again, what ways there are of preserving constitutions generally and each of them in particular, and by what means each of them is most likely to be preserved' (7 (5). 1. 1301 a 20 sqq.).

2. Purpose and subject of the Seventh Book.

This summary does not prepare us for the distinction between πολιτεῖαι and μοναρχία² which is a conspicuous feature of the book, and in fact breaks it into two halves, for the subject of change in constitutions strictly so called is treated apart from that of change in kingships and tyrannies. Another noticeable feature of the book is, that though it now and then recognizes the distinction between the moderate (πατρία or ἐννομος) form of democracy or oligarchy and the absolute (κυρία) form of both, it seems nowhere to refer to the four or five varieties of oligarchy and democracy enumerated in the Sixth Book. Its teaching, however, is on the whole very similar to that of the books which precede and follow it, though it may probably have been originally composed as a separate treatise, and not designed for the place which it now fills in the Politics, or possibly for any place in the

¹ It is worthy of notice that Aristotle does not remark on Plato's observation (Rep. 545 D) that all constitutional change is due to the rise of στάσις ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ ἔχοντι τὰς ἀρχάς, though he cannot have agreed with it.

Plato is much inclined to adopt in the Laws (708 E) a quite different account of constitutional change—ἔμελλον λέγειν ὡς οὐδεὶς ποτε ἀνθρώπων οὐδὲν νομοθετεῖ, τύχαι δὲ καὶ ξυμφοραὶ παντοῖαι πίπτουσαι παντοίως νομοθετοῦσι τὰ πάντα ἡμῖν.

ἡ γὰρ πόλεμος τις βιασάμενος ἀνέτρεψε πολιτείας καὶ μετέβαλε νόμους, ἡ πενίας χαλεπῆς ἀπορία πολλὰ δὲ καὶ νόσοι ἀναγκάζουσι καινοτομεῖν, λοιμῶν τε ἐμπιπτόντων καὶ χρόνον ἐπὶ πολλὴν ἐνιαυτῶν πολλῶν πολλάκις ἀκαιρίας. Aristotle does not notice this account, which Plato seems to accept in an amended form (709 B).

² We trace the germ of it in Pol. 3. 15. 1286 b 13. Isocrates is familiar with the distinction (e. g. Paneg. § 125).

Politics at all. Whether it is the inquiry respecting the causes of revolution announced at the close of the Nicomachean Ethics (10. 10. 1181 b 15 sqq.), it is difficult to say. It would seem at any rate to throw but little light on the question what constitution is the best.

The subject of the book, we gather, is to be change in constitutions (*μεταβολή πολιτείας*). This includes changes in some part of a constitution, and changes of degree in constitutions. But we soon learn that changes in the holders of power not accompanied by constitutional change also fall within the limits of the subject (c. 1. 1301 b 10 sqq.). Not much, however, is said as to this last matter, and we may take the subject of the book to be broadly constitutional change. This is apparently viewed as being usually, though not always (c. 3. 1303 a 13), accompanied by civil disturbance (*στάσις*); so that this is perhaps as much the subject of the book as constitutional change. Change in constitutions, again, is studied whether accompanied by violence or not, for violence is not a necessary accompaniment of it (c. 4. 1304 b 7 sqq.). Our word 'revolution' does not exactly correspond either to *στάσις* or *μεταβολή πολιτείας*.

We must not expect from the book a study of constitutional development or evolution—of the way in which constitutions are adjusted to varying social or ethical conditions; it does not view constitutional change as in many cases a good thing and seek to assist it; it looks at it from the point of view of the constitution in possession, and regards it as a thing to be avoided and kept at bay; its aim is to advise every constitution how to maintain itself. As, however, its teaching is that constitutions can only be durable by being moderate in spirit and wisely administered, we naturally find in its pages many recommendations for the improvement of the various constitutions and of the methods of administration adopted in each. It is thus not out of harmony with the books between which it stands.

In seeking the causes of civil disturbance and constitu-

tional change, Aristotle reverts to the often-considered question as to the cause of the existence of a multiplicity of constitutions, which he rightly considers to be closely connected with the subject before him. Constitutions are many in number, he says, because men do not agree as to what is absolutely just. The rich or well-born take one view, the poor another. The men of virtue and worth (*οἱ ἐπιεικεῖς*) might justly also put in a special claim for themselves, but they are little apt to do so: later on, we are told that they are too few to do it with any chance of success (c. 4. 1304 b 4). The broad cause and source of civil trouble then is a difference of view as to what is just. If all men took the same view on this subject, there would be but one constitution, and there would be no such thing as constitutional change.

There are, however, three heads under which the sources and causes of civil discord and constitutional change (*αἱ ἀρχαὶ καὶ αἱ αἰτίαι τῶν στάσεων καὶ μεταβολῶν περὶ τὰς πολιτείας*, c. 2. 1302 a 16-18) should be arranged. We should know in what frame of mind (*πῶς ἔχοντες*) men stir up civil disturbance (*στάσις*), and with what ends in view, and what are the occasions (*ἀρχαί*) of movements of this kind¹. The ends for which men have recourse to them are gain and honour and the avoidance of their opposites, for themselves or their friends. The main cause which produces a frame of mind favourable to revolution (1302 a 22) is a desire for equality in relation to these things, where men think equality their due, or for superiority, where they think they have a title to it. The occasions of civil disturbance—the things which awake in men this desire for equality or superiority in respect of gain, honour, and the like (1302 a 34 sq.)—are the sight of others justly or unjustly enjoying gain and honour, exposure to outrage on the part of those in power, the fear of being wronged or of undergoing deserved punishment, contempt for the numerical weakness or indiscipline of the holders of power, or again the excessive preponderance in the State of a

¹ A similar classification is employed in the *Rhetoric* (1. 10. 1368 b 27).

3. Aristotle's account of the causes of constitutional change.

single individual or a number of individuals, or lastly the disproportionate increase in number or wealth of some section of the State. Changes of constitution, however, may occur without civil disturbance (*στάσις*), brought on by a wish to check the intrigues of canvassers for office, or by self-confident negligence, or by a succession of small changes¹.

Other occasions of civil trouble are a want of homogeneity in the people of a State, for a State needs time to weld its materials together; even contrasts of site, like that between Athens and Peiræus, are productive of disunion. So small are the things which give occasion to it, though the things for which the makers of revolutions struggle—gain, honour, and the like—are not small, but great. Small things are most productive of civil discord when they concern those who belong to the ruling class. To illustrate this, Aristotle refers to a number of instances in which great consequences had flowed from feuds arising among the leading men of a State from trivial causes—love-quarrels², or failure in suits for the hand of an heiress, or differences about property and the like. So again, the increase in credit or power of some magistracy or section of the State is apt to bring about constitutional change—a change to oligarchy, democracy, or polity, as the case may be. Thus the credit gained by the Council of the Areopagus at Athens in the Persian War gave increased stringency to the constitution, and then the exploit of the seamen of the fleet (*ναυτικὸς ὄχλος*) in winning the victory of Salamis, and putting Athens in the way of acquiring the headship of a hegemony, had the counter-effect of strengthening the democracy. Aristotle

¹ It is not clear whether Aristotle regards that sense of not having one's due which he finds at the root of constitutional change, as present or absent in cases of this kind.

² Lord Clarendon mentions in his *Autobiography* (i. 12–15, ed. 1759) an event of this kind which 'made such impressions upon the whole Court (of Charles the First) by

dividing the lords and ladies both in their wishes and appearances, that much of that faction grew out of it, which survived the memory of the original; and from this occasion (to show us from how small springs great rivers may arise) the women, who till then had not appeared concerned in public affairs, began to have some part in all business.'

gives other instances of the same thing from the history of Argos, Syracuse, Chalcis, and Ambracia. It may be said, broadly, that the winners of power for a State—be they private individuals, or the holders of a magistracy, or a tribe, or any other section of the community, large or small—are apt to become the cause of civil disturbance, for either their honours excite the envy of others and thus produce a rising, or their own heightened sense of importance makes them discontented with a position of mere equality. On the other hand, an even balance of the parts of the State—of the rich and poor, for example, where the moderately well-to-do class is weak or absent—will also often bring about civil trouble and constitutional change.

Such, then, is the broad outline which Aristotle gives of the causes and occasions of constitutional change. It acquires additional definiteness in the chapters which follow, but the general drift of his views is clear enough already.

He evidently holds that the causes of constitutional change are far more numerous and complex than Plato had held them to be in the Republic¹. Among its main sources may probably be reckoned dissension among the holders of power and ill-treatment of those outside their ranks; but given the existence of that sense of unsatisfied claims to gain or honour on the part of the rich or poor, or even on the part of a single individual, which commonly in Aristotle's view underlies revolution, a thousand little circumstances² may set fire to the train and cause an ex-

¹ Far more numerous also, than they were held to be by those who thought that civil trouble always originated in questions about property (2. 7. 1266 a 37).

² The same view is implied in the narrative about Naxos quoted from Aristotle's *Politics* by Athenaeus, *Deipn.* 348. It is not impossible that the narratives in the Seventh Book of the *Politics* (7 (5). 4. 1303 b 19 sqq.), which are designed to illustrate the fatal effects of trifling feuds arising

among the great people of a State, are derived from the *Politics*, for Plutarch (*Reip. gerend. praecepta* c. 32) tells one or two of them at greater length and in more detail than they are told in the Seventh Book, and he may well have quoted them from the *Politics*. It should be noticed that Demosthenes had already used the expression (in *Lept.* c. 162)—*μικροὶ καιροὶ μεγάλων πραγμάτων αἰτίαι γίνονται*.

plosion. Some mute process of social change—some accidental increase in the numbers or prominence of a class or a magistracy—some microscopic cause of quarrel may suffice to bring about a revolution. And when a constitution changes, it may pass into any other constitution, for an oligarchy does not necessarily change into a democracy, or a democracy into a tyranny.

We note that constitutional change is conceived by Aristotle always to imply a desire on the part of individuals to win honour, gain, or glory, or to avoid their opposites, though this desire often needs the spur of oppressive or fraudulent conduct on the part of the rulers¹, or dissensions among them, to wake it to active effort. Disinterested changes or changes proceeding from common consent seem not to be noticed by him. Nor are changes originating in conscientious feeling, religious or other, untainted by a longing for power and spoil, if such there be. Religion was seldom a cause of constitutional change in the history of Greece and Rome, until Christianity appeared on the scene. The makers of revolutions are viewed by Aristotle, with that absence of sentiment which is characteristic of the best Greek writers, as men keen for power, or wealth, or glory. Even Dion, we seem to gather², in undertaking to dethrone the younger Dionysius—an enterprise famous in Greece for the odds against which it was undertaken³—was actuated, in Aristotle's view, simply by a love of glory coupled with a contempt for the feebleness of the tyrant. We do not know how Aristotle would have classified an act like that of Timoleon, who planned the assassination of his brother Timophanes, when he found that the latter had assumed, or was on the point of assuming, the tyranny of Corinth: the act, indeed, was probably unique.

We see also that Aristotle is far from holding that revolutions always 'begin in hunger': the promoters of a revolution, as he has already said in his chapter on

¹ 8 (6). 4. 1318 b 13 sqq.: 6 (4).
13. 1297 b 6 sqq.: 7 (5). 8. 1308 b
34 sqq.

² 7 (5). 10. 1312 a 21 sqq.: cp.
1312 a 4.

³ Diod. 16. 9.

Phaleas, might be, and often were, not only men whose physical wants were fully satisfied, but men positively wealthy, for wealthy men often seek, he says, for an increase of power and position.

We might have expected a different theory of Revolution from Aristotle, looking to his teaching in other parts of the *Politics*. Constitutions, we have been told by him, differ because the holders of power, in some, rule for the common advantage, in others for their own, or because, in some, certain sections of society are dominant, in others certain other sections; and we might have expected that changes of constitution would result from some ethical change in the society in which they occur, or from the rise of some new section or sections of society to predominance. An increase in the numbers of the rich will tend to oligarchy; an increase of the moderately well-to-do to polity; an increase of the poor to democracy. We might have expected also that constitutional change, though often for the worse, would sometimes be for the better, and that we should learn in the *Seventh Book* how to help forward changes for the better, and to prevent or delay changes for the worse. The *Seventh Book*, however, sets itself to show how all constitutional change is to be avoided, and we are taught to view it as arising only partly from changes in the composition of society—ethical changes seem to escape notice—and far more often from faults committed by the holders of power. We learn here the wholesome lesson that, if constitutions ‘*habent sua fata*,’ much may still be done by watchfulness, fairness to those excluded from power, and moderation to preserve them even under unfavourable circumstances.

Here, as elsewhere, Aristotle seems to be unconscious of the inconsistencies in his teaching, which become apparent when different parts of it are brought together and set side by side. He is great as a systematizer, but he is also fond of dealing with a subject part by part, and hence a not infrequent ‘patchiness’ of treatment; he is in one passage possessed by one point of view and in

another by another, and he does not pause to bring the two sections of his work into absolute harmony; indeed, he seems usually unaware of the defect. He inherits much of the Platonic freedom of handling, which had its good side, for a narrow systematizer misses much truth.

4. Causes of change in oligarchy, democracy, aristocracy, and polity, taken separately.

The three chapters which follow (cc. 5-7) place in a strong light the perils of an over-narrow constitution. They describe the besetting weaknesses of each of the four constitutions, democracy, oligarchy, aristocracy, and polity. It is easy to see that of these forms, as might be expected, the narrowest, oligarchy, was the most precarious and the most exposed to overthrow. It was in a higher degree than aristocracy, and in a far higher degree than polity, the rule of a few, and of a few not marked out by merit for rule, but only by wealth or birth.

The beginnings of change in oligarchy might arise either within or outside the ranks of the holders of power. When the blow was struck from outside, it might be struck by an oppressed and infuriated people, or by rich men excluded from power; or again the people might rise from a simple feeling of indignation at the narrowness of the oligarchy. If, on the other hand, the causes of change arose within the privileged body, they might be at least equally various. War and peace were alike fatal to oligarchies. Trifles often sufficed to tear them asunder. Like all constitutions resting on a property-qualification, they were liable to alter in type with every increase or decrease in the prosperity of the State.

Democracies were far less apt to be overthrown. Their overthrow was commonly due to the unscrupulousness of demagogues, who forced the rich to combine against the democracy by confiscating their property, or plundering them of its proceeds by means of public burdens, or by calumnious accusations intended to excite ill-will against them and so to make the confiscation of their property possible. Democracies were at one time apt to change into tyrannies, but that had ceased to be common in the

days of Aristotle, for demagogues had then ceased to be skilled in war, and the demos was no longer resident in the country far away from the centre of affairs, and no longer needed a soldier to champion its cause. They still, however, were liable to changes of type, the moderate form often passing into the extreme.

Turning to mixed constitutions, we find that aristocracies were more exposed to change than polities. Aristocracies, as we learn from instances drawn for the most part from Lacedaemonian history, were imperilled by the fewness of those who held office in them, especially when the less privileged Many think themselves of equal excellence with their rulers, or when men of high position and unsurpassed merit are dishonoured by men of still higher position, or when an individual of vigorous character is excluded from office, or when extremes of wealth and poverty arise in the State—a frequent accompaniment of war—or when some great man, having the power to make himself still greater, seeks to be monarch. Both aristocracies and polities, however, most often owed their fall to some deviation from justice in their combination of social elements. Most of the constitutions which were commonly termed aristocracies, Aristotle here tells us, were like polities in this, that they sought to combine, not virtue, wealth, and numbers, but the two latter elements only; the one constitution, in fact, differed from the other only in the mode in which it combined these elements, aristocracies commonly so called inclining towards oligarchy, and polities commonly so called towards the Many: hence polities were more durable than aristocracies, for not only is the numerical majority stronger, but the Many are more content with equal rights: the rich are apt to encroach, if the constitution gives them the upper hand, and thus to provoke revolution. Aristocracies were often over-indulgent to rich men, leaving them far too free to do as they would, and this had often caused their ruin. Another very frequent cause of their fall was the thoughtless permission of slight and gradual changes in the constitution.

5. Means of preserving constitutions.

We now know how constitutions are overthrown, and it is easy to guess by what means they are preserved. They are preserved by the opposites of the things which overthrow them.

Special delicacy of the political balance in Greek City-States.

The Eighth and Ninth chapters of the Seventh Book are full of political wisdom, won from the study of the small Greek City-State, a form of society in which the political balance was exceptionally delicate, and power easily shifted from hand to hand. The rulers were always under the eyes of the ruled, and familiarity often bred contempt. In most of the States of modern Europe any aberrations on the part of the city-populations can be checked by the interposition of a vastly larger rural population (commonly of conservative tendencies), or of an army mainly recruited from peasant homes; but in ancient Greece the city-populations were usually supreme, and even where the cultivators were not serfs or slaves, seem to have been well able to get their own way. Arms were probably possessed by a far larger number of persons than in modern communities, except where the possession of them was expressly forbidden, and the thirst for power was far greater and more diffused. Civil life in Greece perhaps never entirely shook off the traditions of the age in which it began—an age to which fighting was everything. An ill-natured epigrammatist might have said, not altogether untruly—‘*Grattez le Grec, et vous trouverez l’Épirote.*’

The relations of rich and poor were exceptionally bad. The poor were often unmanageable, partly because they had been oppressed and plundered by the rich, partly (in some States at all events) from a sense of their own importance, for the oarsmen of Athens had won victory and empire for their country, and the fleet was naturally the main-stay of a Power to which exclusion from the sea meant starvation; partly because they were pressed hard in the labour-market by the competition of slaves¹, and still more, per-

¹ This cause of friction must have existed, though it seems to be little, if at all, noticed by Greek

writers. The wholesale enslavement of cities and populations in war, and the wholesale importation

haps, because in most cities of ancient Greece the pursuits of the poor were regarded by the rich and educated with scorn, and poverty thus brought with it some loss of self-respect. It was natural enough, under these circumstances, that the poor should press into political life, and seek to exchange inglorious industries for judicial and official positions, which, however, they could only fill with the aid of State-pay, or in other words, at the expense of others. Frequently, again, there must have been a difference of race between rich and poor; this would be the case not only in colonies or in States founded on conquest, but also in States in which the citizen-body had been replenished, after wars or famines or pestilences, with slaves or aliens¹. We can imagine how bitter struggles of race must have been, when carried on within the walls of a small city. Above all, the methods of party-conflict were often of the most uncompromising kind—massacre, assassination, exile, and confiscation. The combatants in each successive intestine struggle were infuriated by the experience of atrocities or the recollection of them in the past².

The relations of rich and poor being often of this nature, it was only too easy for ambitious individuals, first to win influence with the mob, and then to become tyrants and betray it. The tyrant was a dazzling personage, surrounded with wealth and glitter and luxury and all the outward signs of power, and half-deified in the eyes of many Greeks, not only by his good luck, which was interpreted to imply the favour

of slaves must have made the lot of the poor freeman harder by cheapening the labour-market.

¹ Cp. 3. 5. 1278 a 6, *ἐν μὲν οὖν τοῖς ἀρχαίοις χρόνοις παρ' ἐνίοις ἦν δοῦλον τὸ βάνανσον ἢ ξενικόν* διόπερ οἱ πολλοὶ τοιοῦτοι καὶ νῦν. The common people at Miletus were called by the rich 'Gergithes' (Heraclides Ponticus ap. Athen. Deipn. 523 f, *στασιαζόντων γὰρ τῶν τὰς οὐσίας ἐχόντων καὶ τῶν δημοτῶν, οὓς ἐκεῖνοι Γέργιθας ἐκάλουν*). As far

back as the days of Cleisthenes, the lower classes at Athens must have been of mixed race: *πολλοὺς γὰρ ἐφυλέτευσσε ξένους καὶ δούλους μετοίκους* (3. 2. 1275 b 36).

² The case of Corcyra was famous, but Argos also was notorious for its outbreaks (Diod. 15. 57 sq.: Isocr. Philip. § 52), and as to the early days of Miletus, see Heraclides Ponticus ap. Athen. Deipn. 523 f sqq.

of the Gods, but also by his life of magnificent plenty, which seemed to recall the 'easy life' of their Olympian abode¹. The admirers of tyranny in Greece were commonly admirers of luxury. This was true even of men like the brilliant historian Philistus², long the chief adviser of Dionysius the Elder and of his successor. The things which fascinated these men were precisely those which aroused the contempt of men of nobler character. It was fortunate that Greek despotism was felt by men of this stamp to be a vulgar thing; it sinned against that manly taste for simplicity of life which was one of the best traditions of Greece, confirmed by influences as dissimilar as those of Lacedaemonian institutions and philosophy.

Defects in the working of Greek constitutions indicated in the Eighth and Ninth Chapters.

The two chapters before us (the Eighth and Ninth) suggest a most uninviting picture of the Greek State as it actually was.

The holders of power in it, we gather, were often a mere handful of men, who used their supremacy to enrich themselves and to oppress those they ruled, and yet were

¹ Aristoxenus, in a fragment of his life of Archytas to which reference has been more than once made, describes how the envoy of the younger Dionysius, Polyarchus the luxurious (ὁ ἡδοναπαθής), dwelt on the life of the Great King: εἰπὼν δὲ τοῖς ἐξῆς τὰ περὶ τῆς θεραπείας τῆς τοῦ Περσῶν βασιλείας, οἷους καὶ ὅσους ἔχει θεραπευτήρας, καὶ περὶ τῆς τῶν ἀφροδισίων αὐτοῦ χρήσεως καὶ τῆς περὶ τὸν χρῶτα αὐτοῦ ὀδμῆς καὶ τῆς εὐμορφίας καὶ τῆς ὀμιλίας καὶ περὶ τῶν θεωρημάτων καὶ τῶν ἀκροαμάτων, εὐδαιμονέστατον ἔφη κρίναι τῶν νῦν τὸν τῶν Περσῶν βασιλέα· πλείους γὰρ εἰσιν αὐτῷ καὶ τελειόταται παρεσκευασμένοι ἡδοναί. Δεύτερον δέ, φησί, τὸν ἡμέτερον τύραννον θείη τις ἂν, καίπερ πολὺ λειπόμενον· ἐκείνῳ μὲν γὰρ ἢ γε Ἀσία ὅλη χορηγέι, τὸ δὲ Διονυσίου χορηγεῖον παντελῶς ἂν εὐτελές τι φανείη πρὸς ἐκείνο συγκρινόμενον (Aristox. ap.

Athen. Deipn. 545 f: Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 2. 276). Epicurus, following, he says, the common opinion, held the two characteristics of Deity to be immortality and happiness (Diog. Laert. 10. 123). Contrast the view of Plutarch (Aristides c. 6): τὸ θεῖον τρισὶ δοκεῖ διαφέρειν, ἀφθαρσία καὶ δυνάμει καὶ ἀρετῇ, ὧν σεμνότερον ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ θεϊότατον ἔστιν. The tyrants themselves seem to have been aware how much a luxurious court impressed the Greek spectator (7 (5). 11. 1314 b 28 sqq.). Not every race even now, we must remember, admires the *δοκίμοις* virtues in its ruler.

² Plutarch, Dion c. 36, φιλοτυραννότερος ἀνθρώπων . . . καὶ μάλιστα πάντων αἰεὶ (ηλώσας καὶ θαυμάσας) τρυφὴν καὶ δυνάμιν καὶ πλοῦτους καὶ γάμους τοῖς τῶν τυράννων: Pelopidas c. 34: Timoleon c. 15.

negligent and self-indulgent and jealous of each other. Even in the 'aristocracy,' which rested power on a somewhat broader basis than the oligarchy, trust was often placed in transparent devices intended to diminish the influence of the people. Some aristocracies and oligarchies, we are told, stood their ground well, simply because 'the magistrates behaved well both to those outside the pale of the constitution and to those within it, abstaining from all oppression of the former class and bringing those of its members who were capable of command within the privileged body, and being careful neither to wound the self-respect of the few nor to wrong the many in matters of profit, while treating as equals those recognized by the constitution'—a remark from which we may infer that many aristocracies and oligarchies pursued a totally different course. The magistrates in these constitutions seem to have often, in Aristotle's opinion, held their offices for over-long terms; access to office was thus confined to a few, and these few were made too great for the safety or good government of the State.

In every constitution it seems to have been common for the holders of office to have opportunities of making large illegitimate gains; and this was especially fatal to oligarchies, for the Many, though often well content to be relieved from unremunerative political responsibilities and set free to attend to their own concerns, felt it hard that they should be expected to sacrifice both office and profit¹, and hence had every motive for making an assault on the holders of power. In democracies, again, the rich were often as much oppressed as the poor in oligarchies.

Three principles of the utmost importance were commonly ignored in the organization of the State. In the first place, no care was taken that the constitution should have force on its side—that those who wished well to it should

¹ Cp. Eth. Nic. 8. 16. 1163 b 8, οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἅμα χρηματίζεσθαι ἀπὸ τῶν κοινῶν καὶ τιμᾶσθαι· ἐν πᾶσι γὰρ τὸ ἐλαττον οὐδεὶς ὑπομένει. τῷ δὲ

περὶ χρήματα ἐλαττουμένῳ τιμὴν ἀπονέμουσι καὶ τῷ δωροδόκῳ χρήματα· τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν γὰρ ἐπανισοὶ καὶ σώζει τὴν φιλίαν, καθάπερ εἴρηται.

be stronger than those who did not. This mistake was probably often made in oligarchies and aristocracies. Next, the votaries of each deviation-form were not content, unless they pushed their favourite constitution to an extreme, and thus constitutions which, though faulty, might perhaps have been bearable, became altogether oppressive and intolerable. We gather that the members of a Greek party actually took oaths to each other, and even swore to injure the members of the party opposed to them; each party thus became a band of sworn brethren, and it was perjury not only to change sides, but even to abstain from plotting injury to the opposite faction. The result was that each State came to be two States, and not one.

The third and last mistake, however, was in Aristotle's view the greatest of all. No attempt was made to produce in the classes possessed of power the character and qualities which would enable them to maintain their position. The sons of oligarchs were allowed to indulge in luxury, while the poor they ruled derived vigour from their labours and hardships. Democracy, again, made it a principle to allow men to live as they liked, and accepted the momentary will of the majority as decisive, not seeing that it too needs the support of a congenial *ἦθος*, moulded by law and education in the way most conducive to the maintenance of democratic institutions.

Means by which, according to Aristotle, constitutions may be preserved.

The way to preserve a constitution was, according to Aristotle, to take an exactly opposite course in respect of all these matters.

Aristotle dwells first on the necessity of watchfulness, which is natural enough in one who held that small matters, or gradual social changes not easy to detect, are often at the bottom of revolutions. Well-balanced constitutions must be on their guard to prevent infractions of legality, and especially small infractions, for these tend to repeat themselves, and to mount up in the end to something considerable. Constitutions often stand their ground better for being set in the midst of perils, for danger produces

vigilance. There should be laws to check the rise of quarrels and rivalries among the more important citizens, and no effort should be spared to save those who are not yet involved in these quarrels and rivalries from being drawn into the vortex : this is work which calls for the keen eye of a statesman¹. The same vigilance must be shown in reference to the property-qualification for office, if the constitution rests on one ; it must be adjusted to any change in the wealth of the State—in small States every year, in large ones every three or five years ; the character of the constitution will thus be maintained unaltered. Whatever may be the nature of the constitution, it is well to take care not to aggrandize any single individual unduly ; offices with a limited competence tenable for a long term are better than great offices tenable for a short one. But if great offices have to be conferred on the same individual all together, they should not be taken away all together, but gradually. The laws should, as far as they can, make it impossible for an individual of this kind to arise, strong in the numbers of his friends and in his command of wealth ; but if he does arise, any removal imposed on him should be a removal beyond the limits of the State². Again, since men's ways of life often lead to designs of innovation, a magistracy should be instituted to keep watch on those who live in a manner inexpedient for the constitution, whether it be a democracy or an oligarchy. For just the same reason it is necessary to take precautions against the various sections of the community enjoying prosperity singly and by turns, not simultaneously³—to see that the rich do not flourish and the poor suffer, or the rich suffer and the poor flourish, and that the better

¹ Cp. Demosth. de Cor. c. 246, ἀλλὰ μὴν ὡν γ' ἂν ὁ ῥήτωρ ὑπεύθυνος εἴη, πᾶσαν ἐξέτασιν λάμβανε· οὐ παραιτοῦμαι. τίνα οὖν ἐστὶ ταῦτα ; ἰδεῖν τὰ πράγματα ἀρχόμενα καὶ προαισθῆσθαι καὶ προειπεῖν τοῖς ἄλλοις. ταῦτα πέπρακται μοι.

² 7 (5). 8. 1308 b 19, ἀποδημητικὰς ποιεῖσθαι τὰς παραστάσεις αὐτῶν.

Cp. Plato, Laws 855 C and Stallbaum's note.

³ No student of English history is ignorant, how often the very thing which Aristotle here counsels statesmen to guard against has occurred in the course of it, often without attracting much notice from anybody till too late.

classes do not feel themselves in the shade, while the many are in the sunshine, or *vice versa*. Inequalities of this kind lead to civil trouble, and the way to prevent their occurrence is to see that all elements of the State have a share in office, and to try either to link together (συμμιγνύναι, 1308 b 29) rich and poor, or to increase the strength of the moderately well-to-do.

Above all, care should be taken to prevent office being a source of gain, both by laws devised for this end and by the arrangements of the State in general. When matters are so ordered, oligarchy is freed from one of its most pressing perils, and democracy has for once the chance of allying itself with aristocracy¹, for while office will be open to all, it will be willingly abandoned by the people to men of position (γνώριμοι), and thus both classes will have what they want².

Watchfulness, however, is not everything. Good government is also necessary. Aristotle insists on the conduct of the magistrates and the arrangements as to the magistracies being such as to satisfy both those within the pale of the constitution and those outside it. Fair and kindly treatment of both is essential. In a democracy not only the capital of the rich, but their incomes should be tenderly dealt with. Aristotle evidently desires to relieve them, even against their will, of the less useful public burdens, such as the provision of choruses and torch-races³. In an oligarchy the poor should be well cared for: lucrative offices should be abandoned to them, and outrages committed by rich men on poor men should be punished more severely than those committed by rich men on members

¹ A saying was ascribed by tradition to Periander that democracy was best when it most nearly resembled aristocracy ([Plutarch] Sept. Sap. Conv. c. 11). Isocrates also had eulogized (Panath. § 131) the kind of democracy which allied itself with aristocracy (δημοκρατίαν ἀριστοκρατίᾳ χρωμένην)—the democracy which placed at its head

'the most capable of the citizens and those likely to manage the affairs of the State in the best and justest way' (Panath. § 132).

² Cp. Eth. Nic. 9. 6. 1167 a 34, οὐ γὰρ ἐστ' ὁμονοεῖν τὸ αὐτὸ ἐκάτερον ἐννοεῖν ὁδῆποτε, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ, οἷον ὅταν καὶ ὁ δῆμος καὶ οἱ ἐπιεικεῖς τοὺς ἀρίστους ἄρχειν· οὕτω γὰρ πᾶσι γίγνεται οὐ ἐφίενται.

³ Cp. 8 (6). 5. 1320 b 3.

of their own class. The concentration of property in a few hands should be discouraged: property should be transmitted by inheritance, not by will or gift, and no single individual should be capable of taking more than one inheritance; fortunes will thus be more equal, and a larger number will be raised from the ranks of the poor to those of the well-to-do. Both in oligarchy and democracy those who have the smaller share in the advantages of the constitution should enjoy a superiority over the rest, or at least an equality of position with them, in respect of all offices which are not 'supreme over the constitution' (*κύριαι τῆς πολιτείας*), for offices of this nature must be confided to those favoured by the constitution either exclusively or in such a way that the rest will be in a minority. They should be given to men who are not only well-affected to the constitution and skilled in the work to be done, but also endowed with the type of virtue which is most in harmony with the particular constitution¹.

Generally (Aristotle continues) whatever provisions of law we describe as advantageous to constitutions, are preservative of them²; and especially attention to that principle which we have repeatedly mentioned as one of the highest importance—the principle that those who wish the constitution well must be stronger than those who do not³. But then we must not suppose, as the framers of oligarchical and

¹ As the citizen under every constitution must possess the type of virtue appropriate to the constitution (3. 4. 1276 b 30: cp. 6 (4). 7. 1293 b 5 sq.), it is only natural that Aristotle should expect this of the holder of a *κυρία ἀρχή*.

² 7 (5). 9. 1309 b 14, ἀπλῶς δέ, ὅσα ἐν τοῖς νόμοις ὡς συμφέροντα λέγονται ταῖς πολιτείαις, ἅπαντα ταῦτα σώζει τὰς πολιτείας. Cp. 8 (6). 5. 1319 b 40, τιθεμένους δὲ τοιούτους νόμους καὶ τοὺς ἀγράφους καὶ τοὺς γεγραμμένους, οἱ περιλήψονται μάλιστα τὰ σώζοντα τὰς πολιτείας: 8 (6). 1. 1317 a 29, τὰ γὰρ ταῖς δημοκρατίαις ἀκολουθοῦντα καὶ δοκοῦντα εἶναι τῆς

πολιτείας οἰκεία ταύτης: 7 (5). 11. 1314 a 12, ταῦτα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα τυραννικὰ μὲν καὶ σωτήρια τῆς ἀρχῆς. The provisions of law which are suitable to a democracy are enumerated in 8 (6). 2. 1317 b 18 sqq.

³ Question and answer before the Lords' Committee on the Irish Land Act (1882): 'Q. What should you regard as a stable equilibrium? A. I should regard as a stable equilibrium that position of things in which the majority of the people would be anxious to be conservative in the best sense' (*Times*, May 2, 1882).

democratic constitutions often seem to do, that the laws of a democracy or an oligarchy should be made as democratic or oligarchical as possible ; on the contrary, the mean must always be kept in view. Nor is legislation everything : the wisest laws will be of little use, if the citizens are not trained to live in the way which is most conducive to the maintenance of the constitution of the State, whatever it may be. The best security against weakness (*ἀκρασία*) in the case of an individual is a formed habit of right action, and the same thing is true of a State. It must become a 'second nature' to the citizen to live in the way most conducive to the maintenance of the constitution. We remember that Aristotle has elsewhere said that the virtue of the citizen is relative to the safety of the constitution, just as that of a sailor is relative to the safety of the ship, and that the constitution is the mode of life adopted by the State (3. 4. 1276 b 20 sqq. : 6 (4). 11. 1295 a 40).

Aristotle's views on this subject contrasted with those of the writer of the paper on the Athenian Constitution which is included among the writings of Xenophon.

Vigilance, good conduct, thoughtfulness for those excluded from power, moderation, a suitable training for the citizens—these things, according to Aristotle, are the safeguards of constitutions.

If we read the short paper, or extract from a letter¹, on the Athenian Constitution which finds a place, rightly or wrongly, among the works of Xenophon, we shall see in how totally different a spirit it is written.

It implies throughout that the true way of preserving a democracy is to study exclusively the interest of 'the poor and the common people and the inferior sort' (*οἱ πένητες καὶ οἱ δημόται καὶ οἱ χεῖρους*, 1. 4)—to increase their numbers to the utmost², and to swell their prosperity and to diminish

¹ It is addressed, apparently by an Athenian of oligarchical sympathies (*ἐποίησαμεν*, 1. 12), to a friend (*σὺ νομίζεις*, 1. 8), and is intended to correct his impression that the constitution of Athens and the arrangements of the State generally were a monument of folly. There is much method, it

argues, in the supposed madness of the Athenians.

² Cp. 8 (6). 4. 1319 b 6 sqq., *πρὸς δὲ τὸ καθιστάναι ταύτην τὴν δημοκρατίαν* (sc. *τὴν τελευταίαν*), *καὶ τὸν ἄνθρωπον ποιεῖν ἰσχυρόν εἰσθασιν οἱ προεστώτες τῷ προσλαμβάνειν ὡς πλείστους κ.τ.λ.*

the wealth and the prosperity of 'the rich and the good' (οἱ πλούσιοι καὶ οἱ χρηστοί), for these are always foes to democracy (I. 4-5). 'It is precisely the policy followed by the Athenians of favouring the poor at the expense of the "good," that most clearly proves them to be effectual preservers of their democracy, for the more the poor and the common people and the inferior sort flourish and increase in number, the more the democracy thrives, whereas, if the rich and the "good" flourish, the popular party makes the side opposed to it strong' (I. 4). If Athens allows any one who pleases to get up in the assembly and take an active part in its deliberations, however poor and low and ignorant he may be, it adopts the best means for preserving the democracy (ἡ δημοκρατία μάλιστα ἂν σώζοιτο οὕτως, I. 8). The poor are better advisers for a democracy than the rich, for the rich with all their virtue and wisdom are not well disposed to democracy, and would not advise it for its good, but for their own¹. It might be in the interest of 'orderly government' (ἐννομία), if only the cleverest and best men were allowed to address the assembly, but a democracy has to disregard considerations of 'orderly government,' for 'orderly government' means the supremacy of the 'good' and the silencing and slavery of the demos. A democracy must indulge slaves and allow them to grow rich², for otherwise their owners will lose the sums which they pay by way of contribution (ἀποφορά), and be unable to furnish the State with the means of maintaining a fleet. The metoeci must be indulged for similar reasons. The democracy of Athens puts down the students of gymnastic and music³, for it knows that pursuits of this kind are not for poor men, but it encourages rich men to undertake the costly functions of choregus, gymnasiarch, and trierarch, because the demos derives advantage from their outlay in

¹ Contrast the view expressed by Aristotle in 6 (4). 14. 1298 b 13 sqq., where he says—βουλευσονται γὰρ βέλτιον κοινῇ βουλευόμενοι πάντες, ὁ μὲν δῆμος μετὰ τῶν γνωρίμων, οὗτοι δὲ μετὰ τοῦ πλείθους.

² Cp. Pol. 7 (5). 11. 1313 b 32 sqq.: 8 (6). 4. 1319 b 27 sq.

³ C. I. 13, τοὺς δὲ γυμναζομένους αὐτόθι καὶ τὴν μουσικὴν ἐπιτηδεύοντας καταλέλκεν ὁ δῆμος.

these positions; the poor receive pay for singing and dancing in the choruses, for running in the races and rowing in the triremes, and thus they gain and the rich become less rich (1. 13). If the Athenian demos plunders the rich in the dependent States of the Empire, and exiles them and puts them to death, it does so in order to weaken them, for it knows that if this class once became powerful in the dependencies, it would soon have to say farewell to its empire (1. 14).

The writer sums up as follows—'As to the Athenian constitution, I do not commend it, but since it is the pleasure of the Athenians to be democratically governed, they seem to me, in following the policy which I have described, to take the right means to preserve the democracy' (3. 1). The whole drift of the composition is that a democracy which wishes to be durable must impoverish the rich and diminish their numbers, and see that the demos is as numerous and as well off as possible. Aristotle recommends democracies to adopt a diametrically opposite course (7 (5). 8. 1309 a 14 sqq.). The writer of the *De Republica Atheniensium*, though his notion of the true policy for a democracy is much the same as that of the democratic leaders referred to by Aristotle in the Eighth Book (c. 4. 1319 b 6 sqq.), appears to go even beyond them, for they do not seem to have insisted on the weakening and impoverishment of the rich. He probably wished to depict as vividly as possible the consequences and accompaniments of a democratic *régime*, and to point out that the only way of escaping them is to abjure democracy, though he allows that at Athens, where the fleet does so much for the State, democracy has a just claim to exist (1. 2). Aristotle's aim, on the contrary, is to show that there are other forms both of democracy and oligarchy than the extreme forms, and that those who are called on to administer these extreme forms will, if they are wise, seek the means of preserving them, not in oppression, but in good government and consideration for those excluded from power. Even Aris-

total, however, does not see how much the interests of rich and poor are bound up together—how difficult it is to oppress the capitalist without impoverishing the poor.

If any one desires to test the truth of Aristotle's account of the causes of revolution and the means of preventing it, let him select for study some great and notable instances of constitutional change—the decline and fall of the 'nobilitas' at Rome or the fall of the *ancien régime* in France—and then ask himself whether Aristotle has not stated in advance many of the causes of each of these changes. Some influences, no doubt, escape his notice, and perhaps, in reading the Seventh Book, we are too much allowed to forget that constitutional change is often made necessary, and even desirable, by changes in the social conditions, but nevertheless, it may be questioned whether on the whole anything better and wiser has ever been written on the subject than these two chapters of the Politics.

The Tenth and Eleventh chapters investigate the causes of the fall of monarchies and the means of preserving them.

Causes of the fall of monarchies and means of preserving them.

At the very outset, however, as might be anticipated, a strong contrast is drawn between the two forms assumed by Monarchy in Greece, Kingship and Tyranny. They differ, we are told, in origin and nature, and we are not surprised to find in the sequel that the means by which they are preserved are not altogether the same.

The conception of Kingship was one of the earliest of the good traditions of Greece, and among the noblest and most permanently valuable of them. Aristotle did little more for it than to accept it¹, and hand it on to the Roman and medieval world. The King is, in his view, a man of high worth, or belongs to a family of high worth, or has conferred great benefits on his people—founded its greatness, secured its independence, or added to its territory—or he unites worth or service with power (7 (5). 10. 1310 b 33 sqq.). Kingship, like Aristocracy, rests on desert

¹ He accepts it, though he adds that the only true King is the *παμβασιλεύς*.

(1310 b 2, 31 sq.). It is not won by force or deceit, but is earned. It appears to be conceived by Aristotle as usually hereditary, but not necessarily so (c. 10. 1313 a 10, *ἐν ταῖς κατὰ γένος βασιλείαις*). It is regarded by him as owing its origin to the support of the better classes (*οἱ ἐπιεικεῖς, οἱ γνώριμοι*), and we are told that the King stands between rich and poor to see that neither class suffers wrong from the other. He lives for that which is noble, as the tyrant lives for that which is pleasant. He is ambitious of honour as the tyrant is ambitious of wealth; the soldiers who guard him are citizens of the State, while those who guard the tyrant are aliens. The King rules for the common good; the tyrant regards the common good only so far as it promotes his own.

The same causes, however, which bring about the fall of non-monarchical constitutions—‘constitutions’ strictly so called—bring about the fall both of kingship and tyranny. As in constitutions, so in monarchies, the ends aimed at by those who seek to overthrow them are wealth and honour¹. So again, men attack monarchies, as they attack constitutions, from a sense of wrong or from feelings of fear or contempt. Their attack may be directed either against the person of the monarch or against his throne. Attacks on the person are mainly due to indignation aroused by outrage, while those who assail the monarch’s throne are commonly animated by feelings of contempt, or are made hopeful of success by possessing the monarch’s confidence or by holding high office (1312 a 6 sqq.: 1314 a 23 sqq.).

So far Kingship and Tyranny are exposed to the same perils, but Tyranny has special perils of its own. It falls both from disagreements within the dynasty and from the action of foreign States whose constitutions are hostile to it. Tyrants are always hated, and exposed to attacks inspired by hatred, but the attacks on them which lead to the over-

¹ Those assailants of tyrants, indeed, who are moved by love of distinction (*φιλοτιμία*) do not crave for themselves the wealth and dignities possessed by the tyrant:

what they seek is glory; their object is to distinguish themselves. They too aim at honour, but in a different sense from others (c. 10. 1311 a 28 sqq.: 1312 a 21 sqq.).

throw of the Tyranny are in many cases due to contempt; the founder of a tyranny is less often overthrown than his luxurious successor. Kingship, on the other hand, is less than any other constitution interfered with by foreign States¹; its fall is mostly due to discord in the royal family, or to attempts to make the royal authority more absolute, and to raise it above the law. To moderate the power of a Kingship is the best way to make it last. Aristotle would probably have seen in the despotism of the Tudors and Stuarts the cause of the decline of Monarchy in England.

The picture of *τυραννίς* in the Seventh Book takes no account of several of the forms of it described in the Third and Sixth Books, and concerns itself only with *τυραννίς* in its extreme form (*ἡ μάλιστα τυραννίς*, 6 (4). 10. 1295 a 18), and as it presented itself in a Greek State. Aristotle's account of it is thus hardly less sombre than that given in the Republic of Plato, though, unlike Plato, he does what he can to amend its methods of government.

He draws an interesting distinction in the Tenth Chapter (cp. c. 5. 1305 a 7 sqq.) between some of the earlier Greek tyrants and those of a later day. The earlier tyrants, he tells us, were often ambitious kings, or else holders of great offices in free States, who converted their lawful prerogatives into tyranny—the tyrants of Ionia were of the latter type, and Pheidon of Argos was not the only instance of the former—but as to the later tyrants, and some of the earlier ones apparently—for instance, Cypselus (7 (5). 12. 1315 b 27)—he is at one with Plato in stating that they came forward as the champions of the demos against the rich. In those days, unlike the still later time at which Aristotle himself lived and wrote, demagogues commonly possessed military skill, and it was not difficult for them to seize absolute power. It was thus that Peisistratus at Athens, Theagenes at Megara, and Dionysius at Syracuse won their tyrannies. By the time of Aristotle, however, the conditions had altered: dema-

¹ 1312 b 38: cp. 1312 a 93 sqq.

gogues were then rhetoricians, not soldiers, so that not many of them became tyrants (c. 5. 1305 a 13). Notwithstanding this, Aristotle still speaks of tyranny in these chapters (e.g. c. 10. 1310 b 14) as beginning in demagogy.

We know from the history of the Italian Republics of the Middle Ages that tyranny is a not uncommon outgrowth of the City-State; otherwise Aristotle's account of the Greek tyrant might make us wonder that such a being should ever have existed.

His rule is described as exercised over unwilling subjects and wholly based on force. The mercenaries who maintained him in power were supported by the proceeds of heavy taxes imposed on his subjects. These taxes would no doubt fall mainly on the rich, but both rich and poor are described as suffering under his rule. It is said to combine the worst features of extreme oligarchy and extreme democracy. Like the extreme oligarchy¹, the tyrant deprives the people of arms², oppresses them, drives them from the city, and scatters them in villages. Like the extreme democracy, he carries on a perpetual war with citizens of position (τοῖς γυναιμοῖς); he puts them to death both secretly and openly, and exiles them, for he regards them as his rivals for power; it is, in fact, from their ranks that plots for the overthrow of a tyranny commonly proceed (1311 a 18).

Aristotle's view of tyranny did not probably differ much from that current in the sounder portions of Greek society. We know that though Jason of Pherae was not an oppressive ruler³, his murderers were publicly honoured in most of the Greek States they visited⁴. The tyrant Hiero, in the dialogue of Xenophon which bears his name, describes him-

¹ C. 10. 1311 a 9, ἐκ μὲν ὀλιγαρχίας, but the extreme oligarchy is probably referred to, as previously in 1310 b 4.

² Isocrates mentions in his letter (Epist. 7) to Timotheus, tyrant of the Pontic Heracleia, that Cleomnis, the tyrant of Methymna, trusted all his subjects with arms (c. 8 sq.), but this was evidently

an unusual and somewhat perilous course. Most tyrants went armed themselves, and were surrounded with armed men (Xen. Hiero 2. 8). Cypselus had no guard (Pol. 7 (5). 12. 1315 b 27), but he was an exception to the general rule.

³ Diod. 15. 61.

⁴ Xen. Hell. 6. 4. 32.

self in effect as an outlaw on a throne¹. But then we must remember that tyranny had a brighter side, which Aristotle does not here take into account. The tyrant sometimes gave his State predominance in return for its surrender of freedom. The founder of a tyranny was commonly a man of much energy and ability, capable of doing great things for the State he ruled. We may be sure that Pherae was not sorry to become the first State of Thessaly, even though it owed its aggrandisement to Jason. We may be sure that many citizens of Syracuse rejoiced, when Dionysius the Elder made their city the leading power in Sicily and South Italy, and the rallying-point of Greek resistance to Carthage. Well-cared-for mercenary troops were rapidly becoming more effective in war than citizen-soldiers², and the tyrant's military force was necessarily a mercenary force. Even when the tyrant was not a Jason or a Dionysius, he occasionally won the good-will of his subjects. The memory of Euphron, the tyrant of Sicyon, was idolized by the Sicyonians. He was a benefactor to his State, says Xenophon, and therefore, as often happens, his fellow-citizens took him to be what he was not, a good man³. They buried him in the agora, and worshipped him as the second founder of the State. Aristotle tells us that plots against the tyrant commonly originated with the rich, and it is probable that the poor often forgave him much for his oppression of their oppressors. Here and there, indeed, we find a tyrant governing well. Timotheus, tyrant of the Pontic Heracleia, is an instance of this⁴.

Aristotle himself seems to feel that tyranny might become far less intolerable, if it adopted less objectionable means than those which it usually adopted for securing its own continuance. Periander was credited with the invention of the policy traditionally recommended to tyrants, which, however, recalled in many points the practices of Persian rule. This policy was demoralizing enough. The tyrant

¹ Xen. Hiero c. 4. 4 sq.

² Xen. Hell. 6. 1. 5 sq.

³ Xen. Hell. 7. 3. 12.

⁴ Grote, History of Greece
12. 629.

was to cut off all individuals who towered above the rest—to put an end to *syssitia*, clubs, and intellectual gatherings¹—to allow of no meeting-places for the social employment of leisure nor of any meetings for that purpose—to do all he could to prevent his subjects coming to know or trust each other, or developing high spirit and self-confidence—to get them to live in public and under his eye, and to hang about his court, so that they may think humbly of themselves—to employ spies—to promote disunion and hostility between individuals, to set class against class, and to sow divisions among the rich—to impoverish his subjects by costly works—to be always at war that they may need a leader—to distrust his friends as those most capable of overthrowing him, and to conciliate women and slaves by indulging them, so that even what passes indoors may be known to him. He will be fond of low people, for they will be his humble flatterers and fit instruments for his purposes, and will discountenance all self-respecting and independent characters; his companions will be aliens rather than citizens—artists, singers, and musicians, on whom he lavishes the sums he wrings from the hard-won earnings of the poor.

It is evident that a tyranny administered on these principles must have been fatal to that free social intercourse for purposes of relaxation and discussion which was everything to the Greek. Its evil effects would be experienced both by rich and poor, but the rich probably felt them most. The poor might suffer oppression and be degraded by the deprivation of arms, but the rich and the cultivated were robbed of all that was best in Hellenic life. A city ruled by a tyrant of this type can have been no home for Greeks, or even for honest and self-respecting men.

¹ We see that the founder of the Museum of Alexandria did that which a tyrant would not have done, when he not only tolerated, but endowed and placed near to his own palace, a large gathering of studious men and their disciples. It was natural

enough that the tyrant Euergetes II should scatter the Alexandrian students by his persecutions (Athen. Deipn. 184 c). Dion's Syracusan enterprise, it may be added, received cordial support in the Academy (Grote, History of Greece II. 116).

Aristotle does not say that the traditional method of maintaining a tyranny was ineffective for its purpose, but he regards it as immoral and contemptible (1314a 12). He recommends a wholly different course for the tyrant's adoption, as Isocrates had done before him¹. He does not tell him, as he tells the King, that he may make his throne more lasting by parting with some of its power, but he advises him to rule in such a way as to seem, not the selfish tyrant, but the public-spirited and thrifty steward of the State—in a word, to approximate his rule as far as possible to that of a king, without, however, diminishing the means he possesses of compelling obedience. As in free constitutions, so in tyranny the principle must not be lost sight of, that those who wish well to the constitution must be stronger than those who wish it ill, and the tyrant must take care to win for his tyranny either the combined support of rich and poor, or the support of the stronger of the two factions; it will not then be necessary for him either to liberate slaves² or to deprive freemen of their arms (1315a 31 sqq.).

The very first sentence of the Eighth Book reminds us how little we have heard in the Seventh of the four or five sub-forms of oligarchy and democracy which were enumerated in the Sixth. Aristotle recurs to these sub-forms at the beginning of the Eighth Book, and recalls the fact that though he has distinguished various forms of oligarchy and democracy, and pointed out under what conditions each is in place, he has not shown how each form should be constructed—he has not shown what organization is at once appropriate in each case and satisfactory. Nor has he studied hybrid forms of constitution (*συνδυασμοί*)—forms in which an aristocratic judiciary is combined with an

Sketch of
the con-
tents of the
Eighth
Book.

¹ In his address to Nicocles and his letter to Timotheus.

² This was probably one of the most odious weapons in the arsenal of the tyrant: cp. Xen. Hell. 7. 3. 8, where the murderer of

the tyrant Euphron says in his own defence—*καὶ μὴν πῶς οὐκ ἀπροφασίστως τύραννος ἦν, ὃς δούλους μὲν οὐ μόνον ἐλευθέρους ἀλλὰ καὶ πολίτας ἐποίησε κ.τ.λ.*

oligarchical organization of the deliberative authority and the magistracies, or in which some other combination of differing constitutions occurs. Both these subjects, however, require to be studied. The Eighth Book, nevertheless, as we have it, breaks off before the subject of hybrid forms is reached, and the book consists of an investigation of the first-mentioned subject, followed, as we have already seen, by an epilogue to the discussions respecting magistracies which are left avowedly incomplete in the Sixth.

The fragment of the book which has reached us seems, therefore, to be intended to give technical help to the framers and reformers (1317 a 33 sq.) of democratic and oligarchical constitutions in Greece. Aristotle's object in it is to point out to them, under what circumstances these constitutions should assume a moderate or a pronounced form (c. 7. 1321 a 8), and what institutions are appropriate and desirable in each form, and to save them from constructing each in an inappropriate or undesirable way. A common error, for instance, was¹ to hold that every democracy must unite in itself every democratic feature (*ἅπαντα τὰ δημοτικά*), whereas the very thing that makes democracy vary in form is the circumstance that it need not do so: democracy may embody more or fewer of these characteristics, or all of them, as it pleases (1317 a 29 sqq.). Aristotle seeks to show how each form of democracy and oligarchy should be constituted. He points out how even the extreme democracy and the extreme oligarchy may be made tolerable, just as in the Seventh Book he had shown the tyrant how to make his power durable. His aim in the Eighth Book evidently is to give useful aid to the founders of moderate forms of democracy and oligarchy, and to guide the founders of the extreme forms into moderate paths. There is much in the book which illustrates and enforces in detail the counsel of the Seventh Book to keep the mean (*τὸ μέσον*) in view (c. 9. 1309 b 18 sqq.).

¹ C. 1. 1317 a 35 sqq.

To Aristotle the political art is the means by which the individual is enabled to make the link which binds him to the State a blessing instead of a curse. It cannot, indeed, overrule Nature and Fortune, or make good all defects of material and circumstance; it cannot render human society everywhere all that it ought to be; but it can point out what the State is at its best, for the benefit of the few who can realize its best form, and it can also point out how under every variety of circumstances constitutions may be ameliorated, or at all events made to work tolerably. It must not rest content with depicting an ideal State or a series of ideal States; it must learn to do something for every form of society, however imperfect.

Aristotle's
concep-
tion of the
problem
of Political
Science.

How far it is really the business of Political Science to enter on so many problems of detail, or to construe its functions in so practical a spirit, may well be questioned, but Aristotle's conception of its mission is as creditable to his patriotism, as his handling of the subject is to his wisdom and statesmanship. Theophrastus persevered in the same path, and supplemented Aristotle's Politics by writing a work on Laws, and teaching the statesman how to deal with those 'inclinationes rerum' (*καίροι*), which in practice so largely determine his action¹. Dicaearchus was also an influential Peripatetic writer on political subjects, but after the death of Strato (270-268 B.C.) the Peripatetic school seems to have lost much of its vitality.

Stoicism and Epicureanism had arisen meanwhile, and the broad tendency of their teaching was more or less to detach the individual from politics. To the Stoics Virtue was Knowledge, and came not by habituation, but by teaching; philosophy, therefore, was its source rather than society. To know the law of the Universe was virtue.

Relation of
Stoics and
Epicureans
to Politics
and Political
Science.

¹ Aristotle had said (Eth. Nic. 2. 2. 1104a 5)—τοιούτου δ' ὄντος τοῦ καθόλου λόγου, ἔτι μᾶλλον ὁ περὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα λόγος οὐκ ἔχει τὰ κριβέες· οὔτε γὰρ ὑπὸ τέχνην οὔθ' ὑπὸ παραγγελίαν οὔδε μίαν πίπτει, δεῖ δ' αὐτοὺς αἰετὶ τοὺς πράττοντας τὰ πρὸς

τὸν καιρὸν σκοπεῖν, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ἡτρικῆς ἔχει καὶ τῆς κυβερνητικῆς. Perhaps Theophrastus thought that something might be done for men's guidance even in reference to τὰ πρὸς τὸν καιρὸν.

Still political life recommended itself to them as affording opportunities for doing good. In one respect, indeed, their conception of the statesman is in advance of that of Plato and Aristotle, for in their view he lives to promote not only the happiness of his fellow-citizens but that of mankind¹. The wise man, however, would not take an active part in the affairs of any and every State, for if the State is too unsatisfactory, he will withdraw from its concerns; and after all, 'a philosopher who teaches and improves his fellow-men benefits the State quite as much as a warrior, an administrator, or a civil functionary².' The *σπουδαῖος*, we see, is no longer necessarily a *πολιτικός*, as he was to Aristotle³. Besides, the true State was to the Stoics the World-State—a State co-extensive with the human race, or rather embracing not only men but gods. Still the Stoics wrote freely about politics. They composed treatises on Kingship, which we must not undervalue, for in the Greek world of the third century before Christ the influence of philosophers was considerable, and occasionally availed to temper the despotism of the kings. They also joined with the Peripatetic Dicaearchus in extolling a combination of kingship, aristocracy, and democracy⁴. They took a keen interest in the Lacedaemonian State; its austerity pleased them, and not less its mixed constitution. None of them, however, appear to have studied the technical side of politics in the minute and painstaking way in which Aristotle and Theophrastus studied it, or to have attempted, like Aristotle, to amend the less hopeful constitutions.

The Epicurean school stood still more aloof from politics. Epicurus sought to ease the strain of Greek life, to still that restless ambition to shine which had been at the root both of the greatness and the unhappiness of Greece, and to teach afresh the lesson of Democritus, that if men wish for

¹ See the teaching of the Stoic Athenodorus ap. Sen. de Tranq. An. 3, who says of the statesman—'cum utilem se efficere civibus mortalibusque propositum habeat.'

² Zeller, Stoics Epicureans and

Sceptics, E. T. p. 305. See Athenodorus *ubi supra*.

³ Pol. 3. 4. 1277 b 16: 3. 18. 1288 a 41 sqq.

⁴ Diog. Laert. 7. 131.

cheerful tranquillity (*εὐθυμία*), they must not be over-active either in private or public life, or attempt achievements beyond their power¹. The life of friendship, according to Epicurus, conferred more pleasure and was therefore better than political life.

'Ut satius multo iam sit parere quietum
Quam regere imperio res velle et regna tenere².'

The State exists to prevent the infliction of wrong, and for no higher end: the wise man will take an active part in it only so far as is necessary for his own safety.

Too little of the Greek literature of the two centuries after Theophrastus' death has survived to enable us to say with any certainty how far Aristotle's patient effort to understand and to ameliorate the public and private institutions of Greece was continued during this period; if it was continued, however, it must have been so in the face of many discouragements. We hear, indeed, of two disciples of Arcesilaus the founder of the New Academy, Ecdemus and Megalophanes, the tutors of Philopoemen, who, according to Plutarch, 'more than any other men of their time carried philosophy forward into politics and active life³.' But the great scientific intellects of the third century before Christ—and there was no lack of them—seem to have sought distinction for the most part in other fields of inquiry. Little, if any, progress appears to have been made in the quiet and fruitful path which Aristotle had followed in political inquiry, and it is rather to the practical politics of this century and to such new births of time as the Achaean League that we must look, if we seek to trace some approach to a realization of his principle of moderation. The Achaean League was, indeed, reared on the ruins of that Town-autonomy which

¹ Democrit. Fragm. 20, 92 (Mullach, *Fr. Philos. Gr.* I. 341, 346).

² Lucr. 5. 1127.

³ Plutarch, *Philopoemen* c. 1, "Εκδημος καὶ Μεγαλοφάνης οἱ Μεγαλοπολίται . . . Ἀρκεσίλαφ συνήθεις

ἐν Ἀκαδημαίᾳ γεγονότες, καὶ φιλοσοφίαν μάλιστα τῶν καθ' ἑαυτοὺς ἐπὶ πολιτείαν καὶ πράξεις προσαγόντες. Their names are variously given: see Prof. Freeman, *Federal Government* I. p. 362 note.

he prized, but its government did exemplify in some degree an union of democracy with aristocracy. 'Achaia,' says Mr. Freeman¹, 'still retained its mixture of moderate Democracy and moderate Aristocracy, its freedom from the rule alike of mobs, Tyrants, and Oligarchs.'

The Politics the closing word in a long debate.

The Politics of Aristotle is thus virtually the closing word, or almost the closing word, of a debate begun by Pythagoras and the Sophists, and continued by Socrates, Xenophon, Isocrates, and Plato. Aristotle's political views were the outcome of more than a century and a half of controversy. Fresh vigour had been added to the discussion in the later part of this period by the miseries of Greece.

Isocrates, Plato, and Aristotle.

Three Greek writers especially seem to have taken the state of Greece to heart—Isocrates, Plato, and Aristotle. The orations of Isocrates, many of which are really political pamphlets, were evidently familiar to Aristotle, and were evidently thought by him of sufficient importance to be frequently glanced at in the Politics. Sometimes he agrees with opinions expressed in them; more often he does not. Isocrates is not once mentioned in the Politics, but his heresies probably lent a zest to the composition of the work, for many a tacit contradiction of them is to be found in its pages.

He held that in politics and in the affairs of life opinion usually gives better results than science², whereas Aristotle insisted on the value of the *πολιτικὴ ἐπιστήμη*: he depreciated the legislative art in comparison with that of Rhetoric, for the former, he said, was easily mastered³, and, after all, dealt only with the internal organization of States⁴, whereas the business of Rhetoric is to treat of such matters as the mutual relations of the States of Hellas⁵, and to teach men civil prudence, or wisdom in deliberation,

¹ Federal Government 1. p. 500: see also p. 475 and p. 392 note.

² Adv. Sophistas, §§ 8, 17: De Antid. § 271.

³ De Antid. § 80.

⁴ Aristotle appears to dissent from this view in Pol. 4 (7). 2. 1325 a 11 sqq.

⁵ De Antid. § 79.

which is the true end of education¹. Aristotle, on the contrary, holds that the πολιτικὴ ἐπιστήμη is the supreme authority on all these subjects. It was natural that one who thought opinion a safer guide in politics and the conduct of life than Science, should seek to fit it for the discharge of this function, and should invoke the aid of Rhetoric for this purpose. Isocrates, accordingly, made it his aim to draw Rhetoric away from the humbler topics with which in his day it concerned itself, to the study of questions connected with the mutual relations of Greek States, and thus to render rhetorical training a school of civil wisdom. His strength lay in his affection for Hellas and his keen interest in her well-being. More than anyone else, he deserves credit for insisting on a right use of 'hegemonical' authority. Looking back over the past of Hellas, he saw the Athenians, Lacedaemonians, and Thebans successively rising to supremacy and successively misusing the opportunity that Fortune gave them. His orations are spread over a considerable period of time, and, perhaps in part for this reason, are not very self-consistent. In one (the De Pace) he holds that there was something corrupting in maritime empire; in others he implies that the root of the evil lay in faultiness of constitution. The constitution is the soul of a State (Areopag. § 14 : Panath. § 138). Monarchy, oligarchy, and democracy are all good, if only office be in the hands of those of the citizens who are fittest to rule (οἱ ἱκανώτατοι τῶν πολιτῶν, Panath. § 132 : cp. Xen. de Vectig. I. 1). But on the whole Isocrates is in favour of democracy allied with aristocracy (Panath. § 131 : Areopag. *passim*). Already, however, in the Panegyric Oration (B. C. 380) he had spoken as if all would be well in Greece, if only the Athenians and the Lacedaemonians would come to an agreement, and the other States would follow their example, and all would unite in a war against Persia—this, he implies, would suffice to restore internal harmony to each State without any constitutional alterations (Paneg. §§ 173-4); and in the Philippus (B. C. 346), a work of his extreme old

¹ De Antid. §§ 261-280.

age, he recurs to this earlier view, and holds that the essential thing for Greece is that Philip should heal the feuds of her four greatest States, Thebes, Lacedaemon, Athens, and Argos—the last thing that Philip was likely to do—and then become her leader in an invasion of the Persian Empire.

Plato and Aristotle saw deeper. They say persistently what Isocrates says by fits and starts, that there must be a reorganization of the State, but they hold that the reorganization of the State must be based on a reorganization of knowledge. Plato and Aristotle base Politics, not on Opinion, but on Science, and trace back the Science of Politics to its roots in the Order of Nature. The beginnings of sound Politics lie, according to the former, in a knowledge of the Ideas—according to the latter, in a knowledge of the end of Man and the purposes of Nature.

Plato is less pre-occupied than Isocrates with the disunion of Hellas, and more with the moral and political misconceptions which had made each State two States and not one, and were ruining the best-endowed natures. Let every class possess the virtues demanded by the position which it has to fill; let the mass of men be just and temperate, the soldiers of the State be brave and obedient to its rulers, and let the rulers be men of high natural gifts and worth, to whom philosophy has given a glimpse of real existence, and who have learnt to be wise and just and good in the surest way—by contact with the Idea of Good; let the State no longer corrupt its best natures, but train them to rule by training them in philosophy. The State will then be at one with itself, and the soul of the individual will be so too; and a moral and political regeneration will proceed hand in hand with the regeneration of Science, which will itself be accompanied by a reform of religion.

Aristotle follows Plato in directing his attention mainly to the internal reorganization of the State, though he is well aware with Isocrates of the importance of regulating hegemony¹. Unlike Plato, however, he has no panacea.

¹ He knows how much harm misconception that the art of had been done by the prevailing Politics is the art of Empire (4

Power must be allotted in each State conformably to the social conditions prevailing in it. There are States whose social conditions point to the extreme democracy or the extreme oligarchy. In States so circumstanced these highly defective forms must exist, but they must be wisely organized, so as to be as durable as possible. Elsewhere a moderate oligarchy or democracy will be in place. The holders of power will not be the same everywhere, but whoever they are, they must remember that their power will not be durable unless they not only behave well to each other, but also to those to whom the constitution assigns a subordinate position, whether these happen to be the rich or the poor. They must be moderate and avoid extremes. No government, however, deserves the name of a 'normal government,' unless it is for the common good, which no deviation-form can really be; and if we ask what government for the common good is, it is government which secures happiness to all in the measure in which they are capable of partaking of it (3. 6. 1278 b 21). Virtuous action is the main constituent of happiness; hence government which promotes virtuous action is government for the common good.

The Politics, however, like the Republic of Plato before it, is the work of one who was not only a Hellenic patriot, but also a philosopher. It seeks, on the one hand, to restore rational government in Greece, but it also seeks, on the other, to trace the ideal outline of human society. It is only by studying politics in an ideal spirit, that we discern the full scope and operation of the State. To do this, we must imagine ourselves favoured to the fullest extent by Nature and Fortune, and devise such a State as will give complete effect to the purposes of Nature in regard to man.

Man has an end to achieve—'good life'—and he cannot achieve it except in and through Society. He must join

(7). 2. 1324 b 32 sqq.), and insists on States behaving to other States according to their deserts (4 (7). 2. 1325 a 11 sqq.). Plato himself had said in the Republic that one

of the qualifications of the ruler of a State is to know how a State should behave to other States (Rep. 428 C-D).

with his fellows, and the society thus formed must learn to ascend from the satisfaction of daily physical needs to the satisfaction of higher needs. Society must culminate in the *πόλις*: the individual must find in the *πόλις* a guide of life, a source of virtuous action, and so of happiness. Aristotle, like Plato before him, met the universal craving of man for some guiding and saving Power external to the individual by pointing, not to a priesthood or to a Church, or even to God, but to the State. Man's natural sociality is his salvation, if only it be preserved from distortion.

The group of individuals forming the *πόλις*, if it has not a living law in the person of a *παμβασιλεύς* or Absolute King, must frame laws and live in obedience to them. These laws must mould the conditions under which they live so as to be in the highest degree conducive to virtuous action and happiness. They must be such as to secure as far as possible to each member of the group enough and not more than enough of external goods, and an adequate supply of bodily goods. Above all, they must be such as to develop the goods of the soul—to call forth and give full play to men's highest faculties, moral and intellectual. They must begin by making the Household a nursery of virtue for husband and wife, father and child, master and slave; its head must learn to be less a breadwinner or proprietor than a ruler and a guide in the paths of virtue—to care less for the improvement of his inanimate property than for that of his slaves, less for that of his slaves than for that of the free members of his household. They must carry the same principle into the organization of the State; they must allow no one to be a citizen who is not equal to the duties of a citizen—who has not the purpose and capacity to rule and be ruled with a view to virtuous action and the highest life; they must give political power only to men of mature age and full experience, animated by the aim of ruling for the good of the whole—that is, for the development of the best and happiest life. This equal brotherhood of mature men will live for politics and philosophy, leaving war to the younger citizens

who will in time fill their places. The business of the citizens of full age will be to rule their households and the State, to guide the education of the young, and above all to live their own life—a wholly unimpeded life of the noblest activity. Their happiness will consist in this, that they are in possession of all the material and psychical conditions of such a life, that they live in the society of those who are equally fit to live it¹, and that the social conditions in which they find themselves are precisely those which best suit such a life. The ideal society is as a vessel which has all the winds of heaven in its favour. In a society thus organized man breathes at last his native air, reaches his full stature, and attains the end of his being. Society is no longer a warping and distorting, but an elevating and ennobling influence.

The State exists, then, according to Aristotle, for the sake of that kind of life which is the end of man—not for the increase of its population or wealth, or (necessarily at all events) for empire or the extension of its influence. It exists for the exercise of the qualities which make men good husbands, fathers, and heads of households, good soldiers and citizens, good men of science and philosophers. When the State by its education and laws written and unwritten succeeds in evoking and maintaining in vigorous activity a life rich in noble aims and deeds, then and not till then has it fully attained the end for which it exists. The ideal State is that which adds to adequate material advantages the noblest gifts of intellect and character, and the will to live for their exercise in every relation of life, and whose education, institutions, and law are such as to develop these gifts and to call them into full play.

This is the social and political ideal of Aristotle, broadly stated and stripped of detail. We need not trouble our-

¹ Cp. Eth. Nic. 9.9. 1170a 11, γί-
νεται δ' ἂν καὶ ἀσκησίς τις τῆς ἀρετῆς
ἐκ τοῦ συζῆν τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς, καθάπερ καὶ
Θέογνις φησιν : and 9. 12. 1172 a
11, δοκοῦσι δὲ καὶ βελτίους γίνεσθαι
ἐνεργοῦντες καὶ διορθοῦντες ἀλλή-
λους ἀπομάττονται γὰρ παρ' ἀλλή-

λων οἷς ἀρέσκονται, ὅθεν “ ἐσθλῶν
μὲν γὰρ ἂπ' ἐσθλῷ.” Aristotle is
speaking in these passages of
the intercourse of σπουδαῖοι as
private friends, but the same
thing may probably hold of their
public relations as fellow-citizens.

selves here about the organization by which he thinks that the end of the State is best attained. His conceptions on this subject are affected by the inevitable imperfection of the experience of his race and time.

Concluding
remarks.

His ideal, we feel, is a noble one, the ideal of an aspiring race, perhaps rather Hellenic than Teutonic, rather ancient than modern. Moderns are apt to value excellence for its social utility: the Greek in his best moments worshipped it for its own sake, and held its production to be the *raison d'être* of human society. Yet Aristotle's State, if Hellenic, belongs to a new type of Hellenism, for much of the frivolous and feverish brilliancy of Greek life would vanish before the high aims and serious purpose which he sought to impress upon social life.

There are those, however, who will ask, as some Greeks already asked, whether the end of human life is not rather pleasure than perfection: some will hold that it is the 'greatest pleasure of the greatest number.' The study of Politics, we see, leads up at once to one of the central questions of Ethics—a question which every race and every generation will solve in its own way.

A further question is, whether Aristotle does not go too far in pointing the individual to the State and its law as the sources of his spiritual life. Do not men draw a large portion of their spiritual life—their religion, science, philosophy—from sources lying beyond the limits of the State to which they belong? Is it not well that they should be free to do so—free to adopt the best wherever they find it? Aristotle, on the contrary, apparently expects all stirrings of intellectual and religious life to accept the guidance of the State and its law. And then again, can law do as much as Aristotle thinks it can for perfection of life? It may well be that the community of which a man forms a part exercises over him an almost irresistible moulding influence, and yet that the lawgiver's power to direct and give shape to that influence is far less than Aristotle implies it to be. The influence of society over the individual is one thing; the influence of law over both is another. When Aristotle

ascribes to the lawgiver the power to determine both the written and the unwritten laws of a community, or when he conceives Law as exercising an easy supremacy over all stirrings of life and all forms of activity within it—over religion, science, trade, and production—and fashioning all things at its will, does he not greatly overestimate the power of the lawgiver?

To all these doubts there would, however, be a ready answer—that something very much like what Aristotle proposed had already been effected in the Lacedaemonian State¹. Men remembered also the rule of Pythagoras at Croton. We ourselves recall in comparatively modern times the rule of Calvin at Geneva.

We must bear in mind that Aristotle belonged to a race which was far more conscious of what the State and the lawgiver had done for it than our own. The Greeks felt that the merits of the Spartan were not due to any peculiarity in his religion, but to his State and its laws. Many Greek States looked back to lawgivers in the past who had, they believed, devised the laws, written and unwritten, under which they had won their greatness. If some modern communities look back to religious teachers—Luther or Calvin or Knox—as their founders or re-founders, ancient societies frequently referred their origin to individuals bearing the commission of the State. It was the State that had made them what they were²; and when they felt the need of a reform and asked themselves how it could come about, they sought it not in a reformation of religion, or at all events not in that alone, but in a reformation of the State. Plato and Aristotle were faithful to Greek traditions when they endeavoured to make

¹ Cp. *Eth. Nic.* I. 13. 1102 a 7 sqq., *δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ ὁ κατ' ἀλήθειαν πολιτικός περὶ ταύτην* (i.e. *περὶ ἀρετὴν*) *μάλιστα πεπονησθαι*· *βούλεται γὰρ τοὺς πολίτας ἀγαθοὺς ποιεῖν καὶ τῶν νόμων ὑπηκόους*· *παράδειγμα δὲ τούτων ἔχομεν τοὺς Κρητῶν καὶ Λακεδαιμονίων νομοθέτας, καὶ εἴ τινας ἕτεροι τοιοῦτοι γεγέννηται.*

² This view was asserted even more emphatically by those who regarded virtue as a convention and the coinage of the legislator, like Polyarchus (*Aristox. Fr.* 15: Müller, *Fragm. Hist. Graec.* 2. 276), than by those who held that it had its root in the nature of things.

the State the main lever of moral and spiritual amendment. *Ἀντὸς ὁ πρῶτος ἀντὸς λάσεται*. The State exists for spiritual ends, and must be so organized as to be fit for the task of promoting them.

Everything tended to guide Aristotle to a conception of the State as a small and intimate unity, dominated from one end to the other by a single idea, inspired and permeated by its law—a more human Lacedaemon, a wiser and more many-sided Jerusalem. To him a State was not a State, if it was a mere *congeries* of individuals lacking a common ethical creed to colour its art, its science and philosophy, its political and social life. A State to him is a strongly individualized unity which impresses its dominant idea on its members; it is no mere mechanical unity compatible with infinite dissimilarities of creed and character. The contrast between this ideal of the State and the modern ideal resembles the contrast between a Greek work of art and a modern one. We may say of the Aristotelian State:

‘*Spiritus intus alit, totamque infusa per artus
Mens agitat molem, et magno se corpore miscet.*’

States of this kind have existed, as has been said, not only in ancient but in modern times, and when they have existed, they have been as the leaven which leavens the whole lump. Take away Lacedaemon and Rome from ancient history, or Geneva from modern, and some of the main factors of each will disappear.

In the large national States of modern Europe—‘bodies wanting souls,’ as Plato and Aristotle would perhaps have thought them—we are less sensible of the fashioning influence of the State and its Law. We are hardly conscious enough of the spiritual issues which hang on the making of laws and the government of States. We find it hard to trace back the traditional views of life which are current among ourselves—the tacit ideal of character and conduct which every Englishman acquires from the social ‘milieu’ in which he lives—to any laws ever promulgated by a law-

giver. We hold this ideal to be rather a heritage of blood, an accompaniment of race, than the product of written law. It seems to us the outcome of the national experience, developed by stress of circumstances, and modified as this or that class has gained or lost predominance. The Englishman, unlike the Greek, does not trace back his moral being to a lawgiver—hardly even to any action on the part of his State. Yet if he studies the past of his race, he will perhaps discover that he has underrated the share of his State in making him what he is. His character would have been other than it is, if there had been no French Wars, no Wars of the Reformation, or if English freedom had been less often imperilled and less often fought for. Even the law of the State has had more to do with forming the English character than we commonly remember. It would not probably be quite what it is, if English feudalism had been more like that of France. The laws which have encouraged the ambition to ‘found a family,’ and enabled men to do it, have greatly influenced the national character for good or ill. The laws which, in popular phrase, ‘established the Church of England’ have perhaps done even more to influence it. The laws which regulate marriage and the household are also potent ethical influences.

When we remember these things, we come to see the statesman and statesmanship in a new light. The statesman is revealed to us as a moral and spiritual force—a power capable of imparting to the national character a bent for good or ill, a means of lowering or elevating it. We come to feel that this is the momentous side of his activity—not the increase of the wealth or population of his State, or the extension of its empire, or even perhaps the extension of its influence in the world, but the development of its character and intellect, for if this end is attained, everything else will follow. The statesman is placed in charge of his State, not to anticipate and gratify its desires¹, but to guard and enrich its character and life, to see that they suffer no detriment at his

¹ Plato, *Gorgias* 517 B sq. : 518 E sq.

hands. These are the views of Plato and Aristotle. This and no other was the lesson they taught. It was because the irrational governments around them were potent sources of demoralization, potent solvents of Greek character and manhood, that they seek—Aristotle even more patiently and persistently than Plato—to facilitate the return of the State to the true path.

Aristotle, indeed, is careful to impress on the statesman that the circumstances of a State go far to determine its organization, and that his aims must vary with what is possible in the given case. He must not forget the technical side of statesmanship, and must know how to make an extreme democracy or a tyranny as durable, and therefore as little oppressive and demoralizing, as possible. When, on the other hand, fortune is wholly with him, he will take the end of good life as his guide in moulding every institution of the State.

In one respect, however, Aristotle's conception of the office of the State in regard to the promotion of good life seems to us to sin by defect. It apparently never occurs to him to ask whether the State does not exist to promote good life in others than its own citizens. His best State is to be just to its neighbours, but he is too little accustomed to regard the State as part of a larger whole to ask whether States do not in some degree exist for the elevation of those outside their limits, or even possibly for the 'education of the human race.' To us a State which, however noble in its action, fails to leave its mark upon history and the world at large, would seem not to be all that we could wish a State to be. We look back to a succession of States which have helped to build up the fabric of European civilization, and the State which has not fought a Salamis, or done great things for religion or law or science, falls, in our view, behind the State which has. We regard the State not as living to itself and dying to itself, but as influencing for good or ill the destinies of mankind. Aristotle, on the contrary, knows nothing of the historical mission of States. He looks to the quality of the life, not

to the results achieved—to the intrinsic nobility of the life lived, not to its fruitfulness in consequences. The question which determines his estimate of a State is—how far is the life lived in it a life of perfect manhood? Does it develope and give full play to the noblest faculties of man, and not to one of them only, or a few of them, but to all?

APPENDIX A.

(See pp. 98, 493, 495.)

On the Third and Fourth Chapters of the Sixth Book.

THE integrity of the text in the third and fourth chapters of the Sixth Book has been much doubted, and not without reason.

The question whether there are more constitutions than one has already been discussed in the Third Book (3. 6. 1278 b 6 sqq.), and its renewed discussion is in itself surprising. But of this there are other instances in the Politics. For example, the question what is the most desirable life is discussed in the first three chapters of the Fourth Book, and yet we are again invited to consider 'what is the end of the best life' in the fourteenth and fifteenth chapters (1333 a 15-1334 b 5). Aristotle, in fact, has no scruple in raising a question again, when he wishes to draw a new lesson from the discussion, as he does in each of these discussions of the Fourth Book. We notice the same thing here. The question discussed in these chapters of the Sixth Book is the same as that discussed in the Third, but the object of the discussion is different. There the object had been to obtain a rough classification of constitutions; here it is to point out how great is the number of possible forms, and to correct a prevailing impression that, however much constitutions may appear to differ from each other, they are all forms either of oligarchy or democracy. Aristotle's wish in the Sixth Book is to give aid to the statesman who undertakes the difficult task of reforming existing constitutions (6 (4). 1. 1289 a 1-15). He perhaps knew of cases in which statesmen had ignored the difference between various shades of oligarchy and democracy, and had given to one sub-form institutions appropriate to another.

The third chapter begins by affirming that the reason why there are more constitutions than one is that there are more 'parts of the State' than one, and in enumerating these it groups them under the two heads of *δημος* and *γνώριμοι*. Under the former head fall cultivators, traders, and artisans, each representing a different type of *demos*—under the latter, *γνώριμοι* representing various degrees of wealth, and then again those whose claims rest on birth

and those whose claims rest on virtue. To all these parts may be added any others included among necessary parts of a State *ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὴν ἀριστοκρατίαν* (1290 a 2)—a much disputed reference, but one which we cannot stop to examine here. One constitution, Aristotle goes on, admits all these parts or classes to a share in power, another gives power to only a few of them, a third gives power to a larger number. As the parts differ in kind, the constitutions will also differ in kind, [for constitutions vary relatively to the parts]. ‘A constitution is the ordering of the offices of the State, and this ordering all men distribute among themselves either according to the power of those who are admitted to political rights, or according to some common equality subsisting among them—I mean, for example, the power of the poor or the rich or some power common to both. Thus there will necessarily be as many constitutions as there are ways of ordering the offices of a State according to the relative superiorities and differences exhibited by the parts’ (1290 a 7 sqq.)¹. A common view is that there are two typical constitutions, democracy and oligarchy, and that all others are deviation-forms of these; the aristocracy is counted as a form of oligarchy, and the polity as a form of democracy. But it is better and more correct to make the best constitution (whether in one form only, or in two—kingship and aristocracy) the typical form, and to view other constitutions as deviations from that—the stricter and more despotic forms as oligarchical deviations, the looser and less strict as democratical.

It is a mistake to suppose that democracy can be simply defined as the rule of the many, or oligarchy as the rule of the few. Oligarchy is the rule primarily of the rich, secondarily of the few: democracy is the rule primarily of the free-born, secondarily of the many. We must not, however, suppose a democracy to exist, where a free-born minority rules over a subject majority, nor again where a wealthy majority rules over a minority of poor. Democracy exists when the free-born and the poor, being a majority, are supreme, and oligarchy, when the rich are supreme, being few. This explanation of the nature of democracy and oligarchy is probably added to show that these terms must be used in a less comprehensive sense than that in which they were used by those

¹ Cp. 6 (4). 12. 1296 b 26, καὶ ἕκαστον εἶδος δημοκρατίας κατὰ τὴν ὑπεροχὴν τοῦ δήμου ἐκάστου. It seems best to supply τὴν δύναμιν with τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἢ τῶν εὐπόρων, but the interpretation of the passage 1290 a 7 sqq. is by no

means certain. For κατὰ τιν' αὐτῶν λόγῳ κοινῇ, cp. 3. 6. 1279 a 9, ὅταν ᾖ κατ' ἰσότητά τῶν πολιτῶν συνηκνῖα καὶ καθ' ὁμοιότητα: 6 (4). 4. 1291 b 30 sqq.: 8 (6). 2. 1318 a 3 sqq.: 6 (4). 11. 1296 a 40 sqq.

who brought all existing constitutions under these two heads. If democracy were the rule of the many and oligarchy the rule of the few, it might be more possible to classify all constitutions as democracies or oligarchies.

At this point the result of the discussion, so far as it has gone, is summed up, and the next subject of inquiry announced, as follows : *ὅτι μὲν οὖν πολιτεῖαι πλείους καὶ δι' ἣν αἰτίαν, εἴρηται· διότι δὲ πλείους τῶν εἰρημένων καὶ τίνες καὶ διὰ τί, λέγωμεν ἀρχὴν λαβόντες τὴν εἰρημένην πρότερον. ὁμολογοῦμεν γὰρ οὐχ ἓν μέρος ἀλλὰ πλείω πᾶσαν ἔχειν πόλιν* (c. 4. 1290 b 21-24). It would seem then that, if this passage is authentic, all that Aristotle claims to have as yet established is that there are more constitutions than one, and why this is so; he has not yet displayed their full number, or set forth what varieties of constitution exist, or why there are all these varieties. And it is true that though he has prepared us (1290 a 5-13) for the existence of many different ways of ordering offices relatively to the various forms of the *δημος* and *γνώριμοι*, he has not decisively told us that more constitutions exist than the best constitution (single or two-fold in form) and its oligarchical and democratic deviations. So that there is really room for a renewed consideration of the subject.

The long inquiry into the parts of the State which follows (1290 b 22-1291 b 15) is very interesting, but it gives us an entirely new account of them—one which we might suppose was intended to take the place of that given in c. 3, were it not that in c. 4. 1291 b 15 sqq. (the passage which immediately succeeds the new account) the old contrast of *δημος* and *γνώριμοι* is reverted to, precisely as if the elaborate inquiry (1290 b 22-1291 b 15) had no existence. So again in a later chapter of the Sixth Book (6 (4). 11. 1295 b 1 sqq.) the *μέρη πόλεως* are still *εὐποροὶ σφόδρα*, *ἀποροὶ σφόδρα*, and *οἱ μέσοι τούτων*. The same view prevails also in the Seventh Book (cp. 7 (5). 3. 1302 b 34-1303 a 13 : 4. 1303 b 26-31 : 1304 a 19 sqq. : 1304 a 38-b 4), and we find a similar view implied in the Second (2. 9. 1270 b 21-25)¹.

The account of the parts of the State given in the passage 1290 b 22-1291 b 15 is, however, quite different. We must determine the number of constitutions, says Aristotle, exactly as we should determine the number of zoological species. To do this, we should first mark off the limbs, organs, and features—in other words, the parts—that an animal *must* possess; then we should note that these assume different forms, and that each species of animal will possess

¹ A not very dissimilar account of the parts of the State is apparently implied in the Third Book also (c. 12. 1283 a 14 sqq.).

one of these forms and no more ; we thus arrive at the conclusion that there will be as many species of animal as there are possible combinations¹ of possible forms of each part. Exactly the same thing holds of constitutions. To every State the following parts are necessary—γεωργοί, τὸ βάνανσον, τὸ ἀγοραῖον, τὸ θητικόν, τὸ προπολεμῆσον, τὸ δικαστικόν, τὰ ταῖς οὐσίαις λειτουργοῦν, τὸ δημιουργικόν (an official class), τὸ βουλευόμενον. The parts now enumerated, we notice, represent, not different degrees of wealth or poverty or the like, but different *δυνάμεις* (1291 b 2). There are as many necessary parts of the State as there are separate *δυνάμεις* necessary to its existence. The parts of the State are not the rich and the poor, or the few and the many, but the *γένη* representing the 'powers' essential to it. Judges, deliberators, administrators, and soldiers are parts of the State in a far more real sense than the sections of the demos or the rich. There are therefore as many constitutions as there are possible combinations of possible forms of each part of the State, the higher parts being parts in a fuller sense than the rest. We are reminded of this principle, when in c. 14 (1297 b 39) Aristotle traces the difference between constitutions to differences of the deliberative, judicial, and magisterial elements in each.

How is it then, he in effect continues, that the mistaken view has arisen, that the rich and the poor are in an especial sense parts of the State? It is because people think that wealth and poverty, unlike fighting and tilling the soil and practising a handicraft, are mutually exclusive and cannot be combined. All claim to possess virtue and to be fit to hold most offices (cp. 8 (6). 2. 1317 b 20 : [Xen.] Rep. Ath. 1. 3), but it is of course impossible to be both rich and poor. Hence the rich and the poor are held to be in an especial sense parts of the State, and the former being commonly few in number and the latter many, these parts are thought to be contrary the one to the other, and thus men set up constitutions based on the predominance of the one or the other, and hold that democracy and oligarchy are the only constitutions.

After listening to this full and interesting account of the parts of a State, which agrees to a great extent with the enumeration of the *γένη* composing a State given in 4 (7). 8. 1328 a 21 sqq., we naturally expect to find the *γένη* representing the various *δυνάμεις* of the State treated as its parts in the remainder of the Politics. But

¹ It will be noticed that in c. 4. Aristotle traces back constitutional differences to 'combinations of necessary parts of the State,' in c. 3 to the

award of office to various sections of the *δῆμος* and *γνώριμοι*, exclusively or in conjunction.

this, as has been said already, is far from being the case, though we find, as we have seen, in the fourteenth chapter (1297 b 39 sq.)—and perhaps also in the reference to *συνδρασμοί* in the Eighth Book (1316 b 39 sqq.)—some echoes of the views expressed in the passage 1290 b 22–1291 b 15. What then are we to say of this passage? It seems to be imperfectly worked into the context in which it stands, but whether it was placed where we find it by the hand of Aristotle or by that of another, it is not easy to say. The fact that its teaching is echoed in the fourteenth chapter makes in favour both of its authenticity and of its insertion here by Aristotle. But then how are we to explain the circumstance that its account of the parts of the State is ignored in the passage which immediately succeeds it, to say nothing of 6 (4). 11. 1295 b 1 sqq. and of the Seventh and Second Books?

We may well have here an 'intrusive' or 'added' passage; but the difficulty of harmonizing the third and fourth chapters of the Sixth Book is far from being the only difficulty that we encounter in the course of the first four chapters of this book. There is much that is puzzling in the state in which these chapters have come down to us¹. In this part of the *Politics*, more perhaps than in any other, we feel that we cannot penetrate the secrets of the workshop.

APPENDIX B.

(See p. 240.)

The result of the inquiry in the Fourth Chapter of the Third Book appears to be, that in the best State all citizens are *ἄνδρες ἀγαθοί* in the sense of possessing one or other of the two kinds of the *ἀρετή ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ*—i.e. they possess either the virtue of the good man *qua* *ἀρχόμενος*, or the virtue of the good man *qua* *ἄρχων* (which implies their possession of the other kind, for men learn to rule by learning to be ruled)—but that only those among them who are ruling or have the capacity to rule, possess the virtue of the good man in its full form—the form in which alone *φρόνησις* is present. The subject is perplexed in 3. 5. 1278 a 40 sqq. (where we find a recapitulation of c. 4) by the result of the fourth chapter being stated to be that no one but the ruler or he who has capacity to rule (*ὁ πολιτικός*) possesses the virtue of the good man in the best State, for it seems to be clear that a form, though an inferior form, of the

¹ See on this subject p. 492 sqq.

virtue of the good man is conceded in the fourth chapter to *ἀρχόμενος πολιτικὴν ἀρχήν* in the best State. It is not, however, uncommon to find Aristotle's recapitulatory summaries not absolutely exact. Thus in the recapitulatory summary given in 1. 9. 1258 a 16 the natural kind of *χρηματιστική* appears to be identified with the provision of food, whereas other commodities also are clearly contemplated in c. 8 (1256 b 19). And so here Aristotle probably thinks it enough for his purpose to state the most prominent result of the inquiry and the one most present to his mind, and this is, that a citizen of the best State, if he is to possess the full virtue of a man, must be *πολιτικός*.

But we further find him saying elsewhere in the Third Book (c. 18. 1288 a 38) that it has been proved in the *πρώτοι λόγοι* that the virtue of the citizen of the best State is the same as the virtue of the good man, the reference evidently being to the fourth chapter of this book. How are we to reconcile this statement with the teaching of that chapter (compare also c. 5. 1278 a 40 sqq.), where it seems to be implied that there will be citizens in the best State not capable of ruling and not possessed of *φρόνησις*, and therefore not possessing the full virtue of the good man? The answer probably is, that in 3. 18 Aristotle refers to the full citizens of the best State, the citizens *κατ' ἐξοχήν*, and not to those of its citizens who, being *νεώτεροι*, are not fit for rule and do not possess *φρόνησις*. The word 'citizen' must apparently be used in this more limited sense in a passage of the Fourth Book (c. 13. 1332 a 32 sqq.), for here we are told that a State is good in so far as the citizens who share in the constitution (i. e. in the exercise of political power) are good, and in our State, adds Aristotle, all the citizens share in the constitution. Yet the *νεώτεροι* of the best State can hardly be said to 'share in the constitution.' Aristotle would seem to use the word 'citizen,' as he uses the word *χρηματιστική* in the First Book, in two senses—a wider and a narrower one.

APPENDIX C.

(See p. 259.)

On the Twelfth and Thirteenth Chapters of the Third Book.

'The twelfth and thirteenth chapters,' says Bernays¹, 'contain a separate draft of a discussion (Entwurf zur Erörterung) of the same

¹ Aristoteles' Politik p. 172 n.

questions which are dealt with, partly in the ninth, tenth, and eleventh, partly in the sixteenth and seventeenth chapters. As this draft offers—in its remarks on the ostracism, for instance—some fresh matter, those who were putting the Aristotelian papers in order would be unwilling to leave it unused, and the place in which it appears seemed marked out for it by reason of the kinship existing between its contents and those of the chapters among which it was inserted. . . . Aristotle's intention, however, was that the fourteenth chapter should immediately follow the eleventh.'

It is quite true that the beginning of c. 14 joins on very well to the end of c. 11, and that cc. 12 and 13 deal to some extent with questions already discussed in cc. 9, 10, and 11, and also anticipate inquiries contained in cc. 16 and 17. The discussion, for instance (c. 13. 1283 b 35 sqq.), of the question whether the statesman should legislate for the advantage of the Few Better or the Many, when the Many are collectively superior in virtue to the Few, reminds us of the investigations of the eleventh chapter, and we feel some surprise that a fresh solution of the question should be offered without any notice being taken of the fact that it has been already discussed and settled. So again, the result of cc. 12 and 13 is to modify in one important respect the conclusion announced at the close of c. 11, that the true supreme authority is law adjusted to the normal constitutions, the ruler or rulers retaining unchecked authority only where law cannot deal satisfactorily with individual cases, for we learn from these chapters that in one case (that of the *παμβασιλεία*) law is altogether out of place; yet no notice is taken of the fact that this conclusion conflicts with the previous decision in favour of law. The twelfth and thirteenth chapters also anticipate the sixteenth and seventeenth. They in fact explain so distinctly the conditions under which the *παμβασιλεία* is in place that we are surprised to find in cc. 16 and 17 a long discussion of the question whether it is better to be ruled by the best man or the best laws, which, after battling with the problem as if it was altogether a new one and still unsolved, eventually results in exactly the same solution as had already been announced at the close of c. 13.

On the other hand, it is questionable whether the sequence of the latter part of the Third Book would be altogether satisfactory, even if these two chapters were omitted. For though, as has been noticed, the beginning of c. 14 suits well with the close of c. 11, we hardly expect to find an investigation of the question whether it is better to be ruled by the best man or the best laws following the

assertion at the close of c. 11 that the true supreme authority is rightly constituted law, eked out, where necessary, by the authority of a ruler or rulers. The interposition of cc. 12 and 13, indeed, perhaps serves in some degree to soften the strangeness of this transition, for these two chapters qualify the conclusion in favour of law arrived at in c. 11¹, and prepare the way for cc. 14-17. Then again, while in c. 15. 1286 a 21 sqq. we are led back for the moment to much the same solution as that announced in c. 11. 1282 b 1 sqq., no notice is taken in the former passage of the fact that something very similar had been said before. It may be added that the conclusions arrived at in cc. 12 and 13 are referred to in c. 17. 1288 a 19 sqq., and that this is one of those references which cannot easily be detached from the context and which are consequently less likely than others to be due to an interpolator.

Nor can we well spare the contents of these two chapters. Nowhere else in the Politics do we learn so clearly on what principles the State is to be organized under varying social conditions. Their teaching, again, is borne out by passages such as Eth. Nic. 4. 8. 1124 a 20 sqq. The list given in them of rival claimants for power (οἱ εὐγενεῖς, οἱ ἐλεύθεροι, οἱ πλούσιοι, οἱ κατ' ἀρετὴν ὑπερέχοντες) agrees pretty closely with that given at the end of Pol. 3. 9. If 7 (5). 1. 1301 a 25 sqq. refers to c. 12. 1282 b 18 sqq., and 6 (4). 3. 1289 b 40 sqq. to c. 12. 1283 a 14 sqq., we have another argument in their favour, but both these references are doubtful. We note, however, that c. 13. 1283 b 42 sqq. recapitulates correctly the result of earlier chapters of the Third Book, that c. 13. 1284 b 4 sqq. appears to presuppose the distinction drawn in c. 6 between the ὕρθαι πολιτεῖαι and the παρεκβάσεις, and that the advice given to the lawgiver in c. 13. 1283 b 40 sq. also harmonizes well with c. 6. The view taken of the ostracism as directed against οἱ ὑπερέχοντες (c. 13. 1284 a 17 sqq.) agrees with that taken in 7 (5). 3. 1302 b 18 sqq., and c. 13. 1283 b 16 sq. may be compared with 8 (6). 3. 1318 a 23.

Perhaps the fact is that the latter part of the Third Book from c. 12 onwards is rather a string of more or less independent inquiries than a well-ordered whole. And yet there may be more method in the apparent disorder of these inquiries than strikes us at first sight.

¹ Cp. c. 13. 1284 a 11, ὅθεν δῆλον περὶ τοὺς ἴσους καὶ τῷ γένει καὶ τῷ ὅτι καὶ τὴν νομοθεσίαν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι δυνάμει.

APPENDIX D.

(See p. 290.)

Susemihl (Sus.², Note 677) brackets the passage 1288 a 6, *πρώτον* -15, *ἀρχάς*, as interpolated. He objects to the account of aristocracy given in it on the ground that it makes no reference to that interchange of ruling and being ruled which is elsewhere treated as a characteristic of the ideal aristocracy, and also on the ground that a population fitted for kingship is here distinguished from one fitted for aristocracy, whereas the *παμβασιλεία*, the only true form of kingship, is conceived as arising in the 'best constitution' (3. 13. 1284 b 25), i.e. under an aristocracy. As to the latter objection, perhaps he builds too much on the words *ἐπὶ τῆς ἀρίστης πολιτείας* in this passage. They seem there to mean little more than 'in the case of a constitution which awards power for pre-eminence in virtue.' As to the former objection, it would seem from 4 (7). 14. 1332 b 12-1333 a 13, that in the ideal aristocracy sketched in that book the interchange of rule referred to consists in the younger men being ruled as freemen should be ruled (1333 a 3 sqq.) by their elders, who possess *φρόνησις*, and in their succeeding these elders as rulers when they have attained the due age. This agrees sufficiently well with the account of aristocracy in the passage before us. It is true that it does not include, as in its description of polity, any mention of law, though law is apparently intended to exist in the aristocracy of the Fourth Book. The account of polity is not free from difficulty¹, but the statement that the well-to-do (*οἱ εὐποροὶ*) hold office in it becomes comprehensible, if we remember that the hoplite class, which is supreme in the polity, is said to 'belong rather to the well-to-do than the poor' (8 (6). 7. 1321 a 12).

APPENDIX E.

(See p. 331.)

If 4 (7). 10. 1329 a 40-b 35 is genuine, Aristotle here pauses in the inquiry which he has been pressing forward so fast, and proceeds to justify the step which he has just taken in distributing the

¹ We note, for instance, that the statement that offices in the polity are distributed *κατ' ἀρίαν* appears to imply that they are filled by election, whereas it would seem from 6 (4). 14. 1298 b

8-11 that magistrates in the polity might be appointed either by election or by lot, or partly by election and partly by lot.

population into distinct *γένη*, by showing that the idea of such a distribution is not an invention of his own or a notion which dates from yesterday, but one which may be traced back to an immemorial past¹. So far there is nothing in the contents of this passage which need raise a doubt of its genuineness. Aristotle well knew the value of an appeal to antiquity. He says in the *Rhetoric* (2. 9. 1387 a 16 sqq.) that men more willingly accept the ancient than the new, and regard the ancient as nearly allied to the natural. He appeals in the *Nicomachean Ethics* (8. 11. 1160 a 25 sq.) to the purpose of ancient festivals in order to show what is the purpose of festivals generally, and in the *Politics* (5 (8). 3. 1337 b 29 sqq. : 1338 a 34 sq.) he seeks to discover what were the aims of those who originally introduced music into education, in order to show its true educational use (cp. also *Eth. Nic.* 1. 8. 1098 b 17). Besides, in this very chapter he explains—herein, it would seem, adopting a doctrine of Democritus (*Philodemus de Musica*, 4. col. 36. 29 sqq. : Kemke p. 108)—that the things which are earliest discovered are those which are necessary to man; thus the early date of the arrangements here referred to proves their necessity. But we hardly see why he need have gone on to assert the antiquity of *syssitia* also, which he has not yet instituted, and still less why he should trace the origin of *syssitia* in so much detail. It is true that Isocrates had said that *syssitia* were borrowed by the Lacedaemonians from Egypt in a passage (*Busir.* § 18) which is evidently present to the mind of the writer, and that it is quite in Aristotle's manner to take pleasure in tacitly correcting Isocrates, but it seems hardly necessary for this purpose to go into so much detail as to the exact geographical position of the Itali; and then again, the recommendation to inquirers with which the passage closes, to accept all sound additions to knowledge already made and to rest content with completing what is left incomplete, though quite in harmony with his teaching elsewhere (cp. *Pol.* 2. 5. 1264 a 1 sqq. : *Eth. Nic.* 1. 7. 1098 a 21 sqq.), seems also somewhat superfluous, especially in the midst of an inquiry, in the course of which so many questions are postponed in order that rapid progress may be made. It may be added that it is not clear how the facts mentioned in 1329 b 8–22, which are largely taken from Antiochus of Syracuse (see *Antioch. Fragm.* 3, 4, 6, 8 in Müller, *Fr. Hist. Gr.* 1. 181 sqq.), prove what they seem to be intended to prove, that *syssitia* were known

¹ Cp. Demosth. in *Lept.* c. 89, καὶ τούτων πάντων οὐδέν ἐστι καινὸν οὐδ' ἡμέτερον εὕρημα, ἀλλ' ὁ παλαιός, ὃν

οὗτος παρέβη, νόμος οὕτω κελεύει νομοθετεῖν.

in Italy long before they were known in Crete¹. No notice, again, appears to be taken of this inquiry about syssitia when they are instituted later on (1330 a 3). Above all, the whole passage 1329 a 40-b 35 betrays the same interest in νομοθέται, and chronology, and the history of εὐρήματα, as does the suspected concluding passage of the Second Book². Is it due to the same hand? And is this hand Aristotle's?

APPENDIX F.

(See p. 341.)

The account of εὐδαιμονία as ἐνέργεια καὶ χρήσις ἀρετῆς τελεία, καὶ αὕτη οὐκ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ἀλλ' ἀπλῶς (Pol. 4 (7). 13. 1332 a 7 sqq.) cannot be found *totidem verbis* in the Nicomachean Ethics. In fact, the distinction between ἀπλῶς and ἐξ ὑποθέσεως or πρὸς ὑπόθεσιν τινα, so frequent in the Politics, seems seldom to occur in the Nicomachean Ethics³, though that of ἀπλῶς and τινί is common enough there (see Bon. Ind. 77 a 21-33). Nor is εὐδαιμονία described there in the exact phrase ἐνέργεια καὶ χρήσις ἀρετῆς τελεία, though the words τῆς τελείας ἀρετῆς χρήσις occur in Eth. Nic. 5. 3. 1129 b 31. We rather hear of it as ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια κατ' ἀρετήν, but then, as Aristotle points out, this is much the same thing as speaking of it as ἀρετῆς ἐνέργεια (Eth. Nic. 1. 8. 1098 b 29-31). That the ἐνέργεια must be τελεία, appears from Eth. Nic. 1. 10. 1099 b 26: cp. 1100 a 4. Thus the Nicomachean Ethics may be said to give an account of εὐδαιμονία which is not ill represented by

¹ The argument appears to be that the existence of syssitia in Italy is coeval with the name 'Italy'—a name which, it is tacitly assumed, is far older than the days of Minos. The care which the writer takes to explain the exact sense in which he uses this name may perhaps be accounted for, if we remember that it was commonly used to designate a far wider region: thus the author of the poem bearing the name of Scymnus Chius, who probably reproduces Ephorus, makes 'Italy' include the whole region lying between Terina on the West (306) and Tarentum on the East (330). He also distinguishes it from Oenotria, on which it is said to border (300). If we could trace in the passage of the Politics before us a wish to correct Ephorus, the fact would make in favour of its

authenticity.

² A close resemblance may also be noted between 1329 b 16, διὸ καὶ νῦν ἐπὶ τῶν ἀπ' ἐκείνου τινὲς χρῶνται τοῖς συσσιτίοις καὶ τῶν νόμων ἐνίοις, and 2. 10. 1271 b 30, διὸ καὶ νῦν οἱ περὶ οἱκοὶ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον χρῶνται αὐτοῖς, ὡς κατασκευάσαντος Μίνω πρώτου τὴν τάξιν τῶν νόμων, the latter passage immediately preceding what is apparently an extract from Ephorus, which may or may not have been placed where we find it by the hand of Aristotle.

³ In Eth. Nic. 4. 15. 1128 b 29 we have εἴη δ' ἂν ἡ αἰδώς ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ἐπιεικής· εἰ γὰρ πράξει, ἀσχύνοιτ' ἂν. In Eth. Nic. 7. 15. 1154 b 16 sq. τὰ φύσει ἡδέα are contrasted with τὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκός ἡδέα (= τὰ λατρεύοντα).

the terse phrase of the Politics¹, and the passage in the former treatise which Aristotle has especially before him is probably 1. 9. 1099 a 31—end of c. 10. 1100 a 9. The tendency to mix up *εὐδαιμονία* with *εὐτυχία* is mentioned here (1099 b 7), as it is mentioned in this passage of the Politics (c. 13. 1332 a 25), and the marring effect of calamity on happiness is also dwelt on in both passages (Eth. Nic. 1. 9. 1099 b 2 sqq.: Pol. 4 (7). 13. 1332 a 20). Both speak of happiness as presupposing the possession of external and bodily goods². But the whole treatment of the subject in this chapter of the Politics is more detailed and definite. The view that action, if it is to be *ἀπλῶς καλή*, must have *ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὰ* to deal with as its object-matter, seems certainly not to find equally clear expression in the Nicomachean Ethics.

APPENDIX G.

(See p. 467, note 3.)

The following passages from Censorinus and Olympiodorus, quoted by Ideler in his edition of the *Meteorologica* of Aristotle (vol. i. pp. 484, 257), will serve to illustrate the nature of a 'great winter':—

Censorinus, de Die Natali c. 18: 'Est praeterea annus, quem Aristoteles maximum potius quam magnum appellat, quem solis lunae vagarumque quinque stellarum orbes conficiunt, cum ad idem signum, ubi quondam simul fuerunt, una referuntur. Cuius anni hyems summa est *κατακλυσμός*, quam nostri diluvionem vocant, aestas autem *ἐκπύρωσις*, quod est mundi incendium. Nam his alternis temporibus mundus tum exignescere, tum exauescere videtur' (cp. Cic. de Nat. Deor. 2. 20).

Olympiodorus in Aristot. *Meteorologica* 1. 14. 1, *συμβαίνει δὲ τοῦτο τὴν θάλατταν ὑπερκοῦσθαι καὶ τὴν ἡπειρον θαλαττοῦσθαι διὰ τὸν μέγαν καλούμενον χειμῶνα καὶ τὸ μέγα θέρος. μέγας δὲ ἐστὶν ὁ χειμῶν, ἥνικα πάντες ἐν χειμερινῷ ζωδίῳ γένωνται, ἢ ὑδροχόῳ ἢ ἰχθύσι. μέγα δὲ ἐστὶ θέρος, ὅταν πάντες ἐν θερινῷ ζωδίῳ γένωνται, ἢ λέοντι ἢ καρκίνῳ. ὥσπερ γὰρ ὁ ἥλιος μόνος ἐν λέοντι μὲν γνωόμενος ποιεῖ θέρος, ἐν αἰγοκέρῳ δὲ*

¹ Other references also in the Politics to the Nicomachean Ethics (e. g. that in 2. 2. 1261 a 30), if indeed it is correct so to describe them, are rather reproductions of the

spirit of its teaching than strict citations.

² See also Eth. Nic. 9. 9. 1169 b 4 sqq.

χειμῶνα, καὶ οὕτω γίνεται ὁ ἐνιαυτὸς οὕτω κληθεὶς διὰ τὸ εἰς ἓν καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ φέρειν τὸν ἥλιον, ἀπὸ γὰρ τοῦ αὐτοῦ εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ ἀποκαθίσταται· τί οὖν (?) ἐστὶ διὰ πολλοῦ χρόνου πάντων τῶν πλανήτων γνωμένη τάξις, ἥτις ποιεῖ τὸν μέγαν ἐνιαυτόν; εἰ γὰρ πάντες οἱ πλάνητες κατὰ κορυφὴν γινόμενοι θερμαίνουσιν, ὥσπερ καὶ ὁ ἥλιος, ἀφιστάμενοι δὲ τοῦτου ψύχουσιν, οὐκ ἀπεικὸς πάντας κατὰ κορυφὴν γινόμενους ποιεῖν μέγα θέρος, ἀφισταμένους δὲ χειμῶνα. ἐν οὖν τῷ μεγάλῳ χειμῶνι ἡ ἡπειρος θαλαττοῦται, ἐν δὲ τῷ μεγάλῳ θέρει τοῦναντίον διὰ τόπου μὲν (διὰ τόπου τοῦ μὲν conj. Ideler) ἔκκαυσιν καὶ πολλὴν ξηρότητα, ποῦ (τοῦ Ideler) δὲ ὑγρότητα.

In answer to an inquiry on the subject, the Savilian Professor of Astronomy at Oxford (Rev. C. Pritchard, D.D.) kindly informs me that a 'rough and approximative computation' made by him gives the result that 'in the year 342 B.C. the sun, moon, and five planets were seen together somewhere in the constellations Libra and Scorpio.' This year would seem, therefore, to have been a 'magnus annus' in the sense at any rate which Censorinus attaches to the phrase, though not in the sense attached to it by Olympiodorus, who appears to require the meeting of the heavenly bodies to take place in the particular constellations named by him, and not in Libra or Scorpio. The question, however, is one which I must leave to those who are more versed in these matters than I am.

ADDITIONS AND CORRECTIONS.

P. 11, last line, *dele* comma.

P. 117, last line, *for* who *read* which.

P. 128, line 15, 'Plants and animals.' See however my note on 1. 8. 1256 b 20 (vol. ii. p. 174 sq.).

P. 129, line 3 sqq. See however my note on 1. 8. 1256 b 26 (vol. ii. p. 178 sq.), where I have on further consideration adopted a different rendering of this passage.

P. 163, note 2, *for* iniustum *read* iniustum, *and* *for* conjuges *read* coniuges.

P. 216, note 1, *for* juris *read* iuris.

P. 230, line 12, *for* jure *read* iure.

P. 269, line 24, and p. 282, note. More strictly, a 'perpetual generalship.'

P. 294, line 22, *for* junctura *read* iunctura.

P. 406, last line. I have translated ταμείον here 'treasury,' because Plato is evidently thinking of the ταμείον as a place for storing gold and silver, but with respect to the Lacedaemonian ταμεία, which seem to have been used for the storage of commodities of all kinds, see [Aristot.] Oecon. 1. 6. 1344 b 32 sq. (with Götting's note, p. 81 of his edition) and Schömann, Opusc. Acad. 3. 223 sq.

P. 430, line 29 sqq. I am indebted to Prof. Jowett's Translation of Plato for the renderings given here and p. 459, line 27 sqq.

P. 442, line 24, *dele* the second comma.

P. 467, note 3, line 17, *add* comma before 'in.'

P. 494, note, *add* ¹ before the note.

P. 499, line 11 sqq. I should have made it clearer here that (with Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 746 sq.) I take Aristotle to regard the Polity as 'the best constitution for most States.' Compare 6 (4). 1. 1288 b 38, τὴν βέλτε καὶ κοινωτέραν ἀπάσαις, with 2. 6. 1265 b 26-31, where the Polity is called κοινωτάτη ταῖς πόλεσι. The Polity is described as μέση ἀλιγαρχίας καὶ δημοκρατίας in 2. 6. 1265 b 28, and 'the best constitution for most States' is spoken of as ἡ μέση πολιτεία in 6 (4). 11. 1296 a 7, 37. The hoplites are supreme in the Polity (1265 b 28), and the bulk of the hoplites would probably be μέσοι. Πολιτεῖαν μόνιμον in 6 (4). 12. 1296 b 40 seems to me, as to Mr. Postgate (Notes, p. 30), to mean, not 'durable constitution,' but 'durable Polity' (see p. 501, note 1). Mr. Postgate may possibly be right in holding that 'the best constitution for most States' will be 'in some cases,' not the Polity, but 'others of the mixed forms'—some kind of ἀριστοκρατία, for instance—but I do not feel sure of this. Would Aristotle hold the μέσοι to be supreme in an ἀριστοκρατία, or call an

ἀριστοκρατία α μίση πολιτεία? At any rate, the Polity is uppermost in his mind as 'the best constitution for most States.'

P. 499, note 1. In support of the suggestion here made as to the probable meaning of 6 (4). 11. 1295 b 12 sq., I may refer to Xen. Oecon. 2. 5 sq.

P. 503, note 2, *for* 4 (7). 1329 a 40 sqq. *read* 4 (7). 10. 1329 a 40 sqq.

P. 521, line 21, 'nowhere.' The last chapter of the Seventh Book, however, recognizes in its concluding portion, as we have seen (p. 521, line 1), that there are more kinds of democracy and oligarchy than one. But see p. 519, note 1, as to this part of the chapter.

P. 543, note 1, *for* 93 *read* 39.

END OF VOL. I.



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
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THE
POLITICS OF ARISTOTLE

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THE
POLITICS OF ARISTOTLE.

*WITH AN INTRODUCTION, TWO PREFATORY ESSAYS
AND NOTES CRITICAL AND EXPLANATORY*

BY

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VOLUME II

PREFATORY ESSAYS

BOOKS I AND II—TEXT AND NOTES

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THE POLITICS OF ARISTOTLE.

A TREATISE on Politics in eight books, probably identical with that known to us as 'the Politics,' finds a place in all the three catalogues of Aristotle's works which have been handed down to us—that given by Diogenes Laertius in his life of Aristotle, that of the anonymous writer first published by Menage in his commentary on Diogenes Laertius, and that of 'Ptolemy the philosopher,' which exists only in an Arabic translation¹.

It is described in the first thus (No. 75)—*πολιτικῆς ἀκροάσεως ὡς ἡ Θεοφράστου ᾱ β̄ γ̄ δ̄ ε̄ ζ̄ η̄*: in the second (No. 70)—*πολιτικῆς ἀκροάσεως ἦ*: in the third (No. 32)—if we follow Steinschneider's Latin translation (Aristot. Fragm. 1469 sqq.)—*liber de regimine civitatum et nominatur bulitikun* (s. bolitikun) tractatus viii.

The list of the Anonymus Menagianus is thought by Heitz² not to be copied from that of Diogenes, but to be drawn from a common source. Some of its variations from the text of Diogenes, in fact, are too considerable to have arisen in the process of copying. It omits works named by Diogenes, but also names some which we do not find in his list³. We see that the words *ὡς ἡ Θεοφράστου* do not appear in its version of the title of the Politics. They may probably not have existed in the document copied. We cannot tell how they came

¹ The three catalogues will be found at the commencement of the fifth volume of the Berlin Aristotle—the third of them in a Latin

translation by Steinschneider.

² Die verlorenen Schriften des Aristoteles, p. 17.

³ Heitz, *ibid.* p. 15.

to appear in the list of Diogenes¹. Did he find them in the source from which he copied his list, or did he add them himself? Or are they a gloss which has crept from the margin of Diogenes into his text? Their meaning is as doubtful as their origin. They may merely mean that the Political Teaching both of Theophrastus and of Aristotle was arranged in eight books: more probably they mean that the work was identical with one which was ascribed to Theophrastus as its author. Cicero sometimes cites, as from Theophrastus, statements the like of which we find in the Politics; but it does not follow that he may not owe them to Theophrastus, for Theophrastus may well have repeated remarks originally made by Aristotle, and we know that Cicero distinguishes between the works of Aristotle and Theophrastus on the best constitution², so that one part of the Politics at all events cannot have been ascribed by him to Theophrastus.

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References of any kind to the Politics, especially before the time of Cicero, are scarce, and therefore the question of the probable date and origin of the two first of these lists—the oldest, apparently, of the three—is an interesting one, for, as we have seen, they mention the work by name.

Diogenes Laertius himself lived no earlier than the second century of our era and possibly much later, but, as is well-known, he derives much of his information from far more ancient authorities now lost, and his list of Aristotle's works has been thought by many to have come to him through some intermediate compiler or other from Hermippus of Smyrna, the disciple of Callimachus of Alexandria³, or at all events to precede the rearrangement of Aristotle's works by Andronicus of Rhodes, who lived in the first century before Christ. A short review of the grounds for this opinion will perhaps not be out of place here.

We are told by Plutarch (Sulla c. 26) that when the MSS. of 'most of the works of Aristotle and Theophrastus,' after being rescued from their long seclusion in careless hands at Scepsis⁴, had been carried off by Sulla to Rome

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with the rest of the library of Apellicon of Teos, Tyrannion (a contemporary of Lucullus and Cicero) put them in order (*ἐνσκευάσασθαι τὰ πολλὰ*), and Andronicus, 'having obtained from him the copies which had been made of them' (cp. Strabo, p. 609), 'published them, and framed the lists now current' (*παρ' αὐτοῦ τὸν Ῥόδιον Ἀνδρόνικον εὐπορήσαντα τῶν ἀντιγράφων εἰς μέσον θεῖναι, καὶ ἀναγράψαι τοὺς νῦν φερομένους πίνακας*). We learn further from an equally well-known passage of Porphyry's Life of Plotinus, that Andronicus arranged the works of both writers on a new principle. The passage is as follows:—'Ἐπεὶ δὲ αὐτὸς (Plotinus) τὴν διάταξιν καὶ τὴν διόρθωσιν τῶν βιβλίων ποιεῖσθαι ἡμῖν ἐπέτρεψεν, ἐγὼ δὲ κακείνῳ ζῶντι ὑπεσχόμεν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐπηγγειλάμην ποιῆσαι τοῦτο, πρῶτον μὲν τὰ βιβλία οὐ κατὰ χρόνους ἑᾶσαι φύρδην ἐκδεδομένα ἐδικαίωσα, μιμησάμενος δ' Ἀπολλοδώρου τὸν Ἀθηναῖον καὶ Ἀνδρόνικον τὸν περιπατητικόν, ὃν ὁ μὲν Ἐπίχαρμον τὸν κωμφοδιογράφον εἰς δέκα τόμους φέρων συνήγαγεν, ὁ δὲ τὰ Ἀριστοτέλους καὶ Θεοφράστου εἰς πραγματείας διεῖλε, τὰς οἰκείας ὑποθέσεις εἰς ταῦτὸν συναγαγόν, οὕτω δὴ καὶ ἐγὼ πεντήκοντα τέσσαρα ὄντα ἔχων τὰ τοῦ Πλωτίνου βιβλία διεῖλον μὲν εἰς ἑξ ἑννεάδας, τῇ τελειότητι τοῦ ἑξ ἀριθμοῦ καὶ ταῖς ἑννεάσιν ἀσμένως ἐπιτυχών, ἐκάστη δὲ ἑννεάδι τὰ οἰκεία φέρων συνεφόρησα, δοὺς καὶ τάξιν πρῶτην τοῖς ελαφροτέροις προβλήμασιν (c. 24).

It would seem from this passage that before the time of Andronicus the works of Aristotle were arranged in a confused and merely chronological order—the order of publication, apparently—and that he introduced the new plan of grouping them by their subject-matter, following the example of the grammarian Apollodorus of Athens, who

the writings of Aristotle and Theophrastus included in them. He says that Apellicon purchased 'the books of Aristotle and Theophrastus,' and fails to notice the ambiguity of this expression. His mind is, in fact, absorbed in the story which he is telling about the fate of the writings of the two great Peripatetic teachers, and he

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had in the previous century arranged the Comedies of Epicharmus in ten great τόμοι¹. The writings of Aristotle would include both dialogues and systematic works, and Andronicus would seem to have grouped them together, making, not form or date, but subject-matter the basis of his arrangement. We conclude that in his issue of the works the *περὶ δικαιοσύνης*, for instance, would be grouped with other ethical writings ascribed to Aristotle. It is possible also that in some cases Andronicus took separate treatises and formed a new whole out of them under some general name. Heitz (p. 36) thinks it probable that he did this for the treatises which together make up the 'Physics' of our editions. He is not stated, however, to have constructed any new treatise out of fragments of Aristotle, any more than Apollodorus constructed a new comedy of Epicharmus. His work would seem to have been one of arrangement, not of manufacture.

As the dialogues and other exoteric writings were apparently comprised in his edition and interspersed among the rest of the works², it must have been very different from our own Aristotle. Many spurious works, again, are included in our Aristotle which can hardly have been ascribed to Aristotle in the time of Theophrastus, or have been republished by Andronicus as part of the Scepsis 'find,' though we can well understand that some works of Theophrastus may have been ascribed to Aristotle or *vice versa*, the writings of the two authors having been mixed up together.

Andronicus' issue of Aristotle's works was probably an event of great importance, though not quite as important as a hasty reader of Strabo might imagine. When Strabo asserts, rightly or wrongly, that the Lyceum library at Athens had come, after the withdrawal of Neleus to Scepsis, to possess only 'a few' of the works of Aris-

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THE POLITICS OF ARISTOTLE.

A TREATISE on Politics in eight books, probably identical with that known to us as 'the Politics,' finds a place in all the three catalogues of Aristotle's works which have been handed down to us—that given by Diogenes Laertius in his life of Aristotle, that of the anonymous writer first published by Menage in his commentary on Diogenes Laertius, and that of 'Ptolemy the philosopher,' which exists only in an Arabic translation¹.

The Politics included in all the lists of Aristotle's works.

It is described in the first thus (No. 75)—πολιτικῆς ἀκροάσεως ὡς ἡ Θεοφράστου $\bar{a} \bar{\beta} \bar{\gamma} \bar{\delta} \bar{\epsilon} \bar{\zeta} \bar{\eta}$: in the second (No. 70)—πολιτικῆς ἀκροάσεως η : in the third (No. 32)—if we follow Steinschneider's Latin translation (Aristot. Fragm. 1469 sqq.)—liber de regimine civitatum et nominatur bulitikun (s. bolitikun) tractatus viii.

The list of the Anonymus Menagianus is thought by Heitz² not to be copied from that of Diogenes, but to be drawn from a common source. Some of its variations from the text of Diogenes, in fact, are too considerable to have arisen in the process of copying. It omits works named by Diogenes, but also names some which we do not find in his list³. We see that the words ὡς ἡ Θεοφράστου do not appear in its version of the title of the Politics. They may probably not have existed in the document copied. We cannot tell how they came

¹ The three catalogues will be found at the commencement of the fifth volume of the Berlin Aristotle—the third of them in a Latin

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² Die verlorenen Schriften des Aristoteles, p. 17.

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totle, he makes this assertion with respect to that one library ; he need not be taken to assert the same thing of other great libraries of the Hellenic world, such as those of Alexandria and Pergamon. Strabo's aim is, in fact, to give an explanation of the comparative torpor of the Peripatetic school at Athens during the interval between Neleus and Andronicus, which was in all probability really due to other causes. His assertion is limited to Athens ; the libraries of Alexandria and Pergamon were no doubt in far better case. But even for them the publication of Andronicus' texts may well have been an important event. Not a few spurious works may have found a place among the writings of Aristotle preserved in these two great libraries, and perhaps some of the genuine works were wanting. The Scepsis purchase, on the contrary, would include only those works of Aristotle which were ascribed to him by Theophrastus and Neleus, and would probably include all of these. The publication of Andronicus' edition, and especially its publication at Rome, would serve to concentrate attention on the genuine works of these two writers, and to place them before the world in their entirety, at a moment when the really great philosophers, orators, and artists of Greece were being singled out from the crowd with an ardour which was altogether new. Copies of Aristotle's works acquired after this date would probably be copies of the edition of Andronicus.

The question now arises—Is the list of Aristotle's works given by Diogenes ordered after the fashion of Andronicus or not ? The answer is not difficult. The list is not quite the chaos which it appears at first sight to be : on the contrary, it is to a certain extent in order ; but its order is not the order of Andronicus. First we have the dialogues and other exoteric works, then two or three early abstracts of Platonic lectures or writings, then we come to a part of the list in which logical works seem to predominate ; ethical, political, and rhetorical works predominate towards the middle ; then come physical and zoological works ; last in order we have works designed in all probability for Aris-

totle's own use ('hypomnematic works'), letters, and poems¹. The arrangement can hardly be that of Andronicus². Diogenes' list of Theophrastus' works has been shewn by Usener³ to be derived from the catalogue of a library, and the same thing may probably be true of his list of Aristotle's works⁴. As the former list is for the most part arranged on alphabetical principles, and the latter is not, it is doubtful whether they can have been derived from the same library-catalogue, for if they were, we should hardly expect to find the works of Theophrastus catalogued in one way and those of Aristotle in another. Be this, however, as it may, Diogenes' list of Aristotle's works is probably derived from the catalogue of some library which had purchased its copy of Aristotle's works before Andronicus issued his edition—very possibly an Alexandrian library, but about this we cannot be certain. The mention of the *Politics* in it may therefore date as far back as the formation of the libraries of Alexandria, or rather perhaps the adoption by their authorities of the practice of dividing large works into 'books,' which is implied throughout the list. Some believe that this change dates only from the time of Callimachus, who was chief librarian of the Museum from about 260 to 240 B.C.⁵, but the point is doubtful.

We are on surer ground in referring Diogenes' list of Aristotle's works to pre-Andronican times than in attempting to fix its exact date, or the exact source from which it ultimately came. Diogenes may have copied it himself from some library-catalogue, or on the other hand

¹ The list is said by Heitz (p. 234) to resemble most of those we find in Diogenes in placing the dialogues first, the letters and poems last, and last but one the hypomnematic writings.

² For other reasons which make it unlikely that the list of Aristotle's works given by Diogenes is ultimately derived from Andronicus, see Zeller, *Gr. Ph.* 2. 2. 51 sq.

³ *Analecta Theophrastea*, p. 13 sqq.

⁴ Heitz' comment on the title *ἄρατρα ἰβ* (No. 127 in Diogenes' list of Aristotle's works) is as follows: 'one would conjecture that the substantive to be supplied is *ὑπομνήματα*. For the choice of the title the person who catalogued the papyrus-rolls is unquestionably responsible, and we must no doubt set it down to some Alexandrian librarian' (p. 236-7).

⁵ See on this subject Birt, *Das antike Buchwesen*, p. 482 sqq.

it may have come to him through intermediaries. The latter is perhaps the more probable supposition. Usener believes that Diogenes' list of the works of Theophrastus came to him ultimately from Hermippus of Smyrna, who was the author of a work entitled *Bíoi*, which dealt, among other subjects, with the lives of philosophers and orators¹. He admits that there are peculiarities in the structure of this list which at first sight make against his view. It is taken, as he has shewn, from the catalogue of a library, which apparently added from time to time, by purchase or otherwise, to the collection of the writings of Theophrastus which it originally possessed, and catalogued both its original stock and (for the most part at all events) its later acquisitions in alphabetical order. Thus the list consists of a long alphabetical list followed by a shorter alphabetical list, which is in its turn succeeded first by a group of books not arranged in any order, and next by a third alphabetical group. We know that Hermippus was an accomplished writer and scholar², and it is natural to ask, would he have made his list a mere transcript of an ill-arranged library-catalogue? Usener replies that few of the early *πινακογράφοι* did their work any better³. Ancient authorities speak of Hermippus and Andronicus as having drawn up lists of Theophrastus' works⁴, and mention no one else as having done so; and Diogenes' list of his works is clearly not by Andronicus. But if the *Bíoi* of Hermippus is the ultimate source from which this list came, it does not follow that Diogenes' list of the works of Aristotle was also derived from it. We do not know

¹ See Müller, *Fr. Hist. Gr.* 3.
35.

² We owe to him the vivid sketch of Theophrastus in his lecture-room which Athenaeus has preserved for us (*Deipn.* 21 a).

³ 'Meae sententiae' (the view that the list came through Hermippus) 'illa ipsa obicere possis unde ex bibliothecae usu ortam hanc tabulam esse studui ostendere. uerum haud scio an im-

merito: nam omnibus antiquorum *πινάκων* reliquiis—si librorum tabulas ab ipsis scriptoribus aut discipulis familiarissimis confectas ut par est excipias—id proprium est, quod ea tantum quae in certis bibliothecis siue Alexandrina siue Pergamena siue aliis confecta erant respici solent uolumina' (Usener, *Analecta Theophrastea*, p. 24).

⁴ Heitz, p. 47.

for certain that Hermippus drew up a list of Aristotle's works; and if we admit that it is highly probable that he did, we are still met by the difficulty of accounting for the entire contrast between the structure of the one list and that of the other. The list of Theophrastus' works is alphabetical; that of Aristotle's works is not.

Notwithstanding this difficulty, however, it is perhaps more than possible that both lists may have come from the work of Hermippus. They may even have come from a still earlier source. The *Bíoi* of Hermippus was probably in part an expansion and revision¹ of portions of the vast work of Callimachus (in 120 books), entitled *Πίναξ παντοδαπῶν συγγραμμάτων, ὅτι πίνακες τῶν ἐν πάσῃ παιδείᾳ διαλαμβάνων καὶ ὧν συνέγραψαν*, which gave lists of authors— orators, poets, lawgivers, philosophers—classified in separate groups according to the nature of their writings, and added in each case the full titles of these writings, the number of books, the initial words, and the number of lines. 'In the case of writers who were the authors of more works than one the total number of lines contained in their works was given².' We are at once reminded of the remark with which Diogenes concludes his list of Aristotle's writings, that they contain 445,270 lines. His enumeration of the writings of Theophrastus concludes with a similar mention of the number of lines contained in them. The work of Callimachus, who, as has been said, was chief librarian of the Alexandrian Museum, was probably based on the collection of books preserved in the Museum Library and the stores of other Alexandrian libraries, and this would explain some characteristics of the two lists to which reference has already been made.

The *Politics*, then, is included in a list of Aristotle's works which dates in all probability from an earlier epoch than that of Andronicus. Other indications of its existence

Other indications of the existence of the *Politics*.

¹ See Müller, *Fr. Hist. Gr.* 3. 46: Hermipp. Callimach. fr. 46.

² See Birt, *Das antike Buchwesen*, p. 164.

are derivable from works whose date is less doubtful and also probably earlier.

Thus in the Eudemian Ethics the following passages remind us of passages in the Politics and may perhaps be based on its teaching—3. 1. 1229 a 28, cp. Pol. 4 (7). 7. 1328 a 7: 3. 4. 1231 b 39 sqq., cp. Pol. 1. 9. 1257 a 6 sqq. (where however both uses of the shoe are said to be καθ' αὐτό): 7. 2. 1238 b 7 sq., cp. Pol. 4 (7). 13. 1332 a 10 sqq.?: 7. 10. 1242 a 6 sqq., cp. Pol. 3. 6. 1278 b 20 sq.: 7. 10. 1242 a 13–31, cp. Pol. 4 (7). 8. 1328 a 28 sqq.¹

In the Magna Moralia the following—1. 25. 1192 a 16 sqq., cp. Pol. 1. 9. 1258 a 10 sq. and 10. 1258 a 21 sq.: 1. 34. 1194 b 9, cp. Pol. 6 (4). 11. 1295 b 25: 1. 34. 1194 b 18, cp. Pol. 1. 4. 1254 a 12.

The so-called first book of the Oeconomics (which is ascribed by Philodemus to Theophrastus², though Zeller (Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 944) is half inclined to ascribe it to Eudemus) is to a large extent a reproduction of the teaching of the Politics on this subject, though the writer also makes use of the Laws of Plato and the writings of Xenophon. The compiler of the so-called second book of the Oeconomics, which seems to be of a later date, is also apparently acquainted with the Politics (compare Oecon. 2. 1346 a 26 sqq. with Pol. 1. 11. 1259 a 3 sq.).

Indications of an acquaintance with the Politics appear also in the Rhetorica ad Alexandrum, which is wrongly included among the works of Aristotle: e. g. in 3. 1424 a 12 sqq., with which Zeller (Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 78. 2) has compared Pol. 8 (6). 4. 1318 b 27–38 (cp. also Pol. 8 (6). 5. 1320 b 11 sqq.): also in 3. 1424 b 3 sqq., cp. Pol. 7 (5). 8. 1308 b 34

¹ Since the above was written, I find that Susemihl has drawn attention to one of these passages (Eth. Eud. 7. 2. 1238 b 5 sqq.) in his third edition of the Politics (p. xix, note). He also thinks that in Eth. Eud. 7. 15. 1248 b 26 sqq. the writer had Pol. 4 (7). 13. 1332 a 21 sqq. before him. Zeller (*Hermes*

15. 553 sqq.) holds that in Eth. Eud. 2. 1. 1218 b 32 sqq. the writer had before him, not only Eth. Nic. 1. 8. 1098 b 9 sqq., but also Pol. 4 (7). 1. 1323 a 21 sqq.

² Philodemus de Virtutibus et Vitiis lib. ix. col. 7, reprinted in Aristotelis Oeconomica, ed. Göttling, p. 45.

sqq., 1309 a 22 sq., and Pol. 6 (4). 13. 1297 b 6 sq.: also in 3. 1424 b 10 sqq., cp. Pol. 7 (5). 8. 1309 a 14-23.

An acquaintance with Pol. 7 (5). 4. 1303 b 28 sqq. on the part of the writer of the *De Animalium Motione* may possibly be indicated in c. 7. 701 b 24 sqq.

So again, in the passage from Theophrastus *περὶ βασιλείας* of which we have the substance and something more in Dionys. Hal. Ant. Rom. 5. 73-4, we seem to detect many reminiscences of the *Politics*, and especially a clear reminiscence of Pol. 3. 14. 1285 a 30 sqq. If Bernays is right (Theophrastos über Frömmigkeit, p. 61 sqq.) in regarding Porphyry. *de Abstin.* 2. 12 sqq. as an excerpt from Theophrastus, the disciple perhaps refers in the words *εἰ δὲ λέγει τις κ.τ.λ.* to his master's teaching in Pol. 1. 8. 1256 b 15 sqq.

In the *Fragments* of Aristoxenus, again, we seem to trace occasional echoes of the *Politics*: compare, for instance, *Fragm.* 19 from his *Πυθαγορικαὶ ἀποφάσεις* (Müller, *Fr. Hist. Gr.* 2. 278) with Pol. 2. 8. 1269 a 14 sq., and *Fragm.* 20 with Pol. 4 (7). 16. 1335 a 11 sqq.¹

¹ It is unfortunate that the loss of a few letters in the Herculean papyri on which what remains of the work of Philodemus *de Virtutibus et Vitiis* is written makes it uncertain whether Metrodorus, the friend and disciple of Epicurus, had or had not seen the *Politics*. Philodemus says in the Ninth Book of this work (col. 21: I quote from the text of it appended to Göttling's edition of the *Oeconomica* ascribed to Aristotle)—*κάπειτα δ' . . . ὥς ἔχειν ὡς τοὺς τε πολλοὺς ἐξελέγχο[ν]τε[ς] ἐνθ' ἂν ἐναντίως [τι αὐτοῖς] κατηγο[ρῶ]σιν ὑπὲρ τῶν αὐτῶν, καὶ τῶν ἀγ[νο]ουμένων τι διδά[σ]κοντες, ὅ[π]ερ Ἀριστοτέλ[η]ς ἔπαθεν [κατὰ] τὸν ἐν τῷ πε[ρ]ὶ πολιτικῆ[ς] λόγον ὑπὲρ τοῦ τὸν [μ]ὲν [ἀγα]θὸν ἀνδρα καὶ χρημ[ατιστῆ]ν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι, τὸν δ[ὲ] φ[αῦ]λον καὶ*

χρηματιστὴν [φαῦ]λον, ὥς ὁ Μητροδωρος [δ]πέ[δ]ειξεν. Göttling (p. 206) supposes that the reference is to *Eth. Nic.* 4. 1, but the context (col. 17 sqq.) might equally well be taken to refer to the passage about Thales in Pol. 1. 11. 1259 a 6-18. It is, in fact, just possible that the word which Göttling supplies as *πολιτικῆς*, or *πολειτικῆς*, was *πολιτείας*—Rose supplies *πολιτείας* and takes the reference to be to Pol. 1. 8-10—but it seems more probable that the reference is to a dialogue, in which case we may supply either *πλούτου* (with Spengel, followed by Heitz, p. 195, and Zeller, *Gr. Ph.* 2. 2. 61. 1), or possibly *πολιτικοῦ*. When Metrodorus is related (Plutarch *adv. Colot.* c. 33) to have found fault with philosophers, who

Hieronymus of Rhodes, who lived at the close of the fourth and in the first half of the third century B.C., seems from Diog. Laert. 1. 26 to have told in his *Σποράδην ὑπομνήματα* the story about Thales which we read in Pol. 1. 11, and in a form which, though shortened, is very similar to that of the Aristotelian narrative¹. It is, however, possible that the two writers derived it from a common source.

In the dialogue entitled *Erastae*, which is included among Plato's works, though it can hardly be his, there are things which remind us of Aristotle's teaching: the distinction drawn (135 C sqq.) between *ὁ τὴν τέχνην ἔχων* and *ὁ πεπαιδευμένος* is perhaps more emphasized than we expect to find it in a pre-Aristotelian work and recalls, among other passages of Aristotle, Pol. 3. 11. 1282 a 3 sqq.; we note also that the teaching of the first book of the *Politics* is contradicted, intentionally or otherwise, in 138 C. But we cannot say positively that the writer is acquainted with the *Politics*.

Polybius. Polybius has often been said to show no acquaintance with the *Politics*, and it must be confessed that though there are passages in his Sixth Book which remind us at once of the *Politics*², it is not clear that he had a first-hand knowledge of it. His account of the origin of society and his constitutional teaching seem rather to be based on the

in their pride misinterpreted the function of philosophy, and made themselves ridiculous by seeking to rival Lycurgus and Solon, he may be referring to the Republic and Laws of Plato, not to Aristotle.

¹ Since the above was written, I find that Prinz (De Solonis Plutarchei fontibus, p. 24) and Susemihl (Sus.³ p. xix) have already drawn attention to this.

² Compare Polyb. 6. 57. 2, *δυσὶν δὲ τρόπων ὄντων καθ' οὓς φθίρεσθαι πέφυκε πᾶν γένος πολιτείας, τοῦ μὲν ἔξωθεν, τοῦ δ' ἐν αὐτοῖς φυομένου* with Aristot. Pol. 7(5). 10. 1312 b 38 sq. and other passages: Polyb. 6. 18. 5 with Aristot. Pol.

4 (7). 15. 1334 a 25 sqq.: Polyb. 6. 3. 7 with Aristot. Pol. 2. 6. 1265 b 33 sqq. The account of *βασιλεία* in Polyb. 6. 6. 10 sqq. reminds us of that of Aristotle: Polybius' fear of *αἰξήσις ὑπὲρ τὸ θεόν* (6. 10. 7) reminds us of Aristotle's warnings against *αἰξήσις* *παρὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον* (7 (5). 3. 1302 b 33 sqq., cp. 7 (5). 8. 1308 b 10 sqq.); and the language of Polybius as to the Roman Constitution (6. 11. 11 sqq.) resembles that of Aristotle about the Lacedaemonian constitution (Pol. 6 (4). 9. 1294 b 13 sqq.), no less than that of Plato (Laws 712 C sqq.).

views which were fashionable in the third century before Christ than on the teaching of the Politics.

Society originates, according to him, in the gregarious tendencies common to man and many other animals, not in the household relation, and just as a herd of bulls is led by the strongest, so the primitive form of Monarchy among men is the rule of the strongest and boldest. It is only after a time, in the view of Polybius, that the experience of social life develops in man an *ἐννοια τοῦ δικαίου καὶ τοῦ ἀδίκου, τοῦ καλοῦ καὶ τοῦ αἰσχροῦ* (Polyb. 6. 5. 10: 6. 6. 7, 9)¹—Aristotle, on the contrary, had held perceptions of this kind to be presupposed by human society (Pol. 1. 2. 1253 a 15 sqq.)—and that the Monarchy of the strongest gives place to Kingship, which Aristotle had said to be the primitive constitution. All unmixed constitutions, however, have, according to Polybius, a tendency to degenerate, and so Kingship passes into Tyranny. Aristocracy, the rule of the few good, succeeds, and in its turn passes into Oligarchy, the rule of a bad few. Then comes Democracy, the rule of a virtuous Many, followed by Ochlocracy, the rule of a vicious Many. Combine Kingship, Aristocracy, and Democracy in one constitution, and much will have been done to prevent constitutional decline and change. Thus Polybius recommends a mixture of these three constitutions; this is what mixed government means to him, something quite different from what it means to Aristotle.

We know that even in Aristotle's time there were those who commended the kind of mixed government which Polybius commends². The Lacedaemonian constitution gave the hint of it. But in the century after Aristotle's death the union of kingship, aristocracy, and democracy rose more than ever into credit, vigorously preached by the Stoics, and also probably by the Peripatetic Dicaearchus. Polybius inherited this theory, and handed it on to Cicero and the eulogists of the English constitution in the last century.

¹ Compare the similar view of the Epicureans (Porphy. de Abst. 1. 10).

² See Aristot. Pol. 2. 6. 1265 b 33 sqq.

A connexion has been ingeniously suggested¹ between the constitutional views of Polybius and those of the Eighth Book of the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle (c. 12. 1160 a 31 sqq.). Polybius may perhaps have been acquainted with this treatise², but it is more probable that the source from which he drew was the *Τριπολιτικός* of Dicaearchus³ or some other intermediate authority⁴. His theory of constitutional change would be suggested or confirmed by the history of Rome, in which the *μοναρχία* of Romulus was succeeded by the kingship of Numa, and the tyranny of Tarquin by the aristocracy of the early Republic and the mixed constitution which Polybius commends.

Cicero.

Cicero inherited far more from the Politics than Polybius. He lived like Aristotle at a time which greatly needed moral reinvigoration, and, like Aristotle, he sought this at the hands of the State. He accepts Aristotle's account of the end of the State (de Rep. 4. 3. 3 : 5. 6. 8), as he accepts his account of its origin (de Rep. 1. 25. 39), rejecting that of Epicurus (1. 25. 40). It exists to promote 'good and happy life.' But if we ask what kind of State best fulfils this end, the answer is that a combination of kingship, aristocracy, and democracy does so. Here he returns to the views of Polybius. As to unmixed constitutions, kingship is the best of them, but they are all very liable to decline into forms not based on 'iuris consensus et utilitatis communio'—into tyranny, the rule of a faction, and anarchy (de Rep. 1. 45. 69). Cicero goes far beyond Aristotle in his condemnation of the perverted forms and denies to the

¹ By the late Mr. R. Shute in an unpublished essay.

² Polyb. 3. 4. 11 at any rate appears to echo Eth. Nic. 2. 2. 1104 b 30 sq.

³ See Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 2. 242.

⁴ It is worthy of notice that when Carneades wished to attack Aristotle's notion of justice, he would seem to have sought it in

the *Περὶ Δικαιοσύνης*, not in the Nicomachean Ethics. See Cic. de Rep. 3. 6. 4 : 3. 7. 10 : 3. 8. 12. This, however, does not necessarily prove that the Nicomachean Ethics was not well-known at that time; the other work may have been still better known, or it may have contained in its four large books a fuller treatment of the subject.

communities in which they exist the name of 'res publicae' (de Rep. 1. 25. 39: Augustini argumentum libr. iii: de Rep. 3. 31. 43).

To devise a best State is, in Cicero's view, beyond the power of any single inquirer. The only way to arrive at a true conception of the best State is to study the Roman constitution, which is the work of many generations and centuries, and hence of unsurpassed excellence (de Rep. 1. 46. 70: 2. 1. 2). It is to the experience of Rome, therefore, that Cicero has recourse, when he seeks to discover what institutions best promote a good and happy life. The institutions which do so are Roman institutions—the censorship, the *patria potestas*, and others. Cicero has too much national feeling to follow Greek guidance in politics implicitly, and there is a certain originality in the way in which he accepts the central principle of the Politics without accepting its application in detail. His main aim is a conservative aim—to recall his countrymen to a sense of the value of the triple constitution under which Rome had achieved greatness, and which was increasingly imperilled every day by the rising tendency to autocracy.

Cicero inherited much from the Politics, but it does not necessarily follow that he had a first-hand acquaintance with the book itself. There are passages in the De Republica which seem to indicate such an acquaintance. Thus it is possible that the procedure of Aristotle in the first and third books of the Politics is present to Cicero's mind, when he announces his intention of departing from the practice of those learned inquirers on politics who begin with the union of male and female, the birth of offspring, and the formation of a body of kinsfolk, and frequently distinguish the various meanings in which this or that word is used (de Rep. 1. 24. 38: see vol. i. p. 34). His criticisms on Plato's Communism (de Rep. 4. 4. 4) seem still more clearly to imply an acquaintance with the Politics. The following passages may also be compared: de Rep. 1. 34. 51 with Pol. 1. 2. 1252 a 30 sq. and with 6 (4). 8. 1293 b 38 sqq., 1294 b 17 sq.—de Rep. 1. 35. 55 with Pol. 3. 16. 1287 b

11 sqq.—de Rep. 2. 12. 24 with Pol. 2. 9. 1271 a 20 sq. and 2. 11. 1272 b 38 sqq.—de Rep. 3. 25. 37 *sub fin.* with Pol. 1. 4. 1254 a 14 sq.¹.

One would suppose from the *De Finibus*² that Cicero was at all events acquainted with the part of the *Politics* which treats of the 'optimus rei publicae status,' were it not that in the *De Republica*³ he makes Laelius contrast the method of Plato, who constructed a model State, with that of all other inquirers. All save Plato 'disseruerunt sine ullo certo exemplari formaque rei publicae de generibus et de rationibus civitatum.' Cicero himself will in the *De Republica* so far follow Plato's example as to investigate 'non vaganti oratione, sed defixa in una re publica.' It certainly looks as if Cicero was not aware, when he wrote the *De Republica*, that both Aristotle and Theophrastus had sketched the best form of the State.

Philodemus
de
Musica.

In reading the fragmentary remains of Philodemus de Musica (ed. Kemke), we often notice that Philodemus combats, or refers to, arguments which remind us of those used in the Fifth Book of the *Politics*. Thus Kemke (pp. xiii-xiv) compares lib. 3. fragm. 52 (in his edition) with Pol. 5 (8). 5. 1340 a 18 sqq.: fragm. 53 with 1340 a 14 sq.: fragm. 65, 66 with 5 (8). 7. 1342 a 8 sqq. One or two other passages of which the same thing may be said are noted by Gomperz, *Zu Philodem's Büchern von der Musik*, p. 18 sq. (lib. 3. fr. 24: cp. 5 (8). 5. 1340 b 2) and p. 31 (lib. 3. fr. 54: cp. 1340 a 22). Perhaps the following passages may also be added to the list—lib. 1. fr. 16, cp. 5 (8). 3. 1338 b 1: fr. 17, cp. 5 (8). 5. 1340 a 2-5: lib. 3. fr. 45 (where ἀ[π]οφα[ι]ν[ε]τα[ι] should probably be read in place of ἀ[λλ'] δ φά[σ]κε[τα]ι, Kemke), cp. 5 (8). 5. 1339 b 8-10: fr. 55 and lib. 4. col. 3. 23 sqq., cp. 5 (8). 5. 1340 a 12 sqq.: lib. 4. col. 15. 5 sq., cp. 5 (8). 5. 1339 a 16 sq.: col. 16. 17 sqq., cp. 5 (8). 3. 1338 a 24 sqq. On these similarities the observations of Gomperz, pp. 28-29, are well worth reading. The language

¹ See also Zeller, *Gr. Ph.* 2. 2. 151. 6.

² 5. 4. 11.

³ 2. 11. 22.

of these passages, as he remarks, differs sufficiently from that of the Politics to make it probable that Philodemus had not the Politics before him, but either some work of Aristotle's (a dialogue, Gomperz thinks) used by him in the composition of the Politics, or some work which reproduced the Politics. It is evident, however, that the subjects discussed in the Fifth Book had been much discussed before Aristotle dealt with them, and possibly some at any rate of the expressions which strike us as similar in the Politics and the De Musica may have been originally used by inquirers of an earlier date than Aristotle, and have come both to him and to Philodemus by inheritance.

If Meineke is right, and the short sketch of the political teaching of the Peripatetics contained in the Eclogae of Stobaeus (2. 6. 17) is taken from the work of Areius Didymus, the instructor of the Emperor Augustus, then we have clear evidence that the Politics was well known to this writer, for nearly everything in the sketch is derived from the Politics¹.

The writer whom Plutarch follows in the latter part of the second chapter of his Life of Crassus was probably acquainted with the Politics, for the following passage contains several expressions familiar to readers of its first book. Plutarch here says of Crassus as an owner of slaves—*τοσούτους ἐκέκτητο καὶ τοιούτους . . . αὐτὸς ἐπιστατῶν μαυθάνουσι καὶ προσέχων καὶ διδάσκων καὶ ὅλως νομίζων τῷ δεσπότην προσήκειν μάλιστα τὴν περὶ τοὺς οἰκέτας ἐπιμέλειαν ὡς ὄργανα ἔμψυχα τῆς οἰκονομικῆς. Καὶ τοῦτο μὲν ὀρθῶς ὁ Κράσσος, εἶπερ, ὡς ἔλεγεν, ἡγείτο τὰ μὲν ἄλλα διὰ τῶν οἰκετῶν χρῆναι, τοὺς δὲ οἰκέτας δι' αὐτοῦ κυβερνᾶν τὴν γὰρ οἰκονομικὴν ἐν ἀνύχοις χρηματιστικὴν οὖσαν ἐν ἀνθρώποις πολιτικὴν γυγνομένην ὁρῶμεν*². ἐκέينو δὲ οὐκ εὖ, τὸ μηδένα νομίζειν μηδὲ φάσκειν

¹ See Stobaeus, Eclogae (ed. Meineke), tom. 2. pp. clii., cliv-v., and R. Volkmann, *Leben Schriften und Philosophie des Plutarch von Chaeroneia*, I. 154 sqq.

² This is of course nowhere

said by Aristotle, who would not allow the identity of any section of *οἰκονομική* either with *χρηματιστική* or *πολιτική*, yet his teaching in the Politics perhaps underlies this modification of it.

εἶναι πλούσιον δὲ οὐ δύναται τρέφειν ἀπὸ τῆς οὐσίας στρατόπεδον (ὁ γὰρ πόλεμος οὐ τεταγμένα σιτεῖται κατὰ τὸν Ἀρχίδαμον, ὥσθ' ὁ πρὸς πόλεμον πλούτος ἀόριστος). Crassus (c. 3) was interested in the teaching of Aristotle, and was instructed in his doctrines by a Peripatetic named Alexander¹, from whom these facts about him may ultimately be derived.

The writer, again, whom Plutarch followed in Agis c. 5 may possibly have sought to meet the criticisms which Aristotle passes in Pol. 2. 9. 1270 a 18 sqq. on the laws of the Lacedaemonian State, and to show that Lycurgus was not in fault. See my notes on 1270 a 4 and 19.

Those who are well versed in the Græek and Latin writers of the earlier Roman Empire will probably be able to add to the following scanty list of passages from writers of that epoch, which seem to indicate an acquaintance, direct or indirect, with the Politics or with some points of its teaching:—

Plin. Epist. 7. 17 (cp. Pol. 3. 11. 1281 a 42 sqq.)²:

Dio Chrysostom, Or. 3. 115 R sqq. (?): the reference in Or. 36. 83 R to the ἀγαθὴν ἐξ ἀπάντων ἀγαθῶν πόλιν: Or. 7. 267 R, cp. Pol. 2. 6. 1264 b 39: Or. 14. 439 R, cp. Pol. 3. 6. 1278 b 36:

Plutarch, De Monarchia Democratia et Oligarchia (if the work be his), c. 1, καθάπερ γὰρ ἀνθρώπου βίῃσι πλέονες, ἔστι καὶ δήμῳ πολιτεία βίῃς (cp. Pol. 6 (4). 11. 1295 a 40): several passages in the Reipublicae Gerendae Praecepta—c. 15. 812 B, where the *πρωτεύς* is spoken of as the *ὄργανον* of the *κυβερνήτης* (cp. Pol. 1. 4. 1253 b 29): c. 15. 812 D, οὐ γὰρ μόνον τῆς δυνάμεως κ.τ.λ. (cp. Pol. 2. 11. 1273 b 12 sqq.): c. 17 *init.* (cp. Pol. 2. 2. 1261 a 37 sqq.): c. 24 *init.* (cp. Pol. 4 (7). 2. 1324 b 26 sq. and 4 (7). 3. 1325 a 34 sqq.?): c. 32. 825 A, ἀλλὰ πολλάκις κ.τ.λ. (cp. Pol. 7 (5). 8. 1308 a 31 sqq.). In passages like these, however, Plutarch may well be

¹ Some particulars respecting him will be found in Stahr, Aristoteles bei den Römern, p. 18.

² Plin. Epist. 1. 20 seems to

contain a reminiscence of Poet. 7. 1450 b 34 sqq., rather than of Pol. 4 (7). 4. 1326 a 33 sq.

reproducing, not the Politics, but some work which the Politics reproduces—very possibly the Politics of Aristotle—for we find Plutarch in the last-named passage (c. 32. 825 A-C) relating stories similar to those told in Pol. 7 (5). 4. 1303 b 20 sqq., and 37 sqq., but with more fulness of detail, and these are stories which may well have found a place in the Politics. In Plutarch's *An Seni sit gerenda Respublica*, c. 7. 787 C-D, we are reminded of Pol. 4 (7). 14. 1332 b 38 sqq., but it would be quite unsafe to infer an acquaintance with the Politics from this passage. So again, in the *De Cupiditate Divitiarum* (c. 8. 527 A) the lovers of wealth are divided into two classes, just as they are in Pol. 1. 9—those who make no use of their wealth and those who squander it on pleasures—but Plutarch here quotes from Aristotle an expression which does not occur in the Politics, and he may well be making use of a dialogue of Aristotle in which similar views were put forth. In [Plutarch] *de Liberis Educandis* c. 13. 9 C, the saying *πᾶς ὁ βίος ἡμῶν εἰς ἀνεσιν καὶ σπουδὴν διήρηται* reminds us of Pol. 4 (7). 14. 1333 a 30, but there is so little in the rest of the treatise to point to an acquaintance with the Politics that it is doubtful whether the writer had the Politics before him.

We are reminded of the Politics, again, when we read in Arrian, *Epictetus* 2. 10, that 'the whole is superior to the part and the State to the citizen,' but doctrines such as this were the common property of the Peripatetic school, and a reference to them in no way implies a first-hand acquaintance with the Politics¹.

It is far otherwise when we find Alexander of Aphrodisias distinctly quoting the Politics (in Aristot. *Metaph.* p. 15. 6 Bonitz, τὸν γὰρ δοῦλον ἐν τοῖς Πολιτικοῖς εἶναι εἶπεν ὁσ ἀνθρωπος ὦν ἄλλου ἐστίν)². Here we have a direct reference

Alexander of Aphrodisias.

¹ It is uncertain when the spurious fragments of Hippodamus and other Pythagoreans (see as to these, Zeller, *Gr. Ph.* 3. 2. 85. 2, ed. 2) came into existence, but we often find in them what seem to be indications of an

acquaintance with the Politics.

² It should be added, however, that the Laurentian MS. of Alexander (L) has the reading—τὸν γὰρ δοῦλον ἐν τοῖς Πολιτικοῖς εἶπεν εἶναι τὸν ἀνθρώπον τὸν ἄλλου ὄντα καὶ μὴ ἐαυτοῦ.

of an indubitable kind. Susemihl's first edition of the *Politics* (p. xlv. note 85: cp. Sus.³ p. xviii. sq.) supplies a list of references and quotations subsequent to this date which need not be repeated here.

The passages which have been adduced will suffice to show that we are perhaps in possession of as many indications of the existence of the *Politics* between the time of Aristotle and that of Alexander of Aphrodisias as could well be expected, considering the extent of our literary losses and the entire change in matters political which resulted from the establishment of the Roman Empire.

The *Politics* divided into *πρῶτοι* and other *λόγοι*.

It is not impossible that one or two large works had already appeared broken up by their authors into 'books'—i.e. volumes, or rather papyrus-rolls, of a portable and handy size¹—before the *Politics* came into existence. It would certainly seem that the historical work of Ephorus was published in this form, for it was divided into thirty books, each dealing with a separate subject². Aristotle himself had apparently divided his dialogues—if we may thus interpret the phrase *ἐξωτερικοὶ λόγοι* in Cic. ad Att. 4. 16. 2—into books, prefixing to each book a separate *prooemium*³. But the *Politics* was not composed after this fashion, which was quite a new one in those days. It was divided by Aristotle into *πρῶτοι λόγοι* and other *λόγοι*, the first book having as its subject *οἰκονομία καὶ δεσποτεία* (3. 6. 1278 b 17) and being thus distinguished from *τὰ περὶ τὰς πολιτείας* (1. 13. 1260 b 12), but falling nevertheless within

¹ As Blass points out (*Handbuch der klassischen Alterthumswissenschaft*, i. 313), large works were probably from the first often published in more rolls than one for convenience in perusal, but each scribe who copied them would divide them after a fashion of his own, according to the size of his rolls, without paying much attention to the nature of the contents, and it was a decided step in advance when the sections into

which a work was to be divided came to be authoritatively determined at the outset.

² See Diod. 5. 1: 16. 1. Birt (*Das antike Buchwesen*, p. 471) does not feel absolutely certain (see his remarks on the subject, p. 466 sqq.), but the fact is highly probable, to say the least. See Blass *ubi supra*.

³ See Cic. ad Att. 4. 16. 2, and Blass *ubi supra*.

the *πρῶτοι λόγοι* (3. 6. 1278 b 17). Where these *πρῶτοι λόγοι* end, it is not easy to say, for we cannot infer from the use of the past tense in 3. 18. 1288 a 37, *ἐν δὲ τοῖς πρώτοις ἐδείχθη λόγοις*, that the *πρῶτοι λόγοι* are over before the beginning of this chapter, since we have *εἴρηται δὴ καὶ κατὰ τοὺς πρώτους λόγους* in 3. 6. 1278 b 17—a chapter which certainly seems to form part of the *πρῶτοι λόγοι*, for in 6 (4). 2. 1289 a 26 sqq. the distinction of the *ὀρθαὶ πολιτεῖαι* and the *παρεκβάσεις* (3. 7) is said to fall within the *πρώτη μέθοδος*. On the other hand, there is nothing to show that the Fourth and Fifth Books belong to the *πρῶτοι λόγοι*. But if the point at which the *πρῶτοι λόγοι* close is uncertain, there seems to be no doubt that the distinction between *πρῶτοι* and other *λόγοι* is due to Aristotle, while the division into books is probably not so. Still the eight books of the *Politics* are marked off from each other by clear differences of subject-matter, so that no great violence was done to the composition when it was broken up into books.

If we take the first three books first, and ask how far they hang together, we shall find on examination that there is some want of unity even here. The First Book, as has been already noticed, proves that the household exists by nature, yet the Second treats the question whether it should exist or not as one still open for discussion, and makes no reference to the arguments of the First Book. Perhaps, however, we should not attach too much importance to this, for in the First Book itself the slave is assumed as an element of the household, long before the naturalness of slavery is investigated and established. Then again, the closing sentence of the First Book, as has been noticed elsewhere¹, is not quite in accord with the opening paragraph of the Second, nor is there anything in the conclusion of the First (apart from this closing sentence) to lead us to expect that immediate transition to the subject of the best constitution which we note at the commencement of the Second. There is no clear indication, again, in the Second Book that the First has preceded it. The passage

Question of the unity of the *Politics*.
(1) How far do the first three books hang together?

¹ See notes on 1260 b 20, 27.

2. 2. 1261 b 12 sqq., no doubt, reminds us of 1. 2. 1252 b 28 sq., as do 2. 5. 1263 b 37 sqq. and 2. 9. 1269 b 14 sqq. of 1. 13. 1260 b 13 sqq.; but we are not referred back in these passages to the First Book. The Second Book has one or two links with the Third (compare, for example, 2. 9. 1271 a 18 sq. with 3. 14. 1284 b 37 sqq.), and it stands in a close relation to the Fourth, for in constructing the best State in the Fourth, Aristotle avoids many of the rocks of which we are warned in the Second, and we find one or two subjects discussed in this Book which have been marked out for discussion in the Second (compare 2. 6. 1265 b 16 with 4 (7). 16). The Second Book, in fact, seems to be more closely related to the Third and Fourth Books than to the First. Yet we note that while at the beginning of the Second Book the best constitution is announced as the subject of inquiry, the Third Book, on the contrary, addresses itself (3. 1. 1274 b 32) to an inquiry respecting all constitutions (*περὶ πολιτείας καὶ τίς ἐκάστη καὶ ποία τις*). On the other hand, the Third Book, unlike the Second, distinctly refers to the First (3. 6. 1278 b 17 sqq. : cp. 1. 2. 1253 a 1 sqq.), and its discussion of the virtue of the citizen reminds us of the discussion of the virtue of the woman, child, and slave in the First.

(2) How far do the Fourth and Fifth Books form a satisfactory sequel to the first three?

If we pass on to the Fourth and Fifth Books, and ask how far they form a satisfactory sequel to the first three, we raise a question which has given rise to much debate. Something has already been said on this subject¹. We have just seen that the Second Book prepares the way for the Fourth², and we observe also that the conclusions of the First and Third Books are made use of in more passages than one of the Fourth (compare, for example, 1. 3. 1253 b 18–1. 7. 1255 b 39, 1. 12. 1259 a 37–b 17, and 3. 6.

¹ See vol. i. p. 292 sqq.

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πολιτείας, and 2. 12. 1274 b 26, *τὰ μὲν οὖν περὶ τὰς πολιτείας, τὰς τε κυρίας καὶ τὰς ὑπὸ τῶν εἰρημένας, ἔστω θεθεωρημένα τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον*). But the sentence is one which it would be easy to interpolate.

1278 b 30–1279 a 21, with 4 (7). 3. 1325 a 27–31, and 4 (7). 14. 1333 a 3 sqq.: compare also 3. 5. 1278 a 40 sqq. with 4 (7). 14. 1333 a 11 sqq.)¹. The discrepancies, however, which have already been noted² between the Fourth and Fifth Books on the one hand and the first three on the other must not be lost sight of. It is possible that these two books, like the Seventh, were not originally written for insertion in the work of which they now form a part, at all events in its present form, and were incorporated with it by an afterthought³. The close relation, however, in which they stand to the Second, must be admitted to make against this view, and the only safe course is to confess that we cannot penetrate the secrets of the workshop, or perhaps we should rather say, the Peripatetic school.

We are far more conscious of a break when we pass from the five books to the remaining three. There are indeed many links between the two groups of books. Not only are anticipations to be found in the earlier group of the teaching of the later (compare, for instance, 2. 6. 1265 b 26–30 with 6 (4). 11. 1295 a 25 sqq.), but we trace in both the same twofold aim—the aim of scientific truth and the aim of utility (1. 11. 1258 b 9: 2. 1. 1260 b 32: 3. 2. 1275 b 21: compare 6 (4). 1. 1288 b 35).

But the emphatic announcement at the outset of the Sixth Book of the multiplicity of the problems of Political Science strikes us as something altogether new. We expect that Aristotle will pass quietly on from the best constitution (or in other words Kingship and Aristocracy) to Polity, the only *δρθή πολιτεία* still undiscussed, and if it is true that he gives good reasons (6 (4). 8. 1293 b 22 sqq.) for departing from this course and for studying oligarchy and democracy before he studies the polity, still we are conscious of a considerable change of tone

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A further peculiarity of the later group (6–8) is the emphasis with which these books dwell on a fact which finds no mention elsewhere—that of the existence of many forms of democracy and oligarchy. The Third Book, it is true, had distinguished various kinds of Kingship, so that there is nothing new in the recognition of sub-forms of this or that constitution; but still we nowhere learn outside these three books that democracy and oligarchy have many forms. No truth, however, is more insisted on in the three books, or rather in the Sixth and Eighth, for in the Seventh it is referred to only in the closing chapter¹, a

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Question whether the Fourth and Fifth Books or the Sixth and Eighth were the earlier written.

ἀριστοκρατίαν μὲν οὖν καλῶς ἔχει καλεῖν περὶ ἧς διήλθομεν ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις λόγοις· τὴν γὰρ ἐκ τῶν ἀρίστων ἀπλῶς κατ' ἀρετὴν πολιτεῖαν, καὶ μὴ πρὸς ὑπόθεσιν τινα ἀγαθῶν ἀνδρῶν, μόνην δίκαιον προσαγορεύειν ἀριστοκρατίαν· ἐν μόνῃ γὰρ ἀπλῶς ὁ αὐτὸς ἀνὴρ καὶ πολίτης ἀγαθός ἐστιν· οἱ δ' ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις ἀγαθοὶ πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν εἰσὶ τὴν αὐτῶν.

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and the Sixth and Eighth, were written after the Third, than that either pair of books was written after the other. These two pairs of books seem to be to a considerable extent independent of each other. Both, we notice, are incomplete; there is no clear evidence that either group was ever finished, though the opening of the Sixth Book (6 (4). 2. 1289 a 30) speaks of the inquiry respecting the best constitution as complete, and the Eighth Book, as we possess it, appears to close in the middle of a sentence¹. It is possible that Aristotle went on with the Sixth Book after completing the Third, instead of proceeding with the sketch of the best State. If he did so, however, it is strange that we find in the Fourth and Fifth Books so few traces of the teaching of the Sixth and Eighth.

The Sixth
Book.

A noteworthy feature of the Sixth Book is the state in which we find its earlier portion. The programme given in its second chapter (1289 b 12-26), as has been pointed out elsewhere (vol. i. p. 492 sqq.), does not altogether correspond with the list of questions marked out for treatment in the first chapter. The repetitions of prior discussions which we remark in c. 4 are still more surprising; c. 4. 1290 a 30-b 20 goes over much the same ground as the eighth chapter of the Third Book, and c. 4. 1290 b 21-1291 b 13 not only repeats (with considerable variations of method and result) the investigations of the preceding chapter, but contains much that is similar to the contents of the eighth chapter of the Fourth Book. The first four chapters of the Sixth Book may perhaps not have received a final revision, or may have been tampered with by some later hand.

The
Seventh
Book.

The Seventh Book was probably originally written as a separate treatise, and only inserted by an afterthought between the Sixth and Eighth Books. Not many references to other books of the Politics occur in its pages², and

¹ 8 (6). 8. 1323 a 9, *περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἀρχῶν, ὡς ἐν τύπῳ, σχεδὸν εἴρηται περὶ πασῶν*, where we have *μὲν οὖν* without any *δέ* to follow.

² Such references as those in 7 (5). 1. 1301 a 28 (*ὥσπερ εἴρηται καὶ πρότερον*) and 7 (5). 8. 1308 a 2 (*ποῖα δὲ λέγομεν τῶν πολιτικῶν σοφίσματα, πρότερον εἴρηται*) may easily have been added by a

it has some marked peculiarities. As has been already remarked¹, it systematically distinguishes between *μοναρχίαι* (including Kingships) and *πολιτεῖαι*², and it takes no notice (till its last chapter) of the many sub-forms of oligarchy and democracy dwelt on in the Sixth and Eighth Books; it also advises in one passage (c. 1. 1302 a 2-8) the blending in constitutions of *ισότης ἀριθμητική* with *ισότης κατ' ἀξίαν*, as the best security for durability³. It is perhaps by supposing that the Seventh Book has been inserted between two closely related books composed consecutively, that we shall best explain some difficulties occasioned by the references in the Eighth Book to the Sixth and Seventh Books. On the one hand, the Eighth Book refers more than once to the Seventh as preceding it, and one of these references at all events is too much interwoven with the context to be easily explained away as an addition by a later hand (c. 5. 1319 b 37 sqq.). On the other hand, the Sixth Book is referred to in 8 (6). 2. 1317 b 34 as *ἡ μέθοδος ἡ πρὸ ταύτης*, and in c. 4. 1318 b 7 as *οἱ πρὸ τούτων λόγοι*. If these references are from the hand of Aristotle—which is by no means certain, for they can readily be detached from the context—it may well be that they were inserted before the Seventh Book was intruded between the Sixth and the Eighth, and through an oversight escaped excision afterwards.

Some further light will be thrown on the subject which we have been considering, if we note down from the pages of the *Politics* some promises of future investigations which are not fulfilled in the work as we have it.

Promises of future investigations which are not fulfilled in the *Politics*.

The earliest of these (1. 13. 1260 b 8 sqq.) prepares us to

later hand, or by Aristotle himself, if he incorporated the Seventh Book with the *Politics*.

¹ Vol. i. p. 521.

² A similar distinction is implied in 3. 15. 1286 b 8-13. *Μοναρχία* and *πολιτεία* are often distinguished in the ordinary use of the Greek language (see Liddell and Scott s. v. *πολιτεία*), and the Seventh

Book conforms to the common way of speaking. The Seventh Book also agrees with the Third in tracing the plurality of forms of constitution to varying views of what is just (7 (5). 1. 1301 a 25 sqq. : cp. 3. 9).

³ This recommendation, it may be noticed, is borrowed from Plato, *Laws* 757 E.

expect a full investigation of the virtue of husband and wife, father and child, and of the conduct they should observe to each other, and also of the various forms which each of these relations should assume under each constitution; we are to be told how every constitution will educate the women and children who fall under its authority. Perhaps these inquiries were to find a place in the discussions *περὶ παιδονομίας* to which the Fourth Book (4 (7). 16. 1335 b 2) bids us look forward; but at any rate the intimation of the First Book leads us to expect an interesting ethical investigation which we do not find in the Politics, though the necessity of adapting education to the constitution is often insisted on (e.g. in 5 (8). 1. 1337 a 11 sqq.: 7 (5). 9. 1310 a 12 sqq.: 8 (6). 4. 1319 b 1 sqq.). The Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Books, as we have them, seem in fact too much preoccupied with purely political problems to find room for the delicate ethical inquiry promised in the First Book. Yet we are told at the beginning of the Eighth Book that only a few subjects remain for discussion, and the subject dwelt upon in this passage of the First Book is not included in its enumeration of them. The announcement there made appears, in fact, to be completely forgotten.

Then again, the intimation in the first chapter of the Sixth Book that the making of laws, as distinguished from constitutions, is a part of the province of *πολιτική*, and that the whole province of *πολιτική* must be fully dealt with, leads us to look for an inquiry on the subject of laws in the Politics (cp. 3. 15. 1286 a 5, *ἀφείσθω τὴν πρώτην*). But, as has been noticed already, the programme given in the very next chapter (the second) omits all mention of this topic, and the opening paragraphs of the Eighth Book fail to include it among the subjects which still demand treatment, though it certainly is not dealt with in any part of the Politics which has come down to us.

Other intimations of future discussions which never actually occur will be found in 4 (7). 5. 1326 b 32 sqq.: 4 (7). 10. 1330 a 4 and 1330 a 31 sqq.: 4 (7). 16. 1335 b 2 sqq.:

4 (7). 17. 1336 b 24: 5 (8). 3. 1338 a 32 sqq.: 5 (8). 7. 1341 b 19 sqq.: 8 (6). 1. 1316 b 39 sqq. These passages, however, only prove what we knew without them, that the inquiry as to the best State and its arrangements is incomplete, and also that the Eighth Book is incomplete. The fact that there are no references in the Politics to past discussions which cannot be explained as relating to existing passages in the treatise as we have it, seems to make it probable that no considerable part of the work has been lost, and that it was never finished.

We see then that though there is a certain amount of The unity about the Politics, it is not a well-planned whole. Its component parts fit together more or less, but the fit is not perfect. The Politics a whole whose parts fit together imperfectly. Question as to the probable causes of this.

How is it that this is so? How is it that the Politics, though indisputably a whole, is yet a whole in which we trace these discrepancies of plan?

Beyond all doubt, we must not expect a Greek philosophical treatise to be arranged precisely in the order in which we expect a modern work of the same kind to be arranged. A modern work would not first prove that the household exists by nature, and then inquire whether it ought to exist. Yet this is what Aristotle does in the First and Second Books of the Politics. Cicero has already noticed in the Tusculan Disputations some peculiarities in the methods of investigation practised by Greek philosophers, as distinguished from Greek geometricians. 'Veruntamen mathematicorum iste mos est, non est philosophorum. Nam geometrae cum aliquid docere volunt, si quid ad eam rem pertinet eorum quae ante docuerunt, id sumunt pro concesso et probato: illud modo explicant, de quo ante nihil scriptum est. Philosophi, quamcunque rem habent in manibus, in eam quae conveniunt congerunt omnia, etsi alio loco disputata sunt. Quod ni ita esset, cur Stoicus, si esset quaesitum, satisne ad beate vivendum virtus posset, multa diceret? cui satis esset respondere se ante docuisse nihil bonum esse, nisi quod honestum esset; hoc probato, con-

sequens esse beatam vitam virtute esse contentam, et quo modo hoc sit consequens illi, sic illud huic, ut si beata vita virtute contenta sit, nisi honestum quod sit, nihil aliud sit bonum. Sed tamen non agunt sic. Nam et de honesto et de summo bono separatim libri sunt, et cum ex eo efficitur satis magnam in virtute ad beate vivendum esse vim, nihilo minus hoc agunt separatim. Propriis enim et suis argumentis et admonitionibus tractanda quaeque res est, tanta praesertim¹.

Seneca, again, in an interesting passage of his Fortieth Epistle, contrasts Greek and Roman oratory, and finds more deliberation, reflection, and system in the latter. 'In Graecis hanc licentiam tuleris: nos, etiam cum scribimus, interpungere assuevimus. Cicero quoque noster, a quo Romana eloquentia exsilivit, gradarius fuit. Romanus sermo magis se circumspicit et aestimat praebetque aestimandum.'

But differences of this kind do not suffice to explain the phenomena which need explanation in the *Politics*. What we remark is that, of the three or four parts of which the work is made up, those which precede and those which follow very nearly correspond to each other, but do not quite do so. In passing from one part to another, we are conscious that the two parts do not completely match: the part which we must place second in order is not quite what the part which precedes it leads us to expect it to be, though it is very nearly so. Some of the discrepancies which we notice in the *Politics* may be accounted for on the supposition that the work was never finished and never received a final revision at its author's hands, but then it must be remembered that a similar, or even greater, want of unity has been traced in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, which can hardly have suffered from the same cause.

Whatever may be the case as to the *Nicomachean Ethics*, perhaps the state of the *Politics* becomes in general intelligible if we suppose that Aristotle, notwithstanding his turn for systematization, allowed himself some freedom in work-

¹ Cic. *Tusc. Disp.* 5. 7. 18-19.

ing successively at different parts of the treatise, permitted each part to forget to some extent its membership of a whole, and failed to force on his investigations that complete harmony, of form as well as of substance, which rigorous criticism would require¹. Very probably his views developed as he passed from one portion of the work to another; he seems throughout it to be feeling his way as a pioneer would, and we need not be surprised to find in the Sixth and Eighth Books ideas of which there is no trace in the earlier ones. Possibly some interval of time elapsed between the composition of the different parts². The Third Book is the centre round which the whole treatise is grouped; it is presupposed both in the inquiries of the Fourth Book and in those of the Sixth.

We notice that we have no such programme of future inquiries at the outset of the *Politics* as that which the first and second chapters of the Sixth Book set forth for the remainder of the work, and it may well be the case that Aristotle began the *Politics* without any definite scheme of it before him. He had evidently cast aside the programme which we find at the close of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, and yet he framed no fresh one to take its place. If he had done so, perhaps he would have prepared us by some intimation early in the work for the break of which we are sensible in passing from the first five books to the remaining three. Something might have been lost in freshness and freedom, if the structure of the *Politics* had been more rigorously systematic—if a definite programme had been announced at the outset and adhered to throughout, but the bisected aspect which the work wears at present would have been removed, and the gulf would have been

¹ This will not, however, explain everything; it will not explain, for instance, the state in which we find the first four chapters of the Sixth Book.

² It is also possible that some of the books were rewritten, and that the *Politics*, as we have it, is a mixture of two or more edi-

tions. For instance, a Second Book may once have existed with a commencement in fuller harmony with the conclusion of the First than that of the present Second Book, and a Fourth Book in fuller harmony with the Third than the present Fourth.

bridged between the ethical πολιτική of the earlier group of books and the largely technical πολιτική of the later.

Apart from possible interpolations, the Politics would seem to be the work of one author, and that author Aristotle, not Theophrastus.

Some may be inclined to suspect that the Politics is the work of more authors than one. It is very possible that it is not free from interpolation, but there seems to be no reason to doubt that the bulk of the treatise is to be referred to one and the same author. The same peculiarities of style appear throughout it—peculiarities which are traceable more or less in other works ascribed to Aristotle, and which afford marked indications of character. We are sensible of a certain combativeness—of a fondness for tacitly contradicting other writers, especially Plato; we feel that we have to do with a writer who is at once eager in utterance and circumspect in drawing conclusions.

If we refuse to trust to the evidence of style, we may note that a work composed by more authors than one, and especially a work on Politics, would probably betray its origin by anachronisms, unless these authors were contemporaries. The works of Theophrastus on Plants, though far removed in subject from current events, mark their own date by referring to events long subsequent to the death of Aristotle¹.

Then again, each of the three or four parts into which the Politics falls seems to be the work of a writer who is thinking out the subject for himself—a pioneer, not a deft expositor and elaborator of another man's system. Perhaps the very discrepancies and variations of view which we note in the Politics indicate this. The system is in making, not made. The earlier books of the treatise appear to be unfamiliar with doctrines which are insisted on with emphasis in the later ones. The writer is evidently one who has known Greece in the days of its freedom and greatness before the defeat of Chaeroneia—one who belongs perhaps rather to the age of Philip than to that of Alexander: the opinions he combats and corrects are those of that day; they are the opinions of Plato or Isocrates or the Socratic Schools, not those of a

¹ See Zeller, *Gr. Ph.* 2. 2. 98 n.: 811 n.

later time. If the Politics, or any part of it, had been written even twenty years after Alexander's death, would not the fact be readily discoverable? Would a writer of that date have committed himself to the sanguine view that the Greek race, if united, would be able to rule the world? Would the passages recommending the constitution resting on the *μέσοι* have been expressed as they are, if they had been written after Antipater's introduction of a property-qualification for citizenship at Athens? The writer at any rate would not have needed to go back to *οἱ πρότερον ἐφ' ἡγεμονίᾳ γεγονότες* to find a statesman of far-reaching authority who favoured a constitution resembling the polity.

Nothing surprises us more in the Politics than the fact that, though it was apparently written after Chaeroneia, it is almost entirely preoccupied with the petty States of Greece, and the constitutions prevailing in them. Macedon, it is true, might profit by the pages devoted to Kingship, but throughout the greater part of the work the writer evidently has the Greek City-State and its difficulties in view. He seems wholly unconscious that the sceptre had passed irrevocably from Greece to Macedon; he has not fully deciphered the meaning of Chaeroneia. We need not blame him for this: if Greece had been less exhausted and wiser, Chaeroneia might not have been 'finis Graeciae.' But his view of the situation probably shows that he wrote not long after the battle, and before the magnitude of the catastrophe had been fully realized.

The *ὡς ἡ Θεοφράστου* in the list of Diogenes may suggest the question whether Theophrastus was not the writer of the Politics, or of a part of it. Theophrastus was only 12 or 15 years younger than Aristotle, though he survived him apparently 34 years or more. It is very possible that he wrote some of his books before the death of Aristotle; the Politics might belong to that epoch and yet be his. If this were so, we should still feel pretty sure that we possessed the gist of Aristotle's political

teaching, for the work of Theophrastus would certainly be based on the views of his master. But we feel in reading the Politics that we are in presence of the master, not of the disciple—of the originator of the system, not of its expositor. There is a difference, again, between the style of Aristotle and that of Theophrastus; the writings of the latter were probably far easier reading than those of the former—sweeter, more flowing, and less sinewy¹. Opinions also find expression in the Politics which Theophrastus seems not to have held. He would hardly have been willing to assert, as the First Book of the Politics asserts (c. 8. 1256 b 15 sqq.), the naturalness of animal food². He may perhaps also have rated the importance of external and bodily goods to happiness rather higher than we find it rated in the Fourth Book of the Politics³.

Theophrastus was famed for the freshness with which he could treat a subject already treated by Aristotle⁴, and it is probable that the treatise in six books entitled Πολιτικά, which Diogenes Laertius ascribes to him, was different in many respects from the work which we know as Aristotle's Politics. Cicero distinctly implies that the work of Theo-

¹ Cic. Brutus 31. 121: quis Aristotele nervosior, Theophrasto dulcior? Heylbut (de Theophrasti libris *περί φιλίας*, p. 9) remarks: 'taceri quidem nequit nonnulla minus severe et magis ad communem sensum a Theophrasto tractata esse, qui longe suaviore et faciliore quam Aristoteles scribendi genere utebatur.'

² See Bernays, Theophrastos' Schrift über Frömmigkeit, *passim*. It is not quite clear that the so-called first book of the Oeconomics (c. 2), which Philodemus ascribes to Theophrastus, contemplates the use of animal food. If, again, as Bernays appears to think (Theophrastos über Frömmigkeit, p. 96 sq.), it is to Theophrastus, and not to Porphyry, that we are to ascribe the strong assertion of the identity of men and animals 'in desires and anger, and also in

reasoning (λογισμοίς), and above all in perceptions,' which we find in Porphyry. de Abst. 3. 25, Theophrastus can hardly be the writer of such a passage as Pol. 1. 2. 1253 a 15 sqq.

³ Cicero at all events seems to have thought that he rated these goods higher than Aristotle (see Acad. Post. 1. 9. 33: 10. 35). Theophrastus appears in his Ethics to have thought the question worthy of discussion, whether *πρὸς τὰς τύχας τρέπεται τὰ ἥθη καὶ κινούμενα τοῖς τῶν σωμάτων πάθεσιν ἐξίσταται τῆς ἀρετῆς* (Plutarch, Pericl. c. 38: Sertor. c. 10). He appears to have speculated whether great calamities might not spoil even a good man's character.

⁴ Cic. de Fin. 1. 2. 6: quid? Theophrastus mediocriterne delectat, cum tractat locos ab Aristotele ante tractatos?

phrastus 'De optimo statu reipublicae' was not identical with the work of Aristotle on the same subject, and if it should be suggested that the Fourth and Fifth Books of our 'Aristotle's Politics' are the treatise of Theophrastus or its remains, it may be replied that internal evidence points rather to Aristotle as their author.

Thus far we have assumed that the Politics is a composition committed to writing by its author or authors, but this is precisely what has been questioned by some. One or two critics have drawn attention to the accounts given of Aristotle's style by Cicero and others¹ who were familiar with his dialogues—accounts which are borne out by some of the still existing fragments of those dialogues—and have asked whether the extant works of Aristotle, marked as they are by many roughnesses and peculiarities of style, can really have been composed by him—whether they are not, or most of them are not, mere notes of Aristotle's lectures taken down by his hearers and perhaps put in shape by some one disciple. To some of them, indeed, this theory would not apply. The History of Animals can hardly have had this origin, and the hypomnematic works of Aristotle—if they were intended for his own use—must also have been committed to writing by him. But setting these on one side, and setting on one side also works incorrectly connected with his name, it has been asked whether many, if not all, of the remaining works are anything more than reports of his lectures.

The Politics is probably not a pupil's record of Aristotle's lectures, but a composition committed to writing by Aristotle and designed for use in his school.

There is undoubtedly a colloquial air about them ; some have more of it than others, and none more than the Politics. The Politics reads, even more than the Nicomachean Ethics, like the talk of an experienced inquirer engaged with others in a difficult investigation, and feeling his way through it. We know that notes were taken by

¹ See Zeller's note, Gr. Ph. 2. 111. 1, where some of them are collected. Among these is the

well-known passage, Cic. Acad. 2. 38. 119: *veniet flumen orationis aureum fundens Aristoteles.*

pupils in the lecture-rooms of the great Greek teachers. Aristotle himself took notes of Plato's lectures *περὶ τὰγαθοῦ*, and other disciples of Plato did the same¹. We are told that the Cynic Metrocles 'burnt the lectures of Theophrastus,' an expression which some have taken to mean notes taken by him of Theophrastus' lectures². But then we observe that the works which we associate with the name of Aristotle resemble each other in style more than we should expect, if they had come into existence in this way, unless indeed the report were *verbatim* or nearly so, or the whole of the lectures were reported by a single individual. If the reports were, as they probably would be, by different hands and not very close, it is natural to expect that the rendering of one reporter would differ a good deal from the rendering of another, and that in the result the works ascribed to Aristotle would differ from each other in style more than they actually do. It seems hardly likely that any mere 'redaction' by a single disciple would suffice to restore to them the degree of uniformity which they exhibit. The question then arises—is it likely that the reports would be *verbatim* or nearly so?

Aristotle's report of Plato's lectures *περὶ τὰγαθοῦ* was, it would seem, pretty close³, so far at all events as certain expressions of Plato were concerned, but it is perhaps hardly likely that a long course of lectures would be taken down in the close way in which we must suppose Aristotle's language to have been taken down, if most of what we call his works are in fact reports of his lectures⁴. If his

¹ Heitz, *Verlorenen Schriften des Aristoteles*, p. 217 sq.

² Diog. Laert. 6. 95, οὗτος τὰ αὐτοῦ συγγράμματα κατακαὼν, ὡς φησιν Ἐκάτων ἐν πρώτῳ Χρειῶν, ἐπέλεγε, Τὰ δ' ἔστ' ὀνείρων νερέτερον φαντάσματα, οἷον λῆρος· οἱ δ' ὅτι τὰς Θεοφράστου ἀκροάσεις καταφλέγων ἐπέλεγε, Ἡφαίστη, πρόμοι ὧδε, θέτις νύ τι σείο χατίζει.

³ Cp. Simplic. in Aristot. Phys. 362 a 12 (quoted by Heitz, p. 217),

ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὰγαθοῦ λόγοις, οἷς ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης καὶ Ἡρακλείδης καὶ Ἑστιαῖος καὶ ἄλλοι τοῦ Πλάτωνος ἑταῖροι παραγενόμενοι ἀνεγράψαντο τὰ ρηθέντα αἰνιγματωδῶς, ὡς ἐρρήθη.

⁴ It would seem from Plutarch's treatise *De recta ratione audiendi* (c. 18) that the lecturers of his day were liable to be interrupted by questions put by some member of their audience, to which they were expected to reply. If this was so in Aristotle's time, a faithful report of a lecture would give

lectures, however, were thus taken down, the reports would differ but little from compositions strictly so called, for ancient authors, like modern, may often have dictated their writings to an amanuensis.

But no ancient authority conceives the works of Aristotle to have come into being in this way. Galen, as we have seen, speaks of Aristotle as 'writing' the ἀκροάσεις for his pupils¹. Theophrastus, in a letter to the Peripatetic Phanias cited by Diogenes Laertius², seems to use the term ἀναγνώσεις of his own lectures. The *περὶ τὰ γαθοῦ* of Aristotle, which consisted of notes of Plato's lectures, was never included among the works of Plato, and it would be equally easy to distinguish between reports of Aristotle's lectures and works written by Aristotle. It seems, besides, only natural that Aristotle should write down a course of lectures which he probably intended to re-deliver. He was not, like Socrates or Carneades, one who systematically abstained from writing; he had been a writer from his youth; and is it likely that after composing his Dialogues and his History of Animals and his work on Constitutions, and even noting down the Problems which suggested themselves to him, and accumulating a mass of memoranda, he trusted his political and other teaching to the chapter of accidents? Even if, on the first occasion on which each course was delivered, he used no notes, and a pupil took down a report of the lectures, is it not likely that he would adopt this report, and use it, possibly in an amplified and revised form, on subsequent occasions?

The remark may be added that if the Politics is a pupil's record of Aristotle's lectures, it is the record of a course of lectures singularly broken up into parts. We ask with some curiosity, why a continuous course of lectures should form so imperfect an unity. One would have expected that a single course delivered without notes would have been far

these replies, and probably record the interruption which elicited them.

¹ Above, p. ii.

² 5. 37. It would of course be

unsafe to build too much on the testimony of an alleged letter, which may have been, like much of Greek epistolary literature, falsified or spurious.

more of an unity than the Politics seems to be. It is no doubt possible that the work is a pupil's record of three or four courses put together ; but, on the whole, the supposition which involves fewest difficulties seems to be that the Politics was written by Aristotle for use in his lecture-room, or at all events for the use of his pupils. It is evident that Greek teachers had to study with some care how best to carry their pupils with them. Some hearers, we are told in the Metaphysics¹, would accept nothing but strict mathematical demonstration ; others demanded a frequent use of examples, while others again expected the lecturer to adduce passages from the poets in confirmation of his teaching. Aristotle is careful to explain at the very outset of the Nicomachean Ethics, for the benefit of the first-named class of critics, that ethical and political problems do not lend themselves to mathematical demonstration, but he often illustrates his teaching by familiar examples and often also refers to the poets. These methods would be especially in place in an educational, or acroamatic, treatise. Unlike Plato, who seems for the most part to have written in one and the same way for the outside world and for his pupils, Aristotle made a distinction between the style of his published works and the style of those which he intended for use within his school. With his pupils he seems to have been less attentive to form, less rhetorical, and more colloquial.

His lecturing is not of an *ex cathedra* or formal type ; on the contrary, he seems to regard himself rather as the pioneer of a body of investigators, and takes pains to select that path through the thicket along which they will find it most easy to follow him. He never forgets the traditional impressions, prepossessions, and prejudices of the better sort of Greek ; he himself has inherited these traditions, which need only a certain amount of sifting and correction to become the basis of his own philosophical system. His tone is thus rather that of a comrade than a teacher. We can imagine how great would be the im-

¹ Metaph. a. 3. 995 a 6 sqq.

pression produced on thoughtful Greeks by the Politics; its teaching would be the more effective, because it was so little *ex cathedra* and was conveyed in an unlaboured and conversational style.

It is not impossible that many of Aristotle's works are records of his teaching drawn up by him after the lectures had been delivered. Several of the treatises comprised in the 'Moralia' of Plutarch are thought to be based on lectures previously given; the treatise *De Audiendis Poetis* is expressly said by Plutarch to be so (c. 1)¹. The orators had set the example of writing down their speeches before or after delivery. We need not suppose that all the works of Aristotle were designed for one and the same purpose, or that they all originated in exactly the same way. The extreme brevity and compression of his style in some of them (for instance, in parts of the *Metaphysics* and in the third book of the *De Anima*) would seem to render these writings more suitable for private perusal than for reading aloud. We do not often observe a similar degree of compression in the *Politics*.

The displacement of the Fourth and Fifth Books may be accounted for in many ways. It may be due to the unfinished state of the work: Aristotle may have left his manuscript in pieces, and the 'disiecta membra' may not have been put together aright. Or the particular MS. or MSS. of which the MSS. we possess are reproductions may have had this defect. Several MSS. of the *Metaphysics* of Aristotle (S, A^b, B^b, C^b, E^b)—among them one of the best (A^b)—place Books M and N before K and Λ². Bekker remarks at the close of the Sixth Book of the *History of Animals* (581 a 5), that several MSS. place the Eighth Book immediately after the Sixth: 'octavum et A^a subiungit et P Q C^a D^a E^a F^a G^a m n, septimo in noni locum depresso.' So again, according to Bekker's note at the close of the Seventh Book of the same treatise, P A^a C^a

How is the displacement of the Fourth and Fifth Books to be accounted for?

¹ See Volkmann, *Leben Schriften und Philosophie des Plutarch*, i. 65.

² Bonitz, *Aristotelis Metaphysica*, p. v sqq.

pupils in the lecture-rooms of the great Greek teachers. Aristotle himself took notes of Plato's lectures *περὶ τὰ γαθοῦ*, and other disciples of Plato did the same¹. We are told that the Cynic Metrocles 'burnt the lectures of Theophrastus,' an expression which some have taken to mean notes taken by him of Theophrastus' lectures². But then we observe that the works which we associate with the name of Aristotle resemble each other in style more than we should expect, if they had come into existence in this way, unless indeed the report were *verbatim* or nearly so, or the whole of the lectures were reported by a single individual. If the reports were, as they probably would be, by different hands and not very close, it is natural to expect that the rendering of one reporter would differ a good deal from the rendering of another, and that in the result the works ascribed to Aristotle would differ from each other in style more than they actually do. It seems hardly likely that any mere 'redaction' by a single disciple would suffice to restore to them the degree of uniformity which they exhibit. The question then arises—is it likely that the reports would be *verbatim* or nearly so?

Aristotle's report of Plato's lectures *περὶ τὰ γαθοῦ* was, it would seem, pretty close³, so far at all events as certain expressions of Plato were concerned, but it is perhaps hardly likely that a long course of lectures would be taken down in the close way in which we must suppose Aristotle's language to have been taken down, if most of what we call his works are in fact reports of his lectures⁴. If his

¹ Heitz, *Verlorenen Schriften des Aristoteles*, p. 217 sq.

² Diog. Laert. 6. 95, οὗτος τὰ ἑαυτοῦ συγγράμματα κατακαῶν, ὥς φησιν Ἐκάρων ἐν πρώτῳ Χρειῶν, ἐπέλεγε, Τὰ δ' ἐστ' ὀνείρων νεπτέρων φαντάσματα, οἷον λῆρος· οἱ δ' ὅτι τὰς Θεοφράστου ἀκροάσεις καταφλέγων ἐπέλεγε, ἠφαίστε, πρόμολ' ὦδε, Θέτις νύ τι σείο χατίρει.

³ Cp. Simplic. in Aristot. Phys. 362 a 12 (quoted by Heitz, p. 217),

ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὰ γαθοῦ λόγοις, οἷς ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης καὶ Ἡρακλείδης καὶ Ἑστιαῖος καὶ ἄλλοι τοῦ Πλάτωνος ἑταῖροι παραγενόμενοι ἀνεγράψαντο τὰ ρηθέντα αἰνιγματωδῶς, ὥς ἐρρήθη.

⁴ It would seem from Plutarch's treatise *De recta ratione audiendi* (c. 18) that the lecturers of his day were liable to be interrupted by questions put by some member of their audience, to which they were expected to reply. If this was so in Aristotle's time, a faithful report of a lecture would give

lectures, however, were thus taken down, the reports would differ but little from compositions strictly so called, for ancient authors, like modern, may often have dictated their writings to an amanuensis.

But no ancient authority conceives the works of Aristotle to have come into being in this way. Galen, as we have seen, speaks of Aristotle as 'writing' the ἀκροάσεις for his pupils¹. Theophrastus, in a letter to the Peripatetic Phantias cited by Diogenes Laertius², seems to use the term ἀναγνώσεις of his own lectures. The *περὶ τὰ γὰθόν* of Aristotle, which consisted of notes of Plato's lectures, was never included among the works of Plato, and it would be equally easy to distinguish between reports of Aristotle's lectures and works written by Aristotle. It seems, besides, only natural that Aristotle should write down a course of lectures which he probably intended to re-deliver. He was not, like Socrates or Carneades, one who systematically abstained from writing; he had been a writer from his youth; and is it likely that after composing his Dialogues and his History of Animals and his work on Constitutions, and even noting down the Problems which suggested themselves to him, and accumulating a mass of memoranda, he trusted his political and other teaching to the chapter of accidents? Even if, on the first occasion on which each course was delivered, he used no notes, and a pupil took down a report of the lectures, is it not likely that he would adopt this report, and use it, possibly in an amplified and revised form, on subsequent occasions?

The remark may be added that if the Politics is a pupil's record of Aristotle's lectures, it is the record of a course of lectures singularly broken up into parts. We ask with some curiosity, why a continuous course of lectures should form so imperfect an unity. One would have expected that a single course delivered without notes would have been far

these replies, and probably record the interruption which elicited them.

¹ Above, p. ii.

² 5. 37. It would of course be

unsafe to build too much on the testimony of an alleged letter, which may have been, like much of Greek epistolary literature, falsified or spurious.

more of an unity than the Politics seems to be. It is no doubt possible that the work is a pupil's record of three or four courses put together ; but, on the whole, the supposition which involves fewest difficulties seems to be that the Politics was written by Aristotle for use in his lecture-room, or at all events for the use of his pupils. It is evident that Greek teachers had to study with some care how best to carry their pupils with them. Some hearers, we are told in the Metaphysics¹, would accept nothing but strict mathematical demonstration ; others demanded a frequent use of examples, while others again expected the lecturer to adduce passages from the poets in confirmation of his teaching. Aristotle is careful to explain at the very outset of the Nicomachean Ethics, for the benefit of the first-named class of critics, that ethical and political problems do not lend themselves to mathematical demonstration, but he often illustrates his teaching by familiar examples and often also refers to the poets. These methods would be especially in place in an educational, or acroamatic, treatise. Unlike Plato, who seems for the most part to have written in one and the same way for the outside world and for his pupils, Aristotle made a distinction between the style of his published works and the style of those which he intended for use within his school. With his pupils he seems to have been less attentive to form, less rhetorical, and more colloquial.

His lecturing is not of an *ex cathedra* or formal type ; on the contrary, he seems to regard himself rather as the pioneer of a body of investigators, and takes pains to select that path through the thicket along which they will find it most easy to follow him. He never forgets the traditional impressions, prepossessions, and prejudices of the better sort of Greek ; he himself has inherited these traditions, which need only a certain amount of sifting and correction to become the basis of his own philosophical system. His tone is thus rather that of a comrade than a teacher. We can imagine how great would be the im-

¹ Metaph. α. 3. 995 a 6 sqq.

pression produced on thoughtful Greeks by the Politics; its teaching would be the more effective, because it was so little *ex cathedra* and was conveyed in an unlaboured and conversational style.

It is not impossible that many of Aristotle's works are records of his teaching drawn up by him after the lectures had been delivered. Several of the treatises comprised in the 'Moralia' of Plutarch are thought to be based on lectures previously given; the treatise *De Audiendis Poetis* is expressly said by Plutarch to be so (c. 1)¹. The orators had set the example of writing down their speeches before or after delivery. We need not suppose that all the works of Aristotle were designed for one and the same purpose, or that they all originated in exactly the same way. The extreme brevity and compression of his style in some of them (for instance, in parts of the *Metaphysics* and in the third book of the *De Anima*) would seem to render these writings more suitable for private perusal than for reading aloud. We do not often observe a similar degree of compression in the *Politics*.

The displacement of the Fourth and Fifth Books may be accounted for in many ways. It may be due to the unfinished state of the work: Aristotle may have left his manuscript in pieces, and the 'disiecta membra' may not have been put together aright. Or the particular MS. or MSS. of which the MSS. we possess are reproductions may have had this defect. Several MSS. of the *Metaphysics* of Aristotle (S, A^b, B^b, C^b, E^b)—among them one of the best (A^b)—place Books M and N before K and Λ². Bekker remarks at the close of the Sixth Book of the *History of Animals* (581 a 5), that several MSS. place the Eighth Book immediately after the Sixth: 'octavum et A^a subiungit et P Q C^a D^a E^a F^a G^a m n, septimo in noni locum depresso.' So again, according to Bekker's note at the close of the Seventh Book of the same treatise, P A^a C^a

How is the displacement of the Fourth and Fifth Books to be accounted for?

¹ See Volkmann, *Leben Schriften und Philosophie des Plutarch*, i. 65.

² Bonitz, *Aristotelis Metaphysica*, p. v sqq.

add after ἀρχονται, the last word of this book, the words προιούσης δὴ τῆς ἡλικίας, 'quod est initium libri decimi': here apparently we have a trace of an arrangement of the books by which the spurious Tenth Book was inserted at the close of the Seventh¹.

Displacements of this kind are said to have frequently occurred, when *codices* of parchment took the place of papyrus-rolls and works were transcribed from papyrus to parchment².

Or again, the same thing may have happened to the Politics which some think has happened to the Facta et Dicta Memorabilia of Valerius Maximus³. The Fourth and Fifth Books (i. e. the fourth and fifth volumes or papyrus-rolls) may have circulated as a separate work, and may have been wrongly placed, when restored to the work of which they originally formed a part. If, as may well be the case, the displacement of the two books occurred at a very early date, or at all events prior to the general disuse of papyrus-rolls, this may have been the way in which it came about. But indeed a mere mistake in numbering the eight papyrus-rolls of the archetype would suffice to account for it. It is, no doubt, possible that these two books belong to a different edition of the treatise from the Third Book, and that this circumstance has in some way or other led to their being placed at the end of it. It is not easy, however, to see how it can have done so; nor is the position in which we find them accounted for, if we take the view that they were not originally designed to form part of the work, for this may very probably be true of the Seventh Book, which nevertheless stands fifth in order in the MSS.

¹ Some MSS. of William of Moerbeke's Latin Translation of the Politics in the Bibliothèque Nationale at Paris (Fonds de Sorbonne, 928: Fonds de Saint-Victor, 336) are said by Jourdain (*Recherches critiques sur l'âge et l'origine des traductions latines d'Aristote*, p. 181) 'n'annoncer que sept livres; et le dernier se termine cependant par ces mots: *Palam quia tres hos faciendum ad discip-*

linam: quod medium, quod possibile, quod decens. La division des livres varie donc sans que l'ouvrage soit moins complet.'

² See Birt, *Antike Buchwesen*, p. 374. The change came to be of common occurrence, according to this writer, in the fourth and fifth centuries of our era.

³ See Dict. of Greek and Roman Biography, art. Valerius Maximus.

ON THE MANUSCRIPTS OF THE POLITICS AND THE LATIN TRANSLATION OF WILLIAM OF MOERBEKE.

THE publication in 1872 of Susemihl's critical edition of the Politics will always be regarded as marking an epoch in the study of the work. It comprises a complete collation of all the more important MSS. then known to scholars and a partial collation of the inferior ones; it also contains a revised text of William of Moerbeke's Latin translation of the Politics, based on a collation of a number of MSS. I have not attempted to revise Susemihl's collations. I have, however, collated the first two books of the Politics in MS. 112 belonging to Corpus Christi College, Oxford (referred to by Susemihl in his edition of the Nicomachean Ethics as O¹, but not, I believe, previously collated for the Politics)¹, and I have collated the first two books of William of Moerbeke's Latin translation in MS. 891 of the Philipps Library, Cheltenham (referred to by me as z), and in MS. 112 belonging to Balliol College, Oxford, named o by Susemihl (Sus.¹ p. xxxviii), whose collation of this MS., made by Dr. M. Schanz, extends, however, only to the First Book. I have also collated a number of passages in the first two books of the same Latin Translation in a Bodleian MS. (Canon. Class. Lat. 174), which I refer to as y. This MS. and the Philipps MS. have not, so far as I am aware, been collated before. The latter MS. is of some importance, for though it is neither copied from the a of Susemihl (MS. 19, *sciences et arts, latin*, of the Bibliothèque de l'Arsenal at Paris) nor a from it, these two MSS. evidently belong to the same family, a family of which a has

¹ See as to this MS., so far as the remarks prefixed to the Critical Notes (below, p. 58 sqq.). its text of the Politics is concerned,

hitherto been the sole representative, and Susemihl (with whom Busse concurs, de praesidiis Aristotelis Politica emendandi, p. 11) says of a (Sus.¹ p. xxxv)—‘omnium librorum mihi adhibitorum longe est optimus, quoniam, etsi ceteris non rarius peccat, tamen longe saepius quam alius quis verum retinuit solus.’ The words prefixed in a to the Translation of the Politics—*incipit liber politicorum Aristotilis a fratre Guilielmo ordinis praedicatorum de greco in latinum translatus*—which enabled M. Barthélemy St. Hilaire in 1837 (Politique d’Aristote, tome I, p. lxxix) to establish the truth of Schneider’s conjecture and to designate William of Moerbeke as its author, and which have not hitherto been found in any other MS., are prefixed to this translation in z also, though z does not add at the end of it the words which are found at the end of it in a (St. Hilaire, *ubi supra*: Sus.¹ p. xxxiv); the closing words in z are, in fact, *explicit liber politicorum Aristotilis*¹.

Still it is on Susemihl’s *apparatus criticus* that the following remarks are mainly based, so far at least as the more important MSS. of the Politics are concerned, and my aim in them will be to derive as much instruction as possible from the copious data with which he has furnished the student of the Politics, and especially to throw light on the characteristics and comparative value of the two families into which his MSS. fall, and of the more important MSS. individually. I am all the more desirous to acknowledge my debt to Susemihl, because on questions relating to the text I have often been led to conclusions at variance with his. On these questions I shall be able to speak more definitively, when I have completed my commentary, but something must be said at once as to the principles on which I have framed my text.

Some Palimpsest Fragments of the Third and Sixth (Fourth) Books of the Politics ascribed to the tenth century

¹ See below (p. 60 sqq.) as to these MSS. of William of Moerbeke’s Latin Translation of the Politics. I will only add here as to z, that though its text often agrees with

that of a, it does not by any means always do so; in fact, it occasionally offers readings peculiar to itself, some of them excellent.

have recently been discovered, or rediscovered, in the Vatican Library¹, but no complete MS. of the work is older than the fourteenth. Nor have we any Greek commentaries on the Politics, such as we possess in the case of some other works of Aristotle, which might aid us in the correction of the text. The extant complete MSS. fall, as has been said, into two families, the second of them including a superior and inferior variety. The chief² representatives of the first family are the two manuscripts, M^a (B 105, 'ordinis superioris,' of the Ambrosian Library at Milan), belonging to the second half of the fifteenth century, and P¹ (MS. 2023 of the Bibliothèque Nationale at Paris), transcribed by Demetrius Chalcondylas³, possibly at Milan (see Sus.¹ p. vii), at the close of the fifteenth or the beginning of the sixteenth century⁴. A full account of these manuscripts will be found in Susemihl's large critical edition of the Politics

¹ See the Preface.

² They are not its only representatives, for we are furnished with many readings characteristic of this recension by the corrections and various readings found in P³ and in larger numbers in P⁴, two MSS. of the second family. P⁵, a manuscript of mixed type, being related to both families, would also be of much use, if it were not very late (it belongs to the sixteenth century), and both for this reason and for others, of very doubtful authority. It is also imperfect, for its earlier portion is lost, and it commences only at 1306 a 6. See on these sources Sus.³ praef. p. vi sqq.

³ Or rather Chalcocondylas—'of the bronze pen' (Gardthausen, Gr. Paläographie, p. 72). In studying the readings offered by P¹ it is necessary to bear in mind that Demetrius Chalcondylas was no mere ordinary copyist; he was a learned scholar, and superintended editions of Homer (Florence, 1488), of Isocrates (Milan, 1493), and of Suidas (1499). Susemihl (Sus.³ p. xiv) is no doubt right in regarding as emendations of his several

of the good readings which are found only in P¹. Here and there, however, as Busse has pointed out (*de praesidiis*, etc., p. 45), P¹ appears to preserve the reading of the archetype more faithfully than any other MS. of the first family (e.g. in 3. 9. 1280 b 5).

⁴ P¹ must be classed with the first family, though many of the corrections introduced into it by Demetrius belong to the second, just as P² and P⁴ must be classed with the second family, though many of the corrections introduced into them by their writers belong to the first. It is singular that each of the writers of these three MSS., and perhaps also the writer of the MS. used by Leonardus Aretinus, should have corrected his MS. from the recension to which it does not belong. This may indicate that some doubt was even then felt as to the comparative value of the two recensions. Some of the corrections of this kind in P¹ are in the same ink as the MS., and were therefore probably made either at the time of writing or not long after.

(1872), pp. vii-xii. Bekker omitted to collate these two MSS. for his edition of Aristotle (1831). Some readings from them, however, had been communicated by Haase to Götting and had been published by the latter in his edition of the Politics (1824), and M. Barthélemy St. Hilaire (1837) carried the study of the Paris MSS. of the Politics much farther; but any one who compares the full collation of M^s P¹ made on behalf of Susemihl with previous accounts of the text of these MSS. will see that our knowledge of the readings they offer was greatly enlarged by the publication of his edition of 1872. So far then as extant manuscripts are concerned, the text of the first family has only recently come to be thoroughly known, but it must not be forgotten that students of the Politics have had at their disposal from the first an extremely literal Latin translation published probably about 1260 (*Rhein. Mus.* 39. p. 457) and based on a Greek text of the first family. This translation is the work of one of the earliest students of Greek in Western Europe—William of Moerbeke, a Flemish¹ Dominican, who was Archbishop of Corinth at the close of his life (1280-1)²—and if we may judge by the number of copies of it which exist, was largely used in the middle ages, notwithstanding the censure passed by Roger Bacon on the class of translations to which it belongs³ and its occasional almost complete

¹ Moerbeke, or Meerbecke, is a small town of Eastern Flanders, some miles from Ghent. It is not perhaps quite certain in what sense this translation was the work of William of Moerbeke. More hands than one may have been employed upon it: some parts of it (e.g. the last chapter of the Second Book) show much more ignorance of Greek than others. We cannot feel sure that William of Moerbeke translated the whole; indeed, his functions may have been confined to supervising the work of others and editing the book. The MSS. which mention his name are not

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² Oncken, *Die Staatslehre des Aristoteles*, p. 70.

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unintelligibility, which is mostly due to its extreme literalness, though not unfrequently it is the result of the translator's imperfect knowledge of Greek¹. As no known MS. of the Politics except the Vatican Fragments is older than the fourteenth century, this translation is based on a Greek text earlier than any complete text we possess. Not much earlier, however, it would seem, if Susemihl is right, for he says (Politica, ed. 1872, p. xii)—‘*Rudolphus Schoellius ex compendiorum natura libri M^a archetypum saeculo xiii^o aut xiv^o antiquius non fuisse collegit, unde vel ipsum illum codicem quem vertendo expressit Guilelmus saeculum xii^{um} exiens aut xiii^{um} iniens aetate non superasse ex magno vitiorum numero mirum in modum Guilelmo et Ambrosiano communium concludendum esse videtur.*’ Still the importance of the Latin translation is great, and here again Susemihl has done excellent service, for he has collated several manuscripts of it for his critical edition of the Politics (Sus.¹ p. xxxiv). The value of this translation as an authority for the text of the Politics only gradually came to be perceived. The Aldine edition (1498) was based on a manuscript of the second family, and it was

omnia transfert falsa et corrumpit sapientiam Latinorum’ (quoted by Jourdain, *Recherches critiques sur l’âge et l’origine des traductions latines d’Aristote*, p. 67), and Sepulveda remarks in the preface to his translation of the Politics: ‘*vix enim eos in numero interpretum habendos puto, qui verbum verbo inepta quadam fidelitate reddunt.*’ Yet it is impossible not to respect the feeling which led William of Moerbeke to adopt this mode of translating Aristotle. He followed the example of most of the translators of the Bible in antiquity (Blass, *Handbuch der klassischen Alterthums-Wissenschaft* 1. 223).

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not till 1550, when the third Basle edition of Aristotle appeared, that any use was made of the Latin translation in correcting the text (see Sus.¹ p. xxxii: Sus.² p. xvii). Two years later, Victorius published his first edition of the Politics, and in 1576 a second edition with a commentary (Sus.² p. xviii). He seems to have used the Latin translation for the emendation of the text in both his editions (Schneider, Aristot. Pol. Praefat. p. xx), and he speaks of it thus in his preface to the second:—‘quosunque calamo exaratos codices indagare potui, cunctos deteriores mendosioresque inveni quam fuerit exemplar, quo illa usa est’ (see also his commentary on 4 (7). 12. 1331 b 13 sqq. *Distribui autem*, and on 2. 5. 1264 a 17 sqq. *Si namque eodem pacto*). Schneider bears equally strong testimony to its value for critical purposes in the preface to his edition of the Politics, published in 1809 (p. xxv). Susemihl, with manuscripts of the first family before him, takes a somewhat more measured view on the subject. He sees¹ that it is in some cases impossible² and in others difficult to say what the translator found in his text. The translator’s rendering is not always equally literal³. He sometimes, as Susemihl points out, omits or adds small words, and where he finds that the meaning of

¹ Sus.¹, p. xxxiii.

² E.g. where questions arise as to the insertion or omission of the article, or as to the spelling of Greek words (if the Greek word is not reproduced). Occasionally indeed, the article is expressed by the translator, as for instance in the important passage 1. 13. 1260 a 8, *quare natura quae plura principantia et subiecta*.

³ This will be evident from the following examples. In 1. 6. 1255 a 8, *γράφονται παρανόμων* is rendered, literally enough, *scribunt iniquorum*: in 1. 8. 1256 b 10, *συνεκτεκεῖ* is *coepariunt*: in 1. 9. 1257 a 32, *τῷ εἰσαγεσθαι* is *per adduci*. In 3. 15. 1286 a 9–10, again, the translator finds in his Greek a masculine plural nominative conjoined

with a verb in the third person singular. His Latin reproduces this false concord. Literalness could certainly be carried no further. But in other passages the version is not equally exact: thus for instance in 1256 b 9, *τελειωθείσιν* is rendered *secundum perfectionem* (or *perfectam* — sc. *generationem*): in 1259 a 13, *ὀλίγου μισθωσάμενον modico pro pretio dato*: in 1259 a 22, *τοῦτον ποιοῦνται τὸν πόρον hoc modo faciunt divitias* (see also 1255 b 35, 1268 b 5). An exact ‘ad verbum’ rendering is, in fact, impracticable in Latin, and one or two of these passages seem to show that the translator does not always make his version as literal as he might.

a sentence will thus be made clearer, he does not scruple to add a Latin word or two, for which no equivalent existed in his Greek text (Sus.¹ pp. xxxiii-xxxiv). That Greek text, again, Susemihl allows to have been here and there deformed by chance corruptions, by arbitrary changes, and by the intrusion of glosses (Sus.¹ p. xxxi). Notwithstanding all this, however, Susemihl claimed, in his edition of 1872 at all events, that the Latin translation is 'instar optimi codicis, qui quamvis non eandem auctoritatem quam E in Physicis, Meteorologicis, Psychologicis, et A° in Poeticis et Rhetoricis, tamen eandem quam K^b in Ethicis et fortasse paulo maiorem habeat' (p. xxxii). Dittenberger in his valuable review of Susemihl's edition of 1872 (published in the *Gött. gelehrt. Anz.* for Oct. 28, 1874, p. 1349 sqq.) expressed a doubt (p. 1363), whether Susemihl had in that edition 'kept himself entirely free from the tendency, which he had noticed in Victorius and Schneider, to over-value the *Vetus Interpres*,' and though in his two subsequent editions of 1879 and 1882, and especially in the latter, where he abandons (p. xii. n.) the comparison with K^b, Susemihl shows less confidence in the unsupported testimony of the *Vetus Interpres*, he perhaps still rates it somewhat too high. It is not, to begin with, absolutely clear that we have a right (with Susemihl) to take this translation as a reproduction of a single Greek manuscript. Obviously it renders with great literalness the Greek text which it adopts, but we must bear in mind that a translator, even if he does his work as literally as the author of this ancient translation, is not quite as mechanical a being as a copyist. He may not be invariably faithful to one manuscript¹, and if he is, he may now and then prefer to render some gloss or conjectural reading which he finds in its margin, rather than the reading which stands in its text². He may adopt con-

¹ Susemihl himself points out (Sus.¹, p. xxxv), relying on a marginal annotation in one MS. of the *Vet. Int.* on 3. 17. 1288 a 15, that 'aut in Γ' (the manuscript which the *Vet. Int.* is supposed

to have used) 'hic illic adscriptae erant variae lectiones, aut praeter Γ hic illic etiam alium codicem vel plures alios (Guilelmus) inspexerat.'

² Roemer in the preface to his

jectural emendations of his own or of others. We must, I think, allow for these possibilities in the case of this Latin translation of the Politics, and not rate its testimony quite so high as we should rate that of a Greek manuscript of the same date¹. We must also remember that William of Moerbeke, its probable author, was not a Greek by birth, and that he may have been as little infallible in deciphering Greek manuscripts as he certainly was in interpreting Greek words.

Nevertheless the readings offered by the thirteenth-century translator commonly deserve attention, and Bekker, who has here and there (for the most part in the wake of earlier editors), with manifest advantage to the text, adopted a reading based on his unsupported authority², might well have done something more than he did in his critical edition of the Politics (1831) to call attention to them. He also omitted, as we have already seen, to collate the manuscripts M^a and P¹, though he must have learnt their importance from the imperfect notes of their readings given in Götting's edition (1824) on the authority of Haase. This omission has now been fully repaired by Susemihl, who has been in his turn, perhaps, in his first two editions at all events, a little inclined to overrate the value of the authorities which he was the first fully to turn to account. In his third and last edition, however, besides being generally more conservative in his

edition of Aristotle's Rhetoric (Teubner, 1885, p. xiii) says of William of Moerbeke's Latin Translation of this treatise—'varietates et glossas, quas pro correctionibus habuisse videtur' (cp. Sus.¹ Praef. p. vi), 'ubique cupide arripientem videmus hominem omni sano iudicio destitutum.'

¹ I have followed Susemihl in designating the Greek text which the Vetus Interpres appears to render by the symbol Γ, but I must not be understood to imply by this that I feel sure that it invariably represents the text of a

single manuscript.

² E. g. in 2. 1. 1260 b 41 he accepts εἰς ὁ τῆς on the authority of the Vet. Int. in place of λούρης, the reading of all known MSS.: in 2. 7. 1266 b 2 he accepts δ' ἡδὴ on the same authority: in 3. 12. 1283 a 7 he gets ὑπερέχει in place of ὑπερέχειν from the same source: in 4 (7). 17. 1336 a 6 he is probably right in reading εἰσάγειν (Vet. Int. *inducere*): in 6 (4). 4. 1292 a 22 he adds παρ' before ἐκατέροις, which seems quite indispensable, but which only Vet. Int. gives (*apud*).

dealings with the text, Susemihl is, as we shall see, more cautious in his acceptance of the readings of the first family of manuscripts, and also in his acceptance of the unsupported testimony of the *Vetus Interpres*. He says himself of his third edition (praef. p. xii), that it is '*Bekkerianis multo similior quam duae priores.*'

Besides, however, being the first to give a full record of the readings of the first family of manuscripts, Susemihl has done much to add to our knowledge of the second family also. This is considerably more numerous than the first; it includes, according to Susemihl, nearly a score of manuscripts. The most important of them are P², the I^b of Bekker (MS. Coislin 161 in the Bibliothèque Nationale at Paris), a manuscript of the fourteenth century from one of the monasteries on Mount Athos, of which a full account will be found in the preface to Susemihl's edition of 1872 (pp. xvi-xx); and P³ (MS. 2026 of the Bibliothèque Nationale at Paris), the earliest complete MS. of the Politics known to scholars, for it belongs to the beginning of the fourteenth century (see pp. xx-xxi of the same preface). These two manuscripts have been collated throughout by Susemihl. Of the less good variety of this family¹, only P⁴ (MS. 2025 of the Paris Bibliothèque Nationale) appears to have been collated from beginning to end, but Bekker used some of the manuscripts falling under this head for particular books, and Susemihl has had them collated for the passages indicated by him in his critical edition (1872), pp. xxviii-xxix, and in his explanatory edition (1879), pp. xvi-xvii². O¹ belongs to this variety.

¹ See on the MSS. composing it Sus.¹ p. xxi sq. Their text has often suffered from the intrusion of glosses (see critical note on 1253 a 12) and supplementary additions (see critical note on 1255 b 12). They also frequently omit words, especially the article. Yet here and there they have alone preserved the true reading (e.g. in 1320 a 16, *μη τοι γε*).

² I add an explanation of the

chief symbols which I have adopted from Susemihl. Π stands for the consent of the Aldine edition and all extant MSS., so far as these sources have been consulted for Susemihl's editions: Π¹ for the consent of the extant MSS. of the first family (in the first two books M^a P¹ only) and the text followed by the *Vetus Interpres*: Π² for the consent of the Aldine edition and the MSS. of the second

If we except the Vatican Fragments¹, the manuscripts of the Politics are of a late date, later than the text translated by the Vetus Interpres, which was itself apparently not very early. They are evidently full of the faults which are commonly found in manuscripts. The scribes did their work mechanically for the most part—often without a thought of the meaning of what they were writing—though here and there we seem to detect efforts to emend the text, especially in the case of puzzling words or passages. The manuscripts often incorporate glosses with the text; they often omit whole clauses, especially clauses intervening between repetitions of the same word; still oftener they omit one or more words; they are often led astray by homoeoteleuton; their errors are particularly frequent in relation to certain words; they repeat words from the preceding line; they are apt to place contiguous words in the same case; sometimes they seem to admit two alternative readings together into the text—sometimes we notice that clauses are transposed. To say that they have these defects is, however, only to say that they share the common lot of manuscripts. Their lateness has probably added to their imperfections. We note, for instance, that many of the variations which we observe in them are variations in the termination of words², and these may often have arisen from the misreading or miswriting of contractions, which were used with increasing frequency after the eleventh century. How easily they might thus arise will be seen from Gardthausen's work on Greek Palaeography

family, so far as these sources have been examined for Susemihl's editions: Π³ for the consent of the Aldine edition and the MSS. of the less good variety of the second family, subject to the same limitation. I need hardly explain that the abbreviation 'pr.' prefixed to the name of a MS. refers to its original state and is intended to distinguish an original reading from a correction.

¹ See the Preface.

² See, for instance, the various readings in 1271 a 37 (αὐτῆς Π¹, αὐτῶν Π², αὐτοῦ pr. Π³, αὐτοῖς Π³), 1280 a 24 (ἐλευθερίῃ M², ἐλευθερίοι Π², ἐλεύθεροι Π¹—the true reading being doubtless ἐλευθερίῃ), 1282 a 27, 1284 b 41, 1286 a 25, 1286 b 24, 33, 1287 b 30, 1288 a 23, 1292 b 36, 1297 a 1: and see Sus.¹, p. xii, note 21. Not many pages, however, of Susemihl's *apparatus criticus* are free from instances of error in terminations.

(p. 246), where we find the remark that the same contraction may be used to represent θεότητος, θεότητι, θεότητα, while another represents πόλις, πολύς, πόλεμος, πολέμιος, πολίτης, and even πολιτεία (though the last word is more usually represented by a different contraction), and that a single contraction may be employed to express βάλλοντος, βάλλονται, βάλλοντες, βάλλοντας.

Occasionally all the manuscripts, in addition to the text used by the Vetus Interpres, offer a reading almost or quite certainly wrong¹, but they seem on the whole to preserve with considerable fidelity the idiosyncrasies of Aristotle's peculiar and highly characteristic style. In a large number of passages earlier critics have condemned readings which a closer and more sympathetic study of Aristotle's use of language has proved to be undoubtedly correct². Often and often the manuscripts have retained little idiosyncrasies of style, which less mechanical copyists, or copyists more ready to insist on the ordinary rules of Greek writing, might well have smoothed away. Peculiarities in the order of words³, occasional omissions of a word or words⁴, *constructions ad sensum*⁵, carelessnesses⁶

¹ E.g. in 2. 12. 1274 b 7, ΓΠ (except perhaps pr. P³) have ἐπίσκηψω (instead of ἐπίσκηψιν): in 3. 3. 1276 b 9, ΓΠ have λέγοιμεν for λέγομεν: in 3. 8. 1279 b 28, προσαγορεύοι or προσαγορεύει, one or other of which appears in ΓΠ, must be wrong: in 3. 15. 1286 a 9-10, δοκεῖ . . . οἱ νόμοι ΓΠ: in 3. 16. 1287 a 29, ΓΠ seem to be wrong, and the Vossian *codex* of Julian alone right. Cases in which all the MSS. are wrong and Γ alone is right also occur: see for example the passages referred to above, p. xlviii, note 2.

² Those who do not happen to be acquainted with the second of Vahlen's Aristotelische Aufsätze will thank me for referring to it in illustration of this remark.

³ E.g. 1. 6. 1255 b 2, ἡ δὲ φύσις βούλεται μὲν τοῦτο ποιεῖν πολλάκις, οὐ μέντοι δύναται (so ΓΠ, except

that M⁸ P¹ place τοῦτο after ποιεῖν): 7 (5). 9. 1309 b 27, τέλος δ' οὕτως ὥστε μηδὲ ῥίνα ποιήσει φαίνεσθαι: 7 (5). 10. 1311 a 23, τὰς αὐτὰς ἀρχὰς δεῖ νομίζειν περὶ τε τὰς πολιτείας εἶναι τῶν μεταβολῶν καὶ περὶ τὰς μοναρχίας (except that Γ M⁸ erroneously place τῶν μεταβολῶν before αὐτὰς): 8 (6). 6. 1320 b 33, τὰ μὲν εὐ σώματα διακείμενα πρὸς ὑγίειαν: 4 (7). 1. 1323 b 4, περὶ δὲ τὴν ἔξω κτήσιν τῶν ἀγαθῶν μετριάζουσιν.

⁴ E.g. of πόλις and its parts (see explanatory note on 1266 b 1): of ἀρετῇ, 5 (8). 4. 1338 b 15 and 1. 13. 1260 a 24: of ἔχουσιν, 6 (4). 9. 1294 b 27: of πρὸς τὴν ψυχῇ, 5 (8). 5. 1340 b 17: of μετέχειν, 6 (4). 6. 1292 b 36.

⁵ E.g. 7 (5). 10. 1311 a 33, τῆς δ' ὕβρεως οὕσης πολυμερούς, ἐκαστον αὐτῶν αἴτιον γίνεται τῆς ὀργῆς.

⁶ E.g. 3. 13. 1283 b 16, δῆλον

or roughnesses¹ of style, and even positively bad writing² are faithfully reproduced³.

We have seen, however, that the complete MSS. fall into two families, and here the question arises—what is the origin and the extent of the distinction between them? We know that in parts of the *de Anima* and of some other writings of Aristotle two texts exist, which have been thought by some to represent two separate issues or editions, both from the hand of Aristotle, while others have held one of the texts to be a *réchauffé* due, not to Aristotle, but to some expositor who has rewritten the original with slight alterations in the language, not often affecting the meaning. Has the distinction between the two families of manuscripts in the case of the *Politics* originated in either of these ways? The question is an important one, for if the distinction between them had this origin, it would obviously be altogether improper to blend the readings of the two families together and to form a composite text out of them, as all editors have hitherto sought to do. There is no doubt that the differences existing between the two families are in part of a similar nature to those which exist between the two texts of the second book of the *de Anima*. As in the *de Anima*, so in the *Politics*, we note variations in the order of words, variations in the use of the article, variations in particles and the like. But these variations are far less frequent in the *Politics* than in the portions of the second book of the *de Anima* in which a second text exists. In one or two places of the *de Anima*, again, we trace some slight divergence of

γὰρ ὡς εἴ τις πάλιν εἰς πλουσιώτερος
ἀπάντων ἐστὶ, δῆλον ὅτι κ.τ.λ.: 8
(6). 5. 1319 b 33, ἔστι δ' ἔργον τοῦ
νομοθέτου καὶ τῶν βουλευμένων συν-
ιστάναι τινὰ τοιαύτην πολιτείαν οὐ τὸ
καταστήσαι μέγιστον ἔργον οὐδὲ μό-
νον, ἀλλ' ὅπως σώζεται μᾶλλον.

¹ E.g. 2. 6. 1264 b 39-40 (cp.
de Gen. An. 2. 7. 746 b 7-9): 1. 10.
1258 a 24.

² E.g. 6 (4). 8. 1293 b 26-7.

³ Some of their mistakes seem to be due to their ultimate derivation from an archetype in which words were neither separated nor accented: thus we have ἡ δὴ instead of ἡδὴ in 1252 b 28, ἀρισ-ταρχεῖν instead of ἀριστ' ἀρχεῖν in 1273 b 5, ἀλλ' οὐδ' ἔστιν instead of ἄλλου δ' ἔστιν in 1254 a 15, Χάρητι δὴ instead of Χαρητίδῃ in 1258 b 40.

meaning¹, and this we hardly find in the Politics. And then again, we note that variations in the order of words occur even within the first family, the order followed by M^a P¹ being often different from that followed by Γ, which is in these cases commonly the same as that of the second family. It seems, therefore, hardly necessary to have recourse to the supposition of a double text to account for variations of order². The same thing may be said as to variations in the use of the article and others of the same kind. Besides, many of the differences between the readings of the two families are of a sort which is not equally conspicuous in the two texts of the *de Anima*. One family uses one form of a word, the other another: the first has *ὀψοποιητική*, the second *ὀψοποιική*: the first commonly uses the form *μονάρχης*, the second *μόναρχος*³, and so forth. The second family occasionally avoids *hiatus* where the first does not. Differences of this kind are probably due to grammarian revisers of the text; and if this is so, it seems probable that the differences which might be ascribed to a duality of text have also originated in the same way. Many of the differences, again, between the text of Π¹ and Π² appear to be due to a misreading of contractions, or to omissions on the part of one set of manuscripts or the other (most often of Π¹), or to other accidental causes. It does not seem likely that the contrast of the two families runs back (at all events in its present proportions) to anything like so early a date as do the two

¹ E.g. in *de An.* 2. 9. 421 a 9, where the received text has—*αἴτιον δ' ὅτι τὴν αἴσθησιν ταύτην οὐκ ἔχομεν ἀκριβῆ*, ἀλλὰ χεῖρω πολλῶν ζῶων, and the second text—*αἴτιον δ' ὅτι οὐκ ἔχομεν ἀκριβῆ ταύτην τὴν αἴσθησιν*, ἀλλὰ χεῖριστα ὁσμήναι ἀνθρώπων τῶν ζῶων.

² M^a here and there has an order of its own (e.g. in 1267 b 40). It is easy to see from Susemihl's *ap̄paratus criticus* on 1271 a 25, 36 (*Sus.*¹, pp. 127, 128), how easily these changes of order might

arise, and, if they arose in an archetype, how widely they might be diffused.

³ 'The dependent compounds of the stem *ἀρχω* end in Attic not in *-αρχης*, but throughout in *-αρχος* (*γυμνασίαρχος*, *δήμαρχος*, *ἑπαρχος*, *τριήραρχος*, etc.): still in an Attic inscription of B. C. 324 we find certain finance officials of the deme Athmone named *μεράρχαι*' (*Meisterhans, Grammatik der attischen Inschriften*, pp. 53-54).

texts of portions of the *de Anima*. Both families agree in the order in which they arrange the books. In both, the first four chapters of the Sixth Book are little better than a chaos. This last defect, it is true, may have existed in the work as Aristotle left it. All the manuscripts, and the *vetus versio* also, have the obvious blunder ἐπίσκοψιν in 2. 12. 1274 b 7: all read ἐκ δὲ τοῦ τετάρτου τῶν τετάρτων in 2. 6. 1266 a 18. The text of the Vatican Fragments is a mixed text, and may possibly belong to a time prior to the rise of a marked contrast between the two families.

It would seem, then, that both families of manuscripts may safely be used in the construction of a text of the *Politics*. No editor, in fact, has attempted to base his text on one family only and dispensed altogether with the aid of the other. Bekker mainly relies on the second family, but he has adopted several readings from the *Vetus Interpres*: Susemihl bases his text in the main on the first family, and especially on Γ, but he frequently adopts readings from the second¹. Editors of the *Politics* seem to have no option but to make their text more or less a composite text. Ours must be based partly on the first family of manuscripts, partly on the better variety of the second: occasionally perhaps it may be necessary to take a reading from the less good variety of the second. The question whether in a given passage we are to follow the reading given by the first family or the second, which is often a difficult one, must be decided partly by the proba-

¹ E. g. in the following passages of the First and Second Books: 1255 a 5, 1259 b 2, 1260 a 39, 1262 a 30, 1264 a 1, 1264 b 3, 1265 a 30, 35 (χρησιν), 1265 b 4, 21, 1266 a 20, 23, 1267 b 40, 1270 a 20, 21, 1271 a 27, 1273 a 10, 1273 b 3. It may be added that Susemihl recognizes in his third edition (praef. p. xvi), how prone the MSS. of the first family are to omit words, and how little they are to be depended on in cases of omission; hence we find him in this edition accepting from

the second family not a few words which he had previously eliminated in reliance on the authority of the first family, and generally showing an increased confidence in the second family, though he still prefers the first. Instances of this will be found in the following passages of the first two books, as they stand in Susemihl's third edition—1253 a 25, 1257 b 24, 1260 b 17, 1261 a 22, 1263 b 1, 6, 1264 a 16, 1268 a 26, 1270 a 25, 34, 1273 a 9, b 2, 27, 1274 b 8.

bilities of the particular case, partly in reference to the known tendencies of either family.

The manuscripts of the second family, for instance, as has been said, avoid *hiatus* more frequently than those of the first¹: here in all probability the less polished version is the more genuine. In matters of spelling, again, the first family has perhaps occasionally preserved peculiarities which the second has smoothed away (e. g. the form *συμφυῆναι* in 1262 b 13, which is all the more likely to be correct because it is found in K^b in Eth. Nic. 7. 5. 1147 a 22)². When the first family unanimously places words in one order which the second places in another, the order given by the first family is sometimes to my mind more unstudied and more Aristotelian than that given by the second³. But in graver matters at any rate the advantage seems to me to rest with the second family⁴. In some cases falling under this head, no doubt, the readings of the first family may well deserve our preference. Thus in 2. 11. 1273 a 41, Π¹ give us *ταύτην οὐχ οἶόν τε βεβαίως ἀριστοκρατεῖσθαι τὴν πολιτείαν*, and Π² the softened and probably less genuine reading *ταύτην οὐχ οἶόν τ' εἶναι βεβαίως ἀριστοκρατικὴν πολιτείαν*: and in 2. 1. 1260 b 28 *τίς* Π¹ seems preferable on similar grounds to *ἡ*, which is the reading of the manuscripts of the second family. So again in 4 (7). 12. 1331 b 13 Π¹ have preserved

¹ E. g. in 1254 b 14: 1255 a 11, b 5, 21: 1256 a 33, b 18: 1258 a 31: 1259 b 7: 1261 b 17, 32: 1263 a 28: 1264 a 37, 38, etc. In these passages, however, the elisions by which *hiatus* is avoided are of a trivial and obvious kind: serious cases of *hiatus* are commonly left untouched in both families alike.

² It is not, however, always the case that the spelling of Π¹ is to be preferred. For instance, the form *φιδρία* (Π²) seems preferable to *φιλία* (Π¹)—see critical note on 1271 a 27. It is hardly likely that in matters of spelling complete reliance can safely be placed on either family. It should be noted that in questions as to *hiatus* and commonly also in questions of

spelling we get no assistance from the Vetus Interpres, and are dependent on M^a P¹, so far as the first family is concerned.

³ E. g. in 5 (8). 2. 1337 b 20 Π¹ have *ὁ δὲ αὐτὸ τοῦτο πράττων πολλάκις δι' ἄλλους θητικὸν καὶ δουλικὸν ἂν δόξειε πράττειν* (where *πολλάκις* is to be taken with *ἂν δόξειε*—compare the similar displacement of *πολλάκις* in 1. 6. 1255 b 3), while Π² place *πολλάκις* after *δι' ἄλλους* (and also *ἂν* after *δόξειεν*), thus arranging the words in a more regular and logical, but probably less genuine, order.

⁴ The Vatican Fragments agree far more often with the second family than with the first. See the Preface.

the true reading *νενεμῆσθαι* (Π^2 almost without exception have *μεμῆσθαι*), and in 4 (7). 17. 1336 b 2 ἀπελαύνειν Π^2 seems to be undoubtedly wrong. But on the whole it appears to me that Π^2 less often transmute a puzzling reading into an easier one than Π^1 . Thus, for example, in

1. 2. 1252 b 15, *ὁμοκάπους*, the reading of most MSS. of the second family, is better than *ὁμοκάπνους*, Π^1 P^4 L^2 .
1. 4. 1253 b 27, *τῶν οἰκονομικῶν*, the reading of almost all the MSS. of the second family, is better than *τῶ οἰκονομικῶ*, the reading of the first.
1. 9. 1257 b 24, Π^1 seem to be wrong in omitting *οὔτος*.
1. 11. 1258 b 27, Π^1 have corrected *τρίτον* into *τέταρτον* wrongly, though not unnaturally.
2. 2. 1261 b 7, *οὔτε* Π^2 is probably more genuine than *οὐ* Π^1 .
2. 7. 1267 a 40, Π^1 omit the second *ἀν*, though the repetition of *ἀν* is probably right.
2. 8. 1268 b 12, Π^2 retain the singular but quite Aristotelian (Bon. Ind. 454 a 20 sq.) displacement of *μὲν*, of which indeed there are many traces in the MSS. of the Latin Translation.
- 21, Π^2 add *ἡδὴ* probably rightly.
- 1269 a 18, Vet. Int. has *qui mutaverit*, and may perhaps have found *δ* added in his text before *κινήσας*, where M^s P^1 add *τις* : Π^2 are probably right in reading simply *κινήσας*.
2. 9. 1270 a 34, Π^1 omit an awkward but idiomatic *μὲν*.
3. 12. 1282 b 15, *δὲ* Π^2 is more probably Aristotelian than *δὴ* Π^1 .
3. 14. 1285 b 12, P^2 and (on second thoughts) P^8 give *ἐπανάτασις* : M^s P^1 and possibly Γ (Vet. Int. *elevatio*) wrongly *ἐπανάστασις*.
- 6 (4). 5. 1292 b 5, the difficult word *εἰσὶν* ('takes office') becomes *εἰς εἴη* in Γ M^s pr. P^1 .
- 6 (4). 6. 1293 a 3, Π^2 rightly omit *καὶ* before *εὐπορίας*.
- 6 (4). 12. 1296 b 33, an idiomatic *δὲ* is omitted by Π^1 , but preserved by Π^2 .
- 6 (4). 16. 1300 b 30, *παντὶ* Π^2 seems to me to be right, not *πανόντι* Π^1 .
- 8 (6). 8. 1322 b 14, *εἰσφορὰν* Π^2 is undoubtedly correct, though Γ M^s P^1 substitute the commoner word *ἐφορεία*.
- 4 (7). 1. 1323 b 9, the idiomatic use of *αὐτῶν* is probably correct, but Γ M^s P^1 omit the word.
- 4 (7). 12. 1331 b 5, *τῇν* Π^2 is probably right, though its omission by Γ M^s pr. P^1 makes the passage easier. This omission, however, may well be accidental, as *τῇν* is followed by *τῶν*.

- 5 (8). 5. 1339 a 29, *τε πασι* Π^2 , where the place of *τε*, though not that which we should expect, is justified by many parallel instances (see Bon. Ind. 749 b 44 sqq.), whereas P^1 reads *γε* and M^s omits *τε*, and possibly Γ also, but of this we cannot be certain, for the Vet. Int. seldom renders *τε*.
- 5 (8). 6. 1341 a 13, *καί*, which Π^2 add, is probably right, though not easy to interpret.
- 5 (8). 6. 1341 b 1, Π^1 wrongly substitute *λαμβοι* for *σαμβυκαι*.

The manuscripts of the first family seem also, I think, to admit glosses into the text more frequently than the better ones of the second (see, for instance, Susemihl's *apparatus criticus* on 1. 8. 1256 b 26: 2. 6. 1265 a 21, 22: 2. 7. 1266 a 37: 2. 10. 1271 b 28: 3. 4. 1277 a 23: 3. 10. 1281 a 28, where *σπουδαία*, which is probably a gloss, takes in Π^1 the place of *δλκαία*). Clearly, again, as Dittenberger has remarked¹, and Susemihl has now fully recognized (Sus.³ p. xvi), these manuscripts are apt to omit words, probably because their archetype was somewhat carelessly written². Take the following instances from the Third Book:—

1275 a 11, Π^1 om. *καί γάρ ταῦτα τοῖς ἐπάρχει*: 28, Γ M^s pr. P^1 om. *καίτοι*—*ἀρχῆς*: 1276 a 4, M^s P^1 , and possibly Γ , om. *τῆς*: b 3, M^s P^1 , and possibly Γ , om. *ἀν*: 36, Γ M^s pr. P^1 om. *ἀλλά*: 1277 a 20, Π^1 om. *ἀρετή* after *ἡ αὐτή*: 24, Γ M^s pr. P^1 om. *ἴσως*: 1278 b 2, om. *ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων*: 20, om. *οὐκ ἔλαττον*: 1279 a 2, Π^1 om. *ἔνα*, though M^s P^1 move *εἶναι* to its place: 34, M^s P^1 , and possibly Γ , om. *τῶν* in *τῇν δὲ τῶν δλίγων*: b 15, Π^1 om. *τι*: 1280 b 1, M^s P^1 , and possibly Γ , om. *τοῦ*: 5, Γ M^s pr. P^1 om. *πολιτικῆς*: 1282 a 7, Π^1 om. *καί*: 17, om. *ἡ* before *βελτίους*: 40, M^s P^1 , and probably Γ , om. *τὸ* before *τούτων*: 1283 a 10, Π^1 om. *καί*, and in the next line in *πᾶσαν ἀνισότητ'* Γ M^s pr. P^1 omit the second of the two syllables *αν*, making *ἀνισότητ'* into *ισότητ'* or *ισότητα*: 17, M^s P^1 , and possibly Γ , om. *τ'*: 32,

¹ *Gött. gel. Anz.*, Oct. 28, 1874, p. 1359. If we examine the discrepancies between Π^1 and Π^2 in the first two books of the Politics, we shall find that in a large proportion of cases they arise from the omission of words in Π^1 .

² Omissions also occur in Π^2 , and some of them are on a more

extensive scale than those of Π^1 (see, for example, 1307 b 32–34, 1334 a 37–38, 1336 b 18, 1337 b 16–19, 34–35), but they fortunately occur less frequently, and they give rise to no critical doubts. They are often obviously due to homoeoteleuton.

If we except the Vatican Fragments¹, the manuscripts of the Politics are of a late date, later than the text translated by the Vetus Interpres, which was itself apparently not very early. They are evidently full of the faults which are commonly found in manuscripts. The scribes did their work mechanically for the most part—often without a thought of the meaning of what they were writing—though here and there we seem to detect efforts to emend the text, especially in the case of puzzling words or passages. The manuscripts often incorporate glosses with the text; they often omit whole clauses, especially clauses intervening between repetitions of the same word; still oftener they omit one or more words; they are often led astray by homoeoteleuton; their errors are particularly frequent in relation to certain words; they repeat words from the preceding line; they are apt to place contiguous words in the same case; sometimes they seem to admit two alternative readings together into the text—sometimes we notice that clauses are transposed. To say that they have these defects is, however, only to say that they share the common lot of manuscripts. Their lateness has probably added to their imperfections. We note, for instance, that many of the variations which we observe in them are variations in the termination of words², and these may often have arisen from the misreading or miswriting of contractions, which were used with increasing frequency after the eleventh century. How easily they might thus arise will be seen from Gardthausen's work on Greek Palaeography

family, so far as these sources have been examined for Susemihl's editions: Π³ for the consent of the Aldine edition and the MSS. of the less good variety of the second family, subject to the same limitation. I need hardly explain that the abbreviation 'pr.' prefixed to the name of a MS. refers to its original state and is intended to distinguish an original reading from a correction.

¹ See the Preface.

² See, for instance, the various readings in 1271 a 37 (αὐτῆς Π¹, αὐτῶν P², αὐτοῦ pr. P³, αὐτοῖς Π³), 1280 a 24 (ἐλευθερίῃ M⁶, ἐλευθερίοι Π², ἐλεύθεροι P¹—the true reading being doubtless ἐλευθερίᾳ), 1282 a 27, 1284 b 41, 1286 a 25, 1286 b 24, 33, 1287 b 30, 1288 a 23, 1292 b 36, 1297 a 1: and see Sus.¹, p. xii, note 21. Not many pages, however, of Susemihl's *apparatus criticus* are free from instances of error in terminations.

(p. 246), where we find the remark that the same contraction may be used to represent θεότητος, θεότητι, θεότητα, while another represents πόλις, πολύς, πόλεμος, πολέμιος, πολίτης, and even πολιτεία (though the last word is more usually represented by a different contraction), and that a single contraction may be employed to express βάλλοντος, βάλλοντι, βάλλοντα, βάλλοντες, βάλλοντας.

Occasionally all the manuscripts, in addition to the text used by the Vetus Interpres, offer a reading almost or quite certainly wrong¹, but they seem on the whole to preserve with considerable fidelity the idiosyncrasies of Aristotle's peculiar and highly characteristic style. In a large number of passages earlier critics have condemned readings which a closer and more sympathetic study of Aristotle's use of language has proved to be undoubtedly correct². Often and often the manuscripts have retained little idiosyncrasies of style, which less mechanical copyists, or copyists more ready to insist on the ordinary rules of Greek writing, might well have smoothed away. Peculiarities in the order of words³, occasional omissions of a word or words⁴, *constructions ad sensum*⁵, carelessnesses⁶

¹ E.g. in 2. 12. 1274 b 7, ΓΠ (except perhaps pr. P³) have ἐπίσκεψιν (instead of ἐπίσκηψιν): in 3. 3. 1276 b 9, ΓΠ have λέγοιμεν for λέγομεν: in 3. 8. 1279 b 28, προσαγορεύοι or προσαγορεύει, one or other of which appears in ΓΠ, must be wrong: in 3. 15. 1286 a 9-10, δοκεῖ . . . οἱ νόμοι ΓΠ: in 3. 16. 1287 a 29, ΓΠ seem to be wrong, and the Vossian *codex* of Julian alone right. Cases in which all the MSS. are wrong and Γ alone is right also occur: see for example the passages referred to above, p. xlviii, note 2.

² Those who do not happen to be acquainted with the second of Vahlen's Aristotelische Aufsätze will thank me for referring to it in illustration of this remark.

³ E.g. 1. 6. 1255 b 2, ἡ δὲ φύσις βούλεται μὲν τοῦτο ποιεῖν πολλάκις, οὐ μέντοι δύναται (so ΓΠ, except

that M^a P¹ place τοῦτο after ποιεῖν): 7 (5). 9. 1309 b 27, τέλος δ' οὕτως ὥστε μηδὲ ρίνα ποιήσει φαίνεσθαι: 7 (5). 10. 1311 a 23, τὰς αὐτὰς ἀρχὰς δεῖ νομίζειν περὶ τε τὰς πολιτείας εἶναι τῶν μεταβολῶν καὶ περὶ τὰς μοναρχίας (except that Γ M^a erroneously place τῶν μεταβολῶν before αὐτὰς): 8 (6). 6. 1320 b 33, τὰ μὲν εὖ σώματα διακείμενα πρὸς ὑγίειαν: 4 (7). 1. 1323 b 4, περὶ δὲ τὴν ζῆω κτήσιν τῶν ἀγαθῶν μετριάζουσιν.

⁴ E.g. of πόλις and its parts (see explanatory note on 1266 b 1): of ἀρετήν, 5 (8). 4. 1338 b 15 and 1. 13. 1260 a 24: of ἔχουσιν, 6 (4). 9. 1294 b 27: of πρὸς τὴν ψυχὴν, 5 (8). 5. 1340 b 17: of μετέχει, 6 (4). 6. 1292 b 36.

⁵ E.g. 7 (5). 10. 1311 a 33, τῆς δ' ὕβρεως οὐσης πολυμερούς, ἐκαστον αὐτῶν αἴτιον γίνεται τῆς ὀργῆς.

⁶ E.g. 3. 13. 1283 b 16, δῆλον

or roughnesses¹ of style, and even positively bad writing² are faithfully reproduced³.

We have seen, however, that the complete MSS. fall into two families, and here the question arises—what is the origin and the extent of the distinction between them? We know that in parts of the *de Anima* and of some other writings of Aristotle two texts exist, which have been thought by some to represent two separate issues or editions, both from the hand of Aristotle, while others have held one of the texts to be a *réchauffé* due, not to Aristotle, but to some expositor who has rewritten the original with slight alterations in the language, not often affecting the meaning. Has the distinction between the two families of manuscripts in the case of the *Politics* originated in either of these ways? The question is an important one, for if the distinction between them had this origin, it would obviously be altogether improper to blend the readings of the two families together and to form a composite text out of them, as all editors have hitherto sought to do. There is no doubt that the differences existing between the two families are in part of a similar nature to those which exist between the two texts of the second book of the *de Anima*. As in the *de Anima*, so in the *Politics*, we note variations in the order of words, variations in the use of the article, variations in particles and the like. But these variations are far less frequent in the *Politics* than in the portions of the second book of the *de Anima* in which a second text exists. In one or two places of the *de Anima*, again, we trace some slight divergence of

γὰρ ὡς εἴ τις πάλιν εἰς πλουσιώτερος
ἀπάντων ἐστί, ὅλον ὅτι κ.τ.λ.: 8
(6). 5. 1319 b 33, ἐστὶ δ' ἔργον τοῦ
νομοθέτου καὶ τῶν βουλομένων συν-
ιστάναι τινὰ τοιαύτην πολιτείαν οὐ τὸ
καταστήσαι μέγιστον ἔργον οὐδὲ μό-
νον, ἀλλ' ὅπως σώζεται μᾶλλον.

¹ E. g. 2. 6. 1264 b 39-40 (cp.
de Gen. An. 2. 7. 746 b 7-9): 1. 10.
1258 a 24.

² E. g. 6 (4). 8. 1293 b 26-7.

³ Some of their mistakes seem to be due to their ultimate derivation from an archetype in which words were neither separated nor accentuated: thus we have ἡ δὴ instead of ἥδη in 1252 b 28, ἀρισ-ταρχεῖν instead of ἀριστ' ἀρχεω in 1273 b 5, ἀλλ' οὐδ' ἐστὶν instead of ἄλλου δ' ἐστὶν in 1254 a 15, Χάρητι δὴ instead of Χαρητῖδῃ in 1258 b 40.

meaning¹, and this we hardly find in the Politics. And then again, we note that variations in the order of words occur even within the first family, the order followed by M^a P¹ being often different from that followed by Γ, which is in these cases commonly the same as that of the second family. It seems, therefore, hardly necessary to have recourse to the supposition of a double text to account for variations of order². The same thing may be said as to variations in the use of the article and others of the same kind. Besides, many of the differences between the readings of the two families are of a sort which is not equally conspicuous in the two texts of the *de Anima*. One family uses one form of a word, the other another: the first has *ὀψοποιητική*, the second *ὀψοποιική*: the first commonly uses the form *μονάρχης*, the second *μόναρχος*³, and so forth. The second family occasionally avoids *hiatus* where the first does not. Differences of this kind are probably due to grammarian revisers of the text; and if this is so, it seems probable that the differences which might be ascribed to a duality of text have also originated in the same way. Many of the differences, again, between the text of Π¹ and Π² appear to be due to a misreading of contractions, or to omissions on the part of one set of manuscripts or the other (most often of Π¹), or to other accidental causes. It does not seem likely that the contrast of the two families runs back (at all events in its present proportions) to anything like so early a date as do the two

¹ E.g. in *de An.* 2. 9. 421 a 9, where the received text has—*αἴτιον δ' ὅτι τὴν αἴσθησιν ταύτην οὐκ ἔχομεν ἀκριβῆ, ἀλλὰ χεῖρω πολλῶν ζῶων*, and the second text—*αἴτιον δ' ὅτι οὐκ ἔχομεν ἀκριβῆ ταύτην τὴν αἴσθησιν, ἀλλὰ χεῖριστα ὁσμάται ἀνθρώπος τῶν ζῶων*.

² M^a here and there has an order of its own (e.g. in 1267 b 40). It is easy to see from Susemihl's *apparatus criticus* on 1271 a 25, 36 (*Sus.*¹, pp. 127, 128), how easily these changes of order might

arise, and, if they arose in an archetype, how widely they might be diffused.

³ 'The dependent compounds of the stem *ἀρχω* end in Attic not in *-αρχης*, but throughout in *-αρχος* (*γυμνασίαρχος, δήμαρχος, ἵππαρχος, τριήραρχος*, etc.): still in an Attic inscription of B. C. 324 we find certain finance officials of the deme Athmone named *μεράρχαι*' (*Meisterhans, Grammatik der attischen Inschriften*, pp. 53-54).

texts of portions of the *de Anima*. Both families agree in the order in which they arrange the books. In both, the first four chapters of the Sixth Book are little better than a chaos. This last defect, it is true, may have existed in the work as Aristotle left it. All the manuscripts, and the *vetus versio* also, have the obvious blunder ἐπίσκεψιν in 2. 12. 1274 b 7: all read ἐκ δὲ τοῦ τετάρτου τῶν τετάρτων in 2. 6. 1266 a 18. The text of the Vatican Fragments is a mixed text, and may possibly belong to a time prior to the rise of a marked contrast between the two families.

It would seem, then, that both families of manuscripts may safely be used in the construction of a text of the *Politics*. No editor, in fact, has attempted to base his text on one family only and dispensed altogether with the aid of the other. Bekker mainly relies on the second family, but he has adopted several readings from the *Vetus Interpres*: Susemihl bases his text in the main on the first family, and especially on Γ, but he frequently adopts readings from the second¹. Editors of the *Politics* seem to have no option but to make their text more or less a composite text. Ours must be based partly on the first family of manuscripts, partly on the better variety of the second: occasionally perhaps it may be necessary to take a reading from the less good variety of the second. The question whether in a given passage we are to follow the reading given by the first family or the second, which is often a difficult one, must be decided partly by the proba-

¹ E.g. in the following passages of the First and Second Books: 1255 a 5, 1259 b 2, 1260 a 39, 1262 a 30, 1264 a 1, 1264 b 3, 1265 a 30, 35 (χρησιν), 1265 b 4, 21, 1266 a 20, 23, 1267 b 40, 1270 a 20, 21, 1271 a 27, 1273 a 10, 1273 b 3. It may be added that Susemihl recognizes in his third edition (praef. p. xvi), how prone the MSS. of the first family are to omit words, and how little they are to be depended on in cases of omission; hence we find him in this edition accepting from

the second family not a few words which he had previously eliminated in reliance on the authority of the first family, and generally showing an increased confidence in the second family, though he still prefers the first. Instances of this will be found in the following passages of the first two books, as they stand in Susemihl's third edition—1253 a 25, 1257 b 24, 1260 b 17, 1261 a 22, 1263 b 1, 6, 1264 a 16, 1268 a 26, 1270 a 25, 34, 1273 a 9, b 2, 27, 1274 b 8.

bilities of the particular case, partly in reference to the known tendencies of either family.

The manuscripts of the second family, for instance, as has been said, avoid *hiatus* more frequently than those of the first¹: here in all probability the less polished version is the more genuine. In matters of spelling, again, the first family has perhaps occasionally preserved peculiarities which the second has smoothed away (e.g. the form *συμφύηται* in 1262 b 13, which is all the more likely to be correct because it is found in K^b in Eth. Nic. 7. 5. 1147 a 22)². When the first family unanimously places words in one order which the second places in another, the order given by the first family is sometimes to my mind more unstudied and more Aristotelian than that given by the second³. But in graver matters at any rate the advantage seems to me to rest with the second family⁴. In some cases falling under this head, no doubt, the readings of the first family may well deserve our preference. Thus in 2. 11. 1273 a 41, Π¹ give us *ταύτην οὐχ οἶόν τε βεβαίως ἀριστοκρατεῖσθαι τὴν πολιτείαν*, and Π² the softened and probably less genuine reading *ταύτην οὐχ οἶόν τ' εἶναι βεβαίως ἀριστοκρατικὴν πολιτείαν*: and in 2. 1. 1260 b 28 *τίς* Π¹ seems preferable on similar grounds to *ἡ*, which is the reading of the manuscripts of the second family. So again in 4 (7). 12. 1331 b 13 Π¹ have preserved

¹ E.g. in 1254 b 14: 1255 a 11, b 5, 21: 1256 a 33, b 18: 1258 a 31: 1259 b 7: 1261 b 17, 32: 1263 a 28: 1264 a 37, 38, etc. In these passages, however, the elisions by which *hiatus* is avoided are of a trivial and obvious kind: serious cases of *hiatus* are commonly left untouched in both families alike.

² It is not, however, always the case that the spelling of Π¹ is to be preferred. For instance, the form *φιδία* (Π²) seems preferable to *φιλία* (Π¹)—see critical note on 1271 a 27. It is hardly likely that in matters of spelling complete reliance can safely be placed on either family. It should be noted that in questions as to *hiatus* and commonly also in questions of

spelling we get no assistance from the Vetus Interpres, and are dependent on M^a P¹, so far as the first family is concerned.

³ E.g. in 5 (8). 2. 1337 b 20 Π¹ have *ὁ δὲ αὐτὸ τοῦτο πράττων πολλάκις δι' ἄλλους θητικὸν καὶ δουλικὸν ἂν δόξειε πράττειν* (where *πολλάκις* is to be taken with *ἂν δόξειε*—compare the similar displacement of *πολλάκις* in 1. 6. 1255 b 3), while Π² place *πολλάκις* after *δι' ἄλλους* (and also *ἂν* after *δόξειεν*), thus arranging the words in a more regular and logical, but probably less genuine, order.

⁴ The Vatican Fragments agree far more often with the second family than with the first. See the Preface.

the true reading *νενεμῆσθαι* (Π^2 almost without exception have *μεμιμῆσθαι*), and in 4 (7). 17. 1336 b 2 ἀπελαύνειν Π^2 seems to be undoubtedly wrong. But on the whole it appears to me that Π^2 less often transmute a puzzling reading into an easier one than Π^1 . Thus, for example, in

1. 2. 1252 b 15, *ὁμοκάπους*, the reading of most MSS. of the second family, is better than *ὁμοκάπνους*, Π^1 P^1 L^s .
1. 4. 1253 b 27, *τῶν οἰκονομικῶν*, the reading of almost all the MSS. of the second family, is better than *τῷ οἰκονομικῷ*, the reading of the first.
1. 9. 1257 b 24, Π^1 seem to be wrong in omitting *οὔτος*.
1. 11. 1258 b 27, Π^1 have corrected *τρίτον* into *τέταρτον* wrongly, though not unnaturally.
2. 2. 1261 b 7, *οὔτε* Π^2 is probably more genuine than *οὐ* Π^1 .
2. 7. 1267 a 40, Π^1 omit the second *ἀν*, though the repetition of *ἀν* is probably right.
2. 8. 1268 b 12, Π^2 retain the singular but quite Aristotelian (Bon. Ind. 454 a 20 sq.) displacement of *μέν*, of which indeed there are many traces in the MSS. of the Latin Translation.
- 21, Π^2 add *ἦδη* probably rightly.
- 1269 a 18, Vet. Int. has *qui mulaverit*, and may perhaps have found *ὁ* added in his text before *κινήσας*, where M^s P^1 add *τις* : Π^2 are probably right in reading simply *κινήσας*.
2. 9. 1270 a 34, Π^1 omit an awkward but idiomatic *μέν*.
3. 12. 1282 b 15, *δὲ* Π^2 is more probably Aristotelian than *δὴ* Π^1 .
3. 14. 1285 b 12, P^2 and (on second thoughts) P^s give *ἐπανάτασις* : M^s P^1 and possibly Γ (Vet. Int. *elevatio*) wrongly *ἐπανάστασις*.
- 6 (4). 5. 1292 b 5, the difficult word *εἰσὶν* ('takes office') becomes *εἰς εἴη* in Γ M^s pr. P^1 .
- 6 (4). 6. 1293 a 3, Π^2 rightly omit *καὶ* before *εὐπορίας*.
- 6 (4). 12. 1296 b 33, an idiomatic *δὲ* is omitted by Π^1 , but preserved by Π^2 .
- 6 (4). 16. 1300 b 30, *παντὶ* Π^2 seems to me to be right, not *πανόντι* Π^1 .
- 8 (6). 8. 1322 b 14, *εἰσφοράν* Π^2 is undoubtedly correct, though Γ M^s P^1 substitute the commoner word *ἐφορείαν*.
- 4 (7). 1. 1323 b 9, the idiomatic use of *αὐτῶν* is probably correct, but Γ M^s P^1 omit the word.
- 4 (7). 12. 1331 b 5, *τῇν* Π^2 is probably right, though its omission by Γ M^s pr. P^1 makes the passage easier. This omission, however, may well be accidental, as *τῇν* is followed by *τῶν*.

- 5 (8). 5. 1339 a 29, *τε πασι* Π², where the place of *τε*, though not that which we should expect, is justified by many parallel instances (see Bon. Ind. 749 b 44 sqq.), whereas Π¹ reads *γε* and M^s omits *τε*, and possibly Γ also, but of this we cannot be certain, for the Vet. Int. seldom renders *τε*.
- 5 (8). 6. 1341 a 13, *καὶ*, which Π² add, is probably right, though not easy to interpret.
- 5 (8). 6. 1341 b 1, Π¹ wrongly substitute *λαμβοι* for *σαμβῦκαι*.

The manuscripts of the first family seem also, I think, to admit glosses into the text more frequently than the better ones of the second (see, for instance, Susemihl's *apparatus criticus* on 1. 8. 1256 b 26: 2. 6. 1265 a 21, 22: 2. 7. 1266 a 37: 2. 10. 1271 b 28: 3. 4. 1277 a 23: 3. 10. 1281 a 28, where *σπουδαία*, which is probably a gloss, takes in Π¹ the place of *δικαία*). Clearly, again, as Dittenberger has remarked¹, and Susemihl has now fully recognized (Sus.³ p. xvi), these manuscripts are apt to omit words, probably because their archetype was somewhat carelessly written². Take the following instances from the Third Book:—

1275 a 11, Π¹ om. *καὶ γὰρ ταῦτα τοῖς ὑπάρχει*: 28, Γ M^s pr. Π¹ om. *καίτοι—ἀρχῆς*: 1276 a 4, M^s Π¹, and possibly Γ, om. *τῆς*: b 3, M^s Π¹, and possibly Γ, om. *ἀν*: 36, Γ M^s pr. Π¹ om. *ἀλλὰ*: 1277 a 20, Π¹ om. *ἀρετῇ* after *ἡ αὐτῇ*: 24, Γ M^s pr. Π¹ om. *ἴσως*: 1278 b 2, om. *ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων*: 20, om. *οὐκ ἔλαττον*: 1279 a 2, Π¹ om. *ἔνα*, though M^s Π¹ move *εἶναι* to its place: 34, M^s Π¹, and possibly Γ, om. *τῶν* in *τὴν δὲ τῶν ὀλίγων*: b 15, Π¹ om. *τι*: 1280 b 1, M^s Π¹, and possibly Γ, om. *τοῦ*: 5, Γ M^s pr. Π¹ om. *πολιτικῆς*: 1282 a 7, Π¹ om. *καὶ*: 17, om. *ἡ* before *βελτίους*: 40, M^s Π¹, and probably Γ, om. *τὸ* before *τούτων*: 1283 a 10, Π¹ om. *καὶ*, and in the next line in *πᾶσαν ἀνισότητ'* Γ M^s pr. Π¹ omit the second of the two syllables *αν*, making *ἀνισότητ'* into *ισότητ'* or *ισότητα*: 17, M^s Π¹, and possibly Γ, om. *τ'*: 32,

¹ *Gött. gel. Anz.*, Oct. 28, 1874, p. 1359. If we examine the discrepancies between Π¹ and Π² in the first two books of the Politics, we shall find that in a large proportion of cases they arise from the omission of words in Π¹.

² Omissions also occur in Π², and some of them are on a more

extensive scale than those of Π¹ (see, for example, 1307 b 32–34, 1334 a 37–38, 1336 b 18, 1337 b 16–19, 34–35), but they fortunately occur less frequently, and they give rise to no critical doubts. They are often obviously due to homoeoteleuton.

M^s P¹, and possibly Γ, om. τὰ: b 2, Π¹ om. τι: 1284 b 11, om. τι (perhaps rightly): 1285 a 6, M^s P¹, and possibly Γ, om. τοῖς: 1286 b 31, Π¹ om. καὶ before κατὰ: 1287 a 16, om. τοῖνυν: 25, Γ om. ἐπίτηδες παιδεύσας, M^s P¹ om. παιδεύσας: b 38, Γ M^s pr. P¹ om. καὶ ἄλλο βασιλικόν: 1288 a 6, Π¹ om. ἤδη: 16, om. τινὰ: 29, om. τοῦτον (as they omit οὗτος in 1257 b 24 and οὔτοι in 1273 a 9).

In his third edition, Susemihl adopts the reading of the first family in only four of the passages which I have just cited. A similar array of passages might be adduced from the Sixth Book, and a somewhat shorter one from the First and Second. I am far from saying that in every one of these passages the sin of omission can be positively brought home to Π¹—on the contrary, in more than one of them it is not clear whether Π¹ omit or Π² add—but I am inclined to think, as Susemihl now thinks (Sus.³ p. xvi), that Π² add a good deal less often than Π¹ omit. At all events, it is evident that omissions in Π¹ must be carefully scrutinized before we can safely accept them.

It has already been said that most of the discrepancies between Π¹ and Π² seem to be due to errors of transcription or to have originated in some other easily intelligible way; but there is a certain percentage of which this cannot be said. In the First and Second Books the following variations may be cited under this head:—

- A. 1. 7. 1255 b 26, τούτων Π¹ is replaced by τῶν τοιούτων in Π².
- B. 2. 1. 1260 b 28, τίς Π¹, ἡ Π².
- C. 2. 8. 1267 b 26, κόμης Γ M^s pr. P¹, κόσμω πολυτελεῖ Π².
- D. 2. 9. 1269 b 21, τοιοῦτος ἐστίν Π¹ (so accentuated in M^s P¹), φανερός ἐστι τοιοῦτος ὢν Π².
(Cp. 1269 b 26, where Γ M^s pr. P¹ om. φανερός.)
- E. 2. 10. 1271 b 28, κρήτες Γ M^s pr. P¹ (all other MSS. Λύκτιοι).
- F. 2. 11. 1273 a 41, ταύτην οὐχ οἶόν τε βεβαίως ἀριστοκρατεῖσθαι τὴν πολιτείαν Π¹: ταύτην οὐχ οἶόν τ' εἶναι βεβαίως ἀριστοκρατικὴν πολιτείαν Π².

In E there can be little doubt that a gloss explanatory of Λύκτιοι has taken the place of this word in Γ M^s pr. P¹. Of B and F something has already been said. A, C, D

remain, and these are less easy to classify or account for, but it is noticeable that in all these three passages Π^1 abbreviate, just as elsewhere they omit.

So far we have been considering cases in which Π^1 and Π^2 are at issue¹, and these are the most difficult and perplexing with which we have to deal. It often happens, however, that the three texts of the first family—three, if we include the original of the *vetus versio*—do not agree. M^a and P^1 , and also Γ and M^a , often stand apart by themselves, and Γ and P^1 occasionally do so². When M^a P^1 stand alone, we usually find that Γ agrees with the second family, and the same thing may be said of P^1 when Γ M^a stand alone. Against the union of Γ Π^2 not much weight commonly attaches, as it seems to me, to that of M^a P^1 , and Γ M^a have also, I think, little weight when matched against P^1 Π^2 .

The following passages from the Second Book will illustrate this in reference to M^a P^1 , though some of the readings referred to are far better than others, and I would not pronounce positively against all:—

1260 b 32, M^a P^1 om. τ' : 1261 a 6, M^a P^1 $\acute{\epsilon}\nu$ τῇ Πλάτωνος πολιτείᾳ: the other MSS. have $\acute{\epsilon}\nu$ τῇ πολιτείᾳ τῇ (some τοῦ) Πλάτωνος: 17, M^a P^1 $\omicron\upsilon$ for $\omicron\iota\delta\epsilon$ wrongly: 1261 b 25, M^a P^1 om. τοῖς ἐν ταῖς γυναιξὶ καὶ τοῖς τέκνοις: 28, M^a P^1 om. τίς: 1262 a 35, M^a pr. P^1 om. εἶναι: 1262 b 6, M^a P^1 om. οὕτως wrongly: 7, M^a P^1 om. τε: 1263 b 32, M^a pr. P^1 ἔσται wrongly: 1264 a 1, M^a pr. P^1 ἐκινῶνῃσε wrongly: 1264 b 20, M^a pr. P^1 ὥσπερ wrongly: 39, M^a P^1 om. λόγοις: 1265 a 18, M^a P^1 $\mu\eta$ for $\mu\eta\delta\epsilon\upsilon$ wrongly: 36, M^a P^1 add $\mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu$ after πρῶτος: 1265 b 27, M^a P^1 place $\mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu$ not after βούλεται like the rest, but after ἀλλ, not probably rightly: 1266 b 28, M^a P^1 τάξει instead of τάξειεν: 1268 a 14,

¹ It is possible that the contrast of the two families of MSS. would be less strongly marked, if we possessed a larger number of good MSS. of the Politics. We might probably in that case possess MSS. occupying an intermediate position between the two. This hardly any of our MSS. can be said to do. [My surmise has

been verified by the discovery of the Vatican Fragments.]

² We find Γ and P^1 standing together alone far less often than Γ and M^a , or M^a and P^1 . The remarks in the text were written before I became acquainted with Susemihl's third edition, in which I find that they are to some extent anticipated.

M^s pr. P¹ om. *καὶ ξενικῶν* : 37, M^s P¹ *γεωργεῖν* wrongly : 1268 b 23, M^s P¹ *γενέσθαι* for *γίνεσθαι* : 1269 a 18, M^s P¹ add *τις* before *κινήσας* (wrongly, I think) : 1269 b 28, M^s P¹ *πρώτως* in place of *πρώτος* : 32, M^s P¹ *διώκετο* wrongly for *διωκέτο* : 1270 a 1, M^s pr. P¹ om. *τῆς οἰκείας* wrongly : 8, M^s P¹ *γυνομένων* wrongly for *γενομένων* : 17, M^s P¹ om. *λίαν* before *οὐσίαν* : τὸν M^s, τῶν P¹ wrongly for *τοῖς* : 26, M^s P¹ om. *ἡ* before *καὶ* wrongly : 1270 b 2, M^s P¹ om. *τοὺς πολίτας* wrongly : 8, M^s P¹ om. *ἐστίν* : 26, M^s P¹ *ἡδῆ* wrongly for *ἔδει* : 1271 a 16, M^s P¹ om. *ἄν* wrongly : 1271 b 22, M^s P¹ *τε* wrongly for *δε* : 1272 b 31, M^s P¹ om. *ἔχουσιν* (wrongly, as I think), and om. *ἐν* wrongly : 1273 b 25, M^s P¹ *κρήτης* wrongly for *κρητικῆς* : 37, M^s P¹ om. *γὰρ* wrongly¹.

Changes in the order of words peculiar to M^s P¹ occur not unfrequently ; the following instances may be adduced from the Second Book :—

1260 b 41, 1261 b 7, 1263 a 22, b 16, 17, 1264 a 9, 1265 b 15, 1267 a 38, 1268 a 39, 1271 a 36, b 7, 1272 b 24.

It would be rash to alter the order of words on the authority of these two manuscripts unsupported by others.

As to the readings peculiar to Γ M^s, not many of them, I think, possess merit. Take the following list from the Second Book :—

1261 a 21, Γ M^s om. *καὶ* before *δυνατός* (wrongly, I think) : 33, Γ M^s read *δε* for *γὰρ* wrongly : 1264 a 19, Γ M^s *παθόντες* (P¹ Π^s *μαθόντες*) : b 9, Γ M^s *εἰπουθεν* δὴ wrongly for *ἡπουθεν* δὴ : 1267 a 2, Γ pr. M^s om. *καὶ* wrongly : 1268 b 9, Γ M^s om. *καὶ* wrongly : 1269 a 25, Γ M^s om. *καὶ* before *κινήτοί* : 1270 a 12, Γ M^s om. *ῥοικεν* wrongly : b 8, Γ M^s om. *αὐτῇ* wrongly : 1271 a 18, Γ M^s om. *διὰ* : b 7, Γ M^s om. *μὲν* : 1272 b 1, Γ M^s have *διαφερόντων* wrongly for *διαφθερούντων* : 1273 a 40, Γ M^s have *πολιτειῶν* wrongly for *πολιτῶν* : b 4, Γ M^s have *ἄν* wrongly for *ὦν* : 1274 a 8, Γ M^s om. *τὰ—Περικλῆς* (homoeoteleuton) : 28, Γ M^s om. *μαντικῇν* : b 20, Γ M^s om. *γὰρ* wrongly².

¹ M^s P¹ perhaps diverge rather more frequently from the other texts in the Second Book than in the First and Third, but the readings peculiar to these two MSS. in the First, Third, and Sixth

Books seem to me to be of even less value than in the Second.

² The record of these two MSS. is no better in the First, Third, and Sixth Books.

Readings resting on the authority of only one of the manuscripts of the Politics possess, as a rule, but little weight. 'Such readings,' remarks Dittenberger (*Gött. gel. Ans.*, Oct. 28, 1874, p. 1362), 'should only be adopted after convincing proof, (1) that the reading unanimously given by the other MSS. and probably inherited from the archetype is on internal grounds untenable, and (2) that the emendation offered by the single MS. in question is the easiest, simplest, and most satisfactory that can be offered.' *M*^a is a carelessly written manuscript, and very little importance can be attached to its unsupported testimony. We have already seen that not a few tempting readings peculiar to *P*¹ are probably conjectural emendations of its learned transcriber, and we must beware of attaching too much importance to its unsupported testimony¹. The same thing may be said of *P*², and also of *P*³.

When, however, we ask what value is to be attached to the unsupported testimony of the text followed by the *Vetus Interpres*, we are on more debatable ground. Susemihl still attaches much importance to it, though, as has been said, considerably less in his third edition than in his previous ones. But even he accepts only a moderate proportion of the many readings which rest on its unsupported testimony. Dittenberger unhesitatingly applies to *Γ* the rule which we have just cited from him. 'From this rule,' he says (*Gött. gel. Ans.* p. 1363), 'no exception should be made even in favour of the translation of William of Moerbeke. No doubt it is quite true that it represents the best of all the manuscripts of the Politics, but even the testimony of the best single manuscript, as it is not the sole representative of a family, has from a diplomatic point of view no weight whatever in opposition to the concurrence of all other manuscripts of both families.'

The question, however, arises, as we have seen, how far the translation faithfully reproduces the Greek text (or texts)

¹ Its value may be studied in b 13: 1293 a 30: 1294 a 3, 12, the following passages from the b 8, 23, 24: 1296 a 16, b 7, 10: Sixth Book :—1289 a 10, 15, b 1: 1297 b 16: 1298 a 7, 18: 1299 a 1290 a 1: 1291 b 31: 1292 a 1, 30: 1300 a 3, 5, b 13, 18.

used by the translator¹. Susemihl recognizes even in his first edition that in some matters it is not rigidly faithful to its original. 'Denique, quamvis omnia ad verbum vertere soleat Guilelmus, cavendum tamen est, ne, ubicunque paulo liberiore ratione utatur, semper aliud quid in eius exemplo scriptum fuisse credamus atque in nostris hodie legitur. Nam non solum idem vocabulum Graecum non eodem semper reddit Latino, verum sunt etiam parvulae voces, quas contra codicis sui auctoritatem aut addiderit aut omiserit, velut copulam saepissime adiecit, ubi deest in exemplaribus Graecis², praepositionem cum plurium nominum casibus copulatam ante unumquodque eorum repetere solet³, τε et γε particulas plerumque non vertit, in διόπερ et aliis vocabulis cum περ compositis modo hoc περ quidem voce exprimit, modo silentio transit. Quae cum ita sint, etiam verba quaedam in omnibus aut paene omnibus codicibus omissa, quae Guilelmi auctoritate fretus Aristoteli reddidi, velut 2. 3. 1262 a 12 ἦ, 2. 5. 1263 a 35 ὥς, b 34 ἔσται, 2. 6. 1265 a 34 ζῆν, 3. 3. 1276 a 25 τόπον, 4 (7). 17. 1337 a 7 εἶναι (cf. 2. 7. 1267 b 18 ὥς, 4 (7). 16. 1335 a 30 χρόνῳ), in dubium posse vocari, utrum revera in exemplo suo invenerit an Latine tantum reddiderit sententia et sermonis Latini ratione permotus, eo libentius concedo, quo minus aliis locis tale quid factum esse potest negari, velut vix 1. 9. 1257 b 38 τέλος post αὔξησις legisse censendus est, quamquam vertit *huius autem augmentatio finis*' (Sus.¹, pp. xxxiii-xxxiv).

This list, however, is far from exhausting the laxities

¹ I regret that Busse's excellent dissertation 'de praesidiis Aristotelis Politica emendandi' (Berlin, 1881) did not come to my knowledge till some months after my remarks on the Vetus Interpres and my critical notes had been written. I find that he has anticipated several of the criticisms which I have ventured to make on the thirteenth-century translation as an authority for the text of the Politics. Perhaps however the fact that we have

independently arrived at many similar results on this subject may lend some additional weight to our common conclusions.

² He adds *est* in the following passages of the first two books—1253 a 16, 1255 b 7, 31, 1256 a 21, 1261 a 2, 1264 a 34, 1271 a 5, 1274 b 9: *esse* in 1260 b 37, 1264 a 9: *erit* in 1263 b 34, 1266 b 27.

³ See 1258 a 1, 1262 b 3, 1269 a 10, 1271 b 8. So too *ut*, 1253 b 16 (in most MSS.).

which the worthy translator permits himself. He omits *μὲν* without support from any extant manuscript (so far as they have been examined) in twelve passages of the first two books¹, *καὶ* in sixteen², *δὲ* in eight³, *γὰρ* in three⁴, *ἀν* in four⁵. He fails to render *οὔτε* in 1253 b 38, *τι* in 1253 b 32. He often reads *γε* (1254 a 9, 1266 b 34, 1269 b 9) or *δὲ* (1268 b 41, 1271 b 15) for *τε*, though sometimes *τε* for *γε* (1254 b 34, 1273 b 7, 1274 a 15) or for *δὲ* (1258 a 26), and *γε* for *δὲ* (1252 b 8, 1268 b 16). He renders *ἦ* by *et* in 1252 a 13, 1253 b 34, 1256 a 37, 1258 b 19, and *καὶ* by *aut* in 1262 a 8. He occasionally adds words—*civitates* in 1266 b 1, *scilicet* in 1274 a 1, *eorum* in 1258 a 5. His voices, moods, and tenses often fail to reproduce the voices, moods, and tenses of the original. Thus we find him substituting the passive for the active⁶, the active for the passive⁷, the indicative for the subjunctive⁸, the subjunctive for the indicative⁹, the present for the past¹⁰, the past for the present¹¹. He sometimes, though not very often, omits words of some length, or even two or three words together¹². This is probably the result of accident. He usually adheres to the order of the words

¹ 1252 a 27, 1257 a 7, 1258 b 11, 1259 a 28, 1265 a 9, 1266 b 3, 1270 a 4, b 11, 37, 1273 a 26, 1274 a 26, b 15. The omissions noted in the text may be due in part to errors committed by copyists of the translation, but they appear in all Susemihl's MSS. of it.

² 1252 a 29, 1253 a 31, 1258 a 2 (2 adds *et* here), 1259 a 33, b 8, 29, 1260 a 31, 1262 a 18, 1263 b 34, 1264 a 15, 1266 b 28, 1267 b 24, 1269 a 38, 1270 a 26, 1274 a 25, b 17.

³ 1252 a 13, b 23, 1254 b 24, 1256 b 33, 1262 a 38, 1266 a 11, b 2, 1269 a 19.

⁴ 1264 a 36, 1268 b 13, 1274 b 21.

⁵ 1254 b 1, 1256 a 4, 1265 a 30, 1269 b 26. I am far from saying that the Vet. Int. always makes these omissions without MS. authority, but their frequency makes it pro-

bable that they are largely his own.

⁶ E.g. in 1256 b 41, 1259 a 3, 1262 b 25, 1264 b 14, 1265 b 7, 1266 b 20, 1267 a 38, b 5, 1268 b 21, 1271 b 5, 1274 a 7. Busse makes the same remark (p. 25).

⁷ E.g. in 1262 a 5, 1265 b 10, 1266 a 11, 1269 a 18, 1271 a 22.

⁸ E.g. in 1270 a 27.

⁹ E.g. in 1253 a 22, 1265 b 15, 1288 b 36.

¹⁰ E.g. in 1265 a 27, 1266 a 37, b 3, 7, 27, 1268 b 38, 1269 b 16, 1271 b 4, 22, 1272 b 32, 1273 b 17, 1274 a 3.

¹¹ E.g. in 1262 b 6, 1273 b 39.

¹² Πάντων, 1254 b 15, 1261 a 2: τῇ φύσει, 1253 a 19: γινόμενων, 1257 b 17: καὶ τῆς Κρητικῆς, 1269 a 29: ἔξω Κελτῶν, 1269 b 26: ἑκαστον, 1271 a 29: καθέστηκεν, 1271 a 41: αὐτὸν, 1274 a 27.

in the Greek, but not unfrequently he makes slight changes in it, which do not probably for the most part correspond to anything in the text before him¹. Here and there (e.g. in 1257 a 30-31) these changes are forced on him by the difference between Latin and Greek. We must remember that, however useful this translation may be to us for textual purposes, its author never dreamed of its being thus used. He never designed it to serve as a substitute for a manuscript.

In addition to the minute inaccuracies we have been noting, blunders in translation often occur, and also apparently blunders in the decipherment of the Greek text. Of the former class of blunders a few specimens have already been given; it would be easy to add to their number indefinitely. The last chapter of the Second Book offers some remarkable examples. It is hardly likely that so poor a Greek scholar can have been perfect as a decipherer of Greek writing; it is perhaps owing to this, that he renders ἀνέστιος as ἀνόσιος in 1253 a 5, τοῦ δέινος as τοῦδε νιός in 1262 a 3, ἐθέλειν as μέλλειν or ὀφείλειν in 1267 a 34, ἀρίστην as ἀρετῆς in 1269 a 32, ἐπίκειται as ὑπόκειται in 1271 b 34, and γέρας as γῆρας in 1272 a 37, unless indeed we suppose his Greek text to have been exceptionally defective in these passages. We can sometimes account for errors in the *vetus versio* by the supposition that the translator used a manuscript in which ambiguous contractions similar to those found in M^a occasionally occurred, for in one or two places where M^a has a contraction of this kind we find the translator going astray: thus in 1335 a 27, where instead of πληθύνειν M^a has a contraction which might be taken to stand for πληθός, the rendering of the Vet. Int. is *multum*, and in 1337 a 28 under similar circumstances Vet. Int. has *ipsorum* where we expect *ipsum*. Here and there, again, as Busse has pointed out (pp. 14-28), the translator would seem to have sought to mend defects in his Greek text by conjectures of his own: one of the clearest cases of this is to

¹ His plan is, according to Busse (p. 13), 'ea quae formā ac sensu cohaerent etiam collocati-
one arctius coniungere.'

be found in 4 (7). 14. 1334 a 2 sqq., where the omission of some words in the translator's Greek text (and in M^a) makes nonsense of the sentence, and he has sought to remedy this by rendering *τάξῃ* *ordinis*, as if it were *τάξεως*. So too in 8 (6). 7. 1321 a 6, finding probably in his text the same meaningless fragment of *βανανσικόν* (*νανσικόν*) which appears in M^a, the translator renders it *nautica* to make sense, and in 1. 8. 1256 a 30 he has *multis* for the same reason, though the reading he found in his text was in all probability the blunder *πολλοί*.

It is evident that, however good the manuscript or manuscripts used by the Vetus Interpres may have been¹, we have only an imperfect reproduction of them in his translation. Before, therefore, we can accept a reading which rests on its unsupported authority, we must in the first place make sure that he has manuscript authority for it, and that it has not originated in some error or inaccuracy or conjecture of his own. It is only of a certain number of the readings peculiar to the Vetus Interpres that we can assert this with confidence. The following are instances of readings too remarkable to have originated with the translator :—

2. 1. 1260 b 41, *εἰς ὁ τῆς* in place of *ισότης* II.

2. 7. 1266 b 2, *δ' ἤδη*.

3. 12. 1283 a 7, *ὑπερέχει*.

4 (7). 17. 1336 a 6, *εἰσάγειν*.

1. 2. 1253 a 7, *πετεινοῖς* for *παιτοῖς*.

In the first four of these passages I am inclined to think that the translator's Greek text preserved the true reading. In the fifth he may probably have translated a marginal

¹ They seem to have suffered from the incorporation of glosses with the text (e.g. in 1254 b 1, *φαύλως* appears to be a gloss, *μοχθηρῶς* the true reading: glosses have found their way into the Greek text followed by the Vet. Int. in 1259 b 14 and 1287 a 10;

and in 1291 b 29, *δμοια*, which is probably a gloss intended to explain *τὰ τοῖτοις λεγόμενα κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν διαφοράν*, has been added to these words). We must also credit the text followed by the Vet. Int. with the many erroneous readings common to it with M^a.

correction, for the correction *περὶ τοῖς* appears in the margin of more than one extant manuscript.

So far as to varieties of reading; but manuscripts are liable to still graver defects—to interpolation, chasms in the text, displacement of words, clauses, and paragraphs, and the like. In the text of Aristotle's treatise de Generatione Animalium, for instance, a chasm is thought to be traceable in 2. 1. 735 a 11 (after *θεωροῦντος*)¹, and whole paragraphs in more cases than one seem to be out of their true place². How has it fared with the Politics in respect of these matters?

As to interpolation, I have elsewhere pointed to more than one passage in which it may reasonably be suspected. Susemihl, as is well known, holds that chasms in the text of the Politics occur not unfrequently, and that in many cases the transposition of clauses and paragraphs is called for. There would be nothing surprising in this. We occasionally find sentences obviously displaced in manuscripts of the Politics³, and here and there we seem to trace a minute but indubitable chasm (there is a chasm of this kind in the better manuscripts in 1285 a 19). The question is one on which I would rather not express a definitive opinion, till I have completed my commentary, but so far as I can judge at present, I doubt whether Susemihl has made out his case. Problems of this kind, however, are best discussed in notes on the particular passages in reference to which they arise.

The question whether double versions occur is also an interesting one. This, again, is one for discussion in detail. I will only say that they need to be very clearly established, and that I am inclined to doubt whether they are really traceable in many of the cases in which they have been supposed to be so. The double inquiry into the cause

¹ So think Aubert and Wimmer: see their edition of the de Gen. An., p. 140.

² De Gen. An. 1. 19. 726 b 24-

30: 2. 3. 737 a 34-737 b 7 (Aubert and Wimmer, pp. 98, 152).

³ E.g. in 1264 b 3, 1287 b 18, 1290 a 32.

of the existence of a multiplicity of constitutions contained in the first four chapters of the Sixth Book is, however, certainly suspicious¹, and, as I have said elsewhere, these four chapters are in a condition the origin of which it is difficult to penetrate.

But here we find ourselves in face of those broader problems in relation to the state of the text of the Politics, as to which something has already been said.

¹ Attention has been called to this both by Susemihl and by Mr. J. C. Wilson.

ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΩΝ Α΄.

Ἐπειδὴ πᾶσαν πόλιν ὁρῶμεν κοινωνίαν τινὰ οὖσαν καὶ 1252 a
πᾶσαν κοινωνίαν ἀγαθοῦ τινὸς ἕνεκεν συνεστηκυῖαν (τοῦ γὰρ
εἶναι δοκοῦντος ἀγαθοῦ χάριν πάντα πράττουσι πάντες), δη-
λον ὥς πᾶσαι μὲν ἀγαθοῦ τινὸς στοχάζονται, μάλιστα δὲ
καὶ τοῦ κυριωτάτου πάντων ἢ πασῶν κυριωτάτῃ καὶ πάσας 5
περιέχουσα τὰς ἄλλας· αὕτη δὲ ἐστὶν ἡ καλουμένη πόλις
2 καὶ ἡ κοινωνία ἡ πολιτική. ὅσοι μὲν οὖν οἴονται πολιτικὸν
καὶ βασιλικὸν καὶ οἰκονομικὸν καὶ δεσποτικὸν εἶναι τὸν
αὐτόν, οὐ καλῶς λέγουσιν· πλήθει γὰρ καὶ ὀλιγότητι νομί-
ζουσι διαφέρειν, ἀλλ' οὐκ εἶδει τούτων ἕκαστον, οἷον ἂν μὲν 10
ὀλίγων, δεσπότην, ἂν δὲ πλειόνων, οἰκονόμον, ἂν δ' ἔτι
πλειόνων, πολιτικὸν ἢ βασιλικόν, ὥς οὐδὲν διαφέρουσιν
μεγάλῃ οἰκίᾳ ἢ μικρᾷ πόλιν, καὶ πολιτικὸν δὲ καὶ
βασιλικόν, ὅταν μὲν αὐτὸς ἐφεστήκῃ, βασιλικόν, ὅταν δὲ
κατὰ τοὺς λόγους τῆς ἐπιστήμης τῆς τοιαύτης κατὰ μέρος 15
ἄρχων καὶ ἀρχόμενος, πολιτικόν· ταῦτα δ' οὐκ ἐστὶν ἀληθῆ·
3 δηλον δ' ἔσται τὸ λεγόμενον ἐπισκοποῦσι κατὰ τὴν ὑφη-
γημένην μέθοδον. ὥσπερ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις τὸ σύνθε-
τον μέχρι τῶν ἀσυνθέτων ἀνάγκη διαιρεῖν (ταῦτα γὰρ ἐλά-
χιστα μόρια τοῦ παντός), οὕτω καὶ πόλιν ἐξ ὧν σύγκειται 20
σκοποῦντες ὁψόμεθα καὶ περὶ τούτων μᾶλλον, τί τε διαφέ-
ρουν ἀλλήλων, καὶ εἴ τι τεχνικὸν ἐνδέχεται λαβεῖν περὶ
ἕκαστον τῶν ρηθέντων.

Εἰ δὴ τις ἐξ ἀρχῆς τὰ πράγματα φυόμενα βλέ- 2
ψῃεν, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις, καὶ ἐν τούτοις κάλλιστ' ἂν 25

οὕτω θεωρήσειεν. ἀνάγκη δὴ πρῶτον συνδύεσθαι τοὺς ἄνευ 2
 ἀλλήλων μὴ δυναμένους εἶναι, ὅσον θῆλυ μὲν καὶ ἄρρεν τῆς
 γενέσεως ἔνεκεν (καὶ τοῦτο οὐκ ἐκ προαιρέσεως, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ
 καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴοις καὶ φυτοῖς φυσικὸν τὸ ἐφίεσθαι,
 30 οἷον αὐτό, τοιοῦτον καταλιπεῖν ἕτερον), ἄρχον δὲ φύσει καὶ
 ἀρχόμενον διὰ τὴν σωτηρίαν· τὸ μὲν γὰρ δυνάμενον τῇ
 διανοίᾳ προορᾶν ἄρχον φύσει καὶ δεσπότην φύσει, τὸ δὲ
 δυνάμενον τῷ σώματι ταῦτα ποιεῖν ἀρχόμενον καὶ φύσει
 δοῦλον· διὸ δεσπότη καὶ δούλῳ ταῦτ' συμφέρει. φύσει μὲν 3
 1252 b οὖν διώριται τὸ θῆλυ καὶ τὸ δοῦλον (οὐδὲν γὰρ ἢ φύσις
 ποιεῖ τοιοῦτον οἷον χαλκοτύποι τὴν Δελφικὴν μάχαιραν
 πενιχρῶς, ἀλλ' ἐν πρὸς ἐν οὕτω γὰρ ἂν ἀποτελοῖτο κάλ-
 λιστα τῶν ὀργάνων ἕκαστον, μὴ πολλοῖς ἔργοις ἀλλ' ἐνὶ
 5 δουλεῖον). ἐν δὲ τοῖς βαρβάροις τὸ θῆλυ καὶ δοῦλον τὴν 4
 αὐτὴν ἔχει τάξιν. αἷτιον δὲ ὅτι τὸ φύσει ἄρχον οὐκ ἔχουσιν,
 ἀλλὰ γίνεται ἡ κοινωνία αὐτῶν δούλης καὶ δούλου. διὸ
 φασιν οἱ ποιηταὶ “βαρβάρων δ' Ἑλλήνας ἀρχεῖν εἰκός,”
 ὥς ταῦτ' οὖν φύσει βάρβαρον καὶ δοῦλον ἐν. ἐκ μὲν οὖν τού- 5
 10 των τῶν δύο κοινωνιῶν οἰκία πρώτη, καὶ ὁρθῶς Ἡσίοδος
 εἶπε ποιήσας “οἶκον μὲν πρώτιστα γυναῖκά τε βοῦν τ' ἀρο-
 τήρα”. ὁ γὰρ βοὺς ἀντ' οἰκέτου τοῖς πένησιν ἐστίν. ἡ μὲν
 οὖν εἰς πᾶσαν ἡμέραν συνεστηκυῖα κοινωνία κατὰ φύσιν
 οἶκός ἐστιν, οὗς Χαρώνδας μὲν καλεῖ ὁμοσιπύους, Ἐπιμενίδης
 15 δὲ ὁ Κρῆς ὁμοκάπους· ἡ δ' ἐκ πλειόνων οἰκῶν κοινωνία
 πρώτη χρήσεως ἔνεκεν μὴ ἐφημέρου κόμῃ. μάλιστα δὲ 6
 κατὰ φύσιν ζοικεν ἡ κόμῃ ἀποικία οἰκίας εἶναι· οὗς κα-
 λουσί τινες ὁμογάλακτας παῖδάς τε καὶ παίδων παῖδας.
 διὸ καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ἐβασιλεύοντο αἱ πόλεις, καὶ νῦν ἔτι τὰ
 20 ἔθνη· ἐκ βασιλευμένων γὰρ συνῆλθον· πᾶσα γὰρ οἰκία
 βασιλεύεται ὑπὸ τοῦ πρεσβυτάτου, ὥστε καὶ αἱ ἀποικίαι διὰ
 τὴν συγγένειαν. καὶ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ὃ λέγει Ὀμηρος, “θεμιστεύει 7
 δὲ ἕκαστος παίδων ἢ δ' ἀλόχων”. σποράδες γάρ· καὶ οὕτω
 τὸ ἀρχαῖον ὄκουν. καὶ τοὺς θεοὺς δὲ διὰ τοῦτο πάντες φασὶ

- βασιλεύεσθαι, ὅτι καὶ αὐτοὶ οἱ μὲν ἔτι καὶ νῦν, οἱ δὲ τὸ 25
 ἀρχαῖον ἐβασιλεύοντο, ὥσπερ δὲ καὶ τὰ εἶδη ἑαυτοῖς ἀφο-
 8 μοιουσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι, οὕτω καὶ τοὺς βίους τῶν θεῶν. ἡ δ' ἐκ
 πλειόνων καμῶν κοινωνία τέλειος πόλις ἤδη, πάσης ἔχουσα
 πέρας τῆς αὐταρκειας ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, γινομένη μὲν οὖν τοῦ
 ζῆν ἔνεκεν, οὐσα δὲ τοῦ εὖ ζῆν. διδ' πᾶσα πόλις φύσει ἐστίν, 30
 εἶπερ καὶ αἱ πρῶται κοινωναίαι· τέλος γὰρ αὕτη ἐκείνων,
 ἡ δὲ φύσις τέλος ἐστίν· οἷον γὰρ ἕκαστόν ἐστι τῆς γενέσεως
 τελεσθείσης, ταύτην φαμέν τὴν φύσιν εἶναι ἐκάστου, ὥσπερ
 9 ἀνθρώπου ἵππου οἰκίας. ἔτι τὸ οὐ ἔνεκα καὶ τὸ τέλος βέλ-
 τιστον· ἡ δ' αὐτάρκεια καὶ τέλος καὶ βέλτιστον. ἐκ τούτων 1253 a
 οὖν φανερόν ἐστι τῶν φύσει ἡ πόλις ἐστὶ, καὶ ὅτι ἄνθρωπος
 φύσει πολιτικὸν ζῷον, καὶ ὁ ἀπολις διὰ φύσιν καὶ οὐ διὰ
 τύχην ἦτοι φαῦλός ἐστιν ἢ κρείττων ἢ ἄνθρωπος, ὥσπερ
 καὶ ὁ ὕψ' Ὀμήρου λοιδορηθεὶς “ἀφρήτωρ ἀθέμιστος ἀνέστιος”· 5
 10 ἅμα γὰρ φύσει τοιοῦτος καὶ πολέμου ἐπιθυμητής, ἅτε περ
 ἄλγυς ὦν ὥσπερ ἐν πεττοῖς. διότι δὲ πολιτικὸν ὁ ἄνθρωπος
 ζῷον πάσης μελίσσης καὶ παντὸς ἀγελαίου ζῴου μᾶλλον,
 δῆλον. οὐδὲν γάρ, ὥς φαμέν, μάτην ἡ φύσις ποιεῖ, λόγον
 11 δὲ μόνον ἄνθρωπος ἔχει τῶν ζῴων· ἡ μὲν οὖν φωνὴ τοῦ 10
 λυπηροῦ καὶ ἡδέος ἐστὶ σημεῖον, διδ' καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὑπάρ-
 χει ζῴοις· μέχρι γὰρ τούτου ἡ φύσις αὐτῶν ἐλήλυθε τοῦ
 ἔχειν αἴσθησιν λυπηροῦ καὶ ἡδέος καὶ ταῦτα σημαίνειν
 ἀλλήλοισι· ὁ δὲ λόγος ἐπὶ τῷ δηλοῦν ἐστὶ τὸ συμφέρον καὶ
 12 τὸ βλαβερόν, ὥστε καὶ τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἀδίκον· τοῦτο γὰρ 15
 πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα ζῷα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἴδιον, τὸ μόνον ἀγαθοῦ
 καὶ κακοῦ καὶ δικαίου καὶ ἀδίκου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων αἴσθησιν
 ἔχειν· ἡ δὲ τούτων κοινωνία ποιεῖ οἰκίαν καὶ πόλιν. καὶ
 πρότερον δὴ τῇ φύσει πόλις ἢ οἰκία καὶ ἕκαστος ἡμῶν ἐστίν.
 13 τὸ γὰρ ὅλον πρότερον ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τοῦ μέρους· ἀναιρου- 20
 μένου γὰρ τοῦ ὅλου οὐκ ἔσται πούς οὐδὲ χεῖρ, εἰ μὴ ὁμωνύμως,
 ὥσπερ εἴ τις λέγει τὴν λιθίνην· διαφθαρείσα γὰρ ἔσται
 τοιαύτη, πάντα δὲ τῷ ἔργῳ ὥριστα καὶ τῇ δυνάμει, ὥστε

μηκέτι τοιαῦτα ὄντα οὐ λεκτέον τὰ αὐτὰ εἶναι, ἀλλ' ὁμώ-
 25 νυμα. ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἡ πόλις καὶ φύσει καὶ πρότερον ἢ ἕκα- 14
 στος, δηλὸν· εἰ γὰρ μὴ αὐτάρκης ἕκαστος χωρισθεὶς, ὁμοίως
 τοῖς ἄλλοις μέρεσιν ἔξει πρὸς τὸ ὅλον· ὁ δὲ μὴ δυνάμε-
 νος κοινωνεῖν, ἡ μὴδὲν δεόμενος δι' αὐτάρκειαν, οὐδὲν μέρος
 πόλεως, ὥστε ἡ θηρίον ἢ θεός. φύσει μὲν οὖν ἡ ὁρμὴ ἐν 15
 30 πᾶσιν ἐπὶ τὴν τοιαύτην κοινωνίαν· ὁ δὲ πρῶτος συστήσας
 μεγίστων ἀγαθῶν αἷτιος. ὥσπερ γὰρ καὶ τελεωθὲν βέλτι-
 στον τῶν ζώων ἀνθρωπός ἐστιν, οὕτω καὶ χωρισθὲν νόμου καὶ
 δίκης χερίστον πάντων. χαλεπωτάτῃ γὰρ ἀδικία ἔχουσα 16
 ὅπλα· ὁ δὲ ἀνθρώπος ὅπλα ἔχων φύεται φρονήσει καὶ
 35 ἀρετῇ, οἷς ἐπὶ τὰναντία ἔστι χρῆσθαι μάλιστα. διὸ ἀνοσιώ-
 τατον καὶ ἀγριώτατον ἄνευ ἀρετῆς, καὶ πρὸς ἀφροδίσια
 καὶ ἐδωδὴν χερίστον. ἡ δὲ δικαιοσύνη πολιτικόν· ἡ γὰρ δίκη
 πολιτικῆς κοινωνίας τάξις ἐστίν· ἡ δὲ δίκη τοῦ δικαίου κρίσις.
 1253 b. 3 Ἐπεὶ δὲ φανερόν ἐξ ὧν μορίων ἡ πόλις συνέστηκεν,
 ἀναγκαῖον πρῶτον περὶ οἰκονομίας εἰπεῖν· πᾶσα γὰρ σύγκειται
 πόλις ἐξ οἰκίων. οἰκονομίας δὲ μέρη, ἐξ ὧν πάλιν οἰκία
 συνέστηκεν· οἰκία δὲ τέλειος ἐκ δούλων καὶ ἐλευθέρων. ἐπεὶ
 5 δ' ἐν τοῖς ἐλαχίστοις πρῶτον ἕκαστον ζητητέον, πρῶτα δὲ
 καὶ ἐλάχιστα μέρη οἰκίας δεσπότης καὶ δούλος καὶ πόσις
 καὶ ἄλοχος καὶ πατήρ καὶ τέκνα, περὶ τριῶν ἂν τούτων
 σκεπτέον εἴη τί ἕκαστον καὶ ποῖον δεῖ εἶναι. ταῦτα δ' 2
 ἐστὶ δεσποτικὴ καὶ γαμικὴ (ἀνώνυμον γὰρ ἡ γυναικὶς καὶ ἀν-
 10 ὁρὸς σύζευξις) καὶ τρίτον τεκνοποιητικὴ· καὶ γὰρ αὕτη οὐκ
 ὠνόμασται ἰδίῳ ὀνόματι. ἔστωσαν δ' αὗται τρεῖς ὥς εἴπο-
 μεν. ἔστι δὲ τι μέρος ὃ δοκεῖ τοῖς μὲν εἶναι οἰκονομία, 3
 τοῖς δὲ μέγιστον μέρος αὐτῆς· ὅπως δ' ἔχει, θεωρητέον.
 λέγω δὲ περὶ τῆς καλουμένης χρηματιστικῆς. πρῶτον δὲ
 15 περὶ δεσπότου καὶ δούλου εἴπωμεν, ἵνα τὰ τε πρὸς τὴν
 ἀναγκαίαν χρεῖαν ἴδωμεν, κἂν εἴ τι πρὸς τὸ εἰδέναι περὶ
 αὐτῶν δυνάμεθα λαβεῖν βέλτιον τῶν νῦν ὑπολαμβάνομέ-
 νων. τοῖς μὲν γὰρ δοκεῖ ἐπιστήμη τέ τις εἶναι ἡ δεσποτεία, 4

καὶ ἡ αὐτὴ οἰκονομία καὶ δεσποτεία καὶ πολιτικὴ καὶ βα-
 σιλική, καθάπερ εἶπομεν ἀρχόμενοι· τοῖς δὲ παρὰ φύσιν 20
 τὸ δεσπόμεναι. νόμῳ γὰρ τὸν μὲν δούλον εἶναι τὸν δ' ἐλεύ-
 θερον, φύσει δ' οὐδὲν διαφέρειν. διόπερ οὐδὲ δίκαιον· βίαιον
 γάρ. ἐπεὶ οὖν ἡ κτήσις μέρος τῆς οἰκίας ἐστὶ καὶ ἡ κτητικὴ 4
 μέρος τῆς οἰκονομίας (ἀνευ γὰρ τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἀδύνατον
 καὶ ζῆν καὶ εὖ ζῆν), ὥσπερ δὲ ταῖς ὠρισμέναις τέχναις 25
 ἀναγκαῖον ἂν εἴη ὑπάρχειν τὰ οἰκεία ὄργανα, εἰ μέλλει
 2 ἀποτελεσθῆσεσθαι τὸ ἔργον, οὕτω καὶ τῶν οἰκονομικῶν, τῶν
 δ' ὀργάνων τὰ μὲν ἄψυχα τὰ δ' ἔμψυχα, οἷον τῷ κυ-
 βερνήτῃ ὁ μὲν οἰαξ ἄψυχον, ὁ δὲ πρῶρευς ἔμψυχον (ὁ
 γὰρ ὑπηρέτης ἐν ὀργάνῳ εἶδει ταῖς τέχναις ἐστίν), οὕτω καὶ 30
 τὸ κτῆμα ὄργανον πρὸς ζωὴν ἐστι, καὶ ἡ κτήσις πλήθος
 ὀργάνων ἐστί, καὶ ὁ δούλος κτῆμά τι ἔμψυχον, καὶ ὥσπερ
 3 ὄργανον πρὸ ὀργάνων πᾶς ὁ ὑπηρέτης· εἰ γὰρ ἡδύνατο
 ἕκαστον τῶν ὀργάνων κελευσθὲν ἢ προαισθανόμενον ἀποτε-
 λεῖν τὸ αὐτοῦ ἔργον, ὥσπερ τὰ Δαιδάλου φασὶν ἢ τοὺς τοῦ 35
 Ἑφαιστου τρίποδας, οὓς φησὶν ὁ ποιητὴς αὐτομάτους θεῖον
 δύεσθαι ἀγῶνα, οὕτως αἱ κερκίδες ἐκέρκιζον αὐταὶ καὶ τὰ
 πλήκτρα ἐκιδάριζεν, οὐδὲν ἂν ἔδει οὔτε τοῖς ἀρχιτέκτοσιν
 4 ὑπηρετῶν οὔτε τοῖς δεσπόταις δούλων. τὰ μὲν οὖν λεγόμενα 1254 a
 ὄργανα ποιητικὰ ὄργανά ἐστι, τὸ δὲ κτῆμα πρακτικόν· ἀπὸ
 μὲν γὰρ τῆς κερκίδος ἕτερόν τι γίνεται παρὰ τὴν χρῆσιν
 αὐτῆς, ἀπὸ δὲ τῆς ἐσθήτος καὶ τῆς κλίνης ἡ χρῆσις μό-
 νον. ἔτι δ' ἐπεὶ διαφέρει ἡ ποίησις εἶδει καὶ ἡ πρᾶξις, 5
 καὶ δέονται ἀμφοτέραι ὀργάνων, ἀνάγκη καὶ ταῦτα τὴν
 5 αὐτὴν ἔχειν διαφοράν· ὁ δὲ βίος πρᾶξις, οὐ ποίησις ἐστίν·
 διὸ καὶ ὁ δούλος ὑπηρέτης τῶν πρὸς τὴν πρᾶξιν. τὸ δὲ
 κτῆμα λέγεται ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ μύριον· τό τε γὰρ μύριον οὐ
 μόνον ἄλλου ἐστὶ μύριον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅλως ἄλλου· ὁμοίως δὲ 10
 καὶ τὸ κτῆμα. διὸ ὁ μὲν δεσπότης τοῦ δούλου δεσπότης μό-
 νον, ἐκείνου δ' οὐκ ἔστιν· ὁ δὲ δούλος οὐ μόνον δεσπότης δούλου
 6 ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅλως ἐκείνου. τίς μὲν οὖν ἡ φύσις τοῦ δούλου

καὶ τίς ἡ δύναμις, ἐκ τούτων δῆλον· ὁ γὰρ μὴ αὐτοῦ φύ-
 15 σσει ἀλλ' ἄλλου, ἄνθρωπος ὢν, οὗτος φύσει δοῦλός ἐστιν, ἄλλου
 δ' ἐστὶν ἄνθρωπος, ὃς ἂν κτῆμα ἢ ἄνθρωπος ὢν, κτῆμα δὲ
 5 ὄργανον πρακτικὸν καὶ χωριστόν· πότερον δ' ἐστὶ τις φύσει
 τοιοῦτος ἢ οὐ, καὶ πότερον βέλτιον καὶ δίκαιόν τινα δουλεύειν
 ἢ οὐ, ἀλλὰ πᾶσα δουλεία παρὰ φύσιν ἐστὶ, μετὰ ταῦτα
 20 σκεπτέον. οὐ χαλεπὸν δὲ καὶ τῷ λόγῳ θεωρῆσαι καὶ ἐκ
 τῶν γινομένων καταμαθεῖν. τὸ γὰρ ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι 2
 οὐ μόνον τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν συμφερόντων ἐστὶ,
 καὶ εὐθὺς ἐκ γενετῆς ἔνια διέστηκε τὰ μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ ἄρχεσθαι
 τὰ δ' ἐπὶ τὸ ἄρχειν. καὶ εἶδη πολλὰ καὶ ἀρχόντων καὶ
 25 ἀρχομένων ἐστίν, καὶ αἰεὶ βελτίων ἢ ἀρχῇ ἢ τῶν βελτιόνων
 ἀρχομένων, οἷον ἀνθρώπου ἢ θηρίου· τὸ γὰρ ἀποτελούμενον 3
 ἀπὸ τῶν βελτιόνων βέλτιον ἔργον, ὅπου δὲ τὸ μὲν ἄρχει
 τὸ δ' ἄρχεται, ἐστὶ τι τούτων ἔργον. ὅσα γὰρ ἐκ πλειόνων
 συνέστηκε καὶ γίνεται ἔν τι κοινόν, εἴτε ἐκ συνεχῶν εἴτε ἐκ
 30 διηρημένων, ἐν ἅσασιν ἐμφαίνεται τὸ ἄρχον καὶ τὸ ἀρχό-
 μενον. καὶ τοῦτ' ἐκ τῆς ἀπάσης φύσεως ἐνυπάρχει τοῖς 4
 ἐμψύχοις· καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς μὴ μετέχουσι ζωῆς ἐστὶ τις
 ἀρχή, οἷον ἀρμονίας. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ἴσως ἐξωτερικωτέ-
 ρας ἐστὶ σκέψεως, τὸ δὲ ζῶον πρῶτον συνέστηκεν ἐκ ψυχῆς
 35 καὶ σώματος, ὧν τὸ μὲν ἄρχον ἐστὶ φύσει τὸ δ' ἀρχό-
 μενον. δεῖ δὲ σκοπεῖν ἐν τοῖς κατὰ φύσιν ἔχουσι μᾶλλον 5
 τὸ φύσει, καὶ μὴ ἐν τοῖς διεφθαρμένοις. διὸ καὶ τὸν βέλ-
 τιστα διακείμενον καὶ κατὰ σῶμα καὶ κατὰ ψυχὴν ἄν-
 θρωπον θεωρητέον, ἐν ᾧ τοῦτο δῆλον· τῶν γὰρ μοχθηρῶν ἢ
 1254 b μοχθηρῶς ἔχόντων δόξειεν ἂν ἄρχειν πολλακίς τὸ σῶμα
 τῆς ψυχῆς διὰ τὸ φαύλως καὶ παρὰ φύσιν ἔχειν. ἔστι 6
 δ' οὖν, ὥσπερ λέγομεν, πρῶτον ἐν ζῳῳ θεωρῆσαι καὶ δε-
 σποτικὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ πολιτικὴν· ἢ μὲν γὰρ ψυχὴ τοῦ σώ-
 5 ματος ἄρχει δεσποτικὴν ἀρχήν, ὁ δὲ νοῦς τῆς ὀρέξεως πο-
 λιτικὴν καὶ βασιλικήν· ἐν οἷς φανερόν ἐστιν ὅτι κατὰ φύ-
 σιν καὶ συμφέρον τὸ ἄρχεσθαι τῷ σώματι ὑπὸ τῆς ψυ-

- χῆς καὶ τῷ παθητικῷ μορίῳ ὑπὸ τοῦ νοῦ καὶ τοῦ μορίου τοῦ
 λόγον ἔχοντος, τὸ δ' ἐξ ἴσου ἢ ἀνάπαλιν βλαβερόν πᾶσιν.
- 7 πάλιν ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴοις ὡσαύτως· τὰ 10
 μὲν γὰρ ἡμερα τῶν ἀγρίων βελτίω τὴν φύσιν, τούτοις δὲ
 πᾶσι βέλτιον ἀρχεσθαι ὑπ' ἀνθρώπου· τυγχάνει γὰρ σω-
 τηρίας οὕτως. ἔτι δὲ τὸ ἄρρεν πρὸς τὸ θῆλυ φύσει τὸ μὲν
 κρεῖττον τὸ δὲ χεῖρον, τὸ μὲν ἀρχον τὸ δὲ ἀρχόμενον. τὸν
 αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι καὶ ἐπὶ πάντων ἀνθρώ- 15
 8 πων. ὅσοι μὲν οὖν τοσοῦτον διεστᾶσιν ὅσον ψυχῇ σώματος
 καὶ ἀνθρώπος θηρίου (διάκεινται δὲ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον, ὅσων
 ἐστὶν ἔργον ἢ τοῦ σώματος χρήσις, καὶ τοῦτ' ἐστ' ἀπ' αὐτῶν
 βέλτιστον), οὗτοι μὲν εἰσι φύσει δοῦλοι, οἷς βέλτιόν ἐστιν
 9 ἀρχεσθαι ταύτην τὴν ἀρχήν, εἴπερ καὶ τοῖς εἰρημένοις. ἔστι 20
 γὰρ φύσει δοῦλος ὁ δυνάμενος ἄλλου εἶναι (διὸ καὶ ἄλλου
 ἐστίν) καὶ ὁ κοινωνῶν λόγου τοσοῦτον ὅσον αἰσθάνεσθαι ἀλλὰ
 μὴ ἔχειν· τὰ γὰρ ἄλλα ζῶα οὐ λόγου αἰσθανόμενα, ἀλλὰ
 παθήμασιν ὑπηρετεῖ. καὶ ἡ χρεῖα δὲ παραλλάττει μικρόν
 ἢ γὰρ πρὸς τἀναγκαῖα τῷ σώματι βοήθεια γίνεται παρ' 25
 ἀμφοῖν, παρά τε τῶν δούλων καὶ παρὰ τῶν ἡμέρων ζῶων.
- 10 βούλεται μὲν οὖν ἡ φύσις καὶ τὰ σώματα διαφέροντα
 ποιεῖν τὰ τῶν ἐλευθέρων καὶ τῶν δούλων, τὰ μὲν ἰσχυρὰ
 πρὸς τὴν ἀναγκαίαν χρήσιν, τὰ δ' ὀρθὰ καὶ ἀχρηστα πρὸς
 τὰς τοιαύτας ἐργασίας, ἀλλὰ χρήσιμα πρὸς πολιτικὸν 30
 βίον (οὗτος δὲ καὶ γίνεται διηρημένος εἰς τε τὴν πολεμικὴν
 χρεῖαν καὶ τὴν εἰρηνικὴν), συμβαίνει δὲ πολλάκις καὶ τού-
 ναντίον, τοὺς μὲν τὰ σώματα ἔχειν ἐλευθέρων τοὺς δὲ τὰς
 ψυχὰς· ἐπεὶ τοῦτό γε φανερόν, ὥς εἰ τοσοῦτον γένοιτο διά-
 φοροι τὸ σῶμα μόνον ὅσον αἱ τῶν θεῶν εἰκόνες, τοὺς ὑπο- 35
 λειπομένους πάντες φαίεν ἂν ἀξίους εἶναι τούτοις δουλεῦναι.
- 11 εἰ δ' ἐπὶ τοῦ σώματος τοῦτ' ἀληθές, πολὺ δικαιότερον ἐπὶ
 τῆς ψυχῆς τοῦτο διωρίσθαι· ἀλλ' οὐχ ὁμοίως ῥάδιον ἰδεῖν
 τό τε τῆς ψυχῆς κάλλος καὶ τὸ τοῦ σώματος. ὅτι μὲν
 τοῖνυν εἰσὶ φύσει τινὲς οἱ μὲν ἐλεύθεροι οἱ δὲ δοῦλοι, φα- 1255 a

νερὸν, οἷς καὶ συμφέρει τὸ δουλεύειν καὶ δίκαιόν ἐστιν·
 6 ὅτι δὲ καὶ οἱ τάναντία φάσκοντες τρόπον τινὰ λέγουσιν
 ὀρθῶς, οὐ χαλεπὸν ἰδεῖν· διχῶς γὰρ λέγεται τὸ δουλεύειν·
 5 καὶ ὁ δοῦλος· ἔστι γὰρ τις καὶ κατὰ νόμον δοῦλος καὶ
 δουλεύων· ὁ γὰρ νόμος ὁμολογία τίς ἐστιν, ἐν ᾗ τὰ κατὰ
 πόλεμον κρατούμενα τῶν κρατούντων εἶναι φασιν. τοῦτο δὲ 2
 τὸ δίκαιον πολλοὶ τῶν ἐν τοῖς νόμοις ὥσπερ ῥήτορα γρά-
 φονται παρανόμων, ὡς δεινὸν εἰ τοῦ βιάσασθαι δυνάμενον
 10 καὶ κατὰ δύναμιν κρείττονος ἔσται δοῦλον καὶ ἀρχόμενον
 τὸ βιασθέν· καὶ τοῖς μὲν οὕτω δοκεῖ τοῖς δὲ ἐκείνως, καὶ
 τῶν σοφῶν. αἴτιον δὲ ταύτης τῆς ἀμφισβητήσεως, καὶ ὁ 3
 ποιεῖ τοὺς λόγους ἐπαλλάττειν, ὅτι τρόπον τινὰ ἀρετὴ τυ-
 χάνουσα χορηγίας καὶ βιάζεσθαι δύναται μάλιστα, καὶ
 15 ἔστιν αἰεὶ τὸ κρατοῦν ἐν ὑπεροχῇ ἀγαθοῦ τινός, ὥστε δοκεῖν
 μὴ ἀνευ ἀρετῆς εἶναι τὴν βίαν, ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ δικαίου μόνον
 εἶναι τὴν ἀμφισβήτησιν· διὰ γὰρ τοῦτο τοῖς μὲν εὐνοία 4
 δοκεῖ τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι, τοῖς δ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο δίκαιον, τὸ τὸν
 κρείττονα ἀρχειν, ἐπεὶ διαστάντων γε χωρὶς τούτων τῶν λό-
 20 γων οὔτε ἰσχυρὸν οὐδὲν ἔχουσιν οὔτε πιθανὸν ἄτεροι λόγοι, ὡς
 οὐ δεῖ τὸ βέλτιον κατ' ἀρετὴν ἀρχειν καὶ δεσπάζειν. ὅλως 5
 δ' ἀντεχόμενοί τινες, ὡς οἴονται, δικαίου τινός (ὁ γὰρ νόμος
 δίκαιόν τι) τὴν κατὰ πόλεμον δουλείαν τιθέασι δικαίαν,
 ἅμα δὲ οὐ φασιν τὴν τε γὰρ ἀρχὴν ἐνδέχεται μὴ δι-
 25 καίαν εἶναι τῶν πολέμων, καὶ τὸν ἀνάξιον δουλεύειν οὐδα-
 μῶς ἂν φαίη τις δοῦλον εἶναι· εἰ δὲ μή, συμβήσεται τοὺς
 εὐγενεστάτους εἶναι δοκοῦντας δούλους εἶναι καὶ ἐκ δούλων,
 ἐὰν συμβῇ πραθῆναι ληφθέντας. διόπερ αὐτοὺς οὐ βούλονται 6
 λέγειν δούλους, ἀλλὰ τοὺς βαρβάρους. καίτοι ὅταν τοῦτο λέ-
 30 γωσιν, οὐδὲν ἄλλο ζητοῦσιν ἢ τὸ φύσει δοῦλον, ὅπερ ἐξ
 ἀρχῆς εἶπομεν· ἀνάγκη γὰρ εἶναι τινας φάναι τοὺς μὲν
 πανταχοῦ δούλους τοὺς δὲ οὐδαμοῦ. τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ 7
 περὶ εὐγενείας· αὐτοὺς μὲν γὰρ οὐ μόνον παρ' αὐτοῖς εὐγε-
 νεῖς ἀλλὰ πανταχοῦ νομίζουσιν, τοὺς δὲ βαρβάρους οἴκοι μό-

νον, ὥς ὃν τι τὸ μὲν ἀπλῶς εὐγενὲς ἐλεύθερον, τὸ δ' οὐχ 35
ἀπλῶς, ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ Θεοδέκτου Ἑλένη φησὶν

θείων δ' ἀπ' ἀμφοῖν ἔγονον ῥιζωμάτων

τίς ἂν προσειπεῖν ἀξιώσκειν λάτριν;

- 8 ὅταν δὲ τοῦτο λέγωσιν, οὐδενὶ ἄλλ' ἢ ἀρετῇ καὶ κακίᾳ διο-
ρίζουσι τὸ δοῦλον καὶ ἐλεύθερον καὶ τοὺς εὐγενεῖς καὶ τοὺς 40
δυσγενεῖς. ἀξιοῦσι γάρ, ὥσπερ ἐξ ἀνθρώπου ἀνθρώπον καὶ 1255 b
ἐκ θηρίων γίνεσθαι θηρίον, οὕτω καὶ ἐξ ἀγαθῶν ἀγαθόν· ἡ
δὲ φύσις βούλεται μὲν τοῦτο ποιεῖν πολλάκις, οὐ μὲντοι
9 δύναται. ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἔχει τινὰ λόγον ἢ ἀμφισβήτησις,
καὶ οὐκ εἰσὶν οἱ μὲν φύσει δοῦλοι οἱ δὲ ἐλεύθεροι, δηλὸν 5
καὶ ὅτι ἔν τισι διώρισται τὸ τοιοῦτον, ὃν συμφέρεи τῷ μὲν τὸ
δουλεύειν τῷ δὲ τὸ δεσπόζειν καὶ δίκαιον, καὶ δεῖ τὸ μὲν
ἄρχεσθαι τὸ δ' ἄρχειν, ἣν πεφύκασιν ἀρχὴν ἄρχειν, ὥστε
10 καὶ δεσπόζειν. τὸ δὲ κακῶς ἀσυμφόρως ἐστὶν ἀμφοῖν· τὸ
γὰρ αὐτὸ συμφέρεи τῷ μέρει καὶ τῷ ὅλῳ καὶ σώματι καὶ 10
ψυχῇ, ὃ δὲ δοῦλος μέρος τι τοῦ δεσπότου, οἷον ἔμφυχόν τι
τοῦ σώματος κεχωρισμένον δὲ μέρος. διὸ καὶ συμφέρον
ἐστὶ τι καὶ φιλία δούλῳ καὶ δεσπότῃ πρὸς ἀλλήλους τοῖς
φύσει τούτων ἡξιωμένοις· τοῖς δὲ μὴ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον,
ἀλλὰ κατὰ νόμον καὶ βιασθεῖσι, τούναντίον. 15

Φανερόν δὲ καὶ ἐκ τούτων ὅτι οὐ ταῦτόν ἐστι δεσποτεία 7
καὶ πολιτική, οὐδὲ πᾶσαι ἀλλήλαις αἱ ἀρχαί, ὥσπερ τινές
φασιν· ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἐλευθέρων φύσει ἡ δὲ δούλων ἐστίν, καὶ
ἡ μὲν οἰκονομικὴ μοναρχία (μοναρχεῖται γὰρ πᾶς οἶκος),
2 ἡ δὲ πολιτικὴ ἐλευθέρων καὶ ἴσων ἀρχή. ὁ μὲν οὖν δεσπό- 20
της οὐ λέγεται κατὰ ἐπιστήμην, ἀλλὰ τῷ τοιούτῳ εἶναι,
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ δοῦλος καὶ ὁ ἐλεύθερος· ἐπιστήμη δ' ἂν
εἴη καὶ δεσποτικὴ καὶ δουλική, δουλικὴ μὲν οἶαν περ ὁ ἐν
Συρακούσαις ἐπαίδευεν· ἐκεῖ γὰρ λαμβάνων τις μισθὸν
3 ἐδίδασκε τὰ ἐγκύκλια διακονήματα τοὺς παῖδας. εἴη δ' 25
ἂν καὶ ἐπὶ πλείον τῶν τοιούτων μάθησις, οἷον ὀψοποιικὴ
καὶ ἄλλα τὰ τοιαῦτα γένη τῆς διακονίας· ἔστι γὰρ ἕτερα

ἐτέρων τὰ μὲν ἐντιμότερα ἔργα τὰ δ' ἀναγκαϊότερα, καὶ
 κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν δούλος πρὸ δούλου, δεσπότης πρὸ δε-
 30 σπότη. αἱ μὲν οὖν τοιαῦται πᾶσαι δουλικαὶ ἐπιστήμαί εἰσι, 4
 δεσποτική δ' ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶν ἡ χρηστική δούλων· ὁ γὰρ δε-
 σπότης οὐκ ἐν τῷ κτᾶσθαι τοὺς δούλους, ἀλλ' ἐν τῷ χρῆσθαι
 δούλοις. ἔστι δ' αὕτη ἡ ἐπιστήμη οὐδὲν μέγα ἔχουσα οὐδὲ
 σεμνόν· ἃ γὰρ τὸν δούλον ἐπίστασθαι δεῖ ποιεῖν, ἐκείνον δεῖ
 35 ταῦτα ἐπίστασθαι ἐπιτάττειν. διδὼς τοῖς ἔξουσιν μὴ αὐτοὺς 5
 κακοπαθεῖν, ἐπίτροπος λαμβάνει ταύτην τὴν τιμὴν, αὐτοὶ
 δὲ πολιτεύονται ἢ φιλοσοφοῦσιν. ἡ δὲ κτητική ἐτέρα ἀμ-
 φοτέρων τούτων, οἷον ἡ δικαία, πολεμική τις οὖσα ἢ θηρευ-
 τική. περὶ μὲν οὖν δούλου καὶ δεσπότη τοῦτον διωρίσθω
 40 τὸν τρόπον·

1256 a. 8 Ὅλως δὲ περὶ πάσης κτήσεως καὶ χρηματιστικῆς θεω-
 ρήσωμεν κατὰ τὸν ὑφηγημένον τρόπον, ἐπεὶ περ καὶ ὁ δού-
 λος τῆς κτήσεως μέρος τι ἦν. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν ἀπορήσειεν
 ἂν τις πότερον ἡ χρηματιστικὴ ἢ αὐτὴ τῇ οἰκονομικῇ ἐστὶν
 5 ἢ μέρος τι ἢ ὑπηρετική, καὶ εἰ ὑπηρετική, πότερον ὥς ἡ
 κερκιδοποικὴ τῇ ὑφαντικῇ ἢ ὥς ἡ χαλκουργικὴ τῇ ἀν-
 δριαντοποιίᾳ· οὐ γὰρ ὡσαύτως ὑπηρετοῦσιν, ἀλλ' ἡ μὲν ὄρ-
 γανα παρέχει, ἡ δὲ τὴν ὕλην· λέγω δὲ ὕλην τὸ ὑποκεί- 2
 μενον, ἐξ οὗ τι ἀποτελεῖται ἔργον, οἷον ὑφάντη μὲν ἔρια,
 10 ἀνδριαντοποιῶ δὲ χαλκόν. ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐχ ἡ αὐτὴ οἰκο-
 νομικὴ τῇ χρηματιστικῇ, δῆλον· τῆς μὲν γὰρ τὸ πορίσα-
 σθαι, τῆς δὲ τὸ χρήσασθαι· τίς γὰρ ἔσται ἡ χρησομένη
 τοῖς κατὰ τὴν οἰκίαν παρὰ τὴν οἰκονομικήν; πότερον δὲ
 μέρος αὐτῆς ἐστὶ τι ἢ ἕτερον εἶδος, ἔχει διαμφισβήτησιν.
 15 εἰ γὰρ ἔστι τοῦ χρηματιστικοῦ θεωρῆσαι πόθεν χρήματα καὶ 3
 κτήσεις ἔσται, ἡ δὲ κτήσεις πολλὰ περιεῖληφε μέρη καὶ ὁ
 πλοῦτος, ὥστε πρῶτον ἡ γεωργικὴ πότερον μέρος τι τῆς χρη-
 ματιστικῆς ἢ ἕτερόν τι γένος, καὶ καθόλου ἢ περὶ τὴν τρο-
 φὴν ἐπιμέλεια καὶ κτήσις; ἀλλὰ μὴν εἶδη γε πολλὰ τρο- 4
 20 φῆς, διδὼς καὶ βίοι πολλοὶ καὶ τῶν ζώων καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων

εἰσὶν· οὐ γὰρ οἶον τε ζῆν ἄνευ τροφῆς, ὥστε αἱ διαφοραὶ
 τῆς τροφῆς τοὺς βίους πεποιήκασι διαφέροντας τῶν ζώων.
 5 τῶν τε γὰρ θηρίων τὰ μὲν ἀγελαῖα τὰ δὲ σποραδικὰ ἐστίν,
 ὁποτέρως συμφέρει πρὸς τὴν τροφήν αὐτοῖς, διὰ τὸ τὰ μὲν
 ζυφοάγα τὰ δὲ καρποάγα τὰ δὲ παμφάγα αὐτῶν εἶναι, ὥστε 25
 πρὸς τὰς ῥαστώνας καὶ τὴν αἵρεσιν τὴν τούτων ἢ φύσις τοὺς
 βίους αὐτῶν διώρισεν, ἐπεὶ δ' οὐ ταὐτὸ ἐκάστω ἡδὺ κατὰ φύ-
 σιν ἀλλὰ ἕτερα ἑτέροις, καὶ αὐτῶν τῶν ζυφοάγων καὶ τῶν
 6 καρποάγων οἱ βίοι πρὸς ἄλληλα διεστᾶσιν ὁμοίως δὲ
 καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων· πολλὸν γὰρ διαφέρουσιν οἱ τούτων βίοι. 30
 οἱ μὲν οὖν ἀργότατοι νομάδες εἰσὶν ἢ γὰρ ἀπὸ τῶν ἡμέ-
 ρων τροφὴ ζῶν ἄνευ πόνου γίνεται σχολάζουσιν, ἀναγκαῖον
 δὲ ὄντος μεταβάλλειν τοῖς κτήνεσι διὰ τὰς νομάς καὶ
 αὐτοὶ ἀναγκάζονται συνακολουθεῖν, ὥσπερ γεωργίαν ζῶσαν
 7 γεωργοῦντες· οἱ δ' ἀπὸ θήρας ζῶσι, καὶ θήρας ἕτεροι ἐτέ- 35
 ρας, οἶον οἱ μὲν ἀπὸ ληστείας, οἱ δ' ἀφ' ἀλιείας, ὅσοι λι-
 μνας καὶ ἔλη καὶ ποταμοὺς ἢ θάλατταν τοιαύτην προσοι-
 κοῦσιν, οἱ δ' ἀπ' ὀρνίθων ἢ θηρίων ἀγρίων· τὸ δὲ πλεῖστον
 γένος τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς ζῇ καὶ τῶν ἡμέρων καρ-
 8 πῶν. οἱ μὲν οὖν βίοι τοσοῦτοι σχεδόν εἰσιν, ὅσοι γε αὐτῶ 40
 φυτον ἔχουσι τὴν ἐργασίαν καὶ μὴ δι' ἀλλαγῆς καὶ κα-
 πηλείας πορίζονται τὴν τροφήν, νομαδικὸς γεωργικὸς λη- 1256 b
 στρικὸς ἀλιευτικὸς θηρευτικὸς· οἱ δὲ καὶ μιγνύντες ἐκ τού-
 των ἡδέως ζῶσι, προσαναπληροῦντες τὸν ἐνδεέστατον βίον, ἢ
 τυγχάνει ἐλλείπων πρὸς τὸ αὐτάρκης εἶναι, οἶον οἱ μὲν
 νομαδικὸν ἄμα καὶ ληστρικόν, οἱ δὲ γεωργικὸν καὶ θηρευ- 5
 9 τικόν· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, ὥς ἂν ἡ χρεία συν-
 αναγκάζῃ, τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον διάγουσιν. ἡ μὲν οὖν τοιαύτη
 κτῆσις ὑπ' αὐτῆς φαίνεται τῆς φύσεως διδομένη πᾶσιν,
 ὥσπερ κατὰ τὴν πρώτην γένεσιν εὐθύς, οὕτω καὶ τελειω-
 10 θεῖσιν. καὶ γὰρ κατὰ τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς γένεσιν τὰ μὲν συνεκ-
 τίκεται τῶν ζώων τοσαύτην τροφήν ὥς ἱκανὴν εἶναι μέχρις
 οὗ ἂν θύνηται αὐτὸ αὐτῷ πορίζειν τὸ γεννηθέν, οἶον ὅσα

σκληροτοκεῖ ἢ ῥοτοκεῖ· ὅσα δὲ ῥοτοκεῖ, τοῖς γεννωμένοις
 ἔχει τροφήν ἐν αὐτοῖς μέχρι τινός, τὴν τοῦ καλουμένου γά-
 15 λακτος φύσιν. ὥστε ὁμοίως δῆλον ὅτι καὶ γενομένοις οἷη- 11
 τέον τὰ τε φυτὰ τῶν ῥῶν ἔνεκεν εἶναι καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ῥῶα
 τῶν ἀνθρώπων χάριν, τὰ μὲν ἡμερα καὶ διὰ τὴν χρῆσιν
 καὶ διὰ τὴν τροφήν, τῶν δὲ ἀγρίων, εἰ μὴ πάντα, ἀλλὰ
 τὰ γε πλείστα τῆς τροφῆς καὶ ἄλλης βοθηείας ἔνεκεν, ἵνα
 20 καὶ ἐσθῆς καὶ ἄλλα ὄργανα γίνηται ἐξ αὐτῶν. εἰ οὖν ἡ 12
 φύσις μηδὲν μήτε ἀτελὲς ποιεῖ μήτε μάτην, ἀναγκαῖον
 τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἔνεκεν αὐτὰ πάντα πεποιηκέναι τὴν φύσιν.
 διὸ καὶ ἡ πολεμικὴ φύσει κτητικὴ πῶς ἔσται, ἡ γὰρ θη-
 ρευτικὴ μέρος αὐτῆς, ἣ δεῖ χρῆσθαι πρὸς τε τὰ θηρία καὶ
 25 τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὅσοι πεφυκότες ἀρχεσθαι μὴ θέλουσιν, ὥς
 φύσει δίκαιον τοῦτον ὄντα τὸν πόλεμον. ἐν μὲν οὖν εἶδος 13
 κτητικῆς κατὰ φύσιν τῆς οἰκονομικῆς μέρος ἐστίν· ὃ δὲ
 ἦτοι ὑπάρχειν ἢ πορίζειν αὐτὴν ὅπως ὑπάρχει, ὧν ἐστὶ θη-
 σαυρισμὸς χρημάτων πρὸς ζωὴν ἀναγκαίων καὶ χρῆσιν
 30 εἰς κοινωνίαν πόλεως ἢ οἰκίας. καὶ ἔοικεν ὁ γὰρ ἀληθινὸς 14
 πλούτος ἐκ τούτων εἶναι. ἡ γὰρ τῆς τοιαύτης κτήσεως
 αὐτάρκεια πρὸς ἀγαθὴν ζωὴν οὐκ ἀπειρός ἐστιν, ὥπερ Σό-
 λων φησὶ ποιήσας “πλούτου δ’ οὐδὲν τέρμα πεφασμένον ἀν-
 δράσι κεῖται.” κεῖται γὰρ ὥπερ καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις τέχναις 15
 35 οὐδὲν γὰρ ὄργανον ἀπειρον οὐδεμιᾶς ἐστὶ τέχνης οὔτε πλήθει
 οὔτε μεγέθει, ὃ δὲ πλούτος ὀργάνων πληθὺς ἐστὶν οἰκονο-
 μικῶν καὶ πολιτικῶν. ὅτι μὲν τοῖνυν ἔστι τις κτητικὴ
 κατὰ φύσιν τοῖς οἰκονόμοις καὶ τοῖς πολιτικοῖς, καὶ δι’ ἣν
 αἰτίαν, δῆλον

9 “Ἔστι δὲ γένος ἄλλο κτητικῆς, ἣν μάλιστα καλοῦσι, καὶ
 δίκαιον αὐτὸ καλεῖν, χρηματιστικὴν, δι’ ἣν οὐδὲν δοκεῖ
 1257 α πέρασ εἶναι πλούτου καὶ κτήσεως· ἣν ὥς μίαν καὶ τὴν
 αὐτὴν τῇ λεχθείᾳ πολλοὶ νομίζουσι διὰ τὴν γειννῆσιν·
 ἔστι δ’ οὔτε ἡ αὐτὴ τῇ εἰρημένῃ οὔτε πόρρω ἐκείνης. ἔστι δ’
 ἡ μὲν φύσει ἢ δ’ οὐ φύσει αὐτῶν, ἀλλὰ δι’ ἐμπειρίας

2 τινὸς καὶ τέχνης γίνεται μᾶλλον. λάβωμεν δὲ περὶ αὐτῆς 5
 τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐντεῦθεν. ἐκάστου γὰρ κτήματος διττὴ ἡ χρῆσις
 ἐστίν, ἀμφοτέραι δὲ καθ' αὐτὸ μὲν ἀλλ' οὐχ ὁμοίως καθ'
 αὐτό, ἀλλ' ἡ μὲν οἰκία ἡ δ' οὐκ οἰκία τοῦ πράγματος,
 οἷον ὑποδήματος ἢ τε ὑπόδεσις καὶ ἡ μεταβλητική. ἀμ-
 3 φότεραι γὰρ ὑποδήματος χρήσεις· καὶ γὰρ ὁ ἀλλαττό- 10
 μενος τῷ δεομένῳ ὑποδήματος ἀντὶ νομίσματος ἢ τροφῆς
 χρῆται τῷ ὑποδήματι ἢ ὑπόδημα, ἀλλ' οὐ τὴν οἰκίαν
 χρῆσιν οὐ γὰρ ἀλλαγῆς ἔνεκεν γέγονεν. τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ
 4 τρόπον ἔχει καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων κτημάτων. ἔστι γὰρ ἡ
 μεταβλητικὴ πάντων, ἀρξαμένη τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἐκ τοῦ 15
 κατὰ φύσιν, τῷ τὰ μὲν πλείω τὰ δ' ἐλάττω τῶν ἱκανῶν
 ἔχειν τοὺς ἀνθρώπους. ἢ καὶ δῆλον ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι φύσει τῆς
 χρηματιστικῆς ἡ καπηλικῆ· ὅσον γὰρ ἱκανὸν αὐτοῖς, ἀναγ-
 5 καῖον ἦν ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ἀλλαγὴν. ἐν μὲν οὖν τῇ πρώτῃ
 κοινωνίᾳ (τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν οἰκία) φανερόν ὅτι οὐδὲν ἐστὶν ἔργον 20
 αὐτῆς, ἀλλ' ἤδη πλείονος τῆς κοινωνίας οὕσης. οἱ μὲν γὰρ
 τῶν αὐτῶν ἐκοινωνοῦν πάντων, οἱ δὲ κεχωρισμένοι πολλῶν
 πάλιν καὶ ἐτέρων ὧν κατὰ τὰς δεήσεις ἀναγκαῖον ποιεῖ-
 σθαι τὰς μεταδόσεις, καθάπερ ἔτι πολλὰ ποιεῖ καὶ τῶν
 6 βαρβαρικῶν ἔθνων, κατὰ τὴν ἀλλαγὴν. αὐτὰ γὰρ τὰ 25
 χρήσιμα πρὸς αὐτὰ καταλλάττονται, ἐπὶ πλεον δ' οὐδέν,
 οἷον οἶνον πρὸς σῖτον διδόντες καὶ λαμβάνοντες, καὶ τῶν
 ἄλλων τῶν τοιοῦτων ἕκαστον. ἡ μὲν οὖν τοιαύτη μεταβλη-
 τικὴ οὔτε παρὰ φύσιν οὔτε χρηματιστικῆς ἐστὶν εἶδος οὐδέν,
 7 εἰς ἀναπλήρωσιν γὰρ τῆς κατὰ φύσιν αὐταρκείας ἦν· ἐκ 30
 μέντοι ταύτης ἐγένετ' ἐκείνη κατὰ λόγον. ξενικωτέρας γὰρ
 γινομένης τῆς βοηθείας τῷ εἰσάγεσθαι ὧν ἐνδεεῖς καὶ ἐκ-
 πέμπειν ὧν ἐπλεόναζον, ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἡ τοῦ νομίσματος ἐπο-
 8 ρίσθη χρῆσις. οὐ γὰρ εὐβάστακτον ἕκαστον τῶν κατὰ φύσιν
 ἀναγκαίων διδὸν πρὸς τὰς ἀλλαγὰς τοιοῦτόν τι συνέθεντο 35
 πρὸς σφᾶς αὐτοὺς διδόναι καὶ λαμβάνειν, ὃ τῶν χρησίμων
 αὐτὸ ὃν εἶχε τὴν χρεῖαν εὐμεταχειρίστον πρὸς τὸ ζῆν, οἷον

σίδηρος καὶ ἄργυρος κὰν εἴ τι τοιοῦτον ἕτερον, τὸ μὲν πρῶ-
 τον ἀπλῶς ὀρισθὲν μεγέθει καὶ σταθμῷ, τὸ δὲ τελευταῖον
 40 καὶ χαρακτῆρα ἐπιβαλλόντων, ἵν' ἀπολύσῃ τῆς μετρή-
 σεως αὐτούς· ὁ γὰρ χαρακτήρ ἐτέθη τοῦ ποσοῦ σημείον. πο- 9
 1257 b ρισθέντος οὖν ἤδη νομίσματος ἐκ τῆς ἀναγκαίας ἀλλαγῆς
 θάτερον εἶδος τῆς χρηματιστικῆς ἐγένετο, τὸ καπηλικόν, τὸ
 μὲν οὖν πρῶτον ἀπλῶς ἴσως γινόμενον, εἶτα δι' ἐμπειρίας ἤδη
 τεχνικώτερον, πόθεν καὶ πῶς μεταβαλλόμενον πλείστον
 5 ποιήσει κέρδος. διὸ δοκεῖ ἡ χρηματιστικὴ μάλιστα περὶ τὸ 10
 νόμισμα εἶναι, καὶ ἔργον αὐτῆς τὸ δύνασθαι θεωρῆσαι πό-
 θεν ἔσται πλήθος χρημάτων· ποιητικὴ γὰρ εἶναι τοῦ πλούτου
 καὶ χρημάτων. καὶ γὰρ τὸν πλούτον πολλάκις τιθέασι νο-
 μίσματος πλήθος, διὰ τὸ περὶ τοῦτ' εἶναι τὴν χρηματιστικὴν
 10 καὶ τὴν καπηλικήν. ὅτε δὲ πάλιν λῆρος εἶναι δοκεῖ τὸ 11
 νόμισμα καὶ νόμος παντάπασι, φύσει δ' οὐδέν, ὅτι μετα-
 θεμένων τε τῶν χρωμένων οὐδενὸς ἀξίον οὔτε χρήσιμον πρὸς
 οὐδὲν τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἔστι, καὶ νομίσματος πλουτῶν πολλὰ-
 κισ ἀπορήσει τῆς ἀναγκαίας τροφῆς· καίτοι ἄτοπον τοιοῦτον
 15 εἶναι πλούτον οὐ εὐπορῶν λιμῷ ἀπολείται, καθάπερ καὶ τὸν
 Μίδαν ἐκείνον μυθολογοῦσι διὰ τὴν ἀπληστίαν τῆς εὐχῆς
 πάντων αὐτῷ γιγνομένων τῶν παρατιθεμένων χρυσῶν. διὸ 12
 ζητοῦσιν ἕτερόν τι τὸν πλούτον καὶ τὴν χρηματιστικὴν, ὀρθῶς
 ζητοῦντες. ἔστι γὰρ ἑτέρα ἡ χρηματιστικὴ καὶ ὁ πλούτος ὁ
 20 κατὰ φύσιν, καὶ αὕτη μὲν οἰκονομική, ἡ δὲ καπηλική,
 ποιητικὴ χρημάτων οὐ πάντως, ἀλλ' ἡ διὰ χρημάτων με-
 ταβολῆς. καὶ δοκεῖ περὶ τὸ νόμισμα αὕτη εἶναι· τὸ γὰρ
 νόμισμα στοιχεῖον καὶ πέρας τῆς ἀλλαγῆς ἔστιν. καὶ ἀπει- 13
 ρος δὴ οὗτος ὁ πλούτος ὁ ἀπὸ ταύτης τῆς χρηματιστικῆς·
 25 ὥσπερ γὰρ ἡ ἰατρικὴ τοῦ ὑγιαίνειν εἰς ἀπειρόν ἔστι καὶ
 ἐκάστη τῶν τεχνῶν τοῦ τέλους εἰς ἀπειρον (ὅτι μάλιστα γὰρ
 ἐκεῖνο βούλονται ποιεῖν), τῶν δὲ πρὸς τὸ τέλος οὐκ εἰς ἀπει-
 ρον (πέρας γὰρ τὸ τέλος πάσαις), οὕτω καὶ ταύτης τῆς
 χρηματιστικῆς οὐκ ἔστι τοῦ τέλους πέρας, τέλος δὲ ὁ τοιοῦτος

- 14 πλοῦτος καὶ χρημάτων κτήσις· τῆς δ' οἰκονομικῆς, οὐ χρη- 30
ματιστικῆς, ἔστι πέρας· οὐ γὰρ τοῦτο τῆς οἰκονομικῆς ἔργον.
διδὲ τῇ μὲν φαίνεται ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι παντὸς πλούτου πέρας,
ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν γινομένων ὁρῶ(μεν) συμβαῖνον τούναντίον· πάντες
γὰρ εἰς ἀπειρον αὐξοῦσιν οἱ χρηματιζόμενοι τὸ νόμισμα.
- 15 αἴτιον δὲ τὸ σύνεγγυς αὐτῶν· ἐπαλλάττει γὰρ ἡ χρήσις 35
τοῦ αὐτοῦ οὐσα ἑκατέρα τῆς χρηματιστικῆς, τῆς γὰρ αὐτῆς
ἔστι χρήσεως κτήσις, ἀλλ' οὐ κατὰ ταύτῃ, ἀλλὰ τῆς μὲν
ἕτερον τέλος, τῆς δ' ἡ αὐξήσις. ὥστε δοκεῖ τισὶ τοῦτ' εἶναι
τῆς οἰκονομικῆς ἔργον, καὶ διατελοῦσιν ἡ σώζειν οἰόμενοι
- 16 δεῖν ἡ αὐξεῖν τὴν τοῦ νομίσματος οὐσίαν εἰς ἀπειρον. αἴτιον 40
δὲ ταύτης τῆς διαθέσεως τὸ σπουδάζειν περὶ τὸ ζῆν, ἀλλὰ
μὴ τὸ εὖ ζῆν· εἰς ἀπειρον οὖν ἐκείνης τῆς ἐπιθυμίας οὐσης, 1258 a
καὶ τῶν ποιητικῶν ἀπείρων ἐπιθυμοῦσιν. ὅσοι δὲ καὶ τοῦ εὖ
ζῆν ἐπιβάλλονται, τὸ πρὸς τὰς ἀπολαύσεις τὰς σωματικὰς
ζητοῦσιν, ὥστ' ἐπεὶ καὶ τοῦτ' ἐν τῇ κτήσει φαίνεται ὑπάρ-
χειν, πᾶσα ἡ διατριβὴ περὶ τὸν χρηματισμὸν ἔστι, καὶ τὸ 5
- 17 ἕτερον εἶδος τῆς χρηματιστικῆς διὰ τοῦτ' ἐλήλυθεν. ἐν ὑπερ-
βολῇ γὰρ οὐσης τῆς ἀπολαύσεως, τὴν τῆς ἀπολαυστικῆς
ὑπερβολῆς ποιητικὴν ζητοῦσιν· καὶ μὴ διὰ τῆς χρηματιστι-
κῆς δύνωνται πορίζειν, δι' ἄλλης αἰτίας τοῦτο πειρῶνται,
ἐκάστη χρώμενοι τῶν δυνάμεων οὐ κατὰ φύσιν ἀνδρίας 10
γὰρ οὐ χρήματα ποιεῖν ἔστιν ἀλλὰ θάρσος, οὐδὲ στρατηγικῆς
- 18 καὶ ἰατρικῆς, ἀλλὰ τῆς μὲν νίκην τῆς δ' ὑγίειαν· οἱ δὲ
πάσας ποιοῦσι χρηματιστικὰς, ὥς τοῦτο τέλος ὄν, πρὸς δὲ
τὸ τέλος ἀπαντα δέον ἀπαντᾶν. περὶ μὲν οὖν τῆς τε μὴ
ἀναγκαίας χρηματιστικῆς, καὶ τίς, καὶ δι' αἰτίαν τίνα ἐν 15
χρεῖα ἔσμεν αὐτῆς, εἴρηται· καὶ περὶ τῆς ἀναγκαίας, ὅτι
ἐτέρα μὲν αὐτῆς οἰκονομικὴ δὲ κατὰ φύσιν ἡ περὶ τὴν
τροφὴν, οὐχ ὥσπερ αὐτὴ ἀπειρος, ἀλλὰ ἔχουσα ὄρον·
δῆλον δὲ καὶ τὸ ἀπορούμενον ἐξ ἀρχῆς, πότερον τοῦ 10
οἰκονομικοῦ καὶ πολιτικοῦ ἔστιν ἡ χρηματιστικὴ ἡ οὐ, ἀλλὰ 20
δεῖ τοῦτο μὲν ὑπάρχειν· ὥσπερ γὰρ καὶ ἀνθρώπους οὐ ποιεῖ

ἡ πολιτική, ἀλλὰ λαβοῦσα παρὰ τῆς φύσεως χρήται
 αὐτοῖς, οὕτω καὶ τροφήν τὴν φύσιν δεῖ παραδοῦναι γῆν ἢ
 θάλατταν ἢ ἄλλο τι· ἐκ δὲ τούτων ὡς δεῖ ταῦτα διαθεῖ-
 25 ναι προσήκει τὸν οἰκονόμον. οὐ γὰρ τῆς ὑφαντικῆς ἔρια 2
 ποιῆσαι, ἀλλὰ χρήσασθαι αὐτοῖς, καὶ γινῶναι δὲ τὸ ποῖον
 χρηστὸν καὶ ἐπιτήδειον ἢ φαῦλον καὶ ἀνεπιτήδειον. καὶ γὰρ
 ἀπορήσειεν ἂν τις διὰ τί ἡ μὲν χρηματιστικὴ μῦριον τῆς
 οἰκονομίας, ἡ δ' ἱατρικὴ οὐ μῦριον· καίτοι δεῖ ὑγιαίνειν τοὺς
 30 κατὰ τὴν οἰκίαν, ὥσπερ· ζῆν ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν ἀναγκαίων.
 ἐπεὶ δὲ ἔστι μὲν ὡς τοῦ οἰκονόμου καὶ τοῦ ἀρχοντος καὶ περὶ 3
 ὑγείας ἰδεῖν, ἔστι δὲ ὡς οὐ, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἱατροῦ, οὕτω καὶ περὶ
 τῶν χρημάτων ἔστι μὲν ὡς τοῦ οἰκονόμου, ἔστι δὲ ὡς οὐ, ἀλλὰ
 τῆς ὑπηρετικῆς· μάλιστα δέ, καθάπερ εἴρηται πρότερον, δεῖ
 35 φύσει τοῦτο ὑπάρχειν· φύσεως γὰρ ἔστιν ἔργον τροφήν τῷ
 γεννηθέντι παρέχειν· παντὶ γάρ, ἐξ οὗ γίνεται, τροφή τὸ
 λειπόμενον ἔστιν. διδὲ κατὰ φύσιν ἔστιν ἡ χρηματιστικὴ 4
 πᾶσιν ἀπὸ τῶν καρπῶν καὶ τῶν ζώων. διπλῆς δ' οὕσης
 αὐτῆς, ὥσπερ εἵπομεν, καὶ τῆς μὲν καπηλικῆς τῆς δ' οἰκο-
 40 νομικῆς, καὶ ταύτης μὲν ἀναγκαίας καὶ ἐπαινουμένης, τῆς
 1258 b δὲ μεταβλητικῆς ψεγομένης δικαίως (οὐ γὰρ κατὰ φύσιν
 ἀλλ' ἀπ' ἀλλήλων ἔστί), εὐλογώτατα μισεῖται ἡ ὀβολο-
 στατικὴ διὰ τὸ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ τοῦ νομίσματος εἶναι τὴν κτήσιν
 καὶ οὐκ ἐφ' ὅπερ ἐπορίσθη· μεταβολῆς γὰρ ἐγένετο χάριν, 5
 5 ὁ δὲ τόκος αὐτὸ ποιεῖ πλεόν. ὅθεν καὶ τοῦνομα τοῦτ' εἵληφεν
 ὁμοία γὰρ τὰ τικτόμενα τοῖς γεννώσιν αὐτά ἔστιν, ὁ δὲ
 τόκος γίνεται νόμισμα κομίσματος· ὥστε καὶ μάλιστα παρὰ
 φύσιν οὗτος τῶν χρηματισμῶν ἔστί.

11 Ἐπεὶ δὲ τὰ πρὸς τὴν γινῶσιν διωρίκαμεν ἱκανῶς, τὰ
 10 πρὸς τὴν χρήσιν δεῖ διελθεῖν. πάντα δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα τὴν
 μὲν θεωρίαν ἐλεύθερον ἔχει, τὴν δ' ἐμπειρίαν ἀναγκαίαν.
 ἔστι δὲ χρηματιστικῆς μέρη χρήσιμα τὸ περὶ τὰ κτήματα
 ἔμπειρον εἶναι, ποῖα λυσιτελέστατα καὶ ποῦ καὶ πῶς, οἶον
 ἵππων κτήσις ποῖα τις ἢ βοῶν ἢ προβάτων, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ

2 τῶν λοιπῶν ζώων (δεῖ γὰρ ἔμπειρον εἶναι πρὸς ἄλληλά 15
 τε τούτων τίνα λυσιτελέστατα, καὶ ποῖα ἐν ποίοις τόποις
 ἄλλα γὰρ ἐν ἄλλαις εὐθηνεῖ χώραις), εἶτα περὶ γεωργίας,
 καὶ ταύτης ἤδη ψιλῆς τε καὶ πεφυτευμένης, καὶ μελι-
 τουργίας, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζώων τῶν πλωτῶν ἢ πτηνῶν, ἀφ'
 3 δσων ἔστι τυγχάνειν βοηθείας. τῆς μὲν οὖν οἰκειοτάτης χρῆ- 20
 ματιστικῆς ταῦτα μόρια καὶ πρῶτα, τῆς δὲ μεταβλητικῆς
 μέγιστον μὲν ἐμπορία (καὶ ταύτης μέρη τρία, ναυκληρία
 φορτηγία παράστασις· διαφέρει δὲ τούτων ἕτερα ἐτέρων τῶ
 τὰ μὲν ἀσφαλέστερα εἶναι, τὰ δὲ πλείω πορίζειν τὴν ἐπι-
 4 καρπίαν), δεύτερον δὲ τοκισμός, τρίτον δὲ μισθαρνία· ταύ- 25
 τῆς δ' ἡ μὲν τῶν βαναύσων τεχνῶν, ἡ δὲ τῶν ἀτέχων
 καὶ τῶ σώματι μόνῳ χρησίμων· τρίτον δὲ εἶδος χρημα-
 τιστικῆς μεταξὺ ταύτης καὶ τῆς πρώτης (ἔχει γὰρ καὶ τῆς
 κατὰ φύσιν τι μέρος καὶ τῆς μεταβλητικῆς), ὅσα ἀπὸ γῆς
 καὶ τῶν ἀπὸ γῆς γινομένων ἀκάρπων μὲν χρησίμων δέ, 30
 5 οἶον ὕλοτομία τε καὶ πᾶσα μεταλλευτική. αὕτη δὲ πολλὰ
 ἤδη περιεῖλθε γένη· πολλὰ γὰρ εἶδη τῶν ἐκ γῆς μεταλ-
 λευομένων ἐστίν. περὶ ἐκάστου δὲ τούτων καθόλου μὲν εἴρηται
 καὶ νῦν, τὸ δὲ κατὰ μέρος ἀκριβολογεῖσθαι χρήσιμον μὲν
 6 πρὸς τὰς ἐργασίας, φορτικὸν δὲ τὸ ἐνδιατρίβειν. εἰσὶ δὲ 35
 τεχνικώταται μὲν τῶν ἐργασιῶν ὅπου ἐλάχιστον τύχης,
 βαναυσόταται δ' ἐν αἷς τὰ σώματα λωβῶνται μάλιστα,
 δουλικώταται δὲ ὅπου τοῦ σώματος πλείσται χρήσεις, ἀγεννέ-
 7 σताται δὲ ὅπου ἐλάχιστον προσδεῖ ἀρετῆς. ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶν ἐνόις
 γεγραμμένα περὶ τούτων, οἶον Χαρητῖδῃ τῷ Παρίῳ καὶ 40
 Ἀπολλοδώρῳ τῷ Δημνίῳ περὶ γεωργίας καὶ ψιλῆς καὶ 1259 a
 πεφυτευμένης, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἄλλοις περὶ ἄλλων, ταῦτα
 μὲν ἐκ τούτων θεωρεῖτω ὅτῳ ἐπιμελές· ἔτι δὲ καὶ τὰ λε-
 γόμενα σποράδην, δι' ὧν ἐπιτετυχήκασιν ἔνιοι χρηματίζό-
 8 μενοι, δεῖ συλλέγειν· πάντα γὰρ ὠφέλιμα ταῦτ' ἐστὶ τοῖς 5
 τιμῶσι τὴν χρηματιστικήν, οἶον καὶ τὸ Θάλεω τοῦ Μιλησίου
 τοῦτο γάρ ἐστι κατανόημά τι χρηματιστικόν, ἀλλ' ἐκείνῳ

μὲν διὰ τὴν σοφίαν προσάπτουσι, τυγχάνει δὲ καθόλου τι
 ὄν. ὀνειδίζοντων γὰρ αὐτῷ διὰ τὴν πενίαν ὡς ἀνωφελοῦς 9
 10 τῆς φιλοσοφίας οὐσης, κατανοήσαντά φασιν αὐτὸν ἐλαιῶν
 φορὰν ἐσομένην ἐκ τῆς ἀστρολογίας, ἔτι χειμῶνος ὄντος
 εὐπορήσαντα χρημάτων ὀλίγων ἀρραβῶνας διαδοῦναι τῶν
 ἐλαιουργείων τῶν τ' ἐν Μιλήτῳ καὶ Χίῳ πάντων, ὀλίγου μι-
 σθωσάμενον αὐτ' οὐδενὸς ἐπιβάλλοντος· ἐπειδὴ δ' ὁ καιρὸς ἦκε,
 15 πολλῶν ζητουμένων ἅμα καὶ ἐξαίφνης, ἐκμισθοῦντα δὲν τρόπον
 ἡβούλετο, πολλὰ χρήματα συλλέξαντα ἐπιδειῖξαι ὅτι ῥαδίῳ
 ἐστὶ πλουτεῖν τοῖς φιλοσόφοις, ἂν βούλωνται, ἀλλ' οὐ τοῦτ'
 ἐστὶ περὶ ὃ σπουδάζουσιν. Θαλῆς μὲν οὖν λέγεται τοῦτον 10
 τὸν τρόπον ἐπιδείξιν ποιήσασθαι τῆς σοφίας· ἐστὶ δ', ὥσπερ
 20 εἵπομεν, καθόλου τὸ τοιοῦτον χρηματιστικόν, ἐάν τις δύνηται
 μονοπωλίαν αὐτῷ κατασκευάζειν. διὸ καὶ τῶν πόλεων ἔναι
 τοῦτον ποιοῦνται τὸν πόρον, ὅταν ἀπορῶσι χρημάτων· μονο-
 πωλίαν γὰρ τῶν ὀνίων ποιοῦσιν. ἐν Σικελίᾳ δέ τις τεθέντος 11
 παρ' αὐτῷ νομίσματος συνεπρίατο πάντα τὸν σίδηρον ἐκ
 25 τῶν σιδηρείων, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα ὡς ἀφίκοντο ἐκ τῶν ἐμπο-
 ρίων οἱ ἔμποροι, ἐπώλει μόνος, οὐ πολλὴν ποιήσας ὑπερβο-
 λὴν τῆς τιμῆς· ἀλλ' ὅμως ἐπὶ τοῖς πεντήκοντα ταλάντοις
 ἐπέλαβεν ἑκατόν. τοῦτον μὲν οὖν ὁ Διονύσιος αἰσθόμενος τὰ 12
 μὲν χρήματα ἐκέλευσεν ἐκκομίσασθαι, μὴ μέντοι γε ἔτι
 30 μένειν ἐν Συρακούσαις, ὡς πόρους εὐρίσκοντα τοῖς αὐτοῦ
 πράγμασιν ἀσυμφόρους· τὸ μέντοι ὄραμα Θάλεω καὶ τοῦτο
 ταῦτόν ἐστιν· ἀμφότεροι γὰρ ἑαυτοῖς ἐτέχνασαν γενέσθαι
 μονοπωλίαν. χρήσιμον δὲ γνωρίζειν ταῦτα καὶ τοῖς πολι- 13
 τικοῖς· πολλαῖς γὰρ πόλεσι δεῖ χρηματισμοῦ καὶ τοιούτων
 35 πόρων, ὥσπερ οἰκίᾳ, μᾶλλον δέ. διόπερ τινὲς καὶ πολι-
 τεύονται τῶν πολιτευομένων ταῦτα μόνον.
 12 Ἐπεὶ δὲ τρία μέρη τῆς οἰκονομικῆς ἦν, ἓν μὲν δε-
 σποτική, περὶ ἧς εἴρηται πρότερον, ἓν δὲ πατρική, τρίτον δὲ
 γαμική· καὶ γὰρ γυναικὸς ἀρχεῖν καὶ τέκνων, ὡς ἐλευθέ-
 40 ρων μὲν ἀμφοῖν, οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον τῆς ἀρχῆς, ἀλλὰ

γυναικὸς μὲν πολιτικῶς, τέκνων δὲ βασιλικῶς τό τε γὰρ 1259 b
 ἄρρεν φύσει τοῦ θήλεος ἡγεμονικώτερον, εἰ μὴ που συνέ-
 στηκε παρὰ φύσιν, καὶ τὸ πρεσβύτερον καὶ τέλειον τοῦ νεω-
 2 τέρου καὶ ἀτελοῦς. ἐν μὲν οὖν ταῖς πολιτικαῖς ἀρχαῖς ταῖς
 πλείσταις μεταβάλλει τὸ ἄρχον καὶ τὸ ἀρχόμενον (ἐξ ἴσου 5
 γὰρ εἶναι βούλεται τὴν φύσιν καὶ διαφέρειν μηδέν), ὁμοῦ
 δέ, ὅταν τὸ μὲν ἀρχῇ τὸ δὲ ἀρχῇται, ζητεῖ διαφορὰν εἶναι
 καὶ σχήμασι καὶ λόγοις καὶ τιμαῖς, ὥσπερ καὶ Ἀμασις
 3 εἶπε τὸν περὶ τοῦ ποδανιπτήρος λόγον· τὸ δ' ἄρρεν αἰεὶ πρὸς
 τὸ θήλυ τοῦτον ἔχει τὸν τρόπον. ἡ δὲ τῶν τέκνων ἀρχὴ 10
 βασιλική· τὸ γὰρ γεννήσαν καὶ κατὰ φιλίαν ἄρχον καὶ
 κατὰ πρεσβείαν ἐστίν, ὅπερ ἐστὶ βασιλικῆς εἰδος ἀρχῆς. διὸ
 καλῶς Ὅμηρος τὸν Δία προσηγόρευσεν εἰπὼν “πατὴρ ἄν-
 δρῶν τε θεῶν τε,” τὸν βασιλέα τούτων ἀπάντων. φύσει γὰρ
 τὸν βασιλέα διαφέρειν μὲν δεῖ, τῷ γένει δ' εἶναι τὸν αὐτόν 15
 ὅπερ πέπονθε τὸ πρεσβύτερον πρὸς τὸ νεώτερον καὶ ὁ γεν-
 νήσας πρὸς τὸ τέκνον.

Φανερόν τοίνυν ὅτι πλείων ἡ σπουδὴ τῆς οἰκονομίας 13
 περὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἢ περὶ τὴν τῶν ἀψύχων κτῆσιν, καὶ
 περὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν τούτων ἢ περὶ τὴν τῆς κτήσεως, ὃν καλοῦμεν 20
 2 πλοῦτον, καὶ τῶν ἐλευθέρων μᾶλλον ἢ δούλων. πρῶτον μὲν
 οὖν περὶ δούλων ἀπορήσειεν ἂν τις, πότερόν ἐστιν ἀρετὴ τις
 δούλου παρὰ τὰς ὀργανικὰς καὶ διακονικὰς ἄλλη τιμιωτέρα
 τούτων, οἶον· σωφροσύνη καὶ ἀνδρία καὶ δικαιοσύνη καὶ τῶν
 ἄλλων τῶν τοιούτων ἕξεων, ἣ οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδεμία παρὰ τὰς 25
 3 σωματικὰς ὑπηρεσίας. ἔχει γὰρ ἀπορίαν ἀμφοτέρως· εἴτε
 γὰρ ἔστι, τί διοίσουσι τῶν ἐλευθέρων; εἴτε μὴ ἔστιν, ὄντων
 ἀνθρώπων καὶ λόγου κοινωνούντων ἄτοπον. σχεδὸν δὲ
 ταυτόν ἐστι τὸ ζητούμενον καὶ περὶ γυναικὸς καὶ παιδός,
 πότερα καὶ τούτων εἰσὶν ἀρεταί, καὶ δεῖ τὴν γυναῖκα εἶναι 30
 σώφρονα καὶ ἀνδρείαν καὶ δικαίαν, καὶ παῖς ἐστὶ καὶ ἀκό-
 4 λαστος καὶ σώφρων, ἢ οὐ; καὶ καθόλου δὴ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἐπισκε-
 πτέον περὶ ἀρχομένου φύσει καὶ ἀρχοντος, πότερον ἢ αὐτῇ

ἀρετὴ ἢ ἑτέρα. εἰ μὲν γὰρ δεῖ ἀμφοτέρους μετέχειν καλο-
 35 κάγαθίας, διὰ τί τὸν μὲν ἀρχειν δέοι ἂν τὸν δὲ ἀρχεσθαι
 καθάπαξ; οὐδὲ γὰρ τῷ μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον οἷόν τε διαφέ-
 ρειν· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀρχεσθαι καὶ ἀρχειν εἶδει διαφέρει, τὸ
 δὲ μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον οὐδέν· εἰ δὲ τὸν μὲν δεῖ τὸν δὲ μή, 5
 θαυμαστόν. εἴτε γὰρ ὁ ἀρχων μὴ ἔσται σῶφρων καὶ δί-
 40 καιος, πῶς ἀρξεί καλῶς; εἴθ' ὁ ἀρχόμενος, πῶς ἀρχθή-
 1260 a σεται καλῶς; ἀκόλαστος γὰρ ὢν καὶ δειλὸς οὐδὲν ποιήσει
 τῶν προσηκόντων. φανερόν τοίνυν ὅτι ἀνάγκη μὲν μετέχειν
 ἀμφοτέρους ἀρετῆς, ταύτης δ' εἶναι διαφοράς, ὥσπερ καὶ
 τῶν φύσει ἀρχομένων. καὶ τοῦτο εὐθὺς ὑφήγηται περὶ τὴν 6
 5 ψυχὴν· ἐν ταύτῃ γὰρ ἔστι φύσει τὸ μὲν ἀρχον τὸ δ'
 ἀρχόμενον, ὃν ἑτέραν φαμέν εἶναι ἀρετὴν, οἷον τοῦ λόγον
 ἔχοντος καὶ τοῦ ἀλόγου. δῆλον τοίνυν ὅτι τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον
 ἔχει καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, ὥστε φύσει τὰ πλείω ἀρχοντα
 καὶ ἀρχόμενα· ἄλλον γὰρ τρόπον τὸ ἐλεύθερον τοῦ δούλου 7
 10 ἀρχει καὶ τὸ ἄρρεν τοῦ θήλεος καὶ ἀνὴρ παιδός· καὶ πᾶσιν
 ἐνυπάρχει μὲν τὰ μόρια τῆς ψυχῆς, ἀλλ' ἐνυπάρχει δια-
 φερόντως· ὁ μὲν γὰρ δούλος ὅλως οὐκ ἔχει τὸ βουλευτικόν,
 τὸ δὲ θῆλυ ἔχει μὲν, ἀλλ' ἄκυρον, ὁ δὲ παῖς ἔχει μὲν,
 ἀλλ' ἀτελής. ὁμοίως τοίνυν ἀναγκαῖον ἔχειν καὶ περὶ τὰς 8
 15 ἠθικὰς ἀρετὰς ὑποληπτέον, δεῖν μὲν μετέχειν πάντας, ἀλλ'
 οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον, ἀλλ' ὅσον ἐκάστῳ πρὸς τὸ αὐτοῦ
 ἔργον. διὸ τὸν μὲν ἀρχοντα τελείαν ἔχειν δεῖ τὴν ἠθικὴν
 ἀρετὴν (τὸ γὰρ ἔργον ἐστὶν ἀπλῶς τοῦ ἀρχιτέκτονος, ὁ δὲ
 λόγος ἀρχιτέκτων), τῶν δ' ἄλλων ἕκαστον, ὅσον ἐπιβάλλει
 20 αὐτοῖς. ὥστε φανερόν ὅτι ἐστὶν ἠθικὴ ἀρετὴ τῶν εἰρημένων 9
 πάντων, καὶ οὐχ ἡ αὐτὴ σωφροσύνη γυναικὸς καὶ ἀνδρός,
 οὐδ' ἀνδρία καὶ δικαιοσύνη, καθάπερ ᾤετο Σωκράτης, ἀλλ'
 ἡ μὲν ἀρχικὴ ἀνδρία, ἡ δ' ὑπηρετική. ὁμοίως δ' ἔχει καὶ
 περὶ τὰς ἄλλας. δῆλον δὲ τοῦτο καὶ κατὰ μέρος μᾶλλον 10
 25 ἐπισκοποῦσιν· καθόλου γὰρ οἱ λέγοντες ἐξαπατῶσιν ἑαυτούς,
 ὅτι τὸ εὖ ἔχειν τὴν ψυχὴν ἀρετὴ, τὸ ὀρθοπραγεῖν, ἢ τι

- τῶν τοιούτων· πολὺ γὰρ ἄμεινον λέγουσιν οἱ ἐξαριθμοῦντες
 11 τὰς ἀρετάς, ὥσπερ Γοργίας, τῶν οὕτως ὀρίζομένων. διὸ δέ, ὥσπερ ὁ ποιητὴς εἶρηκε περὶ γυναικὸς, οὕτω νομίζειν ἔχειν περὶ πάντων, “γυναικὶ κόσμον ἢ σιγὴ φέρει,” ἀλλ’ ἀνδρὶ 30 οὐκέτι τοῦτο. ἐπεὶ δ’ ὁ παῖς ἀτελής, δῆλον ὅτι τούτου μὲν καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ οὐκ αὐτοῦ πρὸς αὐτόν ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ τέλος
 12 καὶ τὸν ἡγούμενον. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ δούλου πρὸς δεσπότην. ἔθε- μὲν δὲ πρὸς τὰναγκαῖα χρήσιμον εἶναι τὸν δούλον, ὥστε δῆ- λον ὅτι καὶ ἀρετῆς δεῖται μικρᾶς, καὶ τοσαύτης ὅπως μήτε 35 δι’ ἀκολασίαν μήτε διὰ δειλίαν ἐλλείψῃ τῶν ἔργων. ἀπο- ρήσειε δ’ ἂν τις, τὸ νῦν εἰρημένον εἰ ἀληθές, ἄρα καὶ τοὺς τεχνίτας δεήσει ἔχειν ἀρετὴν· πολλάκις γὰρ δι’ ἀκολασίαν
 13 ἐλλείπουσι τῶν ἔργων. ἡ διαφέρει τοῦτο πλεῖστον; ὁ μὲν γὰρ δούλος κοινωνὸς ζωῆς, ὁ δὲ πορρώτερον, καὶ τοσοῦτον ἐπι- 40 βάλλει ἀρετῆς ὅσον περ καὶ δουλείας· ὁ γὰρ βάνανσος τεχ- νίτης ἀφωρισμένην τινὰ ἔχει δουλείαν· καὶ ὁ μὲν δούλος 1260 b τῶν φύσει, σκυτοτόμος δ’ οὐδεὶς, οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνιτῶν.
 14 φανερόν τοίνυν ὅτι τῆς τοιαύτης ἀρετῆς αἴτιον εἶναι δεῖ τῷ δούλῳ τὸν δεσπότην, ἀλλ’ οὐ τὴν διδασκαλικὴν ἔχοντα τῶν ἔργων δεσποτικὴν. διὸ λέγουσιν οὐ καλῶς οἱ λόγου τοὺς δού- 5 λους ἀποστεροῦντες καὶ φάσκοντες ἐπιτάξει χρῆσθαι μόνον· νοουθετητέον γὰρ μᾶλλον τοὺς δούλους ἢ τοὺς παῖδας.
 15 Ἄλλα περὶ μὲν τούτων διωρίσθω τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον· περὶ δ’ ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυναικὸς καὶ τέκνων καὶ πατρὸς, τῆς τε περὶ ἕκαστον αὐτῶν ἀρετῆς καὶ τῆς πρὸς σφᾶς αὐτοὺς ὁμιλίας, 10 τί τὸ καλῶς καὶ μὴ καλῶς ἐστί, καὶ πῶς δεῖ τὸ μὲν εὖ διώ- κειν τὸ δὲ κακῶς φεύγειν, ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὰς πολιτείας ἀναγ- καῖον ἐπελθεῖν· ἐπεὶ γὰρ οἰκία μὲν πᾶσα μέρος πόλεως, ταῦτα δ’ οἰκίας, τὴν δὲ τοῦ μέρους πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ὅλου δεῖ βλέ- πειν ἀρετὴν, ἀναγκαῖον πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν βλέποντας παι- 15 δεύειν καὶ τοὺς παῖδας καὶ τὰς γυναῖκας, εἴπερ τι διαφέρει πρὸς τὸ τὴν πόλιν εἶναι σπουδαίαν καὶ τοὺς παῖδας εἶναι σπουδαίους
 16 καὶ τὰς γυναῖκας σπουδαίας. ἀναγκαῖον δὲ διαφέρειν· αἱ μὲν

γὰρ γυναῖκες ἡμισυ μέρος τῶν ἐλευθέρων, ἐκ δὲ τῶν παίδων οἱ
 20 κοινωνοὶ γίνονται τῆς πολιτείας. ὥστ' ἐπεὶ περὶ μὲν τούτων
 διάρρισταί, περὶ δὲ τῶν λοιπῶν ἐν ἄλλοις λεκτέον, ἀφέντες ὡς
 τέλος ἔχοντας τοὺς νῦν λόγους, ἄλλην ἀρχὴν ποιησάμενοι
 λέγωμεν, καὶ πρῶτον ἐπισκεψώμεθα περὶ τῶν ἀποφνημαζένων
 περὶ τῆς πολιτείας τῆς ἀρίστης.

25

Β'.

Ἐπεὶ δὲ προαιρούμεθα θεωρῆσαι περὶ τῆς κοινωνίας τῆς
 πολιτικῆς, τίς κρατίστη πασῶν τοῖς δυναμένοις ζῆν ὅτι μάλι-
 στα κατ' εὐχὴν, δεῖ καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἐπισκέψασθαι πολι-
 30 τείας, αἷς τε χρώνται τινες τῶν πόλεων τῶν εὐνομείσθαι
 λεγομένων, κὰν εἴ τινες ἕτεραι † τυγχάνωσιν† ὑπὸ τινῶν εἰρη-
 μέναι καὶ δοκοῦσαι καλῶς ἔχειν, ἵνα τό τ' ὀρθῶς ἔχον ὀφθῇ
 καὶ τὸ χρήσιμον, ἔτι δὲ τὸ ζητεῖν τι παρ' αὐτὰς ἕτερον μὴ
 δοκῇ πάντως εἶναι σοφίζεσθαι βουλομένων, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ μὴ
 35 καλῶς ἔχειν ταύτας τὰς νῦν ὑπαρχούσας, διὰ τοῦτο ταύτην
 δοκῶμεν ἐπιβαλέσθαι τὴν μέθοδον. ἀρχὴν δὲ πρῶτον ποιη- 2
 τέον ἥπερ πέφυκεν ἀρχὴ ταύτης τῆς σκέψεως. ἀνάγκη
 γὰρ ἦτοι πάντας πάντων κοινωνεῖν τοὺς πολίτας, ἢ μηδενός,
 ἢ τινῶν μὲν τινῶν δὲ μή. τὸ μὲν οὖν μηδενὸς κοινωνεῖν φα-
 40 νερὸν ὡς ἀδύνατον· ἢ γὰρ πολιτεία κοινωνία τίς ἐστι, καὶ
 πρῶτον ἀνάγκη τοῦ τύπου κοινωνεῖν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ τύπος εἰς ὃ τῆς
 1261 α μιᾶς πόλεως, οἱ δὲ πολῖται κοινωνοὶ τῆς μιᾶς πόλεως·
 ἀλλὰ πότερον ὅσων ἐνδέχεται κοινωνῆσαι, πάντων βέλτιον 3
 κοινωνεῖν τὴν μέλλουσαν οἰκήσεσθαι πόλιν καλῶς, ἢ τινῶν
 μὲν τινῶν δὲ οὐ βέλτιον; ἐνδέχεται γὰρ καὶ τέκνων καὶ γυ-
 5 ναικῶν καὶ κτημάτων κοινωνεῖν τοὺς πολίτας ἀλλήλοις, ὥσ-
 περ ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ τῇ Πλάτωνος· ἐκεῖ γὰρ ὁ Σωκράτης
 φησὶ δεῖν κοινὰ τὰ τέκνα καὶ τὰς γυναῖκας εἶναι καὶ τὰς
 κτήσεις. τοῦτο δὲ πότερον ὡς νῦν οὕτω βέλτιον ἔχειν, ἢ κατὰ
 2 τὸν ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ γεγραμμένον νόμον; ἔχει δὲ δυσχερείας

ἄλλας τε πολλὰς τὸ πάντων εἶναι τὰς γυναῖκας κοινάς, 10
 καὶ δι' ἣν αἰτίαν φησὶ δεῖν νενομοθετῆσθαι τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον
 ὁ Σωκράτης, οὐ φαίνεται συμβαῖνον ἐκ τῶν λόγων· ἔτι δὲ
 πρὸς τὸ τέλος ὃ φησι τῇ πόλει δεῖν ὑπάρχειν, ὥς μὲν εἴρη-
 2 ται νῦν, ἀδύνατον, πῶς δὲ δεῖ διελεῖν, οὐδὲν διώρισται. λέγω
 δὲ τὸ μίαν εἶναι τὴν πόλιν ὥς ἄριστον ὃν ὅτι μάλιστα πᾶσαν 15
 λαμβάνει γὰρ ταύτην ὑπόθεσιν ὁ Σωκράτης. καίτοι φανε-
 ρόν ἐστιν ὥς προϊούσα καὶ γινομένη μία μᾶλλον οὐδὲ πόλις
 ἔσται· πλῆθος γάρ τι τὴν φύσιν ἐστὶν ἢ πόλις, γινομένη τε
 μία μᾶλλον οἰκία μὲν ἐκ πόλεως, ἄνθρωπος δ' ἐξ οἰκίας
 ἔσται· μᾶλλον γὰρ μίαν τὴν οἰκίαν τῆς πόλεως φαίμεν ἂν, 20
 καὶ τὸν ἓνα τῆς οἰκίας· ὥστ' εἰ καὶ δυνατὸς τις εἴη τοῦτο
 3 δρᾶν, οὐ ποιητέον· ἀναιρήσει γὰρ τὴν πόλιν. οὐ μόνον δ' ἐκ
 πλείονων ἀνθρώπων ἐστὶν ἢ πόλις, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐξ εἶδει δια-
 φερόντων· οὐ γὰρ γίνεται πόλις ἐξ ὁμοίων. ἕτερον γὰρ συμ-
 μαχία καὶ πόλις· τὸ μὲν γὰρ τῷ ποσῷ χρησίμον, ἂν ἦ 25
 τὸ αὐτὸ τῷ εἶδει (βοηθείας γὰρ χάριν ἢ συμμαχία πέφυ-
 κε), ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ σταθμὸς πλείων † ἐλκύσῃ†· διοίσει δὲ τῷ
 τοιοῦτῳ καὶ πόλις ἔθνους, ὅταν μὴ κατὰ κώμας ὥσι κεχωρι-
 σμένοι τὸ πλῆθος, ἀλλ' οἷον Ἀρκάδες· ἐξ ὧν δὲ δεῖ ἐν
 4 γενέσθαι, εἶδει διαφέρει. διόπερ τὸ ἴσον τὸ ἀντιπεπονθὸς 30
 σώζει τὰς πόλεις, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς ἠθικοῖς εἴρηται πρότερον·
 ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐλευθέροις καὶ ἴσοις ἀνάγκη τοῦτ' εἶναι· ἅμα
 γὰρ οὐχ οἶόν τε πάντας ἄρχειν, ἀλλ' ἢ κατ' ἐνιαυτὸν ἢ
 5 κατὰ τινα ἄλλην τάξιν ἢ χρόνον. καὶ συμβαίνει δὴ τὸν
 τρόπον τοῦτον ὥστε πάντας ἄρχειν, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ μετέβαλλον 35
 οἱ σκυτεῖς καὶ οἱ τέκτονες καὶ μὴ οἱ αὐτοὶ αἰεὶ σκυτοτόμοι
 6 καὶ τέκτονες ἦσαν. ἐπεὶ δὲ βέλτιον οὕτως ἔχειν καὶ τὰ περὶ
 τὴν κοινωνίαν τὴν πολιτικὴν, δῆλον ὥς τοὺς αὐτοὺς αἰεὶ βέλ-
 τιον ἄρχειν, εἰ δυνατόν· ἐν οἷς δὲ μὴ δυνατόν διὰ τὸ τὴν
 φύσιν ἴσους εἶναι πάντας, ἅμα δὲ καὶ δίκαιον, εἴτ' ἀγαθὸν 1261 b
 εἴτε φαῦλον τὸ ἄρχειν, πάντας αὐτοῦ μετέχειν, † τοῦτο δὲ
 μιμεῖται τὸ ἐν μέρει τοὺς ἴσους εἴκειν τὸ δ' ὡς ὁμοίους εἶναι ἐξ

ἀρχῆς †· οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἄρχουσιν οἱ δ' ἄρχονται κατὰ μέρος, 7
 5 ὥσπερ ἂν ἄλλοι γενόμενοι· καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν δὴ τρόπον ἀρχόντων
 ἕτεροι ἐτέρας ἄρχουσιν ἀρχάς· φανερόν τοίνυν ἐκ τούτων ὡς
 οὔτε πέφυκε μίαν οὕτως εἶναι τὴν πόλιν ὥσπερ λέγουσί τινες,
 καὶ τὸ λεχθὲν ὡς μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ὅτι τὰς
 πόλεις ἀναιρεῖ· καίτοι τό γε ἐκάστου ἀγαθὸν σώζει ἕκαστον.
 10 ἔστι δὲ καὶ κατ' ἄλλον τρόπον φανερόν ὅτι τὸ λίαν ἐνόον ζῆ- 8
 τεῖν τὴν πόλιν οὐκ ἔστιν ἀμεινον· οἰκία μὲν γὰρ αὐταρκέστε-
 ρον ἐνός, πόλις δ' οἰκίας· καὶ βούλεται γ' ἤδη τότ' εἶναι πό-
 λιν, ὅταν αὐτάρκη συμβαίῃ τὴν κοινωνίαν εἶναι τοῦ πλήθους.
 εἴπερ οὖν αἰρετώτερον τὸ αὐταρκέστερον, καὶ τὸ ἦττον ἐν τοῦ
 15 μᾶλλον αἰρετώτερον.
 3 Ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' εἰ τοῦτο ἀριστόν ἐστι, τὸ μίαν ὅτι μά-
 λιστ' εἶναι τὴν κοινωνίαν, οὐδὲ τοῦτο ἀποδείκνυσθαι φαίνεται
 κατὰ τὸν λόγον, ἐὰν πάντες ἅμα λέγωσι τὸ ἐμὸν καὶ τὸ μὴ
 ἐμόν· τοῦτο γὰρ οἶεται ὁ Σωκράτης σημεῖον εἶναι τοῦ τὴν
 20 πόλιν τελέως εἶναι μίαν· τὸ γὰρ πάντες διττόν· εἰ μὲν οὖν 2
 ὡς ἕκαστος, τάχ' ἂν εἴη μᾶλλον ὁ βούλεται ποιεῖν ὁ Σω-
 κράτης, ἕκαστος γὰρ υἷὸν ἑαυτοῦ φήσει τὸν αὐτὸν καὶ γυ-
 ναῖκα δὴ τὴν αὐτήν, καὶ περὶ τῆς οὐσίας καὶ περὶ ἐκάστου
 δὴ τῶν συμβαινόντων ὡσαύτως· νῦν δ' οὐχ οὕτω φήσουσιν οἱ
 25 κοιναῖς χρώμενοι ταῖς γυναῖξιν καὶ τοῖς τέκνοις, ἀλλὰ πάν-
 τες μὲν, οὐχ ὡς ἕκαστος δ' αὐτῶν· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν 3
 πάντες μὲν, οὐχ ὡς ἕκαστος δ' αὐτῶν· ὅτι μὲν τοίνυν παρα-
 λογισμός τις ἐστι τὸ λέγειν πάντας, φανερόν· τὸ γὰρ πάν-
 τες καὶ ἀμφοτέρω καὶ περιττὰ καὶ ἄρτια διὰ τὸ διττὸν καὶ
 30 ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἐριστικούς ποιεῖ συλλογισμούς· διὸ ἐστὶ τὸ πάν-
 τας τὸ αὐτὸ λέγειν ὧδὲ μὲν καλόν, ἀλλ' οὐ δυνατόν, ὧδὲ δ'
 οὐδὲν ὁμονοητικόν· πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἐτέραν ἔχει βλάβην τὸ 4
 λέγόμενον· ἥκιστα γὰρ ἐπιμελείας τυγχάνει τὸ πλείστων
 κοινόν· τῶν γὰρ ἰδίῳ μάλιστα φροντίζουσιν, τῶν δὲ κοινῶν
 35 ἦττον, ἢ ὅσον ἐκάστῳ ἐπιβάλλει· πρὸς γὰρ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὡς
 ἐτέρου φροντίζοντος ὀλιγωροῦσι μᾶλλον, ὥσπερ ἐν ταῖς οἰκε-

τικαῖς διακονίαις οἱ πολλοὶ θεράποντες ἐνίοτε χεῖρον ὑπηρε-
 5 τοῦσι τῶν ἐλαττόνων. γίνονται δ' ἐκάστῳ χίλιοι τῶν πολιτῶν
 υἱοί, καὶ οὗτοι οὐχ ὥς ἐκάστου, ἀλλὰ τοῦ τυχόντος ὁ τυχὼν
 ὁμοίως ἐστὶν υἱός· ὥστε πάντες ὁμοίως ὀλιγωρήσουσιν. ἔτι 1262 a
 οὕτως ἕκαστος ἐμὸς λέγει τὸν εὖ πράττοντα τῶν πολιτῶν ἢ
 κακῶς, ὁπόστος τυγχάνει τὸν ἀριθμόν, οἷον ἐμὸς ἢ τοῦ δεινός,
 τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον λέγων καθ' ἕκαστον τῶν χιλίων, ἢ ὅσων
 ἢ πόλις ἐστί, καὶ τοῦτο διστάζων· ἀδελφὸν γὰρ ᾧ συνέβη γενέ- 5
 6 σθαι τέκνον καὶ σωθῆναι γενόμενον. καίτοι πότερον οὕτω
 κρεῖττον τὸ ἐμὸν λέγειν ἕκαστον τὸ αὐτὸ μὲν προσαγορεύον-
 τας δισχιλίων καὶ μυρίων, ἢ μᾶλλον ὥς νῦν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι
 7 τὸ ἐμὸν λέγουσιν; ὁ μὲν γὰρ υἷδν αὐτοῦ ὁ δ' ἀδελφὸν αὐτοῦ
 προσαγορεύει τὸν αὐτόν, ὁ δ' ἀνεψιόν, ἢ κατ' ἄλλην τινα 10
 συγγένειαν, ἢ πρὸς αἵματος, ἢ κατ' οἰκειότητα καὶ κηδεῖαν
 αὐτοῦ πρῶτον ἢ τῶν αὐτοῦ, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἕτερον φράτορα
 φυλέτην· κρεῖττον γὰρ ἴδιον ἀνεψιὸν εἶναι ἢ τὸν τρόπον τοῦ-
 8 τον υἱόν. οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' οὐδὲ διαφυγεῖν δυνατόν τὸ μή τινας
 ὑπολαμβάνειν ἑαυτῶν ἀδελφούς τε καὶ παῖδας καὶ πατέρας 15
 καὶ μητέρας· κατὰ γὰρ τὰς ὁμοιότητας αἱ γίνονται τοῖς
 τέκνοις πρὸς τοὺς γεννήσαντας, ἀναγκαῖον λαμβάνειν περὶ
 9 ἀλλήλων τὰς πίστεις. ὅπερ φασὶ καὶ συμβαίνειν τινὲς τῶν
 τὰς τῆς γῆς περιόδους πραγματευομένων· εἶναι γάρ τισι
 τῶν ἄνω Διβύων κοινὰς τὰς γυναῖκας, τὰ μέντοι γενόμενα 20
 τέκνα διαιρεῖσθαι κατὰ τὰς ὁμοιότητας. εἰσὶ δὲ τινες καὶ
 γυναῖκες καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζώων, οἷον ἵπποι καὶ βόες, αἱ
 σφόδρα πεφύκασιν ὅμοια ἀποδιδόναι τὰ τέκνα τοῖς γονευ-
 σιν, ὥσπερ ἡ ἐν Φαρσάλῳ κληθεῖσα Δικαία ἵππος. ἔτι δὲ 4
 καὶ τὰς τοιαύτας δυσχερείας οὐ ῥάδιον εὐλαβηθῆναι τοῖς 25
 ταύτην κατασκευάζουσι τὴν κοινωνίαν, οἷον αἰκίας καὶ φόβους
 ἀκουσίους, τοὺς δὲ ἐκούσιους, καὶ μάχας καὶ λοιδορίας· ὧν
 οὐδὲν ὁσιόν ἐστι γίνεσθαι πρὸς πατέρας καὶ μητέρας καὶ τοὺς
 μὴ πόρρω τῆς συγγενείας ὄντας, ὥσπερ πρὸς τοὺς ἀποθεν·
 ἀλλὰ καὶ πλείον συμβαίνειν ἀναγκαῖον ἀγνοούντων ἢ γνω- 30

ριζόντων, καὶ γενομένων τῶν μὲν γνωρίζοντων ἐνδέχεται τὰς
 νομιζόμενας γίνεσθαι λύσεις, τῶν δὲ μηδεμίαν. ἄτοπον δὲ 2
 καὶ τὸ κοινὸς ποιήσαντα τοὺς υἱοὺς τὸ συνεῖναι μόνον ἀφε-
 λεῖν τῶν ἐρώντων, τὸ δ' ἐρᾶν μὴ κωλύσαι, μηδὲ τὰς χρή-
 35 σεις τὰς ἄλλας, ἃς πατρὶ πρὸς υἷον εἶναι πάντων ἐστὶν
 ἀπρεπέστατον καὶ ἀδελφῶ πρὸς ἀδελφόν, ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ ἐρᾶν
 μόνον. ἄτοπον δὲ καὶ τὸ τὴν συνουσίαν ἀφελεῖν δι' ἄλλην 3
 μὲν αἰτίαν μηδεμίαν, ὥς λίαν δὲ ἰσχυρᾶς τῆς ἡδονῆς γινο-
 μένης· ὅτι δ' ὁ μὲν πατὴρ ἢ υἱός, οἱ δ' ἀδελφοὶ ἀλλήλων,
 40 μὴδὲν οἶσθαι διαφέρειν. ἔοικε δὲ μᾶλλον τοῖς γεωργοῖς 4
 εἶναι χρήσιμον τὸ κοινὰς εἶναι τὰς γυναῖκας καὶ τοὺς παῖ-
 1262 b δας ἢ τοῖς φύλαξιν· ἦττον γὰρ ἔσται φιλία κοινῶν ὄντων
 τῶν τέκνων καὶ τῶν γυναικῶν, δεῖ δὲ τοιούτους εἶναι τοὺς ἀρ-
 χομένους πρὸς τὸ πειθαρχεῖν καὶ μὴ νεωτερίζειν. ὅλως δὲ 5
 συμβαίνειν ἀνάγκη τοῦναντίον διὰ τὸν τοιοῦτον νόμον ὃν
 5 προσήκει τοὺς ὁρθῶς κειμένους νόμους αἰτίους γίνεσθαι, καὶ
 δι' ἣν αἰτίαν ὁ Σωκράτης οὕτως οἶεται δεῖν τάττειν τὰ περὶ
 τὰ τέκνα καὶ τὰς γυναῖκας· φιλίαν τε γὰρ οἶόμεθα μέγιστον 6
 εἶναι τῶν ἀγαθῶν ταῖς πόλεσιν (οὕτω γὰρ ἂν ἦκιστα στασιάζ-
 ζοιεν), καὶ τὸ μίαν εἶναι τὴν πόλιν ἐπαινεῖ μάλιστα ὁ Σω-
 10 κράτης· ὃ καὶ δοκεῖ κάκεῖνος εἶναί φησι τῆς φιλίας ἔργον,
 καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς ἐρωτικοῖς λόγοις ἴσμεν λέγοντα τὸν Ἀρι-
 στοφάνην ὡς τῶν ἐρώντων διὰ τὸ σφόδρα φιλεῖν ἐπιθυμούν-
 των συμφυῆναι καὶ γενέσθαι ἐκ δύο ὄντων ἀμφοτέρους ἕνα.
 ἐνταῦθα μὲν οὖν ἀνάγκη ἀμφοτέρους ἐφθάρθαι ἢ τὸν ἕνα· ἐν 7
 15 δὲ τῇ πόλει τὴν φιλίαν ἀναγκαῖον ὑδαρῇ γίνεσθαι διὰ τὴν
 κοινωνίαν τὴν τοιαύτην, καὶ ἦκιστα λέγειν τὸν ἐμὸν ἢ υἷον
 πατέρα ἢ πατέρα υἷον. ὥσπερ γὰρ μικρὸν γλυκὺ εἰς πολὺ 8
 ὕδωρ μυχθὲν ἀναίσθητον ποιεῖ τὴν κρᾶσιν, οὕτω συμβαίνει
 καὶ τὴν οἰκειότητα τὴν πρὸς ἀλλήλους τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν ὀνομά-
 20 των τούτων, διαφροντίζειν ἦκιστα ἀναγκαῖον ὃν ἐν τῇ πολι-
 τεῖᾳ τῇ τοιαύτῃ, ἢ πατέρα ὡς υἱῶν ἢ υἷον ὡς πατρός, ἢ ὡς
 ἀδελφοὺς ἀλλήλων. δύο γὰρ ἐστὶν ἃ μάλιστα ποιεῖ κήδεσθαι 9

τοὺς ἀνθρώπους καὶ φιλεῖν, τό τε ἴδιον καὶ τὸ ἀγαπητόν· ὦν οὐδέτερον οἶόν τε ὑπάρχειν τοῖς οὕτω πολιτευομένοις. ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ περὶ τοῦ μεταφέρειν τὰ γινόμενα τέκνα, τὰ μὲν ἐκ 25 τῶν γεωργῶν καὶ τεχνιτῶν εἰς τοὺς φύλακας, τὰ δ' ἐκ τούτων εἰς ἐκείνους, πολλὴν ἔχει ταραχήν, τίνα ἔσται τρόπον καὶ γινώσκειν ἀναγκαῖον τοὺς διδόντας καὶ μεταφέροντας 10 τίσι τίνας διδάσιν. ἔτι δὲ καὶ τὰ πάλαι λεχθέντα μᾶλλον ἐπὶ τούτων ἀναγκαῖον συμβαίνειν, οἷον αἰκίας ἔρωτας φόρους· 30 οὐ γὰρ ἔτι προσαγορεύουσιν ἀδελφοὺς καὶ τέκνα καὶ πατέρας καὶ μητέρας τοὺς φύλακας οἳ τε εἰς τοὺς ἄλλους πολίτας δοθέντες καὶ πάλιν οἱ παρὰ τοῖς φύλαξι τοὺς ἄλλους πολίτας, ὥστε εὐλαβεῖσθαι τῶν τοιούτων τι πράττειν διὰ τὴν συγγένειαν. περὶ μὲν οὖν τῆς περὶ τὰ τέκνα καὶ τὰς 35 γυναῖκας κοινωνίας διωρίσθω τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον·

Ἐχόμενον δὲ τούτων ἐστὶν ἐπισκέψασθαι περὶ τῆς κτῆ- 5 σεως, τίνα τρόπον δεῖ κατασκευάζεσθαι τοῖς μέλλουσι πολιτεύεσθαι τὴν ἀρίστην πολιτείαν, πότερον κοινὴν ἢ μὴ κοινὴν 2 εἶναι τὴν κτήσιν. τοῦτο δ' ἂν τις καὶ χωρὶς σκέψαιτο ἀπὸ 40 τῶν περὶ τὰ τέκνα καὶ τὰς γυναῖκας νενομοθετημένων, λέγω δὲ τὰ περὶ τὴν κτήσιν πότερον κἂν ἢ ἐκείνα χωρὶς, καθ' 1263 a ὃν νῦν τρόπον ἔχει πᾶσι, τὰς τε κτήσεις κοινὰς εἶναι βέλτιον καὶ τὰς χρήσεις, οἷον τὰ μὲν γῆπεδα χωρὶς, τοὺς δὲ καρποὺς εἰς τὸ κοινὸν φέροντας ἀναλίσκειν (ἔπερ ἔνια ποιεῖ τῶν ἐθνῶν), ἢ τούναντίον τὴν μὲν γῆν κοινὴν εἶναι καὶ γεωρ- 5 γεῖν κοινῇ, τοὺς δὲ καρποὺς διαιρεῖσθαι πρὸς τὰς ἰδίας χρήσεις (λέγονται δὲ τινες καὶ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον κοινωνεῖν τῶν 3 βαρβάρων), ἢ καὶ τὰ γῆπεδα καὶ τοὺς καρποὺς κοινούς. ἐτέρων μὲν οὖν ὄντων τῶν γεωργούντων ἄλλος ἂν εἴη τρόπος καὶ ῥᾶων, αὐτῶν δ' αὐτοῖς διαπονούτων τὰ περὶ τὰς κτήσεις 10 πλείους ἂν παρέχοι δυσκολίας· καὶ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς ἀπολαύσεσι καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις μὴ γινομένων ἴσων ἀναγκαῖον ἐγκλήματα γίνεσθαι πρὸς τοὺς ἀπολαύοντας μὲν [ἢ λαμβάνοντας] πολλά, ὀλίγα δὲ πονούντας, τοῖς ἐλάττω μὲν λαμβάνουσι,

15 πλείω δὲ πονοῦσιν. ὅλως δὲ τὸ συζῆν καὶ κοινωνεῖν τῶν ἀν- 4
 θρωπικῶν πάντων χαλεπὸν, καὶ μάλιστα τῶν τοιούτων.
 δηλοῦσι δ' αἱ τῶν συναποδήμων κοινωνίαι· σχεδὸν γὰρ οἱ
 πλείστοι διαφερόμενοι ἐκ τῶν ἐν ποσὶ καὶ ἐκ μικρῶν προσ-
 κρούοντες ἀλλήλοις. ἔτι δὲ τῶν θεραπόντων τούτοις μάλιστα
 20 προσκρούομεν, οἷς πλείστα προσχρώμεθα πρὸς τὰς διακονίας
 τὰς ἐγκυκλίουσ. τὸ μὲν οὖν κοινὰς εἶναι τὰς κτήσεις ταύτας 5
 τε καὶ ἄλλας τοιαύτας ἔχει δυσχερείας, ὃν δὲ νῦν τρόπον
 ἔχει καὶ ἐπικοσμηθὲν ἤθεσι καὶ τάξει νόμων ὀρθῶν, οὐ μι-
 κρὸν ἂν διενέγκαι· ἔξει γὰρ τὸ ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων ἀγαθόν·
 25 λέγω δὲ τὸ ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων τὸ ἐκ τοῦ κοινὰς εἶναι τὰς κτή-
 σεως καὶ τὸ ἐκ τοῦ ιδίας. δεῖ γὰρ πῶς μὲν εἶναι κοινὰς, ὅλως
 δ' ιδίας· αἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐπιμέλεια διηρημέναι τὰ ἐγκλήματα 6
 πρὸς ἀλλήλους οὐ ποιήσουσιν, μᾶλλον δὲ ἐπιδώσουσιν ὥς πρὸς
 ἴδιον ἐκάστου προσεδρεύοντος· δι' ἀρετὴν δ' ἔσται πρὸς τὸ χρή-
 30 σθαι κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν κοινὰ τὰ φίλων. ἔστι δὲ καὶ νῦν
 τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον ἐν ἐνίαις πόλεσιν οὕτως ὑπογεγραμμένον
 ὥς οὐκ ὃν ἀδύνατον, καὶ μάλιστα ἐν ταῖς καλῶς οἰκουμέναις
 τὰ μὲν ἔστι τὰ δὲ γένοιτ' ἂν· ιδίαν γὰρ ἕκαστος τὴν κτήσιν 7
 ἔχων τὰ μὲν χρήσιμα ποιεῖ τοῖς φίλοις, τοῖς δὲ χρήται
 35 κοινοῖς, οἷον καὶ ἐν Λακεδαίμονι τοῖς τε δούλοις χρῶνται
 τοῖς ἀλλήλων ὥς εἰπεῖν ἰδίους, ἔτι δ' ἵπποις καὶ κυσίν, κὰν
 δεσθῶσιν ἐφοδίων ἐν τοῖς ἀγροῖς κατὰ τὴν χώραν. φανερόν 8
 τοίνυν ὅτι βέλτιον εἶναι μὲν ιδίας τὰς κτήσεις, τῇ δὲ χρή-
 σει ποιεῖν κοινὰς· ὅπως δὲ γίνονται τοιοῦτοι, τοῦ νομοθέτου
 40 τοῦτ' ἔργον ἰδίον ἔστιν. ἔτι δὲ καὶ πρὸς ἡδονὴν ἀμύθητον ὅσον
 διαφέρει τὸ νομίζειν ἰδίον τι· μὴ γὰρ οὐ μάτην τὴν πρὸς
 1263 b αὐτὸν αὐτὸς ἔχει φιλίαν ἕκαστος, ἀλλ' ἔστι τοῦτο φυσικόν.
 τὸ δὲ φιλαυτον εἶναι ψέγεται δικαίως· οὐκ ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο τὸ 9
 φιλεῖν ἑαυτόν, ἀλλὰ τὸ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ φιλεῖν, καθάπερ
 καὶ τὸν φιλοχρήματον, ἐπεὶ φιλοῦσί γε πάντες ὥς εἰπεῖν
 5 ἕκαστον τῶν τοιούτων. ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τὸ χαρίσασθαι καὶ
 βοηθῆσαι φίλοις ἢ ξένοις ἢ ἐταίροις ἡδιστον· ὃ γίνεται τῆς

- 10 κτήσεως ἰδίας οὔσης. ταῦτά τε δὴ οὐ συμβαίνει τοῖς λίαν ἐν
 ποιούσι τὴν πόλιν, καὶ πρὸς τούτοις ἀναιροῦσιν ἔργα δυοῖν
 ἀρεταῖν φανερῶς, σωφροσύνης μὲν τὸ περὶ τὰς γυναῖκας
 (ἔργον γὰρ καλὸν ἀλλοτρίας οὔσης ἀπέχεσθαι διὰ σωφρο- 10
 σύνην), ἐλευθεριότητος δὲ τὸ περὶ τὰς κτήσεις· οὔτε γὰρ ἔσται
 φανερός ἐλευθέριος ὢν, οὔτε πράξει πρᾶξιν ἐλευθέριον οὔδε-
 μίαν· ἐν τῇ γὰρ χρήσει τῶν κτημάτων τὸ τῆς ἐλευθεριότη-
 τος ἔργον ἐστίν.
- 11 Εὐπρόσωπος μὲν οὖν ἡ τοιαύτη νομοθεσία καὶ φιλάν- 15
 θρωπος ἂν εἶναι δόξειεν· ὁ γὰρ ἀκροώμενος ἄσμενος ἀποδέ-
 χεται, νομίζων ἔσεσθαι φιλίαν τινὰ θαυμαστὴν πᾶσι πρὸς
 ἅπαντας, ἄλλως τε καὶ ὅταν κατηγορῇ τις τῶν νῦν ὑπαρ-
 χόντων ἐν ταῖς πολιτείαις κακῶν ὡς γινομένων διὰ τὸ μὴ
 κοινὴν εἶναι τὴν οὐσίαν, λέγω δὲ δίκας τε πρὸς ἀλλήλους 20
 περὶ συμβολαίων καὶ ψευδομαρτυριῶν κρίσεις καὶ πλουσιῶν
- 12 κολακείας· ὧν οὐδὲν γίνεται διὰ τὴν ἀκοινωνησίαν ἀλλὰ
 διὰ τὴν μοχθηρίαν, ἐπεὶ καὶ τοὺς κοινὰ κεκτημένους καὶ κοι-
 νωνούντας πολλῷ διαφορομένους μᾶλλον ὀρῶμεν ἢ τοὺς χωρὶς
 τὰς οὐσίας ἔχοντας· ἀλλὰ θεωροῦμεν ὀλίγους τοὺς ἐκ τῶν κοι- 25
 νωνιῶν διαφορομένους πρὸς πολλοὺς συμβάλλοντες τοὺς κεκτη-
- 13 μένους ἰδίᾳ τὰς κτήσεις. ἐτι δὲ δίκαιον μὴ μόνον λέγειν
 ὅσων στερήσονται κακῶν κοινωνήσαντες, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅσων
 ἀγαθῶν φαίνεται ὅτι εἶναι ἀάμπαν ἀδύνατος ὁ βίος. αἴτιον
 δὲ τῷ Σωκράτει τῆς παρακρούσεως χρή νομίζειν τὴν ὑπόθε- 30
- 14 σιν οὐκ οὔσαν ὀρθήν. δεῖ μὲν γὰρ εἶναι πως μίαν καὶ τὴν
 οἰκίαν καὶ τὴν πόλιν, ἀλλ' οὐ πάντως. ἔστι μὲν γὰρ ὡς οὐκ
 ἔσται προιοῦσα πόλις, ἔστι δ' ὡς ἔσται μὲν, ἐγγὺς δ' οὔσα
 τοῦ μὴ πόλις εἶναι χείρων πόλις, ὥσπερ κὰν εἴ τις τὴν
 συμφωνίαν ποιήσειεν ὁμοφωνίαν ἢ τὸν ρυθμὸν βάσιν μίαν. 35
- 15 ἀλλὰ δεῖ πλῆθος ὄν, ὥσπερ εἴρηται πρότερον, διὰ τὴν παι-
 δεῖαν κοινὴν καὶ μίαν ποιεῖν· καὶ τὸν γε μέλλοντα παιδεῖαν
 εἰσάγειν, καὶ νομίζοντα διὰ ταύτης ἔσεσθαι τὴν πόλιν σπου-
 δαίαν, ἄσπονον τοῖς τοιούτοις οἰεσθαι διορθοῦν, ἀλλὰ μὴ τοῖς

40 ἔθεσι καὶ τῇ φιλοσοφίᾳ καὶ τοῖς νόμοις, ὥσπερ τὰ περὶ
 τὰς κτήσεις ἐν Λακεδαιμόνι καὶ Κρήτῃ τοῖς συσσιτίοις ὁ
 1264 a νομοθέτης ἐκοίνωσεν. δεῖ δὲ μηδὲ τοῦτο αὐτὸ ἀγνοεῖν, ὅτι χρηὶ 16
 προσέχειν τῷ πολλῷ χρόνῳ καὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς ἔτεσιν, ἐν οἷς
 οὐκ ἂν ἔλαθεν εἰ ταῦτα καλῶς εἶχεν· πάντα γὰρ σχεδὸν
 εὔρηται μὲν, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν οὐ συνήκται, τοῖς δ' οὐ χρώνται
 5 γινώσκοντες. μάλιστα δ' ἂν γένοιτο φανερόν, εἴ τις τοῖς ἔρ- 17
 γοῖς ἴδοι τὴν τοιαύτην πολιτείαν κατασκευαζομένην· οὐ γὰρ
 δυνήσεται μὴ μερίζων αὐτὰ καὶ χωρίζων ποιῆσαι τὴν πό-
 λιν, τὰ μὲν εἰς συσσίτια, τὰ δὲ εἰς φρατρίδας καὶ φυλάς.
 ὥστε οὐδὲν ἄλλο συμβήσεται νενομοθετημένον πλὴν μὴ γεωρ-
 10 γεῖν τοὺς φύλακας· ὅπερ καὶ νῦν Λακεδαιμόνιοι ποιεῖν ἐπι-
 χειροῦσιν. οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ὁ τρόπος τῆς ὅλης πολιτείας τίς 18
 ἔσται τοῖς κοινωνοῦσιν, οὐτ' εἶρηκεν ὁ Σωκράτης οὔτε ῥάδιον
 εἰπεῖν. καίτοι σχεδὸν τό γε πλῆθος τῆς πόλεως τὸ τῶν ἄλ-
 λων πολιτῶν γίνεται πλῆθος, περὶ ὧν οὐδὲν διώριστα, πότε-
 15 ρον καὶ τοῖς γεωργοῖς κοινὰς εἶναι δεῖ τὰς κτήσεις ἢ καὶ
 καθ' ἕκαστον ιδίας, ἔτι δὲ καὶ γυναῖκας καὶ παῖδας ιδίους
 ἢ κοινούς. εἰ μὲν γὰρ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον κοινὰ πάντα πάν- 19
 των, τί διοίσουσιν οὗτοι ἐκείνων τῶν φυλάκων; ἢ τί πλείον
 τοῖς ὑπομένουσι τὴν ἀρχὴν αὐτῶν; ἢ τί μαθόντες ὑπομενοῦσι
 20 τὴν ἀρχήν, ἐὰν μὴ τι σοφίζωνται τοιοῦτον οἶον Κρήτες;
 ἐκείνοι γὰρ τᾶλλα ταῦτα τοῖς δούλοις ἐφέντες μόνον ἀπει-
 ρήκασιν τὰ γυμνάσια καὶ τὴν τῶν ὀπλῶν κτῆσιν. εἰ δέ, κα- 20
 θάπερ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις πόλεσιν, καὶ παρ' ἐκείνοις ἔσται τὰ
 τοιαῦτα, τίς ὁ τρόπος ἔσται τῆς κοινωνίας; ἐν μιᾷ γὰρ πό-
 25 λει δύο πόλεις ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι, καὶ ταύτας ὑπεναντίας
 ἀλλήλαις· ποιεῖ γὰρ τοὺς μὲν φύλακας οἷον φρουρούς, τοὺς δὲ
 γεωργοὺς καὶ τοὺς τεχνίτας καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους πολίτας. ἐγκλή- 21
 ματα δὲ καὶ δίκαι, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα ταῖς πόλεσιν ὑπάρχειν
 φησὶ κακά, πάνθ' ὑπάρξει καὶ τούτοις. καίτοι λέγει ὁ Σω-
 30 κράτης ὡς οὐ πολλῶν δεήσονται νομίμων διὰ τὴν παιδείαν,
 οἷον ἀστυνομικῶν καὶ ἀγορανομικῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν

22 τοιούτων, ἀποδιδούς μόνον τὴν παιδείαν τοῖς φύλαξιν. ἔτι δὲ
 κυρίου ποιεῖ τῶν κτημάτων τοὺς γεωργοὺς ἀποφορὰν φέρον-
 τας· ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον εἰκὸς εἶναι χαλεποὺς καὶ φρονη-
 μάτων πλήρεις ἢ τὰς παρ' ἐνίοις εἰλωτείας τε καὶ πενεστείας 35
 23 καὶ δουλείας. ἀλλὰ γὰρ εἴτ' ἀναγκαῖα ταῦθ' ὁμοίως εἶτε
 μή, νῦν γε οὐδὲν διώρισται, καὶ περὶ τῶν ἐχομένων, τίς ἡ
 τούτων τε πολιτεία καὶ παιδεία καὶ νόμοι τίνες. ἔστι δ' οὔτε
 εὐρεῖν ῥάδιον, οὔτε τὸ διαφέρειν μικρόν, τὸ ποιούς τινας εἶναι
 24 τούτους πρὸς τὸ σώζεσθαι τὴν τῶν φυλάκων κοινωνίαν. ἀλλὰ 40
 μὴν εἴ γε τὰς μὲν γυναῖκας ποιήσει κοινὰς τὰς δὲ κτήσεις 1264 b
 ἰδίας, τίς οἰκονομήσει ὥσπερ τὰ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀγρῶν οἱ ἄνδρες
 αὐτῶν, καὶ εἰ κοινὰ αἱ κτήσεις καὶ αἱ τῶν γεωργῶν γυ-
 ναῖκες; ἄσπονον δὲ καὶ τὸ ἐκ τῶν θηρίων ποιεῖσθαι τὴν πα-
 ραβολήν, ὅτι δεῖ τὰ αὐτὰ ἐπιτηδεύειν τὰς γυναῖκας τοῖς 5
 25 ἀνδράσιν, οἷς οἰκονομίας οὐδὲν μέτεστιν. ἐπισφαλές δὲ καὶ
 τοὺς ἄρχοντας ὥς καθίστησιν ὁ Σωκράτης· αἰεὶ γὰρ ποιεῖ τοὺς
 αὐτοὺς ἄρχοντας, τοῦτο δὲ στάσεως αἷτιον γίνεται καὶ παρὰ
 τοῖς μηδὲν ἀξίωμα κεκτημένοις, ἥπουθεν δὴ παρὰ γε θυ-
 26 μοειδέσι καὶ πολεμικοῖς ἀνδράσιν. ὅτι δ' ἀναγκαῖον αὐτῷ 10
 ποιεῖν τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἄρχοντας, φανερόν· οὐ γὰρ ὅτε μὲν ἄλλοις
 ὅτε δὲ ἄλλοις μέμικται ταῖς ψυχαῖς ὁ παρὰ τοῦ θεοῦ χρυ-
 σός, ἀλλ' αἰεὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς. φησὶ δὲ τοῖς μὲν εὐθύς γινομέ-
 νοις μίξαι χρυσόν, τοῖς δ' ἄργυρον, χαλκὸν δὲ καὶ σίδηρον
 27 τοῖς τεχνίταις μέλλουσιν ἔσεσθαι καὶ γεωργοῖς. ἔτι δὲ καὶ 15
 τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ἀφαιρούμενος τῶν φυλάκων, ὅλην φησὶ δεῖν
 εὐδαίμονα ποιεῖν τὴν πόλιν τὸν νομοθέτην. ἀδύνατον δὲ
 εὐδαιμονεῖν ὅλην, μὴ τῶν πλείστων ἢ μὴ πάντων μερῶν ἢ
 τινῶν ἐχόντων τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν. οὐ γὰρ τῶν αὐτῶν τὸ εὐδαι-
 μονεῖν ὥνπερ τὸ ἄρτιον· τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ ἐνδέχεται τῷ ὅλῳ 20
 ὑπάρχειν, τῶν δὲ μερῶν μηδετέρῳ, τὸ δὲ εὐδαιμονεῖν ἀδύ-
 28 νατον. ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ οἱ φύλακες μὴ εὐδαίμονες, τίνες ἕτε-
 ροι; οὐ γὰρ δὴ οἷ γε τεχνῖται καὶ τὸ πλῆθος τὸ τῶν βαναύ-
 σων. ἡ μὲν οὖν πολιτεία περὶ ἧς ὁ Σωκράτης εἴρηκεν,

25 ταύτας τε τὰς ἀπορίας ἔχει καὶ τούτων οὐκ ἐλάττους
 ἑτέρας·

6 Σχεδὸν δὲ παραπλησίως καὶ περὶ τοὺς νόμους ἔχει τοὺς
 ὕστερον γραφέντας· διδὼ καὶ περὶ τῆς ἐνταῦθα πολιτείας ἐπι-
 σκέψασθαι μικρὰ βέλτιον. καὶ γὰρ ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ περὶ
 ὀλίγων πάνπαν διώρικεν ὁ Σωκράτης, περὶ τε γυναικῶν
 30 καὶ τέκνων κοινωνίας, πῶς ἔχειν δεῖ, καὶ περὶ κτήσεως, καὶ
 τῆς πολιτείας τὴν τάξιν· διαιρεῖται γὰρ εἰς δύο μέρη τὸ 2
 πλῆθος τῶν οἰκούντων, τὸ μὲν εἰς τοὺς γεωργοὺς, τὸ δὲ εἰς τὸ
 προπολεμοῦν μέρος, τρίτον δ' ἐκ τούτων τὸ βουλευόμενον καὶ
 κύριον τῆς πόλεως· περὶ δὲ τῶν γεωργῶν καὶ τῶν τεχνιτῶν, 3
 35 πότερον οὐδεμιᾶς ἢ μετέχουσί τινος ἀρχῆς, καὶ πότερον ὅπλα
 δεῖ κεκτηῖσθαι καὶ τούτους καὶ συμπολεμεῖν ἢ μή, περὶ τού-
 των οὐδὲν διώρικεν ὁ Σωκράτης, ἀλλὰ τὰς μὲν γυναῖκας
 οἶεται δεῖν συμπολεμεῖν καὶ παιδείας μετέχειν τῆς αὐτῆς
 τοῖς φύλαξιν, τὰ δ' ἄλλα τοῖς ἔξωθεν λόγοις πεπλήρωκε
 40 τὸν λόγον καὶ περὶ τῆς παιδείας, ποίαν τινὰ δεῖ γίνεσθαι
 1265 a τῶν φυλάκων. τῶν δὲ νόμων τὸ μὲν πλεῖστον μέρος νόμοι 4
 τυγχάνουσιν ὄντες, ὀλίγα δὲ περὶ τῆς πολιτείας εἴρηκεν, καὶ
 ταύτην βουλόμενος κοινοτέραν ποιεῖν ταῖς πόλεσι, κατὰ μι-
 κρὸν περιάγει πάλιν εἰς τὴν ἑτέραν πολιτείαν· ἔξω γὰρ 5
 5 τῆς τῶν γυναικῶν κοινωνίας καὶ τῆς κτήσεως, τὰ ἄλλα
 ταῦτ' ἀποδίδωσιν ἀμφοτέραις ταῖς πολιτείαις· καὶ γὰρ
 παιδείαν τὴν αὐτὴν, καὶ τὸ τῶν ἔργων τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἀπε-
 χομένους ζῆν, καὶ περὶ συσσιτίων ὡσαύτως· πλὴν ἐν ταύτῃ
 φησὶ δεῖν εἶναι συσσίτια καὶ γυναικῶν, καὶ τὴν μὲν χιλίων
 10 τῶν ὅπλα κεκτημένων, ταύτην δὲ πεντακισχιλίων. τὸ μὲν 6
 οὖν περιττὸν ἔχουσι πάντες οἱ τοῦ Σωκράτους λόγοι καὶ τὸ
 κομψὸν καὶ τὸ καινοτόμον καὶ τὸ ζητητικόν, καλῶς δὲ
 πάντα ἴσως χαλεπὸν, ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ νῦν εἰρημένον πλῆθος δεῖ
 μὴ λανθάνειν ὅτι χώρας δεήσει τοῖς τοσοῦτοις Βαβυλωνίας
 15 ἢ τινος ἄλλης ἀπεράντου τὸ πλῆθος, ἐξ ἧς ἀργοὶ πεντακισ-
 χίλιοι θρέψονται, καὶ περὶ τούτους γυναικῶν καὶ θεραπόν-

7 των ἕτερος ὄχλος πολλαπλάσιος. δεῖ μὲν οὖν ὑποτίθεσθαι
 κατ' εὐχὴν, μηδὲν μέντοι ἀδύνατον. λέγεται δ' ὥς δεῖ τὸν
 νομοθέτην πρὸς δύο βλέποντα τιθέναι τοὺς νόμους, πρὸς τε
 τὴν χώραν καὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους. ἔτι δὲ καλῶς ἔχει προσθεῖ- 20
 ναι καὶ πρὸς τοὺς γειτνιῶντας τύπους, εἰ δεῖ τὴν πόλιν ζῆν
 βίον πολιτικόν· οὐ γὰρ μόνον ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστιν αὐτὴν τοιοῦτοις
 χρῆσθαι πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον ὅπλοις ἃ χρήσιμα κατὰ τὴν
 8 οἰκείαν χώραν ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἕξω τύπους. εἰ δέ
 τις μὴ τοιοῦτον ἀποδέχεται βίον, μήτε τὸν ἴδιον μήτε τὸν 25
 κοινὸν τῆς πόλεως, ὅμως οὐδὲν ἤττον δεῖ φοβεροὺς εἶναι τοῖς
 πολεμίοις, μὴ μόνον ἐλθοῦσιν εἰς τὴν χώραν ἀλλὰ καὶ
 ἀπελθοῦσιν. καὶ τὸ πλῆθος δὲ τῆς κτήσεως ὁρᾶν δεῖ, μήποτε
 βέλτιον ἐτέρως διορίσαι τῷ σαφῶς μᾶλλον, τοσαύτην γὰρ
 εἶναί φησι δεῖν ὥστε ζῆν σωφρόνως, ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις εἶπεν 30
 9 ὥστε ζῆν εὖ (τοῦτο γὰρ ἐστὶ καθόλου μᾶλλον· ἔτι δ' ἐστὶ σω-
 φρόνως μὲν ταλαιπώρως δὲ ζῆν). ἀλλὰ βελτίων ὅρος τὸ
 σωφρόνως καὶ ἐλευθερίως (χωρὶς γὰρ ἐκάτερον τὸ μὲν τῷ
 τρυφᾷ ἀκολουθήσει, τὸ δὲ τῷ ἐπιπόνῳ), ἐπεὶ μόναι γ'
 εἰσὶν ἕξεις αἰρεταὶ περὶ τὴν τῆς οὐσίας χρῆσιν αὐται, οἷον 35
 οὐσία πρᾶως ἢ ἀνδρείως χρῆσθαι οὐκ ἐστίν, σωφρόνως δὲ καὶ
 ἐλευθερίως ἐστίν, ὥστε καὶ τὰς χρήσεις ἀναγκαῖον περὶ αὐτὴν
 10 εἶναι ταύτας. ἀτοπον δὲ καὶ τὸ τὰς κτήσεις ἰσάζοντα τὸ
 περὶ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν πολιτῶν μὴ κατασκευάζειν, ἀλλ' ἀφεῖ-
 ναι τὴν τεκνοποιίαν ἀόριστον ὡς ἱκανῶς ἂν ὁμαλισθησομένην 40
 εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ πλῆθος διὰ τὰς ἀτεκνίας ὁσωνοῦν γεννωμένων,
 11 ὅτι δοκεῖ τοῦτο καὶ νῦν συμβαίνειν περὶ τὰς πόλεις. δεῖ δὲ 1265 b
 τοῦτ' οὐχ ὁμοίως ἀκριβῶς ἔχειν περὶ τὰς πόλεις τότε καὶ νῦν·
 νῦν μὲν γὰρ οὐδεὶς ἀπορεῖ διὰ τὸ μερίζεσθαι τὰς οὐσίας εἰς
 ὁποσονοῦν πλῆθος, τότε δὲ ἀδιαιρέτων οὐσῶν ἀνάγκη τοὺς πα-
 ράζυγας μηδὲν ἔχειν, ἐάν τε ἐλάττους ὦσι τὸ πλῆθος ἐάν τε 5
 12 πλείους. μᾶλλον δὲ δεῖν ὑπολάβοι τις ἂν ὠρίσθαι τῆς οὐσίας
 τὴν τεκνοποιίαν, ὥστε ἀριθμοῦ τινὸς μὴ πλείονα γεννᾶν· τοῦτο
 δὲ τιθέναι τὸ πλῆθος ἀποβλέποντα πρὸς τὰς τύχας, ἂν

συμβαίνῃ τελευτᾶν τινὰς τῶν γεννηθέντων, καὶ πρὸς τὴν
 10 τῶν ἄλλων ἀτεκνίαν. τὸ δ' ἀφείσθαι, καθάπερ ἐν ταῖς 13
 πλείσταις πόλεσι, πενίας ἀναγκαῖον αἴτιον γίνεσθαι τοῖς πο-
 λίταις, ἡ δὲ πενία στάσιν ἐμποιεῖ καὶ κακουργίαν. Φεῖδων
 μὲν οὖν ὁ Κορίνθιος, ὃν νομοθέτης τῶν ἀρχαιοτάτων, τοὺς
 οἴκους ἴσους ᾤθηθαι δεῖν διαμένειν καὶ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν πολιτῶν,
 15 καὶ εἰ τὸ πρῶτον τοὺς κλήρους ἀνίσους εἶχον πάντες κατὰ μέ-
 γεθος· ἐν δὲ τοῖς νόμοις τούτοις τούναντίον ἐστίν. ἀλλὰ περὶ 14
 μὲν τούτων πῶς οἰόμεθα βέλτιον ἂν ἔχειν, λεκτέον ὕστερον·
 ἐλλέλειπται δὲ τοῖς νόμοις τούτοις καὶ τὰ περὶ τοὺς ἀρχον-
 τας, ὅπως ἔσονται διαφέροντες τῶν ἀρχομένων· φησὶ γὰρ
 20 δεῖν, ὥσπερ ἐξ ἐτέρου τὸ στημόνιον ἐρίου γίνεται τῆς κρόκης,
 οὕτω καὶ τοὺς ἀρχοντας ἔχειν δεῖν πρὸς τοὺς ἀρχομένους. ἐπεὶ 15
 δὲ τὴν πᾶσαν οὐσίαν ἐφίησι γίνεσθαι μείζονα μέχρι πεντα-
 πλασίας, διὰ τί τοῦτ' οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς μέχρι τινός;
 καὶ τὴν τῶν οἰκοπέδων δὲ διαίρεσιν δεῖ σκοπεῖν, μή ποτ' οὐ
 25 συμφέρει πρὸς οἰκονομίαν· δύο γὰρ οἰκόπεδα ἐκάστῳ ἔνειμε
 διελὼν χωρίς, χαλεπὸν δὲ οἰκίας δύο οἰκεῖν. ἡ δὲ σύνταξις 16
 ὅλη βούλεται μὲν εἶναι μήτε δημοκρατία μήτε ὀλιγαρχία,
 μέση δὲ τούτων, ἣν καλοῦσι πολιτείαν· ἐκ γὰρ τῶν ὀπλι-
 τευόντων ἐστίν. εἰ μὲν οὖν ὥς κοινοτάτην ταύτην κατασκευά-
 30 ζει ταῖς πόλεσι τῶν ἄλλων πολιτείαν, καλῶς εἴρηκεν ἴσως,
 εἰ δ' ὥς ἀρίστην μετὰ τὴν πρώτην πολιτείαν, οὐ καλῶς· τάχα
 γὰρ τὴν τῶν Λακόνων ἂν τις ἐπαινέσειε μᾶλλον, ἢ καὶ
 ἄλλην τινὰ ἀριστοκρατικωτέραν. ἔνιοι μὲν οὖν λέγουσιν ὥς δεῖ 17
 τὴν ἀρίστην πολιτείαν ἐξ ἀπασῶν εἶναι τῶν πολιτειῶν μεμι-
 35 γμένην, διὸ καὶ τὴν τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων ἐπαινοῦσιν· εἶναι
 γὰρ αὐτὴν οἱ μὲν ἐξ ὀλιγαρχίας καὶ μοναρχίας καὶ δημο-
 κρατίας φασίν, λέγοντες τὴν μὲν βασιλείαν μοναρχίαν, τὴν
 δὲ τῶν γερόντων ἀρχὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν, δημοκρατεῖσθαι δὲ
 κατὰ τὴν τῶν ἐφόρων ἀρχὴν διὰ τὸ ἐκ τοῦ δήμου εἶναι τοὺς
 40 ἐφόρους· οἱ δὲ τὴν μὲν ἐφορείαν εἶναι τυραννίδα, δημοκρα-
 τεῖσθαι δὲ κατὰ τε τὰ συσσίτια καὶ τὸν ἄλλον βίον τὸν

- 18 καθ' ἡμέραν· ἐν δὲ τοῖς νόμοις εἴρηται τούτοις ὡς δέον συγ- 1266 a
κεῖσθαι τὴν ἀρίστην πολιτείαν ἐκ δημοκρατίας καὶ τυραννί-
δος, ἃς ἡ τὸ παράπαν οὐκ ἂν τις θεῖη πολιτείας ἢ χειρίστας
πασῶν. βέλτιον οὖν λέγουσιν οἱ πλείους μιγνύντες· ἡ γὰρ ἐκ
πλείονων συγκειμένη πολιτεία βελτίων. ἔπειτα οὐδ' ἔχουσα 5
φαίνεται μοναρχικὸν οὐδέν, ἀλλ' ὀλιγαρχικὰ καὶ δημοκρα-
τικά· μᾶλλον δ' ἐγκλίνειν βούλεται πρὸς τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν.
- 19 δῆλον δὲ ἐκ τῆς τῶν ἀρχόντων καταστάσεως· τὸ μὲν γὰρ
ἐξ αἰρετῶν κληρωτοὺς κοινὸν ἀμφοῖν, τὸ δὲ τοῖς μὲν εὐπορω-
τέροις ἐπάναγκες ἐκκλησιάζειν εἶναι καὶ φέρειν ἀρχοντας 10
ἢ τι ποιεῖν ἄλλο τῶν πολιτικῶν, τοὺς δ' ἀφείσθαι, τοῦτο δ'
ὀλιγαρχικόν, καὶ τὸ πειρᾶσθαι πλείους ἐκ τῶν εὐπόρων εἶναι
τοὺς ἀρχοντας, καὶ τὰς μεγίστας ἐκ τῶν μεγίστων τιμημά-
20 των. ὀλιγαρχικὴν δὲ ποιεῖ καὶ τὴν τῆς βουλῆς αἵρεσιν· αἰροῦν-
ται μὲν γὰρ πάντες ἐπάναγκες, ἀλλ' ἐκ τοῦ πρώτου τιμῆ- 15
ματος, εἴτα πάλιν ἴσους ἐκ τοῦ δευτέρου, εἴτ' ἐκ τῶν τρίτων·
πλὴν οὐ πᾶσιν ἐπάναγκες ἦν τοῖς ἐκ τῶν τρίτων ἢ τετάρτων,
ἐκ δὲ [τοῦ τετάρτου] τῶν τετάρτων μόνοις ἐπάναγκες τοῖς πρῶ-
21 τοις καὶ τοῖς δευτέροις. εἴτ' ἐκ τούτων ἴσον ἀφ' ἐκάστου τιμῆ-
ματος ἀποδείξαι φησι δεῖν ἀριθμόν. ἔσονται δὲ πλείους οἱ 20
ἐκ τῶν μεγίστων τιμημάτων καὶ βελτίους διὰ τὸ ἐνίους μὴ
22 αἰρεῖσθαι τῶν δημοτικῶν διὰ τὸ μὴ ἐπάναγκες. ὥς μὲν οὖν
οὐκ ἐκ δημοκρατίας καὶ μοναρχίας δεῖ συνιστάναι τὴν τοιαύ-
την πολιτείαν, ἐκ τούτων φανερὸν καὶ τῶν ὕστερον ῥηθησομέ-
νων, ὅταν ἐπιβάλλῃ περὶ τῆς τοιαύτης πολιτείας ἢ σκέψις· 25
ἔχει δὲ καὶ περὶ τὴν αἵρεσιν τῶν ἀρχόντων τὸ ἐξ αἰρετῶν
αἰρετοὺς ἐπικίνδυνον· εἰ γάρ τινες συστήναι θέλουσι καὶ μέτριοι
τὸ πλῆθος, αἰεὶ κατὰ τὴν τούτων αἰρεθῆσονται βούλησιν. τὰ
μὲν οὖν περὶ τὴν πολιτείαν τὴν ἐν τοῖς νόμοις τοῦτον ἔχει
τὸν τρόπον·

30

Εἰσι δὲ τινες πολιτεῖαι καὶ ἄλλαι, αἱ μὲν ἰδιωτῶν αἱ 7
δὲ φιλοσόφων καὶ πολιτικῶν, πᾶσαι δὲ τῶν καθεστηκυῶν
καὶ καθ' ἃς πολιτεύονται νῦν ἐγγύτερόν εἰσι τούτων ἀμφο-

τέρων· οὐδεὶς γὰρ οὔτε τὴν περὶ τὰ τέκνα κοινότητα καὶ τὰς
 35 γυναικάς ἄλλος κεκαινοτόμηκεν, οὔτε περὶ τὰ συσσίτια τῶν
 γυναικῶν, ἀλλ' ἀπὸ τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἀρχονται μᾶλλον.
 δοκεῖ γὰρ τισὶ τὸ περὶ τὰς οὐσίας εἶναι μέγιστον τετάχθαι 2
 καλῶς· περὶ γὰρ τούτων ποιεῖσθαι φασὶ τὰς στάσεις πάν-
 τας. διὸ Φαλέας ὁ Χαλκηδόνιος τοῦτ' εἰσήνεγκε πρῶτος·
 40 φησὶ γὰρ δεῖν ἴσας εἶναι τὰς κτήσεις τῶν πολιτῶν. τοῦτο 3
 1266 b δὲ κατοικιζομέναις μὲν εὐθὺς οὐ χαλεπὸν ᾤετο ποιεῖν, τὰς
 δ' ἤδη κατοικουμένας ἐργωδέστερον μὲν, ὁμῶς δὲ τάχιστ' ἂν
 ὁμαλισθῆναι τῷ τὰς προίκας τοὺς μὲν πλουσίους διδόναι μὲν
 λαμβάνειν δὲ μὴ, τοὺς δὲ πένητας μὴ διδόναι μὲν λαμβά-
 5 νειν δέ. Πλάτων δὲ τοὺς νόμους γράφων μέχρι μὲν τινος 4
 ᾤετο δεῖν ἔαν, πλείον δὲ τοῦ πενταπλασίαν εἶναι τῆς ἐλα-
 χίστης μηδενὶ τῶν πολιτῶν ἐξουσίαν εἶναι κτήσασθαι, καθά-
 περ εἴρηται καὶ πρότερον. δεῖ δὲ μηδὲ τοῦτο λανθάνειν τοὺς 5
 οὕτω νομοθετοῦντας, ὃ λανθάνει νῦν, ὅτι τὸ τῆς οὐσίας τάττον-
 10 τας πλῆθος προσήκει καὶ τῶν τέκνων τὸ πλῆθος τάττειν
 ἔαν γὰρ ὑπεραίρη τῆς οὐσίας τὸ μέγεθος ὁ τῶν τέκνων ἀριθ-
 μός, ἀνάγκη τὸν γε νόμον λύεσθαι, καὶ χωρὶς τῆς λύσεως
 φαῦλον τὸ πολλοὺς ἐκ πλουσιῶν γίνεσθαι πένητας· ἔργον
 γὰρ μὴ νεωτεροποιοὺς εἶναι τοὺς τοιοῦτους. διότι μὲν οὖν ἔχει 6
 15 τινὰ δύναμιν εἰς τὴν πολιτικὴν κοινωνίαν ἢ τῆς οὐσίας ὁμα-
 λότης, καὶ τῶν πάλαι τινὲς φαίνονται διεγνώκότες, οἷον καὶ
 Σόλων ἐνομοθέτησεν, καὶ παρ' ἄλλοις ἐστὶ νόμος ὃς κωλύει
 κτᾶσθαι γῆν ὑπόσπον ἀν βούληταί τις· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὴν
 οὐσίαν πωλεῖν οἱ νόμοι κωλύουσιν, ὥσπερ ἐν Λοκροῖς νόμος
 20 ἐστὶ μὴ πωλεῖν, ἔαν μὴ φανεράν ἀτυχίαν δείξῃ συμβεβη-
 κυίαν· ἔτι δὲ τοὺς παλαιοὺς κλήρους διασώζειν τοῦτο δὲ λυθὲν 7
 καὶ περὶ Λευκάδα δημοτικὴν ἐποίησε λίαν τὴν πολιτείαν
 αὐτῶν, οὐ γὰρ ἔτι συνέβαινεν ἀπὸ τῶν ὠρισμένων τιμημά-
 των εἰς τὰς ἀρχὰς βαδίζειν. ἀλλ' ἔστι τὴν ἰσότητά μὲν
 25 ὑπάρχειν τῆς οὐσίας, ταύτην δὲ ἢ λίαν εἶναι πολλήν, ὥστε
 τρυφᾶν, ἢ λίαν ὀλίγην, ὥστε ζῆν γλίσχρως. δηλον οὖν ὡς

- οὐχ ἱκανὸν τὸ τὰς οὐσίας ἴσας ποιῆσαι τὸν νομοθέτην, ἀλλὰ
8 τοῦ μέσου στοχαστέον. ἔτι δ' εἴ τις καὶ τὴν μετρίαν τάξειεν
οὐσίαν πᾶσιν, οὐδὲν ὄφελος· μᾶλλον γὰρ δεῖ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας
ὀμαλίζειν ἢ τὰς οὐσίας, τοῦτο δ' οὐκ ἔστι μὴ παιδευομένοις 30
ἱκανῶς ὑπὸ τῶν νόμων. ἀλλ' ἴσως ἂν εἴπειεν ὁ Φαλάας ὅτι
ταῦτα τυγχάνει λέγων αὐτός· οἴεται γὰρ δυοῖν τούτοις ἰσό-
τητα δεῖν ὑπάρχειν ταῖς πόλεσιν, κτήσεως καὶ παιδείας.
9 ἀλλὰ τὴν τε παιδείαν ἥτις ἔσται δεῖ λέγειν, καὶ τὸ μίαν
εἶναι καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν οὐδὲν ὄφελος· ἔστι γὰρ τὴν αὐτὴν μὲν 35
εἶναι καὶ μίαν, ἀλλὰ ταύτην εἶναι τοιαύτην ἐξ ἧς ἔσονται
προαιρετικοὶ τοῦ πλεονεκτεῖν ἢ χρημάτων ἢ τιμῆς ἢ συναμ-
10 φοτέρων. ἔτι στασιάζουσιν οὐ μόνον διὰ τὴν ἀνισότητα τῆς
κτήσεως, ἀλλὰ καὶ διὰ τὴν τῶν τιμῶν· τὸνναντίον δὲ περὶ
ἐκάτερον· οἱ μὲν γὰρ πολλοὶ διὰ τὸ περὶ τὰς κτήσεις ἀνι- 40
σον, οἱ δὲ χαρίεντες περὶ τῶν τιμῶν, ἐὰν ἴσας· ὅθεν καὶ “ἐν 1267 a
11 δὲ ἰῆ τιμῇ ἡμὲν κακὸς ἡδὲ καὶ ἐσθλός.” οὐ μόνον δ' οἱ
ἄνθρωποι διὰ τὰναγκαῖα ἀδικοῦσιν, ὣν ἄκος εἶναι νομίζει
τὴν ἰσότητα τῆς οὐσίας, ὥστε μὴ λωποδυτεῖν διὰ τὸ ριγοῦν ἢ
πεινῆν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅπως χαίρωσι καὶ μὴ ἐπιθυμῶσιν· ἐὰν 5
γὰρ μείζω ἔχωσιν ἐπιθυμίαν τῶν ἀναγκαίων, διὰ τὴν
12 ταύτης ἰατρείαν ἀδικήσουσιν· οὐ τοῖνον διὰ ταύτην μόνον,
ἀλλὰ καὶ ἂν ἐπιθυμοῖεν, ἵνα χαίρωσι ταῖς ἀνευ λυπῶν
ἡδοναῖς. τί οὖν ἄκος τῶν τριῶν τούτων; τοῖς μὲν οὐσία βρα-
χεῖα καὶ ἐργασία, τοῖς δὲ σωφροσύνη· τρίτον δ', εἴ τινες 10
βούλονται δι' αὐτῶν χαίρειν, οὐκ ἂν ἐπιζητοῖεν εἰ μὴ παρὰ
13 φιλοσοφίας ἄκος, αἱ γὰρ ἄλλαι ἀνθρώπων δέονται· ἐπεὶ
ἀδικοῦσί γε τὰ μέγιστα διὰ τὰς ὑπερβολάς, ἀλλ' οὐ διὰ
τὰ ἀναγκαῖα, οἷον τυραννοῦσιν οὐχ ἵνα μὴ ριγῶσιν. διὸ καὶ
αἱ τιμαὶ μεγάλαι, ἂν ἀποκτείνῃ τις οὐ κλέπτην ἀλλὰ 15
τύραννον. ὥστε πρὸς τὰς μικρὰς ἀδικίας βοηθητικὸς μόνον
14 ὁ τρόπος τῆς Φαλέου πολιτείας. ἔτι τὰ πολλὰ βούλεται
κατασκευάζειν ἐξ ὧν τὰ πρὸς αὐτοὺς πολιτεύονται καλῶς,
δεῖ δὲ καὶ πρὸς τοὺς γεινιῶντας καὶ τοὺς ἔξωθεν πάντας.

20 ἀναγκαῖον ἄρα τὴν πολιτείαν συντετάχθαι πρὸς τὴν πολε-
 μικὴν ἰσχύν, περὶ ἧς ἐκεῖνος οὐδὲν εἴρηκεν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ 15
 περὶ τῆς κτήσεως· δεῖ γὰρ οὐ μόνον πρὸς τὰς πολιτικὰς
 χρήσεις ἰκανὴν ὑπάρχειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἔξωθεν κιν-
 δύνους. διόπερ οὔτε τοσοῦτον δεῖ πλῆθος ὑπάρχειν ὥν οἱ
 25 πλησίον καὶ κρείττους ἐπιθυμήσουσιν, οἱ δὲ ἔχοντες ἀμύνειν
 οὐ δυνήσονται τοὺς ἐπιόντας, οὔθ' οὕτως ὀλίγην ὥστε μὴ δύνα-
 σθαι πόλεμον ὑπενεγκεῖν μηδὲ τῶν ἴσων καὶ τῶν ὁμοίων.
 ἐκεῖνος μὲν οὖν οὐδὲν διώρικεν, δεῖ δὲ τοῦτο μὴ λαυθάνειν, ὅτι 16
 συμφέρει πλῆθος οὐσίας. ἴσως οὖν ἄριστος ὁρος τὸ μὴ λυσι-
 30 τελεῖν τοῖς κρείττοσι διὰ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν πολεμεῖν, ἀλλ'
 οὔτως ὥς ἂν καὶ μὴ ἐχόντων τοσαύτην οὐσίαν. οἷον Εὐβου- 17
 λος Αὐτοφραδάτου μέλλοντος Ἀταρνέα πολιορκεῖν ἐκέλευ-
 σεν αὐτόν, σκεψάμενον ἐν πόσῳ χρόνῳ λήψεται τὸ χωρίον,
 λογίσασθαι τοῦ χρόνου τούτου τὴν δαπάνην· ἐθέλειν γὰρ
 35 ἔλαττον τούτου λαβὼν ἐκλιπεῖν ἤδη τὸν Ἀταρνέα· ταῦτα δ'
 εἰπὼν ἐποίησε τὸν Αὐτοφραδάτην σύννουον γενόμενον παύσασ-
 θαι τῆς πολιορκίας. ἔστι μὲν οὖν τι τῶν συμφερόντων τὸ 18
 τὰς οὐσίας εἶναι ἴσας τοῖς πολίταις πρὸς τὸ μὴ στασιάζειν
 πρὸς ἀλλήλους, οὐ μὴν μέγα οὐδὲν ὥς εἰπεῖν. καὶ γὰρ ἂν οἱ
 40 χαρίεντες ἀγανακτοῖεν ἂν ὥς οὐκ ἴσων ὄντες ἄξιοι, διὸ καὶ
 φαίνονται πολλάκις ἐπιτιθέμενοι καὶ στασιάζοντες· ἔτι δ' 19
 1267 b ἡ πονηρία τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀπληστον, καὶ τὸ πρῶτον μὲν ἰκα-
 νὸν διωβολία μόνον, ὅταν δ' ἤδη τοῦτ' ἦ πάτριον, αἰεὶ δέον-
 ται τοῦ πλείονος, ἕως εἰς ἀπειρον ἔλθωσιν· ἀπειρος γὰρ ἡ
 τῆς ἐπιθυμίας φύσις, ἧς πρὸς τὴν ἀναπλήρωσιν οἱ πολλοὶ
 5 ζῶσιν. τῶν οὖν τοιούτων ἀρχή, μᾶλλον τοῦ τὰς οὐσίας ὁμα- 20
 λίσκειν, τὸ τοὺς μὲν ἐπιεικέις τῇ φύσει τοιούτους παρασκευά-
 ζειν ὥστε μὴ βούλεσθαι πλεονεκτεῖν, τοὺς δὲ φαύλους ὥστε μὴ
 δύνασθαι· τοῦτο δ' ἐστίν, ἂν ἡττους τε ᾧσι καὶ μὴ ἀδικῶν-
 ται. οὐ καλῶς δὲ οὐδὲ τὴν ἰσότητά τῆς οὐσίας εἴρηκεν· περὶ 21
 10 γὰρ τὴν τῆς γῆς κτήσιν ἰσάζει μόνον, ἔστι δὲ καὶ δούλων
 καὶ βοσκημάτων πλοῦτος καὶ νομίματος, καὶ κατασκευῇ

πολλή τῶν καλουμένων ἐπίπλων. ἡ πάντων οὖν τούτων ἰσό-
 22 τητα ζητητέον ἡ τάξι τινὰ μετρίαν, ἡ πάντα ἐατέον. φαί-
 νεται δ' ἐκ τῆς νομοθεσίας κατασκευάζων τὴν πόλιν μι-
 κράν, εἴ γ' οἱ τεχνίται πάντες δημόσιοι ἔσονται καὶ μὴ 15
 23 πλήρωμά τι παρέξονται τῆς πόλεως. ἀλλ' εἴπερ δεῖ δη-
 μοσίους εἶναι τοὺς τὰ κοινὰ ἐργαζομένους, δεῖ καθάπερ ἐν
 'Επιδάμνῳ τε, καὶ Διόφαντός ποτε κατεσκεύαζεν Ἀθή-
 νησι, τοῦτον ἔχειν τὸν τρόπον. περὶ μὲν οὖν τῆς Φαλέου
 πολιτείας σχεδὸν ἐκ τούτων ἂν τις θεωρήσειεν, εἴ τι τυγχάνει 20
 καλῶς εἰρηκῶς ἢ μὴ καλῶς·

'Ιππόδαμος δὲ Εὐρυφῶντος Μιλήσιος, ὃς καὶ τὴν τῶν 8
 πόλεων διαίρεσιν εὔρε καὶ τὸν Πειραιᾶ κατέτεμεν, γενόμενος
 καὶ περὶ τὸν ἄλλον βίον περιττότερος διὰ φιλοτιμίαν οὕτως
 ὥστε δοκεῖν ἐνίοις ζῆν περιεργότερον τριχῶν τε πλήθει καὶ 25
 κόσμῳ πολυτελεῖ, ἔτι δὲ ἐσθῆτος εὐτελοῦς μὲν ἀλεεινῆς δὲ
 οὐκ ἐν τῷ χειμῶνι μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ τοὺς θερινοὺς χρό-
 νους, λόγιος δὲ καὶ περὶ τὴν ὅλην φύσιν εἶναι βουλόμενος,
 πρῶτος τῶν μὴ πολιτευομένων ἐνεχείρησέ τι περὶ πολιτείας
 2 εἰπεῖν τῆς ἀρίστης. κατεσκεύαζε δὲ τὴν πόλιν τῷ πλήθει 30
 μὲν μυριάνδρον, εἰς τρία δὲ μέρη διηρημένην· ἐποίει γὰρ
 ἐν μὲν μέρος τεχνίτας, ἐν δὲ γεωργούς, τρίτον δὲ τὸ προ-
 3 πολεμοῦν καὶ τὰ ὅπλα ἔχον. διήρει δ' εἰς τρία μέρη τὴν
 χώραν, τὴν μὲν ἱεράν, τὴν δὲ δημοσίαν, τὴν δ' ἰδίαν· ὅθεν
 μὲν τὰ νομιζόμενα ποιήσουσι πρὸς τοὺς θεούς, ἱεράν, ἀφ' ὧν 35
 δ' οἱ προπολεμοῦντες βιώσονται, κοινήν, τὴν δὲ τῶν γεωργῶν
 4 ἰδίαν. ᾗτο δ' εἶδη καὶ τῶν νόμων εἶναι τρία μόνον· περὶ
 ὧν γὰρ αἱ δίκαι γίνονται, τρία ταῦτ' εἶναι τὸν ἀριθμόν,
 ὕβριν βλάβην θάνατον. ἐνομοθέτει δὲ καὶ δικαστήριον ἐν τῷ
 κύριον, εἰς ὃ πάσας ἀνάγεσθαι δεῖν τὰς μὴ καλῶς κεκρί- 40
 σθαι δοκούσας δίκας· τοῦτο δὲ κατεσκεύαζεν ἐκ τινῶν γε-
 5 ρόντων αἵρετῶν. τὰς δὲ κρίσεις ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις οὐ διὰ 1268 a
 ψηφοφορίας ᾗτο γίνεσθαι δεῖν, ἀλλὰ φέρειν ἕκαστον πι-
 νάκιον, ἐν ᾧ γράφειν, εἰ καταδικάζοι ἀπλῶς τὴν δίκην, εἰ

δ' ἀπολύοι ἀπλῶς, κενόν· εἰ δὲ τὸ μὲν τὸ δὲ μή, τοῦτο
 5 διορίζειν. νῦν γὰρ οὐκ ᾔετο νενομοθετησθαι καλῶς· ἀναγκά-
 ζειν γὰρ ἐπιорκεῖν ἢ ταῦτα ἢ ταῦτα δικάζοντας. ἐτίθει δὲ 6
 νόμον περὶ τῶν εὐρισκόντων τι τῇ πόλει συμφέρον, ὅπως
 τυγχάνωσι τιμῆς, καὶ τοῖς παισὶ τῶν ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ τε-
 λευτώντων ἐκ δημοσίου γίνεσθαι τὴν τροφήν, ὥς οὐπω τοῦτο
 10 παρ' ἄλλοις νενομοθετημένον· ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἐν Ἀθήναις οὗτος
 ὁ νόμος νῦν καὶ ἐν ἑτέραις τῶν πόλεων. τοὺς δ' ἄρχοντας 7
 αἵρετοὺς ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου εἶναι πάντας· δῆμον δ' ἐποίει τὰ
 τρία μέρη τῆς πόλεως· τοὺς δ' αἵρεθέντας ἐπιμελεῖσθαι κοι-
 νῶν καὶ ξενικῶν καὶ ὀρφανικῶν. τὰ μὲν οὖν πλεῖστα καὶ
 15 τὰ μάλιστα ἀξιόλογα τῆς Ἱπποδάμου τάξεως ταῦτ' ἐστίν,
 ἀπορήσειε δ' ἂν τις πρῶτον μὲν τὴν διαίρεσιν τοῦ πλήθους
 τῶν πολιτῶν. οἳ τε γὰρ τεχνῖται καὶ οἱ γεωργοὶ καὶ οἱ 8
 τὰ ὄπλα ἔχοντες κοινωνοῦσι τῆς πολιτείας πάντες, οἱ μὲν
 γεωργοὶ οὐκ ἔχοντες ὄπλα, οἱ δὲ τεχνῖται οὔτε γῆν οὔτε ὄπλα,
 20 ὥστε γίνονται σχεδὸν δοῦλοι τῶν τὰ ὄπλα κεκτημένων. μετ- 9
 ἔχειν μὲν οὖν πασῶν τῶν τιμῶν ἀδύνατον· ἀνάγκη γὰρ ἐκ
 τῶν τὰ ὄπλα ἐχόντων καθίστασθαι καὶ στρατηγοὺς καὶ πο-
 λιτοφύλακας καὶ τὰς κυριωτάτας ἀρχὰς ὥς εἰπεῖν· μὴ
 μετέχοντας δὲ τῆς πολιτείας πῶς οἶόν τε φιλικῶς ἔχειν
 25 πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν; ἀλλὰ δεῖ κρείττους εἶναι τοὺς τὰ ὄπλα
 γε κεκτημένους ἀμφοτέρων τῶν μερῶν· τοῦτο δ' οὐ ῥάδιον μὴ
 πολλοὺς ὄντας· εἰ δὲ τοῦτ' ἔσται, τί δεῖ τοὺς ἄλλους μετέχειν 10
 τῆς πολιτείας καὶ κυρίους εἶναι τῆς τῶν ἀρχόντων καταστά-
 σεως; ἔτι οἱ γεωργοὶ τί χρήσιμοι τῇ πόλει; τεχνίτας μὲν
 30 γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι (πᾶσα γὰρ δεῖται πόλις τεχνιτῶν),
 καὶ δύνανται διαγίγνεσθαι καθάπερ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις πόλε-
 σιν ἀπὸ τῆς τέχνης· οἱ δὲ γεωργοὶ πορίζοντες μὲν τοῖς τὰ
 ὄπλα κεκτημένοις τὴν τροφήν εὐλόγως ἂν ἦσαν τι τῆς
 πόλεως μέρος, νῦν δ' ἰδίαν ἔχουσιν, καὶ ταύτην ἰδίᾳ γεωρ-
 35 γήσουσιν. ἔτι δὲ τὴν κοινὴν, ἀφ' ἧς οἱ προπολεμοῦντες ἔξουσιν 11
 τὴν τροφήν, εἰ μὲν αὐτοὶ γεωργήσουσιν, οὐκ ἂν εἴη τὸ μά-

- χιμον ἕτερον καὶ τὸ γεωργοῦν, βούλεται δ' ὁ νομοθέτης· εἰ
 δ' ἕτεροὶ τινες ἔσονται τῶν τε τὰ ἴδια γεωγρῶντων καὶ τῶν
 μαχίμων, τέταρτον αὖ μῦριον ἔσται τοῦτο τῆς πόλεως, οὐδε-
 12 νὸς μετέχον, ἀλλὰ ἀλλότριον τῆς πολιτείας. ἀλλὰ μὴν εἴ 40
 τις τοὺς αὐτοὺς θήσει τοὺς τε τὴν ἰδίαν καὶ τοὺς τὴν κοινὴν
 γεωγρῶντας, τό τε πλῆθος ἄπορον ἔσται τῶν καρπῶν ἐξ ὧν
 ἕκαστος γεωργήσει δύο οἰκίας, καὶ τίνος ἕνεκεν οὐκ εὐθὺς 1268 b
 ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς καὶ τῶν αὐτῶν κλήρων αὐτοῖς τε τὴν τροφὴν
 λήψονται καὶ τοῖς μαχίμοις παρέξουσιν; ταῦτα δὴ πάντα
 13 πολλὴν ἔχει ταραχήν. οὐ καλῶς δ' οὐδ' ὁ περὶ τῆς κρίσεως
 ἔχει νόμος, τὸ κρίνειν ἀξιοῦν διαιροῦντα τῆς δίκης ἀπλῶς 5
 γεγραμμένης, καὶ γίνεσθαι τὸν δικαστὴν διαιτητὴν. τοῦτο δ'
 ἐν μὲν τῇ διαίτῃ καὶ πλείοσιν ἐνδέχεται (κοινολογοῦνται
 γὰρ ἀλλήλοις περὶ τῆς κρίσεως), ἐν δὲ τοῖς δικαστηρίοις οὐκ
 ἔστιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τούναντίον τοῦτ' αὖ τῶν νομοθετῶν οἱ πολλοὶ
 παρασκευάζουσιν ὅπως οἱ δικασταὶ μὴ κοινολογῶνται πρὸς 10
 14 ἀλλήλους. ἔπειτα πῶς οὐκ ἔσται ταραχώδης ἡ κρίσις, ὅταν
 ὀφείλῃν ὁ μὲν δικαστὴς οἴηται, μὴ τοσοῦτον δ' ὅσον ὁ δι-
 καζόμενος; ὁ μὲν γὰρ εἴκοσι μνᾶς, ὁ δὲ δικαστὴς κρινεῖ
 δέκα μνᾶς, ἢ ὁ μὲν πλεον, ὁ δ' ἔλασσον, ἄλλος δὲ πέντε,
 ὁ δὲ τέτταρας· καὶ τοῦτον δὴ τὸν τρόπον δῆλον ὅτι μεριοῦ- 15
 15 σιν· οἱ δὲ πάντα καταδικάσουσιν, οἱ δ' οὐδέν. τίς οὖν ὁ τρό-
 πος ἔσται τῆς διαλογῆς τῶν ψήφων; ἔτι δ' οὐδεὶς ἐπιορκεῖν
 ἀναγκάζει τὸν ἀπλῶς ἀποδικάσαντα ἢ καταδικάσαντα, εἴ-
 περ ἀπλῶς τὸ ἔγκλημα γέγραπται δικαίως· οὐ γὰρ μη-
 δὲν ὀφείλῃν ὁ ἀποδικάσας κρίνειν, ἀλλὰ τὰς εἴκοσι μνᾶς 20
 ἀλλ' ἐκείνος ἤδη ἐπιορκεῖ ὁ καταδικάσας μὴ νομίζων ὀφεί-
 16 λειν τὰς εἴκοσι μνᾶς. περὶ δὲ τοῦ τοῖς εὐρίσκουσιν τι τῇ πό-
 λει συμφέρον ὥς δεῖ γίνεσθαι τινα τιμὴν, οὐκ ἔστιν ἀσφα-
 λές τὸ νομοθετεῖν, ἀλλ' εὐόφθαλμον ἀκούσαι μόνον ἔχει
 γὰρ συκοφαντίας καὶ κινήσεις, ἂν τύχῃ, πολιτείας. ἐμ- 25
 πίπτει δ' εἰς ἄλλο πρόβλημα καὶ σκέψιν ἐτέραν ἀποροῦσι
 γάρ τινες πότερον βλαβερὸν ἢ συμφέρον ταῖς πόλεσι τὸ

κινεῖν τοὺς πατρίους νόμους, ἂν ἢ τις ἄλλος βελτίων. διόπερ 17
 οὐ ῥᾶδιον τῷ λεχθέντι ταχὺ συγχωρεῖν, εἴπερ μὴ συμφέ-
 30 ρει κινεῖν. ἐνδέχεται δ' εἰσηγεῖσθαι τινὰς νόμων λύσιν ἢ
 πολιτείας ὥς κοινὸν ἀγαθόν. ἐπεὶ δὲ πεποιημέθα μνεῖαν,
 ἔτι μικρὰ περὶ αὐτοῦ διαστεῖλαισθαι βέλτιον. ἔχει γάρ, 18
 ὥσπερ εἴπομεν, ἀπορίαν, καὶ δόξειεν ἂν βέλτιον εἶναι τὸ
 κινεῖν· ἐπὶ γοῦν τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν τοῦτο συνενήνοχεν,
 35 οἷον ἰατρικὴ κινήθεισα παρὰ τὰ πάτρια καὶ γυμναστικὴ
 καὶ ὅλως αἱ τέχναι πᾶσαι καὶ αἱ δυνάμεις, ὥστ' ἐπεὶ μίαν
 τούτων θετέον καὶ τὴν πολιτικὴν, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ περὶ ταύτην
 ἀναγκαῖον ὁμοίως ἔχειν. σημεῖον δ' ἂν γεγενῆσθαι φαίη τις 19
 ἐπ' αὐτῶν τῶν ἔργων· τοὺς γὰρ ἀρχαίους νόμους λίαν ἀπλοῦς
 40 εἶναι καὶ βαρβαρικοὺς· ἐσιδηροφοροῦντό τε γὰρ οἱ Ἕλλη-
 νες, καὶ τὰς γυναῖκας ἑωνοῦντο παρ' ἀλλήλων, ὅσα τε 20
 λοιπὰ τῶν ἀρχαίων ἐστὶν που νομίμων, εὐήθη πάνπαν ἐστίν,
 1269 ^a οἷον ἐν Κύμῃ περὶ τὰ φονικά νόμος ἐστίν, ἂν πληθὺς τι
 παράσχηται μαρτύρων ὁ διώκων τὸν φόνον τῶν αὐτοῦ συγ-
 γενῶν, ἔνοχον εἶναι τῷ φόνῳ τὸν φεύγοντα. ζητοῦσι δὲ 21
 ὅλως οὐ τὸ πάτριον ἀλλὰ τ'ἀγαθὸν πάντες· εἰκὸς τε τοὺς
 5 πρῶτους, εἴτε γηγενεῖς ἦσαν εἴτ' ἐκ φθορᾶς τινὸς ἐσώθησαν,
 ὁμοίους εἶναι καὶ τοὺς τυχόντας καὶ τοὺς ἀνοήτους, ὥσπερ καὶ
 λέγεται κατὰ τῶν γηγενῶν, ὥστε ἀτοπον τὸ μένειν ἐν τοῖς
 τούτων δόγμασιν. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις οὐδὲ τοὺς γεγραμμένους ἔαν
 ἀκινήτους βέλτιον. ὥσπερ γὰρ καὶ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας, 22
 10 καὶ τὴν πολιτικὴν τάξιν ἀδύνατον ἀκριβῶς πάντα γραφῆ-
 ναι· καθόλου γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον γραφῆναι, αἱ δὲ πράξεις περὶ
 τῶν καθ' ἑκαστόν εἰσιν. ἐκ μὲν οὖν τούτων φανερόν ὅτι κινή-
 τέοι καὶ τινὲς καὶ ποτὲ τῶν νόμων εἰσίν, ἄλλον δὲ τρόπον
 ἐπισκοποῦσιν εὐλαβείας ἂν δόξειεν εἶναι πολλῆς. ὅταν γὰρ 23
 15 ἢ τὸ μὲν βέλτιον μικρόν, τὸ δ' ἐθίζειν εὐχερῶς λύειν τοὺς
 νόμους φαῦλον, φανερόν ὥς ἐατέον ἐνίας ἀμαρτίας καὶ τῶν
 νομοθετῶν καὶ τῶν ἀρχόντων· οὐ γὰρ τοσοῦτον ὠφελήσεται
 κινήσας, ὅσον βλαβήσεται τοῖς ἀρχουσιν ἀπειθεῖν ἐθισθεῖς.

24 ψεύδος δὲ καὶ τὸ παράδειγμα τὸ περὶ τῶν τεχνῶν· οὐ γὰρ
 ὁμοιον τὸ κινεῖν τέχνην καὶ νόμον, ὁ γὰρ νόμος ἰσχύει 20
 οὐδεμίαν ἔχει πρὸς τὸ πείθεσθαι παρὰ τὸ ἔθος, τοῦτο
 δ' οὐ γίνεται εἰ μὴ διὰ χρόνου πλήθους, ὥστε τὸ ῥαδίως με-
 ταβάλλειν ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων νόμων εἰς ἑτέρους νόμους
 25 καινοὺς ἀσθενῇ ποιεῖν ἐστὶ τὴν τοῦ νόμου δύναμιν. ἔτι δὲ εἰ
 καὶ κινητέοι, πότερον πάντες καὶ ἐν πάσῃ πολιτείᾳ, ἢ 25
 οὐ; καὶ πότερον τῷ τυχόντι ἢ τισίν; ταῦτα γὰρ ἔχει με-
 γάλην διαφοράν. διὸ νῦν μὲν ἀφῶμεν ταύτην τὴν σκέψιν
 ἄλλων γὰρ ἐστὶ καιρῶν

Περὶ δὲ τῆς Λακεδαιμονίων πολιτείας καὶ τῆς Κρη- 3
 τικῆς, σχεδὸν δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων πολιτειῶν, δύο εἰσὶν 30
 αἱ σκέψεις, μία μὲν εἴ τι καλῶς ἢ μὴ καλῶς πρὸς τὴν
 ἀρίστην νενομοθέτηται τάξιν, ἑτέρα δ' εἴ τι πρὸς τὴν ὑπό-
 θεσιν καὶ τὸν τρόπον ὑπεναντίως τῆς προκειμένης αὐτοῖς
 2 πολιτείας. ὅτι μὲν οὖν δεῖ τῇ μελλούσῃ καλῶς πολιτεύ-
 εσθαι τὴν τῶν ἀναγκαίων ὑπάρχειν σχολήν, ὁμολογούμενόν 35
 ἐστίν· τίνα δὲ τρόπον ὑπάρχειν, οὐ ῥάδιον λαβεῖν. ἢ τε
 γὰρ Θετταλῶν πενεστεία πολλάκις ἐπέθετο τοῖς Θετταλοῖς,
 ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τοῖς Λάκωσιν οἱ εἰλωτες (ὥσπερ γὰρ ἐφεδ-
 3 ρεύοντες τοῖς ἀτυχήμασι διατελοῦσιν)· περὶ δὲ τοὺς Κρήτας
 οὐδὲν πω τοιοῦτον συμβέβηκεν· αἴτιον δ' ἴσως τὸ τὰς γειτνιώ- 40
 σας πόλεις, καίπερ πολεμούσας ἀλλήλαις, μηδεμίαν εἶναι 1269 b
 σύμμαχον τοῖς ἀφισταμένοις διὰ τὸ μὴ συμφέρειν καὶ
 αὐταῖς κεκτημέναις περιοίκους· τοῖς δὲ Λάκωσιν οἱ γειτνιών-
 τες ἐχθροὶ πάντες ἦσαν, Ἀργεῖοι καὶ Μεσσήνιοι καὶ Ἀρ-
 κάδες· ἐπεὶ καὶ τοῖς Θετταλοῖς κατ' ἀρχὰς ἀφίσταντο διὰ 5
 τὸ πολεμεῖν ἔτι τοῖς προσχώροις, Ἀχαιοῖς καὶ Περραιβοῖς
 4 καὶ Μάγνησιν. ἔοικε δὲ καὶ εἰ μὴδὲν ἕτερον, ἀλλὰ τό γε
 τῆς ἐπιμελείας ἐργῶδες εἶναι, τίνα δεῖ πρὸς αὐτοὺς ὁμιλῇ-
 σαι τρόπον ἀνιέμενοί τε γὰρ ὑβρίζουσι καὶ τῶν ἴσων ἀξιοῦ-
 σιν ἑαυτοὺς τοῖς κυρίοις, καὶ κακοπαθῶς ζῶντες ἐπιβουλεύουσι 10
 καὶ μισοῦσιν. δῆλον οὖν ὡς οὐκ ἐξευρίσκουσι τὸν βέλτιστον

τρόπον, οὗς τοῦτο συμβαίνει περὶ τὴν εἰλωτείαν. ἔτι δὲ ἡ 5
 περὶ τὰς γυναῖκας ἀνεσις καὶ πρὸς τὴν προαίρεσιν τῆς πο-
 λιτείας βλαβερὰ καὶ πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν πόλεως. ὥσπερ γὰρ
 15 οἰκίας μέρος ἀνὴρ καὶ γυνή, δηλὸν ὅτι καὶ πόλιν ἐγγύς
 τοῦ διχα διηρῆσθαι δεῖ νομίζειν εἰς τε τὸ τῶν ἀνδρῶν πλη-
 θος καὶ τὸ τῶν γυναικῶν, ὥστε ἐν ὅσαις πολιτείαις φαύλως
 ἔχει τὸ περὶ τὰς γυναῖκας, τὸ ἡμισυ τῆς πόλεως εἶναι δεῖ
 νομίζειν ἀνομοθέτητον. ὅπερ ἐκεῖ συμβέβηκεν· ὅλην γὰρ 6
 20 τὴν πόλιν ὁ νομοθέτης εἶναι βουλόμενος καρτερικὴν, κατὰ
 μὲν τοὺς ἀνδρας φανερός ἐστι τοιοῦτος ὢν, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν γυναι-
 κῶν ἐξημέληκεν· ζῶσι γὰρ ἀκολάστως πρὸς ἅπασαν ἀκο-
 λασίαν καὶ τρυφερῶς. ὥστε ἀναγκαῖον ἐν τῇ τοιαύτῃ πολι- 7
 τείᾳ τιμᾶσθαι τὸν πλοῦτον, ἄλλως τε καὶ τύχῳσι γυναι-
 25 κοκρατούμενοι, καθάπερ τὰ πολλὰ τῶν στρατιωτικῶν καὶ
 πολεμικῶν γενῶν, ἕξω Κελτῶν ἢ καὶ εἴ τινας ἕτεροι φα-
 νερώς τετιμῆκασιν τὴν πρὸς τοὺς ἀρρενας συνουσίαν. ἔοικε 8
 γὰρ ὁ μυθολογήσας πρῶτος οὐκ ἀλόγως συζεῖσθαι τὸν Ἄρη
 πρὸς τὴν Ἀφροδίτην· ἡ γὰρ πρὸς τὴν τῶν ἀρρένων ὁμιλίαν
 30 ἢ πρὸς τὴν τῶν γυναικῶν φαίνονται κατακόχμιοι πάντες οἱ
 τοιοῦτοι. διὸ παρὰ τοῖς Λάκῳσι τοῦθ' ὑπῆρχεν, καὶ πολλὰ
 διεφείτο ὑπὸ τῶν γυναικῶν ἐπὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς αὐτῶν. καίτοι 9
 τί διαφέρει γυναῖκας ἀρχειν ἢ τοὺς ἀρχοντας ὑπὸ τῶν
 γυναικῶν ἀρχεσθαι; ταῦτ' ὅμως συμβαίνει. χρησίμου δ'
 35 οὔσης τῆς θρασυτήτος πρὸς οὐδὲν τῶν ἐγκυκλίων, ἀλλ' εἴπερ,
 πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον, βλαβερώταται καὶ πρὸς ταῦθ' αἱ τῶν
 Λακῶνων ἦσαν. ἐδήλωσαν δ' ἐπὶ τῆς Θηβαίων ἐμβολῆς 10
 χρήσιμοι μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲν ἦσαν, ὥσπερ ἐν ἐτέραις πόλεσιν,
 θόρυβον δὲ παρείχον πλείω τῶν πολεμίων. ἐξ ἀρχῆς μὲν
 40 οὖν ἔοικε συμβεβηκέναι τοῖς Λάκῳσιν εὐλόγως ἢ τῶν γυ-
 1270 a ναικῶν ἀνεσις· ἕξω γὰρ τῆς οἰκείας διὰ τὰς στρατείας 11
 ἀπεξενουνο πολὺν χρόνον, πολεμοῦντες τὸν τε πρὸς Ἀργεῖους
 πόλεμον καὶ πάλιν τὸν πρὸς Ἀρκάδας καὶ Μεσσηνίους
 σχολάσαντες δὲ αὐτοὺς μὲν παρείχον τῷ νομοθέτῃ προω-

- δοπεποιημένους διὰ τὸν στρατιωτικὸν βίον (πολλὰ γὰρ ἔχει 5
μέρη τῆς ἀρετῆς), τὰς δὲ γυναῖκας φασὶ μὲν ἀγειν ἐπι-
χειρῆσαι τὸν Δυκοῦργον ἐπὶ τοὺς νόμους, ὥς δ' ἀντέκρουον,
12 ἀποστήναι πάλιν. αἰτίαι μὲν οὖν εἰσὶν αὗται τῶν γενομέ-
νων, ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ταύτης τῆς ἀμαρτίας. ἀλλ' ἡμεῖς
οὐ τοῦτο σκοποῦμεν, τίνοι δεῖ συγγνώμην ἔχειν ἢ μὴ ἔχειν, 10
13 ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ ὀρθῶς καὶ μὴ ὀρθῶς. τὰ δὲ περὶ τὰς γυ-
ναῖκας ἔχοντα μὴ καλῶς ἔοικεν, ὥσπερ ἐλέχθη καὶ πρό-
τερον, οὐ μόνον ἀπρέπειάν τινα ποιεῖν τῆς πολιτείας αὐτῆς
καθ' αὐτήν, ἀλλὰ συμβάλλεσθαί τι πρὸς τὴν φιλοχρη-
ματίαν. μετὰ γὰρ τὰ νῦν ῥηθέντα τοῖς περὶ τὴν ἀνωμα- 15
14 λίαν τῆς κτήσεως ἐπιτιμήσειεν ἂν τις· τοῖς μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν
συμβέβηκε κεκτῆσθαι πολλὴν λίαν οὐσίαν, τοῖς δὲ πάμ-
παν μικράν· διόπερ εἰς ὀλίγους ἦκεν ἢ χώρα. τοῦτο δὲ καὶ
διὰ τῶν νόμων τέτακται φαῦλως· ὠνεῖσθαι μὲν γὰρ ἢ
πωλεῖν τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν ἐποίησεν οὐ καλόν, ὀρθῶς ποιήσας, 20
διδόναι δὲ καὶ καταλείπειν ἔξουσίαν ἔδωκε τοῖς βουλομένοις·
καίτοι ταῦτ' ἀναγκαῖον ἐκείνως τε καὶ οὕτως.
15 ἔστι δὲ καὶ τῶν γυναικῶν σχεδὸν τῆς πάσης χώρας τῶν
πέντε μερῶν τὰ δύο, τῶν τ' ἐπικλήρων πολλῶν γινομένων,
καὶ διὰ τὸ προῖκας διδόναι μεγάλας. καίτοι βέλτιον ἦν 25
μηδεμίαν ἢ ὀλίγην ἢ καὶ μετρίαν τετάχθαι· νῦν δ' ἔξεστι
δοῦναί τε τὴν ἐπὶ κληρον δῶν ἂν βούληται· κὰν ἀποθάνῃ
μὴ διαθέμενος, ὃν ἂν καταλίπῃ κληρονόμον, οὗτος φ' ἂν
16 θέλῃ δίδωσιν. τοιγαροῦν δυναμένης τῆς χώρας χιλίους ἱπ-
πεῖς τρέφειν καὶ πεντακοσίους καὶ ὀπλίτας τρισμυρίους, οὐδὲ 30
χιλίοι τὸ πλῆθος ἦσαν. γέγονε δὲ διὰ τῶν ἔργων αὐτῶν
δῆλον ὅτι φαῦλως αὐτοῖς εἶχε τὰ περὶ τὴν τάξιν ταύτην·
μία γὰρ πληγὴν οὐχ ὑπήνεγκεν ἢ πόλις, ἀλλ' ἀπώλετο
17 διὰ τὴν ὀλιγανθρωπίαν. λέγουσι δ' ὥς ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν προτέ-
ρων βασιλείων μετεδίδοντο τῆς πολιτείας, ὥστ' οὐ γίνεσθαι 35
τότε ὀλιγανθρωπίαν πολεμούντων πολὺν χρόνον καὶ φασιν
εἶναι ποτε τοῖς Σπαρτιάταις καὶ μυρίους οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' εἴτ'

ἐστὶν ἀληθῇ ταῦτα εἴτε μή, βέλτιον τὸ διὰ τῆς κτήσεως
 ὠμαλισμένης πληθύνειν ἀνδρῶν τὴν πόλιν. ὑπεναντίος δὲ 18
 40 καὶ ὁ περὶ τὴν τεκνοποιίαν νόμος πρὸς ταύτην τὴν διόρθω-
 1270 b σιν. βουλόμενος γὰρ ὁ νομοθέτης ὥς πλείστους εἶναι τοὺς
 Σπαρτιατάς, προάγεται τοὺς πολίτας ὅτι πλείστους ποιεῖσθαι
 παῖδας· ἔστι γὰρ αὐτοῖς νόμος τὸν μὲν γεννήσαντα τρεῖς
 υἱοὺς ἄφρουρον εἶναι, τὸν δὲ τέτταρας ἀτελῇ πάντων. καίτοι 19
 5 φανερόν ἐστι πολλῶν γινομένων, τῆς δὲ χώρας οὕτω διηρη-
 μένης, ἀναγκαῖον πολλοὺς γίνεσθαι πένητας. ἀλλὰ μὴν
 καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν ἐφορείαν ἔχει φαύλως· ἡ γὰρ ἀρχὴ κυ-
 ρία μὲν αὐτῇ τῶν μεγίστων αὐτοῖς ἐστίν, γίνονται δ' ἐκ τοῦ
 δήμου πάντες, ὥστε πολλάκις ἐμπίπτουσιν ἄνθρωποι σφόδρα
 10 πένητες εἰς τὸ ἀρχεῖον, οἱ διὰ τὴν ἀπορίαν ὄνιοι ἦσαν.
 ἐδήλωσαν δὲ πολλάκις μὲν καὶ πρότερον, καὶ νῦν δὲ ἐν 20
 τοῖς Ἀνδρίοις· διαφθαρέντες γὰρ ἀργυρίῳ τινές, ὅσον ἐφ'
 ἑαυτοῖς, ὄλην τὴν πόλιν ἀπώλεσαν. καὶ διὰ τὸ τὴν ἀρ-
 χὴν εἶναι λίαν μεγάλην καὶ ἰσοτύραννον δημαγωγεῖν
 15 αὐτοὺς ἠναγκάζοντο καὶ οἱ βασιλεῖς, ὥστε καὶ ταύτῃ συν-
 επιβλάπτεισθαι τὴν πολιτείαν· δημοκρατία γὰρ ἐξ ἀριστο-
 κρατίας συνέβαιεν. συνέχει μὲν οὖν τὴν πολιτείαν τὸ ἀρ- 21
 χεῖον τοῦτο, ἡσυχάζει γὰρ ὁ δῆμος διὰ τὸ μετέχειν τῆς
 μεγίστης ἀρχῆς, ὥστ' εἴτε διὰ τὸν νομοθέτην εἴτε διὰ τύ-
 20 χην τοῦτο συμπέπτωκεν, συμφερόντως ἔχει τοῖς πράγμασιν,
 δεῖ γὰρ τὴν πολιτείαν τὴν μέλλουσαν σώζεσθαι πάντα βού- 22
 λεσθαι τὰ μέρη τῆς πόλεως εἶναι καὶ διαμένειν [ταῦτά]·
 οἱ μὲν οὖν βασιλεῖς διὰ τὴν αὐτῶν τιμὴν οὕτως ἔχουσιν, οἱ
 δὲ καλοὶ κάγαθοι διὰ τὴν γερουσίαν (ἄθλον γὰρ ἡ ἀρχὴ
 25 αὕτη τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐστίν), ὁ δὲ δῆμος διὰ τὴν ἐφορείαν (καθ-
 ἰσταται γὰρ ἐξ ἀπάντων)· ἀλλ' αἰρετὴν ἔδει τὴν ἀρχὴν 23
 εἶναι ταύτην ἐξ ἀπάντων μὲν, μὴ τὸν τρόπον δὲ τοῦτον ὃν
 νῦν παιδαριώδης γάρ ἐστι λίαν. ἔτι δὲ καὶ κρίσεών εἰσι
 μεγάλων κύριοι, ὄντες οἱ τυχόντες, διόπερ οὐκ αὐτογνώμο-
 30 νας βέλτιον κρίνειν ἀλλὰ κατὰ γράμματα καὶ τοὺς

- 24 νόμους. ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἡ δίαίτα τῶν ἐφόρων οὐχ ὁμολογουμένη
τῷ βουλήματι τῆς πόλεως· αὐτὴ μὲν γὰρ ἀνειμένη λίαν
ἐστίν, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις μᾶλλον ὑπερβάλλει ἐπὶ τὸ σκλη-
ρόν, ὥστε μὴ δύνασθαι καρτερεῖν ἀλλὰ λάθρα τὸν νόμον
ἀποδιδράσκοντας ἀπολαύειν τῶν σωματικῶν ἡδονῶν. ἔχει 35
δὲ καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν τῶν γερόντων ἀρχὴν οὐ καλῶς αὐτοῖς·
- 25 ἐπεικῶν μὲν γὰρ ὄντων καὶ πεπαιδευμένων ἱκανῶς πρὸς
ἀνδραγαθίαν τάχα ἂν εἴπειέ τις συμφέρειν τῇ πόλει· καί-
τοι τό γε διὰ βίου κυρίου εἶναι κρίσεων μεγάλων ἀμφισ-
βητήσιμον, ἔστι γάρ, ὥσπερ καὶ σώματος, καὶ διανοίας 40
γῆρας· τὸν τρόπον δὲ τοῦτον πεπαιδευμένων ὥστε καὶ τὸν 1271 a
νομοθέτην αὐτὸν ἀπιστεῖν ὡς οὐκ ἀγαθοῖς ἀνδράσιν, οὐκ
- 26 ἀσφαλές. φαίνονται δὲ καὶ καταδωροδοκούμενοι καὶ κα-
ταχαριζόμενοι πολλὰ τῶν κοινῶν οἱ κεκοινωνηκότες τῆς
ἀρχῆς ταύτης. διόπερ βέλτιον αὐτοὺς μὴ ἀνευθύνους εἶναι· 5
νῦν δ' εἰσὶν. δόξειε δ' ἂν ἡ τῶν ἐφόρων ἀρχὴ πάσας εὐθύ-
νειν τὰς ἀρχάς· τοῦτο δὲ τῇ ἐφορείᾳ μέγα λίαν τὸ δῶρον,
καὶ τὸν τρόπον οὐ τοῦτον λέγομεν διδόναι δεῖν τὰς εὐθύνας.
- 27 ἔτι δὲ καὶ τὴν αἵρεσιν ἣν ποιοῦνται τῶν γερόντων, κατὰ τε
τὴν κρίσιν ἐστὶ παιδαριώδης, καὶ τὸ αὐτὸν αἰτεῖσθαι τὸν 10
ἀξιωθησόμενον τῆς ἀρχῆς οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἔχει· δεῖ γὰρ καὶ βου-
λόμενον καὶ μὴ βουλόμενον ἀρχειν τὸν ἄξιον τῆς ἀρχῆς.
- 28 νῦν δ' ὅπερ καὶ περὶ τὴν ἄλλην πολιτείαν ὁ νομοθέτης
φαίνεται ποιῶν· φιλοτίμους γὰρ κατασκευάζων τοὺς πολί-
τας τούτῳ κέχρηται πρὸς τὴν αἵρεσιν τῶν γερόντων· οὐδεὶς 15
γὰρ ἂν ἀρχειν αἰτήσαιο μὴ φιλότιμος ὢν. καίτοι τῶν
γ' ἀδικημάτων τῶν ἐκουσίων τὰ πλείστα συμβαίνει σχεδὸν
- 29 διὰ φιλοτιμίαν καὶ διὰ φιλοχρηματίαν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις. περὶ
δὲ βασιλείας, εἰ μὲν μὴ βέλτιόν ἐστιν ὑπάρχειν ταῖς πό-
λεσιν ἢ βέλτιον, ἄλλος ἔστω λόγος· ἀλλὰ μὴν βέλτιόν 20
γε μὴ καθάπερ νῦν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸν αὐτοῦ βίον ἕκαστον
- 30 κρίνεσθαι τῶν βασιλέων. ὅτι δὲ ὁ νομοθέτης οὐδ' αὐτὸς οἶται
δύνασθαι ποιεῖν καλοὺς κάγαθούς, δῆλον· ἀπιστεῖ γοῦν ὡς οὐκ

οὔσιν ἱκανῶς ἀγαθοῖς ἀνδράσιν· διόπερ ἐξέπεμπον συμπρεσ-
 25 βευτὰς τοὺς ἐχθρούς, καὶ σωτηρίαν ἐνόμιζον τῇ πόλει εἶναι
 τὸ στασιάζειν τοὺς βασιλεῖς. οὐ καλῶς δ' οὐδὲ περὶ τὰ συσ-
 σίτια τὰ καλούμενα φιδίτια νενομοθέτηται τῷ καταστήσαντι
 πρῶτον· ἔδει γὰρ ἀπὸ κοινοῦ μᾶλλον εἶναι τὴν σύνοδον, 31
 καθάπερ ἐν Κρήτῃ· παρὰ δὲ τοῖς Δάκωσιν ἕκαστον δεῖ
 30 φέρειν, καὶ σφόδρα πενήτων ἐνίων ὄντων καὶ τοῦτο τὸ ἀνά-
 λωμα οὐ δυναμένων δαπανᾶν, ὥστε συμβαίνει τούναντίον
 τῷ νομοθέτῃ τῆς προαιρέσεως. βούλεται μὲν γὰρ δημοκρα- 32
 τικὸν εἶναι τὸ κατασκευάσμα τῶν συσσιτίων, γίνεται δ'
 ἥκιστα δημοκρατικὸν οὕτω νενομοθετημένον· μετέχειν μὲν
 35 γὰρ οὐ ῥάδιον τοῖς λίαν πένησιν, ὅρος δὲ τῆς πολιτείας
 οὗτός ἐστιν αὐτοῖς ὁ πάτριος, τὸν μὴ δυνάμενον τοῦτο τὸ
 τέλος φέρειν μὴ μετέχειν αὐτῆς. τῷ δὲ περὶ τοὺς ναυάρ- 33
 χους νόμῳ καὶ ἕτεροί τινες ἐπιτετιμήκασιν, ὀρθῶς ἐπιτιμῶν-
 τες, στάσεως γὰρ γίνεται αἴτιος· ἐπὶ γὰρ τοῖς βασιλεῦσιν
 40 οὔσι στρατηγοῖς αἰδίοις ἢ ναυαρχία σχεδὸν ἑτέρα βασιλεία
 καθέστηκεν. καὶ ὧδὶ δὲ τῇ ὑποθέσει τοῦ νομοθέτου ἐπιτιμή- 34
 1271 b σσειεν ἂν τις, ὅπερ καὶ Πλάτων ἐν τοῖς νόμοις ἐπιτετίμηκεν
 πρὸς γὰρ μέρος ἀρετῆς ἢ πᾶσα σύνταξις τῶν νόμων ἐστί,
 τὴν πολεμικὴν· αὕτη γὰρ χρησίμη πρὸς τὸ κρατεῖν. τοι-
 γαροῦν ἐσώζοντο μὲν πολεμοῦντες, ἀπώλλυντο δὲ ἄρξαντες
 5 διὰ τὸ μὴ ἐπίστασθαι σχολάζειν μηδὲ ἡσκηκέναι μηδε-
 μίαν ἀσκησιν ἑτέραν κυριωτέραν τῆς πολεμικῆς. τούτου δὲ 35
 ἀμάρτημα οὐκ ἔλαττον· νομίζουσι μὲν γὰρ γίνεσθαι τά-
 γαθὰ τὰ περιμάχῃτα δι' ἀρετῆς μᾶλλον ἢ κακίας, καὶ
 τοῦτο μὲν καλῶς, ὅτι μέντοι ταῦτα κρείττω τῆς ἀρετῆς
 10 ὑπολαμβάνουσιν, οὐ καλῶς. φαύλως δὲ ἔχει καὶ περὶ τὰ 36
 κοινὰ χρήματα τοῖς Σπαρτιάταις· οὔτε γὰρ ἐν τῷ κοινῷ
 τῆς πόλεως ἐστὶν οὐδὲν πολέμους μεγάλους ἀναγκαζομένους
 πολεμεῖν, εἰσφέρουσί τε κακῶς· διὰ γὰρ τὸ τῶν Σπαρ-
 τιατῶν εἶναι τὴν πλείστην γῆν οὐκ ἐξετάζουσιν ἀλλήλων τὰς
 15 εἰσφοράς. ἀποβέβηκέ τε τούναντίον τῷ νομοθέτῃ τοῦ συμ- 37

φέροντος· τὴν μὲν γὰρ πόλιν πεποίηκεν ἀχρήματον, τοὺς
 δ' ἰδιώτας φιλοχρημάτους. περὶ μὲν οὖν τῆς Λακεδαιμονίων
 πολιτείας ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον εἰρήσθω· ταῦτα γὰρ ἐστὶν ἃ μάλιστα
 ἂν τις ἐπιτιμήσειεν·

Ἡ δὲ Κρητικὴ πολιτεία πάρεγγυς μὲν ἐστὶ ταύτης, 10
 ἔχει δὲ μικρὰ μὲν οὐ χεῖρον, τὸ δὲ πλεῖον ἦττον γλαφυ-
 ρῶς. καὶ γὰρ ἔοικε καὶ λέγεται δὲ τὰ πλείστα μεμιμή-
 σθαι τὴν Κρητικὴν πολιτείαν ἢ τῶν Λακῶνων, τὰ δὲ πλεῖ-
 2 στα τῶν ἀρχαίων ἦττον διήρθρωται τῶν νεωτέρων. φασὶ
 γὰρ τὸν Λυκούργον, ὅτε τὴν ἐπιτροπείαν τὴν Χαρίλλου τοῦ 25
 βασιλέως καταλιπὼν ἀπεδήμησεν, τότε τὸν πλείστον δια-
 τρίψαι χρόνον περὶ Κρήτην διὰ τὴν συγγένειαν ἀποι-
 κοι γὰρ οἱ Δύκτιοι τῶν Λακῶνων ἦσαν, κατέλαβον δ' οἱ
 πρὸς τὴν ἀποικίαν ἐλθόντες τὴν τάξιν τῶν νόμων ὑπάρχου-
 3 σαν ἐν τοῖς τότε κατοικοῦσιν. διὸ καὶ νῦν οἱ περίοικοι τὸν 30
 αὐτὸν τρόπον χρῶνται αὐτοῖς, ὥς κατασκευάσαντος Μίνω
 πρώτου τὴν τάξιν τῶν νόμων. δοκεῖ δ' ἡ νῆσος καὶ πρὸς
 τὴν ἀρχὴν τὴν Ἑλληνικὴν πεφυκέναι καὶ κεῖσθαι καλῶς·
 πάσῃ γὰρ ἐπείκειται τῇ θαλάσῃ, σχεδὸν τῶν Ἑλλήνων
 ἰδρυμένων περὶ τὴν θάλασσαν πάντων· ἀπέχει γὰρ τῇ μὲν 35
 τῆς Πελοποννήσου μικρόν, τῇ δὲ τῆς Ἀσίας τοῦ περὶ Τριόπιον
 4 τόπου καὶ Ῥόδον. διὸ καὶ τὴν τῆς θαλάσσης ἀρχὴν κατέσ-
 χεν ὁ Μίνως, καὶ τὰς νήσους τὰς μὲν ἐχειρώσατο τὰς
 δ' ᾤκισεν, τέλος δὲ ἐπιθέμενος τῇ Σικελίᾳ τὸν βίον ἐτελεύ-
 τησεν ἐκεῖ περὶ Κάμικον. ἔχει δ' ἀνάλογον ἡ Κρητικὴ τά- 40
 5 ξις πρὸς τὴν Λακωνικὴν· γεωργοῦσί τε γὰρ τοῖς μὲν εἰλω-
 τες τοῖς δὲ Κρησὶν οἱ περίοικοι, καὶ συσσίτια παρ' ἀμφο- 1272 a
 τέροις ἐστίν· καὶ τό γε ἀρχαῖον ἐκάλουν οἱ Λάκωνες οὐ φι-
 δίτια ἀλλὰ ἀνδρεία, καθάπερ οἱ Κρήτες, ἧ καὶ δῆλον ὅτι
 6 ἐκείθεν ἐλήλυθεν. ἔτι δὲ τῆς πολιτείας ἡ τάξις· οἱ μὲν
 γὰρ ἔφοροι τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχουσι δύναμιν τοῖς ἐν τῇ Κρήτῃ 5
 καλουμένοις κόσμοις, πλὴν οἱ μὲν ἔφοροι πέντε τὸν ἀριθ-
 μὸν οἱ δὲ κόσμοι δέκα εἰσὶν· οἱ δὲ γέροντες τοῖς γέρουσιν,

οὓς καλοῦσιν οἱ Κρήτες βουλὴν, ἴσοι· βασιλεία δὲ πρότερον
 μὲν ἦν, εἴτα κατέλυσαν οἱ Κρήτες, καὶ τὴν ἡγεμονίαν οἱ
 10 κόσμοι τὴν κατὰ πόλεμον ἔχουσιν· ἐκκλησίας δὲ μετέχουσι 7
 πάντες, κυρία δ' οὐδενός ἐστιν ἀλλ' ἡ συνεπιψηφίσαι τὰ δό-
 ξαντα τοῖς γέρουσι καὶ τοῖς κόσμοις. τὰ μὲν οὖν τῶν συσ-
 σιτίων ἔχει βέλτιον τοῖς Κρησὶν ἢ τοῖς Λάκωσιν· ἐν μὲν
 γὰρ Λακεδαίμονι κατὰ κεφαλὴν ἕκαστος εἰσφέρει τὸ τε-
 15 ταγμένον, εἰ δὲ μὴ, μετέχειν νόμος κωλύει τῆς πολιτείας,
 καθάπερ εἴρηται καὶ πρότερον, ἐν δὲ Κρήτῃ κοινοτέρως, 8
 ἀπὸ πάντων γὰρ τῶν γινομένων καρπῶν τε καὶ βοσκημά-
 των ἐκ τῶν δημοσίων καὶ φόρων οὓς φέρουσιν οἱ περί-
 οικοι, τέτακται μέρος τὸ μὲν πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς καὶ τὰς κοι-
 20 νὰς λειτουργίας, τὸ δὲ τοῖς συσσιτίοις, ὥστ' ἐκ κοινοῦ τρέ-
 φεσθαι πάντας, καὶ γυναῖκας καὶ παῖδας καὶ ἄνδρας·
 πρὸς δὲ τὴν ὀλιγοσιτίαν ὥς ὠφέλιμον πολλὰ πεφίλο- 9
 σόφηκεν ὁ νομοθέτης, καὶ πρὸς τὴν διάζευξιν τῶν γυναι-
 κῶν, ἵνα μὴ πολυτεκνώσι, τὴν πρὸς τοὺς ἄρρενας ποιήσας
 25 ὁμιλίαν, περὶ ἧς εἰ φαύλως ἢ μὴ φαύλως, ἕτερος ἔσται
 τοῦ διασκέψασθαι καιρός. ὅτι δὲ τὰ περὶ τὰ συσσίτια βέλ-
 τιον τέτακται τοῖς Κρησὶν ἢ τοῖς Λάκωσι, φανερόν. τὰ
 δὲ περὶ τοὺς κόσμους ἔτι χεῖρον τῶν ἐφόρων· ὃ μὲν γὰρ 10
 ἔχει κακὸν τὸ τῶν ἐφόρων ἀρχεῖον, ὑπάρχει καὶ τούτοις γί-
 30 νονται γὰρ οἱ τυχόντες· ὃ δ' ἐκεῖ συμφέρει πρὸς τὴν πολι-
 τείαν, ἐνταῦθα οὐκ ἔστιν. ἐκεῖ μὲν γάρ, διὰ τὸ τὴν αἵρε-
 σιν ἐκ πάντων εἶναι, μετέχων ὁ δῆμος τῆς μεγίστης ἀρχῆς
 βούλεται μένειν τὴν πολιτείαν· ἐνταῦθα δ' οὐκ ἐξ ἀπάντων
 αἰροῦνται τοὺς κόσμους ἀλλ' ἐκ τινῶν γενῶν, καὶ τοὺς γέρον-
 35 τας ἐκ τῶν κεκοσμηκότων. περὶ ὧν τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἂν τις εἴ- 11
 πειε λόγους καὶ περὶ τῶν ἐν Λακεδαίμονι γινομένων· τὸ
 γὰρ ἀνυπεύθυνον καὶ τὸ διὰ βίου μείζον ἐστὶ γέρας τῆς
 ἀξίας αὐτοῖς, καὶ τὸ μὴ κατὰ γράμματα ἀρχειν ἀλλ'
 αὐτογνώμονας ἐπισφαλές. τὸ δ' ἡσυχάζειν μὴ μετέχοντα 12
 40 τὸν δῆμον οὐδὲν σημεῖον τοῦ τετάχθαι καλῶς· οὐδὲν γὰρ

- λήμματός τι τοῖς κόσμοις ὥσπερ τοῖς ἐφόροις, πόρρω γ'
 13 ἀποικοῦσιν ἐν νήσῳ τῶν διαφθερούντων. ἦν δὲ ποιοῦνται τῆς 1272 b
 ἀμαρτίας ταύτης ἱατρείαν, ἀτοπος καὶ οὐ πολιτικὴ ἀλλὰ
 δυναστευτικὴ· πολλάκις γὰρ ἐκβάλλουσι συστάντες τινὲς τοὺς
 κόσμους ἢ τῶν συναρχόντων αὐτῶν ἢ τῶν ιδιωτῶν, ἔξεστι
 δὲ καὶ μεταξὺ τοῖς κόσμοις ἀπειπεῖν τὴν ἀρχήν. ταῦτα 5
 δὴ πάντα βέλτιον γίνεσθαι κατὰ νόμον ἢ κατ' ἀνθρώπων
 14 βούλῃσιν· οὐ γὰρ ἀσφαλὴς ὁ κανὼν. πάντων δὲ φαυλότα-
 τον τὸ τῆς ἀκοσμίας τῶν δυνατῶν, ἣν καθιστᾷσι πολλάκις
 ὅταν μὴ δίκας βούλωνται δοῦναι· ἥ καὶ δῆλον ὥς ἔχει τι
 πολιτείας ἢ τάξιν, ἀλλ' οὐ πολιτεία ἐστὶν ἀλλὰ δυναστεία 10
 μᾶλλον. εἰώθασι δὲ διαλαμβάνοντες τὸν δῆμον καὶ τοὺς
 φίλους μοναρχίαν ποιεῖν καὶ στασιάζειν καὶ μάχεσθαι πρὸς
 15 ἀλλήλους. καίτοι τί διαφέρει τὸ τοιοῦτον ἢ διὰ τινος χρόνου
 μηκέτι πόλιν εἶναι τὴν τοιαύτην, ἀλλὰ λύεσθαι τὴν πο-
 λιτικὴν κοινωνίαν; ἔστι δ' ἐπικίνδυνος οὕτως ἔχουσα πόλιν, 15
 τῶν βουλομένων ἐπιτίθεσθαι καὶ δυναμένων. ἀλλὰ καθά-
 περ εἴρηται, σώζεται διὰ τὸν τρόπον ξενηλασίας γὰρ τὸ
 16 πόρρω πεποιήκειν. διὸ καὶ τὸ τῶν περιοίκων μένει τοῖς Κρη-
 σίν, οἱ δ' εἰλωτες ἀφίστανται πολλάκις· οὔτε γὰρ ἐξωτερι-
 κῆς ἀρχῆς κοινωνοῦσιν οἱ Κρήτες, νεωστὶ τε πόλεμος ξενικὸς 20
 διαβέβηκεν εἰς τὴν νῆσον, ὃς πεποίηκε φανεράν τὴν ἀσθέ-
 νειαν τῶν ἐκεῖ νόμων. περὶ μὲν οὖν ταύτης εἰρήσθω τοσαύτ'
 ἡμῖν τῆς πολιτείας

Πολιτεύεσθαι δὲ δοκοῦσι καὶ Καρχηδόνιοι καλῶς καὶ 11
 πολλὰ περιττῶς πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους, μάλιστα δ' ἔνια παρα- 25
 πλησίως τοῖς Λάκωσιν αὐταὶ γὰρ αἱ πολιτεῖαι τρεῖς ἀλ-
 λήλαις τε σύνεγγυς πῶς εἰσι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πολὺ δια-
 φέρουσιν, ἥ τε Κρητικὴ καὶ ἡ Λακωνικὴ καὶ τρίτη τούτων
 ἡ Καρχηδονίων· καὶ πολλὰ τῶν τεταγμένων ἔχει παρ'
 2 αὐτοῖς καλῶς. σημεῖον δὲ πολιτείας συντεταγμένης τὸ τὸν 30
 δῆμον ἔχουσαν διαμένειν ἐν τῇ τάξει τῆς πολιτείας, καὶ
 μήτε στάσιν, ὃ τι καὶ ἄξιον εἰπεῖν, γεγενῆσθαι μήτε τύ-

ραννον. ἔχει δὲ παραπλήσια τῇ Λακωνικῇ πολιτείᾳ τὰ 3
 μὲν συσσίτια τῶν ἐταιριῶν τοῖς φιδιτίοις, τὴν δὲ τῶν ἑκα-
 35 τὸν καὶ τεττάρων ἀρχὴν τοῖς ἐφόροις (πλὴν οὐ χεῖρον· οἱ
 μὲν γὰρ ἐκ τῶν τυχόντων εἰσὶ, ταύτην δ' αἰροῦνται τὴν ἀρχὴν
 ἀριστίνδην), τοὺς δὲ βασιλεῖς καὶ τὴν γερουσίαν ἀνάλογον
 τοῖς ἐκεῖ βασιλεῦσι καὶ γέρουσιν καὶ βέλτιον δὲ τοὺς βα- 4
 σιλεῖς μῆτε κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναι γένος, μηδὲ τοῦτο τὸ τυ-
 40 χόν, εἴ τε διαφέρων, ἐκ τούτων αἰρετοὺς μᾶλλον ἢ καθ' ἡλι-
 κίαν· μεγάλων γὰρ κύριοι καθεστῶτες, ἂν εὐτελεῖς ᾧσι,
 1273 a μεγάλα βλάπτουσι καὶ ἔβλαψαν ἤδη τὴν πόλιν τὴν τῶν
 Δακεδαimoniῶν. τὰ μὲν οὖν πλείστα τῶν ἐπιτιμηθέντων ἂν 5
 διὰ τὰς παρεκβάσεις κοινὰ τυγχάνει πάσαις ὄντα ταῖς
 εἰρημέναις πολιτείαις· τῶν δὲ πρὸς τὴν ὑπόθεσιν τῆς ἀρι-
 5 στοκρατίας καὶ τῆς πολιτείας τὰ μὲν εἰς δῆμον ἐκκλίνει
 μᾶλλον, τὰ δ' εἰς ὀλιγαρχίαν. τοῦ μὲν γὰρ τὰ μὲν προσ-
 άγειν τὰ δὲ μὴ προσάγειν πρὸς τὸν δῆμον οἱ βασιλεῖς
 κύριοι μετὰ τῶν γερόντων, ἂν ὁμογνωμονῶσι πάντες· εἰ
 δὲ μή, καὶ τούτων ὁ δῆμος· ἂ δ' ἂν εἰσφέρωσιν οὗτοι, οὐ 6
 10 διακοῦσαι μόνον ἀποδιδῶσιν τῷ δήμῳ τὰ δόξαντα τοῖς ἀρ-
 χουσιν, ἀλλὰ κύριοι κρίνειν εἰσὶ καὶ τῷ βουλομένῳ τοῖς
 εἰσφερομένοις ἀντειπεῖν ἕξεστιν, ὅπερ ἐν ταῖς ἑτέραις πολι-
 τεύαις οὐκ ἔστιν. τὸ δὲ τὰς πενταρχίας κυρίας οὐσας πολλῶν 7
 καὶ μεγάλων ὑφ' αὐτῶν αἰρετὰς εἶναι, καὶ τὴν τῶν ἑκα-
 15 τὸν ταύτας αἰρεῖσθαι τὴν μεγίστην ἀρχήν, ἔτι δὲ ταύτας
 πλείονα ἀρχεῖν χρόνον τῶν ἄλλων (καὶ γὰρ ἐξεληλυθότες
 ἀρχοῦσι καὶ μέλλοντες) ὀλιγαρχικόν· τὸ δὲ ἀμίσθους καὶ
 μὴ κληρωτὰς ἀριστοκρατικὸν θετέον, καὶ εἴ τι τοιοῦτον ἕτε-
 ρον, καὶ τὸ τὰς δίκας ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρχέων δικάζεσθαι πά-
 20 σας, καὶ μὴ ἄλλας ὑπ' ἄλλων, καθάπερ ἐν Δακεδαίμονι.
 παρεκβαίνει δὲ τῆς ἀριστοκρατίας ἡ τάξις τῶν Καρχηδο- 8
 νίων μάλιστα πρὸς τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν κατὰ τινα διάνοιαν ἢ
 συνδοκεῖ τοῖς πολλοῖς· οὐ γὰρ μόνον ἀριστίνδην ἀλλὰ καὶ
 πλουτίνδην οἶονται δεῖν αἰρεῖσθαι τοὺς ἀρχοντας· ἀδύνατον

- 9 γὰρ τὸν ἀποροῦντα καλῶς ἀρχειν καὶ σχολάζειν. εἴπερ οὖν 25
τὸ μὲν αἰρεῖσθαι πλουτίνδην ὀλιγαρχικόν, τὸ δὲ κατ' ἀρε-
τὴν ἀριστοκρατικόν, αὕτη τις ἂν εἴη τάξις τρίτη, καθ' ἣν-
περ συντέτακται καὶ τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις τὰ περὶ τὴν πο-
λιτείαν· αἰροῦνται γὰρ εἰς δύο ταῦτα βλέποντες, καὶ μά-
λιστα τὰς μεγίστας, τοὺς τε βασιλεῖς καὶ τοὺς στρατηγούς. 30
- 10 δεῖ δὲ νομίζειν ἀμάρτημα νομοθέτου τὴν παρέκβασιν εἶναι
τῆς ἀριστοκρατίας ταύτην· ἐξ ἀρχῆς γὰρ τοῦθ' ὄρᾱν ἐστὶ
τῶν ἀναγκαιοτάτων, ὅπως οἱ βέλτιστοι δύνωνται σχολάζειν
καὶ μηδὲν ἀσχημονεῖν, μὴ μόνον ἀρχοντες ἀλλὰ μηδ'
ιδιωτεύοντες. εἰ δὲ δεῖ βλέπειν καὶ πρὸς εὐπορίαν χάριν 35
σχολῆς, φαῦλον τὸ τὰς μεγίστας ὦνητάς εἶναι τῶν ἀρχῶν,
- 11 τὴν τε βασιλείαν καὶ τὴν στρατηγίαν· ἔντιμον γὰρ ὁ νόμος
οὗτος ποιεῖ τὸν πλοῦτον μᾶλλον τῆς ἀρετῆς, καὶ τὴν πόλιν
δλην φιλοχρήματον· ὅτι δ' ἂν ὑπολάβῃ τίμιον εἶναι τὸ
κύριον, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὴν τῶν ἄλλων πολιτῶν δόξαν ἀκο- 40
λουθεῖν τούτοις· ὅπου δὲ μὴ μάλιστα ἀρετὴ τιμᾶται, ταύτην
- 12 οὐχ οἶόν τε βεβαίως ἀριστοκρατεῖσθαι τὴν πολιτείαν. ἐθίξε- 1273 b
σθαι δ' εὐλογον κερδαίνειν τοὺς ὠνουμένους, ὅταν δαπανή-
σαντες ἀρχῶσιν· ἄτοπον γὰρ εἰ πένης μὲν ὦν ἐπιεικῆς δὲ
βουλήσεται κερδαίνειν, φαυλότερος δ' ὦν οὐ βουλήσεται δαπα-
νήσας. διὸ δεῖ τοὺς δυναμένους ἀριστ' ἀρχειν, τούτους ἀρχειν. 5
βέλτιον δ', εἰ καὶ προεῖτο τὴν εὐπορίαν τῶν ἐπιεικῶν ὁ νο-
μοθέτης, ἀλλὰ ἀρχόντων γε ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τῆς σχολῆς.
- 13 φαῦλον δ' ἂν δόξειεν εἶναι καὶ τὸ πλείους ἀρχὰς τὸν αὐτὸν
ἀρχειν· ὅπερ εὐδοκιμεῖ παρὰ τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις. ἐν γὰρ
ὑφ' ἑνὸς ἔργον ἀριστ' ἀποτελεῖται. δεῖ δ' ὅπως γίνηται τοῦτο 10
ὄρᾱν τὸν νομοθέτην, καὶ μὴ προστάττειν τὸν αὐτὸν αὐλεῖν
- 14 καὶ σκυτοτομεῖν. ὥσθ' ὅπου μὴ μικρὰ πόλις, πολιτικώτερον
πλείονας μετέχειν τῶν ἀρχῶν, καὶ δημοτικώτερον· κοινό-
τερόν τε γάρ, καθάπερ εἴπομεν, καὶ κάλλιον ἕκαστον ἀπο-
τελεῖται τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ θᾶττον. δῆλον δὲ τοῦτο ἐπὶ τῶν 15
πολεμικῶν καὶ τῶν ναυτικῶν· ἐν τούτοις γὰρ ἀμφοτέροις

διὰ πάντων ὡς εἰπεῖν διελήλυθε τὸ ἄρχειν καὶ τὸ ἄρχεσ-
 θαι. ὀλιγαρχικῆς δ' οὔσης τῆς πολιτείας ἄριστα ἐκφεύ- 15
 γουσι τῷ πλουτεῖν, αἰεὶ τι τοῦ δήμου μέρος ἐκπέμποντες ἐπὶ
 20 τὰς πόλεις, τοῦτ' ἄν ἴωνται καὶ ποιοῦσι μόνιμον τὴν πο-
 λιτείαν. ἀλλὰ τοῦτί ἐστι τύχης ἔργον, δεῖ δὲ ἀστασιάστους
 εἶναι διὰ τὸν νομοθέτην. νῦν δέ, ἂν ἀτυχία γένηται τις 16
 καὶ τὸ πλῆθος ἀποστῇ τῶν ἀρχομένων, οὐδὲν ἐστι φάρμακον
 διὰ τῶν νόμων τῆς ἡσυχίας. περὶ μὲν οὖν τῆς Λακεδαιμονίων
 25 πολιτείας καὶ Κρητικῆς καὶ τῆς Καρχηδονίων, αἵπερ δικαίως
 εὐδοκιμοῦσι, τοῦτον ἔχει τὸν τρόπον·

12 Τῶν δὲ ἀποφνηαμένων τι περὶ πολιτείας ἔνιοι μὲν οὐκ
 ἐκοινωνήσαν πράξεων πολιτικῶν οὐδ' ὠντινωνοῦν, ἀλλὰ διετέ-
 λεσαν ἰδιωτεύοντες τὸν βίον, περὶ ὧν εἴ τι ἀξιόλογον, εἴρη-
 30 ται σχεδὸν περὶ πάντων, ἔνιοι δὲ νομοθέται γεγόνασιν, οἱ
 μὲν ταῖς οἰκείαις πόλεσιν, οἱ δὲ καὶ τῶν ὀθνείων τισί, πο-
 λιτευθέντες αὐτοί· καὶ τούτων οἱ μὲν νόμων ἐγένοντο δη-
 μιουργοὶ μόνον, οἱ δὲ καὶ πολιτείας, οἷον καὶ Λυκούργος καὶ
 Σόλων· οὗτοι γὰρ καὶ νόμους καὶ πολιτείας κατέστησαν.
 35 περὶ μὲν οὖν τῆς Λακεδαιμονίων εἴρηται, Σόλωνα δ' ἔνιοι 2
 μὲν οἰοῦνται γενέσθαι νομοθέτην σπουδαῖον· ὀλιγαρχίαν τε
 γὰρ καταλῦσαι λίαν ἄκρατον οὔσαν, καὶ δουλεύοντα τὸν
 δῆμον παῦσαι, καὶ δημοκρατίαν καταστήσαι τὴν πάτριον,
 μίξαντα καλῶς τὴν πολιτείαν· εἶναι γὰρ τὴν μὲν ἐν Ἀρείφ
 40 πάγῃ βουλὴν ὀλιγαρχικόν, τὸ δὲ τὰς ἀρχὰς αἰρετὰς ἀρι-
 στοκρατικόν, τὰ δὲ δικαστήρια δημοτικόν. ἔοικε δὲ Σόλων 3

1274 a ἐκεῖνα μὲν ὑπάρχοντα πρότερον οὐ καταλῦσαι, τὴν τε βου-
 λην καὶ τὴν τῶν ἀρχῶν αἵρεσιν, τὸν δὲ δῆμον καταστήσαι,
 τὰ δικαστήρια ποιήσας ἐκ πάντων. διὸ καὶ μέμφονται
 τινες αὐτῷ· λῦσαι γὰρ θάτερον, κύριον ποιήσαντα τὸ δικα-
 5 στήριον πάντων, κληρωτὸν ὄν. ἐπεὶ γὰρ τοῦτ' ἴσχυσεν, ὥσπερ 4
 τυράννῃ τῷ δήμῳ χαριζόμενοι τὴν πολιτείαν εἰς τὴν νῦν
 δημοκρατίαν κατέστησαν, καὶ τὴν μὲν ἐν Ἀρείφ πάγῃ βου-
 λην Ἐφιάλτης ἐκόλουσε καὶ Περικλῆς, τὰ δὲ δικαστήρια

μισθοφόρα κατέστησε Περικλῆς, καὶ τοῦτον δὴ τὸν τρόπον
 ἕκαστος τῶν δημαγωγῶν προήγαγεν αὖξων εἰς τὴν νῦν δη- 10
 5 μοκρατίαν. φαίνεται δὲ οὐ κατὰ τὴν Σόλωνος γενέσθαι τοῦτο
 προαίρεσιν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἀπὸ συμπτώματος (τῆς ναυαρ-
 χίας γὰρ ἐν τοῖς Μηδικοῖς ὁ δῆμος αἴτιος γενόμενος ἐφρο-
 νηματίσθη, καὶ δημαγωγούς ἔλαβε φαύλους ἀντιπολιτευο-
 μένων τῶν ἐπικικῶν), ἐπεὶ Σόλων γε ἔοικε τὴν ἀναγκαιο- 15
 τάτην ἀποδιδόναι τῷ δήμῳ δύναμιν, τὸ τὰς ἀρχὰς αἰρεῖ-
 σθαι καὶ εὐθύνειν (μηδὲ γὰρ τούτου κύριος ὢν ὁ δῆμος
 6 δοῦλος ἂν εἴη καὶ πολέμιος), τὰς δ' ἀρχὰς ἐκ τῶν γνωρί-
 μων καὶ τῶν εὐπρόρων κατέστησε πάσας, ἐκ τῶν πεντακο-
 σιομεδίμων καὶ ζευγитῶν καὶ τρίτου τέλους τῆς καλουμένης 20
 ἱππάδος· τὸ δὲ τέταρτον θητικόν, οἷς οὐδεμιᾶς ἀρχῆς μετῆν.
 νομοθέται δὲ ἐγένοντο Ζάλευκός τε Λοκροῖς τοῖς ἐπιζεφυ-
 ρίοις, καὶ Χαρώνδας ὁ Καταναῖος τοῖς αὐτοῦ πολίταις καὶ
 ταῖς ἄλλαις ταῖς Χαλκιδικαῖς πόλεσι ταῖς περὶ Ἰταλίαν
 7 καὶ Σικελίαν. πειρῶνται δὲ τινες καὶ συνάγειν ὥς Ὀνο- 25
 μακρίτου μὲν γενομένου πρώτου δεινοῦ περὶ νομοθεσίαν, γυμνα-
 σθῆναι δ' αὐτὸν ἐν Κρήτῃ Λοκρὸν ὄντα καὶ ἐπιδημοῦντα
 κατὰ τέχνην μαντικήν· τούτου δὲ γενέσθαι Θάλητα ἐταῖρον,
 Θάλητος δ' ἀκροατὴν Λυκούργου καὶ Ζάλευκου, Ζαλεύκου
 8 δὲ Χαρώνδαν. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν λέγουσιν ἀσκεπτότερον τῷ 30
 χρόνῳ λέγοντες, ἐγένετο δὲ καὶ Φιλόλαος ὁ Κορίνθιος νο-
 μοθέτης Θηβαίοις. ἦν δ' ὁ Φιλόλαος τὸ μὲν γένος τῶν
 Βακχιαδῶν, ἐραστής δὲ γενόμενος Διοκλέους τοῦ νικήσαντος
 Ὀλυμπίαςιν, ὥς ἐκεῖνος τὴν πόλιν ἔλιπε διαμισήσας τὸν
 ἔρωτα τὸν τῆς μητρὸς Ἀλκυόνης, ἀπῆλθεν εἰς Θήβας, κακεῖ 35
 9 τὸν βίον ἐτελεύτησαν ἀμφότεροι. καὶ νῦν ἔτι δεικνύουσι τοὺς
 τάφους αὐτῶν ἀλλήλοισι μὲν εὐσυνόπτους ὄντας, πρὸς δὲ τὴν
 τῶν Κορινθίων χώραν τοῦ μὲν συνόπτου τοῦ δ' οὐ συνόπτου·
 μυθολογοῦσι γὰρ αὐτοὺς οὕτω τάξασθαι τὴν ταφήν, τὸν μὲν
 Διοκλέα διὰ τὴν ἀπέχθειαν τοῦ πάθους, ὅπως μὴ ἀποπτος 40
 ἔσται ἡ Κορινθία ἀπὸ τοῦ χόματος, τὸν δὲ Φιλόλαον, ὅπως

1274 b ἀποπτος. ᾤκησαν μὲν οὖν διὰ τὴν τοιαύτην αἰτίαν παρὰ 10
τοῖς Θηβαίοις, νομοθέτης δ' αὐτοῖς ἐγένετο Φιλόλαος περί
τ' ἄλλων τινῶν καὶ περὶ τῆς παιδοποιίας, οὓς καλοῦσιν
ἐκεῖνοι νόμους θετικούς· καὶ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἰδίως ὑπ' ἐκείνου νενο-
5 μοθετημένον, ὅπως ὁ ἀριθμὸς σώζεται τῶν κλήρων. Χα- 11
ράνδου δ' ἴδιον μὲν οὐδέν ἐστι πλὴν αἱ δίκαι τῶν ψευδομαρ-
τύρων (πρῶτος γὰρ ἐποίησε τὴν ἐπίσκηψιν), τῇ δ' ἀκριβείᾳ
τῶν νόμων ἐστὶ γλαφυρότερος καὶ τῶν νῦν νομοθετῶν.
[Φαλέου δ' ἴδιον ἡ τῶν οὐσιῶν ἀνομάλωσις, Πλάτωνος δ' ἡ 12
10 τε τῶν γυναικῶν καὶ παίδων καὶ τῆς οὐσίας κοινότης καὶ
τὰ συσσίτια τῶν γυναικῶν, ἔτι δ' ὁ περὶ τὴν μέθην νόμος,
τὸ τοὺς νήφοντας συμποσιαρχεῖν, καὶ τὴν ἐν τοῖς πολεμι-
κοῖς ἄσκησιν ὅπως ἀμφιδέξιοι γίνονται κατὰ τὴν μελέτην,
ὥς δέον μὴ τὴν μὲν χρήσιμον εἶναι τοῖν χεροῖν τὴν δὲ
15 ἀχρηστον]. Δράκοντος δὲ νόμοι μὲν εἰσι, πολιτεία δ' ὑπαρ- 13
χούσῃ τοὺς νόμους ἔθηκεν· ἴδιον δ' ἐν τοῖς νόμοις οὐδέν ἐστιν
ὃ τι καὶ μνείας ἄξιον, πλὴν ἡ χαλεπότης διὰ τὸ τῆς ζημίας
μέγεθος. ἐγένετο δὲ καὶ Πιπτακὸς νόμων δημιουργὸς ἄλλ'
οὐ πολιτείας· νόμος δ' ἴδιος αὐτοῦ τὸ τοὺς μεθύοντας, ἃν
20 τι πταίσωσι, πλείω ζημίαν ἀποτίνειν τῶν νηφόντων· διὰ γὰρ
τὸ πλείους ὑβρίζειν μεθύοντας ἢ νήφοντας οὐ πρὸς τὴν συγ-
γνώμην ἀπέβλεψεν, ὅτι δεῖ μεθύουσιν ἔχειν μᾶλλον, ἀλλὰ
πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον. ἐγένετο δὲ καὶ Ἀνδροδάμας Ῥηγῖνος 14
νομοθέτης Χαλκιδικεῦσι τοῖς ἐπὶ Θράκης, οὗ περὶ τε τὰ φο-
25 νικά καὶ τὰς ἐπικλήρους ἐστίν· οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ ἰδίον γε οὐδὲν
αὐτοῦ λέγειν ἔχοι τις ἂν. τὰ μὲν οὖν περὶ τὰς πολιτείας,
τάς τε κυρίας καὶ τὰς ὑπὸ τινῶν εἰρημένους, ἔστω θεωρη-
μένα τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον.

CRITICAL NOTES.

THE following notes are intended to be used in conjunction with the *apparatus criticus* of Susemihl's editions, and especially that of 1872. It is in these editions alone that the MSS. and their readings, and also the version of the Vetus Interpres, can be fully studied. In those cases, indeed, in which I have been obliged to choose between a reading supported by the whole of one family of MSS. and one supported by the whole of the other, and the choice was attended with doubt, I have commonly noted the reading which I have not adopted, and I have taken some pains, in dealing with the readings offered by the first family of MSS., to point out the passages in which we are unable to affirm with certainty that Γ agreed with $M^s P^1$, for perhaps even the third and last of Susemihl's editions hardly makes it clear how numerous they are. The student of Susemihl's *apparatus criticus*, in fact, occasionally finds in it readings which Susemihl does not accept ascribed to Π^2 , and may naturally infer that Π^1 (i.e. Γ as well as $M^s P^1$) support the reading adopted by him. This is, no doubt, frequently the case, but on the other hand it frequently happens that the reading of Γ is not ascertainable, and of course, when this is so, Susemihl's reading rests only on the authority of $M^s P^1$, for we cannot assume without proof that Γ agreed with $M^s P^1$ and not with Π^2 ; on the contrary, Γ often agrees with Π^2 against $M^s P^1$. Thus the *indubitable* discrepancies between Π^1 and Π^2 prove on examination to be considerably less numerous than might be supposed¹. I have seldom

¹ Susemihl would seem in the following notes of his third edition, for instance, tacitly or otherwise to attribute to Π^1 a reading which can only be attributed with certainty to $M^s P^1$:—1252 b 2, *oi* om. Π^2 : 5, *τὸ* post *καὶ* om. Π^2 : 1253 a 32, *δ* om. Π^2 : 1255 b 23, *ταῖς* post *ἐν* add. Π^1 : 26, *ἀποποιεῖται* Π^2 : 1256 b 8, *διδόμενῃ* Π^2 :

13, *γενομένοις* Π^2 : 1258 b 1, *μεταβλητικῆς* Π^2 : 1260 a 31, *δ* ante *ταῖς* add. Π^2 . In 1260 a 21, the reading *πάντων* is ascribed to Π^1 , but we cannot tell from Vet. Int. *omnium* whether he found *πάντων* or *πάντων* in his Greek text (see his rendering of 1263 b 17 sq.). These references need not be carried farther than the First Book.

noted variants clearly not supported by the whole of a family, except when I hoped to be able to throw some fresh light on their value. The readings which I have given from O¹ will at any rate serve to illustrate the character of a manuscript which, though belonging to a well-known variety, does not always agree with P⁴, the MS. to which it is most nearly allied. I have drawn more largely on the *Vetus Interpres*, noting freely any renderings which seemed to call for remark. I have sought by a study of his method of translation to contribute to the solution of the important question, in what cases we can safely infer from his renderings a variation in the Greek text used by him. Here and there, but not often, I have noted renderings to which Susemihl has omitted to call attention. I have also occasionally indicated passages in which the text of the translation appears to be by no means certain, and recorded any readings found in the MSS. of it consulted by me which seemed to deserve mention. But my main object in these notes has been to discuss the copious data furnished by Susemihl, and especially to throw light on the characteristics of the MSS. and the Latin translation, in the hope of contributing to the ascertainment of the correct text of the *Politics*.

My quotations from the Latin translation of Leonardus Aretinus (Lionardo Bruni of Arezzo) are based on a comparison of the beautiful MS. of this translation in the possession of New College, Oxford (MS. 228), which belongs to the middle of the fifteenth century, with a Bodleian MS. (Canon. Class. Lat. 195). I have drawn attention in the following notes to one or two passages in which these MSS. do not support readings ascribed by Susemihl to Aretinus; I do not know what is the cause of this discrepancy, but I may refer to Susemihl's remarks in his first edition of the *Politics*, p. xxix sq., as to the supposed existence of two versions of Aretinus' translation, for it is possible that the discrepancy is thus to be accounted for.

The conjectures by which scholars have sought to emend the text will be found fully recorded in Susemihl's editions.

I have already (above, p. xlviii, note 1, and p. xlix, note 2) explained the symbols which I have adopted from Susemihl. A full account of the MSS. of the *Politics* and the *Vetus Interpres* consulted by Susemihl will be found in the *Prolegomena* to his first edition (that of 1872), and also a full account of the corrections in P¹, P², and P⁴. As to the Vatican Fragments, see the Preface.

I add some remarks on the MSS. consulted by me.

MS. 112 belonging to Corpus Christi College, Oxford (O¹) is a

fifteenth century manuscript containing the Politics together with other writings of Aristotle, or ascribed to him (see for its contents Mr. J. A. Stewart, *The English Manuscripts of the Nicomachean Ethics*, *Anecdota Oxoniensia*, vol. i, part i, p. 5), and bearing at the foot of its first page the following inscription:—*Orate pro anima Joannis Claimondi collegii corporis Christi primi presidis, qui hunc librum eidem condonavit.* (Mr. Stewart mentions, p. 6, that Claimond was President of Corpus from 1517 to 1537.) Its text of the Politics is written in a very legible hand, but there are not a few corrections both between the lines and in the margin, and these corrections are made partly by the writer of the MS. himself, partly by a corrector (corr.¹), whose handwriting is in many cases easily distinguishable from that of the writer of the MS., but in some not so, and especially in those in which the correction is between the lines and consists of a single letter only, or two or three. The ink used by this corrector is often very similar to that of the MS. One or two corrections in the first two books are apparently due to a second corrector. The text of the Politics in O¹ is nearly akin to that of the P⁴ of Susemihl (MS. 2025 of the Bibliothèque Nationale at Paris: see as to P⁴ Sus.¹, p. xxiii), though neither of these MSS. is copied from the other, but the corrections from a MS. of the first family which lend a special interest and importance to P⁴ are wanting in O¹: the corrections in O¹ which are due to corr.¹ are mostly derived from a MS. of the second family, though a few of them (for instance, the expunged addition of ἀρχόντων καὶ in 1260 a 4) may be derived from the Vetus Interpres or possibly from some gloss. The following passages (to which it would be easy to add indefinitely) will suffice to establish its close kinship with P⁴:—1255 a 24, ἀμα—δικαίαν om. pr. P⁴ pr. O¹: 1256 a 14, μέρος om. P⁴ pr. O¹: 1257 a 13, γέγωνε P⁴ O¹: 32, εἰσάσθαι pr. P⁴ pr. O¹: 1257 b 27, οὐκ—28, τέλος om. P⁴ pr. O¹: 1258 a 14, ἀπαντα δέον om. P⁴ pr. O¹: 16, χρία P⁴ O¹. On the other hand, O¹ often differs from P⁴: thus in 1253 a 7 O¹ omits ἀξυξ ὧν, P⁴ only ὧν: in 1253 b 35 O¹ has τοὺς, which P⁴ omits: its reading differs from that of P⁴ in 1254 a 15 sq.: in 1257 a 33–34 it is free from the blunders found in P⁴: in 1258 a 38 pr. O¹ omits καρπῶν καὶ τῶν, pr. P⁴ only καὶ τῶν: in 1259 a 12 pr. O¹ has λόγων, P⁴ δλίγων: in 1261 a 1 pr. P⁴ omits several words, not so O¹: in 1262 b 13 O¹ has συμφύναι, not so P⁴. Here and there we find O¹ agreeing with P³ (thus in 1257 a 16 it has δὲ ἐλάττω, in 1263 b 31 πῶς, in 1264 b 14 μίξαι, in 1271 b 12 ἀσφαλομένους), or with P³ T^b (1264 a 35, πεπιστεύας: 1267 b 28, λόγος); more rarely with M^a P¹ (as in 1264 b 13, εὐθὺς: 1266 a 5,

ἔπειτα : 1268 b 15, δηλονότι), or with M^a (as in 1252 b 3, ἀποτελείτο : 1263 a 24, ἀγαθῶν).

I pass on to MSS. of the Vetus Interpres. MS. Phillipps 891 (z) is a parchment MS. in quarto form, containing the translation of the Politics together with that of the Oeconomics and an unfinished fragment of the commencement of the translation of the Rhetoric, and written at Zara in Dalmatia¹ in the year 1393. This appears from the following inscription on a blank page at its commencement, which is in the same handwriting as the MS. :—*Liber politicorum et yconomicorum Aristotelis in hoc volumine deputatur (deo volente) ad usum mei Jacobini quondam [9=condam] Alberti de mayñtibus (=de maynentibus=dei Maynenti) de Vīc. [Vincentia or Vicentia=Vicenza] quem scripsi in civitate Jadre 1393 cum ibi forem ab illius civitatis communitate pro fisico opere medicine salariatus et habitus. Laus et honor deo.* (For the interpretation of Vīc. and of the contraction for *quem scripsi* I am indebted to the kind aid of Mr. F. Madan, Sub-Librarian of the Bodleian Library. The interpretation which I have given above of the symbol 9̄ is that of Mr. E. Maunde Thompson, Keeper of the MSS. in the British Museum, to whom, no less than to Mr. Madan, my best thanks are due for valuable and ready help. Mr. Maunde Thompson explains the meaning of *quondam Alberti* to be 'formerly son of Albertus' or 'son of the late Albertus.' Having found the form *Patricii de Piccolominiibus* in the title of a book published in 1485 ('Pontificale A. Patricii de Piccolominiibus, Romae, 1485'), I thought it likely that *mayñtibus* was a family-name, but the word remained a puzzle, till Mr. Maunde Thompson solved the problem by discovering the name Mainenti in a list of families belonging to Vicenza contained in the 'Historia di Vicenza, by G. Marzari, Venice, 1691.' I shall be glad if the publication of this inscription should lead to the communication of further particulars respecting the writer, Jacobino dei Maynenti.) At the commencement of the MS., prefixed to the translation of the Politics, are the words to which attention has already been called (above, p. xlii); they are in red letters but in the hand of the writer of the MS. :—*Incipit liber politicorum Aristotelis a fratre Guilielmo ordinis praedicatorum de greco in latinum translatus.* At the close of the translation, the words *quod decens* (answering to τὸ πρέπον, 5 (8). 7. 1342 b 34) are not followed either by the sentence—*reliqua huius*

¹ For other MSS. transcribed at Zara, see Schenkl, Ansonius, pp. xxiii, xxvii. I owe this reference to Mr. Robinson Ellis, whom I have also to

thank for informing me some years ago of the existence of a MS. of the Vetus Interpres in the Phillipps Library.

operis in greco nondum inveni—which succeeds them in all the MSS. but a, or by the sentences which are here found in a and rec. a (see Sus.¹ *ad loc.*), but simply by the words—*Explicit liber politicorum Aristotelis*. At the top of the pages of this MS. and in the margins and in a large blank space purposely left at the foot copious annotations are inserted, and the text itself is interspersed with corrections and explanatory additions. Here and there we meet with corrections which are in the same hand and ink as the MS. and have obviously been made by the writer of it, but most of them and all the annotations are in a far smaller hand than that of the MS., and one which, perhaps for this reason, differs a good deal from it. Some, however, of these annotations and corrections are apparently in the same ink as the MS., and as these are in the same handwriting as others which are in a darker ink, it seems probable that all the annotations and corrections were added by the writer of the MS.¹ If so, he was evidently a diligent student of the Politics in William of Moerbeke's Latin Translation. I have given in the following Critical Notes those of the various readings of z in the first two books which seemed to possess most importance, and have added in Appendix C a complete list of its variations in these books from the text printed by Susemihl, with the exception of unimportant errors of spelling. It will be seen that its omissions and blunders are many, and that here and there the original reading has been erased and an incorrect one substituted; nevertheless, it has in not a few passages either alone or in conjunction with a preserved the true reading. It has no doubt likewise done so in the books which I have not as yet collated, for in glancing at a passage in its text of the Seventh (4 (7). 13. 1331 b 31) I found the word *ἐκκεῖται*, which is rendered in the other MSS. *latet*, rendered (rightly in all probability) *iacet*. It is worthy of notice that as z was written at Zara in Dalmatia, so the allied MS. a was 'written in Italy' (Sus.¹, p. xxxiv). It is possible that a search among Venetian MSS. of the *Vetus Interpres*, if such exist, might bring to light other MSS. belonging to the same family and superior to a and z. We might then be less in the dark than we are at present as to the origin of the marked difference between the two families.

MS. 112 belonging to Balliol College, Oxford (o) is ascribed by Susemihl (Sus.¹, p. xxxviii) to the earlier part of the fourteenth century, and is the oldest of the MSS. of the *Vetus Interpres* yet collated. Its text of the translation of the Politics is evidently

¹ I might be able to speak more more of these annotations than I have positively as to this, if I had read as yet found time to do.

nearly allied to that of Susemihl's c, a far later manuscript, but c is not copied from o.

MS. Bodl. Canon. Class. Lat. 174 (γ) is a beautifully written Italian manuscript, belonging to the fourteenth century, and, in Mr. Madan's opinion, to the latter half of it. Each page contains two columns. The text of the translation of the Politics contained in it has been tampered with in places by an ingenious corrector, who has here and there contrived with the aid of a penknife to convert the original reading into an entirely new one: thus in the rendering of 1256 b 13 we find *parientes* over an erasure, the original reading having probably been *pro genitis*, and in 1258 a 7 again we find *iam* over an erasure, the original reading having probably been *non*. These erasures, however, are readily discernible, and they do not seem to occur very often. This MS. is allied, not to a or z, but to the bulk of the MSS. of the translation.

BOOK I.

1252 a 2. *ἔνεκεν*] 'Only the forms ending in -α are Attic (*ἐνεκα*, *εἵνεκα*, *οὕνεκα*) . . . the form *ἔνεκεν* does not occur in Attic Inscriptions till after about 300 B.C.' (Meisterhans, *Grammatik der attischen Inschriften*, p. 103). Aristotle's frequent use of *ἔνεκεν* deserves notice. 8. *εἶναι* om. Γ P¹ pr. M^a; a later hand adds it in M^a after τὸν. Sus. brackets it, and refers (ed. 1) to 7 (5). 12. 1316 b 2, οὐ δίκαιον οἴονται εἶναι ἴσον μετέχειν τῆς πόλεως τοὺς κεκτημένους μηδὲν τοῖς κεκτημένοις, where P¹ Π² read *εἶναι* and Γ M^a omit it (probably wrongly, as they stand alone), and to 2. 7. 1266 b 1, οὐ χαλεπὸν ᾤετο ποιεῖν, where Γ Π om. *εἶναι*: he also gives a reference to Schanz, *Nov. quaest. Platon.* p. 33 sq. The question whether *εἶναι* should be retained here is a difficult one, for though Π¹ are somewhat prone to omit, and more than once omit *εἶναι* where it seems to be required (e.g. in 1257 b 7), yet they occasionally omit it where it can be dispensed with (e.g. in 1298 b 36), and Aristotle is well known to be sparing in his use of *εἶναι* (see Vahlen, *Beitr. zu Aristot. Poet.* 3. 330, and his edition of the *Poetics*, p. 243 sqq.: see also Bon. Ind. 239 a 9 sqq.). On the other hand, its omission causes a harshness here, which it does not cause in 1266 b 1. In 1. 9. 1257 a 1, again, the verb is νομίζειν, not οἶσθαι, and the construction is softened by the use of ὥς. Meteor. 1. 14. 352 a 25, ἀλλὰ τοῦτου τὴν αἰτίαν οὐ τὴν τοῦ κόσμου γένεσιν οἶσθαι χρή, however, is a nearer parallel. τὸν αὐτόν] Vet. Int. *idem* (τὸ αὐτό Γ?). 15. τοὺς om.

pr. O¹ (with Π²): it is added in the margin by a corrector. But Π² often omit the article—e.g. in 1269 a 7, 1291 a 1, b 3, 1297 a 35. 24. δὴ] *enim* Vet. Int., but we often find *enim* in Vet. Int. where we expect another word—e.g. in 1253 a 23, 1256 a 31, 1272 a 41. *Enim* does not always stand for γάρ in Vet. Int. (see critical note on 1271 a 23). 25. ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις] Vet. Int. *quemadmodum et in aliis*, but he probably did not find καὶ in his Greek text any more than he found it there in 1335 b 30, where he translates καθάπερ τὰ τῶν νεωτέρων *sicut et iuniorum* (see Busse, p. 30). See also below on 1262 a 29. 26. συνδυάζεσθαι] y z have *combinare*: I read *obviare* or *obinare* in o, not (with Sus.) *obinari*.

1252 b 2. M^a P¹ add οἱ before χαλκοτύποι: we cannot tell from *aeris figuratores* what Vet. Int. found in his Greek text: Π² omit it, and they may well be right in doing so: see Vahlen, Beitr. zu Aristot. Poet. 3. 340 sq., and Bon. Ind. 109 b 36 sqq. 5. M^a P¹ add τὸ before δοῦλον: about the reading of Γ we cannot be certain: a similar difference of reading occurs in 1261 b 25. See on the subject Bon. Ind. 109 b 44 sqq.: Vahlen, Beitr. 4. 409. The reading of Γ being doubtful, it seems better to follow Π². 8. βαρβάρων δ'] Vet. Int. *barbaris quidem*. But the Vet. Int. occasionally substitutes γε for δέ (e.g. in 1268 b 16). 14. Χαρόνδας μὲν] M^a P¹ ὁ μὲν Χαρόνδας: Vet. Int. *Charondas quidem*, which may represent Χαρόνδας μὲν, the reading of Π². Charondas is nowhere else in the Politics honoured with the prefixed article by any MS. 15. δημοκράτους] *δημοκράτους* 'Π¹ P⁴ L^s corr. Mb' (Sus.), also O¹: as to M^a, however, see Sus.¹ p. xii. note 20. The New College MS. of Ar. has *homotapos*, but Bodl. *homocapnos*. 17. Vet. Int. *domium* for οἰκίας, but he probably found οἰκίας, not οἰκιῶν, in his Greek text, for in 1259 a 35 he has *domibus* for οἰκία. 20. συνήλθον om. Γ M^a pr. P¹: not so Ar., who has *nam ex hiis qui suberant regno accreverunt*. 28. ἥδη] ἡ δὴ is the reading of O¹ and of all known MSS. except P¹, which has ἥδη, and two others which have ἡ δέ (Ar. *quae quidem*): Vet. Int. *iam*. 29. μὲν οὖν] οὖν om. M^a P¹, and perhaps Ar. (*constituta quidem gratia vivendi*), but μὲν οὖν is undoubtedly right: it is a common fault in the MSS. to drop out οὖν after μὲν (see 1257 b 3, 1294 b 1, 1300 b 24, 1303 b 15, 1314 a 25). 31. αὐτῇ] Vet. Int. *ipsa* (αὐτῇ Γ).

1253 a 1. I follow Π² in adding καὶ before τέλος (so O¹): Π¹ omit it, but the presumption is against this family of MSS. in cases of omission. 2. M^a P¹ add ὁ before ἀνθρώπος (Sus.¹), just as they do in the corresponding passage, 1278 b 19, and in 1253 a 32; we cannot tell whether Vet. Int. found the article in

his Greek text or not: Π³ omit it in all these passages, probably rightly: see above on 1252 b 2 and the authorities there referred to. 5. Susemihl omits to call attention to the fact that Vet. Int. has *sceleratus* for ἀνέσιος: Vet. Int. would seem to have misread ἀνέσιος as ἀνόσιος—cp. 1253 a 35, where he translates ἀνοσιώτατον by *sceleratissimum*. 6. ἄτε περ ἄζυξ ὦν ὥσπερ ἐν πεττοῖς] See Susemihl's *apparatus criticus* for the various readings of the MSS. in this passage. O¹ omits ἄζυξ ὦν, leaving however a lacuna where these words should stand. O¹ here differs from P⁴, for pr. P⁴ omits only ὦν. Vet. Int. *sine iugo existens*, which is no doubt a translation of ἀνευ ζυγοῦ τυγχάνων (for τυγχάνειν is often rendered by *existere* in Vet. Int.—e.g. in 1260 b 31, 1269 b 24), and this is probably a gloss explanatory of ἄζυξ ὦν. Ar. does not render ἄτε περ—πεττοῖς, but this does not prove that the clause was wanting in his Greek text; it may well have been imperfect and incomprehensible. All the MSS. may be said to have πεττοῖς (pettois M^b), though πετεινοῖς appears in the margin of P¹ P⁴ and S^b. Vet. Int. *sicut in volatilibus*, but he may possibly be here translating a conjecture added in the margin of the MS. used by him. There can be little doubt that πεττοῖς is the right reading. 10. τῶν ζῴων] Vet. Int. *supra animalia*, but he seems now and then to add prepositions without finding an equivalent for them in his Greek text—thus in 1263 a 37 he renders ἐφοδιῶν *pro viaticis*, in 1263 b 41 τοῖς συσσιτίοις *pro conviviiis*, in 1316 b 2 τῆς πόλεως *per civitatem*, and in 1273 a 28 τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις *apud Calchedonios*. See also below on 1273 b 15. 12. For ἐλήλυθε τοῦ ἔχειν αἰσθησιν λυπηροῦ καὶ ἡδέος, the Aldine text has ἐλήλυθεν, P⁴ M^b U^b L^s (and O¹) προήλθεν, followed in all these MSS. (which belong to the less good variety of the second family) by ὥστε αἰσθάνεσθαι τοῦ λυπηροῦ καὶ ἡδέος. Compare the deviation of P⁴ Q M^b U^b L^s Ald. from the text of other MSS. in 1253 b 2-4, and of P⁴ Q L^s in 1258 a 32 sqq., and of P⁴ U^b L^s C^o in 1286 b 25, where they read ἀλλ' οὐ καταλείψει τοὺς υἱεῖς διαδόχους ὁ βασιλεὺς ἐπ' ἐξουσίας ἔχων τοῦτο ποιῆσαι (an evident gloss), and of P⁴ L^s Ald. in 1260 a 32, where τὸν τέλειον takes the place of τὸ τέλος in these MSS. O¹ agrees with P⁴ in all these passages. In the passage before us, as in some of the others referred to, a gloss seems to be substituted for the text, for it is not likely that we have to do with traces of a double version. See also the readings offered by P⁴ L^s C^o in 1301 b 33 and 1309 b 2, and by P⁴ U^b V^b L^s in 1302 a 28. 22. εἴ τις λέγει] Vet. Int. *si quis dicat*, but this is no proof that he found λέγει (which P³ alone has) in his Greek text, for in 1288 b 36 he trans-

lates καὶ εἰ τὰλλα λέγουσι καλῶς *et si alia dicant bene*. 23. πάντα δέ] All MSS. of Vet. Int. but k have *omnia enim*. 25. Π¹ omit καὶ before φύσει: P² omits καὶ before πρότερον, and most MSS. of Vet. Int. (but not a or z) omit *et* here. Vet. Int. has *prior*, and several of the less good MSS. of the Politics have προτέρα. O¹ (like P⁴) has καὶ φύσει καὶ πρότερα. 28. μηδὲν δέόμενος] Vet. Int. has *nullo indigens*, but he probably found μηδὲν in his Greek text. 30. πρώτος] O¹ has πρώτον, with s however superscribed above the final ν—I think by the writer of the MS., though it is difficult to be certain. 32. M^a P¹ add δ before ἄνθρωπος: we cannot tell whether Vet. Int. found it in his text: see above on 1253 a 2. 36. πρὸς ἀφροδίσια καὶ ἐδωδήν] Sus.¹: ‘*ad post venerea et add. o,*’ but this *ad* is expunged in o by dots placed beneath it. z adds *ad* here. ‘*Praepositionem cum plurium nominum casibus copulatam ante unumquodque eorum repetere solet Guilelmus*’ (Sus.¹, p. xxxiii).

1253 b 2-4. The reading followed in the text is that of the first family of MSS. and the better variety of the second, except that M^a P¹ read ἡ οἰκία πάλιν in place of πάλιν οἰκία (Vet. Int. *rursum domus*), and that Γ in 3 had οἰκίας in place of οἰκονομίας, unless indeed *domus* is a conjecture due to the translator. The reading of P⁴⁶ Q M^b U^b L^s (and also of O¹), on the other hand, is as follows:—ἀνάγκη περὶ οἰκονομίας εἰπεῖν πρότερον· πᾶσα γὰρ πόλις ἐξ οἰκῶν σύγκειται. οἰκίας δὲ μέρη, ἐξ ὧν αὖθις οἰκία συνίσταται. Bekker follows the reading of these MSS., substituting however ἀναγκαῖον for ἀνάγκη, and in his second edition περὶ οἰκίας for περὶ οἰκονομίας. But see above on 1253 a 12. Οἰκονομίας δὲ μέρη (not οἰκίας δὲ μέρη) appears to be the true reading, for οἰκονομίας here corresponds to οἰκονομίας 2 (which is the reading of all extant MSS. and of Γ) and is confirmed by ἔστι δὲ τι μέρος (sc. οἰκονομίας) 12. Besides, if οἰκίας δὲ μέρη be read, the tautology in 3 seems excessive. Cp. also 1. 12. 1259 a 37, ἐπεὶ δὲ τρία μέρη τῆς οἰκονομικῆς ἦν. 17. δυνάμειθα] δυνάμεθα M^a P¹ C⁴; Vet. Int. *et utique . . . poterimus*, which represents κἂν . . . δυνάμεθα (the reading of almost all the MSS. of the second family), for in 1252 a 26 Vet. Int. renders θεωρήσειεν ἂν *utique contemplabitur*, in 1253 b 8 σκεπτέον ἂν εἶη *considerandum utique erit*, in 1253 b 26 ἀναγκαῖον ἂν εἶη *necessarium utique erit*, and so generally. In 1253 b 38 οὐδὲν ἂν ἴδῃ is *nihil utique opus esset*, in 1264 a 3 οὐκ ἂν ἔλαθεν *non utique lateat*. 19. ο y z render πολιτικὴ by *politica* (z *politica*), which is preferable to *politia*, the reading adopted by Susemihl. 23. z adds *manifestum quod* after *pars domus est*, perhaps introducing into the text a conjectural emendation in the margin of its archetype, the object evidently being to

obtain an apodosis. 24. ἀδύνατον καὶ [ἦν] *est* after *impossible* om. z, perhaps rightly. 25. ὥσπερ δὲ ταῖς] ὥσπερ ταῖς pr. O¹ (corr.¹ in marg. γρ. ὥσπερ δὲ ἐν), but neither of these readings is probably the correct one, for the former is that of P⁴ U^b L^s Ald. (see as to these MSS. above on 1253 a 12 and 1253 b 2-4), and the latter, though adopted by Bekker, is found only in MSS. of little authority: Ar. (who translates *ut vero in artibus*) perhaps found it in his text. The best MSS. have ὥσπερ δὲ ταῖς. 26. μέλλει] Vet. Int. *debeat*, but this is no proof that he found μέλλοι in his Greek text (see above on 1253 a 22). 27. τῶν οἰκονομικῶν] Π¹ τῶν οἰκονομικῶν, but in 1256 b 36 Vet. Int. has *yconomico et politico* (οἰκονομικῶν καὶ πολιτικῶν Π) wrongly beyond a doubt, and perhaps here the three texts of the first family are affected by a similar error. O¹ τῶν οἰκονομικῶν: Ar. *sic etiam in re familiari* (τῶν οἰκονομικῶν?). 33. 'δ om. M^s del. P⁴ (Sus.). We cannot tell whether Vet. Int. found it in his text. O¹ has ὁ. ἡδύνατο] 'Eta as syllabic augment in βούλομαι, δύναμαι, μέλλω does not appear [in Attic Inscriptions] till after 284 B.C.' (Meisterhans, *Grammatik der attischen Inschriften*, p. 78). All the MSS. have ἡδύνατο here and ἡβούλετο in 1259 a 16, but in 1307 a 31 M^s P¹ have ἡδύνατο, the reading of Γ is uncertain, and Π² have εὔδύνατο. 37. δύεσθαι] ὑποδύεσθαι Γ M^s, possibly rightly, for Aristotle may not have preserved the metre in his quotation (compare the various readings in 1328 a 15 and 1338 a 25): O¹ δύεσθαι: Ar. *prodiisse* (δύεσθαι?). οὕτως αἱ κερκίδες ἐκέρκιζον] Vet. Int. *sic si plectines plectinarent*, but it is hardly likely that he found *ei* in his Greek text after οὕτως.

1254 a 5. δ'] z om. *autem* (so M^s). 6. Here again Bekker in reading δέονται δ' follows the less good MSS.: the better MSS. of both families have καὶ δέονται. O¹ has δέονται δ', but καὶ has been added above the line with a caret before δέονται, and then crossed out. τὴν αὐτήν] *hanc* before *eandem* om. z (with a g n), perhaps rightly. 9. τό τε γὰρ μόριον] *quod quidem enim pars*, the reading of o as well as of several other MSS. of the Vet. Int., may perhaps be correct, and not *quae quidem enim pars* (Sus.), for in 1257 b 28 *quod finis* stands for τὸ τέλος. 10. ὁλως] Vet. Int. *simpliciter* (i.e. ἀπλῶς, cp. 7 (5). 1. 1301 a 29-33): ἀπλῶς ὁλως M^s P¹. See Susemihl's *apparatus criticus*. Susemihl holds in his third edition, in opposition to a marginal remark in P⁴, that ὁλως is a gloss on ἀπλῶς and not ἀπλῶς on ὁλως, and that ἀπλῶς is the true reading. It seems strange, however, if that is so, that all the authorities for the text should read ὁλως in 13. 14. αὐτοῦ] So O¹. 15. The reading ἀνθρώπου ὧν Γ M^s pr. P¹ etc. is supported by Alex. Aphrodis. in

Aristot. Metaph. p. 15, 6 (Bonitz), τὸν γὰρ δοῦλον ἐν τοῖς Πολιτικοῖς εἶναι εἶπεν δε ἄνθρωπος ὃν ἄλλου ἐστίν, where, however, the Laurentian MS. of Alexander (L) has τὸν γὰρ δοῦλον ἐν τοῖς Πολιτικοῖς εἶπεν εἶναι τὸν ἄνθρωπον τὸν ἄλλου ὄντα καὶ μὴ ἑαυτοῦ: ἄνθρωπος δέ P^a and probably P^b (for there is an erasure here in P^a), and also most of the less good MSS. O¹ has ἄνθρωπος, followed by δέ expunged by dots placed beneath it, but whether these dots were placed under δέ by the writer of the MS. or by a corrector, it is impossible to say. Ar., as Sus. notes, probably read δέ, not ὃν, but this is not quite clear, for his rendering is—*qui enim sui ipsius non est secundum naturam, sed* (ἀλλὰ?) *alterius homo, hic natura est servus.* ‘Lectio ἄνθρωπος ὃν unice vera videtur, si quidem est natura servus non is, qui quamquam natura alius hominis tamen ipse homo, sed is, qui quamquam homo tamen natura alius hominis est’ (Sus. Qu. Crit. p. 341). Passing on to ἄλλου δ’ ἐστίν κ.τ.λ., we find in Vet. Int. *alterius autem est homo, quicunque res possessa aut servus est.* He would therefore appear to have found in his text δε ἂν κτῆμα ἢ δοῦλος ᾧ, or perhaps δε ἂν κτῆμα ἢ δοῦλος ὃν, which is the reading of M^a: the better MSS. have δοῦλος ὃν, those of less authority ἄνθρωπος ὃν. O¹ has ἀλλ’ οὐδ’ ἔστιν ἄνθρωπος δε ἂν κτῆμα ἢ (i. e. ᾧ, for O¹ is without iotas subscript) δοῦλος ὃν, and in the margin, added by the writer of the MS., γρ. ἄνθρωπος ὃν. Ar. has—*alterius autem est qui possidetur homo existens instrumentum ad acquirendum activum et separabile.* He probably read ἄνθρωπος ὃν. See Susemihl’s *apparatus criticus* for the various readings: he adds in his second or explanatory edition—‘we must regard either δοῦλος ἐστίν or (which is less probable) ἄνθρωπος ὃν as the reading from which the other readings have arisen, but in either case this reading has proceeded from a mere dittography’ (i. e. a repetition of ἄνθρωπος ὃν or δοῦλος ἐστίν in 15). Hence Susemihl reads [δοῦλος ἐστίν]. Busse, however (De praesidiis Aristotelis Politica emendandi, p. 22), attaches little importance to the *est* of the Vet. Int., who, he thinks, found, not δοῦλος ἐστίν, but δοῦλος ὃν (which can hardly be a dittography) in his Greek text, and rendered it freely by *servus est* (compare the renderings noticed above, p. lxxv): he holds δοῦλος ὃν, however, to be ‘hoc loco omni sensu destitutum,’ and falls back on the reading ἄνθρωπος ὃν. This is, as has been said, the reading of the less good MSS., but by adopting it we escape the difficulty of supposing Aristotle to have used the word δοῦλος in his definition of the φύσει δοῦλος. Susemihl’s latest remarks on this passage will be found in Qu. Crit. p. 340 sq. (1886). 39. τῶν γὰρ μοχθηρῶν κ.τ.λ.] Vet. Int. *pestilentium enim et prave* (the equivalent for φαῦλος in 1254 b 2)

se habentium. I know not what *pestilentium* stands for in Vet. Int., but *μοχθηρία* is rendered in 1303 b 15 by *malitia*, and in 1314 a 14 by *malignitas*. Vet. Int. omits to render *ἀν*, but this he occasionally seems to do (e. g. in 1256 a 4, 1265 a 30).

1254 b 14. Π¹ add *καὶ* after *χείρων*, in which they are probably wrong: see below on 1260 a 26. 18. O¹ (like P⁴) has *καὶ τοῦτ' ἔστ' ἐπ' αὐτῶν*. 23. λόγῳ Π¹. Ar. *nam cetera quidem animalia rationem non sentiunt*: he would seem therefore to have read *λόγον*, as does O¹. 34. *γίνονται* is rendered in most MSS. of Vet. Int. by *funt*. The reading of *ο* is not *sint* (as Sus. with a query), but *funt*.

1255 a 5. *καὶ* before *κατὰ* om. Π¹ pr. P³, etc., and Pseudo-Plutarch De Nobilitate. As to the De Nobilitate, if Volkmann's account of it (Leben Schriften und Philosophie des Plutarch, 1. 118) is correct, no weight can be attached to its testimony. See also Bernays, Dialoge des Aristoteles, pp. 14, 140, and Wytttenbach's notes (Plutarch, Moralia, tom. 5, pars 2, p. 915 sqq.). But in fact the passages quoted from Aristotle were not given in the MS., and were inserted by J. C. Wolf, the first editor of the work (see Volkmann and Wytttenbach), so that the text of them in the De Nobilitate possesses no sort of authority. 14. z adds *et* before *violentiam pati*, thus giving an equivalent for *καὶ βιάζεσθαι*, which none of the MSS. of the Vet. Int. known to Sus. appear to do. 16. Susemihl gives *violentia* as the equivalent in Vet. Int. for *τὴν βίαν*, but he notes that *violentiam* is found in a: it is also found in o y z and may probably be the correct reading. 29. *ὅταν τοῦτο λέγωσιν*] Vet. Int., according to Susemihl's text, *cum hos dicunt*, but o y z have *cum hoc dicunt*. Is *hos* a misprint? 35. I follow Π² (and O¹), which omit *καὶ* before *εὐλευθερον*: cp. 7 (5). 12. 1316 b 15, *ὅτι ἀσωτενόμενοι κατατοκίζόμενοι γίνονται πένητες* (so Π), and other passages collected by Vahlen, Poet. p. 216 sq. *Εἰ* before *liberum* is omitted in z, but probably through an oversight. 37. No MS. gives *ἐκγονον*, except P¹, which removes the iota of *ἐκγονοιν* (*sic*) by placing a point under it, nor was *ἐκγονον* found by Vet. Int. in his Greek text. This reading, like some other good ones peculiar to P¹, may well be due, as Susemihl points out (Sus.³ pp. xiii-xiv), to the emending hand of Demetrius Chalcondylas, the writer of the MS.

1255 b 2. *γίνεσθαι*] *γενέσθαι* M³ P¹⁴ O¹, etc.: Vet. Int. *fieri*, which may represent either *γίνεσθαι* or *γενέσθαι* (or indeed other forms, as it stands for *γεγονέναι* in 1268 b 38, and for *γεγενῆσθαι* in 1272 b 32). 12. Γ M³ pr. P¹ add *τοῦ σώματος* after *μέρος*: Sus. thinks that

this may have been the original position of these two words, but it is possible that they may have been added in the margin to explain *κεχωρισμένον δὲ μέρος*, and then have found their way into the text. Additions which may thus be accounted for occur occasionally in P⁴ L^s (see Susemihl's *apparatus criticus* in 1309 b 2, 1313 b 32, 1316 a 1), and also, though less often, in the first family of MSS. (e.g. in the passage before us, in 1259 b 14, in 1268 a 37, and possibly in 1335 a 37: see also below on 1263 a 12). 14. τοῦτων ἡξιούμενοι Π: *qui natura tales dignificantur* Vet. Int., but it is doubtful whether he found τοιούτοις in his text, for, as Busse remarks (p. 42), he translates *τίτες* by *quales* in 1264 a 38: nevertheless, it is true that in 1284 a 9 he renders *ἀξιούμενοι τῶν ἴσων* *dignificati aequalibus*, and that this is his usual way of rendering phrases of this kind, so that we expect *his* here rather than *tales*. Ar. *quapropter aliquid est quod simul prosit et amicitia servo et domino invicem secundum naturam ita dispositis*. 18. ἡ μὲν γὰρ . . . ἡ δὲ] *haec quidem enim . . . haec (or hoc) autem (not hic quidem enim . . . hic autem, like almost all the other MSS.)*. 24. M^s P¹ add ταῖς before Συρακούσας: whether Vet. Int. found ταῖς in his text, we cannot tell from *in Syracusis*. ἐπαίδευεν] So O¹: M^s P¹ ἐπαίδευσεν: Vet. Int. *erudivit*, which might represent either ἐπαίδευεν or ἐπαίδευσεν, for in 1267 b 18 *κατεσκεύαζεν* is *constituit*, in 1267 b 30 *construxit*: in 1267 b 31 *ἐποίησεν* is *fecit*, though in 33 *διήρει* is *dividebat*. 26. πλείον Π: see Bon. Ind. 618 b 13 sqq., and Liddell and Scott, s. v. Meisterhans (*Grammatik der attischen Inschriften*, p. 68) observes—‘before long vowels we find throughout in Attic Inscriptions -ει (πλείων, πλείω, πλείους): before short vowels in the classical period (till 300 B.C.) -ε (πλέονος, πλεόνων, πλέουσιν)—in the post-classical period, on the other hand, -ει (πλείονος, πλείονων, πλείουσιν): the neuter singular, however, even after 300 B.C. usually retains the simple vowel.’ τῶν τοιούτων] so Π² (and O¹): Π¹ τοῦτων. ὀψοποιική] ὀψοποιητική rests only on the authority of M^s P¹, for it is of course impossible to say whether Vet. Int. found ὀψοποιική in his text or ὀψοποιητική. O¹ (like P⁴) has ὀψοποιήκη (or rather ὀψοποιηκή), which probably points to ὀψοποιική, for in 1258 a 37 pr. O¹ has *χρηματιστηκή*. The same MSS. which here read ὀψοποιική, read (if we allow for clerical errors) *κερκιδοποιική* in 1256 a 6, where M^s P¹ (about 1 we cannot be certain) read *κερκιδοποιητική*. All MSS. have *τεκροποιητική* in 1253 b 10. ‘In Plato ὀψοποιική is now restored from MSS.’ (Liddell and Scott). In Eth. Nic. 7. 13. 1153 a 26 and Metaph. E. 2. 1027 a 4 ὀψοποιητική is the form used, but in the latter passage the MSS. are not quite unanimous. In Metaph. K. 8.

1064 b 21, Bekker, Bonitz, and Christ read *ὀψοποιική*, but two MSS. (one of them A^b) have *ὀψοποιητική*. In Eth. Nic. i. i. 1094 a 11 pr. K^b (the best MS.) has *χαλινοποιική*. 35. *μὴ αὐτοὺς κακοπαθεῖν*] Vet. Int. *quod non ipsi malum patientur*.

1256 a 8. *κερικδοποιική*] See above on 1255 b 26. 10. *χαλκόν*] So Π² (and O¹): *χαλκός* γ P¹ and possibly M^a. See explanatory note on this passage. Corr.² P² (i. e. the writer of P² in darker ink than that of the MS.), followed by Bekk., adds *ἡ* before *οἰκονομική*, but Sus.¹ (p. xviii.) says of the corrections thus classed — ‘maximam partem coniecturas sapiunt, etsi vix eas ex ipsius librari ingenio haustas esse crediderim,’ and the erroneous additions of *ἡ* before *οἰκονομική* in 1257 b 20, and *σκοπεῖν* before *προσθήκει* in 1258 a 25, rest on the same authority. 12. *τίς γάρ*] Most MSS. of Vet. Int. *quod enim* (o *quid enim*), but z, like a, has *quae enim*. 16. *πολλά*] o *multas* rightly: is *multae* (Sus.) a misprint? 23. z, like a, has *bestiarum et enim*, answering to *τῶν τε γὰρ θηρίων*. 30. *πολύ*] πολλοὶ pr. O¹ (with P⁴, etc.), *πολὺ* corr.¹: M^a Π² have the same blunder in 1316 b 1. Vet. Int. *multis*, but he probably found πολλοὶ in his text. 31. *οἱ μὲν οὖν*] Vet. Int. *qui quidem enim*: he seems, therefore, to have read *οἱ μὲν γάρ*, unless *enim* is a blunder, which is very possible. Three MSS. of Vet. Int. om. *enim*. 40. *τοσοῦτοι σχεδόν*] z *tot fere*, retaining the order of the Greek text, and *quaecunque* for *δοσοι γε*, not *quicunque*, like the MSS. examined by Susemihl.

1256 b 1. *πορίζονται*] *κομίζονται* M^a P¹, and γ if *ferunt* (Vet. Int.) represents *κομίζονται*, not *πορίζονται*, which perhaps is the case, for *acquirere* stands for *πορίζειν* in 1256 b 28, 1268 a 32, etc., though we have *emerunt* for *πορίσαι* in 1285 b 7. *Πορίζεσθαι*, however, seems the more probable reading, for we have *πορίζοντες τὴν τροφήν* in 1268 a 32, and *πορίζεσθαι τὴν τροφήν* occurs in De Gen. An. 3. i. 749 b 24 and Hist. An. i. i. 487 b 1. No instance of *κομίζεσθαι τὴν τροφήν* is given in the *Index Aristotelicus* of Bonitz. O¹ *πορίζονται*. Ar. *sibi praeeparant* (= *πορίζονται*?). 6. *ὥς ἂν ἡ χρεία συναναγκάξῃ*] *quocunque modo et oportunitas compellat* o (where *et* may possibly be intended to represent *συν-* in *συναναγκάξῃ*). 8. *διδομένη*] *δεδομένη* M^a P¹ and possibly γ (Vet. Int. *data*), but *data* is just as likely to stand for *διδομένη*, for *facta* represents *γνωμένης* in 1262 a 38 (cp. 1263 a 12, b 19, 1270 a 24, 1272 a 17), *laudata* *ἐπαινουμένης* in 1258 a 40, *transmutatum μεταβαλλόμενον* in 1257 b 4, *vocalam καλουμένου* in 1256 b 14. O¹ *διδομένη*. 9. *τελειωθεῖσιν*] Vet. Int. *secundum perfectionem* or *secundum perfectam* (sc. *generationem*), for the reading is doubtful (y z *secundum perfectam*, and, if I am right,

o also, not *secundum perfectionem*, as Sus. with a query). Ar. *sic etiam ad perfectionem deductis*. 18. τοῖς γεννωμένοις] τοῖς γενομένοις Π² (O¹) Bekk.¹: τοῖς γεννωμένοις M^a P¹ Bekk.² Sus. Most of the MSS. of Vet. Int. have *genitis* (so z), or what probably stands for *genitis*, but Sus. finds *generatis* in two of them (k o): I must confess that after looking at o I feel doubtful whether the contraction found in it stands for *generatis*; still k remains. *Genitis*, however, is probably the true reading; but this may just as well stand for τοῖς γεννωμένοις (cp. 1258 a 35, where *genilo* stands for τῷ γεννηθέντι) as for τοῖς γενομένοις or τοῖς γινόμενοις. It is not impossible that Ar. found the last-named reading in his Greek text, for his translation is *ad natorum educationem*, and he renders τῶν γινόμενων in 1335 b 22 and τὰ γινόμενα in 1336 a 16 by *natos*; but no MS. of the Politics has τοῖς γινόμενοις. If we read τοῖς γενομένοις (= τοῖς τέκνοις, as in 4 (7). 16. 1335 b 18), there is a good deal of harshness in the use of *γενομένοις* in two different senses in 13 and 15, and *γενομένοις* 15 loses something of its point; it seems probable also that in 1335 b 18 the true reading is τὰ γεννώμενα Π¹, not τὰ γενώμενα Π² (so in De Gen. An. 2. 6. 742 a 24 τῷ γενομένῳ has apparently in some MSS. taken the place of the true reading τῷ γεννωμένῳ, which is found in Z and accepted by Aubert and Wimmer). I incline on the whole to adopt the reading which may well be that of Π¹, and to read τοῖς γεννωμένοις. Cp. Menex. 237 E, πᾶν γὰρ τὸ τεκὸν τροφήν ἔχει ἐπιτηδεῖαν ᾧ ἂν τέκη· ᾧ καὶ γυνὴ δῆλη τεκοῦσά τε ἀληθῶς καὶ μὴ, ἀλλ' ὑποβαλλομένη, εἰς μὴ ἔχη πηγὰς τροφῆς τῷ γεννωμένῳ. In Plato, Laws 930 D τὸ γεῶμενον, τὸ γεννηθέν, and τὸ γεννώμενον are all used close together. 14. τὴν τοῦ καλουμένου γάλακτος φύσιν] Vet. Int. *vocalam lactis naturam* (τὴν καλουμένην?). 15. γενομένοις] 'τελειωθείσιν Ar. Sus.^{1,2} forsitan recte,' Sus.³, who now places [γενομένοις] in his text; but I find in the New College MS. of Ar., and also in Bodl., *quare similiter est genitis quoque existimandum plantasque animalium esse gratia et cetera animalia hominum causa*. O¹ γενομένοις: Vet. Int. *genitis*. 20. γίνηται] γένηται M^a P¹ and possibly also Γ (Vet. Int. *fiant*). 26. The text of Π¹ and especially of Γ M^a has suffered here from the intrusion of glosses: see Susemihl's *apparatus criticus*. Vet. Int. *hoc praedativum bellum et primum* (z however omits et with M^a P¹). Ar. *ut natura id bellum iustum existat*. 28. o y z have *quarum est* for ὧν ἐστὶ (in agreement with *rerum*). 32. ἀγαθὴν pr. O¹, but dots are placed under -ήν and ὧν is written above, probably by corr.¹ 36. οἰκονομικῶν καὶ πολιτικῶν] οἰκονομικῶ καὶ πολιτικῶ Γ: see note on 1253 b 27. Ar. *multitudo instrumentorum rei familiaris et rei publicae*.

1257 a 3. Vet. Int. either misread *ἐκείνης* as *κειμένη* or found *κειμένη* in his text, for he translates *posita*. Ar. *sed neque est idem neque valde remotum*. He fails to render *ἐκείνης*, but then he also fails to render *τῇ εἰρημένη*. **6.** *κτήματος*] *χρήματος* M^a and probably also Γ, for Vet. Int. has *rei*, not *rei possessae* (*rei*, however, stands for *πράγματος* in 8). **10.** Sus.³ by a misprint omits γὰρ after καί. **17.** η] *qua* o rightly: *yz quare* (with most MSS. of Vet. Int.). **38.** *κάν* *εἴ*] καὶ *εἴ* P¹, and possibly Γ also (Vet. Int. *et si*); Vet. Int., however, occasionally fails to render *ἄν* (see above on 1254 a 39). **40.** *ἐπιβαλλόντων*] *ἐπιβαλλόντων* P¹, Bekk.³, Sus. (Vet. Int. *imprimētibz* might stand for either reading). For *ἀπολύση* the MSS. of Vet. Int. have *absolvant*: so *yz*, and also *o*, though Susemihl gives its reading (with a query) as *absolvat*.

1257 b 7. *εἶναι* om. Π¹: see note on 1252 a 8. Here it can hardly be spared. **11.** καὶ νόμος] O¹ καὶ εἰς νόμον, but the breathing over *εἰς* has been struck through, and corr.¹ has written something ending in *-os* (probably καὶ νόμος) in the inner margin, where the binding partly conceals the correction. See Susemihl's *apparatus criticus* on this passage. **12.** *οὔτε*] So O¹ (with Π): οὐδὲ Bekk. Sus.: but cp. 6 (4). **6.** 1293 a 8, ὥστε πολλάκις οὐ κοινοῦσι τῆς ἐκκλησίας οὔτε (so Π: οὐδὲ Bekk. Sus.) τοῦ δικάζειν: 6 (4). **13.** 1297 b 7, εἰ μὴ (so Π² Bekk.: μῆτε Π¹ Sus.) ὑβρίζη τις αὐτοὺς μῆτε ἀφαιρήται μηδὲν τῆς οὐσίας. **15.** ἀπολείται] Vet. Int. *perit*, cp. 1263 b 28, where he renders *στερήσονται* by *privantur*, and see below on 1262 a 2. **20.** ἡ δὲ καπηλική, ποιητικὴ κ.τ.λ.] Vet. Int. *campatoria autem factiva pecuniarum*, etc., which shews how he interpreted the passage and punctuated it. **21.** ἄλλ' ἢ] Vet. Int. *sed*, not *sed aut*, as in 1305 b 15, or *nisi*, as in 1272 a 11 and 1286 a 37. **24.** οὗτος om. Π¹: compare, however, 2. 11. 1273 a 9, where Π¹ om. οὗτοι, 3. 17. 1288 a 29, where Π¹ om. τοῦτον, and 8 (6). **4.** 1319 b 11, where Π¹ omit τοῦτο. It is of course possible that Π² are wrong in adding these words in the four passages, but the use of οὗτος in the passage before us at any rate, followed by the explanation δ ἀπὸ ταύτης τῆς χρηματιστικῆς, is characteristically Aristotelian (cp. 5 (8). 5. 1340 a 32-34: 6 (4). 9. 1294 b 23). See also 1258 b 8. We must bear in mind that Π¹ are prone to omit words. O¹ has οὗτος. **33.** ὁρῶ ΓΠ, and so O¹: *z* has *videmus*, but the symbol for *-mus* is over an erasure; *y*, however, has *videre* (the first two letters of this word in *y* project slightly into the margin and may have been tampered with), and though *o* has *video*, the last two letters are over an erasure, the original reading having apparently occupied less space than *video*, for the last letter of this word is in actual

contact with the first letter of *accidens*, a perpendicular line being drawn to separate the two words. Possibly therefore the original reading of *o* was *vide* (= *videmus*). 'Ορῶ is not perhaps impossible, for we find λέγω, Pol. 3. 13. 1283 b 1: 6 (4). 15. 1299 b 19: τίθημι, Rhet. 1. 10. 1369 b 23: ἔλαβον, Phys. 8. 5. 257 b 22: μοι δοκεῖ σημαίνειν, Meteor. 1. 3. 339 b 23 (where, however, Blass—*Rhein. Mus.* 30. 500—suspects that Aristotle is quoting from one of his own Dialogues): διειλόμην M^s P² 3⁶ Q^b V^b L^s Ald. (*divisimus* Vet. Int.: διειδόμεθα P¹ Bekk.) in Pol. 6 (4). 3. 1290 a 2, but perhaps Götting and Sus. (following corr. P¹) are right in reading διειδομεν in this passage, for in 1290 a 24 the MSS. and Vet. Int. agree in reading διειδομεν. The emendation δρῶμεν dates as far back as Sepulveda and Victorius, and indeed earlier, for it appears, as we have just seen, in one or two MSS. of Vet. Int.: Bekker adopts it in both his editions, as does also Susemihl, though he brackets the termination. 35. ἐπαλλάττει] *variatur* z (not *variatur*) probably rightly, for *variari*, not *variare*, is the equivalent for ἐπαλλάττειν in the *vetus versio* (cp. 1255 a 13, 1317 a 2). 36. ἐκατέρα] *ἐκατέρας* 'vetusta et emendatiora exemplaria' mentioned by Sepulveda (see p. 19 of his translation); three MSS. also of the Vet. Int. (b g h) have *utrique pecuniatiῶν*, and *ἐκατέρας* is the reading translated by Leonardus Aretinus (*variatur enim usus eiusdem existens utriusque acquisitionis, eiusdem enim est usus acquisitiō, sed non secundum idem*); but all known MSS. of the Politics have ἐκατέρα, and most of the MSS. of the Vet. Int. have *uterque* (agreeing with *usus*). z has *uterque*, altered into *utrique*, not, I think, *utrique* altered into *uterque*. If we read ἐκατέρα, two uses of χρηματιστική are referred to, and this seems to suit better with ἐπαλλάττει than ἡ χρῆσις ἐκατέρας τῆς χρηματιστικῆς: if ἐκατέρας, two kinds of χρηματιστική are referred to, whose 'use' (not 'uses') 'overlaps' (ἐπαλλάττει). Perhaps we rather expect to hear of two uses than of one use. Hence on the whole ἐκατέρα seems preferable, but ἐκατέρα might so easily take the place of ἐκατέρας that the true reading is doubtful. 38. τῆς δ' ἡ ἀξίσεως] Vet. Int. adds *finis* after *augmentatio*, but probably without any equivalent in his Greek, as Sus. remarks (Sus.¹ p. xxxiv).

1258 a 2. z adds *et* before *ipsius* (answering to *καὶ* before τοῦ εὐζην). Sus.¹: 'et post aulem librorum culpa excidisse quam a Guilmo omissum esse verisimilius duco.' As to *ipsius*, it should be noted that, as Dittmeyer has shown ('Quae ratio inter vetustam Aristotelis Rhetoricorum translationem et Graecos codices intercedat,' p. 34), William of Moerbeke in his translation of the Rhetoric often renders the article by *ipse*—e. g. in Rhet. 1. 6. 1362 b 16,

where for ἡδονῆς καὶ τοῦ ζῆν we find *delectationis et ipsius vivere*. 7. οὐσης] z rightly omits *non* before *existente*: all the MSS. known to Sus. add it: y probably had *non* before *existente* originally, though *iam* occupies its place now over an erasure. 32-34. Pr. O¹ has here—ἀλλὰ τῆς λατρικῆς, οὕτω καὶ περὶ χρηματιστικῆς ἔστι μὲν ὡς τοῦ οικονομοῦντος ἔστι δ' ὡς οὐ, ἀλλὰ τῆς κέρδους ὑπηρετικῆς, but corr.¹ adds in the margin γρ. ἀλλὰ τοῦ λατροῦ, οὕτω καὶ περὶ τῶν χρημάτων, and κέρδους is expunged by dots placed beneath. For the various readings offered by P⁴ Q L^s in this passage, see Susemihl's *apparatus criticus*. See also above on 1253 a 12. These MSS. perhaps follow some gloss or paraphrase.

1258 b 1. μεταβλητικῆς] μεταβολικῆς M^s P¹, here alone, for in 1257 a 9, 15, 28, 1258 b 21, 29 these MSS. (like Π²) have the form μεταβλητικῆ, nor is the word used elsewhere by Aristotle apparently. We cannot tell from *translativa* whether Vet. Int. found μεταβολικῆς or μεταβλητικῆς in his Greek text, for he translates τῆς μεταβλητικῆς in 1258 b 21, 29 by *translativae*. 4. ἐφ' ὅπερ ἐπορίσθη] So Π² (and O¹) with Ar. (*et non ad quod inductus est*): ἐφ' ᾧ περ ἐπορίσμεθα Π¹ (Vet. Int. *super quo quidem acquisivimus*). 7. Π¹ add ἐκ before νομίματος, which Π² (and O¹) omit. 16. ποίους] Vet. Int. *quidus*, but he has *quales* for *rives* in 1264 a 38. 27. τρίτον] τέταρτον Γ M^s pr. P¹, apparently a mistaken attempt at emendation. 30. τῶν ἀπὸ γῆς γινομένων] ο γ ex a terra genitis, z ex altera genitis. 33. περὶ ἐκάστου] Here, as Sus. has already noted, ο alone among the MSS. of the Vet. Int. has preserved the true reading—*de unoquoque*. 36. O¹ (with P⁴ and some other MSS. which Bekker follows) adds τῆς before τύχης: see below on 1270 b 19. 40. Χαρητὶδῃ] Χάρητι (χάρητι M^s) δὴ Π Bekk. Many of the MSS. of the Vet. Int., however, and z among them, have *karitide*. Ar. a *carite* (Bodl. *charite*) *pario*.

1259 a 10. In the fourth century B.C. the forms ἐλαῖαι, ἐλαίας, ἐλαῶν take the place of ἐλαίαι, etc., in Attic inscriptions (Meisterhans, *Grammatik der attischen Inschriften*, p. 14), but here all the MSS. seem to have ἐλαιῶν, as all have Πειραιᾶ in 1303 b 11, though some have περαιᾶ in 1267 b 23. 13. Most of the MSS. have ἐλαιουργίων, though some spell or accentuate it wrongly: P¹ has ἐλαιουργίων: P⁴ has ἐλαιούργων, O¹ ἐλαιουργῶν, and so Γ apparently, for Vet. Int. has *oliviarum cultoribus*. Ἐλαιουργία is the word used in the citation from Hieronymus Rhodius in Diog. Laert. 1. 26, which may possibly be a reproduction of the passage before us, and Liddell and Scott adopt this form of the word (not ἐλαιούργιον). In 1295 b 17 P² has διδασκαλίοις, P³ Ald. διδασκαλείς, Π¹ (probably

wrongly) διδασκάλοις. 16. ἡβούλετο] See above on 1253 b 33. 28. ἐπέλαβεν] O¹ has ἐπέλαβεν with ε̇ superscribed over ε̇, apparently by the writer of the MS.: no other MS. gives this reading, which is no doubt wrong: see, however, Schneider *ad loc.* τούτων] τοῦτο (Bekk.) is found only in one MS. and that an inferior one. δ Διονύσιος] δ om. M^s P¹: whether Γ omitted it also, it is of course impossible to say. In 1252 b 14 M^s P¹ give the δ to Charondas, which here they deny to Dionysius. 31. τὸ μέντοι δράμα θάλεω καὶ τοῦτο] Vet. Int.

quod vero visum fuit Thali et huic (ο *quod vero iussum fuerit Thali et huic*). Sus. suspects that the translator found τὸ μέντοι δράμα θάλη καὶ τούτῳ in his text: more probably he found τὸ μέντοι δράμα θάλεω καὶ τούτου (unless he misread τοῦτο as τούτου). This is a possible reading, but all MSS. have τοῦτο. See note in Sus.³, who now reads θάλεω καὶ τοῦτο. Ὅραμα has been variously emended, but Mitchell (Indices Graecitatis in Orat. Att. 2. 581) gives it as occurring, apparently in a similar sense to that which it bears here, in [Demosth.] Proem. 55. p. 1460, 26, δράμα τοῦτο ἐποιεῖτο ὁ δῆμος αὐτοῦ καλόν, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ λυσικτελὲς τῇ πόλει, and it suits well with κατανόημα γ and κατανόησαντα 10.

37. μέρη om. P²³⁴, etc. (also O¹). It is not perhaps quite certain that Π¹ are right in adding it. 39. Almost all MSS. of Vet. Int. (including ο y) have *praeest*, but ἀρχεω is undoubtedly right: z has *praeesse*, which appears to be found in only one of the MSS. known to Sus. (b).

1259 b 16. τὸ νεώτερον] z has *iuvenius* rightly: the other MSS. of Vet. Int. *iuvenem*. 28. σχεδὸν δέ] The weight of manuscript authority is in favour of δὴ in place of δέ, for of the better MSS. only pr. P² has δέ: Vet. Int., however, has *aulem*. Δε̇ seems to be right, answering to μὲν οὖν 21. 31. καὶ before ἀκόλαστος om. Π¹. 35. δέοι ἂν] ο *oporteret utique*, but *oportebit utique*, the reading of the other MSS., is probably right (see above on 1253 b 17).

1260 a 3. διαφορὰς] διαφορὰς Γ (Vet. Int. *huius aulem esse differentiae*), and so probably pr. O¹, for the accent of διαφορὰς is over an erasure: yz have *huius aulem differentiae*, omitting *esse* (in z, however, *differentiae* is over an erasure). ὥσπερ καὶ τῶν φύσει ἀρχομένων] Sussemlil's text of the Vet. Int. here runs, *quemadmodum et natura principantium et subiectorum*, and he thinks that the Vet. Int. found ἀρχόντων καὶ added in his Greek text between φύσει and ἀρχομένων. But it would seem from the *apparatus criticus* to his text of the Vet. Int. (Sus.¹ p. 53), that of the nine MSS. used by him (a b c g h k l m o), one (o) omits *et natura principantium*, making the passage run *quemadmodum et subiectorum*, and seven (b c g h k l m) read *quemadmodum natura et subiec-*

lorum (so γ), except that later hands add *principantium* after *natura* in b and the margin of l. Thus the reading adopted by Susemihl was apparently found by him only in a. I have found it, however, in z, which gives the passage thus—*huius autem (esse om. z) differentiae, quemadmodum et natura principantium et subiectorum*. Whether Vet. Int. found ἀρχόντων καὶ in his Greek text is, however, quite another question. Ar. *quemadmodum in hiis quae natura obediunt*. O¹ has ὥσπερ καὶ τῶν φύσει ἀρχομένων, but corr.¹ has inserted a caret after φύσει and adds in the margin ἀρχόντων καὶ (a dot, however, has been placed under each of these words to expunge it—by whom, it is impossible to say). It is conceivable that Vet. Int. found a similar correction in the margin of the Greek text used by him, and translated it. 4. ὑφήγηται] ὑφηγεῖται Π¹ (Vet. Int. *exemplificatur : exemplificabitur a z*). 15. Ar. is said by Sus.¹ to add δὲ after ὑποληπτέον, but his translation runs in the New College MS. and in Bodl.—*eodem modo se habere necesse est circa morales virtutes, pulandum est omnes participes esse oportere sed non eodem modo, sed quantum cuique opus est*. 20. ἐστὶν] o z have *est*, in place of *et*, before *moralis* rightly (Susemihl reads *et* and does not mention that o has *est*). 21. πάντων] M^s P¹ have ἀπάντων : we cannot tell from Vet. Int. *omnium*, which reading he found in his text. 22. φέτο Σωκράτης] O¹ ὥτεω Σωκράτης (P⁴ φέτο ὁ Σωκράτης). 26. ἀρετῇ] Vet. Int. has *virtute* (= ἀρετῇ, which is the reading of pr. M^s). τὸ ὀρθοπραγεῖν] I follow P² S^b T^b (z has *est* in place of *aut* after *virtute*, but over an erasure) in omitting ἡ before τὸ ὀρθοπραγεῖν : see Vahlen, Poet. p. 136 and Beitr. zu Aristot. Poet. 1. p. 52, where among other passages the following are referred to—Poet. 8. 1451 a 20, Ἡρακλῆϊδα Θησηϊδα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ποιήματα : Rhēt. 2. 12. 1388 b 33, ὀργὴν ἐπιθυμίαν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα (in the passage before us we have ἡ instead of καὶ). Cp. also 2. 3. 1262 a 12, φράτορα φυλίτην, where Π om. ἡ (see Vahlen, Poet. p. 216) : Eth. Nic. 10. 10. 1180 b 34, οἷον ἰατροὶ γραφεῖς (M^b O^b) : Eth. Nic. 8. 14. 1161 b 23, ὁδοὺς θριξὶ ὁτιοῦν K^b O¹ (θριξὶ ὁδοὺς ὁτιοῦν L^b O^b), where other MSS. have ὁδοὺς ἢ θριξὶ ἢ ὁτιοῦν : Pol. 3. 4. 1277 b 10, οἷον ἱππαρχεῖν ἱππαρχέβντα, στρατηγεῖν στρατηγηθέντα καὶ ταξιαρχήσαντα καὶ λοχαγήσαντα (where no MS. has καὶ before στρατηγεῖν, though Vet. Int. has *et* before his equivalent for it) : 6 (4). 4. 1291 b 23–25, where δὲ is absent after πορθμικόν, though Vet. Int. has *autem* : 6 (4). 4. 1292 a 1, where Γ M^s Π^s om. δὲ : 7 (5). 8. 1308 b 27, λέγω δ' ἀντικείσθαι τοὺς ἐπικεικίς τῷ πλήθει, τοὺς ἀπόρους τοῖς εὐπόροις M^s P¹ (other MSS. add καὶ before τοὺς ἀπόρους). 31. ὁ παῖς] ὁ om. M^s P¹ : we have no means of knowing whether Vet. Int. found it in his text. 32.

τὸν τέλειον καὶ (in place of τὸ τέλος καὶ) P⁴ L⁸ Ald. Ar. (*sed ad perfectum et ducem*) Bekk. O¹ has τὸν τέλειον καὶ, but in the margin, probably added by corr.¹, τὸ τέλος καὶ. See above on 1258 a 32 and 1253 a 12. Here also perhaps these MSS. follow a gloss or paraphrase: Aristotle's language in 1. 12. 1259 b 3 may well have suggested it. 36. ἐλλείψῃ] O¹ ἐλλείψει (or rather ἐλλείψει), and so too pr. P⁸: all other MSS. apparently have ἐλλείψῃ: Vet. Int. *deficiat*, which may possibly represent ἐλλείψῃ, but we cannot be sure of this, for after *tanla ut* he could use nothing but the subjunctive. Bekk.¹ ἐλλείψῃ: Bekk.² Sus. ἐλλείψει. 37. ἄρα] ἄρα pr. O¹, changed into ἄρα probably by a corrector, for the circumflex is in darker ink than that used in the MS.

1260 b 17. O¹ adds καὶ before τοὺς παῖδας (with Π⁸). 18. corr.¹ O¹ adds εἶναι in darker ink after γυναῖκας: am z add *esse* after *mulieres*. 19. οἱ κοινωνοὶ] Vet. Int. has *dispensatores*: Sus. thinks he found οἰκονόμοι in his text in place of οἱ κοινωνοὶ, and adopts this reading. All MSS., however, have οἱ κοινωνοὶ, and is it not, to say the least, possible that Vet. Int. here as elsewhere has misread the Greek?

BOOK II.

1260 b 27. Ἐπεὶ δέ] Π¹ om. δέ, but omissions in Π¹ are not infrequent, and δέ, which hardly suits the present ending of Book I., may possibly be a survival from some earlier state of the text. 28. τίς] ἡ P² pr. P⁴, etc. (so O¹): τίς M⁸ P¹ and possibly Γ (Vet. Int. *quae*). Perhaps ἡ is more likely to have been substituted for τίς here than τίς for ἡ. Cp. Metaph. Z. 1. 1028 b 6, διὸ καὶ ἡμῖν καὶ μάλιστα καὶ πρῶτον καὶ μόνον ὡς εἰπεῖν περὶ τοῦ οὕτως ὄντος θεωρητέον τί ἐστίν. 31. κἀν εἰ τινες ἕτεροι τρυγᾶνουσιν] καὶ εἰ M⁸: about Γ we cannot be certain, though Vet. Int. has *et si quae aliae existunt*, for he occasionally fails to render ἀν (see above on 1254 a 39). Nor does *existunt* in Vet. Int. enable us to pronounce with certainty that he found τρυγᾶνουσιν in his Greek text, for in 1270 a 27 he renders κἀν ἀποθάνῃ *et si moritur*. As to τρυγᾶνουσιν, see explanatory note. 36. ἐπιβάλλεσθαι] So O¹: ἐπιβάλλεσθαι M⁸ P¹: *inserere* (Vet. Int.) may represent either. 40. πολιτεία Π: z *civilitas* (with g h l o, y *civilitas* with dots under li): most MSS. of Vet. Int. *civitas* (and so Ar.). The same contraction 'may stand for πόλις, πολύς, πόλεμος, πολέμιος, πολίτης, and even πολιτεία, though the last word is most often expressed by another contraction' (Gardthausen, Gr.

Paläographie, pp. 246, 256). This perhaps explains the occasional interchange of πολιτεία, πολίτης, and πόλις: thus πολιτείας takes the place of πόλεως in Π¹ 1294 b 39, πολιτειῶν of πολιτῶν in P⁴ etc. 1292 a 9, and πολιτῶν of πολιτειῶν in Γ T^b 1265 b 34, while in 1318 a 9 Π¹ have πόλει, Π² πολιτείᾳ. See Susemihl's *apparatus criticus* in 1326 b 5, 1333 a 11 also. I retain πολιτεία here, though not without hesitation. See explanatory note. Sus.^{1 2} πόλις, Sus.³ πολιτεία. 41. Here Vet. Int. alone has preserved the true reading εἰς ὃ τῆς (*unus qui unius*): ἰσότης Π (Ar. *paritas*). Only a fraction, however, of the MSS. of Vet. Int. give this reading. Of those used by Sus. only one (g) has *unus* as its original reading (in four, a b k l, a later hand has substituted *unus*): *nullus* pr. a b, *alius* c h and pr. k l, *illius* m. *Qui* again is *quod* in c g h m and pr. k l. Hence it is important to note that z has *unus qui unius* as its original and only reading. The reading of o is *alius quod unius*: in γ *eius quid unius* has been first written, but *eius* has been erased by dots placed beneath it and *unus* written above, apparently in the same ink and handwriting as the MS.

1261 a 2. Vet. Int. fails to render πάντων, but see above, p. lxiii, note 12, for other cases in which he omits words or phrases. 6. ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ τῇ Πλάτωνος] So O¹, but τῇ after πολιτεία is added above the line with a caret—whether by the writer of the MS., is uncertain. Vet. Int. in *politiā Platonis*. P^{2 3 4} have the reading adopted in the text. 11. δι' ἣν αἰτίαν] z perhaps rightly has *causa*, not *causam*. 15. ὥς ἀριστον ὃν ὅτι μάλιστα πᾶσαν] So Π¹: the order is different in Π² (and O¹), which read πᾶσαν ὥς ἀριστον ὅτι μάλιστα in place of ὥς ἀριστον ὃν ὅτι μάλιστα πᾶσαν: the latter order, however, though more rugged, is perhaps more Aristotelian. These MSS. also, as will be noticed, omit ὃν, probably because ἀριστον precedes it, just as M^a P¹ omit ὃν after δοῦλον in 1252 b 9. 18. ἐστὶν ἡ πόλις] ἐστὶ πόλις M^a P¹: whether Vet. Int. found the article in his text, we cannot say. All MSS., however, have ἡ πόλις in 23. 27. †ἐκκύσει†] ἐκκύσει P¹: Vet. Int. *quemadmodum utique si pondus amplius trahet*, but it is not by any means certain that *trahet* represents ἐκκύσει. It may represent ἐκκύσει or ἐκκύσαι (cp. 1253 b 16, where κἂν εἴ τι δυναίμεθα is rendered in Vet. Int. by *et utique si quid poterimus*): on the other hand, in 1263 b 34 ὥσπερ κἂν εἴ τις ποιήσειεν is rendered *quemadmodum utique si quis faciat*. With the exception of P¹ and the possible exception of Γ, all the MSS. here read ἐκκύση, and I have retained it, marking it however as strange, for we look rather for the optative. There is some harshness about ἐκκύσει. Ar. *ceu si pondus magis attrahat*. 30. γενέσθαι] O¹

γίνεσθαι (Sus.³, in note, γίνεσθαι?). 35. μετέβαλλον] μετέβαλον M^s P¹: *quemadmodum utique si transmutarentur* (Vet. Int.) leaves the reading of Γ uncertain.

1261 b 2 sq. Here Π³ read: ἐν τοῖτοις δὲ μιμῆσθαι τὸ ἐν μέρει τοὺς ἴσους εἶκειν (so O¹: οἰκεῖν two or three MSS.) ὁμοίους (so P³³: ὁμοίως Π³ C⁴ Bekk., also O¹) τοῖς ἐξ ἀρχῆς. M^s P¹: τοῦτο δὲ μιμῆται τὸ ἐν μέρει τοὺς ἴσους εἶκειν τὸ δ' ὡς ὁμοίους εἶναι ἐξ ἀρχῆς. Vet. Int. *hoc autem imitatur scilicet in parte aequales cedere hoc* (τὸδ' Γ) *tanquam similes sint a principio: scilicet* here probably represents τὸ, as in 1261 b 16, 1274 a 16, b 12, and it is also probable, though not absolutely certain, that *tanquam similes sint* stands for ὡς ὁμοίους εἶναι. Ar. *et in eo imitari vicissim equales cedendo invicem alios aliis*. See explanatory note. 4. κατὰ μέρος om. Π¹, but these MSS. are somewhat prone to omit. 5. καὶ om. Π³ Bekk. So O¹, which adds τῶν before ἀρχόντων with P⁴. Ar. *eodem modo illorum qui regunt alii alios gerunt* (so New Coll. MS.: *regunt* Bodl.) *magistratus*. 7. οὐ for οὐτε Π¹: οὐτε followed by καὶ occurs, though rarely, in Aristotle—e. g. in De Part. An. 4. 14. 697 b 16 οὐτε is followed by καὶ οὐ. Cp. also Pol. 5 (8). 5. 1339 a 18 sq. Π¹, it must be remembered, are prone to omit, and in 1264 a 1 they have μὴ for μηδέ, just as in 1265 a 18 M^s P¹ have μὴ for μηδὲν and in 1268 b 16 Γ M^s pr. P¹ have οὐ for οὐδέν. 19. δ om. M^s P¹ (about Γ we cannot be certain), but wrongly. 'In addition to this passage Socrates is referred to in the Second Book as one of the interlocutors in the "Republic" of Plato 13 times (1261 a 6, 12, 16: b 21: 1262 b 6, 9: 1263 b 30: 1264 a 12, 29: b 7, 24, 37: 1265 a 11), and in not one of these passages is the article absent; its authenticity in 1261 b 19 is thus placed beyond doubt, especially as the reason why it is added is not far to seek; the reference, in fact, is not to the historical Socrates, but to Socrates as one of the *dramatis personae* of the dialogue' (Dittenberger, *Gött. gel. Anz.* Oct. 28, 1874, p. 1359). It is, however, true that all MSS. omit the article in 5 (8). 7. 1342 b 23, where the Platonic Socrates is apparently referred to. 25. τοῖς om. M^s P¹: about Γ we cannot be certain. 35. πρὸς . . . τοῖς ἄλλοις] Vet. Int. *apud alios* (πρὸς misread παρὰ?).

1262 a 2. λέγει] Vet. Int. *dicet* (and Ar., following as he often does in his wake, *dicent*), but in 1281 a 19 he has *corrumpet* for *φθείρει*, and in 1257 b 15 *perit* for *ἀπολείται*, in 1263 b 28 *privantur* for *στερῆσονται*. It is very doubtful whether these variations of tense in Vet. Int. represent variations in Γ (see above, p. lxiii, notes 10 and 11). 3. τὸν ἀριθμόν] After τὸν ἀριθμὸν Π¹ add ὃν (Bekker and St. Hilaire, but not Sus., also find ὃν in pr. P²):

perhaps, however, it may well be dispensed with in the passage before us (compare such phrases as *ὁποῖοί τινες ἔτυχον* 3. 15. 1286 b 24, and see Bon. Ind. 778 b 4 sqq.). ‘Ων additum ab aliquo qui Phrynichi praecepta sectabatur: sed vide Lobeck. ad Phryn. p. 277, ad Soph. Aj. 9’ (Göttl. p. 311). τοῦ δεινός] Vet. Int. *huius filius*, possibly misreading τοῦ δεινός as τοῦδε υἱός. 12. ἕτερον] See explanatory note. As to φράτορα, see Liddell and Scott s. v.: the form used in Attic Inscriptions is φράτηρ, not φράτωρ (Meisterhans, Grammatik der attischen Inschriften, p. 63). Vet. Int. has *aut* before *contribulem*, but see above on 1260 a 26. 20. γινόμενα] O¹ γινόμενα. 21. καὶ γυναικες] *et* (not *etiam*) *femellae* o z. 27. τοὺς δὲ ἑκουσίους] om. P¹, probably owing to homœoteleuton, and o omits *haec aulem voluntaria*, probably from the same cause. 28. γίνεσθαι is altered to γενέσθαι in O¹ (by whom, I cannot say). 29. ὥστερ πρὸς τοὺς ἀποθεν] Most of the MSS. of Vet. Int. have *quemadmodum et eos qui longe*, but a z substitute *et ad* for *et*. For the addition of *et* by Vet. Int., see above on 1252 a 25. ἀποθεν M^s P¹⁴ L^s Ald.: cp. 1280 b 9, ἀποθεν M^s P¹³⁴ Q^b T^b Ald., and 1280 b 18, ἀποθεν Π (the Vatican Palimpsest has *απωθε* in 9 and *αποθεν* in 18). Ἀποθεν seems to be the reading commonly found in the MSS. of Aristotle, but ἀπωθεν is the Attic, or at least the old Attic, form (Rutherford, New Phrynichus, p. 60: Liddell and Scott, s. v. ἀπωθεν). 30. ἀλλὰ] ἂ r M^s pr. P¹.

1262 b 7. τε om M^s P¹: Vet. Int. *quidem*, which probably represents γε. Ar. has *enim* only, but may well have found τε γάρ in his Greek text. 8. ταῖς πόλεσιν] z adds *in* before *civitatibus* (in 1261 b 8 we have μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν). 13. συμφυῆναι] συμφῦναι P²³ etc. Bekk. (also O¹), but συμφυῆναι M^s P¹ (συμφυῆναι pr. P⁴, συμφυνηῖαι corr. P⁴) may not impossibly be what Aristotle wrote (though Plato in the passage referred to, Symp. 191 A, has of course συμφῦναι), for in Eth. Nic. 7. 5. 1147 a 22 K^b has συμφυῆναι. Peculiar verbal forms are occasionally used by Aristotle; we have, for instance, προωδοπεποιημένους in 1270 a 4, πείσθαι in Rhet. 1. 11. 1370 b 18. 21. υἱῶν] So O¹, though P⁴ (with Π¹) has υἱοῦ: Ar. *vel patrem ut filii*. 32. τοὺς φύλακας] om. M^s P¹ (so Sus.³³: P¹ only according to Sus.¹). Vet. Int. places his equivalent for these words (*custodes*) after *δοθέντες*: *custodes* may of course represent either τοὺς φύλακας or οἱ φύλακες, but it is hardly likely that Vet. Int. found the latter reading in his text. 33. In reading φύλαξιν I follow Π¹: φύλαξιν εἰς Π² Bekk. (and O¹). Almost all the MSS. of Vet. Int., however, have for καὶ πάλιν οἱ παρὰ τοῖς φύλαξι τοὺς ἄλλους πολίτας *et rursum qui apud alios cives*: Sus. follows a,

which adds *custodes* after *apud*, probably rightly (so too z). Ar. translates 31 sqq., οὐ γὰρ ἔτι κ.τ.λ., *nam non amplius appellant custodes fratres et filios et patres et matres qui* (here the New College MS., but not Bodl., adds *ab*) *aliis civibus deduntur et rursus qui ex custodibus aliis civibus*. 40. χωρὶς κ.τ.λ.] *seorsum ex legum statuto* o, but the last letter of *statuto* is over an erasure.

1263 a 2. πᾶσι] Vet. Int. *omnes*: M^a *πασῶν*. This variation, like that in 1266 a 4, was probably occasioned by an ambiguous contraction. 12. Π¹ add ἅλλ' ἀνίσων after ἴσων, and these authorities may possibly be right, for cases of 'abundantia contraria copulandi' are not rare in Aristotle (Vahlen, *Aristot. Poet.* p. 88), and ἅλλ' ἀνίσων might easily drop out after ἴσων through homœoteleuton, but perhaps it is more likely that ἅλλ' ἀνίσων is a marginal remark which has crept into the text: see above on 1255 b 12 and cp. 1268 a 37, where Γ M^a add ἕτερον εἶναι after βούλεται δ' ὁ νομοθέτης. 13. πρὸς τοὺς ἀπολαύοντας μὲν [ἢ λαμβάνοντας] πολλὰ] Vet. Int. *ad fruentes quidem, si* (ei for ἢ) *accipientes quidem multa: λαμβάνοντας* or *λαμβάνοντας μὲν* may possibly be an alternative reading which has crept from the margin into the text, together with the ἢ introducing the suggestion (see Vahlen on ἢ ναί, *Poet.* 4. 1449 a 7). 23. καὶ before ἐπικοσμηθὲν om. Π¹. ἦθεσι] So O¹ (with Π²), rightly in all probability (see explanatory note): ἴθεσι Π¹. 29. ἐκίστη προσεδρεύοντες Γ M^a Sus. 34. χρήται κοινοῖς] Vet. Int. *utitur tanquam communibus*. 36. κἂν δεηθῶσιν κ.τ.λ.] Vet. Int. *si indigeant pro viaticis in agris per regionem* (a z rec. b *per regionem*: the other MSS. *peregrinationem*, except y which has *peregrinationum*). As to the addition of *pro*, see above on 1253 a 10 and below on 1263 b 41. Vet. Int. appears to read *ἂν* instead of *κἂν*, but then he often omits to render *καί*.

1263 b 4. καὶ τὸν] 'καὶ τὸ Π¹ Ar.' (Sus.)—very possibly only a conjectural emendation, like some other readings peculiar to Π¹ Ar. (see Sus.², p. xiv). The rendering in Ar. is *quemadmodum et amatio pecuniarum*, which probably represents *καθάπερ καὶ τὸ φιλοχρήματον*, or possibly *τὸ φιλοχρήματον εἶναι*, for *τὸ φίλαντον εἶναι* is rendered a line or two above by *amatio sui*. 6. τῆς κτήσεως . . . ὀσσης] a z omit *in* before *possessione* perhaps rightly. 7. οὐ om. Π¹. 9. and 11. τὸ om. M^a Π¹: Vet. Int. *temperantiae quidem circa mulieres* (so in 11 *liberalitatis autem circa possessiones*), but we cannot tell from this what he found in his text, for he sometimes renders the article and sometimes does not. 18. ἄλλως τε καὶ ὅταν] z *aliterque et cum*, answering to the Greek more closely than the reading of Susemihl's MSS. *aliterque cum* (cp. 1269 b 24, where *aliterque et si*

stands for ἄλλως τε κἄν). 21. ψευδομαρτυριῶν] So all MSS. here, though in 1274 b 6 all have ψευδομαρτύρων: even here, however, two MSS. of Vet. Int. (a z) have *falsorum testium*, not *falsorum testimoniorum*. 28. στερεήσονται] Vet. Int. *privantur*: see above on 1262 a 2. 32. πάντως] M^s pr. P¹ πάντη: Vet. Int. *omnino*, which represents πάντως in 1257 b 21, πάντη in 1302 a 3. 34. χείρων πόλις] Vet. Int. adds *erit* before *deterior civitas*, and it is perhaps on his authority that Vict. and Bekker read ἔσται χείρων πόλις, but ἔσται is omitted in all the MSS., and, as we have seen (above, p. lxii, note 2), Vet. Int. occasionally adds the auxiliary verb without support from MSS. Aristotle is sparing in its use. 41. τοῖς συνστειλοῖς] Vet. Int. *pro conviviiis*: see above on 1253 a 10 and 1263 a 36.

1264 a 1. μηδὲ] μὴ Π¹: but see above on 1261 b 7. 8. Susemihl has apparently adopted the form φατρία throughout his third edition, and it is true that in 1300 a 25 and 1309 a 12 all the MSS. examined by him, and in the passage before us nearly all of them, and in 1280 b 37 the best MSS., have this form. So again, in 1319 b 24 all the better MSS. except P³ have φατρία. See however Liddell and Scott s. v. 9. Vet. Int. adds *et* after his equivalent for ὥστε, but, as Busse points out (p. 29 sq.), he does this in 6 (4). 4. 1292 a 17 also, in both cases probably without warrant. 15. καὶ before καθ' ἕκαστον is not rendered either by Vet. Int. or by Ar., who translates—*vel proprias singulorum*. 21. ἐφάντες] Vet. Int. *dimittentes*, which may perhaps stand for ἀφάντες, the reading of some of the less good MSS. ἀπειρήκασι] ἀφηρήκασι M^s P¹: Vet. Int. *negant*, which perhaps represents ἀπειρήκασι, for ἀπειρεῖν in 1272 b 5 is *abnegare*, and the Vet. Int. occasionally renders the perfect by the present—e.g. in 1273 b 17, 1268 b 38, 1272 b 32, 1266 a 37. If this is so, ἀφηρήκασι has only the authority of M^s P¹ in its favour. Perhaps also ἀπειρήκασι corresponds better to ἐφάντες. 26. ποιεῖ] Vet. Int. *faciunt*. 38. τῖρες] Vet. Int. *quales*, just as in 1258 b 16 he has *quibus* for ποίοις. 39. ποιοῦς τῖρας] ποίους τῖρας O¹ (so M^s P¹ apparently): Sus.³ πολοῦς τῖρας.

1264 b 7. αἰ Π, not αἰ: so too in 1254 a 25 and 1264 b 13, but αἰ in 1296 a 24, 1299 a 1, 1333 a 21 etc. See Bon. Ind. 11 a 47 sqq. 'The form αἰ prevails in Attic inscriptions from 361 B.C. onwards' (Meisterhans, *Grammatik der attischen Inschriften*, pp. 14, 64). 9. ἦπουθεν δὴ] ἢ πουθεν δὴ O¹. See explanatory note. 13. εἰδύς] So O¹, with M^s pr. P¹: about 1 we cannot be certain: the rest εἰδύ. 'Εἰδύς is properly used of Time, εἰδύ of Place' (Liddell and Scott). 14. μῖξαι] So O¹: 'μίξαι M^s P¹ P³ Bekk., at v. Classen ad Thuc. 2. 84. 5' Sus.¹ Classen's note

will be found among his critical notes, Bd. 2, p. 192. 19. τῶν αὐτῶν] All Susemihl's MSS. of Vet. Int. have *eorum*, not *eorundem*: z, however, has *eorundem* (τῶν αὐτῶν Π). 20. τὰ is added in Π¹ before περὶ (Vet. Int. here translates the article—*quae circa leges*). 21. τὴν τάξιν] z (with a and pr. k) has *ordinem* rightly. γὰρ] δὲ Π¹. 40. τὸν λόγον is not rendered by Vet. Int., but this may well be an oversight, similar to those pointed out above, p. lxiii, note 12. Ar. also gives no equivalent for it—*cetera vero extraneis peregit sermonibus*. See note in Sus.².

1265 a 4. εἰς] So M¹ P¹: πρὸς O¹ (with Π²): Vet. Int. *ad*, which may represent εἰς as in 1265 a 41, b 3, 1270 a 18, but may also represent πρὸς, as in 1254 b 13, etc. Perhaps πρὸς is more likely to have been substituted for εἰς than εἰς for πρὸς. 12. τὸ is omitted before ζητητικόν in M¹ P¹: whether it was omitted in Γ also, we cannot tell. 14. Vet. Int. translates as if he found the words arranged in the following order—*χώρας βασιλευσίας ἢ τινας ἀλλης ἀπεράντου δεήσει τοῖς τοσοῦτοις τὸ πλῆθος*, but his intention probably is to make it clear that he (wrongly) takes τὸ πλῆθος with τοῖς τοσοῦτοις: see Busse, p. 14 n. He might have remembered *χώρας πλῆθος*, 4 (7). 8. 1328 a 28. 16. περὶ] Vet. Int. almost alone seems to have found παρὰ in his text, for he has *praeler*. For περὶ with the acc. in the sense in which it is used here, cp. γ (5). 11. 1314 b 25. 21–22. For the glosses which deform the text of Π¹ here, see Susemihl's *apparatus criticus*. 24. Almost all the MSS. of Vet. Int. fail to render καὶ before πρὸς: a z alone have *et ad*. 29. διορίσαι τῷ σαφῶς μᾶλλον] Vet. Int. *determinetur plane magis*, but, as has been pointed out elsewhere, he occasionally substitutes the passive for the active. 30. ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις εἶπεν] Sus. is apparently in error when he says that Π¹ omit εἴ. Vet. Int. has *quemadmodum si quis dicat*. What he omits is ἂν, but this he is rather apt to omit (see above on 1254 a 39). He did not probably find εἶπεν in his text, but εἶπεν, for *non utique lateat* (1264 a 3) stands for οὐκ ἂν ἔλαθεν. 33–34. See Susemihl's *apparatus criticus* for the various readings here. Π¹ are not quite unanimous in favour of τῷ μὲν τὸ and τῷ δὲ τὸ, nor indeed are Π² in favour of the reading adopted in the text, for P⁴ etc. (and O¹) have τὸ δὲ τὸ in 34 in place of τὸ δὲ τῷ, but Γ Π agree in reading ἐκάτερον: hence it seems probable that the reading in the text is the correct one, as otherwise ἐκάτερον has to be altered without MS. authority to ἐκατέρω. τῷ ἐπιστόνως] Vet. Int. adds *vivere* after *laboriose*, but it is very doubtful whether he found an equivalent for it in his Greek text. 35. εἴς τις ἀρεταί] εἴς τις ἀρεταί Π (Ar. *virtutes habitus*): Vet. Int. *quoniam*

solī hī habitus sunt virtutes circa habitudinem (ἐξίν—so Π¹) *substantiae*. Probably Victorius' conjecture is right and ἀπεραι should be αἰπεραι: cp. 1285 a 16, where M^s Ald. have ἀπεραι for αἰπεραι. 40. ὁμαλισθησομένην] Vet. Int. *respondentem*. 'Ὁμαλίζειν is usually represented by *regulare* in Vet. Int. (e. g. in 1266 b 3, 16, 1274 b 9).

1265 b 3. ἀπορεῖ] Vet. Int. *dubitat* (probably only a mistranslation, in which, however, he is followed by Ar.). 4. παράφυγας] περίφυγας M^s P¹ and according to Sus. Γ also, but almost all his MSS. of Vet. Int. have *deiectos* (so ο y), and we cannot be certain what Greek word this represents: α z have *iugarios* (z in marg. *aliter deiectos*), and this again is hardly a correct rendering either of περίφυγας or παράφυγας. Ar. has *disparet*. 13. τῶν ἀρχαιωτάτων] Vet. Int. *antiquorum*, but degrees of comparison are often inaccurately rendered by Vet. Int. (see below on 1270 b 1, 1271 b 6, 21, 1272 a 8). 19. ὅπως] πῶς M^s P¹: Vet. Int. *quomodo*, which may represent either πῶς or ὅπως. 20. All Susemihl's MSS. of the Vet. Int. but one (l) have *sit* for γίνεσθαι (so ο y): z *fit*. 21. δειν] om. pr. O¹, but it is added above the line with a caret, in darker ink than the MS. but probably by the writer of it. 25. συμφέρει] For the various readings see Susemihl's *apparatus criticus*. Vet. Int. *expediat*: O¹, with some of the less good MSS., συμφέρη. See explanatory note. Ar. has *videndum est . . . ne non prosit*. 30. πολιτείαν] πολιτειῶν Π¹, possibly rightly. 35. Sus.³ 'τῶν om. Π¹': Π¹, however, would seem to be a misprint for P¹ (see Sus.^{1 2}). 39. ἐφόρων] Vet. Int. *plebeiorum*. In the next line he has *ephoros* for ἐφόρους. Dittmeyer (*op. cit.* p. 36) observes of William of Moerbeke's translation of the Rhetoric—'hic quoque universus interpretis usus respiciendus est: ut verbum Graecum saepe non mutatum versioni inserit, ita idem verbum hic illic sive apto sive inepto vocabulo Latino interpretari conatur.'

1266 a 3. χειρίστας πασῶν] Vet. Int. *pessimas omnibus*. See above on 1263 a 2. 5. ἔπειτα] So O¹ (with M^s P¹). 18. On τοῦ τετάρτου τῶν τετάρτων, see explanatory note. Here probably two alternative readings have both been admitted into the text, as in some MSS. in 1266 a 37, 1273 a 35, 1254 a 10. In O¹, after ἐκ δὲ τοῦ τετάρτου τῶν τετάρτων, the words ἐκ δὲ τοῦ τετάρτου τῶν τετάρτων are added, but they are crossed through and dots placed beneath them, probably by the writer of the MS. 23. συνιστάναι] So O¹: συνεστάναι Π¹ (Vet. Int. *constare*), and also pr. P².

1266 b 1. τὰς δ' ἡδη] Vet. Int. *eas autem quae iam habitabantur* (δ' ἡδη Γ?), which Schneider adopts, rightly followed by Bekker and Susemihl), 'δὴ P¹ Π², δὲ M^s Ar.' (Sus.), but it is not perhaps very clear

what Ar. found in his text, for his translation is—*postquam vero condila foret, difficilius quidem*. O¹ originally had τὰς δὴ, but δὴ has been altered into δέ—by whom, is uncertain. 3. τὰς om. M^a P¹: as to Γ we cannot be certain. 11. Vet. Int. *multitudinem* for τὸ μέγεθος.

18. ὁπόσῃν] ὁπόσῃν P²³ and some of the less good MSS. (so O¹): ὅσῃν M^a P¹ Sus.: Vet. Int. *quantumcunque*, which leaves it uncertain whether he found ὁπόσῃν or ὅσῃν in his text: ὁπόσῃν Ald. Bekk. 26. δῆλον οὖν] All the MSS. of Vet. Int. used by Sus. except a have *palam igitur, quod non sufficiens substantias aequales facere erit legislator* (so o y): a z, however, have *legislatori*. 28. τάξει] τάξει M^a P¹: Vet. Int. *ordinaverit*, which probably stands for τάξειν, for in 3. 4. 1277 b 22 εἰ οὕτως ἀνδρείος εἷς is rendered by the Vet. Int. *si sic fortis fuerit*, and in 1. 2. 1252 a 24 εἰ τις βλέπειν is rendered *si quis viderit*. 31. εἴπειν is probably the true reading here, as in 1270 b 38, 1272 a 35, 1339 a 14. See Susemihl's *apparatus criticus* on these four passages and Bon. Ind. 222 a 4 sqq.

1267 a 5. ἀλλὰ καὶ] a z *sed etiam* (n *sed et*): the rest wrongly *sed*. 8. ἀλλὰ καὶ ἂν ἐπιθυμοῖεν] Vet. Int. *sed et si desiderent*, probably a mistranslation of these words. So Ar. *verum etiam si concupiscant ut molestia careant et voluptate fruantur*. See explanatory note on 1267 a 5. 11. βούλονται] Vet. Int. *possint* (δύνασθαι M^a).

17. βούλεται κατασκευάζειν] Vet. Int. *opus est constitui*, where *constitui* may well stand for κατασκευάζειν, but it is less easy to account for *opus est*. 24. ὧν] Vet. Int. *quam*, referring to *multitudinem* (πλήθος).

25. ἐπιθυμήσουσιν] See Susemihl's *apparatus criticus* for the reading of M^a P¹; it finds support in two MSS. of Vet. Int. only (c y), which read *concupiscunt*: most have *concupiscant*, one or two *concupiscunt* (so z), either of which, however, may stand for ἐπιθυμήσουσιν—cp. 1268 a 41, where θήσει is rendered by *ponat*, and see below on 1267 b 35. ἀμύνειν] Vet. Int. *sufferre* (=ὑπεργεῖν?). 28. ὅτι 'Γ Π Ar. Bekk.' (so Sus.²); but Ar. has *oportet autem neque id latere quantas facultates habere conducat*. Stahr δ τι: Sus.³ [δ] τί.

29. τὸ μὴ λυσιτελεῖν] Vet. Int. *ut non pro levi habeat* (so z and most MSS. of Vet. Int.: o *ut non prae levi habeat*: Sus., however, reads, with g (so also y), *ut non prolem habeat*: in 1279 b 9, on the other hand, τὸ λυσιτελοῦν is rendered *id quod expedit*. Should *ut non pretium habeat* be read (cp. 1258 b 16, where λυσιτελέστατα is *pretiosissima*)?

34. ἐθέλειν] Vet. Int. *debere* (=μέλλειν or ὀφείλειν?, cp. 1253 b 26, 1268 b 12). 35. ταῦτα] z has *haec* (*hec*): Susemihl finds *hoc* in his MSS. 40. ἂν om. Π¹, probably wrongly, just as they are probably wrong in adding ἂν in 8 (6). 8. 1322 a 33

(cp. 3. 13. 1283 b 15, where Π om. *ἀν*, and see Bon. Ind. 41 b 6 sqq.).

1267 b 1. ἀπληστον] Vet. Int. *irreplebilis*. Sus.¹ 'nonne irreplebile?', and it is true that in 1253 a 37 we find ἡ δὲ δικαιοσύνη πολιτικών translated by the Vet. Int. *iustitia autem civile*; but see Dittmeyer, *op. cit.* p. 34, who shows that the practice of William of Moerbeke in his translation of the Rhetoric is to make the predicate agree in gender with the subject—thus in Rhet. 1. 3. 1359 a 5 τούτῳ δὲ ὁ μὲν τοιοῦτος θάνατος κάλλιον is rendered *huic autem talis mors pulchrior*. 14. κατασκευάζων] *constituens* o, perhaps rightly: the other MSS. *construens*. 23. Πειραῖ] *πειρεῖ* O¹. 26. κόμης (in place of κόσμῳ πολυτελεῖ) Π¹. Ar. *ornatu sumptuosus*. 'Quibusdam exemplaribus' (i.e. probably MSS., not printed editions: see above on 1257 b 36) 'illud *ἐτι* δέ, quod in ceteris habetur, abest, ut prolixitas ad capillos, sumptus ad vestem duntaxat referatur' (Sepulveda, p. 51). *Ἔτι* δέ is, in fact, omitted in T^b. 33. All the better MSS. and some of the inferior ones have here τὸ ὅπλα ἔχον (so O¹): only one MS., and that of little authority, has τὰ in place of τὸ as its original reading. The phrase commonly is οἱ τὰ ὅπλα ἔχοντες, κεκτημένοι (see e.g. 1268 a 18, 22: 1297 b 2: 1268 a 20, 25), though not quite invariably (see 4 (7). 10. 1329 b 36: 6 (4). 13. 1297 a 29), and here the τὸ seems better away. See explanatory note. 35. ποιήσουσι] Most of the MSS. of Vet. Int. have *faciant*, and in 36. for βιώσονται *vivant*, but this does not imply that the translator did not find the future in his Greek text: see above on 1267 a 25. 37. εἶδη καὶ τῶν νόμων] Vet. Int. *et species legum*: Busse (p. 27) notes a similar change of order in the version given by Vet. Int. of 4 (7). 3. 1325 b 22.

1268 a 3. καταδικάζει] See Susemihl's *apparatus criticus* here and in the next line. The MSS. which have καταδικάζει seem mostly to have ἀπολύει in 4. O¹ has καταδικάζει and ἀπολύει, the last two letters of ἀπολύει being however expunged and οἱ superscribed, probably by the writer of the MS. All the MSS. of Vet. Int. known to Sus. have *condemnetur* for καταδικάζει (so o y): z, however, has *condempnet*—rightly in all probability, for *absolvat*, not *absolvatur*, follows in all the MSS. Ar. *si condempnaret . . . sin absolvet*. There seems to be little doubt that καταδικάζει and ἀπολύει are correct (see Goodwin, Moods and Tenses, § 77). τὴν δίκην om. Π¹, possibly rightly, for the words may be only a gloss, but Π¹ are somewhat given to omitting words. Ar. *si condempnaret simpliciter sententiam*. 12. αἰρετοὺς εἶναι] Vet. Int. *eligi*. 17. οἱ before γεωργοὶ om. M^s P¹ and possibly of course Γ (Vet. Int.

agricolae). 25. Π¹ add καὶ before κρείττους. 26. M^s P¹ om. γε: about Γ we cannot be certain, for Vet. Int. often fails to render γε. 34. γεωργήσουσιν] Bekker's reading γεωργοῦσιν rests only on the authority of Ar., who has *colunt*. 39. αῶ] Π³ οὖν, O¹ οὖν with αῶ superscribed, whether by corr.¹ or by the writer of the MS., is not certain, but very possibly by the latter, for the ink is quite that of the MS., and οὖν is neither expunged by dots placed beneath nor crossed through. οὖν, though probably not the true reading here, is used in a similar way in Magn. Mor. 2. 9. 1207 b 31 and 2. 11. 1208 b 37, and even in writings of Aristotle (see Bon. Ind. 540 b 32 sqq.).

1268 b 1. γεωργήσει δύο οἰκίας] Vet. Int. *ministrabit duas domos*: hence some have thought that he found ὑπουργήσει δύο οἰκίας in his Greek text, but *ministrare* in Vet. Int. answers to διακομῖν (cp. 1280 b 5, 1333 a 8). He may here render a marginal gloss. Διαπονήσει would be better than διακονήσει, but see explanatory note. 5. See explanatory note. διαρύντα P² etc. (so O¹) seems better than διαρύντας Π¹ (cp. τὸν δικάστην 6). On δίτης, see explanatory note. 9. ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦναντίον τοῦτο] Vet. Int. *sed contrarium huius*: hence it is probable, though not certain, that Γ omitted καὶ with M^s and read τοῦτου with M^s P¹. 12. ὁ μὲν] μὲν ὁ M^s P¹: about Γ we cannot be certain, for some MSS. of Vet. Int. have *quidem iudex* (so z), and others (so ο γ) *iudex quidem*. See explanatory note. 13. κρινεῖ (Bekk.² Sus.) is probably right (cp. 16 καταδικάζουσιν), though Γ Π have κρίνει (so O¹). 15. δὴ] O¹ has δὲ with δὴ superscribed, probably, but not certainly, by the writer of the MS. See explanatory note. 19. Ar. does not render δικαίως (*si simpliciter petatur*).

21. For the omission of ἥδη here by Π¹, cp. 1288 a 6 and 1336 b 36, where they omit it also. Ar. does not render it. 32. μικρὰ] μικρὸν Π¹. 35. ἱατρικῇ] c o *medicinalis* rightly: the rest *medicinali* (for the reading of z, however, see Appendix C, 112. 3). 40. ἐσιδηροφοροῦντό τε γὰρ] Vet. Int. *ferrum enim portabant tunc Graeci* (ἐσιδηροφόρουν τότε γὰρ?).

1269 a 11. γραφῆναι] γράφειν Π¹, possibly rightly. 12. φανερόν] Vet. Int. *videtur*. 16. καὶ τῶν νομοθετῶν καὶ τῶν ἀρχόντων] Vet. Int. *et legislatoribus et principibus* (apparently after *sinnendum*). Busse (p. 27 note) compares *voluntati* for προαίρεσιν in 1271 a 32. 18. τις is added in M^s P¹ before κινήσας: Vet. Int. *qui mutaverit* (perhaps = ὁ κινήσας: see however his version of 1340 b 24): Ar. *qui corrigere perget* (ὁ κινήσας?). See explanatory note. 19. ψεῦδος δὲ κ.τ.λ.] Vet. Int. *mendax quoque exemplum quod ab artibus* (ab probably stands for παρὰ): ψεῦδος, here *mendax*, is *falsum* in

1287 a 33. 21. πλὴν, which is written in P³ over παρά, is probably intended as an alternative reading for παρά: see 1274 b 9, where φαλέου is written above φιλολάου in P³. Bekker, however, reads πλὴν παρά in both his editions. 25. καί, which Bekker adds before πάντες, is found in O¹ and in P⁴ etc., but not in the best MSS. 38. οἱ before εἰλωτες is omitted in M^s P¹ L^s: we cannot tell whether Vet. Int. found it in his Greek text or not. 40. πω] Vet. Int. *unquam*.

1269 b 5. τοῖς Θετταλοῖς] c o om. a before *Thessalis* in Vet. Int. 11. ὥς] *quasi* instead of *quod* o, perhaps rightly, for Vet. Int. takes ἐξευρίσκουσι as a participle. 19. ἀνομοθέτητον] *inordinatum in lege* o. 21. φανερός ἐστι τοιούτος ὢν] I follow here the reading of Π² (which is, except in matters of accent, that of O¹, and also of Ar., who translates—*in viris quidem id fecisse constat*): τοιούτος ἐστὶν Π¹. The reading of Π³ appears to me to be probably the true one, especially as in 26 γ M^s pr. P¹ omit φανερώς, wrongly, it would seem, cp. 1263 b 9, 1311 a 16. 26. See note on 21. 28. *Αρη] O¹ has ἄρην with M^s P¹⁴, etc.: we cannot tell which form Vet. Int. found in his text, for he has *Martem*. *Αρη is the Attic form according to Liddell and Scott. Vahlen reads *Αρη in Poet. 21. 1457 b 21, where Bekker had read *Αρην. 30. κατακόχιμος] Cp. 5 (8). 7. 1342 a 8. 'Forma κατακόχιμος in duobus Politicorum locis [also in Hist. An. 6. 18. 572 a 32] exhibetur sine varia lectione, Eth. Nic. 10. 10. 1179 b 9 κατοκόχιμον [K^b Ald.] Bekk., sed κατακόχιμον codd. L^b M^b O^b' (Bon. Ind. 371 a 8). I retain the reading of the MSS.: Liddell and Scott, however, remark (s. v. κατοκωχή):—'the corrupt forms κατακωχή, κατακόχιμος, must be corrected, except perhaps in late writers: cf. ἀνοκωχή, συνοκωχή.' 35. ἀλλ' εἵπερ, πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον] Vet. Int. *nisi ad bellum*. 36. ταῦθ'] All Susemihl's MSS. of Vet. Int. have *hoc*, but γ has *hec* (= *haec*).

1270 a 11. καὶ μὴ ὀρθῶς] Almost all MSS. of Vet. Int. (including x) have *aut* before *non recte*, but *aut* appears to represent καὶ in 1262 a 8. 13. See Susemihl's *apparatus criticus* for the various readings here: I follow him in reading αὐτῆς καθ' αὐτήν. O¹ has αὐτὴν καθ' αὐτήν. 21. καταλείπειν] καταλείπειν M^s P¹: Vet. Int. *dere-linguere*, which may represent either καταλείπειν, as in 1252 a 30, or καταλείπειν. 22. ταῦτ'] So Π¹ (ταυτὸ P¹): O¹ (with Π²) and Bekk. τοῦτο less well (cp. 1269 b 34). 27. τε om. M^s P¹: about γ we cannot be certain, for the Vet. Int. hardly ever renders τε. κὰν ἀποθάη] Here ο agrees with pr. α in omitting (no doubt erroneously) *et si moritur—voluerit*. 28. ὃν ἂν καταλίπη] *z quem ulique derelinquat*, perhaps rightly. 37. Vet. Int. here renders οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ by *at-*

tamen, as in 1274 b 25: he often renders it by *quin immo sed* (e.g. in 1262 a 14, 1264 a 11), and οὐ μὴν by *attamen* (e.g. in 1267 a 39).

1270 b 1. βουλόμενος γὰρ κ.τ.λ.] Vet. Int. *volens enim legislator ut plures sint Spartiatae, provocat cives quod plures faciant pueros*: but though *plures* is his rendering, he probably found πλείστοις in his text in both places, for he is not always exact in rendering degrees of comparison: see above on 1265 b 13. 3. ἔστι γὰρ] The MSS. of Vet. Int. have *est autem*, not *est enim*. 8. αὐτῇ] αὐτῇ Ar. (*hic enim magistratus*): om. Γ M^s (so Sus.^{1 2}: Sus.³, by a misprint apparently, M^s P¹).

12. Ἀνδρίους] See Susemihl's *apparatus criticus* for the various readings. As to the substitution of τ for δ here in Π¹, it should be noted that this was an error to which Egyptian scribes were especially liable: see Blass, *Hyperidis orationes quatuor*, praef. p. xvii. I know not whether there are any other indications in Π¹ that the archetype of these MSS. was of Egyptian origin. 14. δημομαγεῖν κ.τ.λ.] Vet. Int. *regere populum* (i.e. δημομαγεῖν, cp. 1274 a 10) *se ipsos cogeant reges*: he evidently does not understand δημομαγεῖν, and he is quite capable of construing ἡγαγάζοντο *cogeant* (cp. 1269 a 18, where βλαβήσεται is rendered *nocebit*, and 1271 a 22, where κρίνεσθαι is rendered *iudicare*). Perhaps, as Busse remarks (p. 25), Γ had αἰτούς in place of αὐτούς. All the MSS. read αἰτούς ἡγαγάζοντο καὶ οἱ βασιλεῖς.

15. ταύτῃ] Ο¹ ταῦτα: ταύτῃ, however, is added in the margin, probably by corr.¹ 19. On διὰ τύχην see explanatory note. M^s P¹ add τὴν before τύχην, just as in 1332 a 32 they add τῆς before τύχης: as to the reading in Γ we cannot of course be certain. In 1323 b 29 all the MSS. have ἀπὸ τύχης οὐδὲ διὰ τὴν τύχην.

21. On this passage see explanatory note. 32. αὐτῇ] αὐτῇ Π¹, but see explanatory note. 33. μᾶλλον ὑπερβάλλει] *magis superexcedit* ο (perhaps rightly): other MSS. *magis excedit*. 38. εἰπεῖ] Susemihl reads εἶποι, which is, however, apparently only found in P¹, for M^s has εἴπη, and the reading of Γ is unknown. See his *apparatus criticus* for the varieties of reading.

1271 a 15. τοῖς Ο¹ (with Π²). Ar. *illis utilis*. 17. τῶν after ἀδικημάτων om. Π² Ο¹ Bekk.¹: Bekk.² adds it in brackets.

Whether Vet. Int. found this τῶν in his text, it is of course impossible to say; but after ἀδικημάτων it might easily be omitted: cp. 1283 a 11, where in πᾶσαν ἀνισότηα Γ M^s pr. P¹ make ἀνισότηα into ἰσότηα, and 1284 a 3, where in τὸν βίον τὸν κατ' ἀρετὴν two or three MSS. omit the second τὸν.

18. φιλοτιμίαν] ο γ ζ have *amorem honorum*: Susemihl's MSS. *amorem honoris*. διὰ] Neither Vet. Int. nor Ar. (*per ambitionem et avaritiam*) renders διὰ before φιλοχρη-

ματίαν, and M^s omits it. But compare for the repetition of δὲ, 7 (5). 10. 1311 a 25. 19. In Π¹ μὴ is omitted here and placed between ἡ and βέλτιον (20). 20. ἀλλὰ μὴν κ.τ.λ.] Vet. Int. *sed et si melius, non sicut nunc, sed per ipsius vitam unumquemque* (o here adds *nunc est*) *iudicare regum* (o z *regnum*). Hence Sus.³ reads ἀλλὰ καὶ βέλτιον, * * γε μὴ καθάπερ νῦν, ἀλλὰ κ.τ.λ. and supposes a second βέλτιον to have dropped out before γε, or else δέι or something similar; but μὴν may easily have been corrupted into καὶ in r or misread by the translator. Ar. *attamen melius non ut nunc quidem, sed pro vila cuiusque regis iudicare*. 23. *Enim* here as elsewhere in the *vetus versio* (1268 b 34, 1280 a 38) represents γοῦν. 27. φιδία] In this passage, probably, as in others, we may ascribe the reading φιλία to Π¹, for though almost all the MSS. of Vet. Int. omit the word, two of them (a z) have *amicabilia*. Compare Susemihl's *apparatus criticus* on 1272 a 2, b 34. The form φιλιεῖος occurs in the Herculean papyri on which the fragmentary remains of the work of Philodemus de Musica are preserved (fragm. 30: p. 18 Kemke). Plutarch, however, it is evident, used the form φιδία (see Lycurg. c. 12 *init.*). Dicaearchus, Phylarchus, and Antiphanes (ap. Athen. Deipn. pp. 141, 143) also use either this form or that of φειδία (see Meineke on Athen. Deipn. 143 a). Bekker reads φιδία both in the Politics and in Rhet. 3. 10. 1411 a 25, though in the latter passage (see Roemer *ad loc.*) no MS. has preserved the true reading, nor yet the Vetus Interpres. So too C. F. Hermann (see Gr. Ant. 1. § 28. 1) and Schömann (Gr. Alterth. 1. 280 n.). 31. συμβαίνει] So O¹: Bekker reads συμβαίνειν, but without support from the better MSS. *Quare accidit* in Vet. Int. leaves it uncertain what reading he found in his text. 32. τῇ νομοθέτῃ τῆς προαιρέσεως] Almost all MSS. of Vet. Int. have *legislatoris voluntati* (a m z have *legislatori voluntati*, y *legumlatori voluntati*). See above on 1269 a 16. 37. αὐτῆς Π¹ Bekk. Sus. seems to be correct (cp. 1272 a 15, τῆς πολιτείας): for the readings of other MSS. see Susemihl's *apparatus criticus*. O¹ αὐτοῖς. 40. αἰδῖος] αἰδιος Π³ Ar. (*praefectura illa perpetua*) Bekk. (αἰδιος O¹). 41. Vet. Int. does not render καθέστηκεν, but see above, p. lxiii, note 12, for other instances in which he fails to render words. Ar. *fere alterum est imperium*. ὥδι] Vet. Int. *hoc*.

1271 b 5. Vet. Int. adds *ad virtutem* after his equivalent for μηδὲ. Similar additions appear in his version in 1254 b 20 and 1287 a 30. Ar. omits these words—*nec quicquam aliud exercere sciebant praestabilius quam rem militarem*. 6. τοῦτου] So O¹, though P⁴ with some other MSS. has τοῦτο. Vet. Int. would seem to have

found τοῦτο in his Greek text, for he has—*hoc autem peccatum non modicum*. He probably found ἥλατον in his text, though his translation is *modicum*, for he is often inexact in rendering degrees of comparison (see above on 1265 b 13). Ar. *illud quoque erratum non sane minus, quod putant* (om. μὲν with Γ M^s?) *bona illa quae ad bellum pertinent* (he blindly follows Vet. Int. *bona quae circa res bellicas*) *ex virtute magis quam ex vitio fieri*. To omit μὲν with Γ M^s would be a mistake: 'interdum oppositio per particulam μὲν indicata et inchoata non accurate continuatur' (Bon. Ind. 454 a 17 sqq.). See Vahlen on Aristot. Poet. 6. 1450 a 3 sqq. and b 16 sqq. (Poet. pp. 118, 127). 21. τὸ δὲ πλεῖον] Vet. Int. *plurimum autem*, but see above on 1265 b 13, 1271 b 6. 22. καὶ λέγεται δὲ] Vet. Int. *et dicitur quidem* (καὶ λέγεται γε?), τε M^s P¹. 25. Χαράλλον Π, but in γ (5). 12. 1316 a 34 Π have Χαράλδον. This variation may possibly date back to an uncial archetype. See Sus.¹ p. xiv on the confusion of οὐσιῶν and θουσιῶν in 3. 14. 1285 b 10, 16. 27. ἀποικοι is here rendered by Vet. Int. *domestici*: see above, p. xlv, note 1, for other renderings of the word in Vet. Int. 28. κατέλαβον] Vet. Int. *susceperunt*. οἱ . . . ἐλθόντες] ο *qui venerunt*: other MSS. *qui venerant*. 31. ὡς κατασκευάσαντος] Vet. Int. *ut instituit*. 34. ἐπίκειται] Vet. Int. *supponitur* (ὑπόκειται?). 35. ἀπέχει γὰρ κ.τ.λ.] O¹ δλίγον τῆς πελοποννήσου (P⁴ δλίγον τῆς πελοποννήσου). Vet. Int. *distat enim quidem a Polopo insula modicum, versus Asiam autem ab eo loco qui circa Triopium et a Rhodo* (ῥόδον Π¹, perhaps rightly). Ar. read 'Ῥόδον. 39. ἐπιθέμενος τῇ Σικελίᾳ] Vet. Int. *appositus Siciliae*: cp. 1305 a 14, where ἐπιτίθενται is translated *superponuntur*. 40. Κάμνον is the reading of all the better MSS. (so O¹) and of Γ (καμμον without accent P³): Vict. substituted Κάμκον, and either this or Καμκόν (the true accentuation of the word is, according to Sus., a disputed point) seems to be the correct reading. It is easy to understand how the commoner word took the place of the less common one. 41. τε om. M^s P¹: Vet. Int. *agriculturae enim opus faciunt*, but Vet. Int. hardly ever renders τε, hence the reading in Γ is uncertain.

1272 a 3. ἀνδρεία] O¹ (with Π²) ἀνδρία. Ephorus ap. Strab. p. 480, and Dosiadas and Pyrgion ap. Athen. Deipn. p. 143 have ἀνδρεία, not ἀνδρία. C. F. Hermann (Gr. Ant. 1. § 22. 5) is for ἀνδρεία. 8. πρότερον] Vet. Int. *primo*, but see above on 1265 b 13, 1271 b 6, 21. 16. ἐν δὲ Κρήτῃ κ.τ.λ.] Ar. *at in creta communiter est, ex cunctis enim quae a terra proveniunt vel armentis ex publicis et iis quae afferunt peritici* (so New Coll. MS.: Bodl. *perieci*: neither have *periti*, as Schn., Pol. vol. 2. p. 134) *divisio fit*.

Thus Ar. omits, with all the better MSS., the *καὶ* which Bekker adds before *ἐκ τῶν δημοσίων*. Most of the MSS. of Vet. Int. omit *et* before *ex publicis*, but *a* adds it, and so does *z*. 24. ποιήσας] *a* *z* have *fecit*: the other MSS. of Vet. Int. *facit*. 28. χείρων τῶν ἐφόρων] Vet. Int. *deterius quam quae ephorum*, but whether he found χείρων ἢ τὰ τῶν ἐφόρων in his Greek text, may well be doubted. δ μὲν γὰρ] Here pr. O¹ (cp. P¹) has ὁ μὲν γὰρ τὰ περὶ τοὺς κόσμους οὐ καλῶς ἔχει κακὸν τὸ τῶν ἐφόρων ἀρχεῖον ὑπάρχει καὶ τούτων, but corr.¹ adds in the margin—γρ. δ μὲν γὰρ ἔχει κακὸν τὸ τῶν ἐφόρων ἀρχεῖον ὑπάρχει καὶ τούτων. Evidently a marginal remark τὰ περὶ τοὺς κόσμους οὐ καλῶς has found its way into the text of these two MSS. 29. τούτοις] τούτων Π² O¹ Bekk., but the genitive seems doubtful (cp. 2. 5. 1264 a 29). Ar. *id est et in illis*, which probably implies that he found τούτων in his text: cp. 1253 b 27, where *sic etiam in re familiari* in Ar. probably stands for οὕτω καὶ τῶν οἰκονομικῶν. 36. τῶν] ὧν Π, evidently repeated from περὶ ὧν 35. Vet. Int. *de hiis quae in Lacedaemonia fiunt*. 40. οὐδὲν γὰρ] οὐδὲ γὰρ Γ (Vet. Int. *neque enim*) is adopted by Bekker, but probably wrongly. All the MSS. have οὐδέν. ‘Τι secludendum esse ci. Buecheler, μέτεστι Coraes, sufficeret ἔστι, sed nihil mutandum est’ Sus.¹ Οὐδέν τι is common enough used adverbially, but it does not seem to be often used as it is here. 41. πόρρω γ’ ἀποικοῦσιν] Vet. Int. *longe enim peregrinantur*, but, as Susemihl sees in his third edition, this is no proof that Vet. Int. found γὰρ in his Greek text.

1272 b 5. καὶ μεταξὺ] ο *etiam* (not *et*) *intermedie*. 8–9. See explanatory note. δίκας] Vet. Int. *sententias*, as in γ (5). 3. 1302 b 24. 16. τοῖς βουλομένοις ἐπιτίθεσθαι καὶ δυναμένοις Π¹: Sus. adopts this reading in all his editions, but holds in his third that some word is wanting before τοῖς βουλομένοις. Ar. *est autem periculosus hic reipublicae status, si qui velint possintque invadere*. 28. ἡ before Λακωνικῇ is omitted, not surely by M^s P¹ only (as Sus.² holds), but by Π¹, for Vet. Int. translates—*quae Cretensium et Lacedaemonica et tertia ab hiis quae Calchedoniorum*. 30. σημείον δὲ κ.τ.λ.] Ar. *signum est reipublicae bene institutae quod* (so Bodl.: New Coll. MS. wrongly *quo*) *populus in suo permaneat* (so Bodl.: New Coll. MS. *permanet*) *loco*. Thus he does not render ἔχουσιν, which M^s P¹ omit, but probably wrongly. 36. γὰρ after μὲν om. P² etc., followed by Bekker, but the reading of Π¹ P⁴ (and O¹), which is adopted by Susemihl, seems preferable. Ar. *praeterquam quod non deterius: nam illi ex contingentiis sunt*. The same doubt as to the exclusion or insertion of γὰρ recurs

in 1291 a 29 and 1331 b 34, but in 1291 a 29 Π¹ are supported by the Vatican Palimpsest in adding it. 37. ἀριστίνδην] Vet. Int. *virtuosum*: so again in 1273 a 23, and πλουτίνδην in 1273 a 24 *divitem*. 38. τοῖς ἐκεῖ βασιλεῦσι] Susemihl's MSS. of Vet. Int. have *hiis quae ibi regibus*: z rightly *hiis qui ibi regibus*. 39. See explanatory note on 1272 b 38. 40. εἴ τε] εἴ τε Sus., who takes *si quid* to be the true reading in Vet. Int., but a alone has *si quid* (z *si quod*)—the rest of Susemihl's MSS. having *sed quod, sed quae* (so o), or *se quae*—and probably we should read *sique* in Vet. Int., the reading adopted by Susemihl in 5 (8). 4. 1338 b 16: εἴτε O¹, εἴτε M^a Π^a Bekk.: Ar. *melius autem quod imperatorem non secundum genus neque ex vili aut precellenti magis eligunt quam secundum virtutem*: εἴ τε is probably right, cp. 1338 b 16.

1278 a 7. τὰ δέ] τὰ δέ P³³⁴ etc. Bekk. (so O¹), but the same MSS. have τὰ μὲν in 6, where Bekker's reading τὸ μὲν rests only on a conjecture of Morel's. 9. οἶτοι om. Π¹, but see above on 1257 b 24. 15. ταύτας αἰρεῖσθαι] τούτους αἰρεῖσθαι pr. O¹ (so P⁴), but corr.¹ adds ταύτας in the margin. Both O¹ and P⁴ have ταύτας at the end of the line. Vet. Int. has *hos* in both places. 16. See the various readings for πλείονα in Susemihl, and see above on 1255 b 26. 19. ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρχείων] Vet. Int. *a principibus* (ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρχόντων?). 22. ἡ συνοδοκεῖ τοῖς πολλοῖς] Vet. Int. *ut (ἡ?) videtur multis*. 39. ὅτι δ'] Here z alone among the MSS. of Vet. Int. which have been examined has *enim* (*quicumque enim* instead of *quodcumque autem*), but it has *enim* instead of *igitur* for οὖν in 1273 a 25, and not a few other blunders are to be found in it in this part of the Second Book (δ' Γ Π). Ar. *nam quicquid apud civitatis princeps habetur in pretio, necessarium est et aliorum civium opinionem subsequi*: but Ar. has *enim* in 1268 b 6 also, where Γ Π have δ'. It is not likely that Ar. found anything but δέ in his Greek text in either passage: Sus., however, follows him against Γ Π in both.

1278 b 1. οὐχ οἷόν τε κ.τ.λ.] οὐχ οἷόν τ' εἶναι βεβαίως ἀριστοκρατικὴν πολιτείαν Π^a Bekk. See on this reading the explanatory note on 1273 b 1. 5. ἀριστ' ἀρχεῖν] ἀρισταρχεῖν Γ Π Bekk. (a word which occurs nowhere else in Aristotle or perhaps anywhere), ἀριστ' ἀρχεῖν Spengel, Sus. 6. προεῖρο] Vet. Int. *praeferret*, but προεῖσθαι is no better translated in 1307 b 4, 1314 a 37 sq. εὐπορίαν] ἀπορίαν Γ M^a, but this kind of mistake often occurs—so in 1278 a 32 Γ M^a have ἀποροῦντες wrongly for εὐποροῦντες, in 1288 a 15 P³ Π^a pr. P² have ἀπόροις wrongly for εὐπόροις: see also the readings in 1300 a 2, 1302 a 2, 1303 a 12. 7. ἀλλὰ ἀρχόντων γε] Vet. Int.

sed et principantium. Did he read τε for γε, as he seems to have done in 1274 a 15? 15. τῶν αὐτῶν] Vet. Int. *ab eisdem*, but we have already seen (above on 1253 a 10) that he occasionally inserts prepositions without authority, and here he had a special motive for doing so, for, as Busse (p. 21) points out, he seems to have taken τῶν αὐτῶν with ἀποτελείται. 18. καὶ is added before τῆς πολιτείας in O¹, as in P⁴ etc. 25. Κρητικῆς] M^s P¹ κρήτης: Vet. Int. *Cretensium*. 27. τι om. Π¹. Ar. *eorum autem qui de republica aliquid tradiderunt*. τι is absent in 1. 13. 1260 b 23, in 6 (4). 1. 1288 b 35, and in 5 (8). 5. 1339 a 14 (see Bon. Ind. 88 a 36 sqq.), but we have εἰπεῖν τι in 2. 8. 1267 b 29. 28. οὐδ' ὠνιωσούν] Vet. Int. *nullis*. ἀλλὰ διετέλεσαν κ.τ.λ.] Vet. Int. *sed perseverarunt singulari vita viventes*. 32. οἱ μὲν—μόνον] οἱ μὲν ἐγένοντο δημιουργοὶ νόμων Π¹. 39. μίξαντα] Vet. Int. *miscuisseque*, but this does not prove that he read μίξαι τε: see his rendering of 1259 a 10 sq. εἶναι] Vet. Int. *fuisse*. 41. τὰ δὲ δικαστήρια] τὸ δὲ δικαστήριον Π¹, which Sus. prefers, comparing 1274 a 4, but we have τὰ δικαστήρια in 1274 a 3.

1274 a 2. τῶν ἀρχῶν] O¹ τῶν ἀρχόντων. 4. θάτερον O¹, with Π³ Ar. (*alterum*). 5. ἰσχυσεν M^s P¹: we cannot tell from *invaluit* which reading Vet. Int. found in his text, for he often renders the imperfect by the perfect (e.g. in 1267 b 18, 30, 31). ἰσχυσεν, however, which Sus. adopts, seems preferable to ἰσχυεν Π³ O¹ Bekk.: cp. 6 (4). 13. 1297 b 23. 18. Μηδικαῖς] οἱ μεδίης. See Susemihl's critical note on *Medis* (Sus.¹ p. 145). ἐφρονηματίσθη] Vet. Int. *astute concepit* (the same misapprehension of the meaning of the word appears in his renderings of it in 1284 b 2, 1306 b 28, 1341 a 30). 15. ἐπεὶ Σόλων γε] Vet. Int. *quoniam et Solon*: see above on 1273 b 7. 19. O¹ εἰπόρων, but ἐμ is written over the first syllable, probably by the writer of the MS. 21. Π¹ add τὸ before θητικόν, perhaps rightly (Vet. Int. *quartum autem quod mercenarium*). But I incline to think it is better away: cp. Aristot. *Fragm.* 350. 1537 a 36 sq. and Pol. 6. (4). 4. 1291 a 4. 24. ταῖς Χαλκιδαικάς] Vet. Int. *Chalcidiae* (τῆς Χαλκιδικῆς γ)?). 25. δέ τινες] δὲ καὶ τινες O¹, but καὶ has been expunged by a dot placed beneath it—by whom, is uncertain. Π³ add καὶ before τινες. 27. ἐπιδημούντα] Vet. Int. *praefectum populo* (perhaps, however, *praefectus populo*, which I find in o, may be the true reading). 29. In O¹ δ' is expunged by a dot placed beneath it, and δ' αὐ superscribed—I do not feel certain by whom. 34. Ὀλυμπιασιν] The true reading of the equivalent for this word in Vet. Int. is probably (as Busse points out, p. 9) that of a and pr. b (also pr. z) *olimpiasem*.

'Guilelmum Ὀλυμπίῳ pro nomine a verbo *κηρύσσας* apto accepisse suspicandum est' (Busse, *ibid.*). *διαμυσήσας*] Vet. Int. *recordatus*. 40. ἀπέχθειω] Vet. Int. *abstinentiam*. Ἀπέχθεια is correctly rendered by Vet. Int. in 1305 a 23, 1322 a 2, 17. 41. ἀπὸ τοῦ χώματος] Vet. Int. *a pulvere*.

1274 b 5. Vet. Int. has *Charondi autem nihil est proprium*, and this is the order of the words in P¹ (and M²?). 6. μὲν om. O¹ with Π¹ P⁴. ψευδομαρτύρων ΓΠ Ar. (*falsorum testium*), ψευδομαρτυριῶν Scaliger, Bentley, Bekk., Sus.: cp., however, Rhet. ad Alex. 16. 1432 a 6, ἐν ἀποφάσει ψευδομαρτυρήσας ψευδομάρτυρος δίκην οὐχ ὑφίξει. In 2. 5. 1263 b 21, where the MSS. of the Politics have ψευδομαρτυριῶν, two MSS. of the Vet. Int. (a z) have *falsorum testium*, not *falsorum testimoniorum*. 7. ἐπίσκεψιν Scaliger and Bentley, ἐπίσκεψιν ΓΠ (Vet. Int. *considerationem*). 9. On the passage bracketed see explanatory note. All the MSS. (and Vet. Int.) read φιλολόου: P²³, however, have the alternative reading φαλέου superscribed in the same ink, it would seem, as the MS. (Sus.¹, p. xviii). ἀνωμάλῳσι Bekk., ἀνωμάλῳσι Π (Vet. Int. *irregularitas*, here represents ἀνωμαλία in 1270 a 15, and here probably ἀνωμαλῳσι). 13. γίνονται] So Π¹: pr. O¹ had, I think, γίνονται (with Π²), but it has been dexterously altered into γίνωνται. 14. τὴν μὲν κ.τ.λ.] Susemihl's MSS. of Vet. Int. have *hac quidem manuum utile esse, hac autem inutile*, but z has *hanc quidem manuum utilem (utile pr. manus?) esse, hanc autem inutilem*. τοῖν] So O¹ with P²³ etc.: P¹⁴ ταῖν. 20. τι πταίσωσι, though found only in L^a—a manuscript known to Camerarius, however, had τι πταίωσι (*Politicorum Interpretationes*, p. 109)—is probably right. See Susemihl's *apparatus criticus* for the readings of the other MSS.: most of them read τυπτήσωσι (so O¹). The word used in the law seems to have been ἀμαρτάνειν, which τι πταίσωσι approaches much more nearly than τυπτήσωσι. Camerarius refers to [Plut.] Sept. Sap. Conv. 13, νόμον, ἐν ᾧ γέγραφας, Ἐάν τις οἷον μεθύων ἀμάρτη, διπλάσιαν ἢ τῇ νήφοντι τὴν ζημίαν: to which reference may be added Aristot. Rhet. 2. 25. 1402 b 9 sqq. and Diog. Laert. 1. 76 (ἀμαρτάνειν is the word used in both these passages). Schn. τι πταίωσι (see his note): Bern. Sus. τι πταίσωσι: Bekk. τυπτήσωσι. πλείω ζημίαν] *amplius damnum* (not *damni*) c o z, perhaps rightly. ἀποτείνειν] probably pr. O¹, for after τ there is an erasure leaving a blank, in which ε may once have stood (ἀποτίνειν P², the rest ἀποτείνειν): Vet. Int. *ferre*. 'In the older [Attic] inscriptions τίνω always forms τείνω, ἔτεισα, ἐτείσθην' (Meisterhans, *Grammatik der attischen Inschriften*, p. 88). Here the ε finds its

way into the infinitive ἀποτείνειν. 25. τὰς ἐπιλήρους] Vet. Int. *heredationes*: his rendering of the word is no better in 1304 a 4, 10, where he translates it *hereditatibus* and *heredilatione*. He certainly does not shine in his version of this twelfth chapter.

NOTES.

BOOK I.

1. THE view that the πόλις is a *κοινωνία* had an important bearing C. 1. on Greek political speculation; Plato already asserts it by im- 1252 a. plication (Rep. 371 B: 462 C: 369 C), but Aristotle seems to have been the first to fix the conception of *κοινωνία* and to define its meaning. See vol. i. p. 41 sqq.

2. ἀγαθοῦ τινός. Cp. Eth. Nic. 1. 1. 1094 a 2, and Pol. 1. 6. 1255 a 15, where the expression recurs, and also Eth. Nic. 3. 5. 1112 b 15, τέλος τι. In Pol. 3. 12. 1282 b 15 we have—ἐπεὶ δ' ἐν πάσαις μὲν ταῖς ἐπιστήμας καὶ τέχναις ἀγαθόν (not ἀγαθόν τι) τὸ τέλος. The ends which the various *κοινωνίαι* seek to attain are described in Eth. Nic. 8. 11. 1160 a 8 sqq. In the passage before us, however, ἀγαθόν τι is explained by τοῦ εἶναι δοκοῦντος ἀγαθοῦ, though in strictness this need not be a good at all. On 'seeming good' as the aim in action, see Eth. Nic. 3. 6 and the commentators. Sepulveda (p. 3) refers to de An. 3. 10. 433 a 27, διὸ αἰεὶ κινεῖ μὲν τὸ ὀρεκτόν, ἀλλὰ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἢ τὸ ἀγαθόν ἢ τὸ φαινόμενον ἀγαθόν· οὐ πᾶν δέ, ἀλλὰ τὸ πρακτόν ἀγαθόν. Τὸ εἶναι δοκοῦν ἀγαθόν = τὸ ἐκάστω εἶναι δοκοῦν ἀγαθόν, or τὸ φαινόμενον ἀγαθόν (Eth. Nic. 3. 6. 1113 a 20-24).

4. πῶσαι μὲν κ.τ.λ. These words repeat the second of the two premisses (1252 a 2); they do not contain the conclusion. Μέν is 'while,' as in 5 (8). 2. 1337 b 15 and 5. 1340 a 1. Bonitz remarks on Metaph. Θ. 2. 1046 b 15: 'in apodosis duo quidem membra, τὸ μὲν ὑγεινόν—ψυχρότητα et ὁ δ' ἐπιστήμων ἀμφω, quasi eodem ordine iuxta se posita sunt, sed ipsa apodosis unice in posteriore membro continetur; prius grammaticè coordinatum, re vera subiectum est alteri membro. Cf. de hoc abusu part. μέν—δέ Xen. Cyr. 1. 1. 4 et Bornem. ad h. l.'

Aristotle omits to prove that the aim of *κοινωνίαι* is not the avoidance or mitigation of evil, which is according to some modern inquirers the end of the State.

μέλιστα, Vict. 'illo "maxime" significatur studium ipsius vehementius in persequendo quod quaerit.' So Bern. Cp. 3. 12. 1282 b 15.

Cp. also Eth. Nic. 10. 4. 1174 b 21-23 and 5. 1175 a 30 sq., referring to which latter passages Teichmüller (Aristoteles Philosophie der Kunst, p. 177) says: 'der Eifer geht immer parallel mit den erstrebten Gütern: je höher das Gut, desto grösser die Bemühung darum.' It is not certain, however, that *μάλιστα* here means more than 'above all' (Sus. 'ganz vorzugsweise').

5. *κυριωτάτη*, 'most sovereign.' Cp. 2. 9. 1271 b 6.

πάσας περιέχουσα τὰς ἄλλας. Cp. Eth. Nic. 8. 11. 1160 a 8, *αἱ δὲ κοινωνίαι πᾶσαι μορίοις εἰκόασι τῆς πολιτικῆς*, and 21, *πᾶσαι δ' αὐταὶ (αἱ κοινωνίαι) ὑπὸ τὴν πολιτικὴν εἰκόασιν εἶναι, οὐ γὰρ τοῦ παρόντος συμφέροντος ἡ πολιτικὴ ἐφίεται, ἀλλ' εἰς ἅπαντα τὸν βίον*, and also Plato, Parmen. 145 B, *πάντα δὲ τὰ μέρη ὑπὸ τοῦ ὅλου περιέχεται*. These passages explain the sense in which the words of the text are used. Aristotle is not thinking of the size of the *κοινωνία* here compared, for there were *κοινωνίαι* in Greece, especially of a religious kind—festival-unions, for instance—which extended, as our Churches often do, beyond the limits of the State, but of the more comprehensive end pursued by the *πόλις*—an end as wide as human life—which makes it stand to all other *κοινωνίαι* as a whole stands to its parts. Thus the end of the *πολιτικὴ ἐπιστήμη* is said in Eth. Nic. 1. 1. 1094 b 6 *περιέχειν τὰ τῶν ἄλλων*. See other references given in Bon. Ind. 581 a 41 sqq.

7. The addition of *ἡ κοινωνία ἡ πολιτικὴ* serves to facilitate the transition to the subject discussed in the next sentence.

ὅσοι μὲν οὖν. Socrates (Xen. Mem. 3. 4. 12: 3. 6. 14): Plato (Politicus 259). Aristotle himself had dropped one or two expressions in the last chapter of the Nicomachean Ethics (1180 b 1-2: 1180 b 24), which might be interpreted as lending some countenance to the view that the contrast of household and *πόλις* is a contrast of numbers. Common opinion is said in 4 (7). 2. 1324 b 32 to identify *δεσποτικὴ* and *πολιτικὴ*. It appears to be implied that if the difference lay only in the numbers of those ruled, the four characters would be the same: cp. de Part. An. 1. 4. 644 a 16 sqq., Pol. 3. 8. 1279 b 34, 38 (referred to by Eucken, Methode der Aristotelischen Forschung, p. 50. 4), where a numerical difference is treated as an insufficient basis for a distinction of species, and also Pol. 1. 13. 1259 b 36. *Ὅσοι* 'acerbius dictum est, ut fere nos: "wie gewisse Leute sagen"' (Ideler, Aristot. Meteor. vol. i. p. 363). *Μὲν οὖν* here introduces an inference from what precedes (which is not always the case: see Bon. Ind. 540 b 58 sqq.)—'the *πολιτικὴ κοινωνία* is the supreme *κοινωνία*, and makes the supremest of goods its aim; hence it is a mistake to hold that the *πολιτικός*,

βασιλικός, οικονομικός, and δεσποτικός are the same.' The μέν seems to be taken up, if at all, by δ' 17, but, owing to the long parenthesis which begins in 9 with πλήθει γάρ, the paragraph is perhaps not completed quite as Aristotle originally intended to complete it.

πολιτικὸν . . . εἶναι τὸν αὐτόν. The Vet. Int., Sepulv., and Lamb. (unlike Vict.) rightly make πολιτικὸν κ.τ.λ. the subject and τὸν αὐτόν the predicate. The article is omitted before πολιτικόν, as in Xen. Mem. 1. 1. 16, τί πολιτικός, to give the word an abstract meaning: cp. also 1. 2. 1252 b 9, ὡς ταῦτο φύσει βάρβαρον καὶ δούλον ἐν.

11. ὀλίγων, sc. ἀρχῇ, νομίζουσιν εἶναι. The omission of ἀρχῇ is quite in the Aristotelian manner. See Bon. Ind. 239 a 52 sqq.

12. ὡς οὐδὲν διαφέρουσιν. On this construction with ὡς, cp. Poet. 20. 1457 a 12 and Vahlen's note, p. 214 of his edition. Plato (Politicus, 259 B) limits his assertion by adding the words πρὸς ἀρχήν, 'in the matter of rule.'

13. καὶ πολιτικὸν δὲ καὶ βασιλικὸν κ.τ.λ. Giph. 'et de politico quidem atque rege,' and so Bern. ('und bezüglich des Verhältnisses zwischen dem verfassungsmässigen Staatsmann und dem Könige')—an interpretation in support of which Eth. Nic. 7. 4. 1146 b 11, καὶ τὸν ἐγκρατῇ καὶ τὸν καρτερικόν, πότερον ὁ αὐτὸς ἢ ἕτερός ἐστιν might be quoted; but perhaps it is more likely that the sentence is framed on the model of that which precedes it (πλήθει γὰρ 9—βασιλικόν 12), and would run, if completed, καὶ πολιτικὸν δὲ καὶ βασιλικὸν [οὐκ εἶδει (or οὐτῶ;) νομίζουσι διαφέρειν οἶον] ὅταν μὲν αὐτὸς ἐφιστήσῃ, [νομίζουσιν εἶναι] βασιλικόν. The insertion of διαφέρειν νομίζουσι (Schn.), or of οὕτω διαφέρειν οἰοῦνται (Göttl.), or even of οὐκ εἶδει νομίζουσι διαφέρειν (Rassow, Bemerkungen über einige Stellen der Politik, p. 4, followed by Sus.), does not suffice to complete the sentence. The distinction drawn by the inquirers here referred to between the βασιλικός and the πολιτικός fell short, in Aristotle's opinion, of the truth. They rested the distinction between them on the extent and duration of the authority possessed by them respectively, regarding the βασιλικός as a permanent autocratic ruler and the πολιτικός as one who exchanged his authority from time to time for subjection to rule, and exercised it in subordination to the precepts of the kingly or political science. This distinction between the βασιλικός and the πολιτικός is not, so far as I am aware, to be found *totidem verbis* in the Politicus of Plato, but Aristotle probably gathers it from Polit. 294 A, 300 E sqq., though Plato seems to draw it rather between the ideal βασιλικός and the actual πολιτικός, than between the ideal βασιλικός and the ideal πολιτικός,

whom he does not appear to distinguish (300 C). Plato, however, declines in the *Politicus* (292 E) to refuse the character of βασιλικός to one who, without actually ruling, possesses the kingly science, so that, if the *Politicus* is referred to here, the reference would seem to be not altogether exact. Aristotle, as has been said, holds that those who distinguished in the way he describes between the βασιλικός and the πολιτικός underrated the difference between them. The βασιλεύς, according to him, differs in nature from those he rules (*Pol.* 1. 12. 1259 b 14: cp. *Eth. Nic.* 8. 12. 1160 b 3 sqq.); he is not their equal like the πολιτικός (*Pol.* 1. 7. 1255 b 18 sqq.). Nor is it the case, in Aristotle's view, that an interchange of ruling and being ruled occurs in all forms of πολιτικὴ ἀρχή (cp. *Pol.* 1. 12. 1259 b 4, ἐν μὲν οὖν ταῖς πολιτικαῖς ἀρχαῖς ταῖς πλείοταις μεταβάλλει τὸ ἄρχον καὶ τὸ ἀρχόμενον).

14. αὐτὸς (cp. Plato, *Rep.* 557 E, ἐὰν αὐτῷ σοι ἐπὶ) here seems to unite the meanings of 'alone' (cp. 5 (8). 4. 1338 b 25) and 'uncontrolled' (cp. 2. 9. 1270 b 8), and to stand in opposition both to κατὰ τοὺς λόγους τῆς ἐπιστήμης τῆς τοιαύτης and to κατὰ μέρος ἄρχων καὶ ἀρχόμενος. So Schn., who however translates 'solus et semper,' which hardly brings out the complete meaning.

ὅταν δὲ κ.τ.λ. Ἐφεσθήκη should probably be supplied here.

15. κατὰ τοὺς λόγους κ.τ.λ. The ideal king, and indeed the δῖτος πολιτικός (300 C), of the *Politicus* of Plato rules μετὰ τέχνης (300 E), not in subordination to (κατὰ) the written precepts of his art (compare the contrast of μετὰ τοῦ ὀρθοῦ λόγου and κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον in *Eth. Nic.* 6. 13. 1144 b 26 sqq. and *Magn. Mor.* 1. 35. 1198 a 17 sqq.), just as a training-master who happened to return to his pupils from abroad sooner than he expected, would not feel himself bound by the written directions given them by him for their guidance during his absence (294 D, τὰς τῶν τέχνης γυμναζόντων ἐπιτάξεις). The ideal ruler, like the captain of a ship or a physician, should rule over those committed to his charge, 'not in subordination to the laws, but with plenary authority' (299 C, μὴ κατὰ νόμους, ἀλλ' αὐτοκράτορας). Cp. 301 E, θαυμάζομεν δὴτα ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις πολιτείαις ὅσα ξυμβαίνει γίνεσθαι κακὰ καὶ ὅσα ξυμβήσεται, τοιαύτης τῆς κρηπίδος ὑποκειμένης αὐταῖς τῆς κατὰ γράμματα καὶ ἔθῃ, μὴ μετὰ ἐπιστήμης, πραττούσης τὰς πράξεις; For the expression τοὺς λόγους τῆς ἐπιστήμης τῆς τοιαύτης, cp. *Eth. Nic.* 7. 5. 1147 a 18, τοὺς λόγους τοὺς ἀπὸ τῆς ἐπιστήμης: *Polyb.* 1. 32. 7, καὶ τι καὶ κινεῖν τῶν μερῶν ἐν τάξει καὶ παραγγέλλειν κατὰ νόμους ('ex artis legibus iussa dare,' Schweighäuser) ἤρξατο. Cp. also *Marc. Antonin. Comment.* 6. 35, οὐχ ὁρᾷς, πῶς οἱ βάνταισοι τεχνίται . . . ἀντέχονται τοῦ λόγου τῆς τέχνης, καὶ τοῦτου ἀπο-

σῆμαι οὐχ ὑπομένουσιν; In de Gen. An. 2. 1. 735 a 1 we have ἡ κίνησις ἢ τῶν ὀργάνων ἔχουσα λόγον τὸν τῆς τέχνης, but the expression perhaps bears a somewhat different meaning in this passage, and also in that last quoted.

τῆς τοιαύτης, i.e. τῆς βασιλικῆς. Rassow (Bemerkungen, p. 3) and Susemihl (Sus.², note 3) are probably right in thus explaining τῆς τοιαύτης, which must apparently refer back here as elsewhere to something already mentioned. Plato, as Rassow points out, identifies the βασιλικὴ ἐπιστήμη with the πολιτικὴ ἐπιστήμη (Polit. 259 C).

16. ταῦτα δ' οὐκ ἔστιν ἀληθῆ. These words refer to the whole series of opinions described in 9-16, and especially to that which sums them up, that the πολιτικός, βασιλικός, οἰκονομικός, and δεσποτικός do not differ in kind. Compare the still blunter expression used in criticising the Platonic Socrates (7 (5). 12. 1316 b 17), τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ ψεῦδος.

17. τὸ λεγόμενον, i.e. Aristotle's assertion in 9 (repeated in 16), that the doctrine criticised is erroneous. Mr. Congreve, however, and Prof. Tyrrell (*Hermathena*, 12. 22) take the reference to be 1252 a 3-7. Against this view it may be urged, that (1) it seems more natural to refer τὸ λεγόμενον to that which immediately precedes, especially as otherwise σοῖ 7—ἀληθῆ 16 becomes a long parenthesis, introduced, strangely enough, by μὲν οὖν, and without any δέ to answer to μὲν οὖν: (2) the word δῆλον has already been applied to the conclusion arrived at in 3-7: (3) if we take τὸ λεγόμενον to refer to the assertion that the πόλις aims at the supreme good, we expect to be told in 21 sqq. that fresh light will be thrown on this subject, not that we shall better understand the nature of the differences existing between the parts of which the πόλις is composed, and it is thus that these scholars explain τούτων 21.

τὴν ὑφηγημένην μέθοδον. Cp. de Gen. An. 3. 9. 758 a 28. 'Camerarius viam et rationem quasi praeuntem et ducentem ad certam cognitionem interpretatur' (Schn.); we find, however, κατὰ τὸν ὑφηγημένον τρόπον in Pol. 1. 8. 1256 a 2, where the metaphor seems to fall into the background. Still ὑφηγεῖσθαι is probably used in both passages in a middle, and not, as Bonitz takes it (Ind. 807 b 46 sqq.), in a passive sense. The same plan of inquiry—that of dividing a compound whole into its simplest elements and examining these—had been followed in the Nicomachean Ethics in the case of εὐδαιμονία, and so again in the Third Book of the Politics, the πόλις being πολιτῶν τι πλῆθος, the πολίτης is first studied. Cp. de Part. An. 1. 4. 644 a 29, ἥ μὲν γὰρ οὐσία τὸ τῷ εἶδει ἄτομον,

κράτιστον, εἴ τις δύναιτο περὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστον καὶ ἀτόμων τῷ εἶδει θεωρεῖν χωρὶς, ὥσπερ περὶ ἀνθρώπου, οὕτω καὶ περὶ ὄρνιθος, where the best method is said to be to examine the ultimate species separately, but the remark is added that it is better not to apply this method to fishes and birds, for the species under these genera are not far apart (οὐ πολὺ διεστῶτα), and much repetition would result if it were employed in relation to them. So in the *de Anima* (see *de An.* 2. 3) it is through studying the *δυνάμεις* of the soul successively—τὸ θρεπτικόν, τὸ αἰσθητικόν, and so forth—that we obtain a real knowledge of the soul. And so again in the *History of Animals* Aristotle's first step is to study the parts of which animals are made up, and in the treatise on the *Parts of Animals* to study the homogeneous parts, which are simpler, before the heterogeneous, which are more complex. The method of rising from the parts to the whole was a tradition from Socrates: see Grote, *Plato* 1. 384 sq., who refers to *Hipp. Maj.* 301 B, and notes the objection of Isocrates to it (*ad Nicocl.* § 52). Cp. also *ad Nicoclem*, § 9, *πρῶτον μὲν οὖν σκεπτόμεν τί τῶν βασιλευσάντων ἔργον ἐστὶν ἐὰν γὰρ ἐν κεφαλαιοῖς τὴν δύναμιν ὅλου τοῦ πράγματος καλῶς περιλάβωμεν, ἐνταῦθ' ἀποβλέποντες ἄμεινον καὶ περὶ τῶν μερῶν ἐροῦμεν.* In *de Anima* 1. 1. 402 b 9 sqq. we find Aristotle discussing whether it is better to begin with ἡ ὅλη ψυχὴ or τὰ μέρη or τὰ ἔργα αὐτῶν. His review of the parts of the State in the *Politics*, indeed, quickly reveals to him its *ἔργον*.

20 sqq. καὶ πόλιν answers to ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις, 18. By arriving at the simple elements of the πόλις, which are, as the State consists of households (c. 3. 1253 b 2), the simple elements of the household—husband and wife, father and child, master and slave—we shall not only come to understand the nature of the πόλις, but shall also learn what is the difference between the *δεσποτικός*, *οἰκονομικός*, *πολιτικός*, and *βασιλικός*, and also how far it is possible to arrive at a scientific account of each of these personages. Some take both *τούτων* and *ἕκαστον τῶν ῥηθέντων* to mean 'the parts of which the πόλις is composed,' but if τὸ λεγόμενον 17 refers, as seems probable, to 7-16, we look rather for an inquiry with regard to the *δεσποτικός*, *οἰκονομικός*, etc. than for one respecting the parts of which the πόλις is composed. Besides, *ἕκαστον τῶν ῥηθέντων* reminds us of *τούτων ἕκαστον* 10, words clearly referring to the *δεσποτικός*, etc. Sepulveda, on the other hand, takes *τούτων* to mean 'the parts of which the πόλις is composed,' though he explains *ἕκαστον τῶν ῥηθέντων* as 'quae pertinent ad regem, ad civilem hominem, ad dominum et patrem familias.' Our attention, however, has been specially

drawn in 7-16 to the question as to the nature of the difference existing between the *δεσποτικός*, *οικονομικός*, and the rest, and it seems likely that *διαφέρουσι* 21 takes up *διαφέρειν* 10; perhaps, therefore, on the whole it is most probable that both *τούτων* and *ἕκαστον τῶν ῥηθέντων* refer to the *δεσποτικός*, *οικονομικός*, *πολιτικός*, and *βασιλικός*. Cp. 1. 7. 1255 b 16, *φανερὸν δὲ καὶ ἐκ τούτων ὅτι οὐ ταυτὸν ἐστὶ δεσποτεία καὶ πολιτική, οὐδὲ πᾶσαι ἀλλήλαις αἱ ἀρχαί, ὥσπερ τινὲς φασιν*. We shall find that the analysis of the *πόλις* into its simple elements (which is described in c. 3. 1253 b 1 sq. as completed) does throw light on the difference between the *δεσποτικός*, the *οικονομικός*, and the ruler of a State, and ultimately to some extent also on the difference between the *πολιτικός* and the *βασιλικός*, for we learn to distinguish the rule exercised by the head of the household over his wife, which is a *πολιτικὴ ἀρχή*, from that which he exercises over his child, which is a *βασιλικὴ ἀρχή*. As to *τεχνικόν*, cp. Eth. Nic. 10. 10. 1180 b 20, *οὐδὲν δ' ἦττον ἴσως τῷ γε βουλομένῳ τεχνικῶ γενέσθαι καὶ θεωρητικῶ ἐπὶ τὸ καθόλου βαδιστέον εἶναι δόξειεν ἂν, κακείνῳ γνωριστέον ὡς ἐνδέχεται* *εἴρηται γὰρ ὅτι περὶ τοῦθ' αἱ ἐπιστῆμαι*, and also Pol. 1. 11. 1258 b 33 sqq.: 1259 a 8, 20. For *ἐξ ὧν* 20 (not *ἐκ τίνων*), cp. 1. 3. 1253 b 1, *ἐπεὶ δὲ φανερὸν ἐξ ὧν μορίων ἡ πόλις συνίστηκεν*, and see Jelf, Gr. Gr. 2. § 877. a. Obs. 3, 4.

24. *Εἰ δὲ τις κ.τ.λ.* Δὴ introduces the first step in the inquiry C. 2. just announced: cp. de An. 1. 2. 403 b 26: Pol. 6 (4). 12. 1296 b 14: 6 (4). 14. 1297 b 37. The first question as to this sentence is, does *ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις, καὶ ἐν τούτοις* form part of the protasis or the apodosis? Bernays connects the words with the protasis. Sepulveda, Vict., and Lamb. take them with the apodosis, and, it would seem, more naturally: cp. above 18-21. Proposals to transfer *οὕτω* 26 to before *καὶ* 25 are negated by the usage of Aristotle (see Bon. Ind. 546 b 18 sqq., who refers among other passages to Eth. Nic. 3. 1. 1110 b 9, *εἰ δὲ τις τὰ ἡδύα καὶ τὰ καλὰ φαίη βίαια εἶναι (ἀναγκάζειν γὰρ ἔξω ὄντα), πάντα ἂν εἴη οὕτω βίαια*), no less than by the intrinsic objections to taking this liberty with the MS. text. The meaning of *οὕτω* seems to be not 'as follows' (Bern.), but 'by watching the process of growth from the beginning.' Andrew Schott, in some notes appended to D. Heinsius' Paraphrase of the Politics (p. 1042), takes *ἐξ ἀρχῆς* with *φυόμενα*, and there is, no doubt, some strangeness in the expression *ἐξ ἀρχῆς βλεψέμεν*: still these words are probably to be taken together. *Ἐξ ἀρχῆς* means, 'beginning at the beginning': see Waitz on Anal. Post. 2. 8. 93 a 16. For the genetic method here employed, cp. Meteor. 4. 12. 389 b 24 sqq., and Isocr. De Antid. § 180. In

tracing the growth of the πόλις from its earliest moments, Aristotle follows Plato's example both in the Republic (369 A) and in the Laws (678 sqq.). Plato's object, however, is different from Aristotle's. In the Republic his object, or nominal object, is to find justice—in the Laws it is to discover *τί καλῶς ἢ μὴ κατοικήσθαι κ.τ.λ.* (Laws 683 B); whereas Aristotle's object is to distinguish the *δεσποτικός*, *οἰκονομικός*, *βασιλικός*, and *πολιτικός*, and still more to prove that the πόλις is by nature and prior to the individual, and the source of *αὐτάρκεια* to the latter. His substitution of this method of watching the growth of the πόλις from its smallest elements is not a desertion of the method of division (*διαρεῖν*, 19) announced just previously; it is, on the contrary, its best application. The same plan is followed in c. 9 to distinguish the sound and the unsound *χρηματιστική*. The growth of *χρηματιστική* both within and beyond the limits prescribed by Nature is carefully traced. For τὰ πράγματα, cp. Rhet. 1. 7. 1364 b 8.

26. ἀνάγκη δὴ κ.τ.λ. Society begins in Necessity (that which is necessary always comes first, that which is for well-being afterwards, 4 (7). 10. 1329 b 27), and its earliest form is *συνδυασμός*, the union in pairs of human beings who are indispensable to each other. Aristotle lays stress on the origin of the household in Necessity and the needs of every day, partly in order to differentiate the *οἰκονομικός* and the *πολιτικός*, partly because by tracing the household to Necessity, or in other words Nature, he obtains the means of proving that its outgrowth the πόλις is by Nature. He finds the origin of the Household and the πόλις in Necessity and Nature, not *προαίρεσις* (for this contrast Bonitz, Ind. 837 a 46, compares de Part. An. 2. 13. 657 a 37, *καὶ τοῦτο οὐκ ἐκ προαιρέσεως, ἀλλ' ἡ φύσις ἐποίησε*). Plato had seemed in the Republic (369 B : cp. 371) to regard the πόλις as originating in the exchange of products and labour. Even in the Laws, where the household is treated as the germ of the πόλις (680), no such attempt is made to trace its origin and to resolve it into its constituent elements, as is here made by Aristotle. In the view of the latter, human society originates not in the *ἀλλακτική κοινωνία* (which begins only in the *κώμη* or Village, c. 9. 1257 a 19 sqq.), but in the relations of husband and wife, and master and slave. The starting-point of the process that gives birth to the πόλις is to be sought in a pair of powerful instinctive desires—that of reproduction, which brings male and female together, and that of self-preservation, which draws the slave to his master, the master also gaining in completeness by having the slave's physical strength placed at his disposal. Else-

where, however, we are told that human society originates in the aim to live (τοῦ ζῆν ἔνεκεν, c. 2. 1252 b 29 : 3. 6. 1278 b 24 : cp. Plato, Rep. 369 D) and ultimately to live nobly and well (1252 b 30 : 1278 b 21 sqq.), for which purposes men stand in need of ἡ παρ' ἀλλήλων βοήθεια (1278 b 20). This account of the origin of society is set by the side of that which traces it back to the instincts which lead to the formation of the household ; we are not taught how to weave them together. There is, besides, a further source of human society—simple *δρεξις τοῦ συζῆν* (3. 6. 1278 b 21) : man is so endowed by nature—endowed with speech and perceptions of the good and bad, the just and unjust, the advantageous and disadvantageous—as to seek society irrespective of all needs of *βοήθεια* : he is, in fact, a *πολιτικὸν ζῶν* in an especial degree. Without these endowments the instincts of reproduction and self-preservation would not suffice to give birth to the household and the πόλις, for these instincts are possessed by the lower animals, which nevertheless do not form households or πόλεις.

τοὺς ἀνευ ἀλλήλων κ.τ.λ. Cp. *de Gen. An.* 2. 4. 741 a 3 sq., 2. 5. 741 b 2 sqq., and Menand. *Inc. Fab. Fragm.* 101 :

Οἰκεῖον οὕτως· οὐδέν ἐστιν, ὃ Λάχης,

ἐὰν σκυπῇ τις, ὡς ἀνὴρ τε καὶ γυνή.

Perhaps τῆς γενέσεως ἔνεκεν 27 is intended to qualify not only *συνδυάζεσθαι*, but also τοὺς ἀνευ ἀλλήλων μὴ δυναμένους εἶναι. For this purpose they cannot dispense with each other, and for this purpose they must pair.

27. θῆλυ μὲν καὶ ἄρρεν. It would seem from ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴοις 29, that in this passage, as occasionally elsewhere (e. g. 1. 13. 1260 a 10, 13), these words are used of the male and female human being.

τῆς γενέσεως ἔνεκεν, the origin, but not, in Aristotle's view, the end of wedlock : see *Eth. Nic.* 8. 14. 1162 a 19 sqq. The household, like the πόλις, comes into existence for one end, but subsists for another. *Γένεσις* is a wider term than *γέννησις* : 'et ipsum τὸ γίγνεσθαι et γενᾶσθαι significat, et universam eam seriem mutationum complexitur quibus conficitur generatio' (*Bon. Ind.* 148 b 4).

28. ἀλλ' ὅσπερ . . . ἕτερον. Cp. *Democrit. Fragm.* 184 (*Mullach, Fr. Philos. Gr.* 1. 351 : *Stob. Floril.* 76. 17), referred to by *Lasaulx* (*Ehe*, p. 91) : *Aristot. de Anima*, 2. 4. 415 a 26, *φυσικώτατον γὰρ τῶν ἔργων τοῖς ζώσιν* (all things that partake of life, whether animals or not—*de An.* 3. 12. 434 a 27), ὅσα τέλεια καὶ μὴ πηρώματα, ἢ τὴν γένεσιν αὐτομάτην ἔχει, τὸ ποιῆσαι ἕτερον οἶον αὐτό, ζῶν μὲν ζῶν, φυτὸν δὲ φυτόν, ἵνα τοῦ αἰεὶ καὶ τοῦ θείου μετέχωσιν ἢ δύναται πάντα γὰρ

ἐκείνου ὁρέγεται, καὶ ἐκείνου ἔνεκα πράττει ὅσα πράττει κατὰ φύσιν: and the following passages in the *de Generatione Animalium*—2. 1. 735 a 17 sq.: 2. 1. 731 b 24 sqq.: 1. 23. 731 a 24-b 8: 3. 10. 760 a 35 sqq. (where Nature is said to design that species shall be perpetual). Plato had already pointed to marriage as a mode of attaining immortality (*Laws* 721 B-C: see Lasaulx, *Ehe*, p. 93), and the writer of the so-called First Book of the *Oeconomics*, who is fond of blending the teaching of Aristotle with that of Plato's *Laws* and the writings of Xenophon, reproduces the view (c. 3. 1343 b 23 sqq.). *Eth. Eud.* 2. 6. 1222 b 15 sqq. should also be compared with this passage. This impulse of reproduction can hardly be an *ὁρεξις*, for it is shared by plants, and plants have not *τὸ ὁρεκτικόν* (*de An.* 2. 3. 414 a 31 sqq.): it may, however, possibly be an *ὁρμή* (*Pol.* 1. 2. 1253 a 29). It seems scarcely to find a place in the enumeration of *τὰ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γινόμενα* (*Eth. Nic.* 2. 4. 1105 b 19 sq.) as *πᾶθη συνδυμνῶν ἕξεις*, probably because it belongs to *τὸ θρεπτικόν*, with which an ethical treatise has nothing to do. Aristotle does not enter into the question why the union of man and wife is more than a momentary union, or why it is more lasting than that of male and female among other animals; but his answer may probably be inferred from *Eth. Nic.* 8. 14. 1162 a 19 sqq., which may be contrasted with Locke on Civil Government, 2. §§ 79, 80.

29. *φυτοῖς*. There is no assertion in this passage (as Schn. thinks) of a sex in plants. Aristotle, in fact, holds that though plants share in the male and female principle (otherwise they could not be said to live)—*de Gen. An.* 2. 1. 732 a 11—yet these powers are mingled in them and not separated the one from the other (*de Gen. An.* 1. 23. 731 a 1). All he says is that plants, like animals, are actuated by an impulse to produce a being like themselves: how this is done, is not here noticed.

30. *ἄρχον δὲ κ.τ.λ.* Sc. *ἀνάγκη συνδυάζεσθαι*. Aristotle is probably speaking here only of that form of the relation of ruler and ruled which is exemplified in master and slave. Wherever on one side there is intelligence and on the other brute force only, it is to the interest of both parties to combine, the master supplying what the slave needs and the slave what the master needs. Euripides (*Herc. Furens* 1235) makes his hero refuse to believe that one god can ever have made a slave of another, as some assert:

*Δεῖται γὰρ ὁ θεός, εἴπερ ἔστ' ὄντως θεός,
οὐδενός.*

Aristotle's theory of natural slavery is already indicated here.

For the thought that it is *διάνοια* which makes the master, cp. de An. 1. 5. 410 b 12 sq., *τῆς δὲ ψυχῆς εἶναι τι κρείττον καὶ ἄρχον ἀδύνατον· ἀδυνατώτερον δ' ἔστι τοῦ νοῦ· εὐλογον γὰρ τοῖτον εἶναι προγενέστατον καὶ κύριον κατὰ φύσιν*. In 4 (7). 7. 1328 a 6 we read—*καὶ τὸ ἄρχον δὲ καὶ τὸ ἐλεύθερον ἀπὸ τῆς δυνάμεως ταύτης ὑπάρχει πᾶσιν, ἀρχικὸν γὰρ καὶ ἀήτητον ὁ θυμός*, but yet *θυμός* by itself and severed from *διάνοια* confers freedom rather than the capacity to rule others (4 (7). 7. 1327 b 23–33). The slave is throughout regarded by Aristotle as in the main a creature of thew and sinew and nothing more. His function is the use of his body, and this is the best to be got from him, 1. 5. 1254 b 17 sq.: he shares in reason sufficiently to apprehend it, but has it not (1. 5. 1254 b 22): he is wholly without the deliberative faculty (*τὸ βουλευτικόν*, 1. 13. 1260 a 12), and hence is no partaker in life according to moral choice or happiness (3. 9. 1280 a 33). Plato, on the other hand, had described men possessed of muscular strength and little intelligence as born to be hired labourers (Rep. 371 E).

82. *προορᾶν*. Cp. Plato, Laws 690 B, *τὸ δὲ μέγιστον, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἀξίωμα ἔκτον ἂν γένοιτο, ἔπεσθαι μὲν τὸν ἀνεπιστήμονα κελεύον, τὸν δὲ φρονούντα ἡγείσθαι τε καὶ ἄρχειν*: Isocr. (?) ad Demonium § 40, *πειρῶ τῷ μὲν σώματι εἶναι φιλόπονος, τῇ δὲ ψυχῇ φιλόσοφος, ὥα τῷ μὲν ἐπιτελεῖν δύνηται τὰ δόξαντα, τῇ δὲ προορᾶν ἐπίσται τὰ συμφέροντα*: the same thought recurs in the undoubtedly authentic de Antidosis of Isocrates (§ 180). Cp. also Posidonius ap. Athen. Deipn. 263 c–d, and Democritus ap. Stob. Floril. 44. 14, *κρέσσον ἄρχεσθαι τοῖσιν ἀνθρώποισιν ἢ ἄρχειν*. Aristotle has evidently in view in his account of master and slave the contrast commonly drawn between soul and body.

83. *ταῦτα*, 'that which the other has designed.' For a similar roughness in the use of the word, cp. *τοῦτο*, de Gen. An. 1. 22. 730 b 11.

84. *διό*, because the one completes the other. Cp. Stob. Ecl. Eth. 2. 6. 17 (tom. 2. p. 92 Meineke), *καθὼς δὲ καὶ καθ' ἑαυτὸν ἀδύνατον διατῆναι, ὃ τὸ ἄρχεσθαι συμφέρειν*. The sketch of the political teaching of the Peripatetics here given (tom. 2. p. 91 sqq. Meineke) deserves study, as being in the main a *résumé*, though a brief one, of the teaching of the Politics.

ταῦτ' ἀποφύγειν. In the Third Book, on the other hand, the rule of the master is said only accidentally to aim at the advantage of the slave, *οὐ γὰρ ἐνδέχεται φθειρομένου τοῦ δούλου σώζεσθαι τὴν δεσποτείαν* (3. 6. 1278 b 32). Thus it would seem that even in becoming, as the First Book (c. 13. 1260 b 3) requires him to become, a

source of ethical virtue to his slave, the master will have his own interest in view. We are not told this in the First Book.

34-b 9. In mentioning two *κοινωνίας* and not one, Aristotle has implied that a distinction exists between them, and he now draws attention to the fact, in order that he may remove a difficulty in the way of the acceptance of his view. By nature, then—he in effect says—the female is marked off from the slave (for Nature designed them to serve different purposes), and if this is not so among barbarians, the reason is that among them the element destined by nature for rule is not forthcoming. *Μὲν οὖν* here, as often elsewhere, introduces a renewed reference to a subject on which increased precision is desirable. Cp. 1253 a 10, where, after the fact has been mentioned that language is peculiar to man, *μὲν οὖν* introduces an admission that this is not true of voice, and an explanation of the difference between voice and language. The existence of a distinction between women and slaves is implied in Poet. 15. 1454 a 20 sqq. (a reference given in Bon. Ind. 204 b 45). The practice of buying wives, which seems to be referred to in Pol. 2. 8. 1268 b 39 sq. as common among the barbarians, may have often tended to reduce wives to the level of slaves (see Prof. Robertson Smith, *Kinship and Marriage in Early Arabia*, p. 76 sq.). Plato had remarked already on the treatment of women as slaves in barbarian communities (Laws 805 D-E). Their toils were in some degree compensated by easier child-bearing (Aristot. de Gen. An. 4. 6. 775 a 32 sqq.). Even among the poor of a Hellenic State the true form of the household cannot be quite realized: cp. 8 (6). 8. 1323 a 5, *τοῖς γὰρ ἀπόροις ἀνάγκη χρῆσθαι καὶ γυναίξιν καὶ παισὶν ὥσπερ ἀκολούθους διὰ τὴν ἰδουλίαν*. The fact noted by Plato and Aristotle as to barbarians has been often remarked upon by later writers: so Darwin (*Voyage of the Beagle*, p. 216) says of the Fuegians, ‘the husband is to the wife a brutal master to a laborious slave’; and even as to Montenegro we read—‘How can you expect beauty from women who are used as beasts of burden by the men? . . . The well-grown handsome men who are playing at ball before the palace of the Prince are the husbands and brothers of the poor creatures who are carrying wood and water to their homes’ (Letter from Montenegro in the *Times*, Oct. 11, 1882). On the other hand, Aristotle elsewhere notes the frequency of *γυναικοκρατία* among barbarians (2. 9. 1269 b 24 sq.). Both observations are probably true, however we may choose to reconcile them. It should be added that though Aristotle here contrasts that which prevails among the barbarians with that which

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2. τὴν Δελφικὴν μάχαιραν. See Sus.², Notes 8 and 1353. Vict. appears to have been the first to draw attention to de Part. An. 4. 6. 683 a 22 sqq. (quoted in the last note) and to the important passage from the comic poet Theopompus quoted by Julius Pollux 10. 118, τὸ δὲ ὀβελισκολύχνιον στρατιωτικὸν μέντοι (aliter μὲν τι) χρῆμα, εἴρηται δὲ ὑπὸ Θεοπόμπου τοῦ κωμικοῦ ἐν Εἰρήνῃ—

Ἑμᾶς δ' ἀπαλλαχθέντας ἐπ' ἀγαθαῖς τύχαις
ὀβελισκολυχνίου καὶ ξιφομαχαίρας πικρᾶς.

Vict. says in his note on 6 (4). 15. 1299 b 9 sq., 'Pollux quoque mentionem ipsius fecit, qui narrat militare instrumentum id fuisse. Hoc autem, ut opinor, excogitatum fuerat, ne milites

nimis premerentur duobus gravibus instrumentis ferendis, cum ex uno ita conformato valerent eundem fructum capere.' The proverb Δελφικὴ μάχαιρα (Leutsch and Schneidewin, Paroem. Gr. 1. p. 393) seems to throw no light on the passage before us. We see from Athen. Deipn. 173 c sqq. that the Delphians were famous for their knives and their turn for sacrificial feasting and cookery, and they may very well have used and sold to pilgrims nothing loth to avoid expense (683 a 23 sqq.) a knife which might be used not only for killing the victim but also for flaying it and cutting it up. Contrast Eurip. Electr. 743-769 (Bothe), where Aegisthus first kills the victim (a kid) with a σφαγίς, and then Orestes after flaying it with a Dorian κοπίς asks for a large Phthian κοπίς to cut it up. We need not suppose with Götting (de Machaera Delphica, p. 10) that the Delphic knife was a combination of a knife and a spoon. The passage he quotes from Hesychius—Δελφικὴ μάχαιρα ἀπὸ κατασκευῆς λαμβάνουσα ἔμπροσθεν μέρος σιδηροῦν, ὡς Ἀριστοτέλης—deserves notice, but leaves us much in the dark.

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οὔτω. Cp. 1252 a 24 sqq., though here the clause which explains it, μὴ πολλοῖς ἔργοις ἀλλ' ἐνὶ δουλεῖον, follows and does not precede it. The use of δουλεῖον in the passage before us seems to be a somewhat uncommon one.

ἀποτελοῖτο. Vict. 'effici fabricarique poterit.' Cp. 2. 11. 1273 b 9, ἐν γὰρ ὑφ' ἐνὸς ἔργον ἀριστ' ἀποτελεῖται, and 13, κοινότερόν τε γὰρ, καθάπερ εἵπομεν, καὶ κάλλιον ἕκαστον ἀποτελεῖται τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ θάττον.

8. *τάξιν*. Cp. Magn. Mor. 1. 34. 1194 b 15, ὅταν ἦδη λάβῃ (ὁ υἱὸς) τὴν τοῦ ἀνδρὸς τάξιν. Vict. compares Virg. Aen. 2. 102:

Si omnes uno ordine habetis Achivos.

τὸ φύσει ἄρχον. What this is appears from 1252 a 31 sq. and 4 (7). 7. 1327 b 23-33. According to Aristotle, the relation between the barbarian husband and wife assumes an unnatural form, because that which is naturally the ruling element is wanting. If the wife is a slave, it is because everybody is so. She is no worse off than her husband. Cp. Eurip. Hel. 246, where Helen says—

Τὰ βαρβάρων γὰρ δοῦλα πάντα πλὴν ἐνός,

and see Hug, Studien aus dem classischen Alterthum, p. 60. When in 4 (7). 7. 1327 b 25 Aristotle speaks of the barbarians of cold

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ἡ κοινωνία αὐτῶν refers probably to the conjugal union among the barbarians (so Bern. and Sus.).

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Βαρβάρων δ' Ἑλλήνας ἄρχειν εἰκός, ἀλλ' οὐ βαρβάρους,
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Lecturers, we are told in *Metaph. a.* 3. 995 a 7, were often expected by their audience to produce a poet as a witness to the truth of their statements.

9. ἐκ μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. The two κοινωνίαι are those of husband and wife, master and slave (the latter being here implied to be a κοινωνία, though the name κοινωνοί is apparently denied to master and slave in 4 (7). 8. 1328 a 28 sqq.). That of father and child arises after the foundation of the household. Translate: 'from these two unions, then, proceeds first the household.' Πρώτη is by no means meaningless or pleonastic, for the further societies of the village and State consist of men and women, masters and slaves, but only mediately (mittelbar), inasmuch as they consist of households and households consist of these members. The next paragraph offers a striking analogy (1252 b 15, ἡ δ' ἐκ πλείωνων οἰκιῶν κοινωνία πρώτη χρήσεως ἔνεκεν μὴ ἐφημέρου κόμης): the State also, it is implied, consists of a plurality of households, but only mediately, inasmuch as it is composed of a number of villages which are themselves made up of households' (Dittenberger, *Gött. Gel. Anz.*, Oct. 28, 1874, p. 1373). Some have been tempted to explain οἰκία πρώτη as 'the simplest form of the household' (cp. πρώτη πόλις, 6 (4). 4. 1291 a 17: 4 (7). 4. 1326 b 7), considering the complete form to be realized when children have come into being. But, as Dittenberger observes (p. 1373), there is no confirmatory trace elsewhere in Aristotle's treatment of the household of this distinction between the οἰκία πρώτη and δευτέρα. An οἰκία τέλειος is indeed mentioned in 1. 3. 1253 b 4, but as consisting of slave and free, both of which classes find a place in the household from the first. No doubt, in the third chapter Aristotle adds to the two κοινωνίαι spoken of in 1252 b 10 a third (that which exists between father and child), but the τέλειος οἰκία does not seem to be connected with the appearance of this relation. The parallel of 1252 b 15 also points to the other interpretation, and the absence of any δέ to answer to μὲν οὖν 9 (if indeed the second δέ in 15 does not answer both to μὲν οὖν 12 and to μὲν

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μήτερ, Ἑλλήνων τὸ μὲν γὰρ δοῦλον, οἱ δ' ἐλεύθεροι.

Lecturers, we are told in *Metaph. a.* 3. 995 a 7, were often expected by their audience to produce a poet as a witness to the truth of their statements.

9. ἐκ μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. The two κοινωνίαι are those of husband and wife, master and slave (the latter being here implied to be a κοινωνία, though the name κοινωνοί is apparently denied to master and slave in 4 (7). 8. 1328 a 28 sqq.). That of father and child arises after the foundation of the household. Translate: 'from these two unions, then, proceeds first the household.' Πρώτη is by no means meaningless or pleonastic, for the further societies of the village and State consist of men and women, masters and slaves, but only mediately (*mittelbar*), inasmuch as they consist of households and households consist of these members. The next paragraph offers a striking analogy (1252 b 15, ἡ δ' ἐκ πλείονων οἰκῶν κοινωνία πρώτη χρήσεως ἐνεκεν μὴ ἐφημέρου κόμης): the State also, it is implied, consists of a plurality of households, but only mediately, inasmuch as it is composed of a number of villages which are themselves made up of households' (Dittenberger, *Göttl. Gel. Anz.*, Oct. 28, 1874, p. 1373). Some have been tempted to explain οἰκία πρώτη as 'the simplest form of the household' (cp. πρώτη πόλις, 6 (4). 4. 1291 a 17: 4 (7). 4. 1326 b 7), considering the complete form to be realized when children have come into being. But, as Dittenberger observes (p. 1373), there is no confirmatory trace elsewhere in Aristotle's treatment of the household of this distinction between the οἰκία πρώτη and δευτέρα. An οἰκία τέλειος is indeed mentioned in 1. 3. 1253 b 4, but as consisting of slave and free, both of which classes find a place in the household from the first. No doubt, in the third chapter Aristotle adds to the two κοινωνίαι spoken of in 1252 b 10 a third (that which exists between father and child), but the τέλειος οἰκία does not seem to be connected with the appearance of this relation. The parallel of 1252 b 15 also points to the other interpretation, and the absence of any δέ to answer to μὲν οὖν 9 (if indeed the second δέ in 15 does not answer both to μὲν οὖν 12 and to μὲν

ὄν 9) is not uncommon in the Politics (see Sus.¹, Ind. Gramm. μέν), and affords no ground for the surmise of a lacuna after ἐστίν 12.

10. καὶ ὀρθῶς κ.τ.λ. The word πρώτη suggests the quotation from Hesiod, which Aristotle seems to interpret as making the wife and the ox the elements of the household, and thus supporting his own view, for the ox, he says, is the poor man's slave (cp. Aelian, Var. Hist. 5. 14). If the line which follows (Hes. Op. et Dies 406),

Κτητήν, οὐ γαμετήν, ἥτις καὶ βουσὶν ἔποιτο,

is genuine, the meaning which Aristotle attributes to Hesiod is even further from his real meaning than in the contrary case.

13. εἰς πᾶσαν ἡμέραν συνεστηκυῖα κατὰ φύσιν, 'existing by nature for the satisfaction of daily recurring needs,' (compare the phrase which stands in contrast to this, χρήσεως ἕνεκεν μὴ ἐφήμερον, 16). So we have κατὰ τε τὰ συσσίτια καὶ τὸν ἄλλον βίον τὸν καθ' ἡμέραν (2. 6. 1265 b 41), πρὸς τῷ καθ' ἡμέραν ὄντες (7 (5). 11. 1313 b 20); and τὰ ἐφήμερα are conjoined with τὰ ἀναγκαῖα τοῦ βίου in Strabo 7. p. 311. The κόμη (or γένος), on the contrary, exists to satisfy necessities less incessantly recurring, and as to the πόλις, cp. Eth. Nic. 8. 11. 1160 a 21, οὐ γὰρ τοῦ παρόντος συμφέροντος ἢ πολιτικῆς (κοινωνίας) ἐφίεται, ἀλλ' εἰς ἅπαντα τὸν βίον. The view implied here of the aim of the household seems somewhat to differ from that of 1252 a 26-34, where reproduction and self-preservation are said to bring it into being.

14. οἶκος . . . οὗς. Cp. 3. 13. 1283 b 33, τὸ πλῆθος . . . οὐχ ὡς καθ' ἑκαστον ἀλλ' ὡς ἀθρόους. Aristotle takes up the word οἶκος from Hesiod in place of the more usual οἰκία. As to the ordinary difference in meaning between οἶκος and οἰκία, see Boeckh, Public Economy of Athens, E. T. p. 142, note 680, and Shilleto on Demosth. de Falsa Legatione, § 279. It is in order to show that the household originates in the needs of daily life that Aristotle adduces the names given to its members by Charondas and Epimenides.

ἄμοσιπύους. The σιτίη was a bread-chest: Vict. refers to Aristoph. Plut. 802.

15. ὀμοκάπους. Κάπη is 'a manger.' Götting's argument that as Epimenides belonged to Crete, where syssitia prevailed, he would not be likely thus to designate the household, seems of the least possible weight. As Dittenberger says (*ubi supra*, p. 1357), we do not know for certain that the work of Epimenides which Aristotle here quotes was authentic, or that, if it was, he was speaking of Crete. 'Ὀμοκάπους (with the penult short, at any rate), as Sus.² (Note 17) says, would not fit into an hexameter verse, and Epimenides wrote in hexameters, but we learn from Diog. Laert. 1. 112 that a prose treatise on the Cretan Constitution passed under his

name, and the term may have occurred in this work. The words *κάμματα*, *κάπτειν*, *καμματίδες* seem to be old-fashioned words used in connexion with the common meals at Sparta (Nicochl. ap. Athen. Deipn. 140 d). For *Zeús kapaios*, see Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 3. p. 58 : cp. *Zeús étaupeios*, *ibid.* 4. p. 384. ‘*Ὁμοκίπνους* is more likely to be a corruption from the less familiar *δομοκάπους* than *δομοκάπους* from it,’ observes Mr. Ridgeway (*Trans. Camb. Philol. Soc.* vol. 2. p. 125), who however suggests *δομοκάπους* with the penult long, Dor. for *δομότης*, ‘those who have a common plot of ground.’ Giphanius, who prefers *δομοκίπνους*, explains *δομοκάπους* in this way (p. 21 : Schneider, Pol. vol. 2. p. 9). But perhaps *δομοκάπους* with the penult short better expresses that community in sustenance and in the satisfaction of daily recurring needs to which Aristotle, as Dittenberger remarks (*ubi supra*, p. 1358), points as the characteristic feature of the household. ‘*Ὁμέστιος* is used in the sense of ‘a member of the household’ (Polyb. 2. 57. 7, referred to by Vict.), but not *δομοκίπνους*. The word *δομοκάπους* does not necessarily imply that the free and slave members of the household took their meals together, but the practice would be quite in harmony with the simplicity of early Greek life (cp. Theopomp. fragm. 243 : Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 1. 319).

ἡ δ' ἐκ κ.τ.λ. Πρώτη agrees with *κοινωνία* : for its position in the sentence, cp. Metaph. 1. 3. 1054 b 1, *αἱ ἴσαι γραμμαὶ εὐθείαι αἱ αὐταί* (‘are the same’) : de Part. An. 2. 14. 658 a 28, *καθ' ὅλον τὸ σῶμα πρᾶνός* : Phys. 4. 5. 212 b 19 : Pol. 2. 8. 1269 a 23 : and still nearer, Phys. 4. 4. 212 a 20, *τὸ τοῦ περιέχοντος πέρας ἀκίνητον πρῶτον, τοῦτ' ἔστιν ὁ τόπος*, where the post-position of the adjectives seems to be for emphasis on the point desired to be pressed, and also to secure the juxtaposition of *ἀκίνητον* and *πρῶτον*. Πρώτη in the passage before us qualifies *ἐκ πλειόνων οἰκιῶν*, and perhaps also *χρήσεως ἔνεκεν μὴ ἐφημέρον*. ‘The first society to be formed out of more households than one, and to exist for the satisfaction of needs not daily recurring, is the village.’ See note on 1252 b 9.

16. μέλιστα κ.τ.λ. Vict. ‘nec tamen omnem pagum talem esse affirmat, usu namque venire potest, et sane contingit aliquando, ut e variis locis homines non coniuncti inter se sanguine veniant in eandem sedem, atque illic domicilia sibi construant tot numero iam ut pagum ex ipsis conficiant.’ For the relation of the *κῶμη* to the deme, see Poet. 3. 1448 a 35 sq. Perhaps the *κῶμη* and the rural deme continued to feel as a *gens*, and to obey a gentile authority, longer than is often supposed, and hence in part the preference of oligarchs and of the Lacedaemonians for village-residence and their

dislike of large cities, which had a natural tendency to democracy. The purchaser of land in an Athenian deme to which he did not belong paid something for *ἐγκτησις* (Boeckh, *Publ. Econ. of Athens*, E. T. p. 297 n.: Haussoullier, *Vie Municipale en Attique*, pp. 68, 78): hence the land probably tended, in rural demes at all events, to continue in the hands of the members of the deme. The villages founded by the Teutonic conquerors of Britain were to some extent peopled by kinsmen. 'Harling abode by Harling and Billing by Billing, and each "wick" and "ham" and "stead" and "tun" took its name from the kinsmen who dwelt together in it. In this way the house or "ham" of the Billings was Billing-ham, and the "tun" or township of the Harlings was Harlington' (Green, *The Making of England*, p. 188).

17. ἀποικία οἰκίας. A similar expression is used by Plato, *Laws* 776 A. Cp. also *Laws* 680 A sqq., a passage which was probably present to Aristotle's mind throughout this part of the second chapter (see vol. 1. p. 37, note 1). Plato appeals to the same passage of Homer as is cited in 22, and for the same purpose, to prove the early prevalence of Patriarchal Kingship, or, as he terms it, *δυναστεία*. Both Plato and Aristotle regard kingly rule as characteristic of early society and trace it to the government of the household by the father.

οὗς . . . παῖδας. Aristotle's object in mentioning these names for members of the same village is to show by an appeal to the use of language that the village is an extension of the household. He has proved that the household is necessary and natural, and if he can prove that the village is an outgrowth of the household and the πόλις of the village, then the πόλις will be shown to be natural. Cp. Photius, *Lexicon* (quoted by Schn.), *ὁμογάλακτες, οἱ τοῦ αὐτοῦ γάλακτος, οὗς καὶ γεννήτας ἐκάλουν*, and see Liddell and Scott, s. v. Plato had used the expression *τοὺς παῖδας καὶ παίδων παῖδας ὃ λέγομεν* in the passage of the *Laws* referred to in the last note (681 B), and Homer before him (*Il.* 20. 308). Had Cicero the First Book of the *Politics* in his mind when he wrote (*de Offic.* 1. 17. 54)—*nam cum sit hoc natura commune animantium ut habeant lubidinem procreandi, prima societas in ipso coniugio est; proxima in liberis* (in Aristotle master and slave); *deinde una domus, communia omnia* (cp. 1. 9. 1257 a 21). *Id autem est principium urbis et quasi seminarium reipublicae. Sequuntur fratrum coniunctiones, post consobrinorum sobrinorumque, qui cum una domo iam capi non possint in alias domos tanquam in colonias exeunt. Sequuntur connubia et affinitates, ex quibus etiam plures propinqui.*

Quae propagatio et soboles origo est rerum publicarum? There is no express mention of the village, however, here, though a reference to it may be intended in the words 'alias domos.' Compare Demosth. in Macart. c. 19, *καὶ παῖδες ἐγένοντο αὐτοῖς ἅπασι καὶ παίδων παῖδες, καὶ ἐγένοντο πέντε οἶκοι ἐκ τοῦ Βουσέλου οἴκου ἐνὸς ὄντος.*

19. Διὸ . . . ᾤκουν. The fact that the village is an offshoot of the household enables Aristotle to account for the early prevalence of Kingship. Compare with the passage before us a quotation from Theophrastus *περὶ βασιλείας* in Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 5. 73, *κατ' ἀρχὰς μὲν γὰρ ἅπαντα πόλεις Ἑλλὰς ἐβασιλεύετο, πλὴν οὐχ ὥσπερ τὰ βάρβαρα ἔθνη δεσποτικῶς, ἀλλὰ κατὰ νόμους τινὰς καὶ ἐθισμούς πατρίους* (cp. Pol. 3. 14. 1285 a 16—b 12).

τὰ ἔθνη ('opp. οἱ Ἕλληνες,' Bon. Ind. 216 b 51) are here regarded as preserving the traditions of the village (cp. 1. 9. 1257 a 24.: 2. 8. 1268 b 39). The customs of the early Hellenes are thought both by Thucydides (1. 5—6) and by Aristotle (Pol. 2. 8. 1268 b 39) to have had much in common with those of the barbarians of their own day.

20. ἐκ βασιλευμένων γὰρ συνήλθον, 'for they were formed of persons governed by a king,' i. e. of members of households. Cp. Plato, Laws 680 D, *μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἐκ τούτων τῶν κατὰ μίαν οἰκισιν καὶ κατὰ γένος διασπαρμένων ὑπὸ ἀπορίας τῆς ἐν ταῖς φθοραῖς* (sc. *τοιαῦται πολιτεῖαι γίνονται*), *ἐν αἷς τὸ πρεσβύτατον ἄρχει διὰ τὸ τὴν ἀρχὴν αὐτοῖς ἐκ πατρὸς καὶ μητρὸς γεγονέναι, οἷς ἐπόμενοι καθάπερ δρυθες ἀγέλην μίαν ποιήσουσι, πατρονομούμενοι καὶ βασιλείαν πασῶν δικαιοτάτην βασιλεύοντες*; If *συνήλθον* is here said of the *ἔθνη* as well as the *πόλεις*, both *ἔθνος* and *πόλις* are implied to owe their origin to the household. 'It is worth noting that Aristotle gives us three distinct reasons for the prevalence of kingly rule in early times—here, 3. 15. 1286 b 8 sqq., and '7. 13. 11' (is 4 (7). 14. 1332 b 16 sqq. meant?)—without hinting in any one of the passages that he knew of those specified in the others' (Mr. Postgate, Notes, p. 1). The second of these passages, however, is apparently aporetic; Aristotle is seeing whether the argument in favour of Kingship derivable from the prevalence of it among the men of a former day (*οἱ πρότερον*) may not be met; may they not have rested content with it, because they had no choice, not many men of high excellence being then forthcoming? We observe, moreover, that almost every discussion in the Politics takes less account of preceding ones, and makes less use of their results, than one might have expected, so that we are not much surprised if Aristotle seems in this passage of the Third Book to forget that he has already accounted otherwise for the preva-

lence of Kingship in early times. Locke remarks (Civil Government, 2. § 106)—‘It is plain that the reason that continued the form of government in a single person was not any regard or respect to paternal authority, since all petty monarchies—that is, almost all monarchies near their original—have been commonly, at least upon occasion, elective.’ The etymology of the word ‘King,’ however, appears to make in favour of Aristotle’s view. ‘It corresponds with the Sanscrit ganaka. . . . It simply meant father of a family’ (Prof. Max Müller, Lectures on the Science of Language, 2. 282, 284, quoted by Dr. Stubbs, Const. Hist. of England, 1. 140).

πᾶσα γὰρ οἰκία κ.τ.λ. Camerarius (Politiconum et Oeconomiconum Aristotelis Interpretationes et Explicationes, p. 25) aptly quotes Hom. Od. 1. 397, where Telemachus says,

Αὐτὰρ ἐγὼν οἴκοιο ἀναξ ἔσομ’ ἡμετέροιο
καὶ δμῶων, οὓς μοι ληίσσατο δῖος Ὀδυσσεύς.

21. διὰ τὴν συγγένειαν recurs in 2. 10. 1271 b 24 sq., there also in reference to a colony—φασὶ γὰρ τὸν Λυκοῦργον . . . τότε τὸν πλείστον διατρίψαι χρόνον περὶ Κρήτην διὰ τὴν συγγένειαν ἀποικοὶ γὰρ οἱ Λύκτιοι τῶν Λακῶνων ἦσαν. Just as in that passage the relationship of the Lycians to the Laconians is referred to, so here the reference probably is to the relationship of the ἀποικίαι to the οἰκία. So Sus. (Qu. Crit. p. 333): ‘propter propinquitatem, id est quia nihil nisi colonia domus sive familia dilatata vicus est.’ The words, however, are often explained to refer to the mutual relationship of the members of the ἀποικίαι, Kingship being especially in place among relatives (cp. 1. 12. 1259 b 14 sqq.), and this is a possible interpretation.

22. καὶ τοῦτ’ ἐστὶν ὃ λέγει Ὅμηρος. What is the meaning of τοῦτο? What is the quotation from Homer held by Aristotle to prove? The commentators are not agreed. Giph. ‘Homeri versiculus eo pertinere videtur, ut doceat Aristoteles domesticum imperium esse velut regium’ (p. 24); he would seem therefore to refer τοῦτο to πᾶσα γὰρ οἰκία βασιλεύεται ὑπὸ τοῦ πρεσβυράτου 20 exclusively, as does also Susemihl (Qu. Crit. p. 333). But it is not altogether easy to refer τοῦτο to this particular clause only, and we hardly expect Aristotle to appeal to the practice of the Cyclopes in order to justify a general statement respecting the household of all times. The explanation of Vict. is—‘uitur etiam auctoritate summi poetae, qui idem ostendit, priscos scilicet, ut ipsis commodum erat, solitos regere suam familiam,’ and perhaps it is in some such way as this that we should understand the quotation. Aristotle has been

saying that *πόλεις* and *ἔθνη* had their origin in the coming together of human beings who had been previously ruled by kings, and he uses Homer's account of the Cyclopes to prove the existence in the earliest times of a household form of Kingship—a form in which the king was the husband and father, and the subjects were the wives and children. To Plato (cp. Laws 680 D, τὸ ἀρχαῖον αὐτῶν ἐπὶ τὴν ἀγριότητα διὰ μυθολογίας ἐπανενεγκῶν, and Strabo, p. 592, ταύτας δὴ τὰς διαφορὰς ὑπογράφειν φησὶ τὸν ποιητὴν ὁ Πλάτων, τῆς μὲν πρώτης πολιτείας παράδειγμα τιθέντα τὸν τῶν Κυκλώπων βίον), and probably also to Aristotle (Pol. 1. 2. 1252 b 23, σποράδες γάρ, καὶ οὕτω τὸ ἀρχαῖον φέκουν), the Homeric picture of the Cyclopes is a mythical picture of the rude beginnings of human society. Plato had already used the same quotation from Homer in Laws 680 A sqq. to prove that Patriarchal Kingship (which he terms *δυναστεία*) existed in early times, and the fact that the words with which he prefaces his quotation seem to find an echo in those with which Aristotle prefaces his makes it all the more likely that they quote it for a similar purpose. The passage in the Laws is as follows—ΑΘ. Πολιτείας δέ γε ἤδη καὶ τρόπος ἐστὶ τις οὗτος. ΚΛ. Τίς; ΑΘ. Δοκοῦσί μοι πάντες τὴν ἐν τούτῳ τῷ χρόνῳ πολιτείαν δυναστείαν καλεῖν, ἣ καὶ νῦν ἔτι πολλαχοῦ καὶ ἐν Ἑλλήσει καὶ κατὰ βαρβάρους ἐστὶ λέγει δ' αὐτὴν πού καὶ Ὅμηρος γεγονέναι περὶ τὴν τῶν Κυκλώπων οἰκισιν, εἰπὼν

τοῖσιν δ' οὐτ' ἀγοραὶ βουλευφάροι, οὔτε θέμιστες,
ἀλλ' οἷ γ' ὑψηλῶν ὀρέων ναίουσι κάρηνα
ἐν σπέσσι γλαφυροῖσι, θεμιστεύει δὲ ἕκαστος
παίδων ἢ δ' ἀλόχων, οὐδ' ἀλλήλων ἀλέγουσιν.

Θεμιστεύει δὲ κ.τ.λ. Odyss. 9. 114. Θεμιστεύειν implies kingship: it is used of Minos in Hom. Odyss. 11. 569, quoted by Plato, Gorgias 526 D. The society of the Cyclopes is referred to in Eth. Nic. 10. 10. 1180 a 28, as a typical case of the household standing by itself, not supported or directed by a State. It is in order to account for the independence of the Cyclopic household and its head that Aristotle adds *σποράδες γάρ*: this would have been clearer, if he had quoted the concluding words of the second line, οὐδ' ἀλλήλων ἀλέγουσιν, but the passage was evidently well-known. Plato also mentions the scattered way in which the habitations were distributed in these early days of human society, and is bold enough to give as the reason for it the difficulty of finding subsistence just after the deluge (ἐκ τούτων τῶν κατὰ μίαν οἰκισιν καὶ κατὰ γένος—cp. the *κώμη* of Aristotle—*δυσπαρμένων ὑπὸ ἀπορίας τῆς ἐν ταῖς φθοραῖς*, Laws 680 D), but on this Aristotle is judiciously silent. This 'sporadic' existence of primitive man is also recognized in

the myth of Protagoras (Plato, *Protag.* 322 A) and by Philochorus (Fr. 4: Müller, *Fr. Hist. Gr.* 1. 384): cp. also Plutarch, *Theseus* c. 24, and Paus. 2. 15. 5. Some savage races still live thus: "the Abors, as they themselves say, are like tigers, two cannot dwell in one den," writes Mr. Dalton, "and the houses are scattered singly or in groups of two or three" (Mr. Herbert Spencer, *Fortn. Rev.* Jan. 1881, p. 5).

24. καὶ τοὺς θεοὺς δὲ κ.τ.λ. 'Nay, the fact that men were at the outset ruled by kings has led them universally to assert that the gods also are so ruled.' Διὰ τοῦτο is explained by ὅτι κ.τ.λ.

26. ὁμοιοῦσιν. Cp. *Metaph.* B. 2. 997 b 10: A. 8. 1074 b 3 sqq. (where it is said that the gods are sometimes assimilated in form to men, sometimes to certain of the lower animals): *Poet.* 25. 1460 b 35.

27 sqq. ἡ δ' ἐκ . . . εὖ ζῆν. Bonitz (*Ind.* 751 b 21) and apparently Bernays take τέλειος with πόλις, and a πρώτη πόλις is no doubt mentioned in 6 (4). 4. 1291 a 17 and 4 (7). 4. 1326 b 7, but not in the First Book, unless indeed the village is to be viewed as an imperfect and inchoate πόλις, which is nowhere stated. Nor would the mere union of more villages than one be enough of itself, in Aristotle's view, to constitute a τέλειος πόλις. Τέλειος seems to qualify κοινωνία, not πόλις, and its place in the sentence is explained (see note on 1252 b 15) by the fact that κοινωνία is qualified both by ἐκ πλείονων κομῶν and by τέλειος. The fem. form is more often τελεία or τελεία in Aristotle (*Bon. Ind.* 751 b 56 sqq.).

On μὲν οὖν occurring as it does here in the middle of a sentence, see Vahlen's note on *Poet.* 22. 1458 a 24 (p. 226 sq. of his edition). He compares (among other passages) the following from the *Politics* — 7 (5). 12. 1316 a 9: 4 (7). 10. 1329 b 2 sq.: 4 (7). 17. 1336 b 6 sqq.: to which 1. 9. 1257 b 2 sqq. (μὲν οὖν, Π¹) may be added. See also *Bon. Ind.* 540 b 42 sqq., 'μὲν οὖν saepe usurpatur, ubi notio modo pronunciata amplius explicatur': of this, besides the present passage and 1. 9. 1257 b 2 sq., *Poet.* 22. 1458 a 23 sqq. is a good instance. Μὲν οὖν thus used seems to introduce a comment on what has just been said, whether by way of modification or confirmation or otherwise. So here, after attributing to the πόλις complete αὐτάρκεια, Aristotle remembers that there is an epoch in its history at which this is not its aim; he therefore slightly corrects what he had just said, but only to confirm it subject to that correction. In *de Part. An.* 4. 11. 691 a 28, however, μὲν οὖν in the middle of a sentence seems merely intended (in the sense of 'while,' cp. *Pol.* 2. 6. 1265 a

17) to prepare the way for the sentence introduced by the *δέ* which follows, and to impart greater emphasis to the latter.

γυνομένη τοῦ ζῆν ἔνεκεν. Cp. 3. 6. 1278 b 24: Plato had said the same thing (Rep. 369 D: 371 B). In Aristotle's view the necessary is first sought and then higher things (Pol. 4 (7). 10. 1329 b 27). In Eth. Nic. 8. 11. 1160 a 11 sq., however, the *πόλις* is said to be commonly thought both to be formed and to exist *τοῦ συμφέροντος χάριν*, and in Pol. 3. 6. 1278 b 21 sqq. it seems to be implied that bare existence is not always the aim with which men form it.

πάσης τῆς αὐταρκειας, 'entire self-completeness'—cp. *πᾶς ὁ ὑπηρέτης*, 1. 4. 1253 b 33, and *πᾶσαν τὴν ἀρχήν*, 7 (5). 11. 1313 a 21—both *αὐτάρκεια ἐν τοῖς ἀναγκαίοις*, 4 (7). 4. 1326 b 4, and *αὐτάρκεια* in respect of τὸ εὖ ζῆν, 3. 9. 1280 b 34. Cp. also 1. 8. 1256 b 31.

ἤδη, cp. 7 (5). 8. 1308 a 16, *ἔστι γὰρ ὥσπερ δήμος ἦδη οἱ ὅμοιοι*: Eth. Nic. 6. 10. 1142 b 13, *ἡ δόξα οὐ ζήτησις ἀλλὰ φάσις τις ἦδη* (has, as it were, 'reached the level' of assertion): and cp. also Pol. 2. 2. 1261 b 12, *καὶ βούλεται γ' ἦδη τότε εἶναι πόλις, ὅταν αὐτάρκεια συμβαίνει τὴν κοινωνίαν εἶναι τοῦ πλήθους*.

For the attainment of the *πέρας* by the *πόλις* (the third *κοινωνία* in the order of genesis), cp. de Part. An. 2. 1. 646 b 8, *ταῦτα γὰρ ἦδη τὸ τέλος ἔχει καὶ τὸ πέρας, ἐπὶ τοῦ τρίτου λαβόντα τὴν σύστασιν ἀριθμοῦ, καθάπερ ἐπὶ πολλῶν συμβαίνει τελειοῦσθαι τὰς γενέσεις*: de Gen. An. 3. 10. 760 a 34, *ἐν τῷ τρίτῳ ἀριθμῷ πέρας ἔσχεν ἡ γένεσις*: Probl. 26. 9. 941 a 24, *τελευτᾷ δ' ἐν τρισὶ πάντα*: de Caelo, 1. 1. 268 a 1 sqq.

30. *διό*, 'because it is the completion of societies existing by nature.'

πᾶσα πόλις. Cp. *οἰκία πᾶσα*, 1. 13. 1260 b 13. Aristotle does not, however, mean that the deviation-forms of State are by nature: they are, indeed, expressly declared to be *παρὰ φύσιν*, 3. 17. 1287 b 39.

αἱ πρῶται κοινωνίαι, i.e. *πρῶται γενέσεις*.

34. *ἀνθρώπου ἵππου οἰκίας*. For the asyndeton, cp. 2. 4. 1262 b 30, *αἰκίας ἔρωτας φόνους*, and see Vahlen's note on Poet. 20. 1457 a 22.

ἔτι . . . 1253 a 1, βέλτιστον. 'Further, that for which things exist and the end is best, and self-completeness, the end of the State, is both the end and best'; hence the State brings that which is best; hence it exists by nature, for nature brings the best. Cp. Eth. Eud. 1. 7. 1218 b 10, *τὸ δ' οὐ ἔνεκα ὡς τέλος ἀριστον καὶ αἴτιον τῶν ὑφ' αὐτὸ καὶ πρῶτον πάντων ὥστε τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη αὐτὸ τὸ ἀγαθὸν τὸ τέλος τῶν ἀνθρώπων πρακτῶν*: 2. 1. 1219 a 9, *φανερὸν τοίνυν ἐκ τούτων ὅτι βέλτιστον τὸ ἔργον τῆς ἕξεως τὸ γὰρ τέλος ἀριστον ὡς τέλος ὑπόκειται γὰρ τέλος τὸ*

βέλτιστον καὶ τὸ ἔσχατον, οὐ ἕνεκα τᾶλλα πάντα : Phys. 2. 2. 194 a 32, βούλεται οὐ πᾶν εἶναι τὸ ἔσχατον τέλος, ἀλλὰ τὸ βέλτιστον. A new proof is here adduced of the naturalness of the State, drawn not from the fact that it is the completion of natural societies like the household and village, but from the fact that its end is the best, the end which Nature pursues: cp. de An. Incessu 2. 704 b 15, ἡ φύσις οὐδὲν ποιεῖ μάτην, ἀλλ' αἰεὶ ἐκ τῶν ἐνδεχομένων τῇ οὐσίᾳ περὶ ἕκαστον γένος ζῶν τὸ ἄριστον διόπερ εἰ βέλτιον ᾧδὲ, οὕτως καὶ ἔχει κατὰ φύσιν.

- 1253 a. 3. ὁ ἀπολις διὰ φύσιν καὶ οὐ διὰ τύχην. Aristotle perhaps has in his mind the *Μονότροπος* of the comic poet Phrynichus. 'Nomen fabulae inditum ab homine tristi et moroso, qui Timonis instar solitariam vitam sequeretur et lucem adspectumque hominum fugeret. . . . Sed quidni ipsum audiamus in loco apud Grammat. Seguer. p. 344 haecce dicentem:

Ὅνομα δέ μοῦστι Μονότροπος * *
 * * * ζῶ δὲ Τίμωνος βίον,
 ἀπρόσοδον, ὀξύθυμον, ἄγαμον, ἄζυγον,
 ἀγέλαστον; ἀδιάλεκτον, ἰδιογνώμονα.'

(Meineke, *Historia Critica Comicorum Graecorum*, p. 156, who however emends the third line otherwise in Fr. Com. Gr. 2. 587 sq.: the MSS. have

ἄγαμον, ἄζυγον, ὀξύθυμον, ἀπρόσοδον.)

There were, however, Cynics who took for their motto the lines—

Ἄπολις, ἀοικος, πατρίδος ἑστεργμένος,
 πτωχός, πλανήτης, βίον ἔχων τοῦφ' ἡμέραν

(Diog. Laert. 6. 38 : Bernays, *Theophrastos' Schrift über Frömmigkeit*, p. 162 : compare Athen. Deipn. 611 C): these men were ἀπόλιδες by choice, and this saying of Aristotle's would, therefore, reflect on them, whether it was intended to do so or not. Aristippus, again, had said (Xen. Mem. 2. 1. 13, referred to by Camerarius, *Interpretationes* p. 28)—ἀλλ' ἐγώ τοι . . . οὐδ' εἰς πολιτείαν ἐμυτὸν κατακλήω, ἀλλὰ ξένος πανταχοῦ εἰμί. Philoctetes, on the other hand (Soph. Philoct. 1018), was an ἀπολις διὰ τύχην, and so were Themistocles, when Adeimantus applied the epithet to him (Hdt. 8. 61), and Aristotle himself, when Stageira was in ruins. Vict. compares with the passage before us Cic. Philipp. 13. 1 : nam nec privatos focos nec publicas leges videtur nec libertatis iura cara habere, quem discordiae, quem caedes civium, quem bellum civile delectat, eumque ex numero hominum eiiciendum, ex finibus humanae naturae exterminandum puto . . . Nihil igitur hoc cive, nihil hoc homine taetrius, si aut civis aut homo habendus est, qui civile bellum concupiscit.

4. ὥσπερ καὶ κ.τ.λ. Il. 9. 63—

Ἀφρήτωρ, ἀθέμιτος, ἀνέστιός ἐστιν ἐκείνος,
ὃς πολέμου ἔραται ἐπιδημίου ὀκριέντος.

The lover of civil war is said by Homer to be 'clanless, lawless, hearthless'; Aristotle, however, seems to conceive him to say that the 'clanless, lawless, hearthless' man is a lover of civil war. But to say of a man that he is a lover of war for the sake of war was, in Aristotle's view, to say that he is either φαῦλος or, like Ares, more than man: compare Eth. Nic. 10. 7. 1177 b 9, οὐδεὶς γὰρ αἰρεῖται τὸ πολεμεῖν τοῦ πολεμεῖν ἕνεκα οὐδὲ παρασκευάζει πόλεμον· δόξαι γὰρ ἂν παντελῶς μαιφόνος τις εἶναι, εἰ τοὺς φίλους πολεμίους ποιοίτο, ἵνα μάχαι καὶ φόνοι γίγνουντο, and the indignant words addressed by Zeus to Ares in Hom. Il. 5. 890 (cp. Polyb. 12. 26). For Mr. Jackson's view of this passage, see *Journ. of Philology*, 7. 1877, p. 236 sqq. I translate ὥσπερ κ.τ.λ. 'like the clanless, lawless, hearthless man reviled by Homer.' It is perfectly true that it is the lover of civil war whom Homer reviles, but Aristotle is often inexact in his use of quotations. Mr. Jackson's proposal to place ὥσπερ—ἐπιθυμητής in a parenthesis and to connect ἄτε περ κ.τ.λ. 6 with the words which precede the parenthesis seems to me to involve an awkward severance of ἄτε περ κ.τ.λ. from the words which this clause is conceived to illustrate, and to be also unnecessary (see below on 6).

6. ἄμα γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Sepulv. 'nam simul ac talis quisque natura est, bellandi cupidus est': Lamb. 'non enim potest quisquam talis esse, quin uno eodemque tempore sit et belli cupidus.' Prof. Tyrrell (*Hermathena*, 12. 26)—'no sooner is he such (clanless, lawless, hearthless) by nature than his hand is against every man': but is not φύσει τοιοῦτος = φύσει ἀπολις? For the construction, cp. Hyperid. Or. Fun. col. 7. 30 (p. 60 Blass), ἄμα γὰρ εἰς τ[ὸν τό]πον ἀθροισθῆσονται καὶ τ[ῆς τοῦ]των ἀρετῆς μνησθήσονται[αι].

ἄτε περ ἄλυσθ' ὢν ὥσπερ ἐν πεττοῖς. The term ἄλυσθ' is used in the well-known epigram of Agathias (Anthol. Pal. 9. 482), where the game described is evidently that which the Romans called 'ludus duodecim scriptorum' (resembling our 'backgammon'): Plato, according to M. Becq de Fouquières (*Jeux des Anciens*, p. 358), refers to this game in Rep. 604 C. The epigram has been ingeniously explained both by Mr. H. Jackson (*Journ. of Philology*, loc. cit.) and by M. Becq de Fouquières (p. 372 sqq.), but until more light has been thrown on the meaning of line 26, which has been variously emended, we cannot be quite sure that we know the meaning of the term ἄλυσθ' even in this game, though it would seem to be 'a solitary, unprotected piece'; it is, however, by no means certain that

Aristotle here refers to this particular game. The term *πεττοί* in its wider signification included a variety of games—all games, in fact, in which *πεττοί* were used (Becq de Fouquières, p. 303, 385)—but it was especially applied, in a narrower sense, to a game resembling our ‘draughts’ (ibid. p. 391), which was played on five lines instead of twelve, and in which each player sought to surround and cut off his antagonist or to reduce him to inactivity (Polyb. 1. 84. 7 : Plato, Rep. 487 B—both passages referred to by Becq de Fouquières, p. 397-8). In this game the term *ἄλυσ* may well have borne a different meaning from that which it bore in backgammon, and one more in harmony with its use in the passage before us, but what this meaning was, we can only vaguely conjecture from the connexion in which it is here used. Is *ἄλυσ* an isolated piece pushed by itself far in advance from the ‘sacred line’ (see Becq de Fouquières, p. 402 sqq.), and therefore alone in the midst of foes? There seems to be no reason for supposing with Becq de Fouquières (p. 398-9) that some game other than the ordinary *πεττεία* is here referred to.

7. *διότι*. Vict. ‘quare,’ with many other translators, but as the fact that man is a political animal in a fuller sense than bees or other gregarious animals has not yet been mentioned, it is perhaps better (with Lamb. Bern. and others) to translate it here by ‘that.’

8. *ἀγελαίου ζῴου*. ‘His in verbis Platonis ἀγελαιοτροφική vel ἀγελαιοκομική, quam legimus in Politico, p. 267 B sq., 276 A, significari videtur’ (Engelhardt, Loci Platonici, p. 3). The connexion conceived by Plato to exist between this art and *πολιτική* may possibly be here glanced at. In Hist. An. 1. 1. 487 b 34 sqq. man is spoken of as both *ἀγελαίον* and *μοναδικόν*, and we have the following account of *πολιτικά ζῷα* in 488 a 7—*πολιτικά δ’ ἐστὶν ὧν ἓν τι καὶ κοινὸν γίνεται πάντων τὸ ἔργον· ὅπερ οὐ πάντα ποιεῖ τὰ ἀγελαῖα· ἔστι δὲ τοιοῦτον ἄνθρωπος, μέλιττα, σφήξ, μύρμηξ, γέρανός· καὶ τούτων τὰ μὲν ὑφ’ ἡγεμόνα ἐστὶ τὰ δ’ ἀναρχα, οἷον γέρανός μὲν καὶ τὸ τῶν μελιττῶν γένος ὑφ’ ἡγεμόνα, μύρμηκες δὲ καὶ μυρία ἄλλα ἀναρχα.*

μᾶλλον. For higher faculties are brought by man into the common stock—the power of perceiving that which is good and evil, just and unjust, advantageous and disadvantageous, and of expressing those perceptions—and the higher the faculties brought into the common stock, the fuller the union : cp. Eth. Nic. 9. 9. 1170 b 11, *τοῦτο δὲ γίνομαι· ἂν ἐν τῷ συζῇν καὶ κοινωνεῖν λόγων καὶ διανοίας· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν δόξειε τὸ συζῇν ἐπὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων λέγεσθαι, καὶ οὐχ ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν βοσκομημάτων τὸ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ νέμεσθαι*. On language as special to man, cp. Isocr. de Antid.

§§ 253-7 and Nicocl. § 5 sqq., passages which Aristotle perhaps had in view here. Socrates had anticipated Isocrates in speaking of language as the condition of political life (Xen. Mem. 4. 3. 12, τὸ δὲ καὶ ἐρμηνείαν δοῦναι, δι' ἧς πάντων τῶν ἀγαθῶν μεταδιδομέν τε ἀλλήλοις διδάσκοντες καὶ κοινωνοῦμεν καὶ νόμους τιθέμεθα καὶ πολιτευόμεθα;). According to Plato, Tim. 47 C, λόγος (which he fails to mark off from φωνή) is given us ἕνεκα ἀρμονίας and to regulate the disorderly movements of the soul. It may be questioned whether, as Aristotle seems to imply, language would be useless to a solitary animal.

10. ἄνθρωπος. 'Articulus ubi genus aliquod universum significatur non raro omittitur,' Bon. Ind. 109 b 36 : cp. 1253 a 31, ὥσπερ γὰρ καὶ τελεωθὲν βέλτιστον τῶν ζώων ἄνθρωπός (so Π²) ἐστίν : on the other hand, all MSS. have ὁ ἄνθρωπος in 1253 a 7, 34.

ἡ μὲν οὖν φωνή κ.τ.λ. Language has just been said to be peculiar to man, and μὲν οὖν ('it is true') introduces an admission that this does not hold of voice, in order that an account of the nature of language may be added. It implies a capacity to form households and πόλεις. As to φωνή, see de Gen. An. 5. 7. 786 b 21, where it is said to be τοῦ λόγου ὕλη, and de An. 2. 8. 420 b 32, σημαντικὸς γὰρ δὴ τις ψόφος ἐστὶν ἡ φωνή, καὶ οὐ τοῦ ἀναπνεομένου ἀέρος, ὥσπερ ἡ βῆξ (contrast Plutarch, de Animae Procreatione in Timaeo, c. 27, p. 1026 A, ὡς δὲ φωνή τις ἐστὶν ἄλογος καὶ ἀσημαντος, λόγος δὲ λέξις ἐν φωνῇ σημαντικῇ διανοίας): so the words σημείον and σημαίνειν are used in 11 and 13 in contrast to δηλοῦν 14 (Vict. 'signa dant, haec enim notio est verbi σημαίνειν : homines autem oratione declarant aperiuntque, hoc enim valet verbum δηλοῦν'). The full force of δηλοῦν appears in Pol. 3. 8. 1279 b 15 : σημεία are distinguished from ομοιώματα in 5 (8). 5. 1340 a 33. As to the limitation to τὸ λυπηρὸν καὶ ἡδύ, cp. Eth. Nic. 2. 2. 1104 b 30 sqq. and de An. 2. 9. 421 a 10, φαύλως γὰρ ἄνθρωπος ὁσμάται καὶ οὐδενὸς ὀσφραίνεται τῶν ὀσφραντῶν ἀνευ τοῦ λυπηροῦ ἢ τοῦ ἡδέος, ὡς οὐκ ὄντος ἀκριβοῦς τοῦ αἰσθητηρίου. Aristotle implies here that animals can only indicate to each other feelings of pleasure and pain (cp. Lucr. 5. 1059 sqq., referred to by Giph.), but in de Part. An. 2. 17. 660 a 35—b 2 and Hist. An. 9. 1. 608 a 17 sqq. he speaks of some of them as receiving μάθησις καὶ διδασκαλία from their likes. See on this subject Dr. Ogle's note 5 on Aristotle's Parts of Animals, 2. 17. Not all animals possess φωνή (Hist. An. 1. 1. 488 a 32).

14. ἐπὶ τῷ δηλοῦν. See Bon. Ind. 268 b 13.

τὸ συμφέρον καὶ τὸ βλαβερόν. Giph. (p. 31) draws attention to the fact that Aristotle denies to the lower animals a sense of the advantageous and the harmful.

15. ὥστε καὶ τὸ δίκαιον. Cp. 3. 12. 1282 b 16, ἔστι δὲ πολιτικὸν ἀγαθὸν τὸ δίκαιον, τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ κοινὴ συμφέρον. Epicurus went farther and traced the just back to utility: cp. Diog. Laert. 10. 150 and the well-known line of Horace (Sat. 1. 3. 98) to which Giph. refers:

Atque ipsa utilitas, iusti prope mater et aequi.

16. μόνον is pleonastic, as in 4 (7). 11. 1331 a 11. For the change of number from τοῖς ἀνθρώποις to μόνον, Vahlen (Poet. p. 103) compares τούτῳ διαφέρουσιν (οἱ ἄνθρωποι) τῶν ἄλλων ζώων ὅτι μιμητικώτατόν ἐστι (sc. τῶν ζώων), Poet. 4. 1448 b 6. Φρόνησις, however, is allowed by Aristotle to some animals (Hist. An. 9. 1. 608 a 15: Gen. An. 3. 2. 753 a 12: Eth. Nic. 6. 7. 1141 a 26), but in a sense other than that in which it is ascribed to man, as appears from the last-named passage—διὸ καὶ τῶν θηρίων ἔνια φρόνιμά φασιν εἶναι, ὅσα περὶ τὸν αὐτῶν βίον ἔχοντα φαίνεται δύναμιν προνοητικὴν.

17. αἰσθήσιν. 'Latiore sensu ἔχειν αἰσθησίν τινας idem quod usum habere alicuius rei, novisse aliquid' (Bonitz, Ind. 21 a 1, who compares Eth. Nic. 6. 12. 1143 b 5 and Pol. 3. 11. 1281 b 35, and refers to Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 504. 2, ed. 2, = 650. 2, ed. 3). See also Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 238. 2 (ed. 3), who explains αἰσθησιν in the passage before us by the word 'Bewusstsein,' adding that an immediate kind of knowledge is meant, in contradistinction to ἐπιστήμη. According to Polybius (see above, p. xiii), the ἔννοια τοῦ δικαίου καὶ τοῦ ἀδίκου, τοῦ καλοῦ καὶ τοῦ αἰσχροῦ is the fruit of human society, not that which is prior to human society and makes it possible.

18. ἡ δὲ τούτων κοινωνία. Some translate 'the association of beings possessing these perceptions,' but it seems more natural to take τούτων here as neuter than as masculine, and besides an association of this kind would hardly be said to produce, but rather to be, the household and πόλις. Giph. and Bern. are probably right in translating these words 'community in these things'—i.e. in the good and the bad, the just and the unjust—cp. 3. 9. 1280 b 5, περὶ δ' ἀρετῆς καὶ κακίας πολιτικῆς διασκοποῦσιν ὅσοι φροντίζουσιν εὐνομίας et sqq.: 1. 2. 1253 a 37 sqq.: Eth. Nic. 5. 10. 1134 a 31, ἡ γὰρ δίκη κρίσις τοῦ δικαίου καὶ τοῦ ἀδίκου: Plato, Rep. 484 D, τὰ ἐνθάδε νόμματα καλῶν τε περὶ καὶ δικαίων καὶ ἀγαθῶν: Eth. Nic. 9. 6. 1167 b 2, πολιτικὴ δὲ φιλία φαίνεται ἡ ὁμόνοια . . . περὶ τὰ συμφέροντα γὰρ ἐστὶ καὶ τὰ εἰς τὸν βίον ἀνήκοντα. Some societies are formed for pleasure (Eth. Nic. 8. 11. 1160 a 19), not so the household or the πόλις. These are ethical unities. Cp. also Eth. Nic. 9. 9. 1170 b 4 sqq.: Plato, Politicus 309 C-E: and the myth of Protagoras (Protag. 322 C), in which in answer to the inquiry of Hermes—καὶ

δίκην δὴ καὶ αἰδῶ οὕτω θῶ ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἢ ἐπὶ πάντας νεῖμω;—Zeus replies—'Ἐπὶ πάντας, καὶ πάντες μετεχόντων' οὐ γὰρ ἂν γένοιτο πόλεις, εἰ ὀλίγοι αὐτῶν μετέχουσιν ὥσπερ ἄλλων τεχνῶν. In 1. 2. 1252 a 26–34 the origin of the household, and therefore of the πόλις, had been traced to instincts common to all animals or even to animals and plants, but here we learn that household and πόλις can only exist for human beings, inasmuch as their existence implies endowments which Nature has given only to man. In 3. 9. 1280 a 31 sq., εἰ δὲ μήτε τοῦ ζῆν μόνον ἔνεκεν ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τοῦ εὖ ζῆν (καὶ γὰρ ἂν δούλων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων ἦν πόλις· νῦν δ' οὐκ ἔστι διὰ τὸ μὴ μετέχειν εὐδαιμονίας μηδὲ τοῦ ζῆν κατὰ προαίρεσιν) κ.τ.λ., a somewhat different reason is given why animals other than man do not form πόλεις.

καὶ πρότερον δὴ. On καὶ . . . δὴ see Bon. Ind. 173 a 12 sqq.: conjoined, the two particles seem to indicate a step taken in advance from one point to another by way of inference. Cp. for example Eth. Nic. 4. 1. 1120 a 6 sq. 'Maxime quidem philosophus illa dicendi ratione utitur, si re quadam pertractata significare vult idem quod de ea etiam de alia vel in universum valere' (Eucken, de Partic. usu, p. 44): see 1. 13. 1259 b 32. Aristotle had pointed out that the individual and the household are prior γενέσει to the πόλις; hence he is naturally careful to add that the πόλις is prior φύσει. This is in conformity with the principle—τὸ τῇ γενέσει ὑστερον τῇ φύσει πρότερον (Phys. 8. 7. 261 a 14).

The argument in 18–29 seems to be as follows:—The πόλις is prior to the individual, for the whole is prior to its part. And the whole is prior to its part, because, when severed from the whole, the part loses its capacity to discharge its function, or (which is the same thing) loses its identity. Here Aristotle sums up—we see then, that the πόλις exists by nature and is prior to the individual, for if the individual is not self-complete when severed from the πόλις, he will be posterior to it just as any other part is posterior to its whole, and the individual, if a man and not a god or a brute, is not self-complete when severed from the πόλις. Aristotle might have stopped at the words 'prior to the individual' without adding the words which follow, but he adds these words in order to prove what he assumed in 20, that the individual stands to the πόλις in the same relation of posteriority in which other parts stand to their wholes. In strictness, γὰρ 26 only introduces a proof that the πόλις is prior in nature to the individual, not that it is by nature, but of course, if it is prior by nature to the individual, it exists by nature itself. No proof is given that the πόλις is prior to the household, probably because the same reasoning is applicable both to the household

and to the individual. It is possible that here Aristotle has in his mind the verse of Sophocles (Philoct. 1018), in which Philoctetes calls himself

ἄφιδλον ἔρημον ἄπολιν ἐν ζῶσιν νεκρόν.

As to the validity of the argument, the fact that the individual is not αὐτάρκης without the πόλις does not prove that he stands to it in the relation of a part to its whole. Man is not αὐτάρκης, for example, without the aid of other communities besides his own; yet he is not necessarily a part of those other communities. And even if we accept the conclusion, it does not follow that all parts of all wholes stand in the same relation to those wholes. A limb stands in a far more intimate relation to the body of which it is a part than a wheel does to a cart, or a portion of a rock does to that rock. The Stoics, in fact, recognized this distinction, for they went on to say that the individual is a limb (μέλος, not μέρος) of the whole to which he belongs. This whole they commonly (cp. Cic. de Nat. Deor. 2. 14. 37 sq.) found in the Universe, but not always, for Epictetus (Arrian 2. 10) speaks of the individual as part of the πόλις. Plato also sometimes found it in the Universe (e. g. in Laws 903). We observe that in the Timaeus (68 E: 69 C) he applies to the Universe similar epithets to those applied by Aristotle to the πόλις (τέλειος, αὐτάρκης, πάσας περιέχουσα τὰς ἄλλας κοινωνίας). The Republic, on the other hand, recognizes the πόλις as the whole of which the individual, or rather perhaps the class, is a part (Rep. 552 A). As to the sense in which a human being is a member of a community, see a letter of Shelley's (dated August 12, 1812), which is published in the *Academy* for July 31, 1886. 'A human being,' he says, 'is a member of the community, not as a limb is a member of the body, or as what is a part of a machine, intended only to contribute to some general joint result. . . . He is an ultimate being, made for his own perfection as his highest end, made to maintain an individual existence, and to serve others only as far as consists with his own virtue and progress.' Aristotle, however, would say that he asks nothing from the individual that would not redound to his own perfection and the perfection of his life.

20. τὸ γὰρ ὅλον κ.τ.λ. No notice is here taken of the principle laid down in *Metaph. Z. 10. 1035 b 4 sqq.*, where some parts—parts of the Essence or Form—are said to be prior to τὸ σύνολον—a principle which, applied to the πόλις, might have suggested a different theory of the relation of some at all events of the individuals composing the πόλις to it—but in other respects there is a close resemblance between the two passages: cp. especially 1035 b

14-25. See also *Metaph. Z. 11. 1036 b 30 sqq.* and *16. 1040 b 5 sqq.* For the account of τὸ πρότερον implied in the passage before us, cp. *Phys. 8. 7. 260 b 17*, λέγεται δὲ πρότερον, οὐ τε μὴ ὅτος οὐκ ἔσται πᾶλλα, ἐκεῖνο δ' ἄνευ τῶν ἄλλων, καὶ τὸ τῷ χρόνῳ, καὶ τὸ κατ' οὐσίαν: *Metaph. Δ. 11. 1019 a 1*, τὰ μὲν δὴ οὕτω λέγεται πρότερα καὶ ὕστερα, τὰ δὲ κατὰ φύσιν καὶ οὐσίαν, ὅσα ἐνδέχεται εἶναι ἄνευ ἄλλων, ἐκεῖνα δὲ ἄνευ ἐκείνων μὴ ἢ διαιρέσει ἐχρήσατο Πλάτων. Much the same account is given by Aristotle of the ἀρχή (*Metaph. K. 1. 1060 a 1*, ἀρχὴ γὰρ τὸ συναναίρουσιν) or the οὐσία of a thing (*de An. 2. 1. 412 b 18 sqq.*: cp. *Alex. Aphrod. on Metaph. Z. 16. 1040 b 5*, οὐσίας ἐκεῖνά φαμεν ὅσα κατ' αὐτὰ ὄντα δύναται τὸ οἰκείον ἔργον ἀποτελεῖν· οὐσία γὰρ οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἐστὶν ἢ τὸ ἀφ' οὗ τὸ ἐκάστου ἔργον ἐκπληροῦται). Severance from the Whole, in fact, involves the loss of the Form or οὐσία, and the loss of this involves 'destruction' (cp. *διαφθορεῖσα 22*, and *φθαρέντα*, *de Gen. An. 2. 1. 734 b 24 sqq.*: *735 a 7 sq.*: *1. 19. 726 b 22 sqq.*), but a hand destroyed is a hand unfitted to discharge the functions of a hand, or in other words is not a hand at all. Thus we may almost say that in Aristotle's view the πόλις is the οὐσία or ἀρχή of the individual. In the *Topics*, however, a question is raised (*6. 13. 150 a 33*), εἰ τῷ ὅλῳ συμφέρεται τὰ μέρη· ἀνάπαλιν γὰρ δεῖ συμβαίνειν, τῶν μερῶν φθαρέντων, φείρεσθαι τὸ ὅλον· τοῦ δ' ὅλου φθαρέντος οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον καὶ τὰ μέρη ἐφθάρθαι. But here the object seems merely to be to arm a disputant with a tenable objection.

22. *διαφθορεῖσα γὰρ ἔσται τοιαύτη*, 'for a hand when destroyed' (by being severed from the soul, which is its οὐσία) 'will be no better than a stone hand.' *Giph.* ('haec enim interiit') and others make *διαφθορεῖσα* the predicate, but it is clear that *τοιαύτη* (=probably *λιθίνη*, not *ὁμωνύμως λεχθεῖσα*) is the predicate, if we compare *de Gen. An. 2. 1. 734 b 24*, οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶ πρόσωπον μὴ ἔχον ψυχὴν, οὐδὲ σάρξ, ἀλλὰ φθαρέντα ὁμωνύμως λεχθήσεται τὸ μὲν εἶναι πρόσωπον τὸ δὲ σάρξ, ὥσπερ κἂν εἰ ἐγίγνετο λίθινα ἢ ξύλινα: cp. also *Meteor. 4. 12. 389 b 31*, μᾶλλον γὰρ δῆλον ὅτι ὁ νεκρὸς ἄνθρωπος ὁμωνύμως. οὕτω τοίουν καὶ χεῖρ τελευτήσαστος ὁμωνύμως, καθὼς καὶ αὐλοὶ λίθιναι λεχθεῖσαν. Dr. R. Schöll (*Sus. Qu. Crit. p. 334*) has anticipated me in calling attention to the above passage of the *De Generatione Animalium*.

23. πάντα δὲ . . . τῇ δυνάμει. Cp. *Meteor. 4. 12. 390 a 10*, πάντα δ' ἐστὶν ὠρισμένα τῷ ἔργῳ· τὰ μὲν γὰρ δυνάμενα ποιεῖν τὸ αὐτῶν ἔργον ἀληθῶς ἐστὶν ἔκαστος, οἷον ὁ ὀφθαλμὸς εἰ ὄρᾷ, τὸ δὲ μὴ δυνάμενον ὁμωνύμως, οἷον ὁ τεθνεὺς ἢ ὁ λίθινος: *de Gen. An. 1. 2. 716 a 23*: *Metaph. Z. 10. 1035 b 16*, ἔκαστον γοῦν τὸ μέρος ἐὰν ὀρίζηται καλῶς, οὐκ ἄνευ τοῦ ἔργου ὀρεῖται, ὃ οὐχ ὑπάρξει ἄνευ αἰσθήσεως. Plato had already said much

the same thing, Soph. 247 D, λέγω δὴ τὸ καὶ ὅποιαν οὖν κεκτημένον δύναμιν εἶτ' εἰς τὸ ποιεῖν ἕτερον ὅτι οὖν πεφυκὸς εἶτ' εἰς τὸ παθεῖν καὶ σμικρότατον ὑπὸ τοῦ φανλοτάτου, κὰν εἰ μόνον εἰσάπαξ, πᾶν τοῦτο ὄντως εἶναι· τίθεμαι γὰρ ὅρον ὀρίζειν τὰ ὄντα, ὡς ἔστιν οὐκ ἄλλο τι πλὴν δύναμις. On the other hand, Aristotle seems in Pol. 3. 3. 1276 b 7 to view τὸ εἶδος τῆς συνθέσεως as constituting the identity of an object, and in de Gen. An. 1. 18. 722 b 30 we read—τὰ μέρη τὰ μὲν δυνάμει τὰ δὲ πάθεισι διώρισται, τὰ μὲν ἀνομοιομερῇ τῷ δύνασθαι τι ποιεῖν, οἷον γλῶττα καὶ χεῖρ, τὰ δ' ὁμοιομερῇ σκληρότητι καὶ μαλακότητι καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις τοῖς τοιοῦτοις πάθεισιν.

24. μηκέτι τοιαῦτα ὄντα, 'if no longer fit for performing their destined work': cp. θάλατταν τοιαύτην, 'fit for fishing,' 1. 8. 1256 a 37, and ὅπως δὲ γίνονται τοιοῦτοι, 2. 5. 1263 a 39.

25. Μὲν οὖν is here again, as in 1252 b 9, caught up by a second μὲν οὖν before any δέ appears.

27. One would expect here ὁ δὲ αὐτάρκης χωρισθείς, but Aristotle substitutes ὁ δὲ μὴ δυνάμενος κοινωνεῖν ἢ μὴδὲν δεόμενος δι' αὐτάρκειαν, as the case of the former, who cannot be called αὐτάρκης and yet does not want the State, occurs to him and, characteristically enough, is kept in view at whatever cost of trimness. Μὴδὲν δεόμενος, sc. κοινωνίας or possibly κοινωνεῖν.

29. ἐν πᾶσιν, 'in all human beings.'

30. ὁ δὲ κ.τ.λ. For the turn of the sentence, compare a fragment from the Κναφεύς of Antiphanes (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 3. 66)—

Ὅστις τέχνην κατέδειξε πρῶτος τῶν θεῶν,
οὗτος μέγιστον εὔρεν ἀνθρώποις κακόν.

Cp. also ibid. 4. 75. At Argos men looked back to Phoroneus as having been the first to found a city (Paus. 2. 15. 5). Cicero (De Inventione 1. 2) looks back to some 'magnus vir et sapiens.' Camerarius (p. 31) quotes these two passages, and adds—'Epicurus hoc fortuito factum, ut alia quoque, censet, quemadmodum Lucretius exposuit libro quinto.' The comic poet Athenio makes one of his characters claim the credit for the art of cookery (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 4. 558).

31. On ὥσπερ καὶ . . . οὕτω καί, see Sus.¹, Ind. Gramm. ὥσπερ. τελεωθέν. Aristotle uses both τελεωθέν and τελειωθέν (de Gen. An. 1. 1. 715 a 21), and both τέλος and τελειος (see Bon. Ind.). We find both forms together (τελεώτερα, τελειον) in de Gen. An. 2. 1. 733 b 1 (Bekker). The meaning of τελεωθέν, which is here used in contrast to χωρισθέν νόμον καὶ δίκης, may be illustrated by Eth. Nic. 2. 1. 1103 a 23, οὐτ' ἄρα φύσει οὔτε παρὰ φύσιν ἐγγίνονται

αἱ ἀρεταί, ἀλλὰ πεφυκόσι μὲν ἡμῖν δέξασθαι αὐτάς, τελειουμένοις δὲ διὰ τοῦ ἔθους, and Phys. 7. 3. 246 a 13 sqq. For the gender of *τελειωθέν* and *χωρισθέν*, cp. 4 (7). 13. 1332 b 4, *ἄνθρωπος δὲ καὶ λόγῳ, μόνον γὰρ ἔχει λόγον*.

33. *χείριστον πάντων*. Cp. Hesiod, Op. et Dies 275 sqq.: Hdt. 4. 106, *Ἀνδροφάγοι δὲ ἀγριώτατα πάντων ἀνθρώπων ἔχουσι ἡβρα, οὔτε δίκην νομίζοντες οὔτε νόμῳ οὐδενὶ χρεώμενοι*: Plato, Laws 765 E, *ἄνθρωπος δὲ ὥς φαμεν ἡμερον, ὅμως μὴν παιδείας μὲν ὀρθῆς τυχὸν καὶ φύσεως εὐτυχούς θειότατον ἡμερώτατόν τε ζῶον γίγνεσθαι φιλεῖ, μὴ ἱκανῶς δὲ ἢ μὴ καλῶς τραφεῖν ἀγριώτατον ὅποσα φύει γῆ*: Protag. 327 D-E. See also Eth. Nic. 7. 7. 1150 a 1-5. Plutarch demurs to the saying in the mouth of the Epicurean Colotes (adv. Colot. c. 30), on the ground that in the absence of law men would still be left the teaching of such philosophers as Parmenides, Socrates, Plato, and Heraclitus, and that this would save them from living like beasts.

ἀδικία ἔχουσα ὄπλα. Cp. Rhet. 2. 5. 1382 a 34, *καὶ ἀδικία δύναμιν ἔχουσα* (is to be dreaded)· *τῷ προαιρεῖσθαι γὰρ ὁ ἄδικος ἄδικος*. Giph. (p. 37) compares Plutarch, Cicero c. 46, *οὕτως ἐξέπεσον ὑπὸ θυμοῦ καὶ λύσσης τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων λογισμῶν, μᾶλλον δ' ἀπέδειξαν ὡς οὐδὲν ἀνθρώπου θηρίον ἐστὶν ἀγριώτερον ἐξουσίαν πάθει προσλαβόντος*, which seems to echo Eth. Nic. 7. 7. 1150 a 7, *μυριοπλάσια γὰρ ἂν κακὰ ποιήσειεν ἄνθρωπος κακὸς θηρίου*.

34. *ὁ δὲ ἄνθρωπος κ.τ.λ.* Vict. with others explains *φρόνησις* and *ἀρετή* as the *ὄπλα* here referred to, but in that case why have we the dat. *φρονήσει καὶ ἀρετῇ* and not the acc.? and how can it be said of *φρόνησις* and *ἀρετή* that they can be used for opposite purposes? Cp. Rhet. 1. 1. 1355 b 2, *εἰ δ' ὅτι μεγάλα βλάψειεν ἂν ὁ χρώμενος ἀδίκως τῇ τοιαύτῃ δυνάμει τῶν λόγων, τοῦτό γε κοινόν ἐστι κατὰ πάντων τῶν ἀγαθῶν πλὴν ἀρετῆς, καὶ μάλιστα κατὰ τῶν χρησιμωτάτων, ὅον ἰσχύος ὑγείας πλούτου στρατηγίας*, and Pol. 3. 10. 1281 a 19. And if it be said that virtue is here used in a lower sense than in these passages, it seems strange that in the very next line (36) it should be used in its ordinary sense. Besides, as Holm (de ethicis Politicorum Aristotelis principiis, p. 39 n.) remarks, '*usitata apud Aristotelem dicendi formula ἀρετὴ καὶ φρόνησις virtutes semper significat ipsas, ethicis et dianoeticis: exempla haec sint—Pol. 3. 11. 1281 b 4: 4 (7). 1. 1323 b 22, 33.*' The phrase was known even to the comic poets as one current among philosophers (Meineke, Fragm. Com. Gr. 4. 22). Montecatinus (quoted by Schn.) seems to come much nearer to the truth in rendering these words '*arma homini data sunt ad prudentiam et virtutem*'; and so Bern. '*geschaffen*

mit einer Rüstung zu Einsicht und Tugend,' and Holm (ibid.) 'ad virtutes exercendas.' There is, however, some strangeness in the use of the dative in this sense, and Aristotle does not seem to regard the *δπλα* as means for the attainment of *φρόνησις καὶ ἀρετή*, or as instruments for their exercise, but rather as powers on which they are to impress a right direction (cp. *ἀνευ ἀρετῆς*, 36). May not the words mean 'having arms for prudence and virtue to use' (or 'guide in use')? We have had just before *ἀδικία ἔχουσα δπλα*, and it is not surprising to find Prudence and Virtue also spoken of as using arms or guiding their use. As to the dative, cp. Plutarch, Reip. Gerend. Praec. c. 28, *δεύτερον δέ, ὅτι πρὸς τοὺς βασκάνους καὶ ποτηροὺς δπλον ἢ παρὰ τῶν πολλῶν εὐνοία τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ἐστίν.* "Ὁργανον, which resembles *δπλον* in meaning and is sometimes conjoined with it (de Part. An. 4. 10. 687 b 2-4), often takes this dative (de Gen. An. 4. 1. 765 b 36: Pol. 1. 4. 1253 b 28). Holm refers to Cic. de Orat. 3. 14. 55 *sub fin.* as supporting his interpretation, but this passage perhaps makes quite as much in favour of that just suggested. The next question is, what are the *δπλα* referred to? Bernays (Wirkung der Tragödie, note 16) quotes Seneca de Ira, 1. 17 (1. 16 Didot): Aristoteles ait adfectus quosdam, si quis illis bene utatur, pro armis esse, quod verum foret, si, velut bellica instrumenta, sumi deponique possent induentis arbitrio. Haec arma, quae Aristoteles virtuti dat, ipsa per se pugnant, non exspectant manum, et habent, non habentur. Hence he explains the *δπλα* here mentioned as 'die Affecte' (the emotions). Aristotle, however, only speaks of 'adfectus quosdam' (he is thinking no doubt especially of anger), and there is nothing to show that these 'adfectus' are viewed by him as the only *δπλα* at the disposal of *φρόνησις καὶ ἀρετή*. Language, for instance, may well be another. The words 'haec arma quae Aristoteles virtuti dat' (compare those a little lower down, 'rationem ab iracundia petere praesidium') seem to support the view taken in this note of the dative *φρονήσῃ καὶ ἀρετῇ*. If, as is probable, the 'adfectus quidam' of the de Ira are among the *δπλα* referred to in this passage, Aristotle, like Seneca himself (de Ira, 1. 3), would appear to have regarded them as peculiar to man.

38. *πρὸς ἀφροδίσια . . . χεῖριστον.* Cp. Hist. An. 6. 22. 575 b 30: Plutarch, Gryllus, c. 7. 990 E sqq.: contrast, however, Aristot. de Gen. An. 1. 4. 717 a 23 sqq.

37. *ἐδωδήν.* Plutarch, ibid. c. 8. Philemon (Fragm. 'Αγύρτης, p. 107 Didot) does not go quite so far as Aristotle, and the good Pheraulas (Xen. Cyrop. 8. 3. 49) is of the opposite opinion.

ἢ δὲ δικαιοσύνη . . . δικαίου κρίσις. Here *ἢ δὲ δικαιοσύνη* takes up

ἀνεν ἀρετῆς, and we have the proof that whoever first instituted the πόλις conferred great benefits on men. He, in fact, gave them virtue. 'Justice is bound up with the State, for adjudication, which is the determination of that which is just, is the ordering of political society.' So Bernays, followed by Susemihl, 'ist nichts als die Ordnung der staatlichen Gemeinschaft.' Sus.³ (Note 28 c) refers to 3. 10. 1281 a 11–21. Cp. also 8 (6). 8. 1322 a 5, ἀναγκαία δ' ἐστίν, ὅτι οὐδὲν ὄφελος γίνεσθαι μὲν δίκας περὶ τῶν δικαίων, ταύτας δὲ μὴ λαμβάνειν τέλος, ὥστ' εἰ μὴ γυγνομένων κοινωνεῖν ἀδύνατον ἀλλήλοις, καὶ πράξεων μὴ γυγνομένων. In 4 (7). 8. 1328 b 13 judicial institutions are reckoned among those things which are most necessary in a State (πάντων ἀναγκαϊότατον). The interpretation just given of the words πολιτικῆς κοινωνίας τάξις is perhaps the one which is most likely to be correct, yet another may be mentioned as possible. These words may mean 'an institution of political society' (cp. 4 (7). 10. 1329 b 5, τῶν συσσιτίων ἡ τάξις). Plato had already said (Laws 937 D)—καὶ δὴ καὶ δίκη ἐν ἀνθρώποις πῶς οὐ καλόν, ὃ πάντα ἡμέρωκε τὰ ἀνθρώπινα; But perhaps Aristotle had a saying of Pindar in his mind: cp. Plutarch, Praec. Reip. Gerend. c. 13. 807 C, ὃ δὲ πολιτικός, ἀριστοτέχνας τις ὢν κατὰ Πίνδαρον, καὶ δημιουργὸς εὐνομίας καὶ δίκης. The words ἡ δὲ δίκη τοῦ δικαίου κρίσις seem to be a necessary link in the reasoning, though some would omit them: similar expressions occur in Eth. Nic. 5. 10. 1134 a 31 and Rhet. 2. 1. 1377 b 22 (cp. Menand. Inc. Fab. Fragm. 56). An αἰσθησις τοῦ δικαίου καὶ τοῦ ἀδίκου is a condition precedent of the πόλις (1253 a 15 sqq.), but this is not the same thing as justice.

2. πρῶτον, i.e. before going on to speak of πολιτεία. Thus we are referred back in 3. 6. 1278 b 17 to the πρῶτοι λόγοι, ἐν οἷς περὶ 1253 b. οἰκονομίας διωρίσθη καὶ δεσποτείας, and the First Book itself refers forward at its close to τὰ περὶ τὰς πολιτείας (1. 13. 1260 b 12).

3. οἰκονομίας κ.τ.λ. 'The departments into which household management falls are concerned with' (or possibly 'correspond to') 'the parts of which the household is composed.' The ellipse is no doubt considerable, but not more so than that in 1. 11. 1258 b 27, τρίτον δὲ εἶδος χρηματιστικῆς μεταξύ ταύτης καὶ τῆς πρώτης (ἔχει γὰρ καὶ τῆς κατὰ φύσιν τι μέρος καὶ τῆς μεταβλητικῆς), ὅσα ἀπὸ γῆς καὶ τῶν ἀπὸ γῆς γυγνομένων . . . ὅσον ὑλοτομία τε καὶ πᾶσα μεταλλευτική. See as to constructions of this kind Bon. Ind. 533 b 6–13, and Waitz on Anal. Pr. 1. 46. 52 a 29, to whom Bonitz refers.

4. οἰκία δὲ τέλειος. Lasaulx (Ehe bei den Griechen, p. 7 n.), after referring to δῆμος ἡμιτελής (Il. 2. 701), quotes Antipater ap. Stob. Flor. 67. 25, τέλειος οἶκος καὶ βίος οὐκ ἄλλως δύναται γενέσθαι ἢ μετὰ

γυναικὸς καὶ τέκνων, and a similar saying of Hierocles, Stob. Flor. 67. 21. Aristotle holds the household to be incomplete without slaves. Contrast Locke, Civil Government, 2. § 86: 'the family is as much a family, and the power of the paterfamilias as great, whether there be any slaves in his family or no.' In 3. 4. 1277 a 7 we find the somewhat careless expression—οἰκία ἐξ ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυναικὸς καὶ κτῆσις ἐκ δεσπότου καὶ δούλου—in, it is true, an aporetic passage: a similar looseness of statement is observable in Eth. Nic. 1. 1. 1094 a 9, where wealth is said to be the end of οἰκονομική, teaching which rather resembles that of the first book (so-called) of the *Oeconomics* (cp. *Oecon.* 1. 1. 1343 a 8) than that of the *Politics*.

7. περὶ τριῶν τούτων, 'de his tribus copulis' (Vict.).

8. τί ἕκαστον καὶ ποῖον δεῖ εἶναι, 'what each is and how each ought to be constituted.'

9. δεσποτική, sc. κοινωνία or some such word.

ἀνώνυμον γὰρ κ.τ.λ. The word ἀνώνυμος is especially used by Aristotle, 'ubi generis alicuius non exstat unum quo contineatur nomen' (Bon. Ind. 69 b 3): hence we read in de An. 2. 7. 418 a 27, δ λόγῳ μὲν ἔστιν εἰπεῖν, ἀνώνυμον δὲ τυγχάνει δν. Cp. also 10, καὶ γὰρ αὕτη οὐκ ὠνόμασται ἰδίῳ ὀνόματι, i.e. with a name which exactly fits it: see Rhet. 3. 5. 1407 a 31, where τὰ ἴδια ὀνόματα are contrasted with τὰ περιέχοντα. The words γαμική and τεκνοποιητική are probably felt by Aristotle not to describe the nature of the ἀρχή in the same clear way in which the word δεσποτική describes the ἀρχή of the master over his slave. We are told in the de Anima (2. 4. 416 b 23) that 'everything should be named in reference to the end it realizes.' The words γαμική and τεκνοποιητική certainly do not give us this information. Πατρική is substituted for τεκνοποιητική in 1. 12. 1259 a 38.

11. ἔστωσαν δ' αὐταὶ κ.τ.λ. 'Let the three relations of which we spoke' as needing to be investigated 'be these' (for the absence of αἱ before τρεῖς, see Bon. Ind. 546 a 51 sqq.); 'but there is a part of Household Management which seems to some to be the whole, and to others the most important part of it, and we must inquire what is the truth about this.' For the imperative ἔστωσαν, which closes the business of naming the three relations and asks content with such terms as are forthcoming, cp. 3. 1. 1275 a 29: Eth. Nic. 2. 7. 1108 a 5 sq.: Metaph. Z. 8. 1033 a 25 sq.: Plato, Soph. 231 A. Aristotle does not at this early point of the discussion think it necessary to mention that the claims of χρηματιστική to be a part of οἰκονομία are open to much question, but, as is often his practice, provisionally adopts a view which he will hereafter reconsider and correct.

12. τοῖς μὲν . . . τοῖς δέ. Who these were, is not known. Xenophon goes some way in this direction (cp. Oecon. 6. 4, οὐκοῦν, ἔφη δὲ Σωκράτης, ἐπιστήμης μὲν τινος ἔδοξεν ἡμῖν ὄνομα εἶναι ἡ οἰκονομία· ἡ δὲ ἐπιστήμη αὕτη ἐφαίνεται ἢ οἴκους δύνανται αὔξειν ἄνθρωποι· οἶκος δὲ ἡμῖν ἐφαίνεται ὅπερ κτήσις ἡ σύμπασα: also Oecon. 7. 15 and 11. 9). He has, however, as great a dislike as Aristotle for most branches of ἡ καλουμένη χρηματιστική, and he thinks throughout of husbandry as the vocation of his οἰκονομικός.

14. πρῶτον δὲ περὶ δεσπότου κ.τ.λ. Aristotle investigates the relation of master and slave before he examines χρηματιστική, probably because he started with the aim of determining whether the δεσποτικός is the same as the οἰκονομικός, πολιτικός, and βασιλικός, but also perhaps because the slave is a part of κτήσις (c. 8. 1256 a 2), and the part should be studied before the whole. The two aims which he proposes to keep in view in studying this subject reappear in c. 11. 1258 b 9, ἐπεὶ δὲ τὰ πρὸς τὴν γνῶσιν διωρίκαμεν ἱκανῶς, τὰ πρὸς τὴν χρῆσιν δέῃ διαλθεῖν, and in 3. 8. 1279 b 12, τῷ δὲ περὶ ἐκάστην μέθοδον φιλοσοφοῦντι καὶ μὴ μόνον ἀποβλέποντι πρὸς τὸ πράττειν κ.τ.λ. So again in 2. 1. 1260 b 32 the aim is ἵνα τὸ τ' ὀρθῶς ἔχον ὀφθῇ καὶ τὸ χρήσιμον: cp. 6 (4). 1. 1288 b 35 sqq. The aim of the Politics is from the first twofold—partly scientific accuracy, partly utility. The eleventh chapter of the First Book is intended to be useful, not only to the χρηματιστικός and to the οἰκονομικός, but also to the πολιτικός (1259 a 33).

15. τὴν ἀναγκαίαν χρεῖαν. Cp. c. 5. 1254 b 29, τὴν ἀναγκαίαν χρῆσιν.

16. κἄν εἰ κ.τ.λ. See Bon. Ind. 41 a 4 sqq. Carry on ἴδωμεν.

18. τοῖς μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Some rate δεσποτεία too high, counting it as a science, and identifying the rule of the δεσπότης with household management and political and kingly rule (for with πολιτικῇ and βασιλικῇ—as Bonitz points out, Ind. 614 b 31—ἀρχή must be supplied, as in 1. 7. 1255 b 17): language to this effect is put into the mouth of Socrates both by Xenophon in the Oeconomicus and by Plato in the Politicus. This was one extreme. Others go to the other extreme, and regard the distinction of master and slave as resting only on convention, not on nature, and therefore as based on compulsion and consequently unjust. Aristotle here as elsewhere first sets before his reader two or more opposite views, and then seeks a view which will harmonize their contrariety (λύσει τὰς ἐναντιώσεις) and make either of them seem to possess a basis of plausibility (εὐλόγως δοκοῦντα) by showing that each is in a sense true and in a sense not true: cp. Eth. Eud. 7. 2. 1235 b 13, ληπτέας

δὴ τῷ τρόπῳ ὅστις ἡμῖν ἅμα τὰ τε δοκοῦντα περὶ τούτων μάλιστα ἀποδόσει ('plene explicare, explicando exprimere,' Bon. Ind. 80 b 18 sqq.), καὶ τὰς ἀπορίας λύσει καὶ τὰς ἐναντιώσεις τοῦτο δ' ἔσται ἐὰν εὐλόγως φαίνηται τὰ ἐναντία δοκοῦντα· μάλιστα γὰρ ὁμολογούμενος ὁ τοιοῦτος ἔσται λόγος τοῖς φαινομένοις· συμβαίνει δὲ μένειν τὰς ἐναντιώσεις, ἐὰν ἔστι μὲν ὡς ἀληθές ἢ τὸ λεγόμενον, ἔστι δ' ὡς οὐ. Thus we learn, as the discussion goes on, that there is a δεσποτικὴ ἐπιστήμη (c. 7. 1255 b 22-39), though it has nothing great or impressive about it (1255 b 33), but that the master is not a master by virtue of science but by virtue of character (1255 b 20); he can, in fact, do without the δεσποτικὴ ἐπιστήμη (1255 b 35); it is no part of his essence and therefore no part of his definition. So again, the other side are only partially right (c. 6. 1255 a 3); their objection to slavery holds of one kind of slavery only.

Something has been said already (vol. 1. p. 139 sqq.) as to the question who these objectors to slavery were, who stigmatized it as not based on nature but only on convention, and therefore the offspring of force and consequently unjust. The notions 'conventional,' 'based on force,' and 'unjust' hang together in their contention significantly enough. The connexion which Aristotle traces (Phys. 4. 8. 215 a 3, and often elsewhere) between τὸ βίαιον and τὸ παρὰ φύσιν is inherited by him from Plato (Tim. 64 D) and from still earlier inquirers (cp. Plato, Protag. 337 D, ὁ νόμος, τύραννος ὢν τῶν ἀνθρώπων, πολλὰ παρὰ τὴν φύσιν βιάζεται—the words of the sophist Hippias). So Glaucon in his statement (Rep. 359 C) of the view of Thrasymachus and others about Justice contrasts φύσις with νόμος καὶ βία (ὃ πᾶσα φύσις διώκειν πέφυκεν ὡς ἀγαθόν, νόμος δὲ βίᾳ παράγεται ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ ἴσου τιμήν). On the other hand, we trace the notion of a connexion between force and injustice in a well-known line of Hesiod, Op. et Dies 275—

καὶ νῦν δίκης ἐπάκουε, βίης δ' ἐπιλάβειο πάμπαν,

and in a view referred to by Aristotle, Pol. 4 (7). 2. 1324 a 35 —νομίζουσι δ' οἱ μὲν τὸ τῶν πέλας ἄρχειν, δεσποτικῶς μὲν γινόμενον μετ' ἀδικίας τινὸς εἶναι τῆς μεγίστης, πολιτικῶς δὲ τὸ μὲν ἀδικον οὐκ ἔχειν κ.τ.λ.: cp. 3. 3. 1276 a 12, where we find that some constitutions (e.g. tyranny) were popularly contrasted with others (democracy is probably meant) as founded on force, not on the common advantage. So again in 3. 16. 1287 a 10 sqq. that which is by nature and that which is just are tacitly identified. We hear later on (c. 6. 1255 a 8 sq.) that 'many of those versed in laws' impeached enslavement resulting from war, at any rate when based on a bare superiority of Might, but the persons referred to in the passage

before us seem to have regarded slavery of all kinds and under all circumstances—even, it would seem, when imposed by Greeks on barbarians—as contrary to nature and unjust. This sweeping protest against slavery is certainly remarkable. We see from Plato, *Laws* 777 B sqq., how much difficulty was experienced in the practical maintenance and working of the institution.

23. *ἐπεὶ οὖν κ.τ.λ.* The object of the long sentence which C. 4. begins here, and which, like many other long sentences in Aristotle introduced by *ἐπεὶ*, is ill-constructed enough, is (as we see from 1254 a 13) to commence an investigation into the nature and function of the slave. It is evident that if Aristotle can show that the slave fills a necessary place in the household as an instrument of household science, raised above and somewhat dissimilar to instruments commonly so called, yet, like them, an instrument and an article of property, he will have gone far to solve the twofold question just raised, whether rule over the slave is the same thing as *οἰκονομική*, *πολιτική*, and *βασιλική ἀρχή*, and whether the slave exists by nature, for the naturalness of the slave will result from his necessity, and rule over the slave will be clearly seen to be a less noble thing than rule over those who are not *δρῶντα*. Socrates (*Xen. Mem.* 3. 4. 12), in asserting a close similarity between the management of private and public concerns, had used the following argument—*οὐ γὰρ ἅλλοις τισὶν ἀνθρώποις οἱ τῶν κοινῶν ἐπιμελόμενοι χρῶνται ἢ οἷσπερ οἱ τὰ ἴδια οἰκονομοῦντες*. Aristotle, on the contrary, holds that to rule over slaves is one thing and to rule over freemen is another (c. 7), for slaves, unlike freemen, are mere animate instruments.

ἡ κτήσις μέρος τῆς οἰκίας κ.τ.λ. As often happens at the outset of an inquiry, Aristotle accepts propositions which he will afterwards correct (see note on 1253 b 11). His definitive view is that property is rather a *sine qua non* (οὐ οὐκ ἄνευ) of the household than a part of it, and that the same is true of the relation of *κτητική* or *χρηματιστική* (of the sound sort) to *οἰκονομία*: cp. c. 10 (which, it would seem, must be taken to correct the passage before us and also c. 8. 1256 b 26–27), and see 4 (7). 8. 1328 a 21 sqq., where property is denied to be part of the *πόλις*, though necessary to it (1328 a 33 sq.). Not a few translators and commentators—among them, one MS. of the *Vet. Int.* (2, which inserts ‘manifestum quod’ before its equivalent for *καὶ ἡ κτητική*) and Leonardus Aretinus—make *καὶ ἡ κτητική* κ.τ.λ. an apodosis, but Aristotle often introduces with *ἐπεὶ* a long string of protases, and perhaps it is better to begin the apodosis at οὕτω 30 and to avoid interrupting the continuity of the argument, which seems to me to be as follows:—Without necessities

men can neither live nor live well, hence property is essential to the household, and the science of acquiring it is a part of the science of household management, the end of which is life or good life; but instruments, whether animate or inanimate, are also essential to this science: hence an article of property is an instrument for the purpose of living, and property is a mass of instruments, and the slave is an animate article of property [and therefore an animate instrument for the purpose of living]. The proof, however, that articles of property are instruments for the purpose of living seems unsatisfactory, and Aristotle omits to show that the animate instruments of which Household Science stands in need must be, if human beings, slaves and not free. Sus. brackets the words *καὶ ἡ κτητικὴ μέρος τῆς οἰκονομίας* as having no bearing on the conclusion drawn in 30 sqq.; but Aristotle's object seems to be to show, first the necessity of Property, and next the necessity of instruments, to Household Science. I am not convinced by Susemihl's arguments (Qu. Crit. p. 339 sqq.), that a rearrangement of the paragraph is called for.

25. *ταῖς ὀρισμέναις τέχναις*, 'arts with a definite end': Bonitz (Ind. 524 a 29) compares Metaph. M. 10. 1087 a 16, *ἡ μὲν οὖν δύναμις ὡς ὕλη τοῦ καθόλου οὕσα καὶ ἀόριστος τοῦ καθόλου καὶ ἀόριστου ἐστίν, ἡ δ' ἐνέργεια ὀρισμένη καὶ ὀρισμένου τότε τι οὕσα τοῦδε τίνος*, but Metaph. E. 2. 1027 a 5, *τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἄλλων ἐνίοτε δυνάμεις εἰσὶν αἱ ποιητικαί, τῶν δ' οὐδεμία τέχνη οὐδὲ δύναμις ὀρισμένη* τῶν γὰρ κατὰ συμβεβηκός *δυνάμεις* καὶ τὸ αἰτιὸν ἐστὶ κατὰ συμβεβηκός comes still nearer, and here the opposition is between a cause which works for a definite end and one which works κατὰ συμβεβηκός—cp. Rhet. 1. 10. 1369 a 32, *ἔστι δ' ἀπὸ τύχης μὲν τὰ τοιαῦτα γινόμενα, ὅσων ἡ τε αἰτία ἀόριστος καὶ μὴ ἐνεκά του γίγνεται καὶ μήτε αἰεὶ μήτε ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ μήτε τεταγμένως*, and Metaph. E. 2. 1027 a 19, *ὅτι δ' ἐπιστήμη οὐκ ἔστι τοῦ συμβεβηκός, φανερόν ἐπιστήμη μὲν γὰρ πᾶσα ἡ τοῦ αἰεὶ ἢ τοῦ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ πῶς γὰρ ἡ μαθήσεται ἢ διδάξει ἄλλον; δεῖ γὰρ ὀρίσθαι ἢ τῷ αἰεὶ ἢ τῷ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ, οἷον ὅτι ὠφέλιμον τὸ μελίκρατον τῷ πυρέττοντι ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ*. It is not clear whether Aristotle regards *οἰκονομική* as *ὀρισμένη*: at any rate it is hardly a *τέχνη*—rather a *πρακτικὴ ἐπιστήμη*, or part of one. For the thought, cp. Plutarch, *An Vitiositas ad infelicitiam sufficiat* c. 2, *ἡ κακία . . . αὐτοτελής τις οὕσα τῆς κακοδαιμονίας δημιουργός οὔτε γὰρ ὀργάνων οὔτε ὑπηρετῶν ἔχει χρεῖαν*.

26. *ἀναγκαῖον ἂν εἴη . . . εἰ μέλλει*. See Jelf, Gr. Gr. § 853. 2. b.

27. *οὕτω καὶ τῶν οἰκονομικῶν*. Not to be completed by *τεχνῶν*, nor is *τῶν οἰκονομικῶν* masc., as Götting, who supplies *τὰ οἰκεία ὄργανα*, would make it; the word to be supplied is probably *ὄργανων*. It comes to the surface, as it were, immediately after in *τῶν δ' ὀργάνων*,

and the translation 'the same thing will hold good of the instruments of household science' seems to be justified by the use of the gen. in Phys. 8. 8. 263 a 1, καὶ τῶν κινήσεων ἄρα ὡσαύτως : Pol. 1. 8. 1256 a 29, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων (' ebenso ist es nun auch bei den Menschen,' Bern.: cp. 1256 b 6, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τοὺς ἄλλους). Riddell (Plato, Apology p. 126) apparently interprets the passage before us thus, though he does not explain what substantive he would supply.

29. πρῶτος. Cp. Plutarch, Agis 1. 3, καθάπερ γὰρ οἱ πρῶτοι τὰ ἔμπροσθεν προορώμενοι τῶν κυβερνητῶν ἀφορώσι πρὸς ἐκείνους καὶ τὸ προσ-
τασσόμενον ὑπ' ἐκείνων ποιοῦσιν, οὕτως οἱ πολιτευόμενοι καὶ πρὸς δόξαν ὄρῶντες ὑπηρεταὶ μὲν τῶν πολλῶν εἰσὶν, ὄνομα δὲ ἀρχόντων ἔχουσιν : Reipubl. Gerend. Praecepta, c. 15, ὡς οἱ κυβερνηταὶ τὰ μὲν ταῖς χερσὶ δι' αὐτῶν πράττουσι, τὰ δ' ὀργάνοις ἐτέροις δι' ἐτέρων ἀπαθεν καθήμενοι περιά-
γουσι καὶ στρέφουσι, χρώνται δὲ καὶ ναύταις καὶ πρῶρευσὶ καὶ κελευσταῖς . . .
οὕτω τῇ πολιτικῇ προσήκει κ.τ.λ.

30. ἐν ὀργάνου εἶδει. See Liddell and Scott s. v. εἶδος.

ταῖς τέχναις. Vict. 'in omni arte, quaecunque illa sit,' and so Bern. Sus. 'für die Künste,' but cp. ταῖς ἄλλαις τέχναις, 1256 b 34.

οὕτω καὶ τὸ κτῆμα. Here at length begins the apodosis. For οὕτω introducing the apodosis after a protasis introduced by ἐπεὶ, Eucken (de Partic. usu, p. 30) compares 1. 10. 1258 a 31—34.

31. τὸ κτῆμα . . . ὀργάνων ἐστὶ. Contrast Xenophon's account of κτήσις in Oecon. 6. 4, κτήσιν δὲ τοῦτο ἔφαμεν εἶναι ὃ τι ἐκάστω ὠφέλιμον εἴη εἰς τὸν βίον, ὠφέλιμα δὲ ὄντα εὗρίσκειτο πάντα ὁπόσοις τις ἐπίσταιτο χρῆσθαι—so that friends, for instance (c. 1. 14), come under the head of property, and enemies too, if a man knows how to use friends and enemies. Xenophon's definition seems far too wide. Aristotle avoids this fault by treating property as an appendage of the household and as consisting of ὄργανα, but then there is such a thing as State-property, and his final definition of a κτῆμα in 1254 a 16 as an ὄργανον πρακτικὸν καὶ χωριστὸν seems to imply that an ὄργανον ποιητικόν (a shuttle, for example) is not an article of property, so that his definition of κτήσις appears to be as much too narrow as Xenophon's is too wide. His definition of wealth, however (c. 8. 1256 b 27 sqq.), is not open to these objections.

32. ὥσπερ ὄργανον πρὸ ὀργάνων. For this term cp. de Part. An. 4. 10. 687 a 19 sq., ἥ δὲ χεὶρ ἔοικεν εἶναι οὐχ ἐν ὄργανον ἀλλὰ πολλὰ, ἔστι γὰρ ὥσπερ ὄργανον πρὸ ὀργάνων (the expression is somewhat unusual, and is therefore introduced by ὥσπερ, ὥσπερ) τῇ οὖν πλείστας δυναμένην δέξασθαι τέχνας τὸ ἐπὶ πλείστον τῶν ὀργάνων χρησιμὸν

τὴν χεῖρα ἀποδέδωκεν ἡ φύσις. Many have taken *ὄργανον* *πρὸ ὀργάνων* in this passage of the *De Partibus Animalium* as being equivalent in meaning to *οὐχ ἐν ὄργανον ἀλλὰ πολλὰ*, but this is not apparently its meaning in the passage before us. In *Probl.* 30. 5. 955 b 23 sqq. we read *ἢ ὅτι ὁ θεὸς ὄργανα ἐν ἑαυτοῖς ἡμῖν δέδωκε δύο, ἐν οἷς χρησόμεθα τοῖς ἐκτὸς ὀργάνοις, σώματι μὲν χεῖρα, ψυχῇ δὲ νοῦν*, and in *de An.* 3. 8. 432 a 1 sq. the soul is said to be like the hand, *καὶ γὰρ ἡ χεὶρ ὄργανόν ἐστιν ὀργάνων, καὶ ὁ τοῦς εἶδος εἰδῶν καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις εἶδος αἰσθητῶν*, where *Trendelenburg* explains ‘*manus, qua tanquam instrumento reliqua instrumenta adhibentur, instrumentum instrumentorum dici potest; eodem fortasse sensu τοῦς εἶδος εἰδῶν, i.e. ea species et forma quae reliquas suscipit, iisque, velut manus instrumentis, utitur.*’ Cp. also for the relation of the hand to other *ὄργανα*, *de Gen. An.* 1. 22. 730 b 15 sqq. *Bonitz* collects the uses of *πρὸ* in *Aristotle* (*Ind.* 633 a 34 sqq.), and, like *Vict.* before him, compares *Pol.* 1. 7. 1255 b 29, *δούλος πρὸ δούλου, δεσπότης πρὸ δεσπότου*, interpreting *πρὸ* both here and in the *De Partibus Animalium* as meaning ‘*praeferri alteri alterum.*’ (So *Vict.* ‘*instrumentum quod praestat et antecellit ceteris instrumentis.*’ *Lamb.* ‘*instrumentum instrumenta antecedens.*’) Perhaps, however, something more than this may be meant—‘an instrument which is prior to other instruments and without which they are useless.’

33. *πῶς ὁ ὑπηρέτης*. *Sus.* brackets *ὁ*, following *M^a* and corr. *P⁴*, and *πῶς ὑπηρέτης* (like *πῶς οἶκος*, 1. 7. 1255 b 19) is a commoner expression, but the meaning is ‘the class of assistants as a whole’—cp. *Eth. Nic.* 7. 9. 1150 b 30, *ὁ δ’ ἀκρατὴς μεταμελητικὸς πᾶς*: *Pol.* 1. 2. 1252 b 28, *πάσης τῆς αὐταρκείας*: 7 (5). 11. 1313 a 21, *πᾶσαν τὴν ἀρχήν*. The slave is included under the wider term *ὑπηρέτης* (1254 a 8: *Plato*, *Politicus* 289 C, *τὸ δὲ δὴ δούλων καὶ πάντων ὑπηρετῶν λοιπόν*).

35. *τὰ Δαιδάλου . . . ἢ τοῦς τοῦ Ἡφαίστου τρίποδας*. The article is used before *Ἡφαίστου*, but not before *Δαιδάλου*. Should we compare the examples collected by *Vahlen* (*Poet.* p. 105) in his note on *Ἰλιάς* καὶ ἡ Ὀδύσσεια, *Poet.* 4. 1449 a 1? As to these works of *Daedalus*, cp. *de An.* 1. 3. 406 b 18: *Plato*, *Meno* 97 D: *Euthyphro* 11 B: *Eurip.* *Fragm.* 373 (*Nauck*). The poets of the Old Comedy delighted to imagine the utensils of the kitchen and the household themselves doing what they were bidden, the fish cooking himself and so forth, and slaves thus becoming unnecessary. See the lively lines of *Crates* and others, *Athen. Deipn.* 267 c. The Greeks, in fact, as appears from these verses, looked back to a golden age when there were no slaves.

36. *ὁ ποιητής*. *Homer* (*Il.* 18. 376). The term, however, is

used by Aristotle of others than Homer—Sophocles (Pol. 1. 13. 1260 a 29): an unknown poet (Phys. 2. 2. 194 a 30). Homer refers to them as ‘of their own accord entering the assembly of the gods.’

35–37. ὥσπερ . . . οὕτως αἱ κερκίδες. For the construction of this sentence Rasso (Bemerkungen, p. 5) compares 3. 4. 1277 a 5, ἐπεὶ ἐξ ἀνομοίων ἢ πόλιν, ὥσπερ ζῶν ἐκ ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος καὶ ψυχῇ ἐκ λόγου καὶ ὀρίξεως . . . τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ πόλιν ἐξ ἀπάντων τε τούτων κ.τ.λ., and Sus. adds 3. 15. 1286 a 31, ἔτι μᾶλλον ἀδιέφθορον τὸ πολὺ, καθάπερ ὕδωρ τὸ πλεῖον, οὕτω καὶ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ὀλίγων ἀδιαφθορότερον. In all these passages, after a similar case or cases have been adduced, the original proposition is reverted to and reasserted, perhaps in more distinct and vigorous language—the whole forming, however cumbrously, an undivided sentence. Neither καὶ before ὥσπερ nor εἰ before αἱ κερκίδες is correct.

37. αὐταί, ‘of themselves’: cp. 2. 9. 1270 b 8.

38. οὐδὲν ἄν ἴδει. This is in the main true, but slaves might even then be needed as ἀκόλουθοι (8 (6). 8. 1323 a 5 sq.), a purpose for which they were largely used.

1. τὰ μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. Aristotle has been speaking of the slave as 1254 a. an ὄργανον πρὸς ὄργανον made necessary by the inability of shuttles or combs to do their work by themselves, but now he remembers that the word ὄργανον was commonly used of instruments of production; he feels, therefore, that what he has just said may be misleading and may suggest the idea that the slave is a mere instrument of the textile art, a mere complement of the comb, whereas in fact he is a humble auxiliary in life and action, which are higher things than weaving; hence he guards himself by pointing out that the slave is not an ὄργανον in the usual sense of the word—i. e. a ποιητικὸν ὄργανον (cp. Plato, Polit. 287 E, οὐ γὰρ ἐπὶ γενέσεως αἰτία πηγνύται, καθάπερ ὄργανον)—but a πρακτικὸν ὄργανον, for (1) he is a κτῆμα, (2) he is an ὄργανον πρὸς ζωὴν, and life is πρᾶξις, not ποιήσις. When he has added the further trait that the slave is, like any other κτῆμα, wholly another’s, we know exactly what the slave is, and are prepared to deal with the further question whether a natural slave exists. The slave is a πρακτικὸν and ἑμψυχον ὄργανον, and, though a human being, wholly another’s. As to the use of μὲν οὖν here, see note on 1253 a 10.

3. ἑτερόν τι . . . παρὰ. Cp. 6 (4). 15. 1299 a 18.

5. ἔτι δ’ ἐπεὶ κ.τ.λ. Aristotle now points out, further, that the difference between ὄργανα of ποιήσις and πρᾶξις (and the slave is an ὄργανον of πρᾶξις) is a difference of kind.

8. καὶ ὁ δοῦλος. Cp. καὶ ταῦτα 6: life (*βίος*) is action, and the slave is an *ὄργανον πρὸς ζωὴν*, 1253 b 31, therefore the slave also (as well as life) has to do with action. Mr. Postgate (Notes on the Politics, p. 1) notices the substitution here of *βίος* for *ζωή*.

τὸ δὲ κτήμα κ.τ.λ. Cp. 5 (8). 1. 1337 a 27, ἅμα δὲ οὐδὲ χρή νομίζειν αὐτὸν αὐτοῦ τινὰ εἶναι τῶν πολιτῶν, ἀλλὰ πάντας τῆς πόλεως, μόριον γὰρ ἕκαστος τῆς πόλεως, and Eth. Nic. 5. 10. 1134 b. 10 sq. The slave is also a part of his master (c. 6. 1255 b 11 sq.: Eth. Eud. 7. 9. 1241 b 23).

9. τε γὰρ 'apud Aristot. saepe ita usurpatur, ut particula τε manifesto praepraeprativam vim habeat, eamque sequatur καί' (Bon. Ind. 750 a 2). Here *ὁμοίως* δὲ follows.

10. ὅλως, i.e. without the limiting addition of *μόριον*. 'Opponitur ὅλως iis formulis, quibus praedicatum aliquod ad angustiorembitum restringitur' (Bon. Ind. 506 a 10).

14. φύσει. Vict. 'hoc autem addidit, quia usu venit aliquando ingenuum hominem amittere libertatem, nec suae potestatis esse, cum scilicet capitur ab hostibus: is enim quoque eo tempore non est sui iuris, sed instituto quodam hominum, non natura.' For the definition of the slave here given, cp. Metaph. A. 2. 982 b 25, ὥσπερ ἀνθρώπος φάμεν ἐλεύθερος ὁ αὐτοῦ ἕνεκα καὶ μὴ ἄλλου ὄν, οὕτω καὶ αὕτη μόνη ἐλευθέρα οὕσα τῶν ἐπιστημῶν· μόνη γὰρ αὕτη αὐτῆς ἕνεκεν ἐστίν. The popular use of language implied quite a different view of freedom and slavery: see Pol. 8 (6). 2. 1317 b 2-13, and contrast the well-known passage, Metaph. A. 10. 1075 a 18 sqq.

15. See critical note.

C. 5. 17. πότερον δ' ἐστὶ τις κ.τ.λ. Aristotle passes from the question τί ἐστί to the question εἰ ἐστίν: cp. Metaph. E. 1. 1025 b 16 sqq. He has discovered that there is a niche in the household needing to be filled, but he has not yet discovered whether there are any human beings in existence who are gainers by filling it, and whom it is consequently just and in accordance with nature to employ as slaves.

20. οὐ χαλεπὸν δὲ κ.τ.λ. It is not easy to disentangle in what follows the two modes of inquiry, or to mark the point at which the one closes and the other begins. We see that the relation of ruling and being ruled satisfies all tests of that which is natural; it is necessary, and therefore natural (de Gen. An. 1. 4. 717 a 15)—it is for the common advantage, and therefore natural (Pol. 1. 2. 1252 a 34: 1. 5. 1254 b 6, 12: 1. 6. 1255 b 12-14)—the distinction of ruler and ruled, again, appears in some cases immediately after birth (εὐθὺς ἐκ γενετῆς), and this is a further evidence of naturalness (Eth. Nic. 6. 13. 1144 b 4-6: Pol. 1. 8. 1256 b 7 sq.: Eth. Eud.

2. 8. 1224 b 31 sqq.). Aristotle continues—'and there are many kinds of ruling and ruled elements, and if one kind of rule is better than another, this is because one kind of ruled element is better than another, for ruler and ruled unite to discharge a function, and the function discharged rises as the level of that which is ruled rises.' Aristotle is careful to point out that the lowness of the rule exercised by the master over the slave is due to the lowness of the person ruled, and that the rule of a natural master over a natural slave no more involves an infraction of nature or justice or the common advantage than the rule of the soul over the body.

21. καταμαθεῖν is used of things perceived at a glance without any necessity for reasoning: cp. 3. 14. 1285 a 1. So δρᾶν is occasionally opposed to λόγος (e.g. in Meteor. 1. 6. 343 b 30-33).

23. ζῆνα. Soul and body, man and brute, male and female.

25. δει κ.τ.λ. Cp. 7 (5). 11. 1315 b 4, ἐκ γὰρ τούτων ἀναγκαῖον οὐ μόνον τὴν ἀρχὴν εἶναι καλλίως καὶ ζηλωτοτέραν τῷ βελτιώων ἀρχεῖν καὶ μὴ τεταπεινωμένων κ.τ.λ.

26. οἷον ἀνθρώπου ἢ θηρίου, 'as for instance over a man than over a brute.'

27. ἀπό is probably used in preference to ὑπό, because its signification is more comprehensive—the 'source' (cp. 6 (4). 6. 1293 a 19) rather than the 'agency'—and covers the contribution of the ruled to the common work as well as that of the ruler. 'In the genuine works of Aristotle ἀπό is never found in the sense of ὑπό with the passive, but all cases in which we find it conjoined with a passive verb may easily be explained by attaching to it its ordinary meaning; in many of the spurious writings, on the other hand, we find passages in which ἀπό is used in the sense of ὑπό—e.g. Probl. 7. 8. 887 a 22: Rhet. ad Alex. 3. 1424 a 15, 27' (Eucken, Praepositionen, p. 9). See also Bon. Ind. 78 a 9 sqq.

δπου δὲ κ.τ.λ. Cp. Hist. An. 1. 1. 488 a 7, πολιτικά δ' ἐστὶ (ζῆνα), ὧν ἐν τι κοινὸν γίνεται πάντων τὸ ἔργον' ὅπερ οὐ πάντα ποιεῖ τὰ ἀγελαῖα.

28. ὅσα γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Camerarius (Interp. p. 35) quotes Cic. De Nat. Deor. 2. 11. 29. Γὰρ introduces a proof of the statement in 24 that there are many sorts of ruling elements, and also of ruled, and many kinds of rule. Given the fact of the existence of many compound wholes, each compounded of many constituents, it is not likely that all those constituents will be similarly related to each other and will deserve to be ruled in the same way. Sus. (following Dittenberger, *ubi supra* p. 1376) places καὶ αἰ βελτιών. . . ἔργον 28 in a parenthesis, but perhaps ὅσα γὰρ κ.τ.λ. is intended to

support this assertion as well as that which precedes it, and out of which it grows.

29. *ἐν τι κοινόν*. See Bon. Ind. 399 a 28 sqq., where Metaph. H. 3. 1043 a 31 is referred to, in which passage *τὸ κοινόν* is used as equivalent to *ἡ σύνθετος οὐσία ἐξ ὅλης καὶ εἰδούς*, and such a *σύνθετος οὐσία* may be composed not only of *συνεχῆ*, but also of *διηρημένα*, like *τὸ ὅλον* in 4 (7). 8. 1328 a 21 sqq. For a definition of *τὸ συνεχές* Bonitz (Ind. 728 a 33) refers to Phys. 5. 3. 227 a 10–b 2. Vict.: ‘sive, inquit, ipsae illae partes continentes sunt, ut contingit in corpore hominis, quod constituunt membra quae sibi haerent, sive seiunctae, partibus non concretis, ut fieri videmus in civitate, quae constat e civibus distinctis, cohorte militum,’ etc.

31. *καὶ τοῦτ' ἐκ τῆς ἀπάσης φύσεως κ.τ.λ.* Bonitz (Ind. 225 b 10) seems inclined to explain *ἐκ* in this passage as used ‘pro genetivo partiiivo,’ but cp. de Part. An. 1. 1. 641 b 14, *αἰτία τοιαύτη ἦν ἔχομεν καθάπερ τὸ θερμὸν καὶ τὸ ψυχρὸν ἐκ τοῦ παντός*: ‘and this (i.e. ruling and being ruled) comes to things possessed of life from nature as a whole’ (*ἐκ τῆς ἀπάσης φύσεως*, cp. *περὶ τὴν ὅλην φύσιν*, 2. 8. 1267 b 28). Cp. also de An. 3. 5. 430 a 10, *ἐπεὶ ὅσπερ ἐν ἀπάσῃ τῇ φύσει ἐστὶ τι τὸ μὲν ὅλη ἐκάστω γένει (τοῦτο δὲ ὁ πάντα δυνάμει ἐκείνα), ἕτερον δὲ τὸ αἷτιον καὶ ποιητικόν, τῷ ποιεῖν πάντα, οἷον ἡ τέχνη πρὸς τὴν ὅλην πέπονθεν, ἀνάγκη καὶ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ὑπάρχειν ταύτας τὰς διαφοράς*: Plato, Phileb. 30 A: Phaedrus 270 C: Meno 81 C, *ἅτε τῆς φύσεως ἀπάσης συγγενοῦς οὐσης*. *Τὸ ἄψυχον* is prior *γενέσει*, though not *οὐσίᾳ*, to *τὸ ἐμψυχον* (Metaph. M. 2. 1077 a 19). Inanimate nature shades off almost imperceptibly into animate (Hist. An. 8. 1. 588 b 4 sqq.).

33. *οἷον ἁρμονίας*. Bern. ‘z. B. in der musikalischen Harmonie’—Sus.² ‘wie z. B. (die des Grundtons) in einer Tonart’: the latter suggests that *ἐν ἁρμονίᾳ* should be read instead of *ἁρμονίας*, and certainly, if the word is used in this sense, the genitive seems strange and in need of confirmation from parallel passages. Bonitz, on the other hand (Ind. 106 b 37 sq.), groups this passage with Phys. 1. 5. 188 b 12–16, where *ἁρμονία* appears to be used in a sense opposed to *ἀναρμοστία*—*διαφέρει οὐδὲν ἐπὶ ἁρμονίας εἰπεῖν ἢ τάξεως ἢ συνθέσεως* *φανερὸν γάρ ἐστι αὐτὸς λόγος* (15–16)—cp. Fragm. Aristot. 41. 1481 b 42: the meaning would thus be ‘a rule as of order and system.’ But Aristotle may possibly have in his mind the Pythagorean tenet referred to in Metaph. A. 5. 986 a 2, *τὸν ὅλον οὐρανὸν ἁρμονίαν εἶναι καὶ ἀριθμόν*: cp. Strabo 10. p. 468, *καθ' ἁρμονίαν τὸν κόσμον συνεστάναι φασί*: Plutarch, Phocion c. 2 *sub fin.*: Plato, Tim. 37 A: Philolaus, Fragm. 3 (Mullach, Fr. Philos. Gr. 2.

1): Plutarch, de Procreatione Animae in Timaeo c. 7. 1015 E, c. 28. 1027 A, c. 33. 1029 E sqq.: Stob. Floril. 103. 26 (p. 555. 27 sq.). Compare also the famous saying of Heraclitus (Fr. 45, ed. Bywater) as to the παλίντροπος ἁρμονίη [κόσμου] ὅκωσπερ τόξου καὶ λύρης. If the Pythagorean views are present to Aristotle's mind, some notion of musical harmony may be included in his meaning.

ἀλλὰ κ.τ.λ. Compare the similar dismissal of a physical parallel in Eth. Nic. 8. 10. 1159 b 23.

34. πρῶτον, 'in the first place.' Cp. 1254 b 2, ἔστι δ' οὖν, ὥσπερ λέγομεν, πρῶτον ἐν ζῳῇ θεωρῆσαι καὶ δεσποτικὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ πολιτικὴν, and 10, πάλιν.

35. ὃν τὸ μὲν κ.τ.λ. Cp. Plato, Phaedo 80 A, and Isocr. De Antid. § 180.

36. δεῖ δὲ σκοπεῖν. Sus. (Qu. Crit. p. 342): 'orationem interrompendo refellit quae quis de hac re contradicere possit.' For the rule here laid down, cp. Eth. Nic. 9. 9. 1170 a 22 sqq. In the next line καὶ before τὸν βέλτιστα διακείμενον seems to assert it not only of other things but also of man.

39. τοῦτο, the rule of the soul over the body.

τῶν γὰρ μοχθηρῶν ἢ μοχθηρῶς ἐχόντων. Cp. de An. 3. 4. 429 b 13, ἢ ἄλλῃ ἢ ἄλλως ἔχοντι: de An. 3. 4. 429 b 20 sq.: de Gen. An. 1. 18. 725 a 8, τοῖς κάκιστα διακειμένοις δι' ἡλικίαν ἢ νόσον ἢ ἔξιν (ἢ ἔξιν Z: om. Bekk.)—ἔξις being a more permanent and διάθεσις a less permanent state (see Mr. Wallace on de An. 2. 5. 417 b 15, who refers to Categ. 8. 8 b 28). Μοχθηρῶς ἐχόντων includes both, and relates to individuals who, though not μοχθηροί, are, more or less temporarily, in an unsatisfactory state.

3. δ' οὖν seems to be especially used by Aristotle when a transition is made from a disputable assertion to one which cannot be disputed: cp. Eth. Nic. 9. 11. 1171 a 33 (quoted by Vahlen, Beitr. zu Aristot. Poet. 1. 46), εἰ μὲν οὖν διὰ ταῦτα ἢ δι' ἄλλο τι κρυφίζονται, ἀφαισθῶ συμβαίνειν δ' οὖν φαίνεται τὸ λεχθέν. See also Meteor. 1. 13. 350 b 9: Poet. 4. 1449 a 9. 'Be that as it may, at any rate.'

4. ἢ μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. It will be noticed that Aristotle conceives the soul to exercise δεσποτικὴ ἀρχή over the body even in the case of the lower animals, at any rate when they are healthily and naturally constituted. Plato (Phaedo 80 A) had already spoken of the soul as ruling the body despotically, and Aristotle follows in his track. We might ask whether Aristotle holds that the soul rules the body primarily for its own advantage, and only accidentally for that of the body (cp. 3. 6. 1278 b 32 sqq.), or whether the disparity which he conceives as existing between a natural master and a natural slave

exists between the soul of an insect and its body. Aristotle's meaning, however, is that the body should be the *ὄργανον* and *κτῆμα* of the soul. But he does not always draw this sharp line of demarcation between the soul and the body: in *Eth. Nic.* 10. 8. 1178 a 14, for instance, he relates the body rather closely to the emotions.

5. *πολιτικὴν καὶ βασιλικήν*. *Καὶ* perhaps here means 'or,' as in the passages referred to by Bonitz (*Ind.* 357 b 20). *Πολιτικὴ* and *βασιλικὴ ἀρχή* have this in common, that they are exercised over free and willing subjects (cp. 3. 4. 1277 b 7-9: and see notes on 1259 a 39-b 1). Perhaps the word *βασιλική* is added to enforce the inequality of *νοῦς* and *δρεξις*, and to exclude the notion that an alternation of rule between *νοῦς* and *δρεξις* is ever in place, such as is found in most *πολιτικάι ἀρχαί* (1. 12. 1259 b 4: 1. 1. 1252 a 15). For the relation of *νοῦς* (i. e. *ὁ πρακτικὸς νοῦς*) and *δρεξις* in moral action, see *Eth. Nic.* 6. 2. 1139 a 17 sqq. "*Ορεξις* does not stand to *νοῦς* in the relation of a mere *ὄργανον*—the relation described in *Pol.* 4 (7). 8. 1328 a 28 sqq.—but is to a certain extent akin to it; see *Eth. Nic.* 1. 13. 1102 b 30 sqq., and esp. 1103 a 1, *εἰ δὲ χρή καὶ τοῦτο* (sc. *τὸ ὁρεκτικόν*) *φάναι λόγον ἔχειν, διττὸν ἔσται καὶ τὸ λόγον ἔχον, τὸ μὲν κυρίως καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ, τὸ δ' ὥσπερ τοῦ πατρὸς ἀκουστικόν τι*, where the relation of *δρεξις* to full reason is conceived as that of a child to its father, and a father, we know (*Eth. Nic.* 8. 13. 1161 a 10 sqq.), is not far from a king. On the other hand, in *Eth. Nic.* 5. 15. 1138 b 5 sqq., the relation of the rational to the irrational part of the soul is apparently construed differently, and compared to the relation of a master to his slave or to that of a head of a household to his household; we do not learn how it can be comparable to each of these two dissimilar relations. When Cicero (*de Rep.* 3. 25. 37) says—nam ut animus corpori dicitur imperare, dicitur etiam libidini, sed corpori ut rex civibus suis aut parens liberis, libidini autem ut servis dominus, quod eam coercet et frangit—he probably means by 'libido' something different from *δρεξις*. His notion of the relation of soul and body contrasts, we see, with Aristotle's.

6. *ἐν οἷς*. Cp. 1254 a 39, *ἐν ᾧ τοῦτο δῆλον*: 1254 b 3, *ἐν ᾧ θεωρῆσαι*: 1254 a 36, *σκοπεῖν ἐν τοῖς κατὰ φύσιν ἔχουσι*: and Plato, *Soph.* 256 C, *περὶ ὧν καὶ ἐν οἷς προϋθέμεθα σκοπεῖν*. 'Εν introduces the objects (*ψυχή, σῶμα, νοῦς, δρεξις*) in which the relations are exemplified. 'Εν is sometimes used in the sense of 'as to': see Vahlen, *Poet.* p. 188 (note on 17. 1455 b 14), who compares (among other passages) Plato, *Rep.* 2. 376 B, *θαρροῦντες τιθώμεν καὶ ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ . . . φύσει φιλόσοφον αὐτὸν δεῖν εἶναι*, but this does not seem to be its meaning here.

8. τῷ παθητικῷ μορίῳ ὑπὸ τοῦ νοῦ καὶ τοῦ μορίου τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος. That which is usually called τὸ ὀρεκτικόν is here termed τὸ παθητικόν μόριον, and the term recurs in 3. 15. 1286 a 17, κρείττον δ' ᾧ μὴ πρόσσεσι τὸ παθητικόν ὅλως ἢ ᾧ συμφυεῖς τῷ μὲν οὖν νόμῳ τοῦτο οὐχ ὑπάρχει—cp. 3. 16. 1287 a 32, ἀνευ ὀρέξεως νοῦς ὁ νόμος ἐστίν. In the passage before us τὸ ὀρεκτικόν is distinguished from τὸ λόγον ἔχον, though Aristotle is sometimes not unwilling to treat it as part of τὸ λόγον ἔχον (see Eth. Nic. 1. 13. 1103 a 1 sq., quoted in the last note but one), and in the de Anima (3. 9. 432 a 24 sqq.) he speaks of the division of the soul into τὸ διλογον and τὸ λόγον ἔχον as not his own and not satisfactory. He evidently, however, accepts this division in the Politics; this appears still more distinctly in Pol. 1. 13. 1260 a 6 and 4 (7). 15. 1334 b 17 sq. An accurate treatment of psychological questions would in fact be out of place in a political treatise: see Eth. Nic. 1. 13. 1102 a 23 sq. It is not clear whether in the passage before us Aristotle regards νοῦς as the *ἐξίς* of τὸ λόγον ἔχον, as in Pol. 4 (7). 15. 1334 b 17 sqq.

10. ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ζώοις, 'in man taken in conjunction with the other animals.' It is because the relation of ruling and being ruled appears elsewhere than *περὶ ἀνθρώπων*, that Aristotle expressly limits his inquiries in 3. 6. 1278 b 16 to the question, *τῆς ἀρχῆς εἰδῆ πόσα τῆς περὶ ἀνθρώπων καὶ τὴν κοινωνίαν τῆς ζωῆς*.

11. βελτίω. Cp. 4 (7). 13. 1332 b 3 sq.: Probl. 10. 45. 895 b 23 sqq.: Oecon. 1. 3. 1343 b 15. Being better, their example is to be studied as illustrating the true relation of animals to man (cp. 1254 a 37).

τοῦτοις δὲ πᾶσι. Vict. 'mansuetis omnibus.' Cp. Theophr. Caus. Plant. 1. 16. 13 (quoted by Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 826. 1).

13. ἔτι δὲ κ.τ.λ. Φύσει is added because this is not always the case (cp. 1. 12. 1259 b 1). Κρείττον is probably not 'stronger' (as Sus. and Bern.), but 'better,' as in 3. 15. 1286 a 17: compare as to the relative excellence of male and female de Gen. An. 2. 1. 732 a 5 sqq.: Metaph. A. 6. 988 a 2-7. Aristotle is apparently speaking here, as in 1259 b 1, 1260 a 10, of the male and female human being.

15. ἐπὶ πάντων ἀνθρώπων. Cp. 3. 10. 1281 a 17, πάλιν τε πάντων ληφθέντων, where the meaning seems to be 'taking men as a whole, irrespective of wealth and poverty'; so here 'in the case of human beings as a whole, irrespective of sex.'

16. ψυχῇ σώματος καὶ ἀνθρώπος θηρίου. One would expect ψυχῆς σῶμα καὶ ἀνθρώπου θηρίον, and Thurot (see Sus.¹) is inclined to alter the text thus, but the inversion is characteristic: cp. 2. 2. 1261 a 27,

where one would expect διαίσει δὲ τῷ τοιούτῳ καὶ ἔθνος πόλεως, instead of ἔθνος πόλις.

18. ἡ τοῦ σώματος χρῆσις. The same criterion of a slave is indicated in 1. 2. 1252 a 31 sqq.: 1. 11. 1258 b 38: 1254 b 25. The slave is here defined by his ἔργον, and in 21 by his δύναμις (like the citizen of the best State, 3. 13. 1284 a 2): cp. 1. 2. 1253 a 23. And the end of a thing is the best to which it can attain (cp. 4 (7). 14. 1333 a 29, αἰεὶ ἐκάστῳ τοῦθ' ἀρετώτατον οὗ τυχεῖν ἔστιν ἀκροτάτου).

19. Μέν seems (as Thurot remarks: see *Sus. Qu. Crit.* p. 343) to be followed by no δέ. But this often occurs in the *Politics* (*Sus.*¹, *Ind. Gramm.* μέν), and here, as Susemihl observes, 'μέν praeparat quodammodo quaestionem de ceteris servis, qui non item natura sed lege tantum servi sint, sequente demum in capite instituendam.' It is taken up by μέν τούτων, 1254 b 39, and then the δέ which introduces c. 6 answers this μέν, and consequently in effect μέν 19 also.

οἷς introduces the reason why these are slaves by nature; they are so because it is better for them to be slaves, unlike some who will be mentioned presently. For this pregnant use of the relative, cp. *de Part. An.* 1. 1. 641 b 22.

20. ταύτην τὴν ἀρχήν, sc. δεσποτικὴν ἀρχήν, for τὰ εἰρημένα seem to be σῶμα and θηρίον (mentioned in 16–17). For (Aristotle in effect continues) the natural slave is very near to a brute in capacity, use, and bodily make, though there is a certain difference between them.

γὰρ (21) justifies what precedes: the slave has just been mentioned as on a level with the brute, and now facts are adduced which show how nearly they approach each other. The natural slave is a being who can be another's, just as any article of property can, but who differs from brutes in this, that he shares in reason to the extent of apprehending it, though he has it not. The slave seems to resemble in this τὸ ὀρεκτικὸν μόριον τῆς ψυχῆς (cp. *Eth. Nic.* 1. 13. 1103 a 1 sq.), rather than the body, and we are inclined to ask why the rule exercised over him is not to be a kingly rule, like that of νοῦς over ὁρεξεις. It is because the slave can apprehend reason that he should be addressed with νουθέτησις (1. 13. 1260 b 5), and not with commands alone, as Plato suggested.

23. τὰ ἄλλα ἴφα. Usually used where ἀνθρώπος has gone before (as in 1254 b 10), but here apparently in contradistinction to δοῦλος, as in 3. 9. 1280 a 32.

αἰσθανόμενα. For the part. in place of the finite verb, cp. 2. 5. 1263 a 18 and 4 (7). 14. 1333 a 18, though it is possible that here

some verb should be supplied from *ὑπηρετεῖ*. Cp. also *ὅσοι μῖτε πλούσιοι μῖτε ἀξίωμα ἔχουσιν ἀρετῆς μηδέν*, 3. 11. 1281 b 24, and see Vahlen's note on Poet. 24. 1459 b 7 (p. 243).

24. *παθήμασιν*. 'Usus Aristotelicus vocis *πάθημα* ita exponetur, ut appareat inter *πάθημα* et *πάθος* non esse certum significationis discrimen, sed eadem fere vi et sensus varietate utrumque nomen, saepius alterum, alterum rarius usurpari' (Bon. Ind. 554 a 56 sqq.). For the expression *παθήμασιν ὑπηρετεῖ*, cp. 7 (5). 10. 1312 b 30, *τοῖς θυμοῖς ἀκολουθεῖν*, and for the thought 4 (7). 13. 1332 b 3, *τὰ μὲν οὖν ἄλλα τῶν ζῶων μάλιστα μὲν τῇ φύσει ζῇ, μικρὰ δ' ἔνια καὶ τοῖς ἔθουσιν, ἄνθρωπος δὲ καὶ λόγῳ, μόνον γὰρ ἔχει λόγον*.

καὶ ἡ χρεία. The use made of the slave, no less than his capacity. The use made of tame animals for food is not taken into account: cp. 1. 8. 1256 b 17, *καὶ διὰ τὴν χρῆσιν καὶ διὰ τὴν τροφήν*.

παραλλάττει, 'diverges': cp. de Part. An. 2. 9. 655 a 18: de Gen. An. 3. 10. 760 a 16: Probl. 11. 58. 905 b 8. For the thought, cp. *Σοφία Σειράχ* 30. 24, *χορτάσματα καὶ ῥάβδος καὶ φορτία ὄνῃ, ἄρτος καὶ παιδεία καὶ ἔργον οἰκέτῃ*: Pol. 1. 2. 1252 b 12, *ὁ γὰρ βοῦς ἀντ' οἰκέτου τοῖς πένησιν ἐστίν*: and Aeschyl. Fragm. 188 (Nauck).

25. *τῷ σώματι*, 'with the body,' is to be taken with *βοήθεια* and not made dependent on *τάναγκαῖα*, as Vict. makes it; cp. 1. 2. 1252 a 33: 1. 11. 1258 b 38.

27. *βούλεται μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ.* Aristotle has implied in what he has just been saying that there is a difference between the souls of the free and the slave, and now he continues—'Nature's wish, indeed, is to make the bodies also of freemen and slaves different, no less than their souls, but' etc. He evidently feels that he may be asked why the bodies of slaves are not more like those of the domestic animals than they are. He hints in *ὀρθά* 29 that the crouching carriage of slaves marks them off from man, and allies them to the horse or ox. Aristotle attached much importance to the erect attitude of man: cp. de Part. An. 2. 10. 656 a 10, *εὐθύς γὰρ καὶ τὰ φύσει μέρια κατὰ φύσιν ἔχει τούτῳ μόνῳ, καὶ τὸ τούτου ἄνω πρὸς τὸ τοῦ ὅλου ἔχει ἄνω· μόνον γὰρ ὀρθὸν ἐστὶ τῶν ζῶων ἄνθρωπος*: 4. 10. 686 a 27, *ὀρθὸν μὲν γάρ ἐστι μόνον τῶν ζῶων διὰ τὸ τὴν φύσιν αὐτοῦ καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν εἶναι θείαν· ἔργον δὲ τοῦ θειοτάτου τὸ νοεῖν καὶ φρονεῖν· τοῦτο δ' οὐ ῥάδιον πολλοῦ τοῦ ἀνωθεν ἐπικειμένου σώματος· τὸ γὰρ βάρος δυσκίνητον ποιεῖ τὴν διάνοιαν καὶ τὴν κοινὴν αἴσθησιν*. As to the failure of nature to give effect to her purposes, perhaps she was thought by Aristotle to miss her mark more often in respect of the body than the soul: cp. de Gen. An. 4. 10. 778 a 4, *βούλεται μὲν οὖν ἡ φύσις τοῖς τούτων ἀριθμοῖς ἀριθμεῖν τὰς γενέσεις καὶ τὰς τελευτάς, οὐκ ἀκριβοὶ δὲ διὰ τε τὴν τῆς ὕλης*

ἀοριστίαν καὶ διὰ τὸ γίνεσθαι πολλὰς ἀρχάς, αἱ τὰς γενέσεις τὰς κατὰ φύσιν καὶ τὰς φθορὰς ἐμποδίζουσαι πολλάκις αἰτίαι τῶν παρὰ φύσιν συμπιπτόντων εἰσιν.

31. If this parenthesis is more than a marginal remark which has crept into the text, it is probably intended to draw out the contrast between πολιτικὸς βίος and ἀναγκαῖαι ἐργασίαι: the mere mention of all that is implied in the former will suffice to show the unfitness, physical no less than mental, of the slave for it. For γίνεται διηρημένος ('comes to be divided'), see Top. 7. 5. 154 b 11, 22: 155 a 9: Pol. 7 (5). 9. 1310 a 24, and notes on 1252 b 7, 1264 a 14. The contrast of πολεμικαὶ and εἰρηνικαὶ πράξεις, as constituting the work of the citizen, is familiar enough to us from 4 (7). 14. 1333 a 30 sq., though πολεμικαὶ ἀσκήσεις are distinguished from πολιτικαὶ in 5 (8). 6. 1341 a 8. Cp. [Plutarch] De Liberis Educandis c. 13. 9 c, δοτέον οὖν τοῖς παισὶν ἀναπνοὴν τῶν συνεχῶν πόνων, ἐνθυμνομένους ὅτι πᾶς ὁ βίος ἡμῶν εἰς ἀνεσιν καὶ σπουδὴν διηρηται, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο οὐ μόνον ἐργήγορσις, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὕπνος εὐρέθη, οὐδὲ πόλεμος, ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰρήνη.

33. τοὺς μὲν . . . ψυχάς. Vict. explains, 'ut servi scilicet natura corpora habeant liberorum hominum, liberi autem animos servorum.' But we can hardly supply 'of slaves' after τὰς ψυχάς, and besides, if a freeman had the soul of a slave, that would be no illustration of the failure of Nature to give effect to her purpose in respect of the *bodies* of freemen and slaves, and this alone is in question. Nor would such a freeman be a freeman by nature; yet, as Giphanius says (p. 63), 'de natura et servis et liberis agimus, non de iis qui lege et instituto.' These two latter objections also apply to the translation of τοὺς μὲν—τοὺς δὲ as 'some slaves' and 'other slaves.' If a slave had the soul of a freeman, the failure of Nature would be in respect of his soul, not his body, and he would not be a natural slave. Two interpretations seem open to us. 1. We may refer τοὺς μὲν to slaves, like τὰ μὲν 28, and τοὺς δὲ to freemen, like τὰ δὲ 29, and translate, 'but the very contrary often comes to pass' (cp. 1. 9. 1257 b 33), 'that (the body does not match the soul, but that) slaves have the bodies of freemen and freemen the souls.' Aristotle might have said 'and freemen the bodies of slaves,' but what he wishes to draw attention to is the occasional disjunction of a freeman's body from a freeman's soul. This resembles the interpretation of Bernays. Or 2. we may adopt the rendering of Sepulveda—'saepe tamen accidit oppositum, ut alii corpora, alii animos ingenuorum habeant'—that one set of people have the bodies of freemen and another the souls, or, in other words, that bodily excellence is parted from

excellence of soul. I incline on the whole to the former interpretation. It should be noted that Antisthenes had said that souls are shaped in the likeness of the bodies they dwell in (fr. 33. Mullach, *Fr. Philos. Gr.* 2. 279, ἐντεῦθεν Ἀντισθένης ὁμοσχήμονάς φησι τὰς ψυχὰς τοῖς περιέχουσι σώμασιν εἶναι): his remark, however, seems to have referred, primarily at any rate, to the souls of the dead.

34. ἐπεὶ . . . γέ justifies what precedes by pointing out what would result if the contrary were the case (cp. 1255 a 19: Meteor. 1. 4. 342 a 15—if the γέσεις of lightning-bolts were not ἔκκρισις but ἔκκαυσις, they would ascend instead of descending as they do). So here, to prove that Nature sometimes fails to make the bodies of slaves and freemen different, the argument is that 'if it were not so—if all freemen were far superior in physical aspect to slaves—no one would be found to dispute the justice of slavery.' The argument shows how keenly the Greeks appreciated physical excellence and beauty: here the same thing is said of physical excellence as is said of excellence of body and soul together in 4 (7). 14. 1332 b 16 sqq. and Plato, *Polit.* 301 D–E. We also note that the Greek statues of gods were evidently in respect of physical beauty much above the Greek average: compare Cic. *de Nat. Deor.* 1. 28. 79, quotus enim quisque formosus est? Athenis cum essem, e gregibus epheborum vix singuli reperiebantur, and see C. F. Hermann, *Gr. Antiqq.* 3. § 4, who also refers to Dio Chrys. *Or.* 21. 500 R.

35. τοὺς ὑπολειπομένους, 'inferiores': so Bonitz (*Ind.* 800 a 35), who traces this signification to the simpler one, 'tardius aliis moveri, remanere in via.'

37. εἰ δ' ἐπὶ κ.τ.λ. Aristotle wins an unexpected argument in favour of his doctrine of slavery from the appeal which he has just made to Greek sentiment. 'But if this holds good of a difference of body'—i. e. if a vast physical superiority confers the right to hold as slaves those who are less well endowed in this respect—'with much more justice may it be laid down in the case of a difference of soul,' on which Aristotle has rested the distinction of master and slave.

38. For the thought, cp. *Eth. Nic.* 1. 13. 1102 b 21 sq., and (with Giph.) Plato, *Symp.* 216 D–217 A: Cic. *de Offic.* 1. 5. 15. Aristotle hints that as it is not easy to discern superiority of soul, we need not wonder that the right of the natural master should be disputed.

39. ὅτι μὲν τὸν εἰς φύσει τινὲς οἱ μὲν ἐλεύθεροι οἱ δὲ δούλοι. Cp. c. 6. 1255 b 6, καὶ ὅτι ἐν τισὶ διώρισται τὸ ταιούτων, ὃν συμφέρει τῷ μὲν τὸ δουλεῖν, τῷ δὲ τὸ δεσπόζειν, a passage which seems to make

in favour of the view according to which *οἱ μὲν* and *οἱ δὲ* (1255 a 1) are subdivisions of a class designated by *τινές*. *Οἷς*, 1255 a 2, is carelessly made to refer to *οἱ δὲ* only (cp. *βιασθεῖσι* in 1255 b 15).

C. 6. 3 sqq. The following summary will explain the way in which I
1255 a. incline to interpret the much-disputed passage which follows. The view that slavery is contrary to nature is true *τρόπον τινά*—i.e. if limited to the enslavement of those who are slaves only by convention. For in fact there are such slaves: the law by which captives of war are accounted the slaves of the victors is nothing but a convention. (Aristotle does not necessarily imply that this was the only way in which slaves by convention came into being. They might evidently come into being in other ways—through descent, through debt, through sale by parents and the like. Into these minutiae he does not enter.) This provision (he proceeds) is dealt with by many who concern themselves with the study of laws, just as any peccant public adviser might be dealt with—they impeach it for unconstitutionality; they exclaim against the idea that anyone who may be overpowered by superior force is to be the slave of the person who happens to possess that superior force. Some are against the law, others are for it, and even accomplished men take different sides. (It appears to me that the *πολλοὶ τῶν ἐν τοῖς νόμοις* who are here represented as objecting to slavery based on a mere superiority in might must be distinguished from the authorities mentioned in 1253 b 20 as holding that *all* slavery is conventional and contrary to nature. The *πολλοὶ τῶν ἐν τοῖς νόμοις* do not seem to have objected to slavery based on a superiority of excellence as distinguished from a mere superiority of might. Hence they probably did not object to the enslavement of barbarians in war by Greeks: we see, indeed, that not all the defenders of the law were prepared to defend its application to Greeks. In c. 2. 1252 b 9 the barbarian and the slave, not the conquered person and the slave, are said to be identified by the poets.) Now what is it that alone makes this conflict of view possible? It is that the two contentions ‘overlap’ in a common principle accepted by both, which affords them a common standing-ground, relates them to each other, and limits their antagonism. They both in fact appeal to the common principle that ‘Force is not without Virtue.’ Thus they differ only on the question what is just in this matter, not as to the relation between Force and Virtue. The one side pleads that, as Force implies Virtue, Force has a right to enslave: the other side pleads that as Virtue goes with Force and Virtue conciliates good-will, good-will will exist between those who are right-

fully masters and slaves. Thus the one side rests just slavery on good-will between master and slave, and condemns slavery resulting from war, when good-will is absent, while the other side rests just slavery simply on the presence of superior Force. (We are not told that those who held slavery resulting from war to be unjust in the absence of good-will between the enslaver and the enslaved also held that good-will must necessarily be absent in all cases of enslavement through war. Their contention rather was that it was not safe to make Force of one, unaccompanied by good-will, the test of just slavery.)

This conflict of opinion is, as has been said, evidently due to the fact that both parties make an appeal to the common principle that 'Force is not without Virtue,' for suppose that they gave up this common standing-ground, ceased to shelter their claims under those of Virtue, and thus came to stand apart in unqualified antagonism, then the other line of argument (*ἄτεροι λόγοι*) on which they must necessarily fall back—the contention that superiority in virtue confers no claim to rule—is so wholly devoid of weight and plausibility, that no conflict would arise. (Those who connect the right to enslave with superior force, and those who connect it with the existence of mutual good-will between master and slave, are regarded as having two lines of argument open to them: either they may derive the claims of force and good-will to be the justifying ground of slavery from the claims of virtue, and thus shelter themselves under the latter, or they may impugn the claims of virtue; but if they impugn them, their own contentions lose all weight and cease to produce any serious debate.)

We see then that the solid element in this pair of contending views, if we take them in the form which they assume when they possess any weight at all, is to be found in the principle that superiority in virtue confers the right to rule and to rule as a master rules. We shall arrive at exactly the same result if we examine another view on the subject.

We have hitherto had to do with those who discuss the law in question on its merits; but there are those who support slavery arising through war on the broad ground that it is authorized by a law and that that which is so authorized is *ipso facto* just. But a law, though a justifying ground, is not everything in this matter. For the war may be an unjust one, and either on this ground or on grounds personal to himself, the man enslaved through war may be undeserving of his fate: injustices of this kind the law will not avail to make just. In fact, these inquirers admit as much them-

selves, and contradict their own plea. For they say that Greeks are not to be enslaved, but only barbarians, since barbarians are slaves everywhere (*πανταχοῦ δοῦλοι*) and Greeks nowhere slaves. They make the same distinction in reference to nobility. They say that Greek nobility is nobility everywhere and in an absolute sense, but barbarian nobility is only local. Thus they hold that there are such beings as *πανταχοῦ, ἀπλῶς δοῦλοι*—*πανταχοῦ, ἀπλῶς ἐλεύθεροι* and *εὐγενεῖς*: Theodectes, in fact, connects the latter quality with descent from the gods. What else then do they do but mark off slave and free by a reference to virtue and its opposite? For descent from the good is, they imply, equivalent to goodness, and so it generally is, though not invariably, since Nature sometimes misses her aim.

3. οἱ τάναντία φάσκοντες. For *φάσκειν* used of philosophers or others laying down a dogma, cp. c. 13. 1260 b 6.

6. ὁ γὰρ νόμος κ.τ.λ. As I understand the passage, it is only this particular law that is here said to be an *ὁμολογία*. The law enacting the slavery of captives taken in war, *ὅταν πολεμούντων πόλις ἀλφ*, is said to be a *νόμος αἰδώς* by Xenophon (Cyp. 7. 5. 73 : cp. Thuc. 1. 76. 2, quoted by Camerarius). Aristotle does not notice the limits commonly imposed on the exercise of this right in wars between Greek States: see as to this C. F. Hermann, Gr. Antiqq. 3. § 12, who notes that, as a rule, captives taken in war were enslaved only when the cities to which they belonged were razed, and that they were commonly reserved by the State which captured them for exchange or ransom. The reference of law to an *ὁμολογία* seems to have been a commonplace: see Plato, Rep. 359 A: Xen. Mem. 1. 2. 42 (where it is put in the mouth of Pericles): Xen. Mem. 4. 4. 13 (where Socrates adopts the view). Aristotle himself not only reproduces the popular view in Rhet. 1. 15. 1376 b 9, but speaks in Eth. Nic. 8. 14. 1161 b 14 of friendships which rest on *ὁμολογία* (*πολιτικάι, φυλετικάι, συμπλοϊκαί*) as appearing to be of a *κοινωνική* type. In Pol. 3. 9. 1280 b 10, however, we find an emphatic assertion that those theories of the *πόλις* which reduce it to an alliance, and the law to a *συνθήκη*, are wrong (cp. Rhet. 1. 13. 1373 b 8, where *κοινωνία* is tacitly distinguished from *συνθήκη*). This does not prevent particular laws being based on convention, e. g. that which constitutes a medium of exchange (Eth. Nic. 5. 8. 1133 a 29). The object, it may be added, with which the law enacting enslavement through war is here stated to be an *ὁμολογία* is to justify the assertion *ἔστι γὰρ τις καὶ κατὰ νόμον* (convention) *δοῦλος καὶ δουλεύων*, which immediately precedes. For *ἐν δ' . . . φασιν*,

cp. [Plutarch] Sept. Sap. Conv. 13, *σὲ γάρ, ὦ Πιττακέ, καὶ τὸν σὸν ἐκείνων τὸν χαλεπὸν φαβείται νόμον, ἐν ᾧ γέγραφας κ.τ.λ.*

7. *τοῦτο . . . τὸ δίκαιον*, 'this plea,' 'this justifying ground of claim': cp. Philip of Macedon's Letter to the Athenians, c. 21 (Demosth. p. 164), *ὑπάρχει μοι καὶ τοῦτο τὸ δίκαιον, ἐκπολιορκήσας γὰρ τοὺς ὑμᾶς μὲν ἐκβαλόντας, ὑπὸ Λακεδαιμονίων δὲ κατοικισθέντας, ἔλαβον τὸ χαρίον*: Demosth. adv. Androt. c. 70, *οὐχὶ προσήγαγε ταῦτ' δίκαιον τοῦτο*: adv. Conon. c. 27, *ἐπίστευον τῷ δικαίῳ τούτῳ*, and c. 29, *καὶ τοῦτο τὸ δίκαιον ἔχων*.

8. *τῶν ἐν τοῖς νόμοις*. Cp. Metaph. Θ. 8. 1050 b 35, *οἱ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις* ('dialecticians,' Grote, Aristotle 2. 366): Rhet. 2. 24. 1401 b 32, *οἱ ἐν ταῖς πολιτείαις*. Camerarius (Interp. p. 40) quotes Eurip. Hippol. 430, *αὐτοὶ τ' εἰσὶν ἐν μούσαις ἀεὶ*. We see from Plato, Gorgias 484 C-D, with how much favour those who studied the laws were commonly regarded, and how much was thought to be lost by persons who continued to study philosophy after they had attained a certain age, and were thus led to neglect the study of the laws.

ὥσπερ ῥήτορα. Cp. Antiphanes, Σαπφώ Fragm. 1 (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 3. 112)—

*πῶς γὰρ γένοιτ' ἄν, ὦ πάτερ, ῥήτωρ * **

ἄφωτος, ἦν μὴ ἀλφ' τρις παρανόμων;

10. *κατὰ δύναμιν κρείττους*. Contrast *τὸ βέλτιον κατ' ἀρετὴν*, 21. *κατὰ δύναμιν* is added because *κρείττων* is sometimes (e. g. in c. 5. 1254 b 14) used in the sense of better. It is, on the other hand, distinguished from *βελτίων* in 3. 13. 1283 a 41.

11. *καὶ τῶν σοφῶν*. As Sus. points out (Qu. Crit. p. 344), not all of those included under the designation *οἱ ἐν τοῖς νόμοις* (8) would deserve to be called *σοφοί*. *Σοφοί* are constantly contrasted with *οἱ πολλοί* by Aristotle: philosophers are not perhaps exclusively referred to here, but rather 'accomplished men' generally; even poets would be *σοφοί*, and it is just possible that there is a reference to Pindar (see note on 1255 a 18). It is still more likely that Aristotle remembers the saying of Heraclitus (Fragm. 44, ed. Bywater)—*πόλεμος πάντων μὲν πατήρ ἐστι πάντων δὲ βασιλεὺς, καὶ τοὺς μὲν θεοὺς ἔδειξε τοὺς δὲ ἀνθρώπους, τοὺς μὲν δούλους ἐποίησε τοὺς δὲ ἐλευθέρους*. So we learn (Plato, Laws 776 C), that there were those who pronounced the Helot slavery of the Lacedaemonian State (*ἡ Λακεδαιμονίων ἐλωτεία*), which confessedly originated in conquest, to be *εὖ γεγονῶτα*.

13. *ἐπαλλάττειν*. The following are some of the more prominent uses of this word in the writings of Aristotle. It is used by him (1) of things adjusted to each other, fitting into each other,

dove-tailing—e. g. of teeth that fill each other's intervals, de Part. An. 3. 1. 661 b 21, *ἐναλλάξ ἐμπίπτουσιν (οἱ ὀδόντες), ὅπως μὴ ἀμβλύωνται τριβόμενοι πρὸς ἀλλήλους*, or of two bodies adjusted to one another, de Gen. An. 1. 14. 720 b 10: (2) of two things joined so as to be one, e. g. of hybrid constitutions, Pol. 8 (6). 1. 1317 a 2, where *ἐπαλλάττειν* is used in connexion with *συναγωγαί, συνδυάζεσθαι* (so in Plato, Soph. 240 C, *ἐπαλλαγίς* seems used in a similar sense to *συμπλοκή*): (3) of two or more things united not by joining, but by the possession of a common feature or a common standing-ground, and yet different—things which overlap, or shade off into each other, or are *σύνεγγυς* to each other. So of a thing which unites attributes of two genera, and in which accordingly these two genera overlap—e. g. the pig, which is both *πολυτόκον* and yet *τελειοτοκοῦν* (de Gen. An. 4. 6. 774 b 17, *μόνον δὲ πολυτόκον ὃν ἢ ὡς τελειοτοκεῖ, καὶ ἐπαλλάττει τοῦτο μόνον*)—or of a thing which possesses many of the attributes of a genus to which it does not belong, as the seal does of fishes (Hist. An. 2. 1. 501 a 21, *ἣ δὲ φάκη καρχαρόδουν ἐστὶ πᾶσι τοῖς ὀδοῦσιν ὡς ἐπαλλάττουσα τῷ γένει τῶν ἰχθύων*). So here the arguments of those who plead that good-will is a test of just rule and of those who plead that Force by itself without the presence of good-will confers the right to rule are said *ἐπαλλάττειν*—i. e. to overlap each other (Mr. Heitland, Notes p. 11) and to approach each other—because both start from a common principle though they draw contrary deductions from it. The antithesis to *ἐπαλλάττειν* comes in *διαστάντων χωρὶς τούτων τῶν λόγων* 19, where the *λόγοι* are supposed to draw apart, and no longer to overlap or occupy common ground: cp. *κεχώρισται* in *Περὶ μακροβιότητος καὶ βραχυβιότητος*, 1. 464 b 27, *ἣ κεχώρισται καὶ τὸ βραχύβιον καὶ τὸ νοσῶδες, ἣ κατ' ἐνίας μὲν νόσους ἐπαλλάττει τὰ νοσώδη τὴν φύσιν σώματα τοῖς βραχυβίοις, κατ' ἐνίας δ' οὐδὲν κωλύει νοσώδεις εἶναι μακροβίους ζῆτας*. With the use of *ἐπαλλάττειν* in the passage before us compare its use in Pol. 1. 9. 1257 b 35, where differing uses of the same thing are said *ἐπαλλάττειν*, or to be *σύνεγγυς*, because they differ only in not being *κατὰ ταύτῃν*, and are otherwise identical and of the same thing.

τρόπον τινὰ is used in opposition to *κυρίως* in de Gen. et Corr. 1. 4. 320 a 2 sqq. (Bon. Ind. 772 b 22) and to *ἀπλῶς* in Metaph. Θ. 6. 1048 a 29. Is the meaning this, that it is the tendency of Virtue to win willing compliance (Xen. Mem. 1. 2. 10), but that incidentally, when provided with the requisite external means, it has the power of using force with surpassing effect? Cp. Plato, Polit. 294 A, *τρόπον μέντοι τινὰ δηλὸν ὅτι τῆς βασιλικῆς ἐστὶν ἡ νομοθετικὴ· τὸ δ' ἄριστον*

οὐ τοὺς νόμους ἐστὶν ἰσχύειν, ἀλλ' ἄνδρα τὸν μετὰ φρονήσεως βασιλικόν, and Pol. 1. 8. 1256 b 23, διὸ καὶ ἡ πολεμικὴ φύσει κτητικὴ πως ἔσται. Whatever may be the exact meaning of τὸν here, it seems, like our phrase 'in a way,' to soften and limit the assertion made, as in de An. 3. 5. 430 a 16, τρόπον γὰρ τινα καὶ τὸ φῶς ποιεῖ τὰ δυνάμει ὄντα χρώματα ἐνεργείᾳ χρώματα. For the thought conveyed in this sentence, cp. Solon, Fragm. 36 (Bergk)—

ταῦτα μὲν κράτει,
 ὁμοῦ βίην τε καὶ δίκην συναρμόσας,
 ἔρξα:

Aeschyl. Fragm. 372 (Nauck)—

ἔπου γὰρ ἰσχύς συζυγῶσι καὶ δίκη,
 ποία ξυνοῖς τῶνδε καρτερωτέρα;

Aristot. Rhet. 2. 5. 1382 a 35, καὶ ἀρετὴ ὑβριζομένη δύναμιν ἔχουσα (is to be dreaded)· δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι προαιρεῖται μὲν, ὅταν ὑβρίζηται, αἰεὶ, δύναται δὲ νῦν: Eth. Nic. 10. 8. 1178 a 32: Pol. 7 (5). 10. 1312 a 17, μάλιστα δὲ διὰ ταύτην τὴν αἰτίαν ἐγχειροῦσιν οἱ τὴν φύσιν μὲν θρασεῖς, τιμὴν δὲ ἔχοντες πολεμικὴν παρὰ τοῖς μονάρχοις· ἀνδρία γὰρ δύναμιν ἔχουσα θράσος ἐστίν, δι' ἧς ἀμφοτέρως, ὡς ῥαδίως κρατήσונτες, ποιοῦνται τὰς ἐπιβίσεις. Perhaps also Eth. Nic. 10. 10. 1180 a 21, ὁ δὲ νόμος ἀναγκαστικὴν ἔχει δύναμιν, λόγος ὡν ἀπὸ τιως φρονήσεως καὶ νοῦ should be compared. Giph. (p. 68) compares Plutarch, Dion c. 1, δαί φρονήσει καὶ δικαιοσύνῃ δύναμιν ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ τύχην συνελθεῖν, ἵνα καλλὸς ἅμα καὶ μέγεθος αἱ πολιτικαὶ πράξεις λάβωσιν.

14. καὶ βιάζεσθαι, 'to compel by force as well as to conciliate': cp. Isocr. Philip. § 15, καὶ πλοῦτον καὶ δύναμιν κεκτημένον δσπν οὐδεὶς τῶν Ἑλλήνων, ἃ μόνᾳ τῶν ὄντων καὶ πείθειν καὶ βιάζεσθαι πέφυκεν—a passage which exhibits the contrast of πείθειν and βιάζεσθαι, and one which Aristotle may possibly intend here tacitly, as is his wont, to correct.

15. ἀγαθοῦ τινός. Cp. 1. 1. 1252 a 2, and 3. 9. 1280 a 9, where δικάων τι is contrasted with τὸ κυρίως δίκαιον. As the ἀγαθόν τι which Force implies may be quite other than ἀρετὴ (cp. Rhet. 1. 1. 1355 b 4 sq., where τὰ χρησιμώτατα τῶν ἀγαθῶν, such as physical strength, health, etc., are contrasted with ἀρετὴ), the inference that Force is not without Virtue is incorrect. This appears also from Pol. 3. 10. 1281 a 21—28, where Force is conceived separate from Virtue: cp. 3. 12. 1282 b 23 sqq. Eth. Nic. 4. 8. 1124 a 20—31, again, throws light on the passage before us: men claim respect from others on the strength of any good, κατ' ἀλήθειαν δ' ὁ ἀγαθὸς μόνος τιμητέος.

16. μὴ ἄνευ ἀρετῆς εἶναι τὴν βίαν. It will be observed that the inference drawn is that Force is not without Virtue, which does not

necessarily imply that the possessor of superior force is superior in virtue.

ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ δικαίου κ.τ.λ. Cp. Eth. Nic. 5. 10. 1135 b 27, *ἐτι δὲ οὐδὲ περὶ τοῦ γενέσθαι ἢ μὴ ἀμφισβητεῖται, ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ δικαίου*, and 31, *ὁμολογοῦντες περὶ τοῦ πράγματος, περὶ τοῦ ποτέρως δίκαιον ἀμφισβητοῦσιν*: also Pol. 6 (4). 16. 1300 b 26, *ὅσα ὁμολογεῖται μὲν, ἀμφισβητεῖται δὲ περὶ τοῦ δικαίου*. Here it is conceded on both sides that 'force is not without virtue,' and the only subject of dispute is, whether it is just for force to enslave not only the willing but also the unwilling.

17. διὰ γὰρ τοῦτο κ.τ.λ. Διὰ τοῦτο appears to refer to *ὅτι* 13—*βίαν* 16, and especially to *ὥστε δοκεῖν μὴ ἄνευ ἀρετῆς εἶναι τὴν βίαν*. One side argues from this, that, force being accompanied by virtue, and virtue attracting good-will, slavery is just only where there is good-will between master and slave, and that consequently the indiscriminate enslavement of those conquered in war is unjust; the other side argues that as force implies virtue, wherever there is the force to enslave, there is the right to enslave. For the power which virtue has of attracting good-will, cp. Eth. Nic. 9. 5. 1167 a 18, *ὅλως δ' ἡ εὖνοια δι' ἀρετὴν καὶ ἐπιεικειάν τινα γίνεται, ὅταν τῷ φανῇ καλὸς τις ἢ ἀνδρείος ἢ τι τοιοῦτον, καθάπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀγωνιστῶν εἴπομεν*: Eth. Eud. 7. 1. 1234 b 22, *τῆς τε γὰρ πολιτικῆς ἔργον εἶναι δοκεῖ μάλιστα ποιῆσαι φιλίαν, καὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν διὰ τοῦτο φασιν εἶναι χρήσιμον· οὐ γὰρ ἐνδέχεται φίλους ἑαυτοῖς εἶναι τοὺς ἀδικουμένους ὑπ' ἀλλήλων*: Xen. Mem. 3. 3. 9, *ἐν παντὶ πράγματι οἱ ἀνθρώποι τοῦτοις μάλιστα ἐθέλουσι πείθεσθαι, οὓς ἂν ἡγῶνται βελτίστους εἶναι*. Those who argued against slavery unaccompanied by good-will between master and slave were probably among those who glorified rule over willing subjects, in contradistinction to rule over unwilling subjects. We trace the idea in Gorgias' praise of rhetoric as the best of all arts—*πάντα γὰρ ὑφ' αὐτῇ δούλα δι' ἐκόντων ἀλλ' οὐ διὰ βίας ποιοῖτο* (Plato, Phileb. 58 A-B). The doctrine was perhaps originally Pythagorean: cp. Aristox. Fragm. 18 (Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 2. 278), *περὶ δὲ ἀρχόντων καὶ ἀρχομένων οὕτως ἐφρόνουν· τοὺς μὲν γὰρ ἀρχοντας ἔφασκον οὐ μόνον ἐπιστήμονας, ἀλλὰ καὶ φιλανθρώπους δεῖν εἶναι, καὶ τοὺς ἀρχομένους οὐ μόνον πειθηνίους, ἀλλὰ καὶ φιλάρχοντας*, and Cic. de Legibus 3. 2. 5, *nec vero solum ut obtemperant obediuntque magistratibus, sed etiam ut eos colant diligantque praescribimus, ut Charondas in suis facit legibus* (which shows that what passed for the laws of Charondas in Cicero's day or in that of the authority he here follows had a Pythagorean tinge). Compare also an oracle quoted by Porphyry, de Abstinencia 2. 9 (Bernays, Theophrastos über Frömmigkeit, p. 59):—

οὐ σε θέμις κτείνειν δίκην γένος ἐστὶ βέβαιον [βιαιῶς Valentinus],
 ἔγγονε θειοπρόπων· δ' δ' ἐκούσιον ἂν καταλεύσῃ
 χέρνιβ' ἔπει, θύειν τόδ', Ἐπίσκοπε, φημι δικάως.

Xenophon is especially full of the idea that a ruler should rule so as to win willing obedience from the ruled and so as to make them *εὐνοῦς* to him (see e.g. Mem. 1. 2. 10: Cyrop. 3. 1. 28: 8. 2. 4). One of the *γνώμαι μονόστιχοι* ascribed to Menander (116) runs—*Δούλος πεφυκὸς εὐνοίῃ τῷ δεσπότῃ*: cp. also the words of the attendant in Eurip. *Androm.* 58 (quoted by Camerarius, p. 42)—

εὐνοὺς δὲ καὶ σοὶ ζῶντί τ' ἦν τῷ σῷ πάσει,

and Plutarch, *Cato Censor*, c. 20, where we read of Cato's wife—*πολλάκις δὲ καὶ τὰ τῶν δούλων παιδάρια τῷ μαστῷ προσιεμένη κατεσκεύαζεν εὐνοίαν ἐκ τῆς συντροφίας πρὸς τὸν υἱόν*. But the ruler, it would seem, should also feel *εὐνοία* for the ruled: cp. Democrit. *Fragm.* Mor. 246 (Mullach, *Fragm. Philos. Gr.* 1. 356), *τὸν ἀρχοντα δεῖ ἔχειν πρὸς μὲν τοὺς καιροὺς λογισμόν, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ἐναντίους τὸλμαν, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ὑποταταγμένους εὐνοίαν*: Plutarch, *Reip. Gerend.* Praecepta, c. 28. 820 F–821 B (where *εὐνοία* is used both of the ruler and the ruled): and Dio Chrysost. *Or.* 2. 97 R, where it is implied that the king, unlike the *τύραννος*, *ἀρχει τῶν ὁμοφύλων μετ' εὐνοίας καὶ κηδεμονίας*. Aristotle holds that not merely good-will but friendship (c. 6. 1255 b 13) will exist between the natural slave and his natural master, but, unlike these inquirers, he rests natural slavery, not on the existence of mutual good-will, but on the existence of a certain immense disparity of excellence between master and slave. (It is some years since, in writing this commentary, I was led to take the view I have here taken of the meaning of *εὐνοία* in this passage, and I am glad to find from a note of Mr. Jackson's (*Trans. Camb. Philol. Soc.* vol. ii. p. 115) that he has independently arrived at a nearly similar conclusion. Sepulveda, in his note on 'Quibusdam benevolentia ius esse videtur' (p. 12 b), long ago explained *εὐνοία* of the good-will of the ruled to their rulers and their willing consent to be ruled, but this escaped my notice till recently. See also Giphanius' note, p. 68 sq.).

18. αὐτό, 'by itself,' without any addition of good-will; cp. 3. 6. 1278 b 24, *συνέρχονται δὲ καὶ τοῦ ζῆν ἕνεκεν αὐτοῦ* (as contrasted with τὸ ζῆν καλῶς): 1. 9. 1257 a 25, *αὐτὰ γὰρ τὰ χρήσιμα πρὸς αὐτὰ καταλλάττονται, ἐπὶ πλείον δ' οὐδέν*. Pindar had implied that the rule of the stronger (Plato, *Laws* 690 B) and of *βία* (ibid. 714 E: cp. *Gorg.* 484 B) is in accordance with nature, but is reprov'd for this by Plato (*Laws* 690 C). A confusion or identification of the stronger and the better, as Socrates remarks (*Gorg.* 488 B–D), pervades

the address of Callicles in that dialogue (see esp. Gorg. 483 D). It is, in Aristotle's view, from a confusion of this very kind that the doctrines of the advocates of Force derive whatever plausibility they possess. Athens had already, according to Isocrates, learnt that Might is not Right: cp. Isocr. De Pace, § 69, *ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐ δίκαιόν ἐστι τοὺς κρείττους τῶν ἡττόνων ἄρχειν, ἐν ἐκείνοις τε τοῖς χρόνοις τυγχάνομεν ἐγνωκότες, καὶ νῦν ἐπὶ τῆς πολιτείας τῆς παρ' ἡμῶν καθεστηκυίας.*

19. *ἐπεὶ . . . γε*, as in 1254 b 34 (see note), confirms what has been said by introducing a supposition of the contrary: here it confirms *διὰ τοῦτο*: 'it is owing to the fact that the disputants start from a common principle—the principle that Force is conjoined with Virtue—that a contention between them is possible; for suppose Force and Good-will claimed respectively to be the basis of just slavery, without resting their claims on Virtue, no conflict of opinion would arise; the two claimants would neither of them have a case.' *Ἀτεροὶ λόγοι*, 20, I take to be the line of argument which the two contending parties would have to adopt, if they ceased to shelter their claims under the claims of virtue, and argued in effect that not superiority in virtue, but something else (force or good-will) confers the right to rule. If these words meant 'the one of the two views,' one would rather expect *ἄτερος λόγος*.

διαστάντων . . . χωρὶς τούτων τῶν λόγων, 'severed from the ground which they occupy in common and set opposite the one to the other' (for *χωρὶς* seems to mean 'apart from each other,' not 'apart from other arguments'), or, in other words, no longer 'overlapping' (*ἐπαλλαττόντων*): cp. *περὶ μακροβιότητος*, 1. 464 b 27, where *κεχώρισται* is used in opposition to *ἐπαλλάττει*, and Pol. 8 (6). 7. 1321 a 15, where *διαστῶσι* is opposed to *συνδύζεσθαι*, a word used to explain *ἐπαλλάττειν* in Pol. 8 (6). 1. 1317 a 1.

21. *ὅλως* seems to qualify *δικαίαν* in contrast to *δικαίον τυρός*: cp. 3. 9. 1280 a 21, *ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ διὰ τὸ λέγειν μέχρι τυρός ἐκατέρους δίκαιόν τι νομίζουσι δίκαιον λέγειν ἀπλῶς· οἱ μὲν γὰρ, ἂν κατὰ τι ἄνισοι ᾖσιν, οἷον χρήμασιν, ὅλως οἰόνται ἄνισοι εἶναι*, and 3. 9. 1280 a 9, where *δικαίον τι* is contrasted with *τὸ κυρίως δίκαιον*. Resting on a ground of right (for such the law in question is: cp. Eth. Nic. 5. 3. 1129 b 12, and Pindar, Fragm. 146 (Bergk), quoted by Plato, Gorg. 484 B, Laws 714 E), not on *τὸ ὅλως δίκαιον*, they argue that slavery in war is universally just, but they contradict themselves in the same breath. *Ὅλως* seems to be placed where it is for the sake of emphasis: for the distance at which it stands from *δικαίαν*, cp. 2. 2. 1261 a 15, where *τὴν πόλιν* is similarly severed from *πάσαν*, if we adopt the reading of Π¹, and see below on 1265 b 15.

26. τοὺς εὐγενεστάτους. *Εὐγένεια* was commonly viewed as akin to *ελευθερία* and a kind of superlative degree of it (3. 13. 1283 a 33 sq.). Hence the transition here and in 32 from the one to the other.

28. αὐτοὺς, i.e. Greeks. It is the way with people to do to others what they would not think of allowing to be done to themselves (4 (7). 2. 1324 b 32 sqq.).

32. τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον κ.τ.λ. It is interesting to learn from Aristot. *Fragm.* 82. 1490 a 10 sqq., that the sophist Lycophron had challenged the reality of the distinction between the noble and the ill-born, for the ideas of freedom and nobility lay so close together in the Greek mind, that he or some other sophist may well have gone on to challenge the justifiability of slavery.

34. τοὺς δὲ βαρβάρους οἴκοι μόνον. Cp. Theophrast. *Charact.* 31 (Tauchnitz), ἡ μέντοι μήτηρ εὐγενὴς Θράττα ἐστὶ τὰς δὲ τοιαύτας φασὶν ἐν τῇ πατρίδι εὐγενεῖς εἶναι, and contrast the saying which Menander puts in the mouth of one of his characters (*Inc. Fab. Fragm.* 4: Meineke, *Fragm. Com. Gr.* 4. 229):—

ὅς ἂν εὖ γεγονὼς ἢ τῇ φύσει πρὸς τὰγαθά,

κὰν Αἰθίοψ ἢ, μήτηρ, ἐστὶν εὐγενής·

Σκύθης τις ὄλεθρος; ὁ δ' Ἀνάχαρσις οὐ Σκύθης;

See also Dio Chrysost. *Or.* 15. 451 R. Isocrates, on the other hand, bluntly refers to the *δυσγένεια* of the Triballi (*De Pace*, § 50). The contrast between τὸ ἀπλῶς εὐγενές and τὸ ἐν τοῖς βαρβάροις which the view mentioned by Aristotle implies reminds us of the contrast between natural society and society among the barbarians, which is implied in 1. 2. 1252 a 34—b 6. In 3. 13. 1283 a 35, however, we have ἡ δ' εὐγένεια παρ' ἐκάστοις οἴκοι τίμιος, where no difference is made between barbarians and Greeks.

36. καὶ is commonly used when an example is adduced: cp. 1. 12. 1259 b 8, ὥσπερ καὶ Ἄμασις.

39. ἀρετῇ καὶ κακίᾳ. A remark of the great Eratosthenes is referred to by Strabo (p. 66) thus: ἐπὶ τέλει δὲ τοῦ ὑπομνήματος (ὁ Ἐρατοσθένης) οὐκ ἐπαινέσας τοὺς δίχα διαιροῦντας ἅπαν τὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων πλῆθος εἰς τε Ἕλληνας καὶ βαρβάρους, καὶ τοὺς Ἀλεξάνδρῳ παρανοοῦντας τοῖς μὲν Ἕλλησιν ὡς φίλοις χρῆσθαι, τοῖς δὲ βαρβάροις ὡς πολεμίοις, βέλτιον εἶναι φησιν ἀρετῇ καὶ κακίᾳ διαιρεῖν ταῦτα. This may possibly be a comment on some communication of Aristotle's to Alexander (cp. Plutarch, *de Fort. Alexandri* 1. 6); but Isocrates had said much the same thing in his address to Philip (§ 154: cp. *Panath.* § 163). Plato had already (*Polit.* 262 D) found fault with the division of mankind into Greeks and barbarians, and the passage of the *Politics*

before us shows that Aristotle is really quite at one with Eratosthenes. The fragment of Menander quoted above is in the same spirit. Cp. also Menand. *Ἡρώς*, Fragm. 2 (Meineke, Fragm. Com. Gr. 4. 128),

Ἐχρῆν γὰρ εἶναι τὸ καλὸν εὐγενέστατον,
τοῦλευθέρον δὲ πανταχοῦ φρονεῖν μέγα.

- 1255 b. 2. ἡ δὲ φύσις κ.τ.λ. Πολλάκις appears to qualify βούλεται, οὐ μέντοι δύναται, which words hang together and mean 'wishes without succeeding.' See Dittenberger, *Gött. Gel. Anz.* Oct. 28, 1874, p. 1371. We find πολλάκις, however, out of its place in 5 (8). 2. 1337 b 20, if we adopt the reading of Π¹, which is probably the correct one, and it may possibly be simply out of its place here. For the thought, cp. de Gen. An. 4. 4. 770 b 3 sqq.: 4. 3. 767 b 5 sq.: Rhet. 2. 15. 1390 b 22-31: Pol. 1. 2. 1252 a 28 sqq.: 2. 3. 1262 a 21 sqq.: 7 (5). 7. 1306 b 28-30: also Eurip. Fragm. 76, 166, 167 (Nauck), and Plato, Rep. 415 A, *ἀτε οὖν ξυγγενεῖς ὄντες πάντες τὸ μὲν πολὺ ὁμοίους ἀν' ὑμῖν αὐτοῖς γεννῶντε.*

4. ἡ ἀμφισβήτησις. Cp. 1255 a 12, 17.

5. καὶ οὐκ εἰσὶν κ.τ.λ. These words have been interpreted in many different ways. Bern. (followed by Sus. and others) takes the meaning to be that 'not all actual slaves and freemen are so by nature': Mr. Congreve translates—'it is true that some are not by nature slaves, others by nature free, if you interpret aright *the some* and *the others* (οἱ μὲν, οἱ δέ).' But does not οἱ μὲν mean 'οἱ ἥττους, as such' (τὸ βιασθέν, 1255 a 11: cp. 1255 b 15, τοῖς κατὰ νόμον καὶ βιασθείσι), and οἱ δὲ 'οἱ κρείττους, as such' (cp. τοῦ βιάσασθαι δυναμένου καὶ κατὰ δύναμιν κρείττονος, 1255 a 9)—unless indeed we prefer to explain οἱ μὲν as meaning 'those who are enslaved by force without deserving it,' and οἱ δὲ 'those who enslave others without possessing the superiority of virtue which makes the natural master'?

6. τῷ μὲν . . . τῷ δέ, neut. (as appears from τὸ μὲν . . . τὸ δέ, 7-8).

9. τὸ δὲ κακῶς, sc. δεσπόζειν: 'but a wrongful exercise of this form of rule is disadvantageous to both,' and then follows (τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ κ.τ.λ.) the reason why both suffer together from a wrongful exercise of it. This is that master and slave stand to each other as whole and part.

11. μέρος τι τοῦ δεσπότου, cp. Eth. Nic. 5. 10. 1134 b 10 sq.

12. διὰ καὶ συμφέρον κ.τ.λ. 'There is something advantageous to both in common,' 'there is a community of interest': cp. 1. 2. 1252 a 34, διὰ δεσπότη καὶ δούλου ταὐτὸ συμφέρει, and Isocr. Epist. 6. 3, μὴ κοινὸν δὲ τοῦ συμφέροντος ὄντος, οὐκ οἶδ' ὅπως ἀν' ἀμφοτέροις

ἀρέσκειν *δυνηθῆναι*. The test of τὸ κοινῇ συμφέρον (= τὸ δίκαιον, 3. 12. 1282 b 17), which is here applied to slavery, is the proper test to apply to any political institution, for τὸ κοινῇ συμφέρον is a condition of πολιτικῇ φιλία (Eth. Nic. 9. 6. 1167 b 2 sqq.), and the end of the political union (Eth. Nic. 8. 11. 1160 a 11). Cp. Plato, Rep. 412 D, καὶ μὴν τοῦτό γ' ἂν μάλιστα φιλοῖ, ὃ συμφέρειν ἡγοῖτο τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ ἑαυτῷ, καὶ ὅταν μάλιστα ἐκείνου μὲν εὖ πράττοντος οἴηται *ξυμβαίνειν* καὶ ἑαυτῷ εὖ πράττειν, μὴ δέ, *τοῦναντίον*. Plato is perhaps thinking of political rule of a despotic kind, rather than of the private relation of master and slave, when he says (Laws 756 E), *δούλοι γὰρ ἂν καὶ δεσπόται οὐκ ἂν ποτε γένοιτο φίλοι*. Aristotle himself, however, finds some difficulty in explaining in Eth. Nic. 8. 13. 1161 a 32 sqq., how friendship is possible between an animate instrument like the slave and his master, there being no *κοινωνία* between them (cp. Pol. 4 (7). 8. 1328 a 28 sqq.), but here, in the First Book of the Politics, no notice is taken of this difficulty: on the contrary, in Pol. 1. 13. 1260 a 39 the slave is termed *κοινωνὸς ζωῆς* (where perhaps *ζωή* and *βίος* should be distinguished). Compare with the passage before us Xen. Cyrop. 8. 7. 13, *τοὺς πιστοὺς τίθεσθαι δεῖ ἕκαστον ἑαυτῷ· ἡ δὲ κτήσις αὐτῶν ἔστιν οὐδαμῶς σὺν τῇ βίῃ, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον σὺν τῇ εὐεργεσίᾳ*.

14. *τούτων*, i. e. *δεσποτείας καὶ δουλείας*. Busse (De praesidiis Aristotelis Politica emendandi, p. 42) compares such phrases as *ἀξιούσθαι τῶν ὁμοίων, τῶν ἴσων* (2. 9. 1269 b 9, etc.).

15. *βιασθεῖσι*. Aristotle has by this time forgotten that his dative plural agrees with *δούλῳ καὶ δεσπότῃ*, and that *βιασθεῖσι*, which suits only with *δούλοις*, should have been replaced by a word which would have applied to *δεσπότῃ* also.

16. *καὶ ἐκ τούτων*. The fact had been already proved (cp. 1252 a C. 7. 17) by tracing the development of *κοινωνία*: it had already been shown that *δεσποτεία* and *πολιτικὴ ἀρχή* belong to different *κοινωνίαι*: now it is shown that both the ruled and the mode of rule differ in the two cases.

17. *ἀλλήλαις*, sc. *ταῦτόν*. With his usual economy of words, Aristotle makes *ταῦτόν* do here, though it fits in somewhat roughly.

18. *ἡ μὲν οἰκονομική*, sc. *ἀρχή*. The household seems to be here viewed as under a *μοναρχία* (the three forms of which are *βασιλεία, τυραννίς, αἰσυμνητεία*, 3. 14. 1285 a 17, 30: 6 (4). 4. 1292 a 18), because, though the rule of the husband over the wife is a *πολιτικὴ ἀρχή* (1. 12. 1259 b 1), the rule of the father over the child is a *βασιλικὴ ἀρχή* (ibid.), and that of the master over the slave is

δεσποτική. Perhaps, however (cp. 3. 6. 1278 b 37 sq., where οἰκονομική ἀρχή is distinguished from δεσποτεία), the relation of master and slave may not be included under οἰκονομική ἀρχή. In that case οἰκονομική ἀρχή will be a rule over free persons, but not over free and equal persons, like πολιτική ἀρχή. It must be remembered that the equals over whom πολιτική ἀρχή is said to be exercised are not necessarily ἴσοι κατ' ἀριθμόν, for they may be only ἴσοι κατ' ἀναλογίαν (Eth. Nic. 5. 10. 1134 a 27).

20. ὁ μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. Φανερόν δέ, 16 . . . ἀρχή, 20, is parenthetical, and μὲν οὖν introduces a reaffirmation of what had been already implied in the definition of master and slave (1255 b 6 sqq.)—that a master is a master by virtue of his nature—in order that a transition may be made to δεσποτική ἐπιστήμη and δουλικὴ ἐπιστήμη, and that these sciences, and especially the former, which Plato and Xenophon and Socrates had set on the level of βασιλική, πολιτική, and οἰκονομική, may be replaced on the humble level which is really theirs. Xenophon had said (Oecon. c. 13. 5), ὅστις γάρ τοι ἀρχικοὺς ἀνθρώπων δύναται ποιεῖν, δηλονότι οὗτος καὶ δεσποτικούς ἀνθρώπων δύναται διδάσκειν ὅστις δὲ δεσποτικούς, δύναται ποιεῖν καὶ βασιλικούς, and again (Oecon. c. 21. 10), ὃν ἂν ἰδόντες [οἱ ἐργάται] κινήθῳσι, καὶ μένος ἐκάστω ἐμπέσῃ τῶν ἐργατῶν καὶ φιλονεικία πρὸς ἀλλήλους καὶ φιλοτιμία κρατίστη οὕσα ἐκάστω, τοῦτον ἐγὼ φαίην ἂν ἔχειν τι ἥθους βασιλικοῦ. This is just what Aristotle wishes to contest here and elsewhere in the First Book of the Politics. His way is to trace everywhere in Nature the contrast of the conditionally necessary (τὸ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ἀναγκαῖον) and the noble (τὸ καλόν), and he makes it his business to distinguish carefully between the two. His work on the Parts of Animals is largely taken up with the inquiry, 'what share Necessity and the Final Cause respectively have in their formation' (see Dr. Ogle's translation, p. xxxv). To mix up the δεσποτικὴ ἐπιστήμη with πολιτικὴ or βασιλική is to lose sight of this contrast. The management of slaves has for him nothing of τὸ καλόν (4 (7). 3. 1325 a 25, οὐδὲν γὰρ τό γε δούλῳ, ἢ δούλῳ, χρῆσθαι σεμνόν· ἢ γὰρ ἐπίταξις ἢ περὶ τῶν ἀναγκαίων οὐδενὸς μετέχει τῶν καλῶν). As to τῷ τοιούτῳ εἶναι, cp. Eth. Nic. 4. 13. 1127 b 15, κατὰ τὴν ἕξιν γὰρ καὶ τῷ τοιούτῳ εἶναι ἀλαζών ἐστιν, and 6. 13. 1143 b 24–28. Aristotle's object is to correct Plato, who had said (Polit. 259 B), ταύτην δὲ (sc. τὴν βασιλικὴν ἐπιστήμην) ὁ κεκτημένος οὐκ, ἂν τε ἄρχων ἂν τε ἰδιώτης ὢν τυγχάνῃ, πάντως κατὰ γὰρ τὴν τέχνην αὐτὴν βασιλικὸς ὀρθῶς προσρηθῆσεται; Δίκαιον γοῦν. Καὶ μὴν οἰκονόμος γὰρ καὶ δεσπότης ταυτὸν. The possession of the science of directing slaves in their work is not of the essence of the master (cp. c. 13. 1260 b 3 sq.), and

therefore he is not defined by it. The master may dispense with such knowledge by employing a steward (35).

25. τοὺς παῖδας, 'the slaves.' Camerarius (Interp. p. 45) aptly refers to the Δουλοδιδάσκαλος of the comic poet Pherecrates. 'Ex ea fabulae parte, in qua ministrandi praecepta servo dabantur, petita suspicor quae leguntur apud Athenaeum, xi. p. 408 b—

νυνὶ δ' ἀπονίζων τὴν κύλικα δὸς ἐμπιῖν
ἔγχει τ' ἐπιθείς τὸν ἡθμόν,

et xv. p. 699 f—

ἀνυσὸν ποτ' ἐξελθὼν, σκότος γὰρ γίγνεται,
καὶ τὸν λυχνοῦχον ἔκφερ' ἐνθείς τὸν λύχνον '

(Meineke, Hist. Crit. Com. Graec. p. 82).

εἴη δ' ἂν κ.τ.λ. We rather expect ὀψοποιῆς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τοιοῦτων γενῶν τῆς διακονίας, but this slight looseness is characteristic. Perhaps with ὀψοποιή we should supply 'might be taught.' The example introduced by οἷον is sometimes put in the nom.—e. g. in 7 (5). 11. 1313 b 12, ἀλλ' εἶναι κατασκόπους, οἷον περὶ Συρακούσας αἱ ποταγωγίδες καλοῦμεναι. It would seem that the teacher at Syracuse confined his instructions to a portion only of the services needful to the household; Aristotle suggests that other and higher kinds of service should also be taught, such as cooking. For ἐπὶ πλείον, see Ast, Lexicon Platon. 3. 113: 'cum v. εἶναι et δύνασθαι est plus valere vel latius patere'—the latter here. Socrates had recognized a right and a wrong in ὀψοποιία (Xen. Mem. 3. 14. 5), but Plato counts ὀψοποιοὶ καὶ μάγειροι among the accompaniments of a φλεγμαίνουσα πόλις (Rep. 373 C): Aristotle's not unfriendly reference to the art in the passage before us illustrates his substitution (4 (7). 5. 1326 b 31: 2. 6. 1265 a 31 sqq.) of σωφρόνως καὶ εὐεθερίως as the ideal standard of living for the Platonic σωφρόνως. He was himself charged by Timaeus the historian and others with being an epicure (see Polyb. 12. 24. 2, where Timaeus is quoted as saying that writers disclose by the matters on which they dwell frequently, what their favourite inclinations are—τὸν δ' Ἀριστοτέλην, ὀφαργύοντα πλεονάκεις ἐν τοῖς συγγραμμάσιν, ὀψοφάγον εἶναι καὶ λίχνον: see also Grote's note, Aristotle 1. 24). Rational ways of living needed to be upheld against the savagery of the Cynics and the asceticism of some other schools. Besides, if the household slave could be taught to cook better, there would be all the less need to have recourse, in accordance with a common Greek practice, to the services of outside professionals. 'With the Macedonian times came in the fashion, continued by the Romans, of having cooks among the slaves of their

household, a custom apparently unknown to the earlier Athenians. . . . The reader will here again notice the curious analogy to the history of medicine, for among the late Greeks, and among the Romans, the household physician was always a slave attached to the family' (Mahaffy, *Social Life in Greece*, p. 287, ed. 1).

27. γὰρ introduces the reason why instruction on these subjects should be extended, as Aristotle suggests.

29. πρὸ, according to Suidas (Meineke, *Fr. Com. Gr.* 4. 17) properly meant ἀντί in this proverb, but Aristotle quotes it in a different sense. Another proverb may be compared (Strabo 8. p. 339):—

ἔστι Πύλος πρὸ Πύλοιο· Πύλος γε μὴν ἔστι καὶ ἄλλος,
or in a slightly varied form (Leutsch and Schneidewin, *Paroemiogr.* Gr. 2. 423):—

ἔστι τόκος πρὸ τόκοιο· τόκος γε μὴν ἔστι καὶ ἄλλος.

32. τοὺς δούλους, yet in 33 δούλοις: see below on 1259 b 21.

33. οὐδὲν μέγα οὐδὲ σεμνόν. Cp. 4 (7). 3. 1325 a 25 sqq.: 3. 4. 1277 a 33 sqq.: and contrast the tone of the *Oeconomicus* of Xenophon, who, as we have already seen (above on 1255 b 20), finds in the direction of farm-work, and the winning of cheerful and vigorous service from slaves, a good school of political and even kingly rule (cc. 13, 21).

36. ἐπίτροπος. For the absence of the article, see Bon. Ind. 109 b 36, and cp. *Eth. Nic.* 1. 4. 1097 a 8, ἀπορον δὲ καὶ τί ὠφελήθησεται ὑφάντης ἢ τέκτων κ.τ.λ. *Vict. compares Magn. Mor.* 1. 35. 1198 b 12 sqq., where φρόνησις is described as ἐπίτροπός τις τῆς σοφίας, for the ἐπίτροπος, though managing everything, οὐπω ἄρχει πάντων, ἀλλὰ παρασκευάζει τῷ δεσπότη σχολήν, ὅπως ἂν ἐκεῖνος μὴ κωλυόμενος ὑπὸ τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἐκκλείηται τοῦ τῶν καλῶν τι καὶ προσηκόντων πράττειν: cp. also the story of Pheraulas and Sacas (*Xen. Cyrop.* 8. 3. 39–50). The ἐπίτροπος would be himself a slave ([*Aristot.*] *Oecon.* 1. 5. 1344 a 25 sq.), though one would think that it would not be easy to find a φύσει δούλος fit for the position. Contrast the tone of this passage with that of *Oecon.* 1. 6. 1345 a 5, ἐπισκεπτόν οὖν τὰ μὲν αὐτὸν (τὸν δεσπότην), τὰ δὲ τὴν γυναῖκα, ὡς ἑκατέροις διαιρεῖται τὰ ἔργα τῆς οἰκονομίας· καὶ τοῦτο ποιητέον ἐν μικραῖς οἰκονομίαις δλιγάκις, ἐν δ' ἐπιτροπευομέναις πολλάκις κ.τ.λ. This is more in Xenophon's tone. For a similar contrast between the teaching of this book of the *Politics* and the so-called First Book of the *Oeconomicus*, see note on 1256 a 11.

37. ἡ δὲ κτητική, sc. δούλων, takes up ἐν τῷ κτᾶσθαι, 32.

ἀμφοτέρων τούτων, i. e. δεσποτική and δουλική ἐπιστήμη.

38. οἶον here, as Bonitz points out (Ind. 502 a 7 sqq.), is explanatory (= 'nempe, nimirum, scilicet'), as in 3. 13. 1283 b 1 and other passages, rather than illustrative by instance or comparison.

ἡ δικάια. Cp. 1. 8. 1256 b 23 sq. and Isocr. Panath. § 163: also 4 (7). 14. 1333 b 38—1334 a 2. The just and natural way of acquiring slaves is by raids of a hunting or campaigning type on φύσει δούλοι. Πολεμική τις οὖσα ἡ θηρευτική is added in explanation of ἐτέρα ἀμφοτέρων τούτων, and to show that this science is neither identical with δουλική nor with δεσποτική ἐπιστήμη. Being allied to war and the chase, it is more worthy of a freeman than the other two.

1. χρηματιστικῆς. This word is of frequent occurrence in cc. C. 8. 8—10, and also in c. 11, and the sense in which it is used varies 1256 a. greatly. Taking cc. 8—10 first, we shall find that, apart from passages in which the word is used in an indeterminate sense (such as 1256 a 1, 1257 b 5, 9, 18), it is used

(1) like κτητική (1256 b 27, 40), in a sense inclusive of both the sound and the unsound form (1257 a 17, b 2, 36, 1258 a 6, 37):

(2) of the unsound form (1257 a 29, 1258 a 8), which is also designated ἡ μάλιστα χρηματιστική (1256 b 40 sq.), ἡ καπηλική χρηματιστική (1257 b 20), ἡ μὴ ἀναγκαία χρηματιστική (1258 a 14), ἡ μεταβλητική χρηματιστική (1258 b 1):

(3) of the sound form (1258 a 20, 28), which is also designated χρηματιστική κατὰ φύσιν (1257 b 19), οἰκονομική χρηματιστική (1257 b 20), ἡ ἀναγκαία χρηματιστική (1258 a 16).

In c. 11, on the other hand, ἡ χρηματιστική is made to include not two forms, but three (1258 b 12 sqq.), and these three forms are—A. ἡ οἰκειοτάτη χρηματιστική (1258 b 20), referred to as ἡ κατὰ φύσιν in 1258 b 28: B. ἡ μεταβλητική χρηματιστική (1258 b 21): C. a kind midway between the two (1258 b 27 sq.). In τοῖς τιμῶσι τὴν χρηματιστικὴν (c. 11. 1259 a 5) the word seems to be used in an unfavourable sense.

2. κατὰ τὸν ὑφηγημένον τρόπον. Cp. c. 1. 1252 a 17, τὴν ὑφηγημένην μέθοδον. Either the transition from the slave (the part) to κτήσις (the whole) is here said to be in conformity with Aristotle's accustomed mode of inquiry, or the plan is foreshadowed by which the nature of κτήσις and χρηματιστική is ascertained through an analysis of them into their parts (cp. 1256 a 16, ἡ δὲ κτήσις πολλὰ περιελήφε μέρη καὶ ὁ πλοῦτος), or again the meaning may be that Aristotle will continue to follow τὰ πράγματα φύόμενα, as he in fact does in the sequel. Probably the first of these interpretations is the correct one.

6. ἀνδριαντοποιία. The ἀνδριαντοποιός would appear to be properly a worker in bronze: cp. Eth. Nic. 6. 7. 1141 a 10, Φειδίαν λιθουργὸν σοφὸν καὶ Πολύκλειτον ἀνδριαντοποιόν.

8. τὸ ὑποκείμενον. Cp. de Gen. An. 1. 18. 724 b 3, ἕτερόν τι διὲ ὑποκείσθαι ἐξ οὗ ἔσται πρῶτον ἐνυπάρχοντος (thus it is explained by πάσ-χον in 724 b 6): de Gen. et Corr. 1. 4. 320 a 2, ἔστι δὲ ὕλη μάλιστα μὲν καὶ κυρίως τὸ ὑποκείμενον γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς δεκτικόν, τρόπον δέ τινα καὶ τὸ ταῖς ἄλλαις μεταβολαῖς, ὅτι πάντα δεκτικὰ τὰ ὑποκείμενα ἐναντιώσεων τινων. But the term is not confined in its application to Matter: cp. Metaph. Z. 13. 1038 b 4, περὶ τοῦ ὑποκειμένου, ὅτι διχῶς ὑπόκειται, ἢ τότε τι ὄν, ὥσπερ τὸ ζῶον τοῖς πάθεσιν, ἢ ὡς ἡ ὕλη τῇ ἐντελεχείᾳ.

10. χαλκόν. Some MSS. have χαλκός (for the nom. in sentences introduced by οἶον, see above on 1255 b 25).

11. τῆς μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Contrast Oecon. 1. 1. 1343 a 8, ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τῆς οἰκονομικῆς ἂν εἴη καὶ κτήσασθαι οἶκον καὶ χρήσασθαι αὐτῷ: Eth. Nic. 1. 1. 1094 a 9, οἰκονομικῆς δὲ (τέλος) πλοῦτος: and indeed Pol. 3. 4. 1277 b 24, ἐπεὶ καὶ οἰκονομία ἐτέρα ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυναικός: τοῦ μὲν γὰρ κτᾶσθαι, τῆς δὲ φυλάττειν ἔργον ἐστίν, which agrees with Oecon. 1. 3. 1344 a 2. Probably in these passages of the Nicomachean Ethics and the Politics οἰκονομία as it actually is, not as it ought to be, is in view. For Aristotle seems not only here but elsewhere to make 'using' the proper business of οἰκονομία (see c. 7. 1255 b 31 sq.: c. 10. 1258 a 21 sq.: 3. 4. 1277 a 35: Sus.², Note 68).

13. τοῖς κατὰ τὴν οἰκίαν, 'household things' (Mr. Welldon): cp. 5 (8). 6. 1340 b 27, ἣν διδῶσι τοῖς παιδίοις, ὅπως χρώμενοι ταύτῃ μηδὲν καταγνώσι τῶν κατὰ τὴν οἰκίαν: 1. 10. 1258 a 29, τοὺς κατὰ τὴν οἰκίαν.

14. ἐστί, sc. ἡ χρηματιστική. The change of subject strikes us as strange, but a similar one occurs in Metaph. Γ. 2. 1004 b 22-25, περὶ μὲν γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ γένος στρέφεται ἡ σοφιστική καὶ ἡ διαλεκτική τῇ φιλοσοφίᾳ, ἀλλὰ διαφέρει τῆς μὲν τῷ τρόπῳ τῆς δυνάμεως, τῆς δὲ τοῦ βίου τῇ προαιρέσει. Aristotle reverts to the nominative with which he started (3-4) on his inquiry.

15. εἰ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Vahlen, in his note on Poet. 6. 1450 b 18, holds that εἰ γὰρ is here used in the same sense as in Rhet. 3. 17. 1418 a 35, where he reads with the best MS. λέγων (not λέγει, as Bekker). The meaning will then be—'for this is so' (i.e. 'a dispute may arise on this subject'), 'if, for example,' etc. He therefore places a comma only after διαμφισβήτησιν. (For Susemihl's view see Sus.³ and Qu. Crit. p. 350 sq.) But the passage resembles so closely other passages in Aristotle introduced by εἰ, in which a kind of apodosis begins with ὥστε, that it seems better to interpret εἰ γὰρ as commencing a new sentence, and to place a colon or full stop after διαμφισβήτησιν.

The following passages will serve as illustrations—Metaph. I. 4. 1055 a 22, *ὅπως τε εἰ ἔστιν ἡ ἐναντιότης διαφορά, ἡ δὲ διαφορά δυοῖν, ὥστε καὶ ἡ τέλειος*: Phys. 6. 1. 232 a 12, *εἰ οὖν ἀνάγκη ἡ ἡρεμεῖν ἢ κινεῖσθαι πᾶν, ἡρεμεῖ δὲ καθ' ἕκαστον τῶν ΑΒΓ, ὥστ' ἔσται τι συνεχῶς ἡρεμοῦν ἄμα καὶ κινούμενον*. (See Vahlen's note on Poet. 9. 1452 a 10: Bon. Ind. 873 a 31 sqq.: Bonitz, Aristotel. Studien, 3. 106–124. This use of *ὥστε* may have been common in conversational Greek.) Whichever view we take of the passage, the doubt whether *χρηματιστική* is a part of *οἰκονομική*, or something quite different, will be said to arise from the multifariousness of the forms of acquisition falling under *χρηματιστική*. (This is no doubt more neatly expressed, if with Vahlen we take *εἰ γὰρ* as = *εἴπερ*.) It is implied to be easier to imagine *χρηματιστική* a part of *οἰκονομική*, if it comprises agriculture and sound modes of acquisition of the same kind, than if it has to do with less natural modes, exclusively or otherwise. This is quite in harmony with the subsequent course of the inquiry, which results in the two-fold conclusion that agriculture and other similar ways of acquiring necessities do form a part of *χρηματιστική*, and that this part of *χρηματιστική* is a part of *οἰκονομική* (cp. c. 8. 1256 b 26 and 37). To mark off the sound section of *χρηματιστική* from the unsound is, in fact, the first step towards relating *χρηματιστική* to *οἰκονομική*.

17. *πρῶτον*. *Σκεπτόν*, or some such word, is dropped. The omission of words which will readily be supplied is characteristic of Aristotle's style.

19. *καὶ κτήσις* is added, it would seem, because *ἐπιμέλεια* does not clearly convey what is meant by *κτήσις τροφῆς*. What this is, appears from Eth. Nic. 4. 1. 1120 a 8, *χρήσις δ' εἶναι δοκεῖ χρημάτων δαπάνη καὶ δόσις· ἡ δὲ λήψις καὶ ἡ φυλακὴ κτήσις μᾶλλον*. We find *χρημάτων κτήσις* mentioned in Pol. 1. 9. 1257 b 30.

ἀλλὰ μὲν, 'but further there are many kinds of nutriment'—not only many kinds of property (16), but many kinds of nutriment, and articles of subsistence are only one sort of property.

21. *ὥστε κ.τ.λ.* Cp. Hist. An. 8. 1. 588 a 17 (referred to by Giph.), *αἱ δὲ πράξεις καὶ οἱ βίοι (τῶν ζώων) κατὰ τὰ ἥθη καὶ τὰς τροφὰς διαφέρουσιν*, and 8. 2. 590 a 13 sqq.

23. *τε γὰρ* is here taken up by *ὁμοίως δὲ καί*, 29, as in 1254 a 9, 2. 9. 1269 a 36 sqq., Hist. An. 8. 1. 588 b 24, etc. See Eucken de Partic. usu, 17–20. The classification here adopted (*ζωοφάγα, καρποφάγα, παμφάγα*) is not probably offered as absolutely exhaustive, for in Hist. An. 8. 6. 595 a 13–17 we find *πονηφάγα* and *ρίζοφάγα* ζῶα distinguished in addition to *καρποφάγα*, and in Hist. An. 1. 1. 488 a

14, in addition to *σαρκοφάγα*, *καρποφάγα*, and *παμφάγα*, we hear of *ιδιότροφα*, οἷον τὸ τῶν μελιττῶν γένος καὶ τὸ τῶν ἀραχνῶν. Bernays understands Aristotle to connect gregariousness with an exclusively vegetable diet, and it certainly is not quite clear how he intends to class omnivorous animals. So far as they are carnivorous, we must suppose that they will be solitary. As to carnivorous animals, cp. Hist. An. 1. 1. 488 a 5, *γαμφώνυχον δ' οὐδὲν ἀγελαῖον*. Vict. remarks—'nam aquilae, si gregatim volarent, longe viserentur, quare aves quibus aluntur se abderent; nunc autem solae, ideoque non conspectae, inopinantes illas capiunt: neque etiam invenirent simul tantos ipsarum greges, ut possent ipsis vesci.' I am informed that 'true as what Aristotle says is upon the whole, still there are many exceptions: e.g. nearly all Canidae, some seals, sand-martins, and some vultures are gregarious and yet carnivorous. Hares and some other rodents are grain-eating but not gregarious.' Fish are often gregarious, yet piscivorous. The carrion-eating condor is 'in a certain degree gregarious' (Darwin, Voyage of the Beagle, p. 183). As to the bearing of the food of animals on the duration of pairing, see Locke, Civil Government, 2. § 79.

26. *πρὸς τὰς ῥαστώνας*, 'ad commoditatem victus' (Bon. Ind. s. v.).

αἵρεσιν is perhaps used here and nowhere else by Aristotle in its simplest sense of 'taking' or 'getting'; it is thus that Bonitz would seem to interpret the word here (Ind. 18 b 38), for he marks off this passage from others in which it bears its usual meaning of 'choice.' Aristotle needed a word applicable at once to *ζῷα*, *καρποί*, etc., and he finds it in *αἵρεσις*. So Vict.: 'Natura tribuit singulis rationem eam, qua commode copioseque vivant, et sumant non magno labore quibus pascantur.' Sepulveda, however, translates—'itaque Natura, prout ratio postulat facile parandi cibum quem genus quodque animantium consecatur, vitas eorum distinxit,' and I do not feel certain that he is wrong (Lamb. 'harum rerum electionem': Giph. 'delectu earum').

τούτων, 'the different kinds of food.'

27. *ἐκάστῳ*, not 'each individual member of the three classes of animals,' but 'each of the species contained in a class' is probably meant.

28. *καὶ αὐτῶν τῶν ζωοφάγων*. Cp. de Part. An. 3. 12. 673 b 16, *τό τε γὰρ ἦπαρ τοῖς μὲν πολυσχιδές ἐστι, τοῖς δὲ μονοφυέστερον, πρῶτον αὐτῶν τῶν ἐναιμῶν καὶ ζωοτόκων ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον καὶ πρὸς ταῦτα καὶ πρὸς ἄλλα διαφέρει τὰ τε τῶν ἰχθύων καὶ τετραπόδων καὶ φοτόκων*.

29. *ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων*. These words apparently answer

to τῶν τε γὰρ θηρίων (see above on 23). If so, we have here a further illustration of the remark made in 21—22, αἱ διαφοραὶ τῆς τροφῆς τοὺς βίους πεποιήκασι διαφέροντας τῶν ζῴων. It would indeed be easy to supply οἱ βίοι πρὸς ἄλληλους διεστᾶσιν from the previous sentence, and the tautology of πολὺ γὰρ διαφέρουσιν κ.τ.λ. is not decisive against this, but there are other cases (as has been pointed out above) in which τε γάρ is answered by ὁμοίως δὲ καί, and irrespectively of this it seems likely that the genitive is of the same kind as in 1253 b 27, or in 6 (4). 13. 1297 b 30, δημοκρατία τε γὰρ οὐ μία τῶν ἀριθμῶν ἐστί καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁμοίως, or in Phys. 8. 8. 263 a 1, καὶ τῶν κινήσεων ἅρα ὡσαύτως: cp. 1256 b 6, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τοὺς ἄλλους. The translation will then be, 'the same thing holds good of men too'—i. e. their mode of life also differs according to the food on which they live. Pastoral nomads live on tame animals (31), hunters on fish or wild birds or beasts, brigands on their booty, whatever it may be, husbandmen on the produce of the soil and the fruits of domesticated plants and trees.

31. οἱ μὲν οὖν ἀργότατοι. Μὲν οὖν (which is taken up by οἱ δ' 35) introduces a confirmation in detail of what has just been said ('saepe usurpatur, ubi notio modo pronunciata amplius explicatur,' Bon. Ind. 540 b 42). For ἀργότατοι, cp. ῥαστώνας 26, and Herodotus' account of the Thracians (5. 6, ἀργὸν εἶναι κάλλιστον [κέκριται], γῆς δὲ ἐργάτην ἀτιμότατον τὸ ζῆν ἀπὸ πολέμου καὶ ληιστύος κάλλιστον). The remark illustrates the effect of men's food on their mode of life. Is there a hint that the nomads live most like the golden race, who are described by Hesiod (Op. et Dies 112 sqq.) as living νόσφιν ἄτερ τε πόνων καὶ δειλίας and ἀκηδέα θυμὸν ἔχοντες (compare the 'table of the sun' among the Ethiopians, Hdt. 3. 18)—most like the infant who simply draws on the stores of nature? It is possible, but it would be rash to assert this. For races are apparently held by Aristotle to take a step in advance, when they exchange the wandering pastoral life for the hard-working life of tillers of the soil (4 (7). 10. 1329 b 14). The leisure of nomad life may be too dearly purchased. On the merits of a pastoral (not nomad) population, see Pol. 8 (6). 4. 1319 a 19 sqq. For the contrast of Aristotle's views as to the natural mode of life with those of Dicaearchus, see vol. i. p. 128, note 2.

32. ἀναγκαίου δὲ κ.τ.λ. Cp. de Part. An. 4. 6. 682 b 6, αὐτῶν δὲ τῶν πτηνῶν ὃν μὲν ἐστὶν ὁ βίος νομαδικὸς καὶ διὰ τὴν τροφήν ἀναγκαῖον ἐκτοπίζειν κ.τ.λ. Their way of moving about is enforced on them; their mode of life is none the less on the whole lazy and effortless, because they cannot avoid changing pastures from time to time.

36. *ληστείας*. In treating *ληστεία* as a form of hunting (like Plato, *Laws* 823 B) and a natural way of acquiring food, Aristotle is not thinking of the pickpocket or highwayman of civilized societies—this kind of *ληστής* is called by him *αισχροκερδής* and *ἀνελεύθερος* (*Eth. Nic.* 4. 3. 1122 a 7) and *ἄδικος* (*Eth. Nic.* 5. 10. 1134 a 19)—but of *ληστεία* as he meets with it in the pages of Homer, or of the wild *ληστικά ἔθνη* mentioned by him in *Pol.* 5 (8). 4. 1338 b 23. The Etruscans were ‘even more pirates than traders’ (Meltzer, *Gesch. der Karthager*, 1. 169), and practised piracy not only in the Western Mediterranean but even in the Adriatic (see Dittenberger, *Sylloge Inscriptionum Graecarum*, vol. i. p. 184) at the very time at which Aristotle was writing. Mr. C. T. Newton (*Contemp. Rev.* Dec. 1876) mentions a bronze plate recording a treaty between two cities of Locris, Oianthe and Chalion, which stipulates that it shall be lawful for the citizens of both States to commit piracy anywhere except within their own or their ally’s harbours. ‘The date of this inscription,’ he adds, ‘is probably not earlier than B.C. 431.’ Cp. also Cic. de Rep. 3. 9. 15: *vitae vero instituta sic distant, ut Cretes et Aetoli latrocinari honestum putent*. The Western Mediterranean was a scene of piracy down, probably, even to the time of Aristotle and later (Meltzer, *Gesch. der Karthager*, 1. 342 sqq.). The Greeks, after all, felt that the robber had something of the warrior about him. Both Plato (*Laws* 845 C) and Xenophon (*de Rep. Lac.* 2. 6 sq.) approve the Spartan tolerance of adroit theft of necessities. Aristotle makes *ληστεία* a kind of hunting, and hunting a kind of war (1256 b 23). We ourselves look back on the Vikings with admiration; yet, as Mr. Burton says (*History of Scotland*, 3. 232), the Vikings ‘got their capital by force.’ It should be noticed, however, that in c. 11 *ληστεία* is passed over in silence, and indeed *θηρευτική* in general. Aristotle apparently regards *λησταί* as plunderers for the sake of subsistence, for in 1256 a 19–b 7 he seems to be concerned with the provision of *τροφή*: he may perhaps also regard them as in the main appropriators of articles of food—grain, cattle, and the like. He does not explain how a brigand or pirate’s mode of life is marked off from others by a difference of nutriment, and it is not clear how it can be called *αὐτόφυτος*.

37. *τοιαύτην*, ‘suitable for fishing’: cp. *τοιαῦτα* 1253 a 24, where the sense is ‘possessed of the power of performing their appointed work’—so here ‘possessed of the power of supplying fish.’ See on *τοιοῦτος* Riddell, *Plato’s Apology*, p. 137.

39. *τῶν ἡμέρων καρπῶν*. Aristotle does not include in his

enumeration those who live on the fruits of wild trees, like the 'acorn-eating Arcadians' (Hdt. 1. 66 : Alcaeus, *Fragm.* 91) of early days, before Demeter and Dionysus had given men corn and wine (Leutsch and Schneidewin, *Paroem. Gr.* 1. 42).

40. *ὅσοι γε αὐτόφυτον κ.τ.λ.* Giph. 'vitae genus quod naturae instinctu agat et actionem habeat naturalem': Bern. 'diejenigen (Lebensweisen), welche auf Ausbeutung von Naturerzeugnissen beruhen': Sus. 'welche eine unmittelbar-natürliche Thätigkeit betreiben.' Vict., however, translates 'vitae quaecunque suam e seque natam culturam habent,' and explains the words in his commentary 'vita quae pariat ipsa vi sua sineque alius auxilio quod alat'; and Liddell and Scott interpret *αὐτόφυτος ἐργασία* here as = *αὐτουργία*, a rendering not far removed from that of Vict., which is probably right—compare such words as *αὐτόποιος* (Soph. O. C. 696), *αὐτοτέλειστος*, *αὐτογένηθος*. The meaning will then be 'lives whose work is self-wrought,' and not achieved with the help, or at the expense, of others, like the life of *ἀλλαγὴ καὶ καπηλεία*. Cp. 1. 10. 1258 a 40, *τῆς δὲ μεταβλητικῆς ψευδομένης δικαίως* (οὐ γὰρ κατὰ φύσιν ἀλλ' ἀπ' ἀλλήλων ἐστίν, *Rhet.* 2. 4. 1381 a 21, *διὸ τοὺς ἐλευθερίους καὶ τοὺς ἀνδρείους τιμῶσι καὶ τοὺς δικαίους τοιοῦτους δ' ὑπολαμβάνουσι τοὺς μὴ ἀφ' ἐτέρων ζῶντας τοιοῦτοι δ' οἱ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐργάζεσθαι, καὶ τούτων οἱ ἀπὸ γεωργίας καὶ τῶν ἄλλων οἱ αὐτουργοὶ μάλιστα*, and [Plut.] *Inst. Lac.* c. 12.

41. *δι' ἀλλαγῆς καὶ καπηλείας*. *Καπηλεία* is perhaps meant to explain and limit *ἀλλαγή*, for *ἀλλαγή* up to a certain point is natural (1257 a 15, 28). Still even the simplest form of *ἀλλαγή* may possibly not deserve the epithet *αὐτόφυτος*.

3. *προσαναπληροῦντες κ.τ.λ.*, 'eking out the shortcomings of one 1256 b. mode of life, where it falls short of completeness of provision, by adding on some other.' The superlative *ἐνδεέστατος* is perhaps used because men may be *ἐνδεεῖς* not only *εἰς τὰναγκαῖα*, as in the case before us, but also *εἰς ὑπεροχὴν ἢ εἰς ἀπόλαυσιν* (*Rhet.* 1. 12. 1372 b 24 sq.); or else it is used here, as elsewhere by Aristotle (see Bon. Ind. 403 a 3 sqq.), in a sense in which the use of the comparative would seem more natural. *Ἡ τυγχάνει κ.τ.λ.* implies that the added mode of life must be one which will supply the deficiencies of the other: thus when brigandage is added to the nomadic life, or hunting to agriculture, it is because brigandage and hunting fill up gaps which the pastoral and agricultural modes of life leave unfilled. Compare Strabo, p. 833. 27 sqq.: Dio Chrysostom's picture (*Or.* 7. 224 R) of the life of the rude Euboean mountaineers, *ζῶμεν δὲ ἀπὸ θήρας ὡς τὸ πολὺ, μικρόν τι τῆς γῆς ἐπεργαζόμενοι*: Diodorus' picture of the Ligurians (5. 39. 3, *κυνή-*

γίας δὲ ποιοῦνται συνεχεῖς, ἐν αἷς πολλὰ τῶν θηρίων χειρούμενοι τὴν ἐκ τῶν καρπῶν σπάνιν διορθοῦνται): and Leyden's of the Border people (Scenes of Infancy):—

'The Scott, to rival realms a mighty bar,
Here fixed his mountain home: a wide domain,
And rich the soil, had purple heath been grain;
But what the niggard soil of wealth denied,
From fields more blessed his fearless arm supplied.'

'The Shetlander is a fisherman who has a farm; the Orkneyman a farmer who has a boat' (Tudor's Orkneys and Shetland, quoted in the *Saturday Review* for July 14, 1883).

4. αὐτάρκης, i. e. ἐν τοῖς ἀναγκαίοις (cp. 4 (7). 4. 1326 b 4), which is a very different thing from αὐτάρκεια τοῦ εἶδ (ζῆν (3. 9. 1280 b 34).

6. συναναγκάζη. Bernays: 'wie das Bedürfniss zum Verbinden verschiedener Lebensweisen treibt' (compels them to combine different modes of life). But if we look back to 1256 a 27, we shall see that it is taste (τὸ ἡδύ) that leads men to select this or that mode of life, though necessity may force them to eke it out with some other: will not the meaning therefore be—'as necessity in conjunction with taste may compel'? Cp. Rhet. 2. 7. 1385 b 2, where it is pointed out that a service may be explained away by the plea that those who rendered it did not render it out of kindness alone, but were in part compelled (συναναγκάσθησαν): [Demosth.] adv. Aristog. 2. c. 10, ἡ προαιρουμένους ἢ συναναγκαζομένους: and Xen. Hiero 3. 9.

7. τοιαύτη, that which is necessary for sustenance, and which is αὐτόφωτος. Cp. Eth. Nic. 3. 13. 1118 b 18, ἀναπλήρωσις γὰρ τῆς ἐνδείας ἡ φυσικὴ ἐπιθυμία.

8. φαίνεται διδομένη, 'is evidently given.'

πᾶσιν, here not 'all human beings' (as in 1253 a 30), but 'all animals.'

9. κατὰ τὴν πρώτην γένεσιν. We have the proof of this in 10-15, and of τελειωθείσιν in 15-20, as Prof. Jowett has already remarked. The expression κατὰ τὴν πρώτην ἐν τῇ μητρὶ γένεσιν occurs in Eth. Eud. 1. 5. 1216 a 7.

11. τοσαύτην . . . ὥς. Eucken (de Partic. usu, p. 51-52) finds in Aristotle's writings only one other instance of this use of ὥς—Pol. 7 (5). 5. 1305 a 32. He adds—'paullo saepius in libris pseudo-Aristoteleis particula ὥς eo modo usurpatur.'

12. οἷον ὅσα σκωληκοτοκεῖ ἢ ψοτοκεῖ. Cp. de Gen. An. 2. 1. 732 a 25-32, τῶν δὲ ζῴων τὰ μὲν τελεσιουργεῖ καὶ ἐκπέμπει θύραζε ὁμοιον ἑαυτῷ, οἷον ὅσα φωτοκεῖ εἰς τοῦμφανές, τὰ δὲ ἀδιάρθρωτον ἐκτικτεῖ καὶ οὐκ ἀπειληφὸς τὴν αὐτοῦ μορφήν τῶν δὲ τοιούτων τὰ μὲν ἔναμα ψοτοκεῖ, τὰ δ'

ἄναιμα σκωληκοτοκεῖ· διαφέρει δ' ὧν καὶ σκώληξ· ὧν μὲν γάρ ἐστιν ἐξ οὗ γίνεται τὸ γινόμενον ἐκ μέρους, τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν ἐστὶ τροφή τῷ γινόμενῳ, σκώληξ δ' ἐξ οὗ τὸ γινόμενον ὅλου ὅλου γίνεται. A part of the contents of the egg is intended only to serve as nutriment for the young creature; it is used for that purpose and there is an end of it; the lower part of the σκώληξ, on the contrary, though in Aristotle's view it furnishes in the first place nutriment to the upper and thus aids its growth, begins itself, after it has done this, to grow and receive articulation; and thus no part of the σκώληξ can be said, as a part of the egg can, to be set apart simply and permanently for the sole purpose of nutriment. This is explained in *de Gen. An.* 3. 11. 763 a 9—16, *ποιοῦνται δὲ καὶ τὴν αὔξησιν ὁμοίως τοῖς σκώληξιν· ἐπὶ τὰ ἄνω γὰρ καὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν αὐξάνονται οἱ σκώληκες· ἐν τῷ κάτω γὰρ ἡ τροφή τοῖς ἄνω· καὶ τοῦτό γε ὁμοίως ἔχει τοῖς ἐκ τῶν ψῶν, πλὴν ἐκεῖνα μὲν καταναλίσκει πᾶν, ἐν δὲ τοῖς σκωληκοτοκουμένοις, ὅταν αὐξηθῇ ἐκ τῆς ἐν τῷ κάτω μορίῳ συστάσεως τὸ ἄνω μόριον, οὕτως ἐκ τοῦ ὑπολοίπου διαρροῦνται τὰ κάτωθεν.* On the σκώληξ and τὰ σκωληκοτοκοῦντα (i. e. Insects, *Hist. An.* 5. 19. 550 b 26), see Dr. Ogle's translation of Aristotle on the Parts of Animals, p. xxvii sqq. I can find space only for the following quotation. 'It has been supposed that Aristotle had in some extraordinary way overlooked the eggs of insects, and fancied that these animals produce primarily grubs or maggots. This, however, was not so. He says that there are two kinds of scolex, one capable of motion, in other words a grub or maggot, the other incapable of motion, and so excessively like an ovum in shape, size, and consistency, as to be indistinguishable from it, excepting by considering its ulterior changes (*de Gen. An.* 3. 9. 758 b 10 sqq.).' The only difference between the case of σκωληκοτοκοῦντα and ὄψοτοκοῦντα on the one hand and ζωοτοκοῦντα on the other is, that τὸ λειπόμενον (1258 a 36)—i. e. the surplus material beyond that which is drawn upon in the process of generation—is in the former case severed from the mother, inasmuch as it forms a part of the egg or σκώληξ, while in the case of ζωοτοκοῦντα it is retained within the person of the mother in the form of milk. Cp. *de Gen. An.* 3. 2. 752 b 19 sqq., ἡ γὰρ φύσις ἅμα τὴν τε τοῦ ζῴου ὕλην ἐν τῷ ψῷ τίθῃσι καὶ τὴν ἱκανὴν τροφήν πρὸς τὴν αὐξησιν· ἐπεὶ γὰρ οὐ δύναται τελεεῖν ἐν αὐτῇ ἡ ὄψις, συνεκίττει τὴν τροφήν ἐν τῷ ψῷ· τοῖς μὲν γὰρ ζωοτοκουμένοις ἐν ἄλλῳ μορίῳ γίνεται ἡ τροφή, τὸ καλούμενον γάλα, ἐν τοῖς μαστοῖς· τοῖς δ' ὄψισι τοῦτο ποιεῖ ἡ φύσις ἐν τοῖς ψοῖς, τούναντίον μέντοι ἢ οἷ τὴν ἀνθρωπῶν οἶονται καὶ Ἀλκμαίων φησιν ὁ Κροτωνιάτης, οὐ γὰρ τὸ λευκὸν ἐστὶ γάλα, ἀλλὰ τὸ ὠχρὸν· τοῦτο γὰρ ἐστὶν ἡ τροφή τοῖς νεοττοῖς. In the case of many kinds of fish, indeed, and among them the Salmonidae, provision is made

for the sustenance of the young even after they have left the egg. This has long been known to naturalists. 'When the little fish emerge from the eggs, they have a large bag, the umbilical vesicle, attached to their stomachs; this contains the nourishment which is to serve them for several (three to eight) weeks' subsistence, and they do not commonly take in any food by the mouth until it is absorbed' (from a Paper on Salmon, by F. Day, Esq., F.L.S.). On milk as an evidence of the providence of Nature, see Plutarch de Amore Proles, c. 3, an interesting passage already noticed in vol. i. p. 30, note 2.

13. τοῖς γεννωμένοις. See critical note.

15. φύσιν. Cp. ἡ φύσις τῶν φλεβῶν, Hist. An. 3. 2. 511 b 20, where 'notio vocis φύσις adeo delitescit, ut meram periphrasin nominis esse putes,' though this is not really quite the case (Bon. Ind. 838 a 9 sq.). Cp. also ὁμοιώματα παρὰ τὰς ἀληθινὰς φύσεις, 5 (8). 5. 1340 a 18. 'Thing' or 'object' seems to approach the sense of φύσις used in this way. So Bern., 'den Stoff, den wir Milch nennen.'

ὥστε. The argument is that if there is a provision of nutriment for the creature in process of birth, it is not likely that nutriment should not be forthcoming for it when past that early stage. Cp. Eth. Eud. 7. 2. 1237 a 29, ὥστ' ἐπεὶ καὶ ἀτελῇ (τὰ ὅμοια ἀλλήλοις χαίρει), δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τελειωθέντα. Aristotle, however, carries his inference further, and argues that not only nutriment but ἄλλα ὄργανα will be forthcoming. We see how large is the superstructure which he raises on the fact that in every species of animal a provision of nutriment is made for the earliest moments of existence.

γενομένοις, which Sus.³ places within brackets, may well bear somewhat the same meaning as τελειωθείσιν, which he substituted for it in his first and second editions (cp. Meteor. 4. 2. 379 b 20, ὅταν γὰρ πεφθῇ, τετελειώται τε καὶ γέγονεν: Metaph. B. 4. 999 b 11). Γενομένοις may perhaps be used as a more comprehensive term than τελειωθείσιν, for γένεσις in the sense of ἡ πρώτη γένεσις 9, or ἡ ἐξ ἀρχῆς γένεσις 10, does not necessarily involve τελείωσις. The meaning will be 'when the πρώτη γένεσις is over.' Thus milk is said (de Part. An. 2. 9. 655 b 26 sq.) to be τροφή τοῖς γινόμενοις: τροφή τοῖς γενομένοις is something different. Prof. Jowett quotes Eth. Nic. 8. 14. 1162 a 6, τοῦ γὰρ εἶναι καὶ τραφῆναι αἴτιον (sc. οἱ γονεῖς) καὶ γενομένοις τοῦ παιδευθῆναι. As to the dative, see Bon. Ind. 166 b 26 sqq.

20. εἰ οὖν ἡ φύσις κ.τ.λ. The inference seems to be as follows—'plants exist for the sake of animals, and the lower animals—all tame ones and most of the wild—for the sake of men; [but the lower animals are made by Nature,] and Nature makes nothing in-

complete [in the sense of lacking an end] or in vain, therefore (*οὐν*) all of them must necessarily be made by Nature for the sake of men.' *Αἰτὰ πάντα* 22 has been variously interpreted 'all plants and animals,' 'all wild animals' (Sepulv. 'ipsas omnes feras'), and 'all animals.' I have explained the expression in the first of these ways in vol. i. p. 128, but perhaps on the whole the third interpretation is the one most likely to be correct, for plants have just been said to exist for the sake of animals generally, so that they would not be 'in vain' if they did not exist for the sake of men; besides, what Aristotle is here especially concerned to prove (cp. *θηρία* 24) is that the lower animals are made by Nature for the sake of men; he proceeds, in fact, at once to infer from this, that the kind of war which is waged against wild animals and to compel natural slaves, who differ but little from the lower animals, to submit to enslavement is a natural form of Supply. The interpretation of Sepulveda—'all wild animals'—is a possible interpretation (cp. *θηρία* 24), though the assertion that Nature has made all wild animals for the sake of men seems strange, if we look back to 18, *τῶν δὲ ἀγρίων, εἰ μὴ πάντα, ἀλλὰ τὰ γε πλείστα*, where the contrary seems to be implied. It is true, however, that the same assertion is made, though less conspicuously, if we interpret *αὐτὰ πάντα* 'all animals' or 'all plants and animals.' Aristotle's aim in the passage is to show that just as property in the sense of what is necessary for sustenance is given by Nature to all animals, so the lower animals themselves are made by Nature for the sake of men. Compare Xen. Mem. 4. 3. 10, and Cic. de Nat. Deor. 2. 14 (referred to by Mr. Eaton) and 2. 62–64 (referred to by Giph.). In the last-named passage Cicero argues that as flutes are made for the sake of those who can use them, so the fruits of the soil exist far more for the sake of men than for the sake of the lower animals, 'tantumque abest ut haec bestiarum etiam causa parata sint, ut ipsas bestias hominum gratia generatas esse videamus.' Cp. also Metaph. Λ. 10. 1075 a 16, *πάντα δὲ συντέτακται πως ἀλλ' οὐχ ὁμοίως, καὶ πλεονὰ καὶ πτηνὰ καὶ φυτὰ καὶ οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει ὥστε μὴ εἶναι θατέρῳ πρὸς θάτερον μηδέν, ἀλλ' ἐστὶ τι*.

21. *ἀτελές*. In using this word, is Aristotle referring to man or to the lower animals, which are made for the sake of man? He has often been taken to refer to the state of incompleteness in which man would be left, if he were unprovided with sustenance when past the earliest period of existence. Mr. Welldon translates the passage—'assuming then that none of Nature's products is incomplete or purposeless, [as man requires food and the other animals are

suited to his consumption].’ But looking to the form of the sentence (*ποιεῖ . . . πεποιηκέναι*), it seems more likely that Aristotle refers in the protasis as well as in the apodosis, and in *ἀτελής* as well as in *μάτην*, to the lower animals. ‘*Ατελής* may in fact bear the meaning ‘lacking an end,’ and it is thus that Zeller (‘ohne Zweck,’ Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 565. 6), Bonitz (‘*οὐκ ἔχον τέλος* sive *οὐ ἔνεκα*,’ Ind. 119 a 48), and Susemihl in his translation (‘*zwecklos*’) explain it here. Bonitz mentions no other passage in which the word *ἀτελής* is used in this sense, but perhaps de Gen. An. 1. 1. 715 b 14, *ἡ δὲ φύσις φεύγει τὸ ἀπειρον τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀπειρον ἀτελής, ἡ δὲ φύσις αἰεὶ ζητεῖ τέλος* may be compared: cp. Plato, Phileb. 24 B, *αἰεὶ τοίνυν ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν σημαίνει τούτῳ μὴ τέλος ἔχειν· ἀτελὴ δ’ ὅτε δήπου παντάπασιν ἀπείρῳ γίγνεσθον*. But *ἀτελής* is rarely used in this sense, and I incline on the whole to follow Sepulveda, who translates ‘*imperfectum*’ and adds in his note the explanation ‘*quod non referatur ad aliquem finem, res enim quaeque suo fine perficitur* (Metaph. X),’ where Metaph. 1. 4. 1055 a 12, *τέλος γὰρ ἔχει ἡ τελεία διαφορά, ὥσπερ καὶ τὰλλα τῷ τέλει ἔχειν λέγεται· τέλεια* is probably referred to: cp. Metaph. Δ. 16. 1021 b 23, *ἔτι οἷς ὑπάρχει τὸ τέλος σπουδαῖον, ταῦτα λέγεται τέλεια· κατὰ γὰρ τὸ ἔχειν τὸ τέλος τέλεια*.

μάτην. Cp. de An. 3. 12. 434 a 30, *τὸ δὲ ζῶον ἀναγκαῖον αἰσθῆσιν ἔχειν, εἰ μὴδὲν μάτην ποιεῖ ἡ φύσις· ἔνεκά του γὰρ πάντα ὑπάρχει τὰ φύσει, ἢ συμπτώματα ἔσται τῶν ἔνεκά του*. Cp. also de Gen. An. 2. 5. 741 b 2–5: de Animalium Incessu 2. 704 b 15 sq.

ἀναγκαῖον τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἔνεκεν κ.τ.λ. Aristotle is unaware that many animals existed long before man. We are reminded here of the Socratic teleology, according to which the movements of the sun in summer and winter are arranged with a view to the advantage of man (Xen. Mem. 4. 3. 8, *καὶ ταῦτα παντάπασιν ὅκεν ἀνθρώπων ἔνεκα γιγνομένοις*). But to Aristotle man is only *πῶς τέλος*, not *τὸ ἔσχατον τέλος* (Phys. 2. 2. 194 a 35). He assumes, it will be noticed, that animal food is necessary to man, and thus incidentally pronounces against those scruples as to its use which can be traced back in Greece to very early days. Orphic teaching forbade it (Plato, Laws 782): Empedocles was against it (see Prof. Campbell, Introduction to the Politics of Plato, p. xxiii sq.): Democritus seems to have allowed the slaughter only of those animals which injure or wish to injure man (Stob. Floril. 44. 16, quoted by Bernays, Theophrastus’ Schrift über Frömmigkeit, p. 149), and in this view he was apparently followed by Theophrastus (Porphyr. de Abstin. 2. 22), who may possibly be alluding to the passage of the Politics before us when he says (ibid. 2. 12), *εἰ δὲ λέγοι τις ὅτι οὐκ ἦττον τῶν καρπῶν*

καὶ τὰ ζῷα ἡμῖν ὁ θεὸς εἰς χρῆσιν δίδωκεν—if indeed we are right in ascribing this passage, with Bernays (*op. cit.* p. 61 sqq.), to Theophrastus and not to Porphyry. His contemporary at the head of the Academy, Xenocrates, was also opposed to the use of animal food, though for a different reason (Xenocr. Fragm. 58—Mullach, *Fr. Philos. Gr.* 3. 127 : Zeller, *Gr. Ph.* 2. 1. 678. 6, ed. 2). The unhesitating language of Aristotle on this subject is deserving of notice. If there were those in antiquity who ascribed the *Politics* to Theophrastus, this passage at all events can hardly be from his pen. Observe that Aristotle does not here notice the case of carnivorous animals other than man.

22. αὐτὰ πάντα. See above on 20.

23. διὸ κ.τ.λ. The following extract from Susemihl, *Qu. Crit.* p. 347, will show how variously this passage has been interpreted. 'Victorium si audimus, cui adstipulati sunt Giphanius, Schneiderus, Boesensius, αὐτῆς et ἡ ad πολεμικὴν pertinent, ut nihil nisi parenthesis sint ἢ γὰρ θηρευτική μέρος αὐτῆς, qua indicetur cur bellum etiam contra bestias geri queat contendī : sin Lambinum, Schnitzerum, Stahrium, Bernaysium, αὐτῆς ad πολεμικὴν et ἡ ad θηρευτικὴν : sin Garveum, Hampkeum, alios, αὐτῆς ad κτηνικὴν et ἡ ad θηρευτικὴν spectat.' Victorius' commentary refers ἡ to πολεμική, but his translation refers it to θηρευτική ('studium enim venatorum pars ipsius [artis bellicae] est, quo decet uti,' etc.). Bernays takes αὐτῆς as meaning τῆς πολεμικῆς and refers ἡ to ἡ θηρευτική, and this seems to be the more natural interpretation, looking to the close sequence in which ἡ stands to θηρευτική, but then we hardly expect τοῦτον τὸν πόλεμον 26, though it is true that hunting has just been brought under the head of war (23 : cp. 1255 b 38). Those who refer ἡ to ἡ πολεμική will 'point to the use of the word πόλεμον in 26, and may also adduce Isocr. Panath. § 163, τῶν δὲ πολέμων ὑπελάμβανον ἀναγκαῖστατον μὲν εἶναι καὶ δικαῖστατον τὸν μετὰ πάντων ἀνθρώπων πρὸς τὴν ἀγριότητα τὴν τῶν θηρίων γιγνόμενον, δεύτερον δὲ τὸν μετὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων πρὸς τοὺς βαρβάρους τοὺς καὶ φύσει πολεμίους ὄντας καὶ πάντα τὸν χρόνον ἐπιβουλευόντας ἡμῖν (cp. Plutarch, Demetrius, c. 8 : Porphyry. de Abstin. 1. 14 : and Dio Chrysost. Or. 38. 137 R) ; Isocrates here certainly speaks of war, not hunting. But Aristotle has just said that hunting is a part of war, and the sentence seems to run more naturally if ἡ is referred to ἡ θηρευτική. The words ἡ δεῖ χρῆσθαι πρὸς τε τὰ θηρία κ.τ.λ., in fact, acquire fresh point, if connected with ἡ θηρευτική : θηρευτική is not only to be brought to bear against θηρία, as the name might suggest, but also against men who are like θηρία. The reference of ἡ to ἡ θηρευτική is still further supported by two passages of Plato

(Sophist. 222 B-C: Laws 823 B), which seem to be present to Aristotle's memory no less than the passage from the Panathenaic Oration of Isocrates just quoted, for in them Plato speaks of hunting as having to do not only with wild animals but also with men, in language much resembling that of Aristotle here. Διό draws from the fact that animals are made by nature for the service of man, and that their acquisition is natural, the inference that men who are, like animals, made to be ruled, may be acquired without any infraction of the order of nature. Αὐτῆς can hardly mean τῆς κτητικῆς, for the fact that hunting is a part of κτητική is no proof that war is in some sense a part of κτητική, in the absence of a statement that hunting is a part of war. I incline therefore to translate the passage thus: 'hence the art of war also is in some sense' (i. e. so far as one kind of it is concerned) 'by nature a form of κτητική, for of the art of war the art of the chase' (already said in 1256 a 40-b 2 to be a form of κτητική) 'is a part, which ought to be used against both wild animals and such human beings as being intended by nature to be ruled refuse to be ruled, seeing that this kind of war is by nature just.' There were kinds of war which had nothing to do with acquisition (4 (7). 14. 1333 b 38-1334 a 2). The myth of Protagoras had contrasted the art of war with ἡ δημιουργικὴ τέχνη (Plato, Protag. 322 B, ἡ δημιουργικὴ τέχνη αὐτοῖς πρὸς μὲν τροφήν ἱκανὴ βοηθὸς ἦν, πρὸς δὲ τὸν τῶν θηρίων πόλεμον ἐνδεής· πολιτικὴν γὰρ τέχνην οὐπω εἶχον, ἥς μέρος πολεμική), and Aristotle may wish to point out, in correction of this view, that some kinds of τροφή cannot be obtained without war; he evidently does not agree with Rep. 373 D-E, where the origin of war is traced to the unbounded quest of wealth. On the contrary, he holds that one kind of war (that for the acquisition of φύσει δοῦλοι) falls within the sound or limited χρηματιστική. Columella (de Re Rustica, Lib. 1. Praefat. c. 7) will not admit war to be a laudable form of κτητική: cp. [Aristot.] Oecon. 1. 2. 1343 a 27, ἡ δὲ γεωργικὴ μάλιστα οὐ δικαία· οὐ γὰρ ἀπ' ἀνθρώπων, οὐδ' ἐκόντων, ὥσπερ καπηλεία καὶ αἱ μισθοαρνακαί, οὐτ' ἀκόντων, ὥσπερ αἱ πολεμικαί.

26. 2ν μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. The first question which arises as to this much-debated passage relates to κατὰ φύσιν. Sepulv., Vict. ('unam rationem quaerendi rem, illam inquam quae naturam sequitur'), Lamb., and Giph. connect κατὰ φύσιν with κτητικῆς, but this seems hardly possible. Bern., who connects κατὰ φύσιν with μέρος ἐστίν, translates 'is a natural part of Household Science,' but Susemihl and Mr. Weldon are probably right in translating 'is naturally a part.' The remainder of the paragraph (δ δεῖ κ.τ.λ.) is thus ren-

dered by Sepulveda—'quae (quaestuarialia) vel suppetere debet, vel res ab ipsa comparari, quae condi reponique solent necessariae ad vitam et ad civitatis aut domus societatem tuendam accommodatae'; he adds in his note the following explanation—'aut haec quaestuarialia facultas adesse debet patrifamilias atque homini civili, ut per eam res necessariae ab ipsis comparentur, aut certe per eam res necessariae comparari debent ab eo, cuicumque tribuatur.' He evidently refers *αὐτὴν* 28, not to *τῆς οἰκονομικῆς* 27, to which Bern., Sus., Stahr, and others are probably right in referring it, but to *εἶδος κτητικῆς* 26. There is much more to be said for his view that *χρήματα*, the suppressed antecedent of *ὧν χρημάτων*, is the subject of *ὑπάρχει*. It is thus that both Stahr and Vahlen (Aristotel. Aufsätze, 2. 32) interpret the passage. For the case and position of *χρημάτων* within the relative sentence, see Vahlen *ubi supra*, who compares 4 (7). 1. 1323 b 15: 6 (4). 4. 1290 b 28: 6 (4). 5. 1292 b 8. If we follow these authorities (as I have done in vol. 1. p. 129), we shall translate—'which (form of the Science of Supply) must either be forthcoming, or Household Science must itself ensure that storeable commodities shall be forthcoming,' etc. This interpretation of the passage, however, is open to the objection that it supplies a different subject with the words *ὑπάρχειν* and *ὑπάρχει*, whereas the sentence certainly reads as if one and the same subject should be supplied with each. I incline, therefore, on further consideration, to suggest a different interpretation. May not there be an ellipse of 'having to do with' before *ὧν ἐστὶ θησαυρισμὸς χρημάτων*, just as there is in 1. 3. 1253 b 3, *οἰκονομίας δὲ μέρη, ἐξ ὧν πάλιν οἰκία συνέστηκεν*, and in 1. 11. 1258 b 27 sqq., *τρίτον δὲ εἶδος χρηματιστικῆς . . . ὅσα ἀπὸ γῆς καὶ τῶν ἀπὸ γῆς γινόμενων κ.τ.λ.* (see above on 1253 b 3)? If we explain the passage thus, *δ* (*εἶδος κτητικῆς*) will be the subject both of *ὑπάρχειν* and of *ὑπάρχει*. On Bernays' proposed substitution of *καθό* for *δ*, see Sus. Qu. Crit. p. 352. For other suggested emendations, and for Susemihl's own view of the passage, see notes 2 and 3 in Sus.², vol. 1. p. 116. In strictness the function of *οἰκονομική* is not *τὸ πορίσασθαι τὰ κατὰ τὴν οἰκίαν*, but *τὸ χρῆσασθαι* (c. 8. 1256 a 11: cp. *διαβείναι*, c. 10. 1258 a 24); we are told, however, here (cp. *μάλιστα*, 'if possible,' c. 10. 1258 a 34), that if *ἡ κατὰ φύσιν κτητικὴ* is not forthcoming from the first, *οἰκονομική* must see that it is forthcoming. *Ἐστὶ θησαυρισμὸς* appears to be added because there are things necessary to human life (e. g. light, air, fire) which cannot be stored. On Storeableness as an attribute of Wealth, see Comte, Social Statics, E. T. p. 131, and J. S. Mill, Principles of Political Economy B. 1. c. 3. § 3.

Are slaves and cattle, however, susceptible of *θησαυρισμός*? and does Aristotle's definition of wealth include wealth in land? For the various kinds of wealth, genuine and other, see 2. 7. 1267 b 10 sq. and Rhet. 1. 5. 1361 a 12 sqq. J. S. Mill defines wealth (Principles of Political Economy, Preliminary Remarks, and B. 1. c. 3. § 3) as 'useful and agreeable things of a material nature, possessing exchange value.' Aristotle says nothing here of exchange value, though his definition of *χρήματα* in Eth. Nic. 4. 1. 1119 b 26 as *πάντα ὅσων ἡ ἀξία νομίσματι μετρεῖται* implies this limitation. How far does his account of wealth in the passage before us agree with his account of *κτῆματα* in c. 4. 1254 a 16, where he seems to exclude *ὄργανα ποιητικά* from *κτῆσις*? Such *ὄργανα* are certainly *χρήσιμα εἰς κοινωνίαν πόλεως ἢ οἰκίας*. On Mill's definition, see Prof. H. Sidgwick in the *Fortnightly Review* for Feb. 1879. *Μέν οὖν* is taken up by *μέν τοίνυν* 37, and answered by *δὲ* 40.

31. *ἐκ τούτων*. 'Εκ is here used of the 'material' of which wealth is made, the 'elements' which constitute it: cp. 2. 2. 1261 a 22, *ἐκ πλείονων ἀνθρώπων*.

γάρ, 'for true wealth is not unlimited in quantity (consisting as it does of *ὄργανα*, and no *ὄργανον* being unlimited either in size or quantity), and the wealth of which we speak is not unlimited in quantity.' Just as a very large or very small shuttle, or too many shuttles or too few, would be in the way and ineffective for the end (cp. 4 (7). 4. 1326 a 35 sqq.), so too large or too small a supply of necessary and useful commodities is unfavourable to *ἀγαθὴ ζωὴ*. This thought was taken up by Epicurus: cp. Porphy. de Abstin. 1. 49, *ὥρισται γάρ, φησὶν, ὁ τῆς φύσεως πλοῦτος καὶ ἔστιν εὐπόριστος, ὁ δὲ τῶν κενῶν δοξῶν ἀπόριστός τε ἦν καὶ δυσπόριστος*. Bernays (Theophrastos' Schrift über Frömmigkeit, p. 145) compares also the fourteenth *κυρία δόξα* of Epicurus (Diog. Laert. 10. 144). Cp. also Plutarch de Cupiditate Divitiarum, c. 4. 524 E-F. For *αὐτάρκεια*, cp. c. 9. 1257 a 30.

32. *Σόλων*. See Fragg. 13. 71 sqq., and Theognis 227 where the lines appear in a slightly altered form. They seem to be present to Isocrates' memory in De Pace § 7.

33. *πεφασμένον ἀνδράσι*, 'made known to men.'

34. *ταῖς ἄλλαις τέχναις*, 'in the case of other arts.'

35. *οὐδὲν γὰρ ὄργανον κ.τ.λ.* Aristippus appears to have met this argument by anticipation; cp. Fragg. 58 (Mullach, Fr. Philos. Gr. 2. 412), *οὐχ ὥσπερ ὑπόδημα τὸ μείζον δυσχρηστον, οὕτω καὶ ἡ πλείων κτῆσις τοῦ μέν γὰρ ἐν τῇ χρήσει τὸ περιττὸν ἐμποδίζει· τῇ δὲ καὶ ὀλη χρησθαι κατὰ καιρὸν ἔξεστι καὶ μέρει*.

36. See J. S. Mill, Principles of Political Economy, Preliminary

Remarks, on definitions of wealth which, like that in the text, treat it as 'a mass of instruments.'

38. δι' ἣν αἰτίαν. The reason apparently is that the acquisition of the things assigned by Nature for the service of man is a necessity of human life. For ἣν, see above on 1252 a 20, and cp. de An. 2. 7. 419 a 6.

40. ἣν is affected by attraction to χρηματιστικὴν, though αὐτὸ is C. 9. not: the fem. continues to be used in 41—1257 a 5.

41. δι' ἣν. How this happens, we learn in 1. 9. 1257 b 35 sqq.

3. ἐκείνης. 'Pronomen ἐκείνος ab Aristotele etiam ad proximas 1257 a. voces trahitur' (Busse, de praesidiis Aristotelis Politica emendandi, p. 24, who refers to Pol. 7 (5). 6. 1306 a 10: Meteor. 2. 6. 364 a 8 sq.).

4. δι' ἐμπειρίας. Cp. 1257 b 3.

7. καθ' αὐτό. On predication καθ' αὐτό, see Anal. Post. 1. 4. 73 a 34-b 24 and other passages collected in Bon. Ind. 212 a 3 sqq. We have here to do with use καθ' αὐτό. A thing is used καθ' αὐτό, when it is used as being what it is and nothing else. Thus the term is explained in 12 by χρῆσθαι τῷ ὑπόδηματι ἢ ὑπόδημα. The μεταβλητικὴ χρῆσις of a shoe is an use of it καθ' αὐτό, as much so in fact as the οἰκεία χρῆσις, the use of it as an article of wear; it is because the shoe is a shoe that the buyer buys it and the wearer wears it; still the one use is οἰκεία τοῦ πράγματος (the use for which the shoe was made) and the other is not. If the shoe were used, on the contrary, for measuring, it would not be used as a shoe, but as being of a certain length. This is explained in Eth. Eud. 3. 4. 1231 b 38 sq., where, however, the writer so far departs from Aristotle's view that he treats the sale of an article as an use of it κατὰ συμβεβηκός, not καθ' αὐτό. From the use made of commodities in simple exchange must be distinguished the use made of them by the unsound χρηματιστικὴ, which aims at the indefinite increase of wealth (c. 9. 1257 b 35 sq.).

14. ἡ μεταβλητικὴ, sc. χρῆσις, as in 9, or τέχνη? The latter view seems preferable, for we must supply τέχνη with ἡ τοιαύτη μεταβλητικὴ in 28. Perhaps, however, we may translate simply 'exchange' (Bern. Sus. 'Tauschhandel').

15. μὲν has no δέ to answer to it, apparently because at ἡ καὶ δῆλον the intended course of the sentence is changed: we expect it to be continued—'but later passing the limit of necessity and nature.'

ἐκ τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν, 'from that which is natural' (Mr. Welldon, 'from natural circumstances').

17. ἡ καὶ δῆλον κ.τ.λ. Vict. 'quo perspicuum etiam est non con-

stare natura pecuniariae genus cauponarium.' Lamb. (followed by Bernays and Susemihl): 'ex quo licet intelligere cauponariam (seu mercaturam sordidam quam profitentur atque exercent ii qui ab aliis emunt quod pluris revendant) non esse partem artis pecuniae quaerendae natura.' In favour of Vict.'s rendering, cp. Phys. 2. 2. 194 b 2, τῆς ποιητικῆς ἡ ἀρχιτεκτονική, and the statement in 3, ἔστι δ' ἡ μὲν φύσει ἡ δ' οὐ φύσει αὐτῶν: in favour of the other, c. 8. 1256 b 23, διὸ καὶ ἡ πολεμικὴ φύσει κτητικὴ πως ἔσται. The interpretation of Lamb. is probably right. Bern. conjectures τῆς μεταβλητικῆς for τῆς χρηματιστικῆς, looking probably to ἡ μεταβλητικὴ 14, but all the MSS. read τῆς χρηματιστικῆς, and in 1257 b 2 we have θάτερον εἶδος τῆς χρηματιστικῆς . . . τὸ καπηλικόν.

18. ὅσον γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Sepulveda: 'alioquin necesse erat ut quatenus eis satis esset, commutationibus uterentur.' 'For if it were so, those who practise it would necessarily have made use of exchange only to obtain what suffices for themselves [whereas in fact they notoriously purchase not for their own use, but to resell at a profit]. So the commentators generally. Cp. 5 (8). 3. 1337 b 35, οὐ γὰρ δὴ παίζοντας τέλος γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τοῦ βίου τὴν παιδίαν ἡμῖν. For the omission of ἄν in phrases like ἀναγκαῖον ἦν, see Jelf, Gr. Gr. § 858. 3. 'ικανόν takes up τῶν ικανῶν. Τὸ κατὰ φύσιν is τὸ ικανὸν αὐτοῖς (cp. 30 and 1256 b 11). It is possible, no doubt, to take ἦν historically, and not as = ἦν ἄν, and to translate 'for it was necessary (and therefore natural) to make use of exchange to obtain what suffices for the persons exchanging (which those who practise καπηλική do not do),' and this rendering would suit the paragraph which follows, which is historical in purport; ἀναγκαῖον κ.τ.λ. would also be used in the same sense as four or five lines below (23); but the ordinary interpretation seems on the whole preferable.

19. μὲν οὖν introduces a slight correction of what precedes ('true, exchange is not necessary in the household'). It seems to be answered by ἀλλά, 21: cp. c. 13. 1260 a 13, and see Sus.¹ Ind. Gramm. s. v. μὲν.

τῇ πρώτῃ κοινωνίᾳ, i.e. the household, though the union of male and female and that of master and slave are spoken of as κοινωνία (c. 2. 1252 b 10), and are of course prior to the household, for the household is formed of them. Cp. αἱ πρῶται κοινωνίαί, c. 2. 1252 b 31.

21. αὐτῆς is taken apparently by Sus. to refer to ἀλλαγὴν 19, but I incline to follow Bern. and Mr. Welldon, who refer it to ἡ μεταβλητικὴ 14 (cp. ἡ μὲν οὖν τοιαύτη μεταβλητικὴ, 28). It is true that in 1257 b 1 the earlier form of μεταβλητικὴ is described as ἡ ἀναγκαία

ἀλλαγῇ, so that the sense is much the same, whichever view we adopt.

πλείονος τῆς κοινωνίας οὐσης, i.e. 'extended,' in opposition to πρώτη (Bon. Ind. 618 b 34): cp. 2. 2. 1261 b 12, καὶ βούλεται γ' ἤδη τότε εἶναι πόλις, ὅταν αὐτάρκη συμβαίῃ τὴν κοινωνίαν εἶναι τοῦ πλήθους. 'Ἡ μεταβλητική seems to be regarded as beginning in the κόμη and the πόλις.

οἱ μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. As to the phrase πολλῶν καὶ ἐτέρων, see Bon. Ind. 357 b 8: 'καὶ interdum duo adiectiva coniungit, quorum alterum definiendo alteri inserviat, non solum ubi prius adiectivum πολὺς est (πολλοὶ καὶ παλαιοὶ λέγουσιν, Eth. Nic. 1. 8. 1098 b 27 al.), sed etiam in aliis.' It has been much discussed, on what verb the words πολλῶν καὶ ἐτέρων depend. Schn. would supply ἐδέοντο, while Bern. thinks that no addition is needed, inasmuch as κεχωρισμένοι contains the notion of 'wanting.' For Susemihl's view, see his note. Vict., however, would seem from his commentary to supply ἐκινῶνουν—certainly the most natural course, and that which best agrees with πλείονος τῆς κοινωνίας οὐσης. Aristotle is commonly chary of words, and often expects us to supply a word from a previous clause which is not altogether suitable—e.g. in 3. 16. 1287 b 28 (ἰδοι): 6 (4). 13. 1297 a 40 (πορίζειν): 2. 5. 1264 b 2 (οἰκονομήσει). Cp. also 8 (6). 8. 1322 a 16—18. Both household and village have a certain aggregate of commodities at their disposal, but whereas in the household what one member has all others have, in the village this is not so; on the contrary, some members of the village have corn and no shoes, others shoes and no corn. The members of the village are described as κεχωρισμένοι, i.e. they are no longer ὁμοσίπνοι or ὁμόκαποι, but are parted into a plurality of households. The use of the word κοινωνεῖν in reference both to the household and to the village is of course not fortunate, for the household shares in what it possesses in a different sense from the village.

23. κατὰ τὰς δεήσεις, in contrast to the practice of κάπηλοι.

ποιεῖσθαι τὰς μεταδόσεις . . . κατὰ τὴν ἀλλαγὴν. 'Ἀλλαγή here means 'barter': μεταδόσις is the more comprehensive word, including barter as one of its forms.

24. καὶ (in place of which Bern. conjectures καὶ νῦν) probably means 'no less than the members of the village.'

26. ἐπὶ πλεόν δ' οὐδέν, i.e. no money, which is here contrasted with τὰ χρήσιμα, not that it is not itself one of τὰ χρήσιμα (36), but because it is not directly useful for subsistence, like corn or wine.

29. χρηματιστικῆς, i.e. τῆς μάλιστα χρηματιστικῆς, 1256 b 41.

30. Cp. Eth. Nic. 3. 13. 1118 b 18, ἀναπλήρωσις γὰρ τῆς ἐνδείας ἡ φυσικὴ ἐπιθυμία.

31. κατὰ λόγον, 'in accordance with reason and what one would naturally expect': see the references in Bon. Ind. 368 b 50 sq. It is often used in much the same sense as εὐλόγως (e. g. in Metaph. N. 1. 1088 a 4-6), and the phrase διὰ τιν' αἰτίαν εὐλογον (de Part. An. 2. 17. 660 b 16) may be compared. In Rhet. ad Alex. 9. 1429 a 28 we have—τὰ μὲν γὰρ τῶν πραγμάτων γίνεται κατὰ λόγον τὰ δὲ παρὰ λόγον.

ξενικωτέρας γὰρ κ.τ.λ. 'For, the supply of men's needs coming to be more drawn from sources external to the State.' Here the origin of money is traced to an increased distance between buyer and seller. Money being more portable than commodities in general, an advantage is found in paying a distant seller in this way. Aristotle perhaps remembers that the Greek coinage had its origin in the commerce of Aegina: cp. Strabo, p. 376, "Ἐφορος δ' ἐν Αἰγίνῃ ἄργυρον πρῶτον κοπήναι φησιν ὑπὸ Φείδωνος· ἐμπορίων γὰρ γενέσθαι. In Eth. Nic. 5. 8, however, the advantages of money in all commercial transactions, whether between parties near to or distant from each other, are recognized. Again, the purchaser may not for the moment need any commodity in return: in this case money serves as an ἐγγυητής ὅτι ἔσται ἐὰν δεηθῇ (Eth. Nic. 5. 8. 1133 b 10 sq.). Still all this is quite reconcilable with the view that what first called money into being was its use in distant transactions. Plato (Laws 742 A) seems to regard the payment of wages and of artisans' remuneration as that which makes some sort of money necessary. Giph. (p. 99) refers to Isocr. Paneg. § 42, which is not without resemblances to the passage before us.

32. ὧν ἐνδεεῖς. For the omission of εἶναι and its parts, see Vahlen on Poet. 24. 1459 b 7 (p. 243).

35. διὸ πρὸς τὰς ἀλλαγὰς κ.τ.λ. Cp. 1. 10. 1258 b 4, οὐκ ἐφ' ὅπερ ἐπορίσθη μεταβολῆς γὰρ ἐγένετο χάριν (τὸ νόμισμα). The selection of the particular commodity was a matter of convention, so that here for the first time convention stepped in; but even then money was for a space dealt with inartificially by weighing, till the measure of its artificiality was made complete by the ingenious addition of a stamp to denote the value of the coin. With συνέθεντο, cp. κατὰ συνθήκην, Eth. Nic. 5. 8. 1133 a 29.

37. εἶχε κ.τ.λ., 'possessed utility of a kind to be easily dealt with and made available for the end of existence'—was, in fact, easily carried, easily stored, easily converted into other commodities, and so forth. Vict. 'unum eorum quae . . . possunt

facile deferri ad alios'; but that is only one of the characteristics present to the mind of Aristotle. Lamb. better: 'usum haberet tractabilem ac facilem ad vitam degendam.' For εἶχε τὴν χρεῖαν (which takes up τῶν χρησίων), cp. Sosipater (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 4. 483)—

μεγάλην χρεῖαν τὴν εἰς τὸ πρᾶγμ' ἔχει.

For τὸ ζῆν, cp. 1257 b 41. The Thessalians are said by Isocrates to be ἄνδρες οὐκ εὐμεταχείριστοι (Epist. 2. § 20). Aristotle notices portability and ease in use as characteristics of a satisfactory circulating medium, but not durability or steadiness of value. The last-named characteristic is, however, referred to in Eth. Nic. 5. 8. 1133 b 13 sq.

38. σιδήρεος κ.τ.λ. Iron, or the dross of iron—τὸ ἀχρεῖον τοῦ σιδήρου—(by weight) by the Lacedaemonians ([Plato,] Eryxias 400 B): iron coins were also used at Byzantium (see Mr. Ridgeway, *Trans. Camb. Philol. Society*, vol. 2. p. 131, who refers to Plato Com., Πείσανδρος 3—Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 2. 649)—and Ar. Nub. 249): an iron coin of Hermaeus king of Bactria, brought by Sir Douglas Forsyth from the ruined cities of Central Asia, is mentioned in the *Academy*, Nov. 25, 1876 (p. 527). Cp. also Caesar de Bell. Gall. 5. 12: utuntur (Britanni) aut aere aut taleis ferreis ad certum pondus examinatis pro nummo. As to κἂν εἴ τι τοιούτων ἔτερον, we find in the Eryxias (399 E sqq.) a description of the leather money of Carthage; but, as Mr. Ridgeway says (ibid.), Aristotle may have in his mind 'some such coinage as the electrum money used at Cyzicus.'

41. ὁ γὰρ χαρακτήρ κ.τ.λ. The χαρακτήρ varied with the value. 'The tetradrachm of Syracuse is in early times stamped with a quadriga, the didrachm with a pair of horses, the drachm with a single horse with its rider. Thus the number of horses shows at a glance the number of drachms in any piece of Syracusan money. The obol is marked with the wheel of a chariot' (Prof. P. Gardner, *Types of Greek Coins*, p. 50). 'On the tetrobol of Athens there are two owls; on the diobol the owl has but one head, but two bodies; on the triobol the owl is facing the spectator, and so forth . . . In Thessaly a horseman marks the diobol, a single horse the obol' (ibid. p. 66). But see Mr. Head's remarks, *Hist. Numorum*, p. lvi.

2. τὸ καπηλικόν. The unsound kind of χρηματιστική is so called, 1257 b. not because none but κάπηλοι practised it, but because it was exemplified in, and best illustrated by, their way of trading, with which every one was familiar. The κάπηλος did not himself produce what he sold, but bought it of the producer, and bought to sell again,

not to supply his own household needs. His operations were on a smaller scale than those of the *ἔμπορος*, and, unlike his, were confined within the limits of a particular State (cp. Plato, *Polit.* 260 C: Rep. 371 D: *Sophist.* 223 D: and see Büchschütz, *Besitz und Erwerb*, p. 454–6 and notes). This kind of *χρηματιστική* comes into existence after the appearance of money on the scene, but its existence is in reality due not to money, but to a radically wrong view of the end of human life (1257 b 40 sqq., and esp. 1258 a 5). Money, however, makes it possible,—how, Aristotle does not directly explain; but he probably means that money facilitates sale and re-sale, is easily stored, and the like, and thus meets the spirit of gain half-way. If trade were carried on by barter, the practices of the *κάπηλοι* would be defeated by the cumbrousness of the operation, and they might suffer more by depreciation of stock. ‘The value of money,’ says Gibbon (*Decline and Fall*, c. 9—vol. i. p. 356), ‘has been settled by general consent to express our wants and our property, as letters were invented to express our ideas; and both these institutions, by giving a more active energy to the powers and passions of human nature, have contributed to multiply the objects they were designed to represent.’ See also the quotation from Xen. de Vectigalibus given in the note on 1257 b 33.

3. *μὲν οὖν*. See note on 1252 b 27 sqq.

4. *τεχνικώτερον*. Cp. Isocr. ad Nicocl. § 1.

πόθεν κ.τ.λ. *Πόθεν* seems to depend on *τεχνικώτερον*, which itself seems to be adverbial to *γινόμενον*. But what is the nom. to *ποιήσει*? Vict. and Bern. make *μεταβαλλόμενον* passive, the former supplying *τὸ νόμισμα*, the latter ‘etwas’ (i.e. a commodity). Lamb. and Giph. explain *μεταβαλλόμενον* by ‘permutando,’ apparently making it middle: Bonitz also would seem to take it as middle (*Ind.* 458 b 15), for he adds ‘i.e. *ποῖον γένος τῆς μεταβλητικῆς*.’ Adopting this explanation of *πῶς μεταβαλλόμενον*, which makes *τὸ καπηλικόν* nom. to *ποιήσει*, we are still met by the question, what is the meaning of *πόθεν*? Does it qualify *μεταβαλλόμενον* like *πῶς*, or are the words *πῶς μεταβαλλόμενον* to be taken together by themselves, so that the meaning will be—‘carried on with a more studied skill in devising from what source and by what kind of investment it will win most profit’? Perhaps this is the correct interpretation. Cp. *πῶς*, c. 11. 1258 b 13.

5. *διὰ κ.τ.λ.* Aristotle here passes on to describe the effect of the emergence of this kind of *χρηματιστική* on opinion. It suggests to many the erroneous conclusion that the aim of *χρηματιστική* is the acquisition of money and of as much money as possible. But

then others by a natural reaction refuse to allow that money is wealth, or that this kind of χρηματιστική is χρηματιστική at all. This conflict of view enables Aristotle to step in, as is his wont, and to say that those who take the latter view are so far right that the καπηλική χρηματιστική is not χρηματιστική κατὰ φύσιν, nor is money natural wealth. The natural χρηματιστική is that which goes hand in hand with the science of household management, and which regards the acquisition of commodities, not as an end, but as a means to τὸ εὖ ζῆν rightly understood, and therefore not to be pursued beyond a certain limit of amount.

7. ποιητική γὰρ εἶναι, sc. δοκεῖ.

τοῦ πλούτου καὶ χρημάτων. Vahlen (Aristot. Aufsätze, 2. 13 n.) compares 4 (7). I. 1323 a 37, πλούτου καὶ χρημάτων, and I. 9. 1257 a 1, πλούτου καὶ κτήσεως. Here, as often elsewhere (Bon. Ind. 357 b 13), καὶ appears to be used in an explanatory sense, just as it is two lines lower in τὴν χρηματιστικὴν καὶ τὴν καπηλικήν, and in ἀλλαγῆς καὶ καπηλείας, 1256 a 41. Χρημάτων is an ambiguous word, often meaning money and always suggestive of it (cp. Eth. Nic. 4. 1. 1119 b 26, χρήματα δὲ λέγομεν πάντα ὧν ἡ ἀξία νομίσματι μετρεῖται, and [Plato,] Eryxias 403 D, quoted below on 11).

8. καὶ γὰρ τὸν πλοῦτον κ.τ.λ. These words supply an indispensable link in the argument, which seems to be as follows—χρηματιστική is ποιητική τοῦ πλούτου καὶ χρημάτων, πλοῦτος is νομίσματος πλήθος, therefore χρηματιστική is ποιητική νομίσματος πλήθους, or in other words, its ἔργον is τὸ δύνασθαι θεωρεῖν πόθεν ἔσται πλήθος χρημάτων. This word χρημάτων might have been νομίσματος, but the two words do not lie far apart in meaning. In καὶ γὰρ somewhat of the force of καί perhaps survives: 'they not only misconstrue χρηματιστική and take it to be concerned with money (5), but they also misconstrue πλοῦτος and take it to be abundance of money.' So we have τὸν πλοῦτον καὶ τὴν χρηματιστικὴν, 18.

11. νόμος, 'a mere convention': cp. Eth. Nic. 5. 8. 1133 a 30, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τοῦτοισι ἔχει νόμισμα, ὅτι οὐ φύσει ἀλλὰ νόμῳ ἐστὶ, καὶ ἐφ' ἡμῖν μεταβαλεῖν καὶ ποιῆσαι ἄχρηστον: Magn. Mor. 1. 34. 1194 a 21—23: Plato, Laws 889 E: Xen. Mem. 4. 4. 14, νόμους δ', ἔφη, ὃ Σώκρατες, πῶς ἂν τις ἡγήσαιο σπουδαῖον πρᾶγμα εἶναι ἢ τὸ πείθεσθαι αὐτοῖς, οὓς γε πολλάκις αὐτοὶ οἱ θέμενοι ἀποδοκιμάσαντες μετατίθενται; Νόμος and νόμισμα were both connected in popular etymology with νομίζω. Plato had said in Laws 742 E, πλουσίους δ' αὐτὸ σφόδρα καὶ ἀγαθοὺς ἀδύνατον, οὓς γε δὴ πλουσίους οἱ πολλοὶ καταλέγουσι: λέγουσι δὲ τοὺς κεκτημένους ἐν ὀλίγοις τῶν ἀνθρώπων πλείστου νομίσματος ἀξία κτήματα, ἃ καὶ κακός τις κεκτήτ' ἂν: cp. Rep. 521 A, Laws 736 E,

and Aristot. Rhet. 1. 5. 1361 a 23 sqq. But it is possible that the Cynics, or some of them, are also here referred to. The Eryxias, which is included among the dialogues ascribed to Plato, appears to treat the subject of money and wealth from a Cynical point of view, and we find in it not indeed the exact arguments here used, but arguments pointing to the same conclusion—e.g. 403 D, *τί οὐκ ἐκείνων τὸν λόγον διετέλεσας, ὥς τὰ δοκοῦντα οὐκ ἔστι χρήματα, χρυσίον καὶ ἀργύριον καὶ τᾶλλα τὰ τοιαῦτα*; When we are told (18) that the persons referred to by Aristotle in the passage before us sought wealth and *χρηματιστική* in something other than the things to which these names were commonly given, we are reminded of Eryxias 403 C, *ἐπιστήμην γὰρ τινα παραδίδους τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ ἅμα καὶ πλούσιον αὐτὸν πεποιήκει*, and Diog. Laert. 6. 68, who says of the Cynic Diogenes—*τὴν παιδείαν εἶπε τοῖς μὲν νόις σωφροσύνην, τοῖς δὲ πρεσβυτέροις παραμυθίαν, τοῖς δὲ πένησι πλούτον, τοῖς δὲ πλουσίοις κόσμον εἶναι*. The Cynics seem to have made out knowledge how to use things to be real wealth, and its acquisition true *χρηματιστική*. Compare the doctrine of the Stoics that ‘the wise man alone is rich,’ and see Cic. Paradoxa Stoicorum 6. 3. 51. Zeno of Citium in his ideal polity, which was much coloured by Cynicism, abolished the use of money altogether (Diog. Laert. 7. 33, *νόμισμα δ’ οὐτ’ ἀλλαγῆς ἔνεκεν οἶσθαι δεῖν κατασκευάζειν οὔτε ἀποδημίας ἔνεκεν*). The arguments used by the inquirers here referred to are far from convincing, though Aristotle does not stop to comment on them: money does not necessarily become valueless when deprived of the character of money (cp. *τῶν χρησίων αὐτὸ ὅν*, 1257 a 36), and as Lord Macaulay noted on the margin of his copy of the Politics (*Macmillan’s Magazine*, July 1875, p. 220), ‘a man who has plenty of clothes and drink may die of hunger, yet you would call clothes and drink wealth.’ Aristotle, it is true, speaks (Eth. Nic. 5. 8. 1133 a 31) of money being made ‘useless’ by demonetization, and he also looks upon articles of subsistence as furnishing the truest type of wealth (*ἡ περὶ τὴν τροφήν*, 1258 a 17), but he would hardly go so far as the inquirers he refers to here. Things which serve for clothing and as *ὄργανα* are to him part of true wealth (1256 b 15 sqq.).

οὐδέν. Cp. 5 (8). 6. 1341 b 7: de Gen. An. 4. 4. 771 b 29.

μεταθεμένων. Mr. Welldon: ‘give up a currency and adopt another.’ For this use of the word, compare Fragm. Aristot. 508. 1561 b 4, *ἔλαβεν ὁ Εὐξενος γυναῖκα καὶ συνάκει μεταθίμενος τοῦνομα Ἀριστοξίην*, and the use of the word *μεταστήσωσω* in 7 (5). 1. 1301 b 8. Cp. also Plato, Laws 889 E.

12. οὔτε. See critical note.

14. ἀπορήσει. For this use of the third person, see Bon. Ind. 589 b 47 sqq.: 763 a 25 sq.

15. ἀπολείται. For the future after τοιοῦτον οὐ, cp. 2. 7. 1266 b 36. Compare also Plato, Euthyd. 299 D-E.

τὸν Μίδαν ἐκείνον, sc. ἀπολέσθαι.

20. Bekker reads ἡ δὲ καπηλικὴ ποιητικὴ χρημάτων κ.τ.λ.: thus he evidently, like the Vet. Int., makes ἡ καπηλικὴ the nominative. Susemihl's stopping, however, which I have adopted, seems preferable. With this stopping, the translation will be—'but the other is commercial.' Cp. 1. 10. 1258 a 39.

21. ἀλλ' ἢ. All MSS. have ἀλλ' ἢ or ἀλλ' ἡ, none ἀλλά. The sentence would have been regularly constructed, if it had run—οὐ ποιητικὴ χρημάτων ἀλλ' ἢ διὰ χρημάτων μεταβολῆς, or ποιητικὴ χ. οὐ πάντως, ἀλλὰ διὰ χ. μ. μόνον. Instead of adopting either of these forms, Aristotle anticipates in οὐ πάντως the coming exception and employs both οὐ πάντως and ἀλλ' ἢ: cp. Plato, Protag. 354 B, ἡ ἑχέτι τι ἄλλο τέλος λέγειν . . . ἀλλ' ἢ ἡδονὰς τε καὶ λύπας, where Riddell (Apol. p. 175) remarks, 'the ἄλλο is anticipatory of the exception, and this is also pleonastic.'

22. καὶ δοκεῖ κ.τ.λ. It is thought to be concerned with money, because it operates through exchange and money is the starting-point and goal of exchange. In reality, however, it deals with κτήσις (37), the same subject-matter as οἰκονομικὴ χρηματιστικὴ deals with, though with a different aim. Στοιχείον, 'id quod est simplicissimum, ex quo reliqua conficiuntur' (Bon. Ind. 702 b 32): cp. πορισθέντος οὐδ' ἤδη νομίσματος, 1257 a 41. Πέρας, 'quia contenta haec ratio rei quaerendae est cum coacervat nummos, nec aliud sibi proponit' (Vict.). Cp. Hegesipp. Fragm. (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 4. 479),

Οὐκ, ἀλλὰ τὸ πέρας τῆς μαγειρικῆς, Σῦρε,
εὐρηκέναι πάντων νόμῳ μόνον ἐμέ:

and Posidipp. Fr. (ibid. 4. 521),

Τῆς τέχνης πέρας

τοῦτ' ἔστιν.

Aristotle, however, recognizes a kind of exchange which is carried on independently of money and before money comes into being.

23. καὶ . . . δῆ. See note on 1253 a 18. Here is a further distinction between the καπηλικὴ and the οἰκονομικὴ χρηματιστικὴ. Not only does the former seek wealth by means of exchange alone, but it aims at an unlimited amount. It makes wealth, which is a means, an end,

and as all arts pursue their end to an indeterminate extent, it consequently pursues wealth to an indeterminate extent.

25. εἰς ἄπειρόν ἐστι. Cp. 1258 a 1, εἰς ἄπειρον οὖν ἐκείνης τῆς ἐπιθυμίας οὕσης, and Metaph. Γ. 5. 1010 a 22, εἶναι εἰς ἄπειρον, where Bekker conjectures ἵεναι without necessity: see Bonitz on the passage.

27. ἐκείνο. See above on 1257 a 3.

29. ὁ τοιοῦτος κ.τ.λ., i.e. ὁ χρηματιστικὸς πλοῦτος—'a mass of χρήματα, and especially money, and the quest of this by exchange alone.'

30. τῆς δ' οἰκονομικῆς κ.τ.λ. It is natural, looking to ταύτης τῆς χρηματιστικῆς 28, to explain τῆς οἰκονομικῆς as τῆς οἰκονομικῆς χρηματιστικῆς, and with this view to propose the excision of οὐ, or the substitution of αὐ (Bernays), which the wrong reading of οὖν for αὐ by Π³ in 1268 a 39 might well be used to support. But perhaps no change is necessary, for χρημάτων κτήσεως is very probably that which we are to supply. Transl.: 'but of house-keeping, not money-making, acquisition of commodities there is a measure, for money-making is not the business of the house-keeping acquisition of commodities.' Τοῦτο appears to refer to ὁ τοιοῦτος πλοῦτος κ.τ.λ. Contrast 38, ὥστε δοκεῖ τισὶ τοῦτ' εἶναι τῆς οἰκονομικῆς [χρήσεως τῆς χρηματιστικῆς] ἔργον—i.e. ἡ ἀβξήσις.

32. τῇ μὲν. Vict. 'hac quidem'—'si ita rem attendimus, id est si argumentis ducimur.' The reasoning referred to is that which is set forth in 1257 a 10-31, where we learn that true wealth is that which is necessary to sustenance and for the purposes of the household generally, and that this kind of wealth is limited by the needs of the household (cp. also 1256 b 26-37). Lamb., however, followed by Bernays, translates 'huic quidem'—i.e. for the οἰκονομικὴ χρηματιστικὴ—not rightly, as it seems to me.

33. ἐπὶ δὲ κ.τ.λ., 'but we see the opposite occurring in the experience of life.' For συμβαίνειν ἐπὶ, cp. de Gen. An. 2. 5. 741 b 19, συμβαίνει δ' ἐπὶ πάντων τὸ τελευταῖον γινόμενον πρῶτον ἀπολείπειν, τὸ δὲ πρῶτον τελευταῖον. Aristotle is met by a contrariety between ὁ λόγος and τὰ γινόμενα (or τὰ συμβαίνοντα), and we might expect that he would apply the famous principle of de Gen. An. 3. 10. 760 b 27 sqq., ἐκ μὲν οὖν τοῦ λόγου τὰ περὶ τὴν γένεσιν τῶν μελιττῶν τοῦτον ἔχει τὸν τρόπον, καὶ ἐκ τῶν συμβαίνειν δοκούντων περὶ αὐτάς· οὐ μὴν ἐληπτὰ γέ τὰ συμβαίνοντα ἱκανῶς, ἀλλ' εἰάν ποτε ληφθῇ, τότε τῇ αἰσθήσει μᾶλλον ἢ τῷ λόγῳ πιστευτέον, καὶ τοῖς λόγοις, εἰάν ὁμολογούμενα δεικνύωσι τοῖς φαινομένοις. But the question here is what ought to be and not what is, and τὰ γινόμενα are not as decisive as in a problem of

natural history; men's action, as Aristotle proceeds to point out, is in this matter the offspring of mistake.

δρῶ(μεν). See critical note.

πάντες γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Cp. Xen. de Vectig. 4. 7, καὶ γὰρ δὴ ἐπιπλα μὲν, ἐπειδὴν ἱκανὰ τις κτήσεται τῇ οἰκίᾳ, οὐ μάλᾳ ἔτι προσωοῦνται· ἀργύριον δὲ οὐδεὶς πω οὕτω πολλὸν ἐκτήσατο, ὥστε μὴ ἔτι προσδεῖσθαι.

35. αἴτιον δὲ κ.τ.λ. What is αὐτῶν? I incline to think, not the two kinds of χρηματιστική, but the two kinds of χρημάτων κτήσεις (30), or in other words, the two uses of χρηματιστική. The reason why men act as if wealth were subject to no limit is the mutual proximity and similarity of the two ways of using χρηματιστική. 'For either use of χρηματιστική, being of the same thing, overlaps the other, so as to seem one and the same; for property—the subject-matter of both (cp. 1. 9. 1257 a 13 sq.)—is applied by both to (or has to do with) the same use, but not with the same aim, the aim of the one mode of using it being its increase and that of the other something quite different.' The two kinds of χρηματιστική are, in fact, only two different uses of the same science, or even an identical use, only with a different aim. 'Ἐκατέρα, which is the reading of all known MSS., though three MSS. of the Vet. Int. (b g h) have 'utrique pecuniativae,' seems to be placed where it is to bring out the antithesis to τοῦ αὐτοῦ οὐσα more sharply. Sepulveda appears to have found ἑκατέρας in some MSS. (see critical note on 1257 b 36). There is certainly some strangeness in the immediate sequence of ἑκατέρα ἢ χρήσις and τῆς αὐτῆς χρήσεως, and the genitive τῆς αὐτῆς χρήσεως is perplexing. But if we accept, with Bern. and Sus., Götting's emendation τῆς γὰρ αὐτῆς ἐστὶ κτήσεως χρήσις, we are not quit of our difficulties, for τῆς αὐτῆς κτήσεως is not a satisfactory expression. Perhaps the reduction of the two uses of χρηματιστική mentioned in 35–36 to the one use not κατὰ ταῦτόν of 37 may be no more than the word ἐπαλλάττει prepares us for. For the phrase τῆς γὰρ αὐτῆς ἐστὶ χρήσεως κτήσεις, Soph. El. 11. 171 b 29 may be compared (the passage also illustrates οὐ κατὰ ταῦτόν)—καὶ τῶν λόγων τῶν αὐτῶν μὲν εἰσιν οἱ φιλέριδες καὶ σοφισταί, ἀλλ' οὐ τῶν αὐτῶν ἕνεκεν· καὶ λόγος ὁ αὐτὸς μὲν ἔσται σοφιστικὸς καὶ ἐριστικός, ἀλλ' οὐ κατὰ ταῦτόν, ἀλλ' ἢ μὲν νίκης φαινομένης, ἐριστικός, ἢ δὲ σοφίας, σοφιστικός. Cp. also Pol. 4 (7). 5. 1326 b 33, ὅταν ὅλως περὶ κτήσεως καὶ τῆς περὶ τὴν οὐσίαν εὐπορίας συμβαίνει ποιεῖσθαι μνείαν, πῶς δεῖ καὶ τίνα τρόπον ἔχειν πρὸς τὴν χρήσιν αὐτήν; In 7 (5). 2. 1302 a 37 we have ὃν δύο μὲν ἐστὶ ταῦτα τοῖς ἐρμηνέοις, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὡσαύτως.

38. ὥστε κ.τ.λ. takes up ἐπαλλάττει: the two uses of χρηματιστική overlap, and so the end of the κατηλική χρήσις—the increase of

property—is taken to be the end of the *οικονομική χρῆσις* (for perhaps it is more natural to supply *χρῆσις* here than *χρηματιστική*). Householders are thus led to follow the example of *οἱ χρηματιζόμενοι* in the use of property and to make its indefinite increase their aim. Aristotle seems, however, after all (40 sqq.) to trace the confusion of the *οικονομική χρῆσις* of property with the *καπηλική χρῆσις* of it to something more than the *ἐπάλλαξις* of the two—to a wrong view of the purpose of life and of the nature of *τὸ εὖ ζῆν*. Either men forget everything else for mere existence (*τὸ ζῆν*), or they erroneously take *τὸ εὖ ζῆν* to consist in bodily enjoyment. The same two contrasted classes of misusers of property appear in 4 (7). 5. 1326 b 36 sqq., and in a saying ascribed to Aristotle by Plutarch (*de Cupiditate Divit.* 8. 527 A), *σὺ δὲ οὐκ ἀκούεις, φήσομεν, Ἀριστοτέλους λέγοντος, ὅτι οἱ μὲν οὐ χρώνται [τοῖς χρήμασιν], οἱ δὲ παραχρῶνται* (I owe this quotation to an unpublished essay by the late Mr. R. Shute). As to the former of the two classes, cp. *Eth. Nic.* 4. 1. 1120 a 2, *δοκεῖ δ' ἀπώλειά τις αὐτοῦ εἶναι καὶ ἡ τῆς οὐσίας φθορά, ὡς τοῦ ζῆν διὰ τούτων ὄντος*, and *Dio Chrysost.* *Or.* 6. 209 R. As to the misapprehension of *τὸ εὖ ζῆν* by the second, cp. *Plato, Rep.* 329 A, *ἀγανακτοῦσιν ὡς μεγάλων τιῶν ἀπεστερημένοι, καὶ τότε μὲν (while in the enjoyment of the pleasures of youth) εὖ ζῶντες, νῦν δὲ οὐδὲ ζῶντες*: *Eurip. Fragm.* 284. 3–6: *Hyperid. Fragm.* 209 Blass, *μὴ δύνασθαι καλῶς ζῆν, μὴ μαθῶν τὰ καλὰ τὰ ἐν τῷ βίῳ* (and these *Hyperides* notoriously interpreted in this way): *Theopomp. Fr.* 260. Our own expression ‘living well’ is, however, illustration enough.

40. *τὴν κ.τ.λ.*, ‘their wealth in money’: see below on 1259 b 19.
1258 a. 1. *εἰς ἀπειρον . . . οὔσης*. See note on 1257 b 25.

2. *ὅσοι δὲ καὶ κ.τ.λ.*, ‘and those who do aim at’; or perhaps the sense of *καί* is ‘at all’ (see *Riddell, Apology of Plato*, p. 168).

4. *καὶ τοῦτ'*, i. e. not only *τὸ ζῆν*, but also *τὸ πρὸς τὰς σωματικὰς ἀπολαύσεις*.

6. *ἐλήλυθεν*. For this use of the word, see 8 (6). 2. 1317 b 14 sq. and *Bon. Ind.* 288 a 52 sq.

10. *τῶν δυνάμεων* here seems to include not only arts like *στρατηγική*, but also virtues like *ἀνδρία*: contrast *Eth. Nic.* 2. 4. 1105 b 20 sqq. and 5. 1. 1129 a 11 sqq.

οὐ κατὰ φύσιν. *Plato* (*Rep.* 346) had already insisted that pay is the end of the art of payment, not of medicine, or building, or navigation (cp. *Rep.* 342 D, *ὡμολόγηται γὰρ ὁ ἀκριβὴς ἱατρός σωματῶν εἶναι ἀρχὼν, ἀλλ' οὐ χρηματιστής*). There is perhaps a reminiscence of the passage before us in *Magn. Mor.* 1. 25. 1192 a 15 sqq., and possibly in *Lucian, Cynicus* 545.

11. **στρατηγικῆς**. Generals of the type of Chares (see Theopomp. ap. Athen. Deipn. 532 b sq.) were perhaps present to Aristotle's mind. Aristotle does not refer to the ways of contemporary politicians, but he might well have done so: see Prof. S. H. Butcher, Demosthenes (p. 13), who cites Demosth. Olynth. 3. c. 26 and Isocr. Areopag. § 25. Sophists also used their *φαινομένη σοφία* with a view to *χρηματισμός*, Soph. El. 11. 171 b 27 sqq.

13. **τούτο**, i.e. *τὸ χρηματίζεσθαι*, which must be supplied from *χρηματιστικός*.

τέλος, 'the end of all these *δυνάμεις*.' Cp. 8 (6). 2. 1317 b 5 sq. for a very similar expression.

15. **δι' αἰτίαν τίνα κ.τ.λ.** It has been explained (1257 b 40—1258 a 14) that men come to need the unsound kind of *χρηματιστική*, because they live for *τὸ ζῆν* or for *τὸ εὖ ζῆν* wrongly interpreted.

17. **ἡ περὶ τὴν τροφήν**. The sound form of *χρηματιστική* is, however, concerned with the acquisition of many things besides *τροφή*—e.g. *ἰσθῆς*, *ὄργανα*, *δοῦλοι*, as is explained in c. 8. 1256 b 15 sqq. Still Aristotle viewed articles of subsistence as the type of true wealth, herein apparently following the inquirers referred to in 1257 b 10 sqq., and trifling inexactnesses are not rare in the Politics, so that this one need not disturb us.

19. **ἐξ ἀρχῆς**, c. 8. 1256 a 4, though there no reference had been C. 10. made to *πολιτική*. It was evidently a common view not only that the main function of the head of a household was to add to the household income, but also that the statesman's main business was to provide the State with as large a revenue as possible: cp. c. 11. 1259 a 35, *διόπερ τιwες καὶ πολιτεύονται τῶν πολιτευομένων ταῦτα μόνον*, and see the account given of the *πολίτης ἀγαθός* in Rhet. ad Alex. 39. 1446 b 33, *ὅστις προσόδους παρασκευάζει πλείστας, τῶν ἰδιωτῶν μηδένα δημεύων*, and Theopompus' picture of Eubulus (Fr. 96: Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 1. 293)—*Εὐβουλος . . . δημαγωγὸς ἦν ἐπιφανίστατος, ἐπιμελής τε καὶ φιλόπονος, ἀργυρίων τε συχνὸν πορίζων τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις διένειμε διὰ καὶ τὴν πόλιν ἐπὶ τῆς τούτου πολιτείας ἀνάνδροτάτην καὶ ῥαθυμοτάτην συνέβη γενέσθαι*. Aristotle's object here is to correct these erroneous conceptions of the office of the Statesman and the head of a household.

20. **οὐ**, not *οὐκ*, though preceding *ἀλλά*, as in 1258 a 33 and 3. 14. 1284 b 39. 'Οὐ is used before a vowel without the final *κ* when it stands at the end of a clause and when it is emphatic: cf. Xen. Hell. 2. 2. 2: Cyr. 2. 3. 8, 5. 5. 31, 8. 1. 5: Mem. 4. 7. 7' (Holden, Oeconomicus of Xenophon, p. 191). For the transition to *ἀλλά*, cp. 1258 a 33: 3. 7. 1279 b 1: 6 (4). 8. 1294 a 2.

21. *τοῦτο*, not probably *ἡ χρηματιστική*, though this would harmonize well with c. 8. 1256 b 28, but *χρήματα* as in 35 (*μάλιστα δέ, καθάπερ εἴρηται πρότερον, δεῖ φύσει τοῦτο ὑπάρχειν*). For the thought that the statesman has not, any more than the weaver, to produce the material on which he exercises his art, cp. 4 (7). 4. 1325 b 40 sqq.: 13. 1332 a 28. Cp. also Plato, *Laws* 889 A. Aristotle speaks somewhat differently in *Phys.* 2. 2. 194 b 7, *ἐν μὲν οὖν τοῖς κατὰ τέχνην ἡμεῖς ποιούμεν τὴν ὕλην τοῦ ἔργου ἕνεκα, ἐν δὲ τοῖς φυσικοῖς ὑπάρχει οὐσα.*

ὥσπερ γὰρ καὶ . . . οὕτω καί. See Sus.¹, *Ind. Gramm.* *ὥσπερ.*

23. *τροφὴν κ.τ.λ.* 'So for sustenance nature must make over land or sea or something else.' Cp. *Xen. Mem.* 4. 3. 5 sq., and *Antiphon, Tetral.* 3. 1. 2. For a similar use of *τροφὴν*, cp. *Xen. Oecon.* 17. 14, *ἃ δὲ ἐκείναι ἐργασάμεναι τροφὴν καταβῶνται.* For *ἄλλο τι*, cp. 8. c. 1256 a 37, *λίμνας καὶ ἔλη καὶ ποταμοὺς ἢ θάλατταν τοιαύτην.* The food of animals, indeed, is rather that which comes from earth and water, than earth and water (*de Gen. An.* 3. 11. 762 b 12); earth and water are food rather for plants (*ibid.*): still food is said to be a mixture of earth and water in *de Part. An.* 3. 5. 668 b 11.

24. *ἐκ δὲ τούτων κ.τ.λ.* Schneider, Bonitz (according to Sus. Qu. Crit. p. 356), and Susemihl himself explain *ἐκ τούτων* here as = *μετὰ ταῦτα*, and there is much to be said for their view, though perhaps this use of *ἐκ τούτων* is more common in Xenophon than in Aristotle (as to Plato, see Riddell, *Apol.* p. 162). This rendering certainly has the merit of softening the harshness of the juxtaposition of *τούτων* and *ταῦτα*. But I incline on the whole to think that in the context in which it stands *ἐκ τούτων* means 'starting with this provision.' *Ταῦτα* must mean 'food,' not 'land, sea, etc.,' for it is the function of *οἰκονομική* to deal with the former, not the latter; the word is perhaps in the plural because there are many kinds of food—*τροφή ἐκ γῆς, τροφή ἐκ θαλάττης κ.τ.λ.*

26. *γνῶναι.* Cp. *Phys.* 2. 2. 194 a 36, *δύο δὲ αἱ ἀρχοῦσαι τῆς ὕλης καὶ αἱ γνωρίζουσαι τέχναι, ἥ τε χρωμένη καὶ τῆς ποιητικῆς ἢ ἀρχιτεκτονικῆς.* The ship-captain (representing ἡ χρωμένη), *ποιῶν τι τὸ εἶδος τοῦ πηδάλιου, γνωρίζει καὶ ἐπιτάττει· ὁ δὲ (the ἀρχιτέκτων who superintends its construction), ἐκ ποίου ξύλου καὶ ποίων κινήσεων ἔσται.* The claims of *ὁ χρώμενος* to be credited with knowledge are also maintained in *Pol.* 3. 11. 1282 a 17 sq.

27. *καὶ γάρ.* 'For, if this were not so.'

31. For *ἐπεὶ* followed by *οὕτω*, cp. 1253 b 23–31. The householder must know bad commodities from good, but he need not know even the sound methods of producing or acquiring them. Cp. *Cic. de Rep.* 5. 3. 5.

33. τῶν χρημάτων. The article is probably added, because the meaning is 'the commodities essential to the household.'

34. The use of the word *μάλιστα* implies that occasionally the means of subsistence may not *φύσει ὑπάρχειν*, in which case the householder must provide them as best he can. The territory of the State may be so infertile and the sea so barren of fish, that a resort to other modes of acquiring sustenance than the obtainment of vegetable and animal food from the soil and sea may be inevitable. Aristotle's meaning may be illustrated by the instance of Aegina: cp. Ephor. ap. Strab. p. 376, *ἐμπόριον γὰρ γενέσθαι, διὰ τὴν λυπρότητα τῆς χώρας τῶν ἀνθρώπων θαλαττουργούντων ἐμπορικῶς*.

πρότερον, 1258 a 23.

35. The proof that it is for Nature to supply the animal once brought into the world with food, is that every creature finds its food in the unexhausted residuum of the matter from which it takes its origin, or in other words receives it from the hands of Nature (c. 8. 1256 b 7 sqq.: see note on 1256 b 12). So we read in *de Gen. et Corr.* 2. 8. 335 a 10, *ἅπαντα μὲν γὰρ τρέφεται τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἐξ ὧν περ ἐστίν*. Not only is the earliest food used by an animal born with him and the gift of Nature, but animals subsist throughout life on the products of the earth and water of which they are made (*Meteor.* 4. 4. 382 a 6 sqq.). Cp. *Oecon.* 1. 2. 1343 a 30, *ἔτι δὲ καὶ τῶν κατὰ φύσιν [ἢ γεωργικῇ]· φύσει γὰρ ἀπὸ τῆς μητρὸς ἡ τροφή πᾶσιν ἐστίν, ὥστε καὶ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς*, and *Lucr.* 2. 1156,

Sed genuit tellus eadem quae nunc alit ex se:

Aristotle, however, would say 'land and water,' and would speak not of the mother, but of the unused residuum as the true source of food. But, if food is always won from land and water, all other commodities, it is implied, should be sought from the same quarter, and the Science of Supply should thus procure them.

38. πᾶσιν. Cp. c. 8. 1256 b 7, *ἡ μὲν οὖν τοιαύτη κτήσις ὑπ' αὐτῆς φαίνεται τῆς φύσεως δεδομένη πᾶσιν* (i. e. πᾶσι τοῖς ζῴοις), though here *πᾶσι* seems to mean 'for all human beings,' as in c. 2. 1253 a 30.

2. ἀπ' ἀλλήλων stands in contrast to ἀπὸ τῶν καρπῶν καὶ τῶν ζῴων. 1258 b. Cp. *Rhet.* 2. 4. 1381 a 21, *διὰ τοὺς ἐλευθερίους καὶ τοὺς ἀνδρείους τιμῶσι καὶ τοὺς δικαίους· τοιοῦτους δ' ὑπολαμβάνουσι τοὺς μὴ ἀφ' ἐτέρων ζῶντας· τοιοῦτοι δ' οἱ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐργάζεσθαι, καὶ τούτων οἱ ἀπὸ γεωργίας καὶ τῶν ἄλλων οἱ αὐτουργοὶ μάλιστα*. The idea is still further worked out in *Oecon.* 1. 2. 1343 a 27, *ἡ δὲ γεωργικὴ μάλιστα [κτήσεως ἐπιμέλεια] ἐστὶ δικαία· οὐ γὰρ ἀπ' ἀνθρώπων οὐθ' ἐκόντων, ὥσπερ καπηλεία καὶ αἱ μισθαρνικαί, οὐτ' ἀκόντων, ὥσπερ αἱ πολεμικαί*. Here the writer has before him Plato, *Soph.* 219 D.

ἡ ὀβολοστατική, 'the trade of a petty usurer' (L. and S.): see also Büchschenschütz, Besitz und Erwerb, p. 501, n. 7, who quotes from Etymolog. Magn. 725. 13, ὀβολοστάτας γοῦν οἱ Ἀττικοὶ τοὺς ὀλίγα δανεῖζοντας ἔλεγον ὑπερβολικῶς. Aristotle's objection seems to apply as much to lenders of large sums at usury as to lenders of small; but we find τοκισταὶ κατὰ μικρὸν ἐπὶ πολλῷ singled out as objects of obloquy in the Nicomachean Ethics also (4. 3. 1121 b 34). Cp. M. Cato, de Re Rustica, praef.: maiores nostri hoc sic habuerunt, et ita in legibus posuerunt, furem dupli condemnari, feneratorem quadrupli; quanto peiorem civem existimarint feneratorem quam furem, hinc licet existimari. See also Cic. de Offic. 2. 25. 89, and Sandys and Paley on Demosth. contra Steph. 1. c. 70.

3. διὰ τὸ κ.τ.λ., 'because profit is acquired' (literally perhaps, 'the acquisition of profit results': cp. for κτήσις, 1257 b 30 and 1256 a 19), 'from money taken by itself, and not from exchange, for which money was introduced.' For the ellipse of ἀπὸ τούτου before ἐφ' ὅπερ ἐπορίσθη, cp. 1. 3. 1253 b 3: 5 (8). 5. 1340 a 27: 4 (7). 13. 1332 a 29-30. In usury, according to Aristotle here, the profit comes from money taken by itself, not subjected to any process of exchange, nor converted into corn or any other commodity—the use for which it is intended. It was introduced to serve as a medium of exchange, not to grow, but usury makes it grow. It makes money come out of money, and hence the Greek word for interest (τόκος), for as children are like their parents, so is interest money no less than the principal which begets it. Things, however, should be used for the purpose for which they exist (c. 9. 1258 a 10); hence this mode of acquisition is in an especial degree unnatural. Νόμισμα νομίματος is perhaps, like Δημοσθένης Δημοσθένους, meant to express a filial relation. The nature of Interest on Money seems to be better understood in c. 11 (see below on 21).

- C. 11. 9. We now come to a chapter differing both in matter and manner from the chapters which precede and follow it, and for which we can hardly be said to have been prepared in advance. A friend has expressed to me a doubt of its authenticity, and even if we hold it to be Aristotelian, it might be (as some other passages of the Politics appear to be) a subsequent addition, due either to Aristotle himself or to some succeeding editor. The question deserves examination, and it will be well to notice here a few considerations on either side.

The opening words of c. 8 promise an inquiry into all kinds of property and all forms of the Science of Supply. The question

whether the Science of Supply is a part of the Science of Household Management is here indeed singled out as the first question to be discussed, but we gather that other questions also will be treated. Still no reference is made to a division of the inquiry into a part relating to τὰ πρὸς τὴν γνῶσιν and a part relating to τὰ πρὸς τὴν χρῆσιν. C. 11, however, starts with this distinction. Ἐπεὶ δὲ τὰ πρὸς τὴν γνῶσιν διωρίκαμεν ἰκανῶς, τὰ πρὸς τὴν χρῆσιν δεῖ διελεῖν (c. 11. *init.*). We have learnt—this seems to be the meaning—to distinguish the sound and unsound forms of the Science of Supply. We have also learnt how far the οἰκονομικός has, as such, to concern himself with the Science of Supply; but we have not yet learnt in any degree how to practise this Science, nor which of its branches are most safe or most profitable or most alien to a freeman, nor generally what are the principles of successful money-making. There is nothing un-Aristotelian in giving advice to lovers of money-making (τοῖς τιμῶσι τὴν χρηματιστικὴν, c. 11. 1259 a 5), for Aristotle disapproves of the tyranny and the extreme democracy at least as strongly as he disapproves of a money-making spirit, yet he advises both these constitutions how best to secure their own continuance. Besides, States may find the inquiries of this chapter useful (1259 a 33 sq.). And if to us instruction how to farm and trade seems to fall outside the province of a treatise on Household Management and Politics, this was not the view of Aristotle's time, for Xenophon had sketched in his *Oeconomicus* how a farm was to be managed; the only novelty in this chapter is that it studies the principles of commercial success.

And then again, if Aristotle does not prepare us in c. 8 or elsewhere in the First Book for a consideration of τὰ πρὸς τὴν χρῆσιν in relation to the Science of Supply, it is nevertheless the case that in entering on the question of slavery (c. 3. 1253 b 14 sqq.) he had announced his aim to be not only to arrive at conclusions on the subject better than those commonly held, but also to throw light on the use to be made of the slave (τὰ τε πρὸς τὴν ἀναγκαίαν χρῆσιν ἰδωμεν, 1253 b 15), and a similar inquiry respecting χρηματιστική is not unnatural. Throughout the *Politics* τὸ χρήσιμον, no less than τὸ ὀρθόν, is kept in view (see e.g. 2. 1. 1260 b 32 sq.: 6 (4). 1. 1288 b 35 sqq.).

On the other hand, the account given of χρηματιστική in c. 11 differs in many respects from that given in cc. 8-10. Three kinds of χρηματιστική are now distinguished, not two only as before—the natural kind (or, as it is also now called, ἡ οἰκιστάτη), ἡ μεταβλητική, and a kind midway between the two of which we have heard

nothing in cc. 8-10, and we find labouring for hire (*μισθαρνία*) and lending money at interest (*τοκισμός*) ranged under *ἡ μεταβλητικὴ χρηματιστική*, whereas in cc. 8-10 nothing has been said of *μισθαρνία*, and *ὀβολοστατική* has been described as winning money, not from any process of exchange, but from the barren metal itself. The inclusion, however, of the work of the *τεχνίτης*, as a form of *μισθαρνία*, under *ἡ μεταβλητικὴ χρηματιστική* is quite borne out by 1. 13. 1260 b 2, where *τεχνίται* are said not to exist by nature, though it does not seem to agree with the recognition of the *τεχνίτης* elsewhere (4 (7). 8. 1328 b 21: 6 (4). 4. 1291 a 1 sqq.) as one of the necessary elements of a State. The reference to writers on the subject and to *τὰ λεγόμενα σποράδην* (1258 b 39 sqq.), again, is in accordance with the advice given in Rhet. 1. 4. 1359 b 30 sqq., and this passage of c. 11 may well have been present to the mind of the writer of the so-called Second Book of the *Oeconomics*, whoever he was (see *Oecon.* 2. 1346 a 26 sqq.). Hieronymus of Rhodes, as has been observed elsewhere, may possibly have had a passage from this chapter (1259 a 9 sqq.) before him. The writer of the sketch or epitome of the Political Theory of the Peripatetics which is preserved in the *Eclogae* of Stobaeus (2. 6. 17) would seem to be acquainted with the earlier part of c. 11 down to the notice of *μεταλλευτική*, for he says, *δὲ δὲ καὶ πολλῶν ἔμπειρον δεῖν εἶναι τὸν οἰκονομικόν, γεωργίας προβατείας μεταλλείας, ἵνα τοὺς λυσιστελεστάτους ἅμα καὶ δικαιοτάτους καρποὺς διαγινώσκῃ*: he may well have been acquainted with the later part also, though he does not mention anything from it. The following passage from the First Book of the *Oeconomics* may likewise be based on the teaching of c. 11—*κτήσεως δὲ πρώτη ἐπιμέλεια ἢ κατὰ φύσιν κατὰ φύσιν δὲ γεωργικὴ προτέρα, καὶ δεύτεραι ὅσαι ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς, ὅσον μεταλλευτικὴ καὶ εἴ τις ἄλλη τοιαύτη* (c. 2. 1343 a 25 sqq.).

On the whole, I incline to think that this chapter is Aristotelian, and perhaps coeval with the rest of the First Book.

10. *πάντα δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα κ.τ.λ.* Stahr translates: 'auf diesem ganzen Gebiet hat freilich die Theorie freies Spiel, während die Praxis an nothwendige Bedingungen gebunden ist.' Bern. and Sus. follow him in this translation, and Mr. Welldon's version is—'it is to be observed, however, that in all such matters speculation is free, while in practice there are limiting conditions.' Vict. however translates—'cuncta autem huiusmodi contemplationem habent libero homine dignam, usum vero necessarium'—and I incline to this view of the passage. We have *ἐλευθέρᾳ ἀγορᾷ*, 4 (7). 12. 1331 a 32: *ἐλευθέρᾳ ἐπιστήμῃ*, *Metaph.* A. 2. 982 b 27.

Prof. Tyrrell (*Hermathena*, 12. 28) 'thinks it will be found that *ἐλεύθερος* when of two terminations always means "liberalis," not "liber."' The aim of the remark will then be to distinguish between what is liberal and what is not so in relation to these matters—an aim which appears also below, 1258 b 34–39, as well as in the contrast of *ἐντιμότερα* and *ἀναγκαύτερα ἔργα*, c. 7. 1255 b 28, and in 5 (8). 2. 1337 b 15 sqq. We are told, in fact, that though speculation about matters relating to the practice of *χρηματιστική* is liberal, the exercise of the arts which fall under the head of *χρηματιστική* is not so. So in *de Part. An.* 1. 5. 645 a 5 sqq. Aristotle tells us that he will treat of Zoology *μηδὲν παραλιπὼν εἰς δύναμιν μήτε ἀτιμότερον μήτε τιμώτερον* καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς μὴ κεχαρισμένοις αὐτῶν (sc. τῶν ζῴων) πρὸς τὴν αἴσθησιν, κατὰ τὴν θεωρίαν ὁμοῦς ἢ δημιουργήσασα φύσις ἀμηχάνους ἡδονὰς παρέχει τοῖς δυναμένοις τὰς αἰτίας γνωρίζειν καὶ φύσει φιλοσόφους. It appears from Plato, *Laws* 889 D, that there were those who ranked agriculture very high among the sciences.

12. *ἔστι δὲ κ.τ.λ.* Varro in his *De Re Rustica* (lib. 2. praef. 5) gives a similar account of the qualifications which a farmer should possess:—*quarum* (sc. *agriculturae et pastionis*) *quoniam societas inter se magna . . . qui habet praedium, habere utramque debet disciplinam, et agriculturae et pecoris pascendi, et etiam villaticae pastionis: ex ea enim quoque fructus tolli possunt non mediocres, ex ornithonibus ac leporariis et piscinis.* Compare also the opening lines of Virgil's *Georgics*, and Cicero *de Senectute* 15. 54. The following passage of Varro, *de Re Rustica* (2. 1. 16) is very similar to that before us—in *qua regione quamque potissimum pascas, et quando, et quois? ut capras in montuosis potius locis et fruticibus, quam in herbidis campis, equas contra; neque eadem loca aestiva et hiberna idonea omnibus ad pascendum.* It will be noticed that Aristotle places 'res pecuaria' before 'agricultura,' perhaps because pastoral farming long prevailed more extensively in Greece than agriculture (Büchschütz, *Besitz und Erwerb*, pp. 208 sqq., 313), perhaps because it was more lucrative (cp. *Cic. de Offic.* 2. 25. 89), perhaps because animals like the horse and ox deserve precedence. We hear nothing from him as to the employment of slaves as a source of profit.

χρήσιμα (cp. 30, *ἀκάρπων μὲν χρησίμων δέ*) apparently takes up τὰ πρὸς τὴν χρῆσιν and bears probably somewhat the same meaning as in *Rhet.* 1. 5. 1361 a 15, *ταῦτα δὲ πάντα καὶ ἀσφαλῆ καὶ ἐλευθέρια καὶ χρήσιμα* ἔστι δὲ *χρήσιμα* μὲν μᾶλλον τὰ κάρπια, ἐλευθέρια δὲ τὰ πρὸς ἀπολαύσιν κάρπια δὲ λέγω ἀφ' ὧν αἱ πρόσοδοι, ἀπολαυστικά δὲ ἀφ' ὧν μηδὲν παρὰ τὴν χρῆσιν γίγνεται, ὃ τι καὶ ἄξιον.

κτῆματα is used in 2. 1. 1261 a 5 in the same sense as *κήσεις*, 1261 a 8, but here it seems to be used in a sense exclusive of *γεωργία* (cp. 17), and the illustrations which follow seem to show that its meaning is 'farm-stock' (Vict. 'pecora'). Horses, oxen, sheep, and some other animals (15) are included under *κτῆματα*, but not, it would appear, the water-animals and birds referred to in 19.

13. **πῶς**. Vict. 'quomodo habita et curata.'

14. **κτῆσις ποία τις**, 'what course should be followed in the getting of horses,' so as to secure the maximum of profit. *Κτῆσις* includes both breeding and purchase: *ποία* refers to quantity, quality, kind of animal, etc.

15. **τῶν λοιπῶν ζώων**, e. g. mules, asses, swine, goats. As to the animals referred to, see above on 12.

πρὸς ἄλληλα. Vict. 'oportet quasi conferre ipsa inter se, videreque ex equorumne gregibus sive armentis boum maiores utilitates capiantur.'

18. **ἤδη**. Cp. de Gen. An. 2. 6. 742 a 19, τὸ δὲ πρότερον ἤδη πολλαχῶς ἐστίν: ibid. 2. 6. 742 b 33, ἀρχὴ δ' ἐν μὲν τοῖς ἀκινήτοις τὸ τί ἐστίν, ἐν δὲ τοῖς γινομένοις ἤδη πλείους: ibid. 1. 20. 729 a 19, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ συνιστάντος πρώτου ἐξ ἐνὸς ἤδη ἐν γίνεται μόνον. These passages may serve to illustrate the use of *ἤδη* in the text, though the word does not perhaps bear quite the same meaning in all of them. In the passage before us it may be roughly rendered by 'again.'

ψιλῆς . . . πεφυτευμένης. The distribution of the two kinds of cultivation throughout Greece is well described by Büchschütz, *Besitz und Erwerb*, pp. 293-6. As to Italy, cp. Varro de Re Rustica, 1. 2. 6: contra quid in Italia utensile non modo non nascitur, sed etiam non egregium fit? quod far conferam Campano? quod triticum Appulo? quod vinum Falerno? quod oleum Venafro? Non arboribus consita Italia est, ut tota pomarium videatur? An Phrygia magis vitibus cooperta, quam Homerus appellat ἀμπελῆεσσαν, quam haec? aut Argos, quod idem poeta πολύπυρον?

μελιττουργίας. As Vict. points out, honey was of more importance to the ancients than to us. See Büchschütz, p. 228 sq., who remarks that 'though sugar was known to the ancients, they used it solely for medical purposes, so that the only material they possessed for sweetening food was honey.' Plato's citizens in the *Laws* are to be γεωργοὶ καὶ νομεῖς καὶ μελιττουργοί (842 D).

19. **καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζώων**. Should we translate 'and concerning the other animals, whether water-animals or winged,' or should we supply 'the management of' before 'the other animals' from the

latter portions of the words *γεωργίας, μελιττουργίας*? Perhaps we are intended to supply these words. Aristotle seems here to refer, not to fish and fowl in a wild state, but to poultry-houses and fish-preserves. In his time these appurtenances of a farm would be on a simple and moderate scale, wholly unlike that of the 'villatica pastio' in the days when Roman luxury was at its height (Varro, *de Re Rustica* 3. 3. 6 sqq.). Yet a great *ιχθυοτροφεῖον* existed at Agrigentum early in the fifth century before Christ (Diod. 11. 25. 4).

20. *τῆς . . . οἰκειοτάτης χρηματιστικῆς*, 'of the Science of Supply in its most undistorted form.' The word *οἰκίος* is used by Aristotle in connexion with *κύριος* and with *κατὰ φύσιν*, and in contradistinction to *βίη* (see Bon. Ind. s. v.). Cp. also c. 9. 1257 a 12, *οὐ τὴν οἰκίαν χρῆσιν, οὐ γὰρ ἀλλαγῆς ἔσκεν γέγονεν*.

21. *ταῦτα μόρια καὶ πρῶτα*. *Μόρια* is sometimes used, like *μέρη* (Bon. Ind. 455 b 40 sqq.), of 'ea quae naturam alicuius rei constituunt ac distinguunt' (Bon. Ind. 473 b 55 sqq.), and this would seem to be its meaning here. The simplest elements of a thing are often called *πρῶτα*, as in Pol. 1. 3. 1253 b 5, *πρῶτα καὶ ἐλάχιστα μέρη οἰκίας* (see Bon. Ind. 652 b 42 sqq.), but here *πρῶτα* appears rather to mean 'the primary or leading elements' (cp. *μέγιστον* 22): see Bon. Ind. 653 a 26 sqq., '*πρῶτος* significat ipsam per se rei notionem et naturam (ut quae iam a principio sit et rem constituat).' So we have in 28, *τῆς πρώτης χρηματιστικῆς* (cp. Oecon. 1. 2. 1343 a 25 sqq.), and in *de Caelo* 1. 3. 270 b 2, *τὸ πρῶτον τῶν σωμάτων*. The account now given of the various forms of the *οἰκειοτάτη χρηματιστική*, which is referred to in 28 as *ἡ κατὰ φύσιν*, is not harmonized with the account given in c. 8 of the *βίη* included under the natural *χρηματιστική*: for instance, we now hear nothing of *ληστεία*. Aristotle, however, here mentions only *τὰ πρῶτα*.

τῆς δὲ μεταβλητικῆς. Already in c. 10. 1258 b 1 the unsound *χρηματιστική* has been called *μεταβλητική*, instead of *καπηλική*, and here the change is especially necessary, for *ἐμπορία* could hardly be brought under *καπηλική* without some sense of strangeness. 'Exchanging' comprises, we are told, the transport and sale of commodities (*ἐμπορία*), and the letting-out of money (*τοκισμός*) or of labour, skilled or unskilled (*μισθαρνία*). 'This classification,' says Büchschütz (*Besitz und Erwerb*, p. 455), 'nearly approaches that accepted by modern political economy, inasmuch as the first of the three departments has to do with traffic by way of sale, and the second and third with traffic by way of letting, the object let out being in the one case capital (money, land, etc.),

and in the other labour.' Aristotle, however, makes no reference to the letting of land. Büchschütz points out that in Plato's Sophist (219 D) *μισθωσις* is already brought under *μεταβλητική* (Besitz und Erwerb, p. 251 n.). He also compares Plato, Rep. 371 E, *οἱ δὲ πωλοῦντες τὴν τῆς ἰσχύος χρεῖαν κέλονται μισθοῖοι*. In the passage before us Aristotle regards the work of the *βάνανσος τεχνίτης* as a form of *μισθαρνία*: in Pol. 5 (8). 2. 1337 b 12 sqq., however, *μισθαρνικαὶ ἐργασίαι* are distinguished from *βάνανσοι τέχναι*.

22. *ναυκληρία φορτηγία παράστασις*. Sus. and others translate the first two words, 'maritime trade,' 'inland trade'; but Büchschütz (p. 456 and note 1) explains them otherwise. According to him, *ἐμπορία* is here resolved into the three elements—the provision of a ship, the conveyance of cargo, and exposure for sale. The *ναύκληρος* lets out a ship, sometimes (Xen. Mem. 3. 9. 11) himself taking passage in it; the merchant transports goods from point to point; and the salesman, wholesale or retail, sets out goods for sale. *Ἐμπορία* is thus made to include the work of the *κάπηλος*, if this interpretation is correct. That *φορτηγία* does not refer exclusively to land-trade, appears from C. F. Hermann, Griech. Antiqq. 3. § 45. 6 (ed. 2). According to Büchschütz (p. 458), the transport of commodities was effected in Greece almost entirely by sea. It should be added that the same individual might often be *ναύκληρος*, *φορτηγός*, and wholesale salesman in one.

23. *παράστασις* would probably be safer and less remunerative than *ναυκληρία* and *φορτηγία*. As to the chances of *ναυκληρία*, see Eth. Eud. 7. 14. 1247 a 21 sqq., and for the general *ὄρος ἀσφαλείας*, Rhet. 1. 5. 1361 a 19 sqq. A shield-manufactory was safer than a bank (see Sandys and Paley on Demosth. Pro Phorm. c. 11). The remark in the text is interposed to give useful guidance in the practice of *χρηματιστική* (cp. *τὰ πρὸς τὴν χρῆσιν δεῖ διελθεῖν*, 1258 b 9): we find a similar hint in Oecon. 1. 6. 1344 b 28 sqq.

26. *τῶν ἀτέχνων κ.τ.λ.* is masc. There is no need to alter *τεχνῶν* to *τεχνιτῶν*. Similar transitions occur in 1. 10. 1258 a 33-34 (*τοῦ οἰκονόμου . . . τῆς ὑπηρετικῆς*) and 3. 1. 1275 a 23-26. As the labour of the *θήs* is of a purely physical kind, he is nearly akin to the slave: cp. 1258 b 38 and 5 (8). 2. 1337 b 21, *θητικὸν καὶ δουλικόν*.

27. *τρίτον δὲ εἶδος κ.τ.λ.* How can this kind be said to possess any of the characteristics of *μεταβλητική*? Probably because, though the commodities it acquires are acquired from the earth, it does not seek wealth *ἀπὸ τῶν καρπῶν καὶ τῶν ζῳῶν* (1258 a 38), but

seeks it from things *ἀκαρπα μὲν χρήσιμα* δέ, such as timber-trees, just as *μεταβλητική* seeks it *ἀπ' ἄλλῳ* or from money.

29. *ὅσα κ.τ.λ.* ' (Having to do with) things won from the earth and from products of the earth not yielding fruit, but still useful.' For the ellipse, see notes on 1253 b 3, 1256 b 26. Of commodities won *ἀπὸ γῆς* marble or chalk may serve as an example: timber is an instance of a commodity won *ἀπὸ τῶν ἀπὸ γῆς γινόμενων ἀκάρπων μὲν χρησίμων* δέ. Metals probably fall under the former head, notwithstanding that they are called, together with some other mineral products, *τὰ ἐν τῇ γῇ γινόμενα* (Meteor. 3. 6. 378 a 19 sqq.).

32. *ἤδη*, 'again' (see above on 18). The indifferent use of *γένους* and *εἶδος* should be noted here. Cp. Rhet. 1. 2-3, 1358 a 33-36.

35. *φορτικόν*. Cp. Rhet. 3. 1. 1403 b 35, *οὕτω δὲ σύγκειται τέχνη περὶ αὐτῶν, ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ περὶ τὴν λέξιν ὀψέ προήλθεν· καὶ δοκεῖ φορτικὸν εἶναι, καλῶς ὑπολαμβάνομενον*. To overdo the illustration of one's meaning is *φορτικόν* (Poet. 26. 1461 b 27 sqq.). And those who pay too much attention to *τὸ χρησίμον* especially merit the epithet (4 (7). 14. 1333 b 9: 5 (8). 3. 1338 b 2). Cp. also 7 (5). 11. 1315 a 40, *περίεργον δὲ τὸ λέγειν καθ' ἕκαστον τῶν τοιούτων*: Metaph. α. 3. 995 a 8 sqq.

εἰσὶ δὲ . . . 39. ἀρετῆς. These remarks come in with singular abruptness, and it is not clear that they are not an interpolation. On the other hand, there is something not quite satisfactory in the sequence, if we omit them and place *ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶν ἐνίοις κ.τ.λ.* immediately after *φορτικὸν δὲ τὸ ἐνδιατρίβειν*. Susemihl places *περὶ ἐκάστου δὲ τούτων* 33—*τὸ ἐνδιατρίβειν* 35 after, instead of before, *εἰσὶ δὲ—ἀρετῆς*, but *τούτων* 33 is thus robbed of its significance and not much is gained in any way. There is this to be said for the passage, that a somewhat similar reference to the varying dignity of different kinds of slave-work is to be found in c. 7. 1255 b 27 sqq.

36. *τεχνικώταται*. According to Eth. Eud. 7. 14. 1247 a 5, *στρατηγία* and *κυβερνητική* are instances of arts in which *τέχνη ἐστί, πολὺ μόντοι καὶ τύχης ἐνυπάρχει*. Agathon, on the other hand, traced a relation between Art and Fortune in the well-known line, quoted in Eth. Nic. 6. 4. 1140 a 19, *τέχνη τύχην ἑσπερζε καὶ τύχη τέχνην*.

37. *βαναυσόταται*. Those pursuits also are *βάνανσοι* which deteriorate the character or the intelligence (*τὴν ψυχὴν ἢ τὴν διάνοιαν*, 5 (8). 2. 1337 b 8 sqq.), but this does not conflict with what is said here.

λωβῶνται. For the third person plural after *τὰ σώματα*, see Bon. Ind. 490 a 44 sqq.

38. δουλικώταται. Cp. 1. 2. 1252 a 33: 1. 5. 1254 b 18.

39. προσδεῖ, i.e. in addition to technical skill (cp. Eth. Nic. 10. 10. 1181 a 12).

ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶν κ.τ.λ. According to Varro de Re Rustica 1. 1. 8, and Columella 1. 1. 7, both Aristotle and Theophrastus wrote on agriculture. See Menage on Diog. Laert. 5. 50. They probably refer to the Γεωργικά, which the list of Aristotle's works given by the Anonymus of Menage names as spurious (No. 189), though in the Arabic list based on Ptolemaeus (No. 72) it is accounted genuine. See Aristot. Fragm. 255 sq., 1525 b 1 sqq., and Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 100. n. 1, who adds—'that Aristotle did not write on agriculture and the cognate subjects, appears from Pol. 1. 11. 1258 b 33, 39.' The Γεωργικά are thus probably spurious. Is it possible that Charetides of Paros is the same as the Chartodras, whose opinions as to manures are referred to by Theophrastus in Hist. Plant. 2. 7. 4? A Messenian named Charetidas figures in an inscription (Dittenberger, Sylloge Inscr. Graec. 240. 5, vol. i. p. 346). Apollodorus of Lemnos is mentioned by Varro and Pliny (see Dict. of Greek and Roman Biography, s. v.).

1259 a. 3. ἐκ τούτων, 'with the aid of their writings': cp. Eth. Nic. 10. 10. 1181 b 17: Rhet. 1. 4. 1359 b 30 sq.: de Gen. An. 1. 11. 719 a 10: de Part. An. 2. 16. 660 a 7. As to the collection of scattered notices of instances of commercial sagacity and success, cp. 2. 5. 1264 a 3, πάντα γὰρ σχεδὸν εὑρηται μὲν, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν οὐ συνήκται, τοῖς δ' οὐ χρεῶνται γινώσκοντες, and Rhet. 1. 4. 1359 b 30 sq. An attempt to act on this suggestion appears to be made in the so-called Second Book of the Oeconomics: see Oecon. 2. 1346 a 26 sqq.

6. οἷον κ.τ.λ. 'such as the feat told of Thales.' Cp. Plato, Rep. 600 A, ἀλλ' οἷα δὴ εἰς τὰ ἔργα σοφοῦ ἀνδρὸς πολλὰ ἐπινόηαι καὶ εὐμήχανοι εἰς τέχνας ἢ τινὰς ἄλλας πράξεις λέγονται, ὥσπερ αὖ Θάλεώ τε περὶ τοῦ Μιλησίου καὶ Ἀναχάρσιος τοῦ Σκύθου; Καί here as elsewhere serves to introduce an example. It is not quite clear whether οἷον κ.τ.λ. is adduced in illustration of the sentence immediately preceding or of ἔτι δὲ . . . συλλέγειν. Perhaps Sus. is right in taking the former view of the passage—cp. τοῦτο γὰρ ἐστὶ κατανοήματι χρηματιστικόν, which seems to take up πάντα γὰρ ὠφέλιμα ταῦτ' ἐστὶ τοῖς τιμῶσι τὴν χρηματιστικὴν, and also 1259 a 33, χρήσιμον δὲ γνωρίζειν ταῦτα καὶ τοῖς πολιτικοῖς, which seems to refer back to the same words. The passage also gains in point when taken in this way, for it conveys a hint that Aristotle is aware how paradoxical the idea of χρηματιστικοί learning anything from Thales

will appear to his readers. Τοῦ Μιλησίου is added to distinguish him from the Cretan Thales mentioned in 2. 12. 1274 a 28. His ingenuity was proverbial (Aristoph. Aves 946); yet there was also a popular impression that he was σοφός, but not φρόνιμος (Eth. Nic. 6. 7. 1141 b 3 sqq.).

8. τὴν σοφίαν. Cp. Diog. Laert. 1. 22, καὶ πρῶτος σοφὸς ὠνομάσθη (ὁ Θαλῆς) ἄρχοντας Ἀθήνησι Δαμασίου, καθ' ὃν καὶ οἱ ἐπὶ τὰ σοφοὶ ἐκλήθησαν.

τυγχάνει δὲ καθόλου τι ὅν, i.e. not confined to philosophers like Thales, but generally applicable in commercial transactions. We have not here a σοφός devising a novel subtlety, but rather an instance of the use of a recognized weapon from the armoury of χρηματιστική.

9. ὀνειδιζόντων γὰρ κ.τ.λ. For the construction, cp. 2. 12. 1274 a 25. The charge against philosophers was a commonplace (Anaxippus ap. Athen. Deipn. 610 f: Plato, Gorg. 484 C sqq.: Isocr. adv. Sophist. §§ 7-8: Eth. Eud. 7. 14. 1247 a 17 sqq.).

11. ἐκ τῆς ἀστρολογίας. The Egyptian priests claimed to be able to predict καρπῶν φθορὰς ἢ τοῦναντίον πολυκαρπίας by means of their observation of the stars (Diod. 1. 81. 5).

12. εὐπορήσαντα, cp. Plutarch, Sulla c. 26, εὐπορήσαντα τῶν ἀντιγράφων.

ἐλίγων. The point of the story lies in the smallness of the capital. Thales only paid down the earnest-money of the rent of the olive-presses which he hired, trusting to his future profit to pay the rest. If we compare Cic. de Divin. 1. 49. 111, non plus quam Milesium Thalem, qui ut obiurgatores suos convinceret ostenderetque etiam philosophum, si ei commodum esset, pecuniam facere posse, omnem oleam, antequam florere coepisset, in agro Milesio coemisse dicitur, we shall see that though this passage is very similar to the passage before us, Cicero's version of the story, nevertheless, as Vict. remarks, misses the point, for only a large capitalist could have done what Thales is described as doing. Cicero can hardly have had this passage of the Politics before him; still less can Pliny, who tells the story of Democritus (Hist. Nat. 18. 28). The version of Hieronymus of Rhodes, though abbreviated, is nearer to the Politics—φησὶ καὶ ὁ Ῥόδιος Ἱερώνυμος ἐν τῇ δευτέρῃ τῶν σποράδην ὑπομνημάτων, ὅτι βουλόμενος δεῖξαι [ὁ Θαλῆς] ῥῆγον εἶναι πλουτεῖν, φορὰς μελλούσης ἐλαιῶν ἔσεσθαι, προνοήσας ἐμισθώσαστο τὰ ἐλαιουργεῖα καὶ πάνμπλειστα συνείλε χρήματα (Diog. Laert. 1. 26). We cannot, however, be certain that Aristotle and he were not

drawing from some common source. If the story is true, it would seem that a citizen of Miletus was legally capable of renting olive-presses in Chios. Chios and Miletus both belonged to the Ionic Confederacy, and a special friendship seems to have existed between the two States (Hdt. i. 18: 6. 5). This may have made the thing easier.

διαδοῦναι is used because the owners of the presses were many.

13. τ' is displaced as elsewhere by being added 'ei vocabulo quod utrique membro commune est,' Bon. Ind. 749 b 44 sqq.: cp. *μεταξύ τε τῶν εἰδῶν καὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν*, Metaph. K. i. 1059 b 6: *ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ διαγωγὴν τε παισὶν ἀρμόττει καὶ ταῖς ἡλικίαις ἀποδιδόναι ταῖς τοιαύταις*, Pol. 5 (8). 5. 1339 a 29: *νομίζοντες τὸν τε τοῦ ἐλευθέρου βίον ἕτερόν τινα εἶναι τοῦ πολιτικοῦ καὶ πάντων αἰρετώτατον*, Pol. 4 (7). 3. 1325 a 19.

15. For the two participles *ἐκμισθοῦντα*, *συλλέξαντα*, cp. 8 (6). 5. 1320 b 8, *διαλαμβάνοντας τοὺς ἀπόρους ἀφορμὰς διδόντας τρέπειν ἐπ' ἐργασίας*, and Plato, Rep. 465 C, *τὰ δὲ πάντως πορισάμενοι θέμενοι παρὰ γυναικῶν τε καὶ οἰκίας, ταμεύειν παραδόντες*. But here the participles are in different tenses.

17. *πλουτεῖν*, 'to become rich,' as in 8 (6). 4. 1318 b 20.

18. *μὲν οὖν* ('so then') is here used as in c. 2. 1252 a 34.

19. *ἐπίδειξιν . . . τῆς σοφίας*. Cp. Plato, Hippias Minor, 368 C, *σοφίας πλείστης ἐπίδειγμα*.

'But, as we said, the plan adopted by Thales—that of trying to secure oneself a monopoly—is a general principle of the science of money-making.' *Τὸ τοιοῦτον* is explained by *ἐάν τις . . . κατασκευάζειν*: compare the use of *ἐάν* in Rhet. 3. 5. 1407 b 19, and of *εἴαν* in Metaph. M. i. 1076 a 30.

21. δὶδ. Having said that this plan is not confined to philosophers but embodies a broad principle of money-making science (*χρηματιστικόν* 20), Aristotle points out that some States practise it, when they are in want of money (*χρημάτων* 22). See on the subject of State-monopolies in Greece Büchschütz, Besitz und Erwerb, p. 547 sqq., who traces them at Selymbria (Oecon. 2. 1348 b 33 sqq.), Byzantium (1346 b 25 sq.), and Lampsacus (1347 a 32 sqq.), and refers to the scheme of Pythocles at Athens (1353 a 15 sqq.) and to the measures of Cleomenes, the governor of Egypt (1352 b 14 sqq.). 'There is no evidence,' he adds, 'that monopolies were anywhere used in Greece, as they have often been in modern States, as a permanent source of revenue.' 'Nay,' Aristotle continues, 'in Sicily an individual with whom a sum of money had been deposited'—he seems to have had a larger

amount at his disposal than Thales—‘resorted to a similar device, but he found that his success aroused the jealousy of the ruler of the State.’ Thus the story incidentally bears out the assertion made in 21–23, that States occasionally seek revenue from sources of this kind. The hero of this story may probably have been a *τραπεζίτης*: cp. Demosth. Pro Phorm. c. 11, ἡ δ’ ἐργασία (of banking) προσόδους ἔχουσα ἐπικυδύνουσι ἀπὸ χρημάτων ἀλλοτριῶν, and see Büchschütz, p. 502.

24. *συνεπρίατο*. Compare the use of *συνωνεῖσθαι* in Theopomp. Fr. 219 and Plutarch, de Cupiditate Divitiarum c. 3. 524 B.

25. *τῶν σιδηρείων*. Bern. ‘iron-mines’: Sus. ‘iron-works.’ The latter rendering is perhaps the more likely to be correct, as the metal would come from smelting-works, even if the ore was obtained in Sicilian mines, which may possibly have been the case, for iron-ore is still ‘found in the mountains of Sicily’ (A. K. Johnston, Dict. of Geography, art. Sicily). Aetna and the Lipari islands were famed in myth as the scene of the labours of Hephaestus and the Cyclopes (Virg. Georg. 4. 170 sqq.: Aen. 3. 675 sqq.: 8. 416 sqq.: Ovid, Fasti 4. 287 sq.).

ἐμπορίων. The merchants are conceived as sojourning at the *ἐμπόρια* (cp. 4 (7). 6. 1327 a 11 sqq.), which would usually be on the seacoast or not far from it, like the Peiraeus or Naucratis (*τῆς Αἰγύπτου τὸ ἐμπόριον*, Aristot. Fragm. 161. 1505 a 14). Not every city was an *ἐμπόριον*.

26. *ἐπώλει*. Note the tense.

27. *τῆς τιμῆς*, i. e. the usual price charged for iron. His winnings appear to have been due, in part to the advance on the usual price, which though small mounted up in proportion to the large quantity of iron sold, in part to the large returns which even the usual price brought to the merchants.

ἐπὶ τοῖς πεντήκοντα ταλάντοις ἐπέλαβεν ἑκατόν. Cp. Matth. 25. 20, Κύριε, πέντε τάλαντά μοι παρέδωκας· ἴδε, ἄλλα πέντε τάλαντα ἐκέρδησα ἐπ’ αὐτοῖς, and Strabo p. 701, ὅν τινα κοινὰ καὶ ἄλλοις Ἰνδοῖς ἰσθόρηται, ὥς τὸ μακρόβιον ὥστε καὶ τριάκοντα ἐπὶ τοῖς ἑκατόν προσλαμβάνειν. The article may be prefixed to *πεντήκοντα ταλάντοις* because the sum originally invested was fifty talents, or it may be added for the same reason for which it is prefixed to *δέκα* in Xen. Oecon. 20. 16, ῥαδίως γὰρ ἀνὴρ εἰς παρὰ τοὺς δέκα διαφέρει τῷ ἐν ὥρᾳ ἐργάζεσθαι, on which passage Dr. Holden remarks, ‘where parts of a whole are stated in numbers, the article is sometimes prefixed to the numeral “to denote the definiteness of the relation” (Madvig, § 11, Rem. 6).’ Bernays translates, ‘he gained a hundred talents in addition to the

fifty which he had laid out': Mr. Weldon, 'he realized 200 per cent. on all his outlay.' Perhaps the passage quoted from St. Matthew makes in favour of Bernays' interpretation, though the article is probably to be explained in the same way as in the passage of Xenophon.

28. *τούτον μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ.* This man brought on himself expulsion from the State, while Thales won applause for his wisdom, but yet the two men proceeded on the same principle. *Μὲν οὖν* is answered by *μέντοι* 31.

31. *ἀσυμφόρους*. Cp. 2. 9. 1270 b 20, *συμφερόντως ἔχει τοῖς πράγμασιν*. Dionysius probably objected to the whole available supply of a commodity so important both in war and peace as iron finding its way into the hands of a single private individual and coming to be obtainable only at an enhanced price. He would also hold that a private person had no business with a monopoly; monopolies would in his view be for the State. Besides, tyrants usually sought to keep their subjects poor (7 (5). 11. 1313 b 18) and distrusted the rich (7 (5). 10. 1311 a 15 sqq.).

33. *καὶ τοῖς πολιτικοῖς*, i.e. to statesmen as well as to heads of households (cp. c. 8. 1256 b 37, *ὅτι μὲν τοίνυν ἔστι τις κτητικὴ κατὰ φύσιν τοῖς οἰκονόμοις καὶ τοῖς πολιτικοῖς*, and Eth. Nic. 6. 5. 1140 b 10) and to those who hold the science of money-making in high esteem (1259 a 5). For *χρήσιμον γνωρίζειν*, cp. 8 (6). 1. 1317 a 33, *χρήσιμον δ' ἕκαστον αὐτῶν γνωρίζειν*.

34. *πολλαῖς γὰρ πόλεσι κ.τ.λ.* A large revenue was essential to the working of the extreme democracy (Pol. 6 (4). 6. 1293 a 1 sq.); States frequently at war were also bound to have plenty of money at command (2. 9. 1271 b 11). Households stand less in need of exceptional sources of income.

35. *τινὲς καὶ πολιτεύονται*, i.e. in addition to those who pursue these aims in private life. See Schneider's note, vol. 2. p. 65, on the *πορισταί* at Athens, but Eubulus is probably referred to—cp. Plutarch, Reip. Gerend. Praecepta, c. 15 *sub fin.*, and Theopomp. Fr. 96 (Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 1. 293). See also Plato, Laws 742 D, and the account of the good citizen given in Rhet. ad Alex. 39. 1446 b 33.

For *ταῦτα* as the object of *πολιτεύονται*, cp. 2. 7. 1267 a 18.

- C. 12. 37. *Ἐπεὶ δὲ κ.τ.λ.* 'Since we distinguished' (in 1. 3. 1253 b 3 sqq.) 'three parts of *οἰκονομική*' (for *ἦν*, cp. Metaph. Δ. 6. 1071 b 3, *ἐπεὶ δ' ἦσαν τρεῖς οὐσίαι*, and de Caelo 1. 3. 269 b 33), the question arises, with which of them is *οἰκονομική* most concerned? We have seen that the *οἰκονομικός* as such can hardly

be said to be directly concerned with *χρηματιστική*: but with which of the three relations that make up the household—*γαμική*, *πατρική*, *δεσποτική*—is he most concerned? This is the question which Aristotle apparently intends to raise here (compare the solution given at the beginning of c. 13), but his articulation of it is in unusual disarray. He has no sooner enumerated the three parts of *οικονομική*, than he proceeds to refer to the account which he has already given of *δεσποτική*, and to distinguish the rule exercised by the husband over his wife from the rule exercised by the father over his children, with the object apparently of showing that the two latter relations represent a higher kind of rule (*πολιτική* or *βασιλική*) than the former—the result being that *οικονομική* is more concerned with *πατρική* and *γαμική* than with *δεσποτική* (cp. 1. 5. 1254 a 25, *αἰὲ βελτίων ἢ ἀρχὴ ἢ τῶν βελτιόνων ἀρχομένων*, and 4 (7). 14. 1333 b 27, *τοῦ γὰρ δεσποτικῶς ἄρχειν ἢ τῶν ἐλευθέρων ἀρχὴ καλλίων καὶ μᾶλλον μετ' ἀρετῆς*), and that it is more concerned with *δεσποτική* than with *χρηματιστική*.

39. καὶ γάρ. Vict. 'statim autem causam affert, cur distinxerit copulam patris ac liberorum a copula viri et uxoris; docet enim illa imperia diversa esse.'

ἄρχειν, sc. *ἔφαμεν* (latent in *ἦν*, 37) *τὸν οἰκονόμον*. The reference would seem to be to c. 3. 1253 b 4 sq.

ὧς ἐλευθέρων μὲν ἀμφοῖν, i.e. *τοῦ ἀρχομένου χάριν* (4 (7). 14. 1333 a 3 sqq.), or perhaps for the common good of ruler and ruled (3. 6. 1278 b 37 sqq.). Contrast *δεσποτικὴ ἀρχή*, 3. 6. 1278 b 32 sqq. *Πολιτικὴ, βασιλική* (3. 7. 1279 a 33), and *ἀριστοκρατικὴ ἀρχή* (3. 17. 1288 a 11) are forms of *ἢ τῶν ἐλευθέρων ἀρχή*. It may be questioned whether it is quite an adequate idea of *ἢ τῶν ἐλευθέρων ἀρχή* to make it consist simply in ruling for the benefit of the ruled; Marcus Aurelius (Comment. 1. 14) seems to understand it otherwise.

1. *πολιτικῶς*, 'as a citizen-ruler rules over his fellow-citizens.' 1259 b. *Πολιτικὴ ἀρχή* is said in 3. 4. 1277 b 7 to be the kind of rule which is exercised over *τῶν ὁμοίων τῷ γένει καὶ τῶν ἐλευθέρων*, but this account seems too wide, for the rule of a father over a child would then fall under *πολιτικὴ ἀρχή*: in 1. 7. 1255 b 20 it is explained as *ἐλευθέρων καὶ ἴσων ἀρχή*, and this seems more exact, but we must bear in mind that under *ἴσων* are included proportionate, as well as absolute, equals. *Πολιτικὴ ἀρχή* usually implies an interchange of ruling and being ruled (cp. 3. 6. 1279 a 8 sqq.), but it does not necessarily do so (cp. c. 1. 1252 a 15)—it does not do so in the case of the wife, nor does it do so in the case of the rule of

νοῦς over *δρεξις*, which is πολιτικὴ καὶ βασιλική (1. 5. 1254 b 5). The relation of husband and wife is elsewhere described as ἀριστοκρατική (Eth. Nic. 8. 12. 1160 b 32 sqq.: 8. 13. 1161 a 22 sqq.), because it should be such as to assign τὸ ἀρμόζον ἐκάστῳ (cp. Pol. 6 (4). 8. 1294 a 9, δοκεῖ δὲ ἀριστοκρατία μὲν εἶναι μάλιστα τὸ τὰς τιμὰς νενεμηθῆαι κατ' ἀρετήν). Aristotle holds that though on the whole and as a rule the man is superior to the woman, there is nevertheless work which she can do better than he, and that account should be taken of this fact in determining the position of the wife in the household.

2. εἰ μὴ που κ.τ.λ. Sus. 'was nicht ausschliesst, dass das Verhältniss sich hie und da auch wider die Natur gestaltet,' and so Mr. Welldon: 'wherever the union is not unnaturally constituted.' Sepulveda, on the other hand, supplies as the nom. to συνίστηκε, not ἡ κοινωνία, but 'mas et femina,' translating 'nisi ubi praeter naturam constiterunt,' and Lambinus 'mas,' translating 'nisi forte ita comparatus est, ut a natura desciverit.' I incline, however, to take συνίστηκε as impersonal and to translate 'except where there is a contravention of nature.' See Bon. Ind. 342 b 20 sqq., and for συνίστηκε παρὰ φύσιν, ibid. 731 a 20-27. As to the impersonal use of verbs in Greek, see Riddell, *Apology of Plato*, p. 155 sqq. The following epigram on James I is quoted by the late Mr. Mark Pattison in his copy of Stahr's edition of the *Politics* (1839):

'Rex fuit Elisabeth, nunc est regina Iacobus.'

4. ἐν μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. Μὲν οὖν appears to be answered by δ' 9. In most cases of political rule, indeed, there is an interchange of ruling and being ruled, which does not occur in the case of husband and wife. Free and equal citizens, in fact, aim at being equal in nature and differing in nothing. (I take τὸ ἀρχον καὶ τὸ ἀρχόμενον to be the nom. to βούλεται.) Yet even here differences do not wholly vanish, for the holders of office seek for the time of their magistracy to have their position marked by a distinctive aspect and bearing, a distinctive mode of address and marks of respect; thus if there is an equality of nature, there is a temporary inequality in externals even among like and equal citizens. The relation in which the citizen-ruler stands to those over whom he rules during his term of office is that in which the male permanently stands to the female. (Cp. 2. 2. 1261 a 30 sqq., where the same idea appears that even ἐλεύθεροι καὶ ἴσοι are differentiated by the fact of their holding or not holding office.) The husband, we learn, rules his wife as a citizen-ruler rules his fellow-citizens; he is marked off from his wife less by a difference in nature than by a difference σχήμασι καὶ λόγοις καὶ τιμαῖς. The father, on the contrary, is different

in nature from his child (1259 b 14). Aristotle does not, perhaps, always abide by this view of the relation of husband and wife; thus in *Eth. Nic.* 5. 10. 1134 a 26 sqq., τὸ πολιτικὸν δίκαιον, which obtains ἐπὶ κοινωνῶν βίου πρὸς τὸ εἶναι αὐτάρκειαν, ἐλευθέρων καὶ ἴσων ἢ κατ' ἀναλογίαν ἢ κατ' ἀριθμόν, is said not to obtain even between husband and wife, though the conjugal relation comes nearer to realizing it than any other household relation, but only τὸ οἰκονομικὸν δίκαιον—indeed in this very book of the *Politics* (c. 13. 1260 a 29) he requires from the wife a submissive silence before her husband.

7. *ἔταν*, 'for the time during which.'

ἔγχεϊ, sc. τὸ *ἄρχον*. The claim made by a ruler (*Amasis*) is mentioned in illustration. Cp. 6 (4). 14. 1298 a 10, τὴν τοιαύτην γὰρ ἰσότητά ζητεῖ ὁ δῆμος: 7 (5). 8. 1308 a 11, ὁ γὰρ ἐπὶ τοῦ πλήθους ζητοῦσιν οἱ δημοτικοὶ τὸ ἴσον: 8 (6). 3. 1318 b 4, ἀλλ' ὅμως ζητοῦσι τὸ ἴσον καὶ τὸ δίκαιον οἱ ἥττους, οἱ δὲ κρατοῦντες οὐδὲν φροντίζουσιν.

8. *σχήμασι*. Lamb. 'vestitu,' Bern. 'die Tracht,' but *ἑσθήτη* and *σχήματι* are distinguished in *Eth. Nic.* 4. 9. 1125 a 30 (cp. *Rhet.* 2. 8. 1386 a 32, if *ἑσθήτη* is the right reading in this passage). Sepulv. and Giph. 'ornatu:' Vict. 'vestibus.' Perhaps 'aspect and bearing.' See Bon. Ind. 739 b 59—740 a 5.

λόγοις, 'mode and matter of address.'

καὶ (before *ἄμασις*) as elsewhere introduces an instance. *Amasis* is an instance of 'that which rules after being ruled.' He had been a subject and was now a ruler. He claimed that, like the utensil referred to, which had been recast to form the image of a god and now was an object of veneration to the Egyptians, he should be treated for what he was, not what he had once been. Cp. *Hdt.* 2. 172. A somewhat similar metaphor is used by Themistocles in Aelian. V. H. 13. 39.

9. ἀλλ' . . . τοῦτον ἔχει τὸν τρόπον, 'at all times, not merely for a term, stands to the female in this relation.'

11. τὸ γὰρ γενήσαν. *Γενῶν* is used of the female as well as the male (cp. 4 (7). 16. 1334 b 36: de *Gen. An.* 2. 5. 741 b 3), but Aristotle is here evidently thinking of the father, not the mother.

ἄρχον ἐστίν, cp. *Metaph. A.* 7. 1072 b 10, ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἄρα ἐστὶν ὄν, and *Pol.* 2. 6. 1265 b 19, ἴσονται διαφέροντες. It is not identical with *ἀρχει*: the participle is used in an adjectival sense, 'a permanent quality being predicated of the subject' (Holden, *Oeconomicus* of Xenophon, Index p. 36 *).

12. βασιλικῆς εἰδὸς ἀρχῆς, 'the specific nature of royal rule.' Sus. 'was denn eben die Form einer königlichen Gewalt ergibt.' Cp. *Eth. Nic.* 8. 12. 1160 b 24, ἡ μὲν γὰρ πατὴρ πρὸς υἱέας κοινωνία

βασιλείας ἔχει σχῆμα, Pol. 1. 4. 1253 b 30, ἐν ὀργάνῳ εἶδει, and 3. 15. 1286 a 2 sq.

14. τὸν βασιλέα τούτων ἀπάντων. Cp. Eth. Nic. 8. 12. 1160 b 24-27, ἡ μὲν γὰρ πατὴρ πρὸς νείεις κοινωνία βασιλείας ἔχει σχῆμα, τῶν τέκνων γὰρ τῷ πατρὶ μέλει· ἐντεῦθεν δὲ καὶ Ὅμηρος τὸν Δία πατέρα προσαγορεύει, πατρικὴ γὰρ ἀρχὴ βούλεται ἡ βασιλεία εἶναι. Homer is praised for using the words 'father of gods and men' to designate the Kingship of Zeus over gods and men. For, Aristotle proceeds, the father is the truest type of a King. The King, like the father, 'should surpass those he rules in nature' ('indole,' Bon. Ind. 837 a 52, cp. Pol. 2. 2. 1261 a 39, διὰ τὸ τὴν φύσιν ἴσους εἶναι πάντας), 'but be one with them in race.'

15. μὲν should logically have followed φύσει, but, as Bonitz observes (Ind. 454 a 20), who compares 6 (4). 5. 1292 b 12 sqq., 'interdum non ei additur vocabulo in quo vis oppositionis cernitur.'

- C. 13. 18. Φανερόν τοίνυν. So far as the protasis introduced by ἐπεὶ in 1259 a 37 survives the long series of considerations which break in upon it in 1259 a 39-b 17, it here finds its apodosis, which is introduced by τοίνυν, as elsewhere by ὥστε (Bon. Ind. 873 a 31 sqq.) or possibly διὼ (Bonitz, Aristotel. Stud. 3. 122 sqq.). For the connexion of the whole, see note on 1259 a 37. Xenophon in the Oeconomicus had described with much zest the mixture of vigilance and geniality with which the thrifty Ischomachus gets everybody connected with his farm, from his wife and his steward downwards, to strain every nerve for the increase of his substance, which is, according to him, the aim of οἰκονομία (cp. Oecon. c. 6. 4, ἡ δὲ ἐπιστήμη αὕτη—i. e. ἡ οἰκονομία—ἐφαίνετο ἢ οἶκους δύνανται αὔξειν ἄνθρωποι). In tacit opposition to Xenophon, Aristotle here presses the consequences of the principle which he has established in the foregoing chapters, that χρηματιστική, and even its soundest part, is in strictness no part of οἰκονομία, but only an auxiliary art (ὑπηρετική), and that though οἰκονομία will not be indifferent to the goodness or badness of the property it uses (1258 a 26), its business is nevertheless rather to care for the excellence of the human beings with whom it has to deal, and for that of the free rather than the slave. The original propounder of this view may well have been Socrates (Cleitophon 407 A sq.: see Wyttienbach on [Plutarch] de Liberis Educandis c. 7. 4 E), but traces of it appear in Plato, Politicus 261 C and Laws 743 E, and we find doctrines of a similar kind ascribed to Cynics like Diogenes (Aelian, V. H. 12. 56: cp. Diog. Laert. 6. 41). The views of Crassus, who was not unacquainted with the teaching of Aristotle (Plutarch, Crassus c. 3), may possibly have been influenced

by the passage before us (see the account of them given in Crassus c. 2. and above, p. xvii). Cato the Censor is praised by Plutarch (Cato Censor, c. 20) for combining with keenness as an economist care for the welfare of his wife and children. For the relation of the Stoic and Epicurean conceptions of *οικονομία* to those of Plato and Aristotle, see Schömann, Opusc. Acad. 3. 234 sqq.

19. τὴν τῶν ἀψύχων κτήσιν, 'inanimate property.' Cp. 2. 7. 1267 b 10, τὴν τῆς γῆς κτήσιν, and 1. 9. 1257 b 40, τὴν τοῦ νομίσματος οὐσίαν.

20. τὴν τῆς κτήσεως, ὃν καλοῦμεν πλοῦτον. Sus. 'als diesen' (inanimate property) 'in den tüchtigen Stand zu setzen, den man Reichthum und Wohlhabenheit nennt,' ὃν καλοῦμεν πλοῦτον being explanatory of ἀρετὴ κτήσεως, cp. Rhet. 1. 6. 1362 b 18, πλοῦτος ἀρετὴ γὰρ κτήσεως καὶ ποιητικὸν πολλῶν [ἀγαθῶν.]

21. τῶν ἐλευθέρων μᾶλλον ἢ δούλων. For the addition of the article before ἐλευθέρων and its absence before δούλων, see Vahlen's note on Poet. 4. 1449 a 1, where Rhet. 2. 13. 1390 a 16, μᾶλλον ζῶσι κατὰ λογισμὸν ἢ κατὰ τὸ ἦθος is quoted. It is, however, possible that a slightly depreciatory significance attaches to the omission of the article before δούλων, as in Agesil. 11. 4, ἥσκει δὲ ἐφομιλεῖν μὲν παντοδαποῖς, χρῆσθαι δὲ τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς. Cp. 1. 7. 1255 b 32—33.

πρῶτον μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. Μὲν οὖν here as often elsewhere is introductory to a clearer definition of what has just been said. (The μὲν is apparently answered by δέ 28.) Aristotle has spoken in the preceding sentence of an ἀρετὴ δούλων, and the thought occurs to him that there are two senses of ἀρετή, and that he may be understood merely to inculcate on the master the communication of technical excellence to the slave (cp. 1260 b 3 sqq.). He therefore loses no time in raising the question, what the virtue is in the case of slaves, which he has said the householder is to care for and promote: is it merely ὀργανικὴ καὶ διακοικὴ ἀρετή, or are they capable of ἠθικὴ ἀρετή? (For the terms in which the question is raised, cp. 5 (8). 5. 1339 b 42, οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ ζητητέον μή ποτε τοῦτο μὲν συμβέβηκε, τιμωτέρα δ' αὐτῆς ἢ φύσις ἐστὶν ἢ κατὰ τὴν εἰρημένην χρεῖαν.) Aristotle had defined the natural slave in the words, ὅσων ἐστὶν ἔργον ἢ τοῦ σώματος χρήσις, καὶ τοῦτ' ἔστ' ἀπ' αὐτῶν βέλτιστον, 1. 5. 1254 b 17—words which went farther even than the well-known saying in Homer (Ody. 17. 322), that Zeus in taking away a man's freedom takes away half his virtue—and he feels that a doubt may well be raised whether a slave is capable of moral virtue. The course of the argument on this subject seems to be as follows:—'The answer is not easy, for if the slave has moral virtue, how does he differ from a freeman? Yet if he has it not, the fact is surprising, seeing that he is a man

and shares in reason. The same question, however, arises as to the wife and child, and it is better to put the question in its most comprehensive form—is the virtue of that which by nature rules the same as the virtue of that which by nature is ruled, or different? (It will be seen that Aristotle abstains for the present from raising any question as to that which neither naturally rules nor naturally is ruled.) If we say that both have complete virtue, why should the one rule and the other be ruled? If again we say that their virtue differs in degree, the same question arises, for between ruling and being ruled there is a difference not of degree, but of kind. If, on the other hand, we say that one has virtue and the other not, how can the ruler rule well, or the ruled obey well, without virtue? Both, it is clear, must have virtue, and virtue must have different kinds, just as there are different kinds of that which is by nature ruled. We are familiar with this in the case of the soul; in the soul there is a part which naturally rules and another which naturally is ruled, and to each of these two parts we attribute a virtue of its own. But if these two parts, related to each other as naturally ruling and ruled, exist by nature, then other pairs also, destined by nature to rule and be ruled respectively, exist by nature—the master and slave, the husband and wife, the father and child—and each member of these three pairs has a virtue of its own varying according to the constitution of the soul in each and the work each has to perform.' We must bear in mind that in the *Meno* of Plato Socrates is made to assert the identity of the temperance and other virtues of women and men, in opposition to the sophist Gorgias, and that Aristotle's object here is to show that virtue varies with social function, the virtue of the ruled not being the same as the virtue of the ruler. It is, however, also his object to show, in opposition to those who confined virtue to the ruler (3. 4. 1277 a 20), that τὸ φύσει ἀρχόμενον, whether wife, child, or slave, is not without moral virtue, but has a sort of virtue varying with its psychical constitution and the function it discharges. Here therefore, as elsewhere, Aristotle steers a midway course between two extremes—the view of those who denied virtue to the ruled, and the view of those who identified the virtue of women and men.

24. σωφροσύνη κ.τ.λ. These virtues are instanced as those most likely to be found in slaves, more likely than μεγαλοψυχία, φρόνησις, or σοφία.

τῶν ἔξω. For this use of the gen., Susemihl rightly compares 1. 13. 1260 b 2 (already referred to by Schn., vol. 2. p. 68): 3. 5. 1278 a 27: 3. 13. 1284 b 11 (if Π² are wrong): 5 (8). 4. 1338 b 30.

30. ἔχει . . . ἀμφοτέρως. 'For whichever alternative we adopt, difficult questions arise' (Lamb. 'dubitationem habet, utrumcunque dixeris'). Ἐχει is probably here impersonal; see Bon. Ind. 305 b 31 sqq., and Riddell, *Apology of Plato*, p. 155 sq.

εἴτε γὰρ ἔστι, sc. ἀρετὴ τις δούλου.

32. καὶ . . . δῆ. See note on 1. 2. 1253 a 18.

33. πότερον . . . ἑτέρα. This is not exactly the same question as had been raised about the woman and child just before; perhaps it is already felt to be paradoxical to deny to the ἀρχόμενον φύσει the possession of any kind of moral virtue. Besides, the question now raised is that which Socrates had raised (1260 a 22), and Aristotle is much preoccupied with his view on the subject.

34. γὰρ justifies ἐπισκεπτέον by adducing difficulties which arise.

καλοκάγαθίας. The question is put as paradoxically as possible, for καλοκάγαθία is precisely the type of virtue from which slaves and women and children are furthest removed: see L. Schmidt, *Ethik der alten Griechen* 1. 333 sq., who refers to Xen. Mem. 1. 1. 16, περὶ τῶν ἄλλων (διελέγετο Σωκράτης), ἃ τοὺς μὲν εἰδότες ἡγεῖτο καλοὺς ἀγαθοὺς εἶναι, τοὺς δ' ἀγνοοῦντας ἀνδραποδώδεις ἀνδραποδιστὰς κεκληθῆσθαι. Καλοκάγαθία is the virtue of knights and hoplites (Xen. Mem. 3. 5. 18 sqq.). Cp. also Eth. Nic. 4. 7. 1124 a 1, ἔσκε μὲν οὖν ἡ μεγαλοψυχία οἷον κόσμος τις εἶναι τῶν ἀρετῶν· μείζους γὰρ αὐτὰς ποιεῖ καὶ οὐ γίνεται ἄνευ ἐκείνων· διὰ τοῦτο χαλεπὸν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ μεγαλόψυχον εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ οἶδεν τε ἄνευ καλοκάγαθίας: Magn. Mor. 2. 9. 1207 b 20 sqq.: Eth. Nic. 10. 10. 1179 b 10 sqq. The conception of καλοκάγαθία is still further worked out in Eth. Eud. 7. 15.

37. τὸ δὲ κ.τ.λ. Cp. 1. 1. 1252 a 9.

38. οὐδέν, 'not at all,' as in Probl. 10. 35. 894 b 13.

40. ἀρχθήσεται. The fut. med. ἄρξονται occurs in a passive sense in 8 (6). 4. 1318 b 36.

1. δειλός. Cp. Plato, *Laws* 901 E, δειλίας γὰρ ἔργονος ἐν γε ἡμῖν 1260 a. ἀργία: Aristot. Eth. Nic. 9. 4. 1166 b 10, διὰ δειλίαν καὶ ἀργίαν, and below 1260 a 36.

3. ταύτης δ' . . . ἀρχομένων. These words are often translated—'and that there are different forms of virtue corresponding to the differences between the naturally ruled.' But then hitherto, as Susemihl remarks (*Hermes* (1884), Bd. 19. Heft 4), Aristotle has been dwelling on the difference between ruler and ruled, not on the differences between various ruled elements, and if ὥσπερ here means 'corresponding to,' we certainly expect ὥσπερ καὶ τοῦ φύσει ἀρχοντος καὶ ἀρχομένου. Not ὥσπερ καὶ τῶν φύσει ἀρχόντων καὶ ἀρχομένων, the reading to which the rendering found in two MSS. (a, z)

of the *velus versio* points—‘quemadmodum et natura principantium et subiectorum’—for hitherto, as Sus. sees, though he accepts this reading, no stress has been laid on the fact of the existence of different forms of ἀρχοντα and ἀρχόμενα: on the contrary, it is on the difference between τὸ ἀρχον and τὸ ἀρχόμενον and their respective ἔργα that the existence of different forms of virtue has been rested. Perhaps, however, ὥσπερ does not here mean ‘corresponding to,’ but simply ‘as indeed’—so that our rendering will run ‘and that different types of virtue exist, as indeed differences also exist between the naturally ruled.’ Compare the use of ὥσπερ in 1. 11. 1259 a 35, πολλὰς γὰρ πόλεσι δεῖ χρηματισμοῦ, ὥσπερ οἰκίᾳ, μᾶλλον δέ. Aristotle’s meaning will then be, that there is nothing more surprising in the fact of ruler and ruled having different types of virtue than there is in the fact of the naturally ruled differing in character. He has already said in 1. 5. 1254 a 24, καὶ εἶδη πολλὰ καὶ ἀρχόντων καὶ ἀρχομένων ἐστίν, καὶ ἀεὶ βελτίων ἢ ἀρχὴ ἢ τῶν βελτιόνων ἀρχομένων. Perhaps, however, τῆς ἀρετῆς should be supplied before τῶν φύσει ἀρχομένων, and the translation should be—‘as indeed differences also exist between the virtue of one naturally ruled element and that of another.’ Those who take ὥσπερ in the sense of ‘corresponding to’ will be much tempted to read ὥσπερ καὶ τῶν φύσει ἀρχόντων καὶ ἀρχομένων, but this reading rests, as has been said, only on the authority of one or two MSS. of the *velus versio*, the rendering found in which may represent nothing more than a conjectural emendation. This change of reading might, indeed, be dispensed with, if an ellipse of πρὸς τὸ φύσει ἀρχον or πρὸς τὰ φύσει ἀρχοντα could be supposed between ὥσπερ καὶ and τῶν φύσει ἀρχομένων (compare the ellipse of πρὸς τὴν ψυχὴν in 5 (8). 5. 1340 b 17). But ὥσπερ need not mean ‘corresponding to,’ and probably does not. (Since writing the foregoing note, I have become acquainted with the following annotation by the late Mr. Mark Pattison in the copy of Stahr’s Politics already referred to (above on 1259 b 2). Stahr translates in this edition—‘diese aber ihre Verschiedenheiten hat, so gut wie die, welche von Natur zum Beherrschtwerden und zum Herrschen bestimmt sind.’ The annotation is—‘if the words [ἀρχόντων καὶ] are to form part of the text, surely the meaning is, not “so gut wie die,” but “have differences corresponding to the differences between the natural ruler and the natural ruled.” But all the MSS. appear to omit them, and the meaning is—“and in the same way as there are differences between the virtues of the ruler and those of the ruled, so there are differences between the virtues of the different species of the ruled.”’)

4. καὶ τοῦτο κ.τ.λ. I take the literal rendering to be—‘and this has at once led the way for us in the case of the soul’ (‘this’ being ‘the existence of a natural ruler and a natural ruled, each with a virtue of its own’). For ὑφίγγηται in this sense, compare Plato, *Lysis* 217 A, ἀρ’ οὖν καὶ καλῶς . . . ὑφηγείται ἡμῖν τὸ νῦν λεγόμενον; and the use of the word προοδοποιεῖσθαι in de Gen. An. 4. 4. 770 b 3. Περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν is perhaps not far removed in meaning from ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ (cp. Bon. Ind. 579 a 29 sqq.). The soul is one of the things that lie nearest to us, and on examining it the phenomenon of which we are in quest appears, and thus we are guided to detect it in other cases also. Cp. Plutarch, de Fraterno Amore c. 2 *inil.*, καίτοι τὸ παράδειγμα τῆς χρήσεως τῶν ἀδελφῶν ἡ φύσις οὐ μακρὰν ἔθηκεν, ἀλλ’ ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ σώματι τὰ πλείστα τῶν ἀναγκαίων διττὰ καὶ ἀδελφὰ καὶ διδυμα μηχανησαμένη, χεῖρας, πόδας, ὄμματα, ὄτα, ῥίνας, ἐδίδαξεν ὅτι κ.τ.λ. The perfect ὑφίγγηται may be defended, either as referring to the previous assertion of the existence of a ruling and a ruled element within the soul (1. 5. 1254 b 5), or as implying that the soul affords an already forthcoming and familiar example of the fact—cp. de Part. An. 1. 3. 643 b 10, δεῖ πειρᾶσθαι λαμβάνειν κατὰ γένη τὰ ζῷα, ὡς ὑφίγγησθ’ οἱ πολλοὶ διορίσαντες ὀρνίθος γένος καὶ ἰχθύος. Schütz’ conjectural addition of τὰ before περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν simplifies the passage, but is perhaps unnecessary. It should be added that Vict. takes ὑφίγγηται in a passive sense (‘incoeptum est’), and that Bonitz also (Ind. 807 b 46) gives it a passive meaning. The correctness of this view, however, is open to doubt. For the thought, cp. 4 (7). 14. 1333 a 16 sqq.

6. οἶον does not seem here to exemplify but to explain, as in 3. 13. 1283 b 1.

8. τῶν ἄλλων, ‘other things besides the rational and irrational elements of the soul.’

ὅστε κ.τ.λ. Thurot (*Études*, p. 18), with most others, translates the words ὅστε φύσει τὰ πλείω ἄρχοντα καὶ ἀρχόμενα ‘de sorte que la plupart des êtres commandent ou obéissent par nature,’ and fails, not without reason, to find a satisfactory meaning in the words when thus translated, adding ‘du moins la leçon vulgaire ne se lie pas avec ce qui suit immédiatement.’ Hence he proposes to read ὅστε πλείω τὰ φύσει ἄρχοντα καὶ ἀρχόμενα. But is not another interpretation of τὰ πλείω possible? May not the meaning of the passage be as follows—‘so that not only is this one case of a ruling element and a ruled natural, but the plurality of cases of the same thing which we observe are natural too—I say “plurality,” for the free rules the slave in one way, and the male the female in another,

and the man the child in a third, and while (μέν) the parts of the soul exist in all these, they exist differently in each.' The first conclusion drawn is, that in a plurality of cases we find a ruling element and a ruled, both existing by nature. The reason for proving their naturalness is that only τὰ φύσει ἄρχοντα καὶ ἀρχόμενα have a moral virtue of their own; thus the τεχνίτης, being neither φύσει nor fully a slave, has not a moral virtue of his own, except so far as he is a slave. From this first inference Aristotle passes on to a second—that of a diversity of psychological constitution and of moral virtue in every ruling and ruled element subsisting by nature, according as the function discharged in each case is absolute and complete (τὸ ἀπλῶς ἔργον) or falls in various degrees short of being so. For τὰ πλείω ἄρχοντα καὶ ἀρχόμενα, cp. de Gen. An. 2. 7. 746 a 12, ἐπεὶ δὲ τὰ μὲν μονοτόκα, τὰ δὲ πολυτόκα τῶν τοιούτων ἐστὶ ζῶων, καὶ τὰ πλείω τῶν ἐμβρύων ('mehreren Embryen,' Aubert and Wimmer) τὸν αὐτὸν ἔχει τρόπον τῷ ἐνί: de Caelo 1. 8. 276 b 19, ἐν τοῖς πλείοσιν οὐρανοῖς ('in den mehreren Himmelsgebäuden,' Prantl). So we have οἱ πολλοὶ σύνδεσμοι ('a multiplicity of conjunctions') in Rhet. 3. 5. 1407 b 12, and οἱ πολλοὶ θεραπείαι in Pol. 2. 3. 1261 b 37: cp. also Dio Chrys. Or. 1. 50 R, τὰλλα οὕτως ἀγαπᾷ τὰ ἀρχόμενα τοὺς ἄρχοντας. Thurot, as has been said, would read ὅστε πλείω τὰ φύσει ἄρχοντα καὶ ἀρχόμενα, but this conclusion seems hardly to be that to which the preceding words point. Bernays avoids this objection in his rewriting of 8-17, as does also Susemihl in his still more sweeping reconstruction of 8-20 (Qu. Crit. p. 359: *Hermes* 19. 588 sqq.), but no MS. gives them any support, nor am I convinced that any change is necessary.

11. τὰ μόρια τῆς ψυχῆς, i. e. τὸ ἄλογον and τὸ λόγον ἔχον: cp. de Gen. An. 2. 4. 741 a 2, τὰ δ' ἄλλα μόρια τῆς ψυχῆς (other than ἡ γενῶσα καὶ θρεπτικὴ ψυχὴ) τοῖς μὲν ὑπάρχει, τοῖς δ' οὐκ ὑπάρχει τῶν ζῶων. To give the slave τὸ λόγον ἔχον, τὸ παθητικόν must be counted here (as in Eth. Nic. 1. 6. 1098 a 3 and 1. 13. 1103 a 2) as part of τὸ λόγον ἔχον, not of τὸ ἄλογον, for he has not the more indubitable element of τὸ λόγον ἔχον, τὸ βουλευτικόν (1260 a 12: cp. 3. 9. 1280 a 32 sqq.), which is apparently identical with that which is called τὸ λογιστικόν in Eth. Nic. 6. 2. 1139 a 12. Thus in 1. 5. 1254 b 22, he is said κοινωνεῖν λόγου τοσοῦτον ὅσον αἰσθάνεσθαι ἀλλὰ μὴ ἔχειν.

13. ἄκυρον, 'imperfect in authority,' 'imperfectly obeyed'—cp. Eth. Nic. 7. 10. 1151 b 15, λυποῦνται, ἐὰν ἄκυρα τὰ αἰτῶν ᾗ ὥσπερ ψηφίσματα. In women τὸ βουλευτικόν is there, but often does not get its own way.

14. ἀτελής. Cp. Plato, Laws 808 D, ὅσῃ γὰρ μάλιστα [ὁ παῖς] ἔχει

πηγὴν τοῦ φρονεῖν μήπω κατηρτυμένην, and Rep. 441 A-B. Cp. also Aristot. Phys. 7. 3. 247 b 18 sqq., where the child is described as in a state of φυσικὴ ταραχή, which must settle down before it can become φρόνιμος καὶ ἐπιστήμων. In Eth. Nic. 3. 4. 1111 b 8 προαίρεσις, and in Eth. Nic. 6. 13. 1144 b 8 νοῦς, are denied to the child, who is said in Eth. Nic. 3. 15. 1119 b 5 to live κατ' ἐπιθυμίαν.

ὁμοίως κ.τ.λ., i. e. the moral virtues, like the parts of the soul, exist in all, but differently. The construction of this sentence seems to be—ὑποληπτέον τοίνυν ἀναγκαῖον (εἶναι) ὁμοίως ἔχειν καὶ περὶ τὰς ἠθικάς ἀρετάς, δεῖν μὲν κ.τ.λ. For the omission of εἶναι, see Bon. Ind. 43 a 6, 239 a 9 sqq., and cp. c. 9. 1257 b 32. A somewhat similarly constructed sentence occurs in Magn. Mor. 1. 18. 1190 a 15 sq.: cp. also 28, διὸ δεῖ, ὥσπερ ὁ ποιητὴς εἴρηκε περὶ γυναικός, οὕτω νομίζειν ἔχειν περὶ πάντων. Bekker and Sus., however, begin a fresh sentence with ὑποληπτέον.

16. ὅσον κ.τ.λ. Ἐπιβάλλει or some such word needs to be supplied here, but Aristotle follows pretty closely the language of Meno in Plato, Meno 72 A, καθ' ἐκάστην γὰρ τῶν πράξεων καὶ τῶν ἡλικῶν πρὸς ἕκαστον ἔργον ἐκάστω ἡμῶν ἡ ἀρετὴ ἐστίν. Compare also for the thought Plato, Rep. 601 D.

17. διὸ κ.τ.λ. 'Hence the ruler must possess moral virtue in its complete rational form, for any function taken absolutely and in its fullness belongs to [and demands] a master-hand, and reason is such a master-hand.' The function of healing, for instance, is predicated ἀπλῶς of the physician who directs and superintends the process, and only in a qualified way (πως) of the subordinate who carries his directions into effect: cp. 4 (7). 3. 1325 b 21, μάλιστα δὲ καὶ πράττειν λέγεται κυρίως καὶ τῶν ἑξωτερικῶν πράξεων τοὺς ταῖς διαποίαις ἀρχιτέκοντας. Cp. also Eth. Nic. 7. 12. 1152 b 1, περὶ δὲ ἡδονῆς καὶ λύπης θεωρῆσαι τοῦ τὴν πολιτικὴν φιλοσοφούντος· οὗτος γὰρ τοῦ τελούς ἀρχιτέκων, πρὸς δὲ βλέποντες ἕκαστον τὸ μὲν κακὸν τὸ δ' ἀγαθὸν ἀπλῶς λέγεται, and Marc. Antonin. Comment. 6. 35. As to τελείαν . . . τὴν ἠθικὴν ἀρετὴν, cp. Magn. Mor. 2. 3. 1200 a 3, ἡ τελεία ἀρετὴ ὑπάρξει, ἣν ἔφαμεν μετὰ φρονήσεως εἶναι: Eth. Nic. 10. 8. 1178 a 18, τὸ δ' ὁρθὸν τῶν ἠθικῶν (ἀρετῶν) κατὰ τὴν φρόνησιν: Pol. 3. 4. 1277 b 18 sqq. (especially ἡ δὲ φρόνησις ἀρχοντος ἰδίας ἀρετὴ μόνη, 25).

21. οὐχ ἡ αὐτὴ κ.τ.λ. Cp. 3. 4. 1277 b 20 sqq. This teaching is anticipated in Eth. Nic. 8. 14. 1162 a 26, ἔστι γὰρ ἐκατέρου ἀρετὴ (i. e. ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυναικός).

22. Σωκράτης. Cp. Plato, Meno 71-73, though the absence of the article before Σωκράτης seems to imply that Aristotle is speaking of the historical Socrates, not of the interlocutor in the Meno. Anti-

sthenes agreed with Socrates (Diog. Laert. 6. 12). On the views of Socrates and Plato respectively as to the unity of virtue, see Zeller, Plato, E. T. p. 448 sqq. Plutarch seeks to prove in his *De Virtute Muliebri*, that though there are differences between the virtue of men and that of women, just as there are differences between the same virtue in different men (e.g. the courage of Ajax and Achilles), yet the virtues of women are not specifically different from those of men.

24. τὰς ἄλλας, sc. ἀρετάς, i.e. σωφροσύνη καὶ δικαιοσύνη. The word ἀρετή is so easily supplied that it is often suppressed—e.g. in 3. 5. 1278 b 1 and 5 (8). 4. 1338 b 15.

τοῦτο, i.e. the conclusion stated in 20–24. This had been reached through premisses relating to the virtue of φύσει ἄρχοντα and ἀρχόμενα in general, but it might also have been reached by examining the subject more in detail, as for instance by examining the virtue of women, children, and slaves separately and successively (κατὰ μέρος μᾶλλον ἐπισκοποῦσιν). This seems from what Meno says (Plato, Meno 71 E) to have been the method followed by Gorgias.

25. καθόλου. For the place of καθόλου, see Vahlen's note on Poet. 17. 1455 a 24 (p. 184). The thought is too characteristic of Aristotle and recurs too often in his writings to need much illustration, but reference may be made to Eth. Nic. 2. 7. 1107 a 28 sqq.: Pol. 2. 6. 1265 a 31: Rhet. 2. 19. 1393 a 16 sqq.

26. τὸ εὖ ἔχειν τὴν ψυχὴν. Plato had said this in Rep. 444 D, ἀρετὴ μὲν ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὑγιεία τέ τις ἂν εἴη καὶ κάλλος καὶ εὐεξία ψυχῆς.

τὸ ὀρθοπραγεῖν. As to the omission of ἧ, see critical note. For this definition of virtue, cp. Plato, Charmides 172 A: Meno 97.

27. ἐξαριθμοῦντες, as in Plato, Meno 71 E, πρῶτον μὲν, εἰ βούλει ἀνδρὸς ἀρετὴν . . . εἰ δὲ βούλει γυναικὸς ἀρετὴν . . . καὶ ἄλλη ἐστὶ παιδὸς ἀρετὴ, καὶ θηλείας καὶ ἄρρενος, καὶ πρεσβυτέρου ἀνδρός, εἰ μὲν βούλει, ἐλευθέρου, εἰ δὲ βούλει, δούλου: cp. also 77 A.

28. διό seems to introduce an inference from the general tenour of 17–24.

29. ὁ ποιητής, here Sophocles (Ajax 293). Cp. Athen. Deipn. 559 a, where the following lines are quoted from the Ὑπνος of Xenarchus:

Εἴτ' εἰσὶν οἱ τέττιγες οὐκ εὐδαίμονες,
ὦν ταῖς γυναιξὶν οὐδ' ὀτιοῦν φωνῆς ἔνε;

30. πάντων, slaves, children, and women. For the thought, cp. Xen. Rep. Lac. 3. 4 sq.

For the asyndeton at γυναικί, compare the somewhat similar examples adduced by Vahlen in his note on Poet. 25. 1460 b 23 (p. 261 sqq.).

31. οὐκέτι. Cp. de Gen. et Corr. I. 2. 315 b 3.

32. πρὸς τὸ τέλος καὶ τὸν ἡγούμενον, 'relative to the fully developed human being' (contrasted with ἀτελής: cp. I. 2. 1252 b 31, τέλος γὰρ αὕτη ἐκείνων) 'and to his guiding authority.' The child is apparently regarded as finding in his father the fully developed type of manhood which he himself is designed ultimately to realize and as accepting guidance from him. Cp. Eth. Eud. 7. 15. 1249 b 6, δεῖ δὴ, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις, πρὸς τὸ ἄρχον ζῆν καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἕξιν κατὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν τὴν τοῦ ἀρχοντος, οἷον δοῦλον πρὸς δεσπότην καὶ ἕκαστον πρὸς τὴν ἐκάστου καθήκουσαν ἀρχήν: Eth. Nic. 3. 15. 1119 b 7, and 3. 5. 1113 a 5 sqq.

33. ὁμοίως δὲ κ.τ.λ. For the thought, cp. Menander, Inc. Fab. Fragm. 56:

Ἔμοι πόλις ἐστὶ καὶ καταφυγὴ καὶ νόμος
καὶ τοῦ δικαίου τοῦ τ' ἀδίκου παντὸς κριτῆς
ὁ δεσπότης· πρὸς τοῦτον ἓνα δεῖ ζῆν ἐμέ,

and Fragm. 150:

Ἐλεύθερος πᾶς ἐν δεδούλωται, νόμφ,
δυσὶν δὲ δοῦλος, καὶ νόμφ καὶ δεσπότη.

Ἰθμεν, e. g. in c. 5. 1254 b 25.

35. The construction of τοσοῦτος with ὅπως does not seem to be very common. See with respect to it Weber, Die Absichtssätze bei Aristoteles, p. 33, who compares Oecon. I. 6. 1344 b 29, καὶ τὰς ἐργασίας (δεῖ) οὕτω νεμεῖσθαι ὅπως μὴ ἅμα κινδυνεύσωσιν ἅπαντα.

36. ἑλλείψῃ. Eucken (de Partic. usu, p. 54) compares 7 (5). I. 1301 b 7: 4 (7). 14. 1334 a 5.

ἀπορήσειε δ' ἂν τις κ.τ.λ. It would be possible to take ἀρα (37) and ἥ (39) as in the same construction, and the whole sentence ἀρα—πλείστον as dependent on ἀπορήσειε (for ἀρα followed by ἥ in indirect interrogations, see Vahlen, Beitr. zu Aristot. Poet. I. 43 sq., and on Poet. 4. 1449 a 7), but ἥ διαφέρει τοῦτο πλείστον is probably not a part of the question raised: it is rather Aristotle's own solution of the ἀπορία (see Bon. Ind. 313 a 7 sqq., and compare the very similar passage, 7 (5). 9. 1309 b 8—11). The difficulty raised is—'if we allow the existence of an ἀρετὴ δοῦλου, because the slave needs to possess it, must we not also allow the existence of an ἀρετὴ τεχνίτου?'

40. κοινωνὸς ζωῆς, 'is a sharer with his master in a common existence': cp. 3. 6. 1278 b 16, τῆς ἀρχῆς εἶδη πόσα τῆς περὶ ἀνθρώπων καὶ τὴν κοινωνίαν τῆς ζωῆς, and other similar phrases collected by Lasaulx, Ehe bei den Griechen (p. 13, note 22). It was only of φύσει ἀρχόμενα that the possession of a form of moral virtue was

proved in 1259 b 32 sqq. Cp. Plin. Epist. 8. 16: *servis respublica quaedam et quasi civitas domus est.*

* πορρώτερον, 'less closely attached to the master.' Cp. 3. 5. 1278 a 11, τῶν δ' ἀναγκαίων οἱ μὲν ἐνὶ λειτουργοῦντες τὰ τοιαῦτα δούλοι, οἱ δὲ κοινὸι βάνανσοι καὶ θῆτες.

1260 b. 1. ἀφωρισμένην τινὰ ἔχει δουλείαν. Sepulveda translates 'determinatae cuidam servituti addictus est,' and explains in his note that the βάνανσος τεχνίτης is not a slave for all purposes, but only for the performance of a definite servile task. The extent of his slavery is determined by his ἔργον: cp. 6 (4). 15. 1300 a 15, ἡ ἐκ πάντων ἢ ἐκ τινῶν ἀφωρισμένων, οἷον ἡ τιμῇματι ἢ γένει ἢ ἀρετῇ ἢ τιμῇ τοιοῦτῃ ἄλλῃ, and Eth. Nic. 8. 11. 1159 b 33.

καὶ ὁ μὲν δούλος κ.τ.λ. The artisan is not only rather an adjunct of the household than one of its ruled members, but he is also not by nature. He is not a φύσει ἀρχόμενος, and all that has been proved in the foregoing is that φύσει ἀρχόμενα possess a moral virtue of their own. Nature has indeed provided men with materials for dress and consequently for shoemaking (1. 8. 1256 b 20), but the shoemaker works for hire and practises μισθαργία, which was brought under the unnatural form of χρηματιστική in 1. 11. 1258 b 25. Yet in 4 (7). 8. 1328 b 6 and 6 (4). 4. 1291 a 1 sq. artisans are admitted to be a necessary element in a State; it seems strange then that they are not by nature.

2. τῶν ἄλλων τεχνιτῶν. For the gen., see note on 1259 b 24.

3. φανερόν τοίνυν κ.τ.λ. The reasoning is—we have seen that the slave possesses a certain ministerial form of moral virtue over and above his technical excellences, and that his moral virtue is relative to his master, who is his end and guiding authority; hence it is from the master *qua* master, and not from the master as possessing the δεσποτική ἐπιστήμη, that the slave must derive the kind of moral virtue which he ought to possess. The concluding part of the sentence, if it were complete, would apparently run—τελείαν ἔχοντα τὴν ἠθικὴν ἀρετὴν, ἀλλ' οὐ τὴν διδασκαλικὴν ἔχοντα τῶν ἔργων δεσποτικῇ. Nothing is gained, as it seems to me, by introducing τὸν (with Bern. Sus. and others) before τὴν διδασκαλικήν. The point insisted on by Aristotle appears to be that the master should be the source of moral virtue (in a subordinate and ministerial form) to the slave *qua* master, and as possessing complete moral virtue and reason, not as possessing the δεσποτικὴ ἐπιστήμη: it is not, that the master and nobody else is to be the source of moral virtue to the slave. Aristotle had said at the commencement of the chapter (1259 b 20), that the householder should care for the virtue of his slaves, and

he has now made it clear what sort of virtue he should seek to produce in them. In 1. 7. 1255 b 30 sqq. (cp. 4 (7). 3. 1325 a 23 sqq.) the *δεσποτική ἐπιστήμη* has already been said to be nothing great and to be in no way of the essence of the master. Socrates and Plato, who had denied the name of *δεσπότης* to any one not possessed of the science of *δεσποτική*, are here glanced at; Aristotle perhaps also remembers the picture of the *δεσπότης* in Xenophon's *Oeconomicus*, himself training his slaves to be efficient servants. Xenophon, however, had already in the same work depicted the householder as teaching his slaves justice (*πειρώμαι ἐμβιβάζειν εἰς τὴν δικαιοσύνην τοὺς οἰκέτας*, *Oecon.* 14. 4: compare his account of the training of a housekeeper, *ibid.* 9. 13), and in this Aristotle is thoroughly with him.

5. διὸ λέγουσιν οὐ καλῶς οἱ λόγου τοὺς δούλους ἀποστεροῦντες κ.τ.λ. When Aristotle speaks of *ἐπίταξις* in connexion with the master of slaves, he has in his mind *ἐπίταξις περὶ τὰ ἀναγκαῖα*: cp. 4 (7). 3. 1325 a 25, οὐδὲν γὰρ τό γε δούλω, ἢ δούλος, χρῆσθαι σεμνόν· ἡ γὰρ ἐπίταξις ἢ περὶ τῶν ἀναγκαίων οὐδενὸς μετέχει τῶν καλῶν, and 1. 7. 1255 b 33, ἔστι δ' αὕτη ἡ ἐπιστήμη οὐδὲν μέγα ἔχουσα οὐδὲ σεμνόν, ἀ γὰρ τὸν δούλον ἐπίστασθαι δεῖ ποιεῖν, ἐκείνον δὲ ταῦτα ἐπίστασθαι ἐπιτάττειν. The drift of the passage before us, therefore, seems to be—'the master should be the source of moral virtue to the slave, hence he should not confine himself to commands relating to the slave's discharge of his servile functions.' But then comes the question—what is the meaning of *οἱ λόγου τοὺς δούλους ἀποστεροῦντες*? Bern. and Sus. translate 'those who forbid converse with slaves'—Stahr, 'those who withdraw rational admonition (*die vernünftige Zurechtweisung*) from slaves' (cp. Xen. *Oecon.* 13. 9, ἀνθρώπους δ' ἔστι πιθανωτέρους ποιεῖν καὶ λόγῳ, ἐπιδεικνύοντα ὥς συμφέρει αὐτοῖς πείθεσθαι); but I incline on the whole, following Bonitz (*Ind.* 436 b 50) and the earlier commentators, to explain *λόγου* here as 'reason' (cp. 1260 a 17–19 and *Eth. Nic.* 1. 13. 1102 b 33, ὅτι δὲ πείθεται πως ὑπὸ λόγου τὸ ἀλογον, μὴ οὖν καὶ ἡ νοουμένη καὶ πᾶσα ἐπιτίμησις τε καὶ παράκλησις), though it should be borne in mind that the two senses of the word *λόγος*, 'reason' and 'reasoning,' often tend to pass into each other. We still have to ask, however, what is the meaning of *οἱ λόγου ἀποστεροῦντες*. The earlier commentators explain the words 'those who deny that slaves partake in reason' (cp. 3. 1. 1275 a 28, καίτοι γελοῖον τοὺς κυριατάτους ἀποστερεῖν ἀρχῆς), but perhaps their meaning rather is 'those who withhold reason from the slave' (by withholding the reasoning which is its source, 1. 5. 1254 b 22). For the relation of *λόγος* to the moral virtues, see *Eth. Nic.* 6. 1. With

the teaching of the passage before us may be compared that of Eth. Nic. 9. 9. 1170 b 10, συναισθάνεσθαι ἄρα δεῖ καὶ τοῦ φίλου ὅτι ἔστιν, τοῦτο δὲ γίνοιτο· ἂν ἐν τῷ συζῆν καὶ κοινωνεῖν λόγον καὶ διανοίας· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν δόξειε τὸ συζῆν ἐπὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων λέγεσθαι, καὶ οὐχ ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν βοσκημάτων τὸ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ νέμεσθαι. What is here said of the intercourse of two friends may hold to a certain extent of the intercourse between master and slave. The reference in οἱ λόγου τοὺς δούλους ἀποστεροῦντες κ.τ.λ. is to Plato, Laws 777 E: cp. also 720 B sqq. Pallas, one of the favourite freedmen of the Emperor Claudius, 'would not deign even to speak to his slaves, but gave them his commands by gestures, or, if that was not enough, by written orders' (Capes, Early Roman Empire, p. 87). According to Clement of Alexandria (Aristot. Fragm. 179. 1508 b 7 sqq.), οὐδὲ προσγελᾶν δούλοις Ἀριστοτέλης εἶα. Is not this writer thinking of what Plato had said in the Laws?

6. φάσκοντες. 'Infinitives following certain verbs (of saying, thinking, etc.) sometimes contain a Dictative force . . . The governing verb gets a different and a stronger meaning: to "say" becomes to "recommend" or to "pray"' (Riddell, Apology of Plato, p. 148). Φάσκειν is used of philosophers setting forth a dogma.

7. νουθητέον γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Aristotle does not say why (Vict. wishes that he had), but his reason probably is that the slave's one chance of sharing in reason is to receive it in reasoning from outside. The child (1260 a 13) has τὸ βουλευτικόν already, though as yet imperfect, whereas the slave has it not; all he has is the power of recognizing reason when set before him by another. One of Menander's characters says, in a fragment which perhaps belongs to the Ἀδελφοί (fr. 2: Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 4. 69)—

Οὐ λυποῦντα δεῖ

παιδάριον ὀρθοῦν, ἀλλὰ καὶ πείθοντά τι.

Aristotle's view would probably strike his contemporaries as a decided paradox, for Pseudo-Plutarch, de Liberis Educandis c. 12. 8 F, most likely expresses the view commonly taken—κακὴν φημι, δεῖν τοὺς παῖδας ἐπὶ τὰ καλὰ τῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων ἄγειν παραινέσεις καὶ λόγοις, μὴ μὰ Δία πληγαῖς μηδ' αἰκισμοῖς. Δοκεῖ γάρ που ταῦτα τοῖς δούλοις μᾶλλον ἢ τοῖς ἐλευθέροις πρέπειν· ἀποναρκῶσι γὰρ καὶ φρίττουσι πρὸς τοὺς πόνοους, τὰ μὲν διὰ τὰς ἀλγηδόνας τῶν πληγῶν, τὰ δὲ καὶ διὰ τὰς ὕβρεις: cp. also Ecclesiasticus 33. 28.

8. περὶ δ' ἀνδρὸς κ.τ.λ. Nothing of this kind appears in the Politics; its inquiries, in fact, seldom assume this delicate ethical character. There are a few words as to the mutual behaviour of

husband and wife in *Oecon.* 1. 4. 1344 a 13 sq. which may possibly reproduce some part of Aristotle's teaching. See also the Latin translation of a fragment on this subject (which can hardly be from the pen of Aristotle) in Val. Rose, *Aristoteles Pseudepigraphus*, p. 644 sqq.

11. τὸ καλῶς. See Bon. Ind. 291 b 25 sqq.

12. ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὰς πολιτείας. The First Book (οἱ πρῶτοι λόγοι, ἐν οἷς περὶ οἰκονομίας διωρίσθη καὶ δεσποτείας, 3. 6. 1278 b 17) is here marked off from τὰ περὶ τὰς πολιτείας: cp. ἡ πρώτη μέθοδος περὶ τῶν πολιτειῶν, 6 (4). 2. 1289 a 26. So in *Rhet.* 2. 24. 1401 b 32, the phrase οἱ ἐν ταῖς πολιτεαῖς occurs, and Plato's *Republic* seems to have been sometimes spoken of as αἱ πολιτεῖαι (cp. 6 (4). 7. 1293 b 1, ὥσπερ Πλάτων ἐν ταῖς πολιτεαῖς: see for other instances Henkel, *Studien*, p. 10).

14. ταῦτα, i. e. ἀνὴρ καὶ γυνή, τέκνα καὶ πατήρ, though only παῖδες and γυναῖκες are mentioned in 16; it is perhaps taken for granted that the training of the head of the household will be relative to the constitution.

τὴν δὲ τοῦ μέρους κ.τ.λ. Cp. 5 (8). 1. 1337 a 29, μόριον γὰρ ἕκαστος τῆς πόλεως ἢ δ' ἐπιμέλεια πέφυκεν ἑκάστου μορίου βλέπειν πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ὅλου ἐπιμέλειαν.

15. πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν. The virtue of the part must be adjusted to the virtue of the whole; hence the virtue of the woman and the child must be adjusted to the constitution, for the constitution is the standard of virtue in the πόλις, the whole to which they belong. Cp. 7 (5). 9. 1310 a 12 sqq.: 5 (8). 1. 1337 a 11 sqq. The course followed in 4 (7). 14. 1332 b 12 sqq. is quite in conformity with this principle, though we are concerned there only with the children, or probably the sons, not with the women; δηλον γὰρ (says Aristotle in that passage), ὥς ἀκολουθεῖν δεήσει καὶ τὴν παιδείαν κατὰ τὴν διαίρεσιν ταύτην (i. e. the decision whether the same persons are always to be rulers or not).

18. αἱ μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Cp. Plato, *Laws* 781 A sq.

19. οἱ κοινῶν τῆς πολιτείας. Cp. 3. 3. 1276 b 1, ἔστι δὲ (ἡ πόλις) κοινῶν πολιτῶν πολιτείας, and 8 (6). 6. 1320 b 28, αἱ δὲ δεῖ παραλαμβάνειν ἐκ τοῦ βελτίονος δήμου τοὺς κοινῶνους.

20. ὥστ' ἐπεὶ κ.τ.λ. Birt (*Das antike Buchwesen*, p. 459. 3) holds that 'these last five lines are evidently added by the "redaction" to form a transition to the Second Book.' The opening paragraph of the Second Book, however, accords but ill with the close of the First (see note on 1260 b 27); in fact, καὶ πρῶτον 23 . . τῆς ἀρίστης 24 would be better away, though it certainly is the case that

the designers of 'best constitutions' are criticised in the Second Book before actual constitutions like the Lacedaemonian, etc., are criticised. It is possible that the closing words of the First Book were added by a bungling editor, but it is also possible that Aristotle himself may be in fault. The opening paragraph of the investigations which now constitute the Second Book of the Politics may have been imperfectly harmonized by him with the closing sentence of τὰ περὶ οἰκονομίας καὶ δεσποτείας, just as the sequence of the Third and Fourth (Seventh) Books is not absolutely perfect, and the programme of the Politics given at the close of the Nicomachean Ethics is departed from to a large extent in the Politics itself. Or again the opening paragraph of the Second Book may have been an after-thought of Aristotle's, and the book may have originally begun Ἀρχὴν δὲ πρῶτον ποιητέον κ.τ.λ. This is perhaps less probable, as ταύτης τῆς σκέψεως 37 seems to refer back to θεωρῆσαι περὶ τῆς κοινωνίας τῆς πολιτικῆς 27. It is impossible to penetrate these secrets of the workshop; one thing, however, should be borne in mind, that the component parts of the Politics are not as closely welded together as they might be, and often look as though they were more or less separate works. This makes defects of 'callida iunctura' less surprising.

BOOK II.

- C. 1. 27. Ἐπεὶ δὲ κ.τ.λ. The First Book ends, καὶ πρῶτον ἐπισκεψόμεθα
 1260 b. περὶ τῶν ἀποφηνανένων περὶ τῆς πολιτείας τῆς ἀρίστης. The Second begins by premising that Aristotle's aim is to inquire what form of political union is best for those most favourably circumstanced—a fact which had not been stated before—and then proceeds to argue that this involves a preliminary review of 'other constitutions than that to be propounded by Aristotle' (τὰς ἄλλας πολιτείας), whether actual working constitutions (termed κύριας in 2. 12. 1274 b 27) held to be well-ordered, or schemes in good repute put forward by individual inquirers. The two passages are evidently not in strict sequence. The opening paragraph of the Second Book is not perhaps absolutely inconsistent with the closing words of the First, inasmuch as all that is said at the close of the latter book is that those who have put forward views with regard to the best constitution will be first dealt with, but it appears to ignore them. In c. 12. 1273 b 27 sqq. the plan of the book is still further extended to include a notice of οἱ ἀποφηνάμενοί τι περὶ πολιτείας generally, and even of those

who were the authors of laws only and not of constitutions. Isocrates (Nicocl. § 24) refers to the Lacedaemonians and Carthaginians as admittedly possessing good constitutions; Polybius (6. 43) adds Crete and Mantinea, and in the opinion of some, Athens and Thebes. Plato (Laws 638 B) speaks of Ceos and the Italian Locri as well-governed. Cp. also Plato, Rep. 599 E and Crito 52 E.

29. τὰς ἄλλας πολιτείας, 'others than that which I am about to set forth': cp. παρ' αὐτὰς ἕτερον, 33. It is possible that these words may be used in the same sense ('other than my own') in 4 (7). 4. 1325 b 34.

31. † τυγχάνωσιν †. In eleven passages at least of the genuine writings of Aristotle, if the MSS. are to be trusted, we find εἰ followed by the subjunctive. These are as follows:—30 b 14, 66 b 9, 636 b 29, 1261 a 27, 136 a 20, 27, 179 b 22, 343 b 33, 1279 b 22 (συμβαίνει, Vat. Palimpsest), 1447 a 24, and the passage before us. (In 1132 a 11 K^b has the subjunctive after κὰν εἰ: see also 322 b 28, 326 a 6, 645 b 31, and Susemihl's *apparatus criticus* on 1323 a 2.) In the first four of these passages the subjunctive is used with καὶ εἰ, εἰ, οὐδ' ἂν εἰ, and ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ: in the remainder with κὰν εἰ. See Vahlen, Beitr. zu Aristot. Poet. 1. 35 sqq., Bon. Ind. 217 a 31 sqq. and 41 a 26 sq., and Eucken, de Partic. Usu p. 59 sqq. All the MSS. but pr. P^s and possibly Γ have τυγχάνωσιν here, and all except P¹ and possibly Γ have ἐλκύση in 1261 a 27. Vahlen's instructive discussion of the question as to the construction of κὰν εἰ with the subjunctive in Aristotle's writings results in the conclusion that its use is 'very doubtful' and in Poet. 1. 1447 a 24 he substitutes κὰν εἰ τυγχάνουσιν for κὰν εἰ τυγχάνωσιν, which is the reading of the one authoritative MS. of the Poetics. Bonitz would emend all the passages referred to above, so as to expel from Aristotle's writings the use of εἰ with the subjunctive. Eucken remarks (*ubi supra*, p. 63), that τυγχάνωσιν here, συμβαίνει in 3. 8. 1279 b 22, and τυγχάνουσιν in Poet. 1. 1447 a 25 may very easily have arisen from τυγχάνουσιν, συμβαίνει, and τυγχάνουσιν, and that it is only in passages 'ubi minima mutatione ex indicativo nasci potuit' that the subjunctive is found after κὰν εἰ in Aristotle's writings. It is easy, however, to lay too much stress on arguments of this kind (see Blass as to Dawes' Canon, Handbuch der klass. Alterthums-Wissenschaft, 1. 252). In Plato, Rep. 579 D the MSS. have κὰν εἰ μὴ τῷ δοκῇ, and in Thuc. 6. 21 an 'indubitable' instance of εἰ with the subjunctive occurs (Classen *ad loc.*). See Stallbaum's note on Laws 958 C, where other instances of the occurrence of this construction in Attic

writers are noticed. Aristotle is not a strictly Attic writer, and the fact should be noted for what it is worth that there are other passages of the Politics in which either the one family of MSS. or the other gives the subjunctive where we expect the indicative or else the subjunctive with *ἄν*: thus in 1301 a 38 Π^a have *τυγχάνωσιν*, and in 1307 a 37 *ὅτε θέλωσι*, while in 1313 a 20 Π^a have *ὅσα γὰρ ἐλαττόνων ὄσι κύριοι*. On the whole, I have contented myself with indicating by obeli the grave doubts which attach to the inculcated readings—*τυγχάνωσιν* here and *ἐλκύσῃ* in 1261 a 27.

32. *ἵνα κ.τ.λ.* There is a considerable resemblance between the passage before us and de An. 1. 2. 403 b 20 sqq. With regard to *τὸ ὁρθῶς ἔχον* and *τὸ χρήσιμον* as the two ends of inquiry in the Politics, cp. 1. 3. 1253 b 15 sq. and 6 (4). 1. 1288 b 35 sq.

33. *τὸ ζητεῖν τι παρ' αὐτὰς ἕτερον* very probably refers to Isocr. de Antidosi § 83, *οὐδὲν γὰρ αὐτοὺς δεῖ ζητεῖν ἑτέρους [νόμους], ἀλλὰ τοὺς παρὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις εὐδοκιμοῦντας πειραθῆναι συναγαγεῖν, ὃ ῥαδίως ὅστις ἂν οὖν βουλευθεῖς ποιήσῃ*. It is precisely this view that the Second Book is intended to disprove. See the opinion of Isocrates on this subject, de Antid. §§ 79–83. Πάντως probably goes with *σοφίζεσθαι βουλομένων* in the sense of 'at all hazards.'

35. *τὰς νῦν ὑπαρχούσας*. Vict. 'significat, ut arbitror, utrumque genus rerumpublicarum (id est, et usurpatas ab aliquibus civitatibus et literarum monumentis proditas), etsi id nomen magis convenire videtur receptis iam, verius enim hae *ὑπάρχειν* dicuntur.'

διὰ τοῦτο. Bonitz (Ind. 546 a 47) compares for this use of *τοῦτο*, in which 'per ubertatem quandam dicendi quae antea exponuntur postea epanaleptice comprehenduntur,' Categ. 5. 2 b 17: de An. 3. 3. 427 b 8–11. Cp. also c. 11. 1273 b 5.

36. *ἀρχὴν δὲ κ.τ.λ.* The natural starting-point of an inquiry *περὶ τῆς κοινωνίας τῆς πολιτικῆς* (1260 b 27) is the question, in what and how much is there to be *κοινωνία*? The question put by Protagoras (Plato, Protag. 324 E) reminds us in form of that raised here, but Protagoras is there thinking of virtue as the thing shared.

40. *πολιτεία*. Cp. 3. 4. 1276 b 29, *κοινωνία δ' ἐστὶν ἡ πολιτεία*, where the meaning of *πολιτεία* is evidently 'constitution'; thus Bonitz (Ind. 612 b 15) is apparently right in rendering the word here as 'civitatis forma et ordo'; otherwise we might be tempted by *τοὺς πολίτας* 38 and *οἱ πολῖται* 1261 a 1 to explain it here, as in some other passages (see Bon. Ind. 612 b 10 sqq.), as = 'the citizen-body,' especially as in 3. 3. 1276 b 2 the *πολιτεία* is spoken of rather as the thing shared, than the *κοινωνία*—a term more usually applied to the *πόλις*.

41. Citizenship implies membership of the same city, and membership of the same city implies residence in the same locality. Still residence in the same locality does not amount to much: cp. Eth. Nic. 9. 9. 1170 b 11, *τοῦτο δὲ γίνουτ' ἂν ἐν τῇ συζῇν καὶ κοινωνεῖν λόγων καὶ διανοίας*: οὕτω γὰρ ἂν δόξειε τὸ συζῇν ἐπὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων λέγεσθαι, καὶ οὐχ ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν βοσκημάτων τὸ ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ νέμεσθαι.

2. *πότερον κ.τ.λ.* The question is raised in very similar 1261 a. language to the question about Kingship, 3. 14. 1284 b 37. This is worth remarking, as these correspondences show a certain continuity of treatment.

ῥῶν. What are the objects which it is implied cannot be shared? This appears from Plato, Rep. 464 D, *διὰ τὸ μηδένα ἴδιον ἐκτῆσθαι πλὴν τὸ σῶμα, τὰ δ' ἄλλα κοινά*. In the Laws (739 C) Plato insists with humorous exaggeration, that even hands ears and eyes are to be common.

Θ sqq. 'Community in women involves both many other C. 2. difficulties, and this especially, that the object for the sake of which Socrates recommends its establishment by legislation evidently is not borne out (proved to be a desirable object) by the arguments he uses, and then again as a means to the end which he marks out for the State, the scheme set forth in the dialogue is impracticable; yet how it should be limited and qualified, is nowhere definitely explained.' Socrates fails to make out that the aim with which he pleads for a community in women—that of rendering the State as far as possible one—is a correct aim; and the means which he adopts for the realization of his end are—apart from qualifications and limitations of which we hear nothing from him—impossible. The first of these two allegations is developed in c. 2 and the second in c. 3. The Platonic Socrates anticipates a reception of this kind for his suggestion of community in women and children; cp. Rep. 450 C, *καὶ γὰρ ὡς δυνατὰ λέγεται, ἀπιστοῖτ' ἂν, καὶ εἰ ὅτι μάλιστα γένοιτο, ὡς ἀριστ' ἂν εἴη ταῦτα, καὶ ταύτη ἀπιστήσεται*. Aristotle's criticisms on the Lacedaemonian and other constitutions are grouped under two heads (c. 9. 1269 a 30) in a not very dissimilar way. As to *ἀδύνατον*, cp. c. 3. 1261 b 30, *διὸ ἐστὶ τὸ πάντας τὸ αὐτὸ λέγειν ὥδι μὲν καλόν, ἀλλ' οὐ δυνατόν, ὥδι δ' οὐδὲν ὁμοιοητικόν*, and 1262 a 14 sqq. As to *δι' ἣν αἰτίαν*, cp. c. 4. 1262 b 5 sq. For *οὐ φαίνεται συμβαῖνον* in the sense of 'evidently does not result,' cp. 2. 6. 1266 a 5, *οὐδ' ἔχουσα φαίνεται*, and see Bon. Ind. 808 b 40 sqq. For *συμβαῖνον ἐκ τῶν λόγων*, cp. Top. 8. 1. 156 b 38 (Bon. Ind. 713 b 16), and de Caelo 1. 3. 270 b 11. It seems

better to interpret these words as 'borne out by the arguments used' than with Thurot (*Études sur Aristote*, p. 19) to explain, 'la communauté n'atteint pas le résultat, en vue duquel Platon établit cette législation.' The sentence *ὥς μὲν εἴρηται νῦν* appears to be the nom. to *ἐστί*, which we must supply with *ἀδύνατον*: cp. c. 5. 1263 a 22, *ὃν δὲ νῦν τρόπον ἔχει . . . οὐ μικρὸν ἂν διενέγκαι*. As to *πρός*, cp. 2. 4. 1262 b 3: 3. 13. 1284 a 1: 4 (7). 17. 1336 b 31 sq.: 5 (8). 3. 1338 a 42. For *διελείν* ('explicare,' Bon. Ind. 180 a 23, 29), cp. Eth. Nic. 6. 1. 1138 b 20 sqq., and 9. 8. 1168 b 12, *ἵσως οὖν τοὺς τοιοῦτους δεῖ τῶν λόγων διαίρειν καὶ διορίζειν, ἐφ' ὅσον ἐκάτεροι καὶ πῇ ἀληθεύουσιν*: also Metaph. A. 9. 992 b 18 sq.

15. *ὅτι μάλιστα* qualifies *μίαν* (cp. 1261 b 16, and *τελέως*, 1261 b 20).

16. *ταύτην ὑπόθεσιν*, 'this as his fundamental aim.' For this use of *οὗτος*, see Bon. Ind. 546 a 51 sqq. For the gender—*ταύτην*, not *τοῦτο*—cp. 5 (8). 3. 1337 b 32: 4 (7). 7. 1327 b 41.

καίτοι κ.τ.λ. For the argument, compare 7 (5). 9. 1309 b 21 sqq.

18. *πλήθος . . . τι*. Cp. 3. 1. 1274 b 41: 1275 b 20: 4 (7). 8. 1328 b 16—passages which explain the addition of *τι*. Plato had said in Rep. 462 C, *καὶ ἥτις δὴ ἐγγύτατα ἐνὸς ἀνθρώπου ἔχει (αὕτη ἡ πόλις ἄριστα διοικεῖται)*, but his meaning is that the hurt of one member of the community is to be felt as a hurt by all, just as the hurt of a finger is felt as a hurt by the whole man. He knows well that the State consists both *ἐκ πλείονων ἀνθρώπων* and *ἐξ εἰδὲς διαφερόντων* (Polit. 308 C). Nevertheless there was a real difference of opinion between Aristotle and Plato on this subject. The State is less of a *σύμφυσις* (2. 4. 1262 b 14 sqq.) to Aristotle than to Plato; the individual counts for more with him, and is less lost and swallowed up in the State.

22. *ἀναιρήσει γὰρ τὴν πόλιν*. Cp. 1261 b 8 sq. For the future, cp. 2. 5. 1264 a 5, *μάλιστα δ' ἂν γένοιτο φανερόν, εἴ τις τοῖς ἔργοις ἴδοι τὴν τοιαύτην πολιτείαν κατασκευαζομένην* οὐ γὰρ *δυνήσεται κ.τ.λ.*

23. *ἐξ εἰδὲς διαφερόντων*. Cp. 3. 4. 1277 a 5 sq., and the enumeration of the different *γένη* of the *πόλις* in 4 (7). 8. 1328 b 20 sq. and 6 (4). 4. Especially the broad distinction of rulers and ruled is referred to (cp. 4 (7). 14. 1332 b 12); but even among rulers there will be differences (1261 b 5). When we are told in 6 (4). 11. 1295 b 25 that *ἡ πόλις βούλεται ἐξ ἴσων εἶναι καὶ ὁμοίων ὅτι μάλιστα*, the word *πόλις* appears to include only the citizens, as in the phrase *ἡ πόλις πολιτῶν τι πλήθος ἐστίν*, 3. 1. 1274 b 41. But even like and equal citizens can only be 'as far as possible' like and equal, for some of them will be rulers and others ruled.

25. *μὲν* is answered by *δέ* 29. For the thought expressed in 24—27, cp. Xen. de Vectig. c. 4. 32, *ὥσπερ σύμμαχοι, ὅσφ' ἂν πλείους συνιῶσιν, ἰσχυροτέρους ἀλλήλους ποιούσιν.*

27. *ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ κ.τ.λ.* It is not quite clear whether the meaning is 'just as a greater weight of anything is more useful than a less,' or 'just as a greater weight depresses the scale more.' Giph. takes the words in the former way, Vict. in the latter. '*ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ* does not always imply an ellipse after *ὥσπερ ἂν* (see Bon. Ind. 872 b 55 sqq. and Eucken, de Partic. Usu, p. 60), but it may perhaps do so here, and we may be right in translating (with Giph.)—'just as would be the case, if a weight were to depress the scale more.'

+ *ἐλακύση*†. See critical note on this word, and also above on 1260 b 31.

διοίσει δὲ κ.τ.λ. The first of the many questions which arise as to this passage is, what is the meaning of *τῷ τοιοῦτῳ*? Here as elsewhere it seems to mean 'in the before-mentioned respect,' but it is not quite clear whether it should be explained as = *τῷ ἐξ εἵδει διαφερόντων εἶναι*, or 'in being all the stronger for being larger, even though its components are identical.' Probably the latter explanation is the correct one. *Κεχωρισμένοι κατὰ κώμας*, again, may mean either 'scattered (sundered from each other) in villages' (cp. 1. 9. 1257 a 22, *οἱ δὲ κεχωρισμένοι πολλῶν πάλιν καὶ ἐτέρων*, and Hdt. 1. 96), or 'distributed in villages' (cp. 2. 5. 1264 a 6, *οὐ γὰρ δυνήσεται μὴ μερίζων αὐτὰ καὶ χωρίζων ποιῆσαι τὴν πόλιν*, and Eth. Nic. 4. 3. 1121 b 19). The two interpretations do not lie far apart, but perhaps the former of them is the more likely to be correct (see Liddell and Scott s.v. *κώμη*). Passing on to discuss the meaning of the passage as a whole, we find that *ὅταν μὴ*—*Ἀρκάδες* has been taken by some to be explanatory of *πόλις*, and has been rendered 'when the members of the *πόλις* are not scattered in villages, but are concentrated in a city, like the Arcadians (after the foundation of Megalopolis),' but it seems strange that 'the Arcadians' should be selected to serve as an example of a *πόλις*. It is far more likely that *ὅταν μὴ*—*Ἀρκάδες* refers to the members of the *ἔθνος*, and is intended to explain under what circumstances the difference alleged to exist between the *πόλις* and the *ἔθνος* does really exist. But then comes the question, what is the meaning of *οἷον Ἀρκάδες*? Sepulveda explains, '*gens quae non per castella et vicos distributa est, ut divisos habeat magistratus, sed sparsas per agros domos habitat, ut olim Arcades*,' and Lamb., Ramus, and others follow in his track, but Aristotle does not indicate in any way that he is not referring to the Arcadians of his own day, who had long

ceased to live in this fashion. Dittenberger, on the other hand, whose able discussion of the passage in *Gött. gel. Anz.* 1874, p. 1376 sqq. (see an extract from it in *Sus.*², Note 132) deserves careful perusal, explains the passage thus (p. 1383)—‘provided, that is to say, that the nation is not distributed, like most barbarian nations, into non-independent (unselbständige) villages, but, like the Arcadian for instance, into a number of independent (selbständiger) City-States.’ He holds that a distinction is drawn in the passage between ‘nations forming a political unity (commonly with a monarchical constitution)’ and nations composed of a number of City-States. This is a possible view of it, but it must not be forgotten that in Aristotle’s day the Arcadians were a confederacy of City-States, and that a general assembly of the nation met at Megalopolis: cp. *Aristot. Fragm.* 442. 1550 b 6 (*Harpocr.* p. 280), *μύριοι ἐν Μεγάλῃ πόλει . . . συνέδριόν ἐστι κοινὸν Ἀρκάδων ἀπάντων, οὗ πολλάκις μνημονεύουσιν οἱ ἱστορικοί: διελεκεται δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης ἐν τῇ κοινῇ Ἀρκάδων πολιτείᾳ ἀρχόμενος τοῦ βιβλίου*, and see Müller, *Fr. Hist. Gr.* 2. 134, who refers to *Diod.* 15. 59, *περὶ δὲ τοὺς αὐτοὺς χρόνους Λυκομήδης ὁ Τεγέατης ἔπεισε τοὺς Ἀρκάδας εἰς μίαν συντέλειαν ταχθῆναι καὶ κοινὴν ἔχειν σίνονδον συνεστῶσαν ἐξ ἀνδρῶν μυρίων, καὶ τούτους ἔξουσίαν ἔχειν περὶ πολέμου καὶ εἰρήνης βουλευέσθαι*, as well as to *Paus.* 8. 27 and some other passages. Cp. also *Hyperid. adv. Demosth. col.* 16. 14 (p. 10 Blass), *τοὺς κοινούς συλλόγους Ἀχαιῶν τε καὶ Ἀρκάδων*. It is to this confederation that Müller (*ubi supra*) takes Aristotle here to allude, and the writer of some valuable remarks on the passage in the *Guardian* newspaper for Jan. 27, 1886. explains it in the same way. Is it not likely that Aristotle’s meaning is—‘a nation also differs from a City-State in being all the stronger for being larger, even though its components are identical, whenever at least the nation is not scattered in villages, as some nations are, but united in a confederacy, like the Arcadian’? It will then be implied that the addition of fresh villages to an uncompact mass of villages brings no accession of strength, whereas the addition of fresh City-States to a confederacy like the Arcadian does so. An *ἔθνος* ‘sundered in villages’ seems, indeed, to have been little better than a rope of sand: cp. *Diod.* 5. 6, *οἱ δ’ οὖν Σικανοὶ τὸ παλαιὸν κωμηδὸν ᾤκουν, ἐπὶ τῶν ὀχυρωτάτων λόφων τὰς πόλεις κατασκευάζοντες διὰ τοὺς ληστές· οὐ γὰρ ἦσαν ὑπὸ μίαν ἡγεμονίαν βασιλεύς τεταγμένοι, κατὰ πόλιν δὲ ἐκάστην εἰς ἣν ὁ δυναστεύων: Hdt.* 1. 96: *Dion. Hal., Ant. Rom.* 1. 9. Pollux, it may be noted, speaks as if the *ἔθνος* were always composed of *πόλεις*—*καὶ αἱ μὲν πολλαὶ πόλεις εἰς ἓν συντελοῦσαι ἔθνος, αἱ δὲ πολλαὶ κῶμαι εἰς ἓν συμφέρουσαι ὄνομα πόλις* (9. 27, quoted by C. F. Hermann, *Gr.*

Antiqq. 1. § 11. 10)—but this evidently was not the case. As to the position of *καί* before *πόλις*, Dittenberger remarks that though it is surprising, it is not more surprising than much else in Aristotle's collocation of words. See note on 1254 b 16. Certainly *καὶ θεῶν πόλις* would be more natural, but perhaps the idea uppermost in Aristotle's mind is, that there is another pair of things between which a similar contrast exists, and he places *καί* before both these two things. Compare the displacement of the negative noticed in Bon. Ind. 539 a 14 sqq.

29. *ἐν*. The State is a *κοινωνία ἐξ ἧς ἔν τι τὸ γένος*, 4 (7). 8. 1328 a 25: cp. 1. 5. 1254 a 28 sqq. For the various kinds of unity, see Metaph. Δ. 6. 1016 b 31 sqq. Aristotle inherits the thought expressed in this passage to some extent from earlier inquirers—from the Pythagoreans, from Heraclitus (Eth. Nic. 8. 2. 1155 b 4 sq.), and from Plato (Polit. 308 C: Laws 773 C sqq.). Of course he also holds the complementary truth that there should be an unity of ethical conviction as to *τὰ ποιητικά εὐδαιμονίας* in the minds of the citizens (4 (7). 8. 1328 a 37 sqq.).

30. *διόπερ κ.τ.λ.* For other passages in the Politics in which *τὰ ἤθικά* are referred to, see Bon. Ind. 101 b 19 sqq. It is the reciprocal rendering of an equivalent amount of dissimilar things, not the receipt of an equal amount of the same thing, that holds the State together (*σώζει τὰς πόλεις*, cp. 1261 b 9 and 3. 12. 1282 b 16 sq.). Cp. Eth. Nic. 5. 8. 1132 b 33, *τῷ ἀντιποιεῖν γὰρ ἀνάλογον συμμείνει ἡ πόλις*: 9. 1. 1163 b 32 sqq.: Eth. Eud. 7. 10. 1243 b 29 sqq. and 1242 b 22 sqq. (In the first of these passages Aristotle includes under *ἀνταπόδοσις* a return of ill for ill, as well as of good for good, and thus takes a wider view of it than he does in the passage before us: *ἀνταπόδοσις* is made to include the return of ill for ill, and further (1133 a 4 sq.) the return not only of service for service, but of favour for favour.) The fact that the State rests on *τὸ ἴσον τὸ ἀντιπεπονηός*, and not on the other kind of equality, serves to show that it is composed of unlikes, for if all the members of the State were likes (e. g. shoemakers), there would be no question of equivalence; an absolutely equal share of the one product would be assignable. As it is, the ruler renders to the ruled the offices of a good ruler, and the ruled repay him with the offices of good subjects. It is thus that the State holds together, and that friendship is maintained between its members (Eth. Nic. 8. 8. 1158 b 11 sqq.). This is true even of free and equal citizens, among whom one would least expect any difference in kind to exist, for though here there is no intrinsic difference, yet the impossibility

of all ruling at the same time leads to an 'imitation' of, or approximation to, such difference, and breaks them into rulers and ruled, two classes different in kind, even though they interchange their positions from time to time. Hence here too τὸ ἴσον τὸ ἀντιπεπονηθός is in place.

83. κατ' ἐνιαυτόν, 'year by year,' cp. 7 (5). 8. 1308 a 40, ἐν ὅσαις μὲν πόλεσι τιμῶνται κατ' ἐνιαυτόν, ἐν δὲ ταῖς μείζοσι διὰ τριετηρίδος ἢ πενταετηρίδος. Mr. Welldon: 'they must follow a system of yearly rotation.' Vict. 'hoc igitur pacto solum id administrari potest, si interposito spatio anni unius id fiet.'

ἢ κατὰ τινα ἄλλην τάξιν ἢ χρόνον, 'or by some other order of succession' (Bern. 'Abfolge') 'or official period.'

84. καὶ . . . διή, see note on 1. 2. 1253 a 18. For συμβαίνειν ὥστε Bonitz compares Pol. 6 (4). 5. 1292 b 12. Cp. also de Sensu 2. 437 b 8.

85. ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ κ.τ.λ., 'as all would be shoemakers and carpenters, if' etc. So Giph. p. 154.

87 sqq. οὕτως. Sepulv. 'ut nunc sese res habet in sutoribus et fabris, ut iidem semper sint sutores, iidem fabri.' Since it is better that the same men should always rule (cp. for the thought Isocr. Busiris § 16: Nicocl. §§ 17-18: Aristot. Pol. 4 (7). 14. 1332 b 16 sqq. and 6 (4). 2. 1289 a 39 sq.: Eth. Eud. 7. 10. 1242 b 27 sq.: and contrast Pol. 6 (4). 11. 1295 b 25), and that there should be a permanent difference between rulers and ruled, men seek, where this is out of the question, to get as near to this state of things as possible (μυμείται), and by alternation of office to create two different classes, rulers and ruled, thus conjuring up a difference where it can hardly be said to exist. For ἐν οἷς δὲ . . . τοῦτο δέ, see Bonitz (Ind. 166 b 58-167 a 12), who points out that in this passage there is not (as in 6 (4). 12. 1296 b 32: 4 (7). 9. 1329 a 11) any preceding sentence introduced by μὲν for the first δέ of the two to answer. The same thing appears in Rhet. 1. 4. 1359 a 32 sqq. and other passages adduced by Bonitz.

1261 b. 1. εἴτ' ἀγαθὸν εἴτε φαῦλον τὸ ἄρχειν. Camerarius (p. 76) refers to Plato, Rep. 345 E sqq.: 346 E sqq. Cp. also Pol. 3. 6. 1279 a 8 sqq.

2. † τοῦτο δὲ μυμείται τὸ ἐν μέρει τοὺς ἴσους εἰκεῖν τὸ δ' ὥς ὁμοίους εἶναι ἐξ ἀρχῆς†. I place in the text the reading of the first family of MSS., for though it is obviously untenable as it stands, it probably approaches the true reading far more closely than that of the second. See Susemihl's able note on this passage in Qu. Crit. p. 360. He reads ἀνομοίους for δ' ὥς ὁμοίους, and this conjecture may be correct, but it is of course only a conjecture. 'Ἐν τοῦτοις δὲ (Π²)

might perhaps with advantage take the place of *τοῦτο δὲ* (Π'), but *μμεῖται* (Π') appears to suit better with *οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀρχονται κ.τ.λ.* than *μμεῖσθαι* (Π*), with which *βέλτιον* must be supplied, for, as Thurot says (*Études*, p. 24), 'Aristote constate un fait, mais ne donne pas un précepte.' A. Schott, in Heinsius' Paraphrase of the Politics (p. 1044) conjectures *τῷ* in place of *τὸ* 3, and Sus. adopts this conjecture, which certainly simplifies the passage if *τοῦτο δὲ* is read or if the reading of the second family is adopted, but if we read *ἐν τοῖτοις δὲ μμεῖται τὸ ἐν μέρει τοὺς ἴσους εἴκειν τὸ ἀνομοίους εἶναι ἐξ ἀρχῆς*, *τὸ—εἴκειν* will be the nom. to *μμεῖται*, and the translation will be, 'in the case of these the alternation of ruling and being ruled imitates an original inequality.' So Thurot (*Études*, p. 23), 'là où les membres de l'État sont naturellement égaux, l'inégalité naturelle est imitée par l'alternative dans l'exercice du pouvoir et dans l'obéissance. Les citoyens commandent et obéissent tour à tour, comme s'ils devenaient d'autres hommes, c'est-à-dire comme s'ils étaient inégaux.' Cp. 1. 12. 1259 b 7, *ὅταν τὸ μὲν ἀρχῇ τὸ δ' ἀρχῇται, ζητεῖ διαφορὰν εἶναι κ.τ.λ.* For *μμεῖται* in the sense in which it is used here, cp. Isocr. Archid. § 81, *ἣν οὖν εἰλικρινὲς τοῦτο ποιήσωμεν, ὁ μμησαμένοις ἡμῖν συνήρεγκεν, οὐκ ἄδηλον ὅτι ῥαδίως τῶν πολεμίων ἐπικρατήσομεν*, and Plato, Polit. 293 E, 301 A. *Εἴκειν* appears to occur extremely rarely in Aristotle: Bonitz (Ind. 219 b 18) gives no other instance of the pres. infinitive.

5. *καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν δὴ τρόπον κ.τ.λ.* 'And in the same way, again, even when they rule, one man holds one office and another another [just as if there were a difference between them].' So inseparable is differentiation from the State, that when its members are alike and equal, differences are conjured up not only between rulers and ruled, but even among rulers. It is thus that I incline to understand the passage; I add, however, Mr. Welldon's translation of it—'the same principle [of alternation] during the period of their rule regulates the distribution of the different offices among different persons.'

7. On *οὕτε*, see critical note. As to *πέφυκε*, see Vahlen's note on Poet. 6. 1450 a 2.

οὕτως. Cp. c. 5. 1263 b 31, *δεῖ μὲν γὰρ εἶναι πῶς μίαν καὶ τὴν οἰκίαν καὶ τὴν πόλιν, ἀλλ' οὐ πάντως κ.τ.λ.*: 1261 a 15, b 16, *ὅτι μάλιστα*: 1261 b 20, *τελέως*: 1261 b 10, *λίαν*.

8. *τὸ λεχθὲν ὡς μέγιστον ἀγαθόν*. Cp. Rep. 462 A. For the pleonastic use of *ὅτι*, cp. Phys. 8. 7. 260 a 25 and the passages collected in Bon. Ind. 538 b 33 sqq. We have *ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν* here, but *ἐν* is absent in the similar passage, c. 4. 1262 b 8.

10. καὶ κατ' ἄλλον τρόπον, i.e. by asking, not how the State is composed, but what is most desirable.

12. καὶ βούλεται γ' ἤδη κ.τ.λ. Cp. 4 (7). 4. 1326 b 7 sqq.

C. 3. 16. Ἀλλὰ μὴν κ.τ.λ. Here Aristotle seems to pass to his second point (1261 a 12 sq.), that saying mine and not-mine of the same thing is not a means to the unity of the State. The unity of the State is not 'indicated' (ἀποδείκνυσθαι, cp. σημείον εἶναι, 19) by men's saying mine and not-mine of the same thing.

18. κατὰ τὸν λόγον, 'in connexion with' (or 'in') 'the expression,' i. e. τὸ λέγειν πάντας ἅμα τὸ ἐμὸν καὶ τὸ μὴ ἐμὸν.

28. τὸ γὰρ πάντες κ.τ.λ. For the ambiguity of περιττὰ καὶ ἄρτια, cp. c. 5. 1264 b 20 sqq.: de Soph. El. 4. 166 a 33 sqq. As to πάντες, cp. 7 (5). 8. 1307 b 35 sqq.: 4 (7). 13. 1332 a 36 sq.

29. καὶ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις takes up and justifies παραλογισμός: not only do ambiguous terms such as these cause contention in practical life, but in discussions also they generate contentious syllogisms. Cp. Top. 8. 11. 162 a 16, σόφισμα δὲ συλλογισμὸς ἐριστικός: 12. 162 b 3, ψευδὴς δὲ λόγος καλεῖται τετραχῶς, ἓνα μὲν τρόπον ὅταν φαίνηται συμπεραίνεσθαι μὴ συμπεραινόμενος, ὅς καλεῖται ἐριστικός συλλογισμός. Cp. also Metaph. a. 3. 995 a 10, ἔχει γὰρ τι τὸ ἀκριβὲς τοιοῦτον, ὥστε, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν συμβολαίων, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν λόγων ἀνελεύθερον εἶναι τισι δοκεῖ: Isocr. adv. Soph. § 7, τὰς ἐναντιώσεις ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν λόγων τηροῦντας, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἔργων μὴ καθορῶντας (also § 14): Plato, Polit. 306 A, τοῖς περὶ λόγους ἀμφισβητητικοῖς. Thurot (Études, p. 24) refers to Waitz, Top. 8. 3. 159 a 1 and An. Post. 1. 1. 71 a 5. Perhaps Pol. 4 (7). 7. 1328 a 19, οὐ γὰρ τὴν αὐτὴν ἀκρίβειαν δεῖ ζητεῖν διὰ τε τῶν λόγων καὶ τῶν γιγνομένων διὰ τῆς αἰσθήσεως should also be mentioned.

31. οὐ δυνατόν. 'Iurisconsulti negant fieri posse ut eiusdem rei duo in solidum sint domini; hoc tantum permittunt, ut rei communis dominum quisque se vocare possit, sed pro parte indivisa, non in solidum' (Giph.). Cp. ἀδύνατον, 1261 a 14.

32. τὸ λεγόμενον, i. e. (probably) τὸ πάντας τὸ αὐτὸ λέγειν ἐμὸν καὶ μὴ ἐμὸν.

34. φροντίζουσιν, 'men care for': cp. 6 (4). 11. 1295 b 24, βούλονται: 8 (6). 8. 1321 b 25, καθιστᾶσιν. Plato had claimed (Rep. 463 C-D), that his plan of an extended application of the names of brother, sister, father, mother, son, and daughter would not impair the fulfilment of the duties implied by such relationship. With this Aristotle does not agree.

35. ἣ ὅσον ἐκάστῳ ἐπιβάλλει. Vict. 'aut quantum suas partes postulare putant.' Men care for matters of common interest less,

or at any rate only to the extent to which they are personally concerned in them.

πρὸς γὰρ τοῖς ἄλλοις is added to explain this limitation of attention. Even where there is no other cause for inattention, men may well think that some one else is looking after the matter. Cameraarius (p. 78) compares Xen. Cyrop. 5. 3. 49 sq.

38. The argument is—each of the citizens has a thousand sons, and these not exclusively his, for every son is as much the son of one citizen as he is of another; hence all the fathers will alike neglect the sons. The indefiniteness of the relation between father and child and the neglect to which this will lead is here insisted on, as in the next paragraph the fractional character of this relationship and the consequent diminution of *οἰκειότης*. Cp. Rep. 463 C, *παντὶ γάρ, φ' ἂν ἐντυγχάνῃ τις, ἢ ὡς ἀδελφῷ ἢ ὡς ἀδελφῇ ἢ ὡς πατρὶ ἢ ὡς μητρὶ ἢ υἱεὶ ἢ θυγατρὶ ἢ τούτων ἐγγόνοις ἢ προγόνοις ποιεῖ ἐντυγχάνειν.*

γίνονται, 'every citizen comes to have.' Cp. *γίνεται*, c. 5. 1264 a 14: 8 (6). 1. 1317 a 24: 7 (5). 4. 1304 b 5.

πολιτῶν must be taken here in a sense exclusive of the third class of the Republic, though this class also is included by Plato within the citizen-body.

1. *ἔτι κ.τ.λ.* Here Aristotle seems to pass from the point of 1262 a. neglect and defect of attention to that of defective *οἰκειότης*. Plato had claimed (Rep. 462 B sqq.) that all the citizens of his State would feel as one man, and would sympathize as keenly with any one of their number who might happen to meet with good or ill fortune, as the physical frame responds to pain or pleasure affecting a limb. Aristotle contends, on the contrary, that they will be connected with any given member of their body only by a fractional relationship varying with the size of the State, and will feel only a fractional joy or sorrow at his prosperity or adversity, nor will they feel even that without doubt and uncertainty, for they will not know whether they ever had a child, much less whether it has survived.

2. *οὕτως*, i. e. 'fractionally,' or in other words, with the feeling that he has a thousandth share in him, not the whole; *οὕτως* is explained by *ὑπόστος τυγχάνει τὸν ἀριθμόν*, as *οὕτω 6* is explained by *τὸ αὐτὸ μὲν προσαναγορεύοντας*: cp. Metaph. B. 4. 999 b 33, *τὸ γὰρ ἀριθμῷ ἐν ἢ τὸ καθ' ἕκαστον λέγειν διαφέρει οὐδέν*. οὕτω γὰρ λέγομεν τὸ καθ' ἕκαστον τὸ ἀριθμῷ ἐν, where *τὸ ἀριθμῷ ἐν* explains *οὕτω* (see Bonitz' note on the passage).

3. *οἷον ἐμὸς ἢ τοῦ δεινὸς κ.τ.λ.*, 'i. e. he will say he is my son, or so and so's, naming in this way each of the thousand fathers or

more who are comprised in the State.' For the case of *ἐμός*, Göttl. compares Soph. Antig. 567, ἀλλ' ἦθε μέντοι μὴ λέγε. Cp. also Metaph. Θ. 8. 1049 b 5. The Latin idiom is the same: cp. Cic. de Legibus I. 21. 54: ergo adsentiris Antiocho familiari meo—magistro enim non audeo dicere.

4. καθ' ἕκαστον τῶν χιλίων. Κατά is not 'of' here, for then we should have καθ' ἐκάστου (cp. 7 (5). 7. 1307 b 2, εἴρηται κατὰ πᾶσων τῶν πολιτειῶν): we must take καθ' ἕκαστον as one word (= singulos): cp. Eth. Nic. I. 4. 1097 a 13, καθ' ἕκαστον γὰρ λατρεύει, and see Bon. Ind. 226 a 25 sqq. See also Ast, Lexicon Platon. 2. p. 145.

6. καίτοι πότερον κ.τ.λ. Δισχιλίων καὶ ('vi non multum ab ἡ distans,' Bon. Ind. 357 b 20) μυρίων is probably gen. after ἕκαστον, which is the subject of λέγειν. Plato had hoped that when the whole of the citizens spoke of the same person or thing as 'mine,' the State would be pervaded with a feeling of friendliness and brotherhood. Μέν has nothing to answer to it, but instances of this are by no means rare: see for example 3. 13. 1284 b 13. On μέν *solitarium* see Holden, Oeconomicus of Xenophon, Index p. 80*. In the passage before us the reason why μέν has nothing to answer to it probably is that Aristotle in his eagerness hurries on to ἡ μάλλον κ.τ.λ. without pausing to add 'but though using the same name, not feeling any clear sentiment of relationship.'

9. The words αὐτοῦ . . . αὐτοῦ are emphatic: cp. Ἴδιον ἀνεψιόν, 13, and Plutarch de Esu Carnium 2. 5. 998 D, υἱὸν αὐτοῦ τὸν κείμενον ἡ ἀδελφὸν αὐτοῦ. Though A, B, C, and D call the same man severally by a different name, they nevertheless have that keen sense of something ἴδιον in connexion with him which, in Aristotle's view, the change proposed by Plato would take away or seriously diminish.

11. οἰκειότητα, here included under συγγένεια, while in the Rhetoric (2. 4. 1381 b 33 sq.) οἰκειότης and συγγένεια figure as two distinct forms of φιλία.

12. ἡ τῶν αὐτοῦ. Giph. 'ut si frater uxorem ducat.'

πρὸς δὲ τοῦτοις ἕτερον. All the MSS. read ἕτερον, but Bern. conjectures ἕτεροι, and Thurot (followed by Sus.) ἕτερος (Études sur Aristote, p. 26). 'Ἑτερος,' says Thurot, 'est opposé à πρὸς τοῦτοις, aux parents considérés comme faisant une seule classe: cf. 3. 14. 1285 a 29.' We then have ὁ μὲν—ὁ δὲ—ὁ δὲ—πρὸς δὲ τοῦτοις ἕτερος, and the sentence gains in neatness. And even if we take τοῦτοις not as masc. (with Thurot), but as neut. (cp. πρὸς δὲ τοῦτοις, 1261 b 32: 3. 14. 1285 b 10: 6 (4). 11. 1295 b 13, and often elsewhere), and make πρὸς τοῦτοις mean 'besides' or 'again,' the change of

ἕτερον into ἕτερος or ἕτεροι is attractive. But all the MSS. are against it, and perhaps the point which Aristotle is pressing is not so much the number of persons related to one man as the number of appellatives indicating definite relationship in ordinary use under the actual system. *Ἑτερον, if we retain it, will be added, because the person hitherto spoken of would not be called φράτωρ or φυλήτης by his relatives. It is not quite clear whether πρὸς τοῦτοις should be translated 'in addition to these appellatives,' or simply 'again.' It is to be noticed that Aristotle in defending the family defends also not only the more distant degrees of relationship, but the phratric and tribal relations, which in modern societies do not exist. Cp. 2. 5. 1264 a 8, and the mention of phratries in 3. 9. 1280 b 37.

φράτορα φυλήτην. For the omission of ἡ, see critical note on 1260 a 26.

14 sqq. Women had the credit in Greece of being especially quick in noticing resemblances between parents and children (Athen. Deipn. 5. 190 e). Athenaeus makes the remark in commenting on Helen's recognition (Odys. 4. 141 sqq.) of Telemachus' likeness to his father, and this passage of the Odyssey may well be present to Aristotle's memory here.

16. κατὰ γὰρ τὰς ὁμοιότητας. Cp. κατὰ τὰς ὁμοιότητας, 21. Λαμβάνειν τὰς πίστεις is more usually followed by ἐκ or διὰ, but these resemblances are referred to here rather as the standard by which conclusions as to parentage are arrived at, than as the source from which they are drawn. Compare the use of κατὰ in 4 (7). 14. 1332 b 15, δῆλον γὰρ ὡς ἀκολουθεῖν δεήσει καὶ τὴν παιδείαν κατὰ τὴν διαίρεσιν ταύτην.

18. καί, 'in fact.' Not only is it likely to happen, but it does happen. Cp. de Gen. An. 1. 20. 729 a 31, ὅπερ καὶ φαίνεται συμβαῖνον.

19. τὰς τῆς γῆς περιόδους. Aristotle dwells in Rhet. 1. 4. 1360 a 33 sq. on the utility of these works in discussions about legislation, and here we have an instance of it. Hdt. 4. 180 is probably Aristotle's authority in this passage, though the Aueans, of whom Herodotus is here speaking, are said by him to be παραθαλάσσιοι (c. 181: see Camerarius, p. 79). Aristotle refers to Herodotus less respectfully in de Gen. An. 3. 5. 756 b 6 (Ἡρόδοτος δ' μυθολόγος), and in Hist. An. 6. 31. 579 b 2. Meltzer (Geschichte der Karthager 1. 69) holds that the Libyans were as a rule monogamists, and that the customs here and elsewhere (4. 172, 176) ascribed to Libyan races by Herodotus were exceptional among them.

21. εἰσὶ δὲ τινες κ.τ.λ. Vet. Int. 'sunt autem quaedam etiam

femellae etiam aliorum animalium'; thus he takes γυναῖκες here as = 'females,' as do Lambinus and many other translators and commentators after him, including Susemihl (also Liddell and Scott, s.v.). Sepulveda however translates, 'sunt autem mulieres quaedam et in aliis animantium generibus foeminae,' and Bernays, 'wirklich giebt es Frauen und auch Thierweibchen.' Γυναῖκες is not often used by Aristotle in the sense of 'females,' and I incline to follow the rendering of Sepulveda and Bernays, especially as the word seems to bear its ordinary meaning in the very similar passage from the History of Animals quoted in the next note.

23. τοῖς γονεῦσιν. Cp. Hist. An. 7. 6. 586 a 12, εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ γυναῖκες ἑοικότα αὐταῖς γεννῶσαι, αἱ δὲ τῷ ἀνδρί, ὥσπερ ἡ ἐν Φαρσάλῃ ἵππος ἡ Δικαία καλουμένη, and Plin. Nat. Hist. 7. 12. 51. Vict. 'ea de causa Iusta appellata fuit, quasi fideliter semper redderet quod acceperat.' Giph. 'quasi suum cuique redderet, Iusta vulgo dicta fuit.' Vict. is probably right: compare the language of Pheraulas in Xen. Cyrop. 8. 3. 38, μάλα μικρὸν γήδιον, οὐ μέντοι πονηρὸν γε, ἀλλὰ πάντων δικαιοτάτον· ὃ τι γὰρ λάβοι σπέρμα, καλῶς καὶ δικαίως ἀπεδίδου αὐτό τε καὶ τόκον οὐδὲν τι πολύν· ἤδη δέ ποτε ὑπὸ γενναϊότητος καὶ διπλάσια ἀπέδωκεν ὧν ἔλαβεν, and Fragm. 4 of Menander's Γεωργός (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 4. 97), together with Meineke's comments:

Ἀγρὸν εὐσεβέστερον γεωργεῖν οὐδένα
οἶμαι· φέρει γὰρ ὅσα θεοῖς ἄνθη καλὰ,
κιττὸν, δάφνην· κριθὰς δ' ἐὰν σπείρω, πάνν
δικαίως ὧν ἀπέδωχ' ὅσας ἂν καταβάλω.

In the land of the just (Hesiod, Opera et Dies, 225-237), as Mr. Evelyn Abbott has pointed out to me,

Τίκτουσιν . . . γυναῖκες ἑοικότα τέκνα τοκεῦσι.

Mr. Bywater adds a reference to Hor. Od. 4. 5. 23:

Laudantur simili prole puerperae.

C. 4. 26. ταύτην τὴν κοινωνίαν. Cp. 1262 b 15, διὰ τὴν κοινωνίαν τὴν τοιαύτην.

27. τοὺς δὲ ἐκουσίους. Cp. ἐλεγισμοὺς τοὺς δὲ ἐποικοῦς ὀνομάζουσιν, Poet. 1. 1447 b 14, and see Vahlen on this passage (Poet. p. 91), who collects other instances. See also Shilleto on Demosth. de Falsa Legatione c. 200. Aristotle refers to involuntary homicides, and then it occurs to him to add—'and voluntary ones.' Plato hoped to prevent outrages of the kind referred to here by his regulations as to relationship (Rep. 461 D: cp. 465 A-B); he holds that younger men in his State will not do violence to seniors, because they will regard them as their fathers. But Aristotle does not think that they will be restrained by consider-

ation for a fatherhood which he accounts unreal, and if they are not, then their violence may chance to fall on their real father or other near relative, and thus they may unwittingly sin against the divine ordinances.

28. *δοσιον*. 'Herodotus often uses the epithets *οὐχ δόσιος* and *ἀνόσιος* of violations of duty to near relatives, e.g. in 3. 19: 3. 65: 4. 154' (L. Schmidt, *Ethik der alten Griechen*, 1. 400). Aristotle does not neglect in the *Politics* considerations of *τὸ δοσιον*: cp. 4 (7). 16. 1335 b 25. He writes as a Hellene animated by the religious feelings of his race and time. In his view, ignorance and absence of intention would not remove the lamentableness or even perhaps the guilt of these crimes. Nor would it excuse the absence of *λύσεις*. So Plato (*Laws* 865 A–866 B) enforces on the involuntary homicide not only purification but a temporary exile. His procedure in cases of homicide is largely copied from the Attic (Grote, *Plato* 3. 404–5). See as to the Attic Law on the subject Gilbert, *Gr. Staatsalt.* 1. 368 sq. In the *Hercules Furens* of Euripides, the hero, though his murder of his wife and children has been committed in the unconsciousness of raving madness, still veils his face before Theseus in order to save him the pollution inseparable from the sight of even an involuntary homicide (1050 sqq.). See also Prof. Jebb's note on *Soph. O. T.* 1415. It appears from the *Liber Poenitentialis* of Theodore, 3. 14 (Thorpe, *Ancient Laws of England*, 2. 5, cp. *Capitula et Fragmenta Theodori*, *ibid.* 2. 74) and from that of Egbert, 2. 1 (Thorpe 2. 183), that even justifiable or unwilling homicide was regarded by the Church as needing to be expiated by penance. So again, under the laws of King Alfred, 'even in the case of unintentional homicide, it was *prima facie* lawful and even proper to slay the slayer' (Sir J. Stephen, *History of the Criminal Law in England*, 3. 24). Plato, however, set little store by *λύσεις* (*Rep.* 564 E), so far as *ἀδικήματα* are concerned; those to which Aristotle here refers, therefore, would in his view only avail in the case of an *ἀκούσιον ἀμάρτημα* (*Laws* 860 sqq.). Indeed, if Bernays is right (*Theophrastos über Frömmigkeit*, p. 106), the Peripatetics thought little of expiatory sacrifice, so that Aristotle may here be speaking somewhat exoterically.

30. *καί* does not mean 'both' probably, but emphasizes *πλείον*.

31. *τῶν μὲν γνωριζόντων*, gen. after *λύσεις*.

32. *ἀποπον δέ*. Cp. Plato, *Rep.* 403 A sq.

35. *πατρὶ πρὸς υἱόν*. Cp. Plato, *Rep.* 403 B, *ἀπτεσθαι ὥσπερ υἱὸς παιδικῶν ἐραστῆν*.

38. *ὥς λίαν δὲ κ.τ.λ.* Cp. Plato, *Rep.* 403 A sq.

40. τοῖς γεωργοῖς is in the dative not after *χρήσιμον*, but after *κοινάς*, unless indeed we should compare the use of the dative in c. 7. 1267 a 37, τὸ τὰς οὐσίας εἶναι ἴσας τοῖς πολίταις.

1262 b. 2. τοιοῦτους, i. e. ἦττον φίλους: cp. 4 (7). 10. 1330 a 26 sqq.

3. ὅλως δὲ κ.τ.λ. Aristotle has been making a number of objections to this or that feature of the proposed law, and the last of them (ἦττον ἔσται φιλία, 1) leads up now to a broad impeachment of the law as a whole. 'Broadly, the law is a bad one; it brings about results the very opposite of those which a law should bring about.' Compare the transition in *Metaph. M.* 2. 1077 a 14. For the thought that affection is the end of *πολιτική*, cp. *Eth. Eud.* 7. 1. 1234 b 22.

5. καὶ δι' ἣν αἰτίαν, 'and of that on account of which.'

7. φιλίαν κ.τ.λ. For the thought, cp. *Eth. Nic.* 8. 1. 1155 a 22 sqq. and *Xen. Mem.* 4. 4. 16, ὁμόνοια μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν δοκεῖ ταῖς πόλεσιν εἶναι.

τε γάρ is here duly followed by καί.

11. ἐν τοῖς ἐρωτικαῖς λόγοις. Cp. *Plato, Symp.* 191 A: 192 D sq.: 'in the discourses on the subject of love' contained in the *Symposium* of Plato. It is not necessary to suppose that Aristotle means to designate the dialogue by this as a second title. See *Sus.*³, Note 148.

12. For this construction with λέγειν, cp. 6 (4). 9. 1294 b 20: *Polyb.* 6. 46. 9.

13. ἀμφοτέρους ἕνα. Cp. for the contrast of ἀμφοτέροι and εἷς, 3. 4. 1277 a 30, ἀμφοτέρα καὶ οὐ ταῦτά, and *St. Paul, Ephes.* 2. 14, ὁ ποιήσας τὰ ἀμφοτέρα ἓν.

14. ἐνταῦθα μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. In this case τὸ σφόδρα φιλεῖν is present and the persons are only two in number (contrast μικρὸν γλυκὺ εἰς πολὺ ὕδωρ μυχθέν): here therefore a close unity results which involves the absorption and disappearance of the two persons or one of them (cp. μία ψυχή, *Eth. Nic.* 9. 8. 1168 b 7). The case is, in fact, that of a σύμφυσις: cp. *συμφυῆναι* 13 (*Plato, Symp.* 191 A, had already used the word *συμφύναί*), and *Phys.* 4. 5. 213 a 9, σύμφυσις δέ, ὅταν ἀμφω ἐνεργείᾳ ἐν γένωνται. But the measure which Plato is for applying to the State will not produce τὸ σφόδρα φιλεῖν, but only a weak and watery kind of affection, and this watery sentiment will be spread over a whole State. For both these reasons no σύμφυσις will result. Plato's idea was not entirely novel (cp. *Hdt.* 4. 104), and it survived him, not only in the *πολιτεία* of Zeno of Citium (cp. *Diog. Laert.* 7. 131, and *Athen. Deipn.* 561 c quoted by Henkel, *Studien* p. 27), but far later (see *Plutarch's* account of the proposition of Hor-

tensius, Cato Minor, c. 25). For τὸν ἕνα in the sense of τὸν ἕτερον, cp. τῷ ἐνὶ παιάνι ('the one form of paean') Rhet. 3. 8. 1409 a 10.

17. γλυκύ, probably the γλυκὺς ἀκρατος οἶνος of Diog. Laert. 7. 184. The γλυκύ is φίλα, the ὕδωρ the κοινωνία, here the large κοινωνία of the State. A similar comparison recurs in de Gen. et Corr. 1. 10. 328 a 23 sqq., and in an illustration by Chrysippus of the nature of a κράσις (Diog. Laert. 7. 151).

18. οὕτω κ.τ.λ. This sentence may be construed in two ways at least: either we may (with Sus. and others) place a comma after τούτων 20 and supply ἀναισθητον εἶναι with τὴν οἰκειότητα κ.τ.λ., taking διαφροντίζειν ἥκιστα ἀναγκαῖον ἐν κ.τ.λ. as an acc. absolute, or we may with Bonitz (Ind. 192 b 61) make διαφροντίζειν govern τὴν οἰκειότητα. Συμβαίνει ἥκιστα ἀναγκαῖον ἐν will then go together (cp. οὐδὲν ἄλλο συμβήσεται νενομοθετημένον, 2. 5. 1264 a 9). If we adopt the latter interpretation, the question will arise, how the genitives in ἡ πατέρα ὡς νῶν, ἡ υἱὸν ὡς πατρός, ἡ ὡς ἀδελφούς ἀλλήλων are to be explained. On this subject see Mr. Ridgeway (*Trans. Camb. Philol. Soc.*, vol. 2. p. 132), who compares Metaph. M. 5. 1079 b 34, εἶδος ὡς γένους ('an εἶδος viewed in relation to a genus') and Pol. 7 (5). 11. 1314 b 17, ταμίαν ὡς κοινῶν (he would however read ἀδελφούς ὡς ἀλλήλων); but perhaps Susemihl's interpretation, which is certainly simpler, is also more likely to be correct. For the acc. absol. with the participle of εἶμι and its compounds, see Dr. Holden's note on Xen. Oecon. 20. 10, ῥάδιον ἐν πολλῇν ποιεῖν, and Jelf, Gr. Gr. § 700. I take ἥκιστα with ἀναγκαῖον, not with διαφροντίζειν. It is probably in order to avoid the repetition involved in ἀδελφὸν ὡς ἀδελφοῦ, that Aristotle writes ὡς ἀδελφούς ἀλλήλων.

23. τὸ ἴδιον is that which belongs to oneself, exclusively of all others: τὸ ἀγαπητόν 'carum valet . . . idque significare voluit Catullus cum inquit "si quid carius est oculis," quo uno se aliquis consolatur, in quo omnem spem suorum gaudiorum collocatam habet, quo impetrato ac retento contentus vivere potest' (Vict. on Rhet. 1. 7. 1365 b 16, quoted by Mr. Cope in his note on this passage, which should be consulted).

24 sqq. Cp. Plato, Rep. 415 B sq.

27. πολλὴν ἔχει ταραχήν, 'perplexity': cp. c. 8. 1268 b 3. For the use of ἔχει, cp. Eth. Nic. 8. 15. 1163 a 10.

28. γινώσκειν ἀναγκαῖον. Susemihl asks (Sus.³, Note 152) 'what harm will there be in this, so far as the displaced children of guardians are concerned?' Mr. Welldon's explanatory addition may well be correct—and hence a child cannot be absolutely separated from the class to which he belongs.' Aristotle may also

hint that persons incorporated with one class and conscious of being related to the members of another will find themselves in an equivocal position, being neither quite the one thing nor the other.

29. *πάλαι*, above in 1262 a 24 sqq.: so *τὸν πάλαι λόγον* in 3. 11. 1282 a 15 refers to 1281 a 39-b 21.

33. If with Vet. Int. M^s and pr. P¹ we read *φύλαξι τοὺς ἄλλους πολίτας* in place of *φύλαξιν εἰς τοὺς ἄλλους πολίτας*, which the sense seems to oblige us to do, we must translate *οἱ παρὰ τοῖς φύλαξι* 'those placed among the guardians' (placed among them, but not born among them).

34. *ὥστε κ.τ.λ.* is connected, not with the whole of the preceding clause, but with the word *προσαγορεύουσιν* in it.

C. 5. 38. *κατασκευάζεσθαι*, probably passive.

πολιτεύεσθαι τὴν ἀρίστην πολιτείαν. Cp. Plato, *Laws* 676 C, (*πόλεις*) *πεπολιτευμένοι πάσας πολιτείας.*

40. *τοῦτο δ' ἂν τις κ.τ.λ.* *Τοῦτο* clearly refers to *πότερον κοινὴν ἢ μὴ κοινὴν εἶναι τὴν κτήσιν*, but in explaining it (*λέγω δὲ κ.τ.λ.*) Aristotle does not, as we expect, repeat these words; he substitutes a slightly different topic of inquiry, i. e. whether both property and use ought to be common. He wisely decides to treat the question of community of property apart from that of community in women and children: experience has confirmed his view that the two questions are separable. His feeling appears to be—(1) that a decision in favour of severalty as respects women and children does not necessitate a similar decision as to property; (2) that alternatives present themselves for consideration in reference to property which had not presented themselves in reference to women and children. For instance, the ownership of property may be several and its use common, or the ownership common and the use several, or both ownership and use may be common. He thus prepares the way for his own solution, which is, if we take into account the conclusions of the Fourth Book, that while part of the land is to be *κοινὴ* and to be set apart for the supply of the common meals and for the service of the gods, other property is to be owned in severalty and yet made common in use.

41. *λέγω δὲ κ.τ.λ.*, 'and I mean that as to what relates to property (one may inquire) whether,' etc. Susemihl brackets *τὰ περὶ τὴν κτήσιν* (see his remarks, *Qu. Crit.* p. 365), and these words may certainly be a marginal note which has crept into the text (see critical note on 1272 a 28 for an instance of this), but the expression *λέγω δέ*, which, as Sus. allows, often introduces matter of a somewhat superfluous kind (see Vahlen on *Poet.* 13. 1453 a 4),

here perhaps applies to the whole of the succeeding sentence, and not to τὰ περὶ τὴν κτήσιν exclusively.

1. ἐκεῖνα, i.e. τὰ τέκνα καὶ αἱ γυναῖκες. For the gender, cp. αὐτά, 1263 a. c. 5. 1264 a 7.

2. πᾶσι 'commode opponitur iis quae sequuntur, ὅπερ ἕνα ποιεῖ τῶν ἐθνῶν, et λέγονται δέ τινες καὶ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον κοινωνεῖν τῶν βαρβάρων' (Busse, De praesidiis Aristotelis Politica emendandi, p. 23). Yet the Libyans referred to in 1262 a 19 sq. had women in common (for other instances, see below on 1266 a 34). Πᾶσι, however, probably goes with ἔχει, and not with what follows, as Sus. thinks.

3. The words τὰς τε κτήσεις . . . χρήσεις imply that there is a doubt whether κτήσεις and χρήσεις need be treated in the same way, and οἷον takes up this unexpressed doubt and instances a way (not the only one, nor indeed Aristotle's own) in which κτήσεις may be made several and χρήσεις common. We might have expected that καὶ τὰ γήπεδα καὶ τοὺς καρποὺς κοινούς, 8, would have been the first alternative introduced by οἷον, but while it suits better the expressed thought of τὰς τε κτήσεις—χρήσεις, the hint contained in these words that it is better to make a distinction between κτήσεις and χρήσεις would not have been taken up. Spengel's proposed insertion of τὰς κτήσεις ἢ τὰς χρήσεις ἢ (or τὰς χρήσεις ἢ τὰς κτήσεις ἢ) before τὰς τε κτήσεις seems to me unnecessary.

χωρίς, sc. εἶναι. For the change of subject to ἀναλίσκειν, cp. 5, εἶναι . . . γεωργεῖν: 4 (7). 5. 1326 b 29, τὸ γὰρ πάντα ὑπάρχειν καὶ δεῖσθαι μηδενὸς αὐταρκες: and 3. 11. 1281 b 28. See Riddell, *Apology of Plato*, p. 210.

5. τῶν ἐθνῶν, Vict. 'intelligit autem barbaras nationes': this appears from καὶ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον, 7. For τὰ ἔθνη in this sense, cp. 1. 2. 1252 b 19: 5 (8). 2. 1324 b 10. Diodorus (5. 34. 3) says of the Vaccae of Spain—οὗτοι καθ' ἕκαστον ἔτος διαιρούμενοι τὴν χώραν γεωργοῦσι, καὶ τοὺς καρποὺς κοινοποιούμενοι μεταδίδασιν ἑκάστῳ τὸ μέρος, καὶ τοῖς νοσφισαμένοις τι γεωργοῖς θάνατον τὸ πρόστιμον τεθείκασι. Aristotle, however, will hardly have been acquainted with the Vaccae. He may possibly have the Itali in his mind (4 (7). 10. 1329 b 5 sqq.), and other races practising the custom of common meals (cp. 1263 b 40, ὥσπερ τὰ περὶ τὰς κτήσεις ἐν Λακεδαιμόνι καὶ Κρήτῃ τοῖς συσσιτίοις ὁ νομοθέτης ἐκοίνωσεν). Κοινῇ ἀναλίσκειν is used in Rep. 464 C of Plato's guardians, who, we know, had common meals (Rep. 458 C). Cp. also Diod. 5. 9. 4, τὰς οὐσίας κοινὰς ποιησάμενοι καὶ ζῶντες κατὰ συσσίτια, and Strabo, p. 701 *sub fin.* Aristotle instances only barbarians; we find, however, an approach

to the system he describes in Crete, where the men, women, and children received their maintenance from the State (ὥστ' ἐκ κοινού τρέφεσθαι πάντας, 2. 10. 1272 a 20). 'Les Syssities existent de nos jours dans les communes kabyles sous le nom de *Thimecheret*' (Jannet, *Les institutions sociales à Sparte*, who refers to Hanoteau et Letourneux, *La Kabylie* 2. 82 sqq.).

ἢ τοῦναντίον κ.τ.λ. For γεωργεῖν κοινῇ, cp. Plato, *Laws* 739 E, πειμάσθων μὲν δὴ πρῶτον γῆν τε καὶ οἰκίας, καὶ μὴ κοινῇ γεωργούντων. In this scheme the land would be common and cultivation common—i.e. the cultivators would act under the control of some central authority, and their labour would not be confined to a particular piece of land, but applicable promiscuously to the whole cultivable area belonging to the community. This system is hardly less unlike than the preceding one to that of the Teutonic village-community (see for a description of it Sir H. Maine's work on *Village Communities*, p. 79 sq.). 'In some Russian communes the meadow portion of the communal land is mown by all the peasants in common, and the hay afterwards distributed by lot among the families' (Wallace, *Russia* 1. 208). No mention is made by Aristotle of any barbarian races which treated both land and produce as common, but the partly Greek population of the Liparaean islands appears to have done so for a time; see the remarkable passage of Diodorus (5. 9. 4 sq.) referred to in the last note.

8. ἑτέρων, 'others than the citizens,' not, I incline to think, 'others than the owners,' though the two meanings do not lie far apart. Aristotle is considering the question in the interest of οἱ μέλλοντες πολιτεύεσθαι τὴν ἀρίστην πολιτείαν (1262 b 38). For the contrast between ἑτέρων ὄντων τῶν γεωργούντων and αὐτῶν αὐτοῖς διαπονούντων, cp. c. 8. 1268 a 36 sqq. If those who till the soil are not citizens but a separate and subordinate class, like the Helots or the tillers of the soil in Aristotle's own ideal community (4 (7). 10. 1330 a 25 sqq.), disagreements would be less likely to result from the citizens holding property in common, for, as the citizens would not work themselves, individual citizens would not be in a position to compare their own hard work and small recompense with the easy work and large recompense of others, and thus one main source of disagreement among the citizens would be removed. If this observation is intended as a criticism of Plato's arrangements in the *Republic*, it seems to miss its mark, for the guardians cannot be said αὐτοὶ αὐτοῖς διαποιεῖν, and though the γεωργοὶ are made citizens by Plato, they are not intended to hold property in

common. It is true, however, that in Laws 739 E Plato uses the expression *κοινῇ γεωργεῖν* in reference to the Republic.

9. ἄλλος ἂν εἴη τρόπος καὶ βίῳ. Vict. 'alia erit ratio et minus molestiae in se continebit.' Κοινωνίας should probably be supplied with *τρόπος* (cp. 7), or else τῶν περὶ τὰς κτήσεις (cp. 10).

10. αὐτῶν, i.e. τῶν πολιτῶν—not, as it seems to me, τῶν γεωργούντων, though this interpretation has the high authority of Bonitz (Ind. 187 a 57) in its favour.

τὰ περὶ τὰς κτήσεις, not (as Lamb.) acc. after διαπονούντων, but nom. to παρέχοι.

11. καὶ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Cp. Eth. Nic. 9. 6. 1167 b 9 sqq.

13. [ἢ λαμβάνοντας]. See critical note. Congreve omits ἢ λαμβάνοντας πολλά: Sus. brackets ἢ λαμβάνοντας.

15. ὅλως δέ, 'but indeed we may say broadly that,' etc. Apart from all intensifying circumstances, living together and sharing in everything is in itself enough to give rise to troubles.

καί introduces a limitation and explanation of τὸ συζῆν: see Bon. Ind. 357 b 13 sqq., and cp. c. 2. 1261 a 17, προϊούσα καὶ γινόμενη μία μᾶλλον. The article is omitted before κοινωνεῖν, as it is omitted before βοηθῆσαι in 1263 b 5, τὸ χαρίσασθαι καὶ βοηθῆσαι (cp. also 7 (5). 10. 1311 a 13 sq., 15 sq.: 7 (5). 11. 1313 a 40—b 18).

τῶν ἀνθρωπικῶν πάντων. Bonitz (Ind. 57 b 43) gives a reference to Eth. Nic. 3. 5. 1112 a 28, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ περὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπικῶν πάντων (βουλεύονται).

16. τῶν τοιούτων, 'the things of which we have spoken,' i.e. property, which, it is evident from what follows, is classed by Aristotle with ἐγκύκλια, cp. 18, τῶν ἐν ποσὶ . . . μικρῶν, and 21, ἐγκυκλίου. So in c. 7. 1266 a 36 sq. τὸ περὶ τὰς οὐσίας explains ἀπὸ τῶν ἀναγκαίων. Aristotle appears to think that quarrels are more likely to arise over questions relating to ἀναγκαῖα and τὰ καθ' ἡμέραν than over greater matters.

17. τῶν συναποδήμων. Fellow-travellers are perhaps conceived here, as Bernays implies by his translation, to be sharers in a common purse, but this is not quite certain, for the next illustration is taken from a master and his servants, who would not have a common purse. It is enough to cause quarrels, if men κοινωνοῦσι τῶν ἐγκυκλίων.

18. διαφερόμενοι, not διαφέρονται. Sus.¹ (Ind. Gramm. s.v. Participium) compares 1. 5. 1254 b 23. Cp. also 4 (7). 14. 1333 a 18, and see note on 1259 b 11. The participle expresses a habitual fixed characteristic, and means rather more than the indicative.

ἐκ τῶν ἐν ποσὶ . . . ἀλλήλοις explains how their differences arise.

ἐκ μικρῶν. Cp. 7 (5). 4. 1303 b 18.

20. προσχρέμεθα seems here to be used in a sense ('utor in aliquam rem': see Ast, Lex. Platon. 3. p. 213) more common in Plato than in Aristotle.

τὰς διακονίας τὰς ἐγκυκλίους. Cp. c. 3. 1261 b 36, ἐν ταῖς οἰκετικαῖς διακονίαις, and Plato, Theaet. 175 E, φ' ἀνεμέσσητον εὐήθει δοκεῖν καὶ οὐδενὶ εἶναι, ὅταν εἰς δουλικά ἐμπέσῃ διακονήματα, οἷον στρωματόδεσμον μὴ ἐπιστάμενος συσκευάσασθαι μηδὲ ὄψον ἡδύναι ἢ θώπας λόγους.

22. For δὲ νῦν τρόπον κ.τ.λ. as the subject of διενέγκαι, cp. c. 2. 1261 a 13. But why is ἐπικοσμηθῆν neut.? Does it agree with some neut. latent in δὲ... ἔχει, perhaps τὸ μὴ κοινὰς εἶναι τὰς κτήσεις?

23. καί before ἐπικοσμηθῆν (add. Π²) implies that severalty of property is not enough without ἥθη κ.τ.λ. The use of καί is somewhat similar in 6 (4). 16. 1300 b 22, πέμπτον τὸ περὶ τῶν ἰδίων συναλλαγμάτων καὶ ἐχόντων μέγεθος. We have in 1263 b 39 τοῖς ἔθεσι καὶ τῇ φιλοσοφίᾳ καὶ τοῖς νόμοις, and Π¹ read ἔθεσι here, but ἥθεσι (Π²) is in all probability the correct reading—cp. Plato, Laws 751 C, ἔπειτα αὐτοὺς μάλλοντας αἰρήσεσθαι τεθράφθαι τε ἐν ἥθεσι νόμοις εὖ πεπαιδευμένους πρὸς τὸ κ.τ.λ.: Rep. 557 C, πᾶσιν ἥθεσι πεποικιλμένη πολιτεία: Ephor. ap. Strab. p. 302, τῶν δικαιοτάτοις ἥθεσι χρωμένον.

24. ἔξει γὰρ κ.τ.λ. This implies that there is good in community of property. What this is, is not distinctly stated, but Aristotle probably means that it ensures every one having what he needs. See 4 (7). 10. 1330 a 2 sqq.

26. πῶς, i. e. κατὰ τὴν χρῆσιν.

ὅλως, 'broadly, on the whole.'

27. αἱ μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. 'For when every one has a separate province, one main source of disputes will be removed, and work will prosper all the more, because each man will feel that he is applying himself to business of his own.' Γάρ explains and justifies the preceding sentence. Τὰ ἐγελήματα, i. e. those mentioned in 12. Αἱ ἐπιμέλειαι appears to be nom. to ἐπιδώσουσι (Bon. Ind. 271 a 43). Cp. Soph. El. 33. 183 b 19 sqq., Xen. Hiero 9. 7, ἡ γεωργία αὐτῇ ἂν πολὺ ἐπιδόη, and Pol. 6 (4). 15. 1299 a 38, καὶ βέλτιον ἕκαστον ἔργον τυγχάνει τῆς ἐπιμελείας μονοπραγματούσης ἢ πολυπραγματούσης.

29. δι' ἀρετὴν is here emphatic (cp. δι' ἀρετὴν, 5 (8). 2. 1337 b 19, where the antithesis is δι' ἄλλους, which is not far removed in meaning from ἐξ ἀνάγκης, 1263 b 10, ἔργον γὰρ καλὸν ἀλλοτριᾶς οὐσης ἀπέχεσθαι διὰ σωφροσύνης, and 22, ὡν οὐδὲν γίνεται διὰ τὴν ἀκοινωνησίαν ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν μοχθηρίαν): δέ answers to μέν 27. 'And on the other hand it will be owing to virtue, that according to the proverb,

“friends’ goods” will be “common goods.” Virtue will be called forth for the accomplishment of this result, and this will be a gain. Pythagoras was, it would seem, the original author of the saying (Diog. Laert. 8. 10), but Zeller doubts whether he meant it as an injunction to practise communism (Gr. Ph. 1. 291. 3). The addition here of *πρὸς τὸ χρῆσθαι* (cp. *ἐπὶ τὴν χρῆσιν*, 8 (6). 5. 1320 b 10) perhaps looks as if Aristotle so understood it. Epicurus certainly did so: cp. Diog. Laert. 10. 11, *τόν τε Ἐπίκουρον μὴ ἀξιοῦν εἰς τὸ κοινὸν κατατίθεσθαι τὰς οὐσίας, καθάπερ τὸν Πυθαγόραν κοινὰ τὰ φίλων λέγοντα* ἀπιστούντων γὰρ εἶναι τὸ τοιοῦτον, εἰ δ’ ἀπίστων, οὐδὲ φίλων.

31. *ἐνίαις πόλεσιν*. Tarentum (8 (6). 5. 1320 b 9 sqq.): Carthage (8 (6). 5. 1320 b 4 sqq.): the Lacedaemonian and Cretan States (1263 b 40 sq.): Rhodes (Strabo, p. 652). Compare also Isocrates’ picture of the earlier Athens (Areopag. § 35). For the appeal here made to the practice of existing States, cp. Rhet. 1. 1. 1354 a 18, *εἰ περὶ πάσας ἦν τὰς κρίσεις καθάπερ ἐν ἐνίαις τε νῦν ἐστὶ τῶν πόλεων καὶ μάλιστα ταῖς εὐνομουμέναις, οὐδὲν ἂν εἶχον ὃ τι λέγωσιν*.

ὑπογεγραμμένον. For the meaning of this word, cp. de Gen. An. 2. 6. 743 b 20—25, esp. *οἱ γραφεῖς ὑπογράφαντες ταῖς γραμμαῖς οὕτως ἐναλείφουσι τοῖς χρώμασι τὸ ζῶον*: it explains *τύπῳ διορίζειν* in de An. 2. 1. 413 a 10. The fact that the institution of property assumes here and there in outline the form which Aristotle wishes it to assume is taken as an indication that this form is not impracticable.

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ἐκ μικρῶν. Cp. 7 (5). 4. 1303 b 18.

20. προσχρώμεθα seems here to be used in a sense ('utor in aliquam rem': see Ast, Lex. Platon. 3. p. 213) more common in Plato than in Aristotle.

τὰς διακονίας τὰς ἐγκυκλίου. Cp. c. 3. 1261 b 36, ἐν ταῖς οἰκει-καῖς διακονίαις, and Plato, Theaet. 175 E, ὃ ἀνεμέσῃτον εὐήθει δοκεῖν καὶ οὐδενὶ εἶναι, ὅταν εἰς δουλικά ἐμπέσῃ διακονήματα, οἷον στρωματό-δεσμον μὴ ἐπιστάμενος συσκευάσασθαι μηδὲ ὄψον ἡδύναι ἢ θῶπας λόγους.

22. For ὃν δὲ νῦν τρόπον κ.τ.λ. as the subject of διενέγκαι, cp. c. 2. 1261 a 13. But why is ἐπικοσμηθέν neut.? Does it agree with some neut. latent in ὃν... ἔχει, perhaps τὸ μὴ κοινὰ εἶναι τὰς κτήσεις?

23. καὶ before ἐπικοσμηθέν (add. Π²) implies that severalty of property is not enough without ἡθῆ κ.τ.λ. The use of καὶ is somewhat similar in 6 (4). 16. 1300 b 22, πέμπτον τὸ περὶ τῶν ἰδίων συναλ-λαγμάτων καὶ ἐχόντων μέγεθος. We have in 1263 b 39 τοῖς ἔθεσι καὶ τῇ φιλοσοφίᾳ καὶ τοῖς νόμοις, and Π¹ read ἔθεσι here, but ἡθεσι (Π²) is in all probability the correct reading—cp. Plato, Laws 751 C, ἔπειτα αὐ τοὺς μάλλοντας αἰρήσεσθαι τεθράφθαι τε ἐν ἡθεσι νόμων εὐ πεπαιδευμένους πρὸς τὸ κ.τ.λ.: Rep. 557 C, πᾶσιν ἡθεσι πεποικιλμένη πολιτεία: Ephor. ap. Strab. p. 302, τῶν δικαιοτάτοις ἡθεσι χρωμένων.

24. ἔξει γὰρ κ.τ.λ. This implies that there is good in community of property. What this is, is not distinctly stated, but Aristotle probably means that it ensures every one having what he needs. See 4 (7). 10. 1330 a 2 sqq.

26. πῶς, i. e. κατὰ τὴν χρῆσιν.

ὅλως, 'broadly, on the whole.'

27. αἱ μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. 'For when every one has a separate province, one main source of disputes will be removed, and work will prosper all the more, because each man will feel that he is applying himself to business of his own.' Γάρ explains and justifies the preceding sentence. Τὰ ἐγκλήματα, i. e. those mentioned in 12. Αἱ ἐπιμελειαὶ appears to be nom. to ἐπιδώσουσι (Bon. Ind. 271 a 43). Cp. Soph. El. 33. 183 b 19 sqq., Xen. Hiero 9. 7, ἡ γεωργία αὐτῇ δὲν πολὺ ἐπιδοίη, and Pol. 6 (4). 15. 1299 a 38, καὶ βέλτιον ἕκαστον ἔργον τυγχάνει τῆς ἐπιμελείας μονοπραγματούσης ἢ πολυπραγματούσης.

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and Laconia. Aristotle perhaps uses *ἐν Λακεδαιμόνι* here as he uses *ἐν Ἀθήναις* in 2. 8. 1268 a 10, *ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἐν Ἀθήναις οὗτος ὁ νόμος νῦν καὶ ἐν ἑτέροις τῶν πόλεων*, where the name of the city seems to stand for the State. He does not seem to intend to contrast *ἐν Λακεδαιμόνι* with *ἐν τοῖς ἀγροῖς κατὰ τὴν χώραν*, or to suggest that it was only in the city that men placed their slaves, horses, and dogs at each other's service. Nothing of the kind is said by Xenophon in the passage of the *de Rep. Lac.* (6. 3 sq.) which Aristotle seems to have before him here.

36. *κἂν δεηθῶσιν ἐφοδίων*, i. e. *καὶ ἐφοδίοις*, *ἂν δεηθῶσι* (cp. Xen. *Rep. Lac.* 6. 4, *ὅπου γὰρ ἂν ὑπὸ θήρας ὀψισθέντες δεηθῶσι τῶν ἐπιτηδείων*). The word *ἐφοδίοις* is caught into the construction of the conditional clause and must be supplied from it: cp. *χρημάτων*, 1. 8. 1256 b 29.

37. *ἐν τοῖς ἀγροῖς κατὰ τὴν χώραν*. This seems at first sight tautological, and many emendations have been suggested: see Susemihl's critical note (*Sus.*³, vol. i. p. 170). Both Busse (*Sus.*³) and Mr. Welldon suggest, ingeniously enough, the substitution of *ἐν ταῖς ἀγραις* for *ἐν τοῖς ἀγροῖς*—a change which agrees well with the passage of Xenophon *de Rep. Lac.* part of which has been quoted in the last note, for Xenophon makes no mention of *ἀγροί* and does use the words *ὑπὸ θήρας ὀψισθέντες*. The passage concludes—*τοιγαροῦν οὕτως μεταδιδόντες ἀλλήλοις καὶ οἱ τὰ μικρὰ ἔχοντες μετέχουσι πάντων τῶν ἐν τῇ χώρᾳ, ὅπότεν τινὸς δεηθῶσιν*. But we find *ἐν ἀγρῷ* in the very similar passage, [Plutarch] *Inst. Lac.* c. 23, and the meaning of *ἐν τοῖς ἀγροῖς κατὰ τὴν χώραν* may not improbably be 'in the farms throughout the territory.' Sturz (*Lexicon Xenophont.* s. v. *ἀγρός*) collects many passages of Xenophon in which *ἀγροί* = 'praedia.' The word may possibly bear this meaning in *Pol.* 7 (5). 5. 1305 a 19, *ἐπὶ τῶν ἀγρῶν οἰκεῖν τὸν δῆμον ἀσχολον ὄντα πρὸς τοῖς ἔργοις*. In Plato, *Laws* 881 C, however, we have *κατ' ἀγρούς τῆς χώρας που*, so that there is nothing strange in the conjunction of the two words. The *χώρα*, or district attached to the city, included villages or even towns, as well as woods, fields, and the like (cp. Xen. *Hiero* 9. 7, *κατ' ἀγρούς ἢ κατὰ κώμας*).

38. For the change of subject from *εἶναι* to *ποιεῖν*, see note on 1263 a 3. As to the thought, Plato himself had said, *Laws* 740 A (while giving up community of property as impracticable in the absence of a complete reform of marriage, rearing, and education)—*μεμίσθων δ' οὖν τοιαύδε διανοία πως, ὥς ἄρα δεῖ τὸν λαχόντα τὴν λῆξιν ταύτην νομίζειν μὲν κοινὴν αὐτὴν τῆς πόλεως ξυμπάσης κ.τ.λ.* But the expression used by Aristotle appears to be derived from Isocrates

(Areopag. § 35)—κεφάλαιον δὲ τοῦ καλῶς ἀλλήλοισ ὀμλεῖν· αἱ μὲν γὰρ κτήσεις ἀσφαλεῖς ἦσαν, οἷσπερ κατὰ τὸ δίκαιον ὑπῆρχον, αἱ δὲ χρήσεις κοινὰὶ πᾶσι τοῖς δεομένοις τῶν πολιτῶν. Cp. also Xen. Mem. 2. 6. 23, τὸν δὲ φθόνον παντάπασιν ἀφαιρούσιν (οἱ καλοὶ κἀγαθοί), τὰ μὲν ἑαυτῶν ἀγαθὰ τοῖς φίλοις οἰκεία παρέχοντες, τὰ δὲ τῶν φίλων ἑαυτῶν νομίζοντες.

39. τοιοῦτοι, sc. ὥστε τῇ χρήσει ποιεῖν κοινὰς τὰς κτήσεις. For the thought, cp. 4 (7). 13. 1332 a 31 sqq.

40. καὶ πρὸς ἡδονήν, as well as in relation to virtue, cp. 29. But how does the fact that a reasonable degree of self-love is natural prove that to regard something as one's own adds greatly to human pleasure? Perhaps the link is supplied by Rhet. 1. 11. 1370 a 3, ἀνάγκη οὖν ἡδὺ εἶναι τό τε εἰς τὸ κατὰ φύσιν ἵκναι ὥς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ, where we learn that pleasure arises from the satisfaction of nature, and Pol. 5 (8). 7. 1342 a 25, ποιεῖ δὲ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἐκάστοις τὸ κατὰ φύσιν οἰκείον (cp. 5 (8)). 5. 1340 a 3, ἔχει γὰρ ἡ μουσικὴ τὴν ἡδονὴν φυσικὴν, διὸ πάσαις ἡλικίαις καὶ πᾶσιν ἥθεσιν ἢ χρήσις αὐτῆς ἐστὶ προσφιλής). If so, the complete argument will be 'for the satisfaction of a natural craving brings pleasure, and is not self-love in moderation natural'? Compare also Rhet. 1. 11. 1371 b 18 sq., and Hist. An. 8. 1. 589 a 8, τὸ δὲ κατὰ φύσιν ἡδὺ διώκει δὲ πάντα τὴν κατὰ φύσιν ἡδονήν. Or should we complete the ellipse thus—'for is there not a purpose, namely pleasure, for which we are so constituted as to feel love for ourselves, and is not this an ordinance of nature'? Or again—'yes, and natural pleasure too, for is not self-love implanted in us for a purpose and natural'? The first of these ways of completing the ellipse is probably the correct one.

41. νομίζειν ἰδιόν τι, 'to regard a thing as one's own,' for νομίζειν will hardly be used here in the sense which it bears in 3. 1. 1275 b 7, οὐδ' ἐκκλησίαν νομίζουσιν ἀλλὰ συγλήτους.

μὴ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. See on this use of μὴ, Bon. Ind. 464 b 43 sqq. ('dubitanter et modestius affirmantis est'). Eucken (de Partic. Usu p. 57) would read ἔχῃ for ἔχει in b 1, because Aristotle sometimes uses the subjunctive in this construction (e.g. in 6 (4)). 4. 1291 a 9, where all the MSS. have the subjunctive: Eth. Nic. 10. 2. 1172 b 36: 10. 10. 1179 b 24), and 'in eodem libro ad eandem sententiam significandam modo coniunctivum, modo indicativum adhibuisse minime verisimile sit.' But the indicative is found under similar circumstances (without various reading) in Eth. Nic. 10. 1. 1172 a 34 and 10. 2. 1173 a 23, and Bekker, whom Susemihl follows, is probably right in retaining this variation of mood.

2. τὸ δὲ κ.τ.λ. The connexion just established between affec- 1263 b.

tion for oneself and Nature reminds Aristotle of a fact which seems to conflict with it, that *φιλαντία* is blamed and justly so, and he proceeds to explain that the epithet *φιλαυτος* is applied to those who are fonder of themselves than they should be. Herein he follows Plato, Laws 731 E sqq. (cp. 732 B, διὰ πάντα ἄνθρωπον χρὴ φεύγειν τὸ σφόδρα φιλεῖν αὐτόν), and he repeats the same view in Eth. Nic. 4. 10. 1125 b 16 (cp. 3. 13. 1118 b 22 sqq.: 2. 7. 1107 b 28 sq.: 4. 10. 1125 b 9 sqq.). In Eth. Nic. 9. 8. 1168 b 15-23 and 1169 a 20 sq. the unfavourable use of the word is connected rather with the preference of money, honour, and τὰ περιμάχῃτα ἀγαθὰ generally to τὸ καλόν: so too in Magn. Mor. 2. 13. 1212 b 2-6. Affection for oneself is implied in Pol. 7 (5). 9. 1309 b 12 to be to a certain extent a preservative against ἀκρασία, though not a complete preservative like virtue.

3. If here we read, with all the MSS. except P¹, καθάπερ καὶ τὸν φιλοχρήματον, we must explain 'as it is for this that we blame the money-lover,' ψέγομεν being supplied from ψέγεται 2. To read τό for τόν undoubtedly makes the sentence far less rugged: its meaning will then be—'as to be a money-lover is to be fonder of money than one ought to be.' Cp. Plato, Rep. 347 B, ἣ οὐκ οἶσθα, ὅτι τὸ φιλότιμόν τε καὶ φιλάργυρον εἶναι ὄνειδος λέγεται τε καὶ ἔστιν;

4. ἐπεὶ κ.τ.λ., 'and it cannot be intended to blame men for loving what all love' seems to be here suppressed. Cp. δ πᾶσι δοκεῖ τοῦτ' εἶναι φάμεν, Eth. Nic. 10. 2. 1172 b 36, and Pol. 2. 8. 1269 a 3.

6. For the absence of the article before βοηθῆσαι, see above on 1263 a 15.

ἐταίροις, Π² rightly: cp. Rhet. 2. 4. 1381 b 34. For the thought, cp. Eth. Nic. 9. 9. 1169 b 10 sqq.: 8. 1. 1155 a 7, τί γὰρ ὄφελος τῆς τοιαύτης εὐετηρίας, ἀφαιρεθείσης εὐεργεσίας, ἣ γίγνεται μάλιστα καὶ ἐπαυτωτάτῃ πρὸς φίλους; Aristotle possibly has in his mind some lines of Antiphanes (Inc. Fab. Fragm. 4: Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 3. 133).

δ γίνεται κ.τ.λ. shows that χαρίσασθαι, βοηθῆσαι must be used in reference to goods or money, for it would still be possible to help and confer favours on friends in other ways, even though property were common.

7. ταῦτα, if we read οὐ συμβαίνει, appears to refer to τὸ νομίζειν ἰδίον τι and τὸ χαρίσασθαι καὶ βοηθῆσαι φίλοις—'these things do not come to pass for those who' etc.: cp. 2. 9. 1269 b 39 sq., and Xen. Mem. 1. 2. 11, καὶ φονεύειν δὲ τοῖς τοιούτοις ἥκιστα συμβαίνει.

8. ἔργα δυοῖν ἀρεταῖν. Cp. Isocr. Nicocl. § 41, σωφροσύνης ἔργα

καὶ δικαιοσύνης. It would seem from Eth. Nic. 10. 8. 1178 a 21—b 1 that both *προαίρεσις* and *πράξεις* are necessary to perfect virtue. But the passage before us does not raise this subtle question; it appears to imply (cp. Magn. Mor. 1. 19. 1190 b 1 sqq.: Eth. Eud. 2. 1. 1219 b 11: 2. 11. 1228 a 16), that men may be virtuous without being able to evidence their virtue.

9. *φανερῶς*, 'undisguisedly' or 'visibly and unmistakably'? Probably the latter (cp. *φανερὰν*, c. 7. 1266 b 20).

τὸ περὶ τὰς γυναῖκας, sc. *ἔργον*, which comes to the surface in the parenthesis.

10. *καλόν*, and therefore a work of virtue (cp. 4 (7). 14. 1333 b 28.)

ἀλλοτρίας is emphatic: no woman, it is implied, would be another's in the State described in the Republic.

11. *ἔσται*. For the suppression of the subject, cp. de Part. An. 1. 3. 643 b 17: Metaph. Z. 12. 1038 a 13.

13. *ἐν τῇ γάρ*. For the place of *γάρ* (*ἐν γάρ τῇ*, Ald.), cp. *διὰ τὸ ἀντὶ περόνης γάρ*, de Part. An. 2. 6. 652 a 18: *ἐν τοῖς δεξιοῖς γάρ*, de Part. An. 3. 9. 671 b 35. As to the thought here expressed, cp. Eth. Nic. 4. 2. 1120 b 27 sqq., where we find that *ἐλευθεριότης* has to do both with *δόσις* and *λήψις*, though more with the former than with the latter (4. 1. 1119 b 25).

15. *μὲν* here seems to have no *δέ* to answer to it, because the structure of the sentence is altered at *ὅν*, 22. If the sentence had been more regularly constructed, it would apparently have run—'hence, while legislation of the kind proposed wears a plausible look, it will in reality fail to remove the evils which it is designed to remove, it will involve the loss of many goods, and it will require men to live a life which cannot be lived by man.'

ἡ τοιαύτη νομοθεσία. Cp. c. 4. 1262 b 20, *ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ τῇ τοιαύτῃ*, and c. 5. 1264 a 6, *τὴν τοιαύτην πολιτείαν*.

16. *ὁ γὰρ ἀκροῦμενος κ.τ.λ.* Aristotle is probably thinking here of communism in relation to property: cp. *τὴν οὐσίαν*, 20. Yet Ephorus seems, if we may judge by his eulogistic remarks on some Scythian races which had women children and property in common, to have been, in their case at all events, well pleased with the institution (Strabo, p. 302), to say nothing of Cynics and half-Cynics, like Diogenes of Sinope and Zeno of Citium (Diog. Laert. 6. 72: 7. 33, 131). Plato had not been sanguine of support (Rep. 450).

18. *ὅταν κ.τ.λ.* So Plato, Rep. 464 D—465 C.

19. *ἐν ταῖς πολιτείαις*. Cp. 5 (8). 1. 1337 a 13, *βλάπτει τὰς πολιτείας*.

21. *περὶ συμβολαίων*. Compare Strabo p. 702, quoted below on 1267 b 37. These suits would be brought within narrow limits in the State of the Laws (742 C : cp. Rep. 556 A); there were indeed some actual States in which they were not permitted (Eth. Nic. 9. 1. 1164 b 13 sqq.). Theophrastus recommended the registration of property and of contracts (*συμβόλαια*) in the hope of avoiding suits on this subject or diminishing their number (Fr. 97). Such a register appears to have existed in some States (see C. F. Hermann, Gr. Ant. 3. § 49. 10). Zeno of Citium, the founder of Stoicism, was for getting rid of law-courts altogether in his ideal State (Diog. Laert. 7. 33). It is evident that Greek society had more than enough of litigation. As to actions for false evidence, it is obvious that the adoption of community of property would remove only one of their occasions.

22. *καὶ τοὺς κοινὰ κακτημένους κ.τ.λ.* Sus. 'dass gerade Leute welche Etwas gemeinschaftlich besitzen und benutzen . . .' Here *καὶ* is perhaps rightly rendered by 'gerade': 'it is just those who possess and enjoy things in common, whom' etc. Among the cases referred to here would be that of brothers holding undivided property, which seems to have been not uncommon at Athens (see Caillmer, Succession légitime à Athènes, p. 34 sqq.) and elsewhere (Jannet, Les institutions sociales à Sparte, p. 88 sqq.). 'Les enfants, après la mort de leur père, au lieu de partager entre eux sa fortune, restaient quelquefois dans l'indivision' (Caillmer, *ubi supra*). See C. F. Hermann, Gr. Ant. (ed. Thalheim), Rechtsalt. p. 54. 2.

23. *ἀλλὰ θεωροῦμεν κ.τ.λ.* 'Theoreîn is here synonymous with *δρᾶν*' (Bon. Ind. 328 a 36). 'But those who fall out in consequence of owning common property look to us to be few in number, because we compare them with the large number of those who own property in severalty.'

24. *στερήσονται*. The fut. med. of *στερέω*, like that of several other verbs (*θρέψονται*, c. 6. 1265 a 16 : *ἄρξονται*, 8 (6). 4. 1318 b 36), is often used in a passive sense.

κοινωνήσαντες (cp. *κοινωνούντας*, 23), 'having made common stock': so we have *χρημάτων κοινωνήσαντας*, Xen. Oecon. 6. 3. For the tense, see below on 1270 a 4 and 1271 b 4.

25. Vict. 'tot autem tantaque sunt (bona quibus spoliantur), ut plane cognoscatur non posse ullo pacto vitam traduci illa lege.' The life which the members of Plato's State are to live is in such flagrant opposition to well-ascertained tendencies of human nature—so starved and poor in pleasure, affection, and virtue, and so wanting in concord—that it will be unliveable.

30. παρακρούσεως is usually rendered 'error,' but perhaps Liddell and Scott, who compare Soph. El. 17. 175 b 1, are right in rendering it 'fallacy.'

31 sqq. Compare the argument in 7 (5). 9. 1309 b 21 sqq.

33. προϊούσα. Cp. c. 2. 1261 a 17, προϊούσα καὶ γινομένη μία μᾶλλον.

33 sq. Cp. 8 (6). 1. 1317 a 27, οὐ μόνον διαφέρει τῷ βελτίῳ καὶ χείρῳ γίνεσθαι τὴν δημοκρατίαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ μὴ τὴν αὐτήν.

34. ὥσπερ κἂν εἰ κ.τ.λ. 'Just as you would spoil a harmony or a rhythm, if' (Mr. Weldon).

35. τὸν ῥυθμὸν βάσιν μίαν. The unit of a rhythm—the *ἀσύνθετον* of which it is composed—is the *βάσις* or else the syllable (Metaph. N. 1. 1087 b 36). The *βάσις* is in dancing the 'step,' in verse the metrical foot. Thus to make the State absolutely and in every way one is here compared to dwarfing a long rhythm to one single *βάσις*, i. e. to one of its component parts: cp. c. 2. 1261 a 19, οἰκία ἐκ πόλεως, ἄνθρωπος δ' ἐξ οἰκίας, where *ἄνθρωπος* answers to *βάσις*.

36. πρότερον, c. 2. 1261 a 18.

διὰ τὴν παιδείαν. Eucken (Praep. p. 39) explains *διὰ* with the acc. here 'by means of' ('durch, vermittelt'), comparing de Caelo 3. 2. 301 a 18, σύγκρισιν δὲ ποιῶν διὰ τὴν φιλότητα: Meteor. 2. 8. 366 b 5: Phys. 4. 11. 219 b 29, cp. b 23 sq. So Bonitz remarks (Ind. 177 a 45), 'διὰ cum acc. coniunctum legitur, ubi genetivum exspectes,' instancing this passage and referring to *διὰ ταύτης*, 38.

37. κοινὴν καὶ μίαν. Bern. 'zum einigen und Einen Staat machen:' Sus. 'zur Gemeinschaft und Einheit gestalten.' Perhaps the latter translation comes nearest to the sense. There is no English word which adequately represents *κοινήν*: 'to make it social and so one' is an approach to the meaning of the words.

38. διὰ ταύτης. Cp. 4 (7). 13. 1332 b 31 sqq.

39. τοῖς τοιούτοις, i. e. 'by the measures which we have described,' measures which do not unite the State by improving the character of the citizens.

40. τῇ φιλοσοφίᾳ, distinguished here from τοῖς ἔθεσι, as from ἀνδρία, καρτερία, and other ethical virtues in 4 (7). 15. 1334 a 23, 32, where Bonitz (Ind. 821 a 6) explains the meaning of the word to be 'virtus intellectualis': cp. Eth. Nic. 2. 1. 1103 a 17, ἡ δ' ἡθικὴ ἀρετὴ ἐξ ἔθους περιγίνεται. Here perhaps 'intellectual culture' (Mr. Weldon) is the meaning.

41. τοῖς συσσιτίοις, adduced apparently as an instance of a law acting on the character. Compare Aristotle's language as to *syssitia* in 4 (7). 10. 1330 a 1 sqq.

1264 a. 1. τοῦτο αὐτό, 'this by itself': cp. αὐτὸ τοῦτο, I. 6. 1255 a 18.

2. τῷ πολλῷ χρόνῳ κ.τ.λ. Plato himself appeals (Rep. 376 E) to the testimony of Time in favour of γυμναστική and μουσική. For ἔτεσιν Bernays (Gesammelte Abhandlungen I. 177) conjectures ἔθνεσιν (comparing Simonides Ceus, Fragm. 193 Bergk: he might have added to his citations Plato, Laws 638 E, ἐπεὶ καὶ μυρία ἐπὶ μυρίοις ἔθνη περὶ αὐτῶν ἀμφισβητοῦντα ὑμῖν πόλεσι δυνεῖν τῷ λόγῳ διαμάχου' ἂν, for the saying of Simonides appears to be present to Plato's mind in this passage of the Laws), and the suggestion of a reminiscence of this bit of Simonides here is brilliant and ingenious, but we find ἐκ πολλῶν ἐτῶν καὶ παλαιῷ χρόνῳ in Aristot. Fragm. 40. 1481 a 41, and tautological expressions are not rare in Aristotle's writings (see Vahlen, Poet. p. 87, on Poet. I. 1447 a 17, ἐτέρως καὶ μὴ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον): besides, ἐν οἷς suits ἔτεσιν better than ἔθνεσιν.

4. εὐρηται. Cp. 4 (7). 10. 1329 b 25, σχεδὸν μὲν οὖν καὶ τὰ ἄλλα δεῖ νομίζειν εὐρησθαι πολλάκις ἐν τῷ πολλῷ χρόνῳ, μᾶλλον δ' ἀπειράκις. Aristotle held that the world existed from everlasting (Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 432 sq.) and mankind too (ibid. 508. 1), and that in the infinity of past time everything has been discovered, and, if lost, discovered over again. Hence he advises inquirers rather to avail themselves of what has been already made out and to investigate what has been insufficiently investigated, than to seek to strike out something altogether new (4 (7). 10. 1329 b 33 sq.). There seem, however, to have been subjects on which Aristotle claims to have inherited little or nothing from his predecessors (see Eucken, Methode d. Aristot. Forschung, p. 5, who refers to Phys. 4. 1. 208 a 34: de Gen. et Corr. I. 2. 315 a 34: Meteor. I. 13. 349 a 14).

συνήκται, 'gathered together for scientific use': cp. Metaph. A. 9. 991 a 18 and 5. 986 a 3, ὅσα εἶχον ὁμολογούμενα δεικνύναι ἐν τε τοῖς ἀριθμοῖς καὶ ταῖς ἁρμονίαις πρὸς τὰ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ πάθη καὶ μέρη καὶ πρὸς τὴν ὅλην διακόσμησιν, ταῦτα συνάγοντες ἐφήρμοττον. The word is already used by Isocrates, de Antid. §§ 83, 45.

5. μάλιστα δ' ἂν κ.τ.λ. Thurot (Études, p. 28) would supply 'l'impossibilité de l'unité sociale, telle que la veut Platon,' but perhaps it is more natural to supply εἰ ταῦτα καλῶς ἔχει from 3.

7. δυνήσεται. For this use of the third person 'non addito ris,' see Bon. Ind. 589 b 47. For the future, see above on 1261 a 22. According to Dionysius of Halicarnassus (Ant. Rom. 2. 7) Romulus' first step was to effect divisions of the kind here referred to. Cp. also Xen. Hiero c. 9. 5, διήρηνται μὲν γὰρ ἀπασαι αἱ πόλεις αἱ μὲν

κατὰ φυλάς, αἱ δὲ κατὰ μύρας, αἱ δὲ κατὰ λόχους. Aristotle probably remembers Nestor's advice (Il. 2. 362)—

Κρῦν' ἄνδρας κατὰ φύλα, κατὰ φρήτρας, Ἀγάμεμνον,

ὥς φρήτρη φρήτρηφιν ἀρήγη, φύλα δὲ φύλοις,

and the line (Il. 9. 63) which associates the ἀφρήτωρ with the ἀθέμιτος and the ἀνέστιος.

αὐτά = 'cives,' Sus.¹, Ind. Gramm. s. v. (who however doubts the correctness of the reading), or perhaps in a somewhat vaguer sense 'the materials of the State': so Camerarius (Schn. 2. 88) 'ea quae Socraticis rationibus contrahuntur et fiunt unum.' For the neuter, cp. ἐκείνα, 1263 a 1.

χωρίζων. Bonitz (Ind. 860 a 10) compares Eth. Nic. 4. 3. 1121 b 19.

8. τὰ μὲν... τὰ δέ, 'on the one hand'—'on the other.' Plato, in fact, adopts *syssitia* in the Republic (416 E: cp. 458 C), and *syssitia* (Laws 842 B), *phratries* (785 A), and *tribes* (745 E) in the Laws. *Syssitia* differ from *phratries* and *tribes* in not being based on relationship: Herodotus also regards them as belonging to τὰ ἐς πόλεμον ἔχοντα (1. 65: see Trieber, *Forschungen zur spartanischen Verfassungsgeschichte*, pp. 15, 18 sqq.). Dosiadas (ap. Athen. Deipn. 143 b) says of Lyctus in Crete, διήρηνται δ' οἱ πολῖται πάντες καθ' ἐταίριας, καλοῦσι δὲ ταύτας ἀνδρεία (= συσσίτια).

9. ὥστε κ.τ.λ. ὥστε with the indicative ('and so') draws an emphatic conclusion: cp. c. 8. 1268 a 20. Plato will not succeed in making his guardians an undivided unity; he will only succeed in forbidding them to cultivate the soil. But this is nothing new (cp. Pol. 4 (7). 10. 1329 a 40 sqq.). Thus what is new in Plato's scheme is not practicable, and what is practicable is not new. The mention of the prohibition of agriculture to the guardians reminds Aristotle that two classes will exist in Plato's State, guardians and cultivators, and he now turns to consider their mutual relations.

10. καὶ νῦν, 'as it is.'

Λακεδαιμόνιοι. For the absence of the article, see Meisterhans, *Grammatik der attischen Inschriften*, p. 90, who remarks that the article is commonly absent in Attic Inscriptions before names of peoples in the plural, though exceptions to this rule occur even in inscriptions of an early date. Aristotle sometimes omits and sometimes adds the article (see, for instance, 1264 a 20, and c. 9. 1269 a 29—b 7). The references given in the Index Aristotelicus suggest the view that Aristotle uses the word *Λακεδαιμόνιοι* of the Lacedaemonians in their public capacity as constituting a State,

while he uses *Λάκωνες* both of the State (as in 7 (5). 7. 1307 b 23, οἱ δὲ Λάκωνες τοὺς δῆμους κατέλυνον) and of the people, but more often of the latter. See Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 1. 40. 1.

ἐπιχειροῦσιν, 'attempt to bring about.' Schiller (*Slaverei*, p. 21, n. 72) remarks on this word. Some Spartans were probably compelled by need to till the soil. Cp. 2. 9. 1270 b 6, πολλοὺς πένητας, and Plutarch, *Agis* 5. 3, *πενία ἀσχολίας τῶν καλῶν καὶ ἀνελευθερίαν ἐπιφέρονσα*. Prof. Jowett points out that *ἐπιχειρεῖν* is often used pleonastically by Plato, though he does not adopt the view that it is pleonastic here, but translates 'try to enforce.' Cp. c. 9. 1270 a 6, *ἀγειν ἐπιχειρῆσαι*.

11. οὐ μὴν ἀλλά. Why 'not but that'? How is this sentence in opposition to that which precedes? Perhaps Aristotle's meaning is—'but indeed it is not only in this respect that the constitution is in fault, for the whole scheme of it is hard to make out.'

ὁ τρόπος κ.τ.λ., i. e. the whole *σύνθεσις* of guardians and cultivators, as distinguished from the arrangements as to the guardians with which Aristotle has hitherto been occupied. Cp. c. 7. 1267 a 17, ὁ τρόπος τῆς Φαλίου πολιτείας, c. 9. 1271 b 2, ἡ πᾶσα σύστασις τῶν νόμων, and Polyb. 4. 20. 7, τὴν δὴν πολιτείαν. Much pains have been taken to secure the internal unity of the guardians, but none to secure the harmony of the whole State, which includes the third class as well as the two upper ones. Cp. Plato, *Rep.* 421 A, ἀλλὰ τῶν μὲν ἄλλων ἐλάττων λόγος κ.τ.λ.

12. τοῖς κοινωνοῦσιν, i. e. τοῖς πολίταις: cp. 1. 13. 1260 b 19, οἱ κοινωνοὶ τῆς πολιτείας. Bern. 'für alle Angehörigen eines solchen Staates.'

13. τό γε πλῆθος. Cp. *Rep.* 442 C, τῷ συμκρῶ μέρει: 428 D-E, τῷ συμκροτάτῳ ἔθνει καὶ μέρει ἑαυτῆς.

14. γίνεται, 'results in being,' cp. 1. 2. 1252 b 7: *Rhet.* 3. 9. 1409 b 26: Strabo, p. 653, εἰ δ' . . . ἐξ Ἀργεῶν καὶ Τίρυνθος ἀπῆρην ὁ Τληπόλεμος, οὐδ' οὕτω Δωρικὴ γίνεται ἢ ἐκείθεν ἀποικία.

περὶ ὧν κ.τ.λ. 'Immemor fuit Aristoteles locorum, quales sunt de *Rep.* iii. p. 417 A: iv. p. 419, quibus certe possessiones eorum non constituendas esse communes disertis verbis dixit Plato, et profecto per se satis superque apparet uxorum, liberorum, possessionum communionem ex eius sententia propriam esse debere custodum,' Sus.¹ (cp. Sus.², Note 170). See also *Tim.* 18 B. As Susemihl remarks, Aristotle seems to take it for granted above, c. 4. 1262 a 40, that community of women and children is to be confined to the guardians.

15. ἢ καὶ often means 'or even' (e. g. in Plato, *Phileb.* 61 A):

elsewhere, however, and perhaps here, it seems to mean 'or also,' 'or again' (e. g. in de Gen. An. 1. 18. 723 a 29, ἐν τῷ σύμμετρον ἢ ἀσύμμετρον εἶναι ἢ καὶ δι' ἄλλην τιὰ τοιαύτην αἰτίαν: ibid. 1. 18. 724 b 5, πότερον ὡς ὕλην καὶ πάσχον ἢ ὡς εἶδος τι καὶ ποιοῦν, ἢ καὶ ἀμφω).

17. εἰ μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Three alternatives are considered: 1. the case of the γεωργοὶ having women, children, and property in common (17-22): 2. the opposite case (22-40): 3. the case of their having women and children in common but not property (40 sq.). The other case of property being common and women and children not so, is not considered.

18. τί διοίσουσιν κ.τ.λ. Cp. c. 4. 1262 a 40 sqq. If a community in women, children, and property produces close friendship, it will do so among the cultivators no less than among the guardians. The two classes will be, it is implied, on a par in point of unity, and in whatever excellence flows from community in these things. Yet rulers ought to differ from those they rule (cp. c. 6. 1265 b 18), and this is the opinion of Plato. Evidently, however, it does not follow, if women, children, and property are common in both classes, that the two will be absolutely alike, as Aristotle's argument implies.

ἢ τί πλεῖον κ.τ.λ. The argument seems to be that if the cultivators are in no way dissimilar to the guardians, the former will gain nothing by obeying the latter. In Aristotle's view, the ruled, if inferior to the ruler, profit by their obedience: so the slave, 1. 2. 1252 a 30 sqq.—domestic animals, 1. 5. 1254 b 10 sqq.—the subjects of the παμβασιλείς, 3. 13. 1284 b 33. Bernays omits ἢ—αὐτῶν, but this clause seems to be in place, and not superfluous.

19. ἢ τί μαθόντες κ.τ.λ. 'Or what is to make them' etc.? The use of τί μαθόντες perhaps implies that their submission to ὅμοιοι would be a mistake. 'Τί μαθών signifies an intentionally, τί παθών an accidentally, wrong action,' Jelf, Greek Grammar, § 872. 2 k.

21. τὰλλα ταῦτά κ.τ.λ. Cp. c. 6. 1265 a 5, τὰ ἄλλα ταῦτά ἀποδίδωσιν.

For ἐφέντες, cp. c. 6. 1265 b 22, ἐφίησι.

Τοῖς δούλοις probably includes those elsewhere called περίοικοι by Aristotle (e. g. in c. 10. 1272 b 18), though a distinction seems to be made between the terms δούλος and περίοικος in 4 (7). 10. 1330 a 25 sqq. Aristotle's account of the status of the Cretan slaves is confirmed by the tenour of the recently discovered inscription containing a portion of the laws of Gortyna. See Bücheler und Zitelmann, Das Recht von Gortyn, p. 64: 'their legal status appears to have been good . . . they have property of their own (col. 3. 42), a well-developed family-law, are capable of marriage with free women

(col. 7. 3): nay, they even have a remote and contingent right of succession to the property of their master' (col. 5. 27: see also Bücheler und Zitelmann, p. 144).

ἀπειρήκασι. Compare the well-known scolion of Hybrias the Cretan (Bergk, Poet. Lyr. Gr.):

Ἔσσι μοι πλοῦτος μέγας δόρυ καὶ ξίφος
καὶ τὸ καλὸν λαισθήιον, πρόβλημα χρωτός·

* * *

τούτῳ δεσπότης μοῖας κέκλημαι.

Τοὶ δὲ μὴ τολμώντ' ἔχειν δόρυ καὶ ξίφος
καὶ τὸ καλὸν λαισθήιον, πρόβλημα χρωτός,
πάντες γόνυ πεπτηῶτες ἄμῳ
. (προσ)κυνεῦντί (με) δεσπότην
καὶ μέγαν βασιλέα φωνέοντες.

Compare also 6 (4). 13. 1297 a 29 sqq., and what Xenophon says of Cyrus (Cyrop. 8. 1. 43)—οὐδ' αὖ κατεσκεύαζεν εἰς τὸ δουλεῖν, τούτους οὐτε μελετᾶν τῶν ἐλευθερίων πόνων οὐδένα παρῶρμα οὐδ' ὅπλα κεκτῆσθαι ἐπέτρεπεν· ἐπεμέλετο δὲ ὅπως μήτε ἄσιτοι μήτε ἄποτοί ποτε ἔσονται ἐλευθερίων ἔνεκα μελετημάτων. Plato (Laws 625 D) speaks of bows and arrows as the arms most suitable to Crete, but he no doubt does not intend to imply that the Cretans did not possess and use ὅπλα of a heavier kind.

22. εἰ δέ, καθάπερ κ.τ.λ. Sepulv. 'sin autem eodem modo, quo in aliis civitatibus, haec' (i.e. households and property) 'fuerint apud ipsos constituta, qui erit communitatis modus?' It should be noted that the expression, τίς ὁ τρόπος τῆς κοινωνίας, is used by Adeimantus in Rep. 449 C, though in reference to the guardians alone.

25. δύο πόλεις. Aristotle retorts on Plato the charge which he had brought (Rep. 422 E sqq.) against most large States of his own day.

26. ποιεῖ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Cp. Rep. 419: 415 D—417 B: 543 B—C. Φυλακή was a common euphemism at Athens for the garrison of a dependent city (Plutarch, Solon c. 15): cp. 7 (5). 11. 1314 b 16 sqq. Yet the term φύλακες must have had a somewhat unpleasant sound in the ears of Greeks, for the Athenians gave this name to the officials whom the Lacedaemonians called harmosts (Theophr. Fragm. 129 Wimmer: Boeckh, Public Economy of Athens E. T. p. 156). Πολίτας, 27, is the predicate.

29. καὶ τούτοις, to the cultivators and artisans who are the real citizens of Plato's State, no less than to the citizens of actual States.

ὁ Σωκράτης, Rep. 425 C-D.

32. ἀποδιδούς. Vict. 'cum tamen tribuerit': cp. 1265 a 3, βουλόμενος. Μόνον qualifies τοῖς φύλαξιν.

ἔτι δὲ κ.τ.λ. Rep. 464 B, οὔτε οἰκίας οὔτε γῆν οὔτε τι κτῆμα.

33. ἀποφορά is the technical term for 'the money which slaves let out to hire paid to their master' (Liddell and Scott): see Büchschütz, Besitz und Erwerb p. 195. The contribution in kind which the Helots rendered to their masters went by this name (Plutarch, Lycurg. c. 8: Inst. Lac. c. 40). Plato's designation for the contribution of οἱ ἄλλοι πολῖται to the support of the guardians is, however, not ἀποφορά (for this would imply that they were slaves), but μισθὸς τῆς φυλακῆς (Rep. 416 E).

34. πολλὸ μᾶλλον, because they are free and citizens, and have the land in their hands.

35. εἰλωτείας, 'bodies of Helots,' just as πολιτεία is used by Aristotle occasionally (Bon. Ind. 612 b 10 sqq.) in the sense of 'a body of citizens.' So δουλείας, 36: cp. Thuc. 5. 23, ἦν ἡ δουλεία ἐπαναστήται.

36. 'Whether a definite settlement of the question as to property and the family is as necessary in relation to the cultivators as it is in relation to the guardians or not, at present at all events nothing definite has been laid down.'

37. καί, 'nor.'

38. τε here as elsewhere 'ei vocabulo additur, quod utrique membro commune est,' Bon. Ind. 749 b 44 sqq. The meaning of πολιτεία here is not absolutely certain; it might possibly be 'participation in political power'—cp. 4 (7). 9. 1329 a 13, ἀμφοτέρους ἀποδιδόναι τὴν πολιτείαν ταύτην ('hanc partem reipublicae administrandae,' Bon. Ind. 612 b 47). See Bon. Ind. 612 b 38 sqq. in illustration of the sense 'ius civitatis, potestas in civitate.' But Bonitz does not appear to attach this sense to the word in this passage, and perhaps the ordinary meaning of 'political constitution' is more probable here. Aristotle has been speaking of this class as a separate πόλις (24), and he would like to know what its πολιτεία is to be, because it is essential that its character should be suitable to its position, and the πολιτεία is a main determinant of character.

ἔστι δ' . . . ῥᾷδιον, sc. τίς ἡ τούτων τε πολιτεία κ.τ.λ.

39. οὔτε . . . κοινωνίαν. 'Nor is their character of slight importance in relation to the preservation of the guardians' society.' For the construction, cp. Eryxias 394 D, ἡ τῆς μὲν οἰκίας ἢ τε χρῆσις πολλὴ τυγχάνει οὔσα καὶ ἀναγκαία, καὶ μεγάλα τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ τὰ διαφέροντα τὰ πρὸς

τὸν βίον ἐν τῇ τοιαύτῃ οἰκίᾳ οἰκεῖν μᾶλλον ἢ ἐν σμικρῇ καὶ φαύλῃ οἰκιδίῳ· τῆς δὲ σοφίας ἢ τε χρεία ὀλίγου ἀξία καὶ τὰ διαφέροντα σμικρὰ ἢ σοφῇ ἢ ἀμαθεῖ εἶναι περὶ τῶν μεγίστων; In the passage before us we have τὸ ποιούς τινας εἶναι τούτους instead of the simple infinitive οἰκεῖν. Ποιούς τινας (cp. 5 (8). 5. 1340 a 7, 8: 5 (8). 6. 1341 b 18) includes what is often expressed by two alternatives, as (e. g.) in Rhet. 3. 1. 1404 a 9, διαφέρει γάρ τι πρὸς τὸ δηλῶσαι ὥδι ἢ ὥδι εἰπεῖν.

1264 b. 2. τὰ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀγρῶν. A verb must be supplied from οἰκονομήσει (see above on 1257 a 21 and 1258 b 19); perhaps, however, οἰκονομήσει itself will do (cp. 3. 18. 1288 a 34).

3. κἂν εἰ . . . γυναῖκες. 'And who will keep house, if . . . ?' This clause has much exercised the commentators ('secluserunt Sylburgius, Bekkerus, ante τίς 2 traiecerunt Schneiderus et Coraes, lacunam post haec verba statuit ante Sus. iam Thurotus' Sus.¹), but a similarly constructed sentence is to be found in Phys. 8. 3. 254 a 27, εἴπερ οὖν ἐστὶ δόξα ψευδὴς ἢ ὅλως δόξα, καὶ κινήσις ἐστὶ, κἂν εἰ φαντασία, κἂν εἰ ὅτε μὲν οὕτως δοκεῖ εἶναι ὅτε δ' ἐτέρως. Göttling: 'Deinde verba κἂν εἰ κοινὰ κ.τ.λ. sic intelligenda sunt: καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἀπορήσειεν ἂν τις (sc. τίς οἰκονομήσει αὐτῶν);, εἰ κοινὰ αἱ κτήσεις καὶ αἱ τῶν γεωργῶν γυναῖκες εἰσιν.' So Vict. 'idem etiam incommodum illic nascetur, si' etc. But no fresh apodosis need be supplied: τίς οἰκονομήσει is the common apodosis of the whole sentence. (If in the much-debated passage, Soph. O. T. 227-8, we retain the reading of all the MSS. ὑπεξελὼν αὐτὸς καθ' αὐτοῦ, the apodosis (κελεύω πάντα σημαίνειν ἐμοί) must be obtained from the preceding line (226) in much the same way as in the passage before us and in the passage just quoted from the Physics.) If women are common, the question will arise who is to keep house, whether property is also common or not, for 'nulla certam aut suam domum habebit' (Giph. p. 187). Whether Aristotle's objection holds, is another matter.

4. ἄτοπον δὲ κ.τ.λ. Cp. Rep. 451 D. In the Laws, however (804 E), Plato appeals to the example of the women of the Sauromatae to show that women's pursuits should be the same as men's. Still Plutarch (de Amore Proles, c. 1) found men even in his day inclined to regard the lower animals as furnishing a standard of that which is natural in matters relating to marriage and the begetting and rearing of offspring; he himself seems to think that they follow nature more closely than man. This short treatise is well worth reading even in the abbreviated and imperfect form in which we have it.

6. οἷς probably refers to θηρίων: Bonitz, however (Ind. 500 b 22), refers it to ἀνδράσιν. Οἷς is here used in a pregnant sense, as in 1. 5. 1254 b 19, and Isocr. Paneg. § 123.

7. τοὺς αὐτοὺς, i.e. as Vict. points out, not 'eodem homines,' but 'eundem ordinem.'

8. στάσεως αἴτιον. Cp. 4 (7). 9. 1329 a 9 sqq. Sus.² (Note 182) explains the difference between the schemes of Plato and Aristotle in regard to this matter.

9. ἀξίωμα. Cp. Eth. Nic. 3. 11. 1117 a 22, ἀνδρείοι δὲ φαίνονται καὶ οἱ ἀγνοοῦντες, καὶ εἰσιν οὐ πόρρω τῶν εὐελπίδων, χεῖρους δ' ὅσφ' ἀξίωμα οὐδὲν ἔχουσιν (i. e. οὐδενὸς ἑαυτοὺς ἀξιούσιν, Bon. Ind. 70 a 43), ἐκεῖνοι δέ.

ἦπουθεν δῆ. So Π, except that accentuation varies and Vet. Int. with M^a reads εἶπουθεν δῆ. Ἡ πού γε δῆ Bekk.¹ (following Vict. Schn. Cor. with some differences of accentuation): ἦπουθεν δῆ Bekk.². Ἡπουθεν δῆ does not appear to occur elsewhere, though ἦπού νυν . . . δῆ occurs in Eurip. Troad. 59, and ἦπου δῆ ibid. 158, and Thucydides has ἦπου δῆ 1. 142. 3, and ἦπού γε δῆ, 6. 37. 2, and Aeschines de Falsa Legatione, § 88, ἦπου . . . γε. The particle ἦ is nowhere found in Aristotle, if we except this passage (Eucken de Partic. Usu p. 69). Δῆπουθεν is common enough, though it is not found apparently in Aristotle.

θυμοειδέσι καὶ πολεμικοῖς. The members of the second class of Plato's Republic are referred to, who are thus designated in Rep. 375 A, 376 C (Eaton).

11. ἄλλοις is governed by μέμικται: ταῖς ψυχαῖς is added to give the place of mingling: cp. Rep. 415 B, ὃ τι αὐτοῖς τούτων ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς παραμέμικται.

13. φησί, Rep. 415 A.

εὐθὺς γινομένοις, cp. Rep. 415 A, ἐν τῇ γενέσει.

14. μίξαι, sc. τὸν θεόν.

15. καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν, 'even the happiness of the guardians' (Sus. 'selbst die Glückseligkeit der Wächter'). Is the meaning, 'not only wives children and property, but even happiness'? Or is it 'even their happiness, which is the last thing one would expect him to take away'?

16. φησί, 'Rep. iv. p. 419 sq., at immemor fuit Aristoteles alterius loci v. p. 465 sq. neque respexit quae Plato docuit ix. p. 580-592 B, et sic haud intellexit non eam quam ei tribuit, sed plane contrariam esse veram Platonis sententiam' (Sus.¹). There is, however, as Zeller observes (Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 698. 2) a real difference between the views of Plato and Aristotle on this point, 'for Plato is in principle opposed to the contention of Aristotle that the happiness of the individual as such is to be a decisive consideration in framing the institutions of the State, and he insists

for precisely this reason (Rep. 420 B sqq.) that the individual must find his highest happiness in a self-forgetting (selbstlosen) devotion to the Whole.'

17. ἀδύνατον δὲ κ.τ.λ. Cp. 4 (7). 9. 1329 a 23, εὐδαίμονα δὲ πόλιν οὐκ εἰς μέρος τι βλέψαντας δεῖ λέγειν αὐτῆς, ἀλλ' εἰς πάντας τοὺς πολίτας, and 4 (7). 13. 1332 a 36, καὶ γὰρ εἰ πάντας ἐνδέχεται σπουδαίους εἶναι, μὴ καθ' ἕκαστον δὲ τῶν πολιτῶν, οὕτως αἰρετώτερον.

18. μὴ τῶν πλείστων κ.τ.λ. One expects μὴ πάντων ἢ τῶν πλείστων ἢ τινῶν, but a not very dissimilar displacement occurs in 4 (7). 11. 1330 b 37, ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ συμβαίνει καὶ ἐνδέχεται κ.τ.λ. : cp. also Magn. Mor. 1. 20. 1190 b 19, λέγω δὲ ἃ οἱ πολλοὶ φοβοῦνται ἢ οἱ πάντες. Zeller (Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 698. 2) would like to get rid of the second μή, but cp. Laws 766 A, μὴ ἱκανῶς δὲ ἢ μὴ καλῶς τραφέν κ.τ.λ.

19. οὐ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Cp. 7 (5). 8. 1307 b 35, παραλογίζεται γὰρ ἡ διάνοια ὑπ' αὐτῶν, ὥσπερ ὁ σοφιστικὸς λόγος· εἰ ἕκαστον μικρόν, καὶ πάντα. τοῦτο δ' ἔστι μὲν ὥς, ἔστι δ' ὥς οὐ· τὸ γὰρ ὅλον καὶ τὰ πάντα οὐ μικρόν, ἀλλὰ σύγκειται ἐκ μικρῶν, and also Plato, Protag. 349 C.

24. ἡ μὲν οὖν πολιτεία (cp. ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ, 28) gives the title of Plato's Πολιτεία (mistranslated 'Republic') as we have it : so τοὺς νόμους 26 agrees with the title of the Laws. Aristotle's testimony supports not only the authenticity of both dialogues, but also that of their titles : cp. Athen. Deipn. 507 f, οἱ δὲ συντεθέντες ὑπ' αὐτοῦ νόμοι καὶ τούτων ἔτι πρότερον ἡ πολιτεία τί πεποιήκασιν ; The plural, αἱ πολιτεῖαι, seems, however, to have been sometimes used : see note on 1260 b 12. The object of the criticisms on the Republic which we have been perusing is, we see from this sentence, in the main to point out ἀπορίαι enough in connexion with the work to show that there is still room for another attempt to depict a 'best constitution' (cp. 2. 1. 1260 b 32 sqq.). The same may be said of the somewhat grumbling criticism of the Laws which follows. Aristotle's real opinion of the two works must be gathered from the Politics as a whole ; we shall best be able to gather it, if we note, as we have sought to do in vol. i, the points in which his political teaching and method depart from those of Plato.

C. 6. 26. Σχεδὸν δὲ παραπλησίως κ.τ.λ. . . διό. Giph. 'Reddit initio rationem, cur et in secundam Platonis Rempublicam disserat hanc : quia ut primae, item et secundae sua sint vitia et incommoda.' To study the rocks on which other voyagers have been wrecked is the best means of avoiding similar disasters. A further reason seems to be introduced by καὶ γὰρ 28.

31. τῆς πολιτείας τὴν τάξιν. Probably not after περί, but acc. after διώρικεν. The expression seems to refer especially to the

distribution of political power (cp. 2. 10. 1272 a 4: 3. 11. 1281 b 39: 7 (5). 7. 1307 b 18); thus in what follows we are told in what hands Plato has placed the supreme authority of the State.

33. τρίτον δ' ἐκ τούτων, 'and third recruited from these last' (i. e. from τὸ προπολεμὸν μέρος): cp. Plato, Rep. 412 D, ἐκλεκτίον ἄρ' ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων φυλάκων τοιούτους ἄνδρας, οἱ ἂν κ.τ.λ. For the expression, cp. de Part. An. 2. 1. 646 a 20, δευτέρα δὲ σύστασις ἐκ τῶν πρώτων ἢ τῶν ὁμοιομερῶν φύσις: Plato, Laws 891 C, ψυχὴν δὲ ἐκ τούτων (earth, air, fire, and water) ὕστερον: Phileb. 27 B, πρῶτον μὲν τοῖνυν ἀπειρον λέγω, δεύτερον δὲ πέρασ, ἔπειτ' ἐκ τούτων τρίτον μικτὴν καὶ γεγενημένην οὐσίαν. For the identification of τὸ βουλευόμενον and τὸ κύριον, cp. 6 (4). 14. 1299 a 1.

34. περὶ δὲ . . . μή. 'Reapse haec non praetermissa esse a Platone invitus ipse testatur Aristoteles 6-10 et 31-34' (Sus.¹). But perhaps the recognition of the first class as ἀρχόντες and of the second as τὸ προπολεμὸν μέρος does not absolutely involve the denial of all office and all share in military service to the third class. That Aristotle did not understand Plato to have pronounced clearly for the denial of θπλα to the third class appears from c. 5. 1264 a 20 sq.

37. τὰς μὲν γυναῖκας κ.τ.λ. Plato, Rep. 451 E-452 A. Aristotle hints his surprise that Plato should say so little about the γεωργοὶ and τεχνῖται, and so much about the women.

39. τὰ δ' ἄλλα κ.τ.λ., 'but for the rest' (for τὰ ἄλλα, cp. 7 (5). 11. 1314 a 39: Plato, Rep. 403 B: Laws 763 E), 'we find that he has filled the dialogue with extraneous discussions' (cp. Demosth. de Cor. c. 9), 'and with discourse about the education of the guardians.' A somewhat similarly constructed sentence occurs in c. 11. 1273 a 9, ἀ δ' ἂν εἰσφέρωσιν οὗτοι, οὐ διακοῦσαι μόνον ἀποδιδάσαι τῇ δήμῳ τὰ δόξαντα τοῖς ἀρχουσιν. What extraneous matters are here referred to? Among other things perhaps, as Sus. conjectures, 'illa quae 608 C-621 D de animorum immortalitate proponuntur,' but also probably the ethical discussions, such as that on justice, which Aristotle himself deals with in a separate treatise (cp. 4 (7). 1. 1323 b 39, ἑτέρας γάρ ἐστιν ἔργον σχολῆς ταῦτα). The same complaint as to extraneous matter in the Republic is made by Dio Chrysostom, Or. 7. 267 R. The juxtaposition of λόγοις and τὸν λόγον here is awkward, but not much more so than that of λέγεται and λεχθῆναι in de Gen. An. 2. 7. 746 b 7 sqq.

3. ταύτην βουλόμενος κ.τ.λ. 'Though wishing': cp. c. 5. 1265 a 1264 a 32. Κοινοτέραν ταῖς πόλεσι probably means, not 'having

more affinity to existing States,' but 'more suitable to them' or 'more within their reach': cp. 6 (4). I. 1288 b 38, where (as Bonitz points out, Ind. 399 b 15 sqq.) *τὴν ῥῶν καὶ κοινοτέραν ἀπάσαις (ταῖς πόλεσι πολιτείαν)* is apparently used in the same sense as *τὴν μάλιστα πάσαις ταῖς πόλεσιν ἀρμόττουσαν* 34. For the fact, cp. Laws 739 E.

4. εἰς. Cp. 3. 3. 1276 b 14, *ὅταν εἰς ἑτέραν μεταβάλλῃ πολιτείαν ἢ πόλιν*, and 7 (5). I. 1301 b 14 sq.

6. ἀποδίδωσιν. Cp. 6 (4). II. 1296 a 40, *ταύτην ἀποδοῦναι τὴν τάξιν* (sc. *ταῖς πόλεσιν*): 2. II. 1273 a 10: 2. 12. 1274 a 15 sq.

7. παιδείαν τὴν αὐτήν. The subjects of education prescribed in the two dialogues are much the same—*γυμναστική, μουσική*, arithmetic, geometry, astronomy; even dialectic reappears, for this study seems to be required in the Laws (965 B sqq.) of the members of the Nocturnal Council, as it is required of select individuals in the Republic. 'The main principles of education are essentially the same as in the Republic' (Zeller, Plato E. T. p. 542). But as the education prescribed in the Laws is in the main designed for the whole body of citizens and not for a few of them only, like that of the Republic, it must probably be intended by Plato to be less arduous and exacting.

τὸ . . . ζῆν. 'Plat. Legg. 741 E: 806 D—807 D: 842 D: 846 D: 919 D sq.' (Sus.¹).

8. καὶ . . . γυναικῶν. 'Plat. Legg. 780 D sqq.: 806 E: cf. 842 B' (Sus.¹). We are not expressly told in the Republic that women are to take part in the *syssitia*, though, as Sus. remarks (Sus.², Note 153), they are probably intended to do so, but in the Laws this is distinctly insisted upon. Giph., however (p. 194), takes Aristotle's meaning to be, that while in the Republic men and women are intended to take their meals at the same tables, in the Laws separate mess-tables are instituted for women. The notion of *syssitia* for women would be all the more surprising to Greeks, as one name for the *syssitia* was *Andreia* and the institution was regarded as an essentially military one (Hdt. I. 65).

9. τὴν μὲν. 'He makes to consist' seems to be suppressed, unless we suppose *φησὶ δεῖν εἶναι* to be carried on, which is perhaps less likely.

χιλίων. Cp. Rep. 423 A, *ὡς ἀληθῶς μεγίστη, καὶ ἐν μόνον ἡ χιλίων τῶν προπολεμούντων*. For the total of the citizens of the Republic, the number of the first class and that of the third (far the largest) must be added.

10. πεντακισχιλίων. 'Accuratius *πεντακισχιλίων καὶ τετταράκοντα*, v. Plat. Legg. 737 E: 740 C sq.: 745 B sqq. etc.' (Sus.¹).

μὲν οὖν, 'it is true that,' as in 17. We pass with μὲν οὖν from description to criticism, as in c. 10. 1272 a 12.

11. περιττόν, 'uncommon, out of the common,' but no English word adequately translates it. The epithet suggests an aspiring wisdom which follows paths of its own—which has something of greatness, but also of superfluity: cp. 5 (8). 2. 1337 a 42, 2. 8. 1267 b 24, and περιεργότερον, 25. So περιττή τῶν ἄλλων, Poet. 24. 1459 b 36 seems to be represented by σεμνὸν καὶ αὐθαδές, Rhet. 3. 1406 b 3 (Vahlen, Beitr. zu Poet. 3. 291: Bon. Ind. 585 a 59). Περιττός is often joined with ἴδιος, but is less wide and more subtle in meaning.

τοῦ Σωκράτους. Aristotle identifies with Socrates the Ἀθηναῖος ξένος of the Laws. Grote (Plato 3. 301 n.) conjectures that the latter name was preferred by Plato to avoid the difficulty of implying the presence of Socrates in Crete. In c. 7. 1266 b 5 we have Πλάτων δὲ τοὺς νόμους γράφων, and in c. 9. 1271 b 1, ὅπερ καὶ Πλάτων ἐν τοῖς νόμοις ἐπιτετίμηκεν.

12. κομψόν, 'clever,' opposed to ἀπλουστέρας in de Caelo 3. 5. 304 a 13: to ἱκανῶς in Pol. 6 (4). 4. 1291 a 11.

καινοτόμον, 'novelty of view,' cp. c. 7. 1266 a 35.

ζητητικόν, 'the spirit of inquiry'—love of inquiry and keenness in inquiry.

καλῶς δὲ πάντα, sc. ἔχειν: see Bon. Ind. 306 a 16.

13. καὶ introduces an instance of πάντα: cp. ὥσπερ καὶ Ἀμασις, 1. 12. 1259 b 8.

πλήθος. For the acc. cp. c. 9. 1271 a 9, and see Dr. Holden's note on Xen. Oecon. 13. 3, τὰ ἔργα μάθῃ ὡς ἔστιν ἐργαστία. In the criticisms on constitutions contained in the Second Book Aristotle commonly notices first, or at any rate before he has gone very far, their arrangements with respect to what he terms in the Fourth Book the ὑποθέσεις of the State—the number of the citizens and the extent of the territory (cp. 4 (7). 4. 1325 b 38, διὸ δεῖ πολλὰ προϋποθεῖσθαι καθάπερ εὐχομένους, εἶναι μέντοι μηδὲν τούτων ἀδύνατον· λέγω δὲ οἷον περὶ τε πλήθους πολιτῶν καὶ χώρας).

14. Βαβυλωνίας. Cp. 3. 3. 1276 a 28.

15. Yet the territory of the Spartans (is Aristotle thinking of his own time, when Messenia had been lost?) is said in 2. 9. 1270 a 29 to be capable of supporting 30,000 hoplites and 1500 horse-men, who, if Spartans, would be ἀργοί. But perhaps this is not present to Aristotle's mind. He does not probably mean to assert that it would be capable of supporting 31,500 ἀργοί. See note on 1270 a 29.

16. *θρέψονται*. See note on *στερήσονται*, 1263 b 28.

17. *μὲν οὖν* (here answered by *μέντοι*, as in 1257 a 28 and 1259 a 28) prepares the way for and helps to emphasize the correction introduced by *μέντοι*. 'True, it is right to presuppose freely, but one must not presuppose anything impossible.' Plato had, in effect, said much the same thing (Laws 709 D: 742 E: Rep. 456 C). Aristotle repeats this remark in 4 (7). 4. 1325 b 38, without any indication that he is conscious of the repetition.

18. *λέγεται*. 'Expressis quidem verbis hoc non fit in Legibus Platonis, sed recte hanc sententiam e iv. p. 704-709 et v. p. 747 D eruere potuit Aristoteles' (Sus.¹). Add 625 C sqq. and 842 C-E. In Laws 705 D-E the Cretan laws are censured for looking only to war (i. e. *πρὸς τοὺς γεινιῶντας τόπους*), whereas the Athenian Stranger claims that he legislates looking to nothing but the virtue of his citizens. For this reason he dispenses with a fleet. Aristotle does not approve of this (cp. 4 (7). 6. 1327 a 21 sqq.). If, as Susemihl following Schlosser points out (Sus.², Note 204), Plato pays regard to considerations of defence against neighbours in fixing the number of the citizens (Laws 737 C-D: cp. 628 D), Aristotle would no doubt ask why he does not keep them in view when dealing with other matters. See also c. 7. 1267 a 17 sqq. and 6 (4). 4. 1291 a 6-22.

22. *πολιτικόν*, i. e. a life of intercourse with other States: cp. 4 (7). 6. 1327 b 3 sqq., where we have *ἡγεμονικὸν καὶ πολιτικὸν βίον*.

τοιούτοις . . . δ. Cp. c. 7. 1266 b 36: 1267 a 24.

23. *ἄπλοις*. Is there not a reference here to Plato, Laws 625 C sqq., where the Cretan lawgiver is said to have chosen for the Cretans such arms as were most suitable to swift runners in a hilly country like Crete—bows and arrows, in fact? Aristotle urges that the arms used by a nation should be such as to enable it not only to cope with its foes in its own territory, but also to retaliate on them in theirs, which bows and arrows would not enable it to do. He dwells elsewhere on the importance of a fleet for this purpose (4 (7). 6. 1327 a 23 sqq.).

28. *καὶ τὸ πλῆθος δὲ κ.τ.λ.* The connexion of this with what precedes is illustrated by the similar sequence of topics in c. 7. 1267 a 17-27. The amount of the collective wealth, no less than the nature of the *ἄλλα* at the command of the State, must be fixed in relation to perils from without. The verb after *μήποτε* is suppressed and 'must be supplied in the indicative, not the subjunctive, as the idea of "warding off" (Abwehr) is here absent' (Weber, Die Absichtssätze bei Aristoteles, p. 17).

29. βέλτιον κ.τ.λ. Τῷ σαφέως μᾶλλον explains ἐτέρως—'in a way which differs through being clearer': cp. de Part. An. 4. 5. 681 a 18, ἕτερα τοιαῦτ' ἐν τῇ θαλάττῃ μικρὸν διαφέρει τούτων τῷ ἀπο-λελύσθαι. Lamb. 'aliter definire, hoc est, planius atque apertius.' Bern. however seems to take it as explaining βέλτιον: 'ob nicht vielleicht eine andere Begrenzung besser, weil deutlicher, ist.'

30. φησι. Cp. Laws 737 D. Ephorus also (ap. Strab. p. 480) had praised the Cretans for living σωφρόνως καὶ λιτῶς. I do not feel the difficulty which Susemihl follows others in raising (see Sus.², Critical Note, and Qu. Crit. p. 368 sq.) with regard to τοῦτο—ζῆν at all as strongly as he does. Aristotle makes two objections to Plato's ὅρος—1. that it is too vague and fails to enlighten: 2. that it tends to mislead. For other instances in which μᾶλλον is used in the sense of λίαν, see Bon. Ind. 445 a 1 sqq. In de Gen. An. 2. 8. 748 a 7 we have, οὗτος μὲν οὖν ὁ λόγος καθόλου λίαν καὶ κενός. Τοῦτο—ζῆν gives the reason for Aristotle's suggestion in 28 sq. that a clearer definition should be substituted.

33. σωφρόνως καὶ ἐλευθερίως. Cp. 4 (7). 5. 1326 b 30 sqq., a passage which shows that Aristotle intended fully to discuss in a later part of his work the question of the true mode of using property.

χωρὶς γὰρ κ.τ.λ., 'for if we part the one from the other, liberal living will accompany luxurious life, and temperate living a life of hardship.' For ἀκολουθεῖν as here used, Bonitz (Ind. 26 a 44) compares 3. 13. 1285 a 39 and Eth. Eud. 3. 5. 1232 a 31. Cp. also Theopomp. fragm. 110 (Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 1. 295), τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ τῶν κακῶν οὐδὲν αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ παραγίγνεται τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἀλλὰ συντέτακται καὶ συνακολουθεῖ τοῖς μὲν πλούτοις καὶ ταῖς δυναστείαις ἄνοια, καὶ μετὰ ταύτην ἀκολασία, ταῖς δ' ἐνδείαις καὶ ταῖς ταπεινώσει σωφροσύνη καὶ μετριότης. In c. 7. 1266 b 26 and in 4 (7). 5. 1326 b 37 sqq. the alternative to τρυφᾶν is γλίσχρως, not ἐπιπόνως, ζῆν.

34. τῷ ἐπιπόνως, sc. ζῆν, suppressed as already implicitly expressed in τρυφᾶν (cp. 1. 11. 1258 b 19).

35. ἕξεις αἰρεταί (see critical note and cp. Eth. Nic. 6. 13. 1144 a 1 sq.) is a wider term than ἀρεταί: ἐγκράτεια (e.g.) is a σπουδαία ἕξις, but not an ἀρετή in the strict sense of the word (see the references in Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 627. 2). Those who reject Victorius' conjecture of αἰρεταί for ἀρεταί, which is the reading of all the MSS., and prefer to strike out one of the two words ἕξεις and ἀρεταί, should probably strike out the former, for the illustrations which follow (35 sq.) show that good ἕξεις are alone referred to.

37. τὰς χρήσεις, i. e. τὰς ἐνεργείας, in contradistinction to τὰς ἕξεις

(see Bon. Ind. 854 b 37 sqq. for instances of this use of the word). Here also Aristotle would seem to refer to commendable *χρήσεις* only.

38. τὰς κτήσεις, 'landed property,' as in 4 (7). 9. 1329 a 18. Plato does not equalize all kinds of property (cp. 1265 b 22). The lots of land, however, are evidently intended by him to be equal or virtually equal (Laws 737).

39. κατασκευάζειν, 'de placitis philosophicis (cf. ποιεῖν, τίθεσθαι) dicitur,' Bon. Ind. 374 b 17 sq.

ἀφείναι κ.τ.λ. It is not the case that Plato trusts to ἀτεκνία alone to maintain the numbers of his citizen-body unaltered: see Laws 740 D-E, 923 D. Aristotle, however, desires a limitation of τεκνοποιία: he wishes the State to fix a definite number of children, not to be exceeded, in the case of every marriage (4 (7). 16. 1335 b 22). Aristotle must be quite aware that Plato intends to fix the number of citizens in the Laws, but he appears to think that Plato takes no effectual means to secure that the number named shall not be exceeded.

40. ἂν ὁμαλισθησομένην. On ἂν with the Future Participle, see Goodwin, Moods and Tenses, § 41. 4. Madvig (Adversaria Critica 1. 463) would read ἀνομαλισθησομένην, but this verb appears only to occur elsewhere in a single passage, Rhet. 3. 11. 1412 a 16, καὶ τὸ ἀνομαλίσθαι τὰς πόλεις.

41. διὰ τὰς ἀτεκνίας, 'by means of': see note on 1263 b 36.

1265 b. 1. ὅτι δοκεῖ κ.τ.λ. Plato does not give this reason. The fact mentioned by Aristotle is interesting.

δεῖ δὲ κ.τ.λ., 'this stationariness of numbers will need to be maintained with greater accuracy in the State of the Laws than it is now,' for in this State those over the right number will be starved, which now is not the case. This remark was perhaps suggested by an observation in the Laws (928 E)—ἐν μὲν οὖν ἄλλῃ πολιτείᾳ παῖς ἀποκεκηρυγμένος οὐκ ἂν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀπολίσσῃ, ταύτης δέ, ἥς οἶδε οἱ νόμοι ἔσονται, ἀναγκαίως ἔχει εἰς ἄλλην χώραν ἐξοικίσεσθαι τὸν ἀπάτορα· πρὸς γὰρ τοῖς τετταράκοντα καὶ πεντακισχιλίοις οἴκοις οὐκ ἔστιν εἶνα προσγενέσθαι.

3. ἀπορεῖ, 'is destitute' (cp. μηδὲν ἔχειν 5).

For μερίζεσθαι τὰς οὐσίας εἰς ὅποσον οὖν πλῆθος, where εἰς seems to be used of the recipients, cp. c. 9. 1270 a 18, εἰς ὀλίγους ἦκεν ἡ χώρα, and de Part. An. 3. 3. 664 a 27 sq.

4. ἀδιαίρετον, indivisible by testation (Laws 740 B): by sale (741 B): in other ways (742 C): not divisible even by the action of the State (855 A sq.: 856 D-E: 909 C sq.: 877 D).

τοὺς παράλυσας, 'eos qui praeter numerum et extra ordinem accessissent' Lamb. (cp. τοῖς περιγενομένοις, Laws 740 D).

7. τὴν τεκνοποιίαν, 'reproductive intercourse.' Compare on this subject 4 (7). 16. 1335 b 22 sq.

10. τῶν ἄλλων, i.e. other than τῶν γεννησάντων implied in τῶν γεννηθέντων.

If with P¹ Π² Bekk. we read ταῖς πλείσταίς, we must infer that in some States a check of some kind on the procreation of children existed. Aristotle's suggestion in 7-10 much resembles that of Plato, Rep. 460 A, τὸ δὲ πλῆθος τῶν γάμων ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀρχουσι ποιήσομεν, ὅς ὥς μάλιστα διασώζωσι τὸν αὐτὸν ἀριθμὸν τῶν ἀνδρῶν, πρὸς πολέμους τε καὶ νόσους καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀποσκοποῦντες.

12. κακουργίαν. Vict. 'alii autem in minutioribus rebus exercent malitiam suam, qui multis locis in his libris vocantur ab ipso κακοῦργοι, id est, fraudulentī.' Κακοῦργοι and μικροπόνηροι are conjoined, it is true, in 6 (4). 11. 1295 b 10, and contrasted with ὑβρισταὶ καὶ μεγαλοπόνηροι (cp. Rhet. 2. 16. 1391 a 18), but in Pol. 7 (5). 8. 1308 a 19 the malpractices ending in tyranny which long terms of office favour are spoken of by this name, and these cannot be said to be 'in minutioribus rebus.' 'Knavery' perhaps comes near the meaning. For the thought here expressed, Sus.² compares c. 7. 1266 b 13 (cp. also Isocr. Areopag. § 44); yet Aristotle seems to make less of this danger in 7 (5). 12. 1316 b 18 sqq.

Φείδων μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. 'Pheidon, in fact.' Here, as in ἔτιοι μὲν οὖν, 1265 b 33 sqq., and also in 3. 5. 1278 a 6 sq., μὲν οὖν introduces a confirmation of what has preceded, in order to emphasize the sentence introduced by δέ. The arrangements of the Laws are said to be the opposite of those of Pheidon, because Pheidon, though careless as to the equality of the lots, fixed for ever both the number of households in his city and the number of citizens, whereas Plato equalizes the lots and fixes the number of households, but does not effectually fix the number of citizens (cp. 1265 a 38, ἀποπον δὲ καὶ τὸ τὰς κτήσεις ἰσάζοντα τὸ περὶ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν πολιτῶν μὴ κατασκευάζειν, ἀλλ' ἀφείναι τὴν τεκνοποιίαν ἀόριστον). Under Pheidon's scheme no pauper citizens would exist: Plato, on the contrary, takes no effectual means for preventing their existence. Is Pheidon's early date mentioned to indicate surprise that Plato took no better means than he did of preventing the existence of paupers within the citizen-body? If Pheidon legislated for Corinth, we can understand how it came to send forth so many colonies in early days. Aristotle would go farther, however, than Pheidon; he would not be content with excluding the over-plus from citizen-

ship, but would prevent it from coming into existence. 'Ο Κορίνθιος is probably added to distinguish this Pheidon from the better known tyrant of Argos (7 (5). 10. 1310 b 26). Compare with the aims of Pheidon those of Philolaus, who also was a Corinthian (c. 12. 1274 b 4 sq.). We learn from Isaeus de Apollodori Hereditate § 30 (quoted by Caillemer, Succession légitime à Athènes, p. 133), that the Attic law required the Archon to take care that no house was left without a representative (καὶ οὐ μόνον ἰδίᾳ ταῦτα γινώσκουσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ δημοσίᾳ τὸ κοινὸν τῆς πόλεως οὕτω ταύτ' ἔγνωκε νόμῳ γὰρ τῷ ἄρχοντι τῶν οἰκῶν, ὅπως ἂν μὴ ἐξηρημῶνται, προστάττει τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν). But Pheidon went much further than this; he fixed not only the number of households, but also the number of the lots and the number of the citizens. Lycurgus is conceived to have fixed the number of households and lots in Plutarch, Agis 5. 1.

13. ὣν νομοθέτης τῶν ἀρχαιοτάτων. For the gen. see Jelf, Gr. § 533. 1.

14. οἴκους, used of households especially as owning property: see Boeckh, Public Economy of Athens, E. T. p. 142 n. (who refers to Xen. Oecon. 1. 4-5), and Holden's Index to the Oeconomicus, p. 95*. Here perhaps something of this meaning is present; elsewhere, however, e.g. in 1. 7. 1255 b 19 and 1. 2. 1252 b 14, the difference between οἶκος and οἰκία seems hardly traceable.

ἴσους, 'as they originally were'? or 'at their original number'? If the former, the primitive distribution of property, as well as the primitive number of households, would be stereotyped; if the latter, only the primitive number of households. Perhaps this is all that is meant.

15. ἀρίστους . . . κατὰ μέγεθος. For the severance, cp. de Part. An. 4. 8. 683 b 28, τούτων δ' ἐκάστου πλείω εἶδη ἐστὶ διαφέροντα οὐ μόνον κατὰ τὴν μορφήν ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ τὸ μέγεθος πολὺ, and see below on 1265 b 29.

16. τοῖς νόμοις τούτοις recurs in 18, and also in 1266 a 1.

τοῦναντίον. See above on 12.

17. ὕστερον, 4 (7). 10. 1330 a 2-23: 4 (7). 16. 1335 b 19-26 (Sus.).

18. ἐλλείπεται δὲ κ.τ.λ. At first sight it seems surprising that Aristotle digresses here to the subject of οἱ ἄρχοντες from that of the property and numbers of the citizens, with which he has been dealing, for he returns to the subject of their property in 21, but the reason for this is that he has just been mentioning an omission (a 38-b 17), the omission to regulate τεκνοποιία, and now he has another omission to mention, the omission to explain distinctly

in what way the rulers are to be different from the ruled. Hence the *καί* before τὰ περὶ τοὺς ἄρχοντας.

19. ὅπως. So Π² Bekk.: M² P¹ πῶς. In either case 'how' will be the translation. Giph. (p. 201): 'hoc tantum Plato ... magistratus privatis antecellere et meliores esse debere, universe et confuse, similitudine suo more adhibita, monuit.' Aristotle would have been glad if Plato had spoken more definitely and in detail on this subject.

ἔσονται διαφέροντες. See above on 1259 b 11.

φησί. 'Plato, Legg. 734 E: non tamen prorsus neglegere debuit Aristoteles quae Plato disseruit 961 A sq.: 951 E sqq.' (Sus.¹). Some few of the citizens are to receive a more scientific training in arithmetic, geometry, and astronomy than the rest (Laws 818 A). In 632 C we find the guardians of the State described as of two kinds—φύλακας ἐπιστήσας, τοὺς μὲν διὰ φρονήσεως, τοὺς δὲ δι' ἀληθείας δόξης ἰόντας—so that even the 'warp' of the State will apparently be of two textures, and this is confirmed by 961 A sq. and 951 E sqq.

20. τῆς κρόκης, called ἐφυφή in Laws 734 E.

21. For the repetition of δεῖν, compare the repetition of δῆλον in 3. 13. 1283 b 16 sqq., of ἔργον in 8 (6). 5. 1319 b 33 sqq., and the addition of ἄτερος in 7 (5). 4. 1304 a 16 and ἐκείνον in 7 (5). 10. 1312 b 17. See also above on 1261 b 8.

22. πενταπλασίας. Sepulv. p. 43 b—'mirum est Aristotelem ad quintuplum dicere, cum in libro quinto de legibus Plato ad quadruplum dicat, nisi forte, quod suspicor, vitio librariorum factum est ut in Aristotelicis exemplaribus πενταπλασίας scriptum sit pro τετραπλασίας': Sus.¹—'immo τετραπλασίας, v. Plat. Legg. 744 E, cf. 754 D sqq.: errorem ipsius Aristotelis esse, non librariorum, inde apparet quod idem repetitur 7. 1266 b 5 sqq.' Plato's words, Laws 744 E, are—μέτρον δὲ αὐτὸν (i. e. τὸν ὅρον = τὴν τοῦ κλήρου τιμὴν) θέμενος ὁ νομοθέτης διπλάσιον εἰσεῖ τοῦτον κτᾶσθαι καὶ τριπλάσιον καὶ μέχρι τετραπλασίου. He would seem therefore, as Prof. Jowett points out (Politics of Aristotle 2. 1. 63), to permit the acquisition of property four times the value of the lot in addition to the lot, so that the richest man in the State would be, as Aristotle says (c. 7. 1266 b 5 sqq.), five times as rich as the poorest, who has nothing but the lot. The passage 754 D sqq., to which Sus. refers, does not seem to bear on the subject, if Stallbaum's interpretation of it is correct. Μείζονα 22 appears (cp. τῆς ἐλαχίστης, 1266 b 6) to mean 'greater than the minimum with which every citizen starts' (i. e. the lot).

23. διὰ τὴν κ.τ.λ. 'Why should not an increase be allowed in respect of land up to a certain point?' The answer is 'because if a citizen were allowed to add to his landed property, what he gains other citizens must lose; their lots must pass from them or be diminished, and thus, besides an infraction of the laws, the main security against pauperism within the citizen-body, itself not complete (cp. 1265 b 4 sq.), would be still further weakened.'

25. συμφέρει. Eucken de Partic. Usu p. 58: 'particula ita adhibita (i. e. in oratione obliqua) vulgo cum indicativo construitur, ita ut μὴ indicet eum qui dicat expectare ut affirmetur sententia, μὴ οὐ ut negetur—cf. Pol. 5 (8). 5. 1339 b 42: Phys. 8. 6. 259 b 3: Eth. Nic. 8. 9. 1159 a 6.' Some MSS. (not the best) have συμφέρη, and it is possible that the Vet. Int. ('ne forte non expediat') found it in his Greek text. The subjunctive occurs in this construction in only four other passages of Aristotle, if we exclude the Rhetorica ad Alexandrum: these are Rhet. 2. 20. 1393 b 19: Top. 6. 9. 147 a 21: Metaph. M. 4. 1079 b 6: Metaph. N. 3. 1090 b 8 (Weber, Die Absichtssätze bei Aristoteles, p. 16: see also Eucken, *ubi supra*).

ἐνείμε. 'Plat. Legg. 745 E: 775 E sqq., cf. 848: at mirum est hoc loco idem in Platone ab Aristotele reprehendi, quod ipse instituit, 4 (7). 10. 1330 a 14 sqq.' (Sus.¹). But Aristotle's words in that passage are δύο κλήρων ἐκάστῳ νεμθέντων—two lots, not necessarily two houses. The object of Plato in this arrangement seems to have been to provide a means of settling the married son in a separate household of his own (Laws 776 A). Aristotle would probably approve the separation, but perhaps in his State there would be little need for the arrangement, for if the father were 37 years of age when he married, and the son waited to marry till he was 37, he would not be very likely to marry in his father's lifetime. At any rate, Aristotle does not provide for the contingency in what we have of the Politics.

26. διελὼν χωρίς. Vict. 'distinctas separatasque.'

χαλεπὸν δὲ οἰκίας δύο οἰκεῖν. Cp. Demosth. in Boeot. de Nomine, c. 26, εἰ γὰρ οὕτω δαπανηρὸς ἦν ὥστε γάμψ γεγαμηκὸς τὴν ἐμὴν μητέρα ἐτέραν εἶχε γυναῖκα, ἧς ὑμεῖς ἐστέ, καὶ δὴ οἰκίας ᾗκει, πῶς ἂν ἀργύριον τοιοῦτος ὢν κατέλιπεν;

26 sqq. Here Aristotle passes from the subject of the citizens, their numbers and property, to that of the constitution. His objections to the constitution described in the Laws are as follows. It is not the next best after that which Plato places first, for it aims at being a polity, which is a constitution compounded of two constitutions, whereas an ἀριστοκρατία like the Lacedaemonian, which is

compounded of three, is better. Nor again (1266 a 5 sqq.) does it answer to Plato's own account of the best constitution, for this is compounded, according to him, of monarchy and democracy, whereas the constitution of the Laws is a mixture of oligarchy and democracy and leans rather to oligarchy.

27. βούλεται μὲν. This μὲν appears to emphasize βούλεται and to imply that success is not attained; we see, however, from 1266 a 7, μάλλον δ' ἐγκλίειν βούλεται πρὸς τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν, that, in Aristotle's view, the constitution of the Laws hardly remains true even in aim to a midway course between oligarchy and democracy.

28. ἐκ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Cp. 3. 7. 1279 b 1. See Laws 753 B. 'Ἐστίν, sc. ἡ σύνταξις ὅλη.

29. εἰ μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. Μὲν οὖν ('now while') here introduces an admission which does not exclude, but rather lends fresh emphasis to, a coming criticism introduced by δέ. Translate: 'now while, if his view in constructing (1265 a 39) this constitution is that it is the constitution most readily attainable by States.' 'Ὡς κοινοτάτην must be taken with ταῖς πόλεσι and with πολιτείαν. For the severance of πολιτείαν from ὡς κοινοτάτην, cp. 2. 2. 1261 a 15, and see above on 1255 a 21. For κοινοτάτην τῶν ἄλλων, see Bon. Ind. 403 a 3 sq. ('superlatus comparativi vim in se continet, ita ut vel ipse coniungatur cum genetivo comparativo').

31. εἰ δ' ὅς κ.τ.λ. This is Plato's meaning (Laws 739 E, δδανασίας ἐγγύτατα καὶ ἡ μία δευτέρως). 'Ita tamen cum Platone agit Aristoteles, ut videatur id compertum se non habere; hoc autem facit, ut aequior ipsi videatur' (Vict.). For τὴν πρώτην πολιτείαν, cp. Laws 739 B.

33. ἀριστοκρατικώτεραν, 'more aristocratic than the State of the Laws' is probably the meaning, not than the Lacedaemonian State. Aristotle is inclined to regard the State of the Laws as leaning too much to oligarchy (1266 a 7).

ἐνιοι μὲν οὖν, 'some, in fact': see note on 1265 b 12. Who these inquirers were, is not known; they seem to have recognized only three constitutions, monarchy, oligarchy, and democracy; neither Socrates nor Plato, therefore, can well be referred to, though Plato (Laws 691 C—693 E: cp. 773 C—D) praises the Lacedaemonian constitution for tempering the 'strong wine' of royalty with a senate representing age and sobriety, and with the Ephorate representing the democratic principle of the lot or something like it. There is a nearer approach to the views of these ἐνιοι in the doubt expressed by Megillus, the Spartan interlocutor in the Laws (712 D), whether to call the Lacedaemonian constitution a tyranny

(because of the Ephorate) or a democracy or an aristocracy or a kingship. On the difference between their conception of mixed government and that of Aristotle something has already been said, vol. i. p. 264, and above, p. xiii. Whether Aristotle agrees with them in regarding the senate as an oligarchical element in the constitution, is not quite clear, for though in 7 (5). 6. 1306 a 18 sq. he describes the mode of electing the senators as *δυναστευτική*, he elsewhere says of the senate, *ἄθλον ἢ ἀρχὴ αὐτῇ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐστίν* (2. 9. 1270 b 24). He clearly, however, did not agree with them in their view that the Lacedaemonian constitution was a mixture of monarchy, oligarchy, and democracy, for he speaks of it as a mixture of virtue (or aristocracy) and democracy in 6 (4). 7. 1293 b 16 sq. With the passage before us 6 (4). 9. 1294 b 18-34 should be compared, where other grounds for finding a democratical and an oligarchical element in this constitution are mentioned.

38. *δημοκρατεῖσθαι*. Bonitz remarks on this passage (Ind. 174 b 54), 'ubi subiectum non additur, *δημοκρατεῖσθαι* non multum differt a *δημοκρατίαν εἶναι*,' and he refers to 40 and to 7 (5). 1. 1301 b 16. It is not, however, quite certain that *τὴν πολιτείαν* should not be supplied: cp. 2. 11. 1273 a 41, where Π¹ are probably right in reading *ταύτην οὐχ οἶδ' ὅν τε βεβαίως ἀριστοκρατεῖσθαι τὴν πολιτείαν*, and 7 (5). 1. 1301 b 14 sqq.

39. *κατὰ*, 'in respect of': cp. *τῶν κατ' ἀρετὴν ἡγεμονικῶν*, 3. 17. 1288 a 11.

ἐκ τοῦ δήμου. For this mention of a *demos* in the Lacedaemonian State, cp. c. 9. 1270 b 8, 18, 25: 6 (4). 9. 1294 b 30. It is not meant that the ephors were always taken from the *demos*, but that all citizens were eligible (cp. c. 9. 1270 b 25, *καθίσταται γὰρ ἐξ πάντων*). As to the distinction between 'people' (or *οἱ τυχόντες*, c. 9. 1270 b 29) and *καλοὶ κἀγαθοί* (1270 b 24), see Schömann, Opusc. Acad. 1. 108 sqq.: 'non Homoeos illis qui *ὑπομείοντες* erant opposit, sed in ipsis Homoeis alios *καλοὺς κἀγαθοὺς* esse innuit, alios autem in quos haec appellatio non conveniat. . . Dignitatis tantum atque existimationis discrimen est' (p. 138). See 6 (4) 9. 1294 b 29 sq.

40. *δημοκρατεῖσθαι* δέ. Cp. c. 9. 1271 a 32: 6 (4). 9. 1294 b 19 sqq.: 6 (4). 5. 1292 b 11 sqq. Cp. also Isocr. Areopag. § 61: Thuc. 1. 6. 4.

1266 a. 1. ἐν δὲ κ.τ.λ. 'Aristotle understands this last principle' (that the best constitution should be a compound of monarchy and democracy) 'somewhat differently from what Plato seems to have intended' (Grote, Plato 3. 363 n.). Plato says (Laws 693 D)

that *μοναρχία* (not *τυραννίς*) and *δημοκρατία* are the two mother-forms of constitution, Persia being an extreme example of the former, and Athens of the latter: *δεῖ δὴ οὖν καὶ ἀναγκαῖον μεταλαβεῖν ἀμφοῖν τούτων, εἴπερ ἐλευθερία τ' ἔσται καὶ φιλία μετὰ φρονήσεως*: that is to say, a good constitution should partake of each of the two mother-forms (not of their extreme phases), or as he expresses it in 692 A, the fiery self-willed strength of birth (*ἡ κατὰ γένος αὐθάδης ῥώμη*) must be tempered by the sobriety of age and checked by an approach to the principle of the lot. In other words, the force of authoritative hereditary government and the tempering element of freedom ought to find a place in every good State. It is doubtful from the sequel whether Plato intended to represent monarchy, even in its milder form, as an essential ingredient. Thus in Laws 756 E he describes his scheme for the election of councillors as 'a mode of election midway between monarchy and democracy,' though it is hard to see anything in it which could in strictness be called monarchical. He certainly never meant that a good State must be an union of tyranny and extreme democracy, of which forms alone it could be said that they are the worst of constitutions or not constitutions at all. Aristotle here seems to confound democracy with extreme democracy, for he elsewhere speaks of democracy in general as the least bad of the *παρεκβάσεις* (Eth. Nic. 8. 12. 1160 b 19: Pol. 6 (4). 2. 1289 b 4 sqq.).

δέον. It is possible that *ἐστί* should be supplied with *δέον* here, as in Eth. Nic. 2. 7. 1107 a 32 and 7. 3. 1145 b 28. Bonitz, however, is apparently inclined to emend the latter passage and to adopt a different reading from that of Bekker in the former (see Ind. 168 a 50 sqq.).

3. As to tyranny, cp. 6 (4). 8. 1293 b 28 sq.: 6 (4). 2. 1289 b 2. Aristotle must refer, as has been said already, to the extreme democracy (cp. 6 (4). 14. 1298 a 31: 7 (5). 10. 1312 b 36), which is called in 6 (4). 14. 1298 b 14 *ἡ μάλιστ' εἶναι δοκοῦσα δημοκρατία*, but he nowhere else seems to treat the extreme democracy as worse than the extreme oligarchy: both are *διαμεταίτιοι τυραννίδες*, 7 (5). 10. 1312 b 37.

4. *ἡ γὰρ κ.τ.λ.* The *ἀριστοκρατία*, which is a mixture of *οἱ εὐποροί*, *οἱ ἄποροι*, and *οἱ καλοὶ κἀγαθοί*, or of *πλοῦτος*, *ἐλευθερία*, and *ἀρετή*, is superior to the polity, which combines only *οἱ εὐποροί* and *οἱ ἄποροι* (*πλοῦτος* and *ἐλευθερία*): cp. 6 (4). 8. 1294 a 15: 7 (5). 7. 1307 a 7 sqq. Each of the three elements—*πλοῦτος*, *ἐλευθερία*, *ἀρετή*—is the *ἄρος* of a constitution (1294 a 10): hence the *ἀριστοκρατία* may be

said to combine three constitutions. It is true that a constitution combining only two of the three elements is admitted (6 (4). 7. 1293 b 16) to be *ἀριστοκρατική*, but this is not Aristotle's usual account of the *ἀριστοκρατία*. Susemihl, following Riese, brackets *ἡ γὰρ—βελτίων*: he is inclined, indeed, to question with Schmidt the authenticity of the whole passage 1265 b 29, *εἰ—1266 a 6*, *δημοκρατικά* (Qu. Crit. p. 370). His reason for bracketing *ἡ γὰρ—βελτίων* is that the view expressed in this clause cannot have been held by Aristotle, who would regard, for instance, a combination of aristocracy and democracy, or even of oligarchy and democracy, as better than a combination of oligarchy, democracy, and tyranny (Sus.², Note 222). The clause seems certainly open to this objection, but perhaps the contrast present to Aristotle's mind is that which he has just drawn between an *ἀριστοκρατία* like the Lacedaemonian and a polity like that of Plato's Laws.

5. οὐδ' ἔχουσα φαίνεται. See note on 1261 a 9.

7. τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν, as in c. 11. 1273 a 22 (contrast 1273 a 6).

9. ἐξ αἰρετῶν κληρωτοὺς. 'In the appointment of members of the Boulê, of the astynomi, and of the judges of competitions, Laws 756 B-E: 763 D sq.: 765 B-D' (Sus.², Note 223). As to κοινὸν ἀμφοῖν, cp. 6 (4). 9. 1294 b 6 sqq.

10. ἐκκλησιάζειν. 'Plato, Legg. 764 A,' Sus.¹—compulsory for the first and second classes only. See 6 (4). 13. 1297 a 17 sqq., where provisions of this nature are reckoned among *ὀλιγαρχικά σοφίσματα τῆς νομοθεσίας*.

φέρειν ἀρχοντας. 'In reality, only in the election of the judges of gymnastic competitions (Laws 765 C), and also of the Boulê (Laws 756 B-E), and Aristotle has not yet come to the subject of the Boulê' (Sus.², Note 225).

11. τοῦτο δὲ takes up τὸ δὲ κ.τ.λ.: see Bon. Ind. 166 b 58 sqq.

12. καὶ τὸ πειρᾶσθαι κ.τ.λ. So the astynomi and agoranomi must belong to the first or second class (763 D-E); the three hundred names from which the Nomophylakes are selected are to be chosen by those who are serving or have served in war as hoplites or horse-soldiers, and hoplites and horse-soldiers were well-to-do, substantial people (753 B sq.); the superintendent of education is to be chosen by the magistrates out of the Nomophylakes (766 B); the select judges are to be chosen by the magistrates out of their own number (767 C-D). As to the Nocturnal Council, see 951 D-E.

13. καὶ τὰς μεγίστας κ.τ.λ. 'Haec falsa sunt, v. Plat. Legg. 753 B sqq.: 755 B sqq.: 766 A sq.: 945 E sqq.' (Sus.¹). It is true

that selection from the two highest classes is enforced only in the cases of the *astynomi* and the *agoranomi*, but Plato probably counted on his arrangements proving adequate to secure the same result as to the *Nomophylakes* (for these needed at least as much as the *Astynomi* to be at leisure to attend to public affairs—cp. *καὶ τούτους*, 763 D), and therefore as to the superintendent of education, the select judges, and the Nocturnal Council. On the other hand, the emphasis with which Plato insists on high excellence in his magistrates, especially in reference to the superintendent of education (*ἄριστος εἰς πάντα*, 766 A) and the priests of Apollo (*πάντη ἄριστον*, 946 A), seems to negative Aristotle's charge that the constitution approaches oligarchy. Still, in Aristotle's view, an *ἀριστοκρατία* selects the best *ἐκ πάντων*, not *ἐκ τινῶν ἀφωρισμένων* (6 (4). 5. 1292 b 2-4).

14. *καί*, 'as well as the choice of *ἄρχοντες*.' The distinction between membership of the *Boulê* and *ἀρχή* is not always maintained: cp. 7 (5). 6. 1306 b 8. As to the election of members of the *Boulê*, see Laws 756 B sqq.

15. *ἀλλ'* seems to answer to *μέν* (see Sus.¹, Ind. Gramm. s. v. *μέν*). It introduces a limitation of what has just been said, as in Eth. Nic. 10. 5. 1176 a 21, *ἤδεια δ' οὐκ ἔστιν, ἀλλὰ τούτοις καὶ οὕτω διακειμένοις*: cp. Rhet. 2. 24. 1402 a 27.

16. *ἐκ τῶν τρίτων*. Should we supply *τιμημάτων* here with Mr. Eaton, or is *τῶν τρίτων* masc.? The same question arises with regard to *τῶν τρίτων ἢ τετάρτων*, 17, and *τοῖς πρώτοις καὶ τοῖς δευτέροις*, 18. In the passage of the Laws, the substance of which Aristotle is here reproducing (756 B sqq.), Plato has *ἐκ τῶν μεγίστων τιμημάτων*, *ἐκ τῶν δευτέρων τιμημάτων*, *ἐκ τῶν τρίτων τιμημάτων*, and lastly *ἐκ τοῦ τετάρτου τιμήματος*, and if he changes without apparent cause from the plural to the singular, it is possible that Aristotle, who has hitherto used the singular (*τοῦ πρώτου τιμήματος*, *τοῦ δευτέρου τιμήματος*, 15 sq.), may change from the singular to the plural. It is, however, also possible that *τῶν τρίτων* may be masc., and mean 'the members of the third class.'

17. *πλὴν οὐ πᾶσιν ἐπ' ἀνάγκης ἦν τοῖς ἐκ τῶν τρίτων ἢ τετάρτων*. Here again the doubt arises whether *τιμημάτων* should be supplied with *τῶν τρίτων ἢ τετάρτων*, or whether these words are of the masculine gender. *Πᾶσι* has universally been taken to agree with *τοῖς ἐκ τῶν τρίτων ἢ τετάρτων*, and if we thus take it, *τιμημάτων* must be supplied, and the meaning of the sentence will be, 'but Plato did not make voting compulsory [in elections from the third class] on all the members of the third and fourth classes.' This is a strange

way of expressing the fact that Plato compelled the three higher classes alone to vote in elections from the third, and it is not surprising that extensive alterations have been suggested in the MS. text. But is it absolutely certain that *πᾶσιν* agrees with *τοῖς ἐκ τῶν τρίτων ἢ τετάρτων*? May not the meaning of the passage be—‘but Plato did not make voting compulsory on all in the case of those elected from the thirds or fourths,’ or, if we supply *τιμημάτων*, ‘from the third or fourth classes’? For the dative *τοῖς ἐκ τῶν τρίτων ἢ τετάρτων*, if we understand it thus, cp. 1. 8. 1256 b 34, *ταῖς ἄλλαις τέχναις* (‘in the case of other arts’), and [Xen.] Rep. Ath. 1. 5, *ἐνίοις τῶν ἀνθρώπων*, and see Bon. Ind. 166 b 26–38. *Πᾶσιν* is no more bound to be in agreement with *τοῖς κ.τ.λ.* than *ταύτης* with *τῆς ἡγεμονίας* in 7 (5). 4. 1304 a 22–23: see for other instances of the same thing de Part. An. 4. 9. 685 a 9: 3. 1. 662 a 9. If, however, the interpretation of *τοῖς ἐκ τῶν τρίτων ἢ τετάρτων* which I have ventured to suggest should be thought inadmissible, I would propose the omission of *τοῖς*: *αἰρεῖσθαι* will then need to be supplied, as in the next sentence. See Susemihl’s *apparatus criticus*, and Qu. Crit. p. 370 sqq., for the emendations which have been already proposed. As to *ἦν*, cp. 1. 12. 1259 a 37.

18. *ἐκ δὲ [τοῦ τετάρτου] τῶν τετάρτων*. The probability is that *τοῦ τετάρτου* and *τῶν τετάρτων* are alternative readings, which have been by some misadventure admitted together into the text. See critical note for other instances of the same thing. It is hardly conceivable that Aristotle wrote ‘from the fourth class of the fourths,’ and the only remaining alternative is to adopt Victorius’ conjecture of *τῶν τετάρτων*, which Sepulveda found in some MSS.—there also probably a conjectural emendation.

19. *ἐκ τούτων*, ‘from the persons so elected.’

20. *οἱ ἐκ τῶν μεγίστων τιμημάτων καὶ βελτίους*. These words seem to go together as the subject of the sentence. For *οἱ ἐκ τ. μ. τιμημάτων*, cp. Plato, Laws 756 D, *τὸν ἐκ τοῦ τετάρτου καὶ τρίτου τιμήματος . . . τὸν δ’ ἐκ τοῦ δευτέρου καὶ πρώτου*. *Βελτίους*, ‘the more respectable’: cp. 3. 13. 1283 a 36. That these words refer not to the elected but to the electors, is evident from Plato’s use of them; besides, the *μέγιστα τιμήματα* (i.e. the first and second, 13) will number in the Boulé exactly as many representatives as the third and fourth. Not only most of the magistrates will belong to the well-to-do classes (1266 a 12), but also most of the voters in the election of members of the Boulé.

23. *τὴν τοιαύτην πολιτείαν*, ‘the constitution of which we have spoken,’ i.e. *τὴν ἀρίστην*, 1266 a 2. The conclusion here arrived at

is considered by Aristotle to be established, partly by what he has said in 1266 a 3, and partly by the failure of Plato to construct his State in the way in which he had announced that it ought to be constructed. We need not infer from 1266 a 4, that the best constitution of Aristotle will be a compound of more constitutions than two; all that Aristotle says is, that a constitution compounded of more than two is better than a constitution compounded of two only. It is evident from the passage before us, as well as from the commencement of the Second Book, that Aristotle is looking forward to an inquiry as to the best constitution.

26. καὶ περὶ τὴν αἵρεσιν τῶν ἀρχόντων, i. e. as well as in the election of members of the Boulê. For in the election of the Boulê, though Aristotle has not fully described it in the passage before us, the process laid down by Plato is threefold (Laws 756 B sqq.):—first, an equal number of individuals is to be nominated by election from each class in the manner he prescribes: next, all the citizens are to select out of those thus nominated 180 persons from each class: thirdly, half of these are to be taken by lot. Thus Plato's scheme for the election of the Boulê is one which involves τὸ ἐξ αἵρετῶν αἵρετοῦς, and Aristotle implies by καὶ that this is a perilous way of electing a Boulê. Plato employs the same method in the selection of the Nomophylakes, Laws 753.

27. ἔχει ἐπικίνδυνον, cp. 4 (7). 2. 1324 a 38, ἐμπόδιον ἔχει. Cp. also de Gen. et Corr. 1. 7. 323 b 30, ὅσα ἢ ἐναντία ἐστὶν ἢ ἐναντίωσιν ἔχει. Observe that Aristotle's objection is to ἐξ αἵρετῶν αἵρετοί, not to κληρωτοὶ ἐκ προκρίτων, an arrangement which suits a polity (6 (4). 14. 1298 b 9).

29. τὴν πολιτείαν τὴν ἐν τοῖς νόμοις. Aristotle does not meddle with the laws which occupy so large a part of the dialogue (1265 a 1), because his aim is to show that the constitution sketched in it is unsatisfactory, and that there is still room for an effort to suggest a better.

31. πολιτεῖαι. Bern. 'Verfassungsentwürfe.' Aristotle refers to C. 7. constitutional schemes, not to actual constitutions like those of Solon and Lycurgus.

The word ἰδιώτης is used by Aristotle both in contrast with such terms as ἀρχων (6 (4). 16. 1300 b 21) or οἱ τὰ κοινὰ πράττοντες καὶ πολιτευόμενοι (4 (7). 2. 1324 b 1), and in contrast with οἱ εἰδότες (3. 11. 1282 a 11: cp. Plato, Soph. 221 C, Protag. 322 C). Here both these contrasts seem to be combined: we find the former of the two in c. 11. 1273 a 35 and c. 12. 1273 b 29. The distinction of the ἰδιώτης and the philosopher survives in Cicero (Vict. quotes

pro Sestio 51. 110) and in Epictetus (Arrian, Epictet. 3. 19)—see Grote, Plato 3. 130 n.

33. καὶ καθ' ἑς κ.τ.λ. Vict. 'est quasi declaratio antecedentis illius nominis.'

34. οὐδεὶς γὰρ κ.τ.λ. We read of the Cynic Diogenes in Diog. Laert. 6. 72, ἔλεγε δὲ καὶ κοινὰς εἶναι δεῖν τὰς γυναῖκας, γάμον μηδένα νομίζων, ἀλλὰ τὸν πείσαντα τῇ πεισάσῃ (πεισθείσῃ conj. H. Stephanus) συνεῖναι κοινούς δὲ διὰ τοῦτο καὶ τοὺς νύεας: but if this view was expressed in the Πολιτεία which passed under his name (Diog. L. 6. 80: Henkel, Studien p. 9), Aristotle knows nothing of it. The work must either have been spurious or of a later date than this passage. Zeno of Citium taught a community of women among the wise in his Πολιτεία (Diog. L. 7. 131), and was followed by Chrysippus (ibid.), but this would be after the time of Aristotle. The Ecclesiazusae of Aristophanes was not a πολιτεία. Aristotle, however, mentions in 2. 3. 1262 a 19 sqq. that some Libyans had women in common, and he might have mentioned other instances of this, just as he notices the customs of some barbarous tribes in relation to community of property (c. 5. 1263 a 1 sqq.): see for instance Hdt. 4. 104, and Strabo's report (p. 302) of the stories of Ephorus about some Scythian tribes—εἰτ' αἰτιολογεῖ διότι ταῖς διαίταις εὐτελεῖς ὄντες καὶ οὐ χρηματισταὶ πρὸς τε ἀλλήλους εὐνομοῦνται, κοινὰ πάντα ἔχοντες τὰ τε ἄλλα καὶ τὰς γυναῖκας καὶ τέκνα καὶ τὴν ὅλην συγγένειαν, πρὸς τε τοὺς ἐκτὸς ἀμαχοί εἰσι καὶ ἀνίκητοι, οὐδὲν ἔχοντες ὑπὲρ οὐ δουλεύουσιν. Cp. also Ephor. Fr. 53 and Strabo p. 775. Euripides in the Protesilaus (Fr. 655 Nauck) had made one of his characters say,

Κοινὸν γὰρ εἶναι χρῆν γυναικεῖον λέχος:

indeed, we are told by Polybius, that among the Lacedaemonians καὶ πατριὸν ἦν καὶ σύνηθες τρεῖς ἄνδρας ἔχειν τὴν γυναῖκα καὶ τέτταρας, τοτὲ δὲ καὶ πλείους ἀδελφούς ὄντας, καὶ τὰ τέκνα τούτων εἶναι κοινὰ (12. 6b. 8 Hultsch). In c. 12. 1274 b 9, the plan of a community in property as well as in women and children is spoken of as special (ἰδίῳ) to Plato; here only the latter.

36. ἀπὸ τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἄρχονται. The authors of constitutional schemes before the time of Plato seem to have made their special care the supply of the necessary wants of their citizens. (It is not clear how far this is true of Hippodamus.) Plato, though he too attaches great importance to questions relating to property (Laws 736 C sqq.), did not lose sight of higher things. Cp. 4 (7). 10. 1329 b 27, where τὰ ἀναγκαῖα are contrasted with τὰ εἰς εὐσηχημοσύνην καὶ περιουσίαν and are said to be attended to first. Plato has some remarks in Laws 630 E on the way in which the legislators of his

own day approached their task. For ἀρχονται, cp. de Sensu 1. 436 a 19-b 1: Top. 1. 14. 105 b 12-15. Their starting-point was also their main point, as the next sentence shows. Cp. Isocr. Areopag. §§ 44-45.

38. ποιείσθαι. We have ποιούσι στάσις, 7 (5). 4. 1304 b 4, but ποιούνται τὰς ἐπιθέσεις, 7 (5). 10. 1312 a 20, and στασιωτικῶς ποιησάμενων τὴν κόλασιν, 7 (5). 6. 1306 a 38. See on phrases of this kind Shilleto, Demosth. de Falsa Legatione § 103, where he says—'any verb in Greek may be resolved into the cognate substantive with ποιείσθαι.'

39. τοῦτ' perhaps means the regulation of property with a view to prevent civil discord. Bern. 'dahin zielende Vorschläge.' Others, who must probably be earlier in date than Phaleas (for he is contrasted with τῶν πάλαι τινῶν in 1266 b 16), e.g. Pheidon the Corinthian (c. 6. 1265 b 12), had sought to regulate property. According to Henkel, Studien p. 36, who refers to Roscher, Thucydides p. 247, Anm. 1, Phaleas was an older contemporary of Plato.

40. τὰς κτήσεις, 'landed property' (1267 b 9), as in c. 6. 1265 a 38 and 4 (7). 9. 1329 a 18.

1. κατοικοῦμέναις is probably not to be taken with χαλεπὸν, but 1266 b. rather in the sense of 'for,' or possibly 'in the case of.'

οὐ χαλεπὸν ᾤετο. It would seem from this that even in the foundation of colonies unequal lots of land were often given. Πόλεις must be supplied here and πόλεις in the next line. This is a word which Aristotle often omits: thus πόλεις has to be supplied in c. 9. 1269 a 34: τὴν πόλιν in c. 11. 1272 b 31: πόλεις in 8 (6). 4. 1319 a 37 and 3. 6. 1278 b 12.

τὰς δ' ἤδη κατοικοῦμένας, sc. πόλεις ὁμαλίζειν. Cp. for this phrase Rhet. 3. 11. 1412 a 16, καὶ τὸ ἀνωμαλίσθαι τὰς πόλεις.

3. τῷ τὰς προίκας κ.τ.λ. Rich men were to give dowries when their daughters married poor men, but not to accept them from the parents of the bride, if poor, when they or their sons married. Poor men were never to give dowries, but only to receive them. Aristotle does not criticise this regulation, but it appears to make it the interest of rich fathers to marry their daughters to rich men; thus it tends to defeat its own object. An additional regulation compelling rich families to intermarry with poor ones would seem to be needed. This scheme of equalizing landed property by regulations as to dowries implies that dowries were often given in land, and also that they were often large, as we know from other sources that they were. We see also that poor fathers commonly gave dowries as well as rich ones. Plato abolishes dowries

altogether in the Laws (742 C: 774 C). Vict. remarks, 'in mentem hoc etiam venit Megadoro Plautino,' and quotes Plaut. Aulul.

3. 5. 4:

Nam meo quidem animo, si idem faciant ceteri
Opulentiores, pauperiorum filias
Ut indotatas ducant uxores domum:
Et multo fiat civitas concordior
Et invidia nos minore utamur quam utimur,
Et illae malam rem metuant, quam metuunt, magis,
Et nos minore sumptu simus quam sumus.

The absence of a dowry, however, would be much felt by the wife, owing to the facility of divorce in Greece: cp. Menand. Sentent. 371, *νύμφη δ' ἀπρὸς οὐκ ἔχει παρρησίαν*, and see C. F. Hermann, Gr. Antiqq. 3. § 30. 16, who quotes this line. See also vol. i. p. 171 sq.

6. *ἐάν*, sc. τὸ τῆς οὐσίας πληθὺς (cp. *ἐατέον*, 1267 b 13). Plato, however, would seem, no less than Phaleas, to have equalized the landed property of his citizens (Laws 737 C, *τὴν τε γῆν καὶ τὰς οἰκίσεις ὅτι μάλιστα ἴσας ἐπιμεμητέον*). Phaleas himself did not meddle with anything but land (1267 b 9 sq.), but this may well have been an oversight, for his views clearly pointed to an equality in all kinds of property. If so, he went, in intention at all events, farther than Plato.

πλεῖον δὲ κ.τ.λ. Literally, 'to acquire to a larger extent than would leave his property five times the size of the smallest.' As to *πενταπλασίαν*, see note on 1265 b 22, the passage referred to in *πρότερον*.

12. *ἀνάγκη κ.τ.λ.*, 'the abrogation of the law must of necessity follow': 'neque enim pati poterunt patres filios suos esurire' (Vict.). Some render *λύεσθαι* 'be broken,' but the following passages, collected by Bonitz (Ind. 439 a 5)—2. 8. 1269 a 15: 7 (5). 7. 1307 b 10: 6 (4). 14. 1298 b 31—seem to point rather to 'abrogation' as the meaning. Cp. also c. 8. 1268 b 30, *νόμων λύσιν ἢ πολιτείας*, and 1269 a 15, τὸ δ' ἐθίζειν εὐχερῶς λύειν τοὺς νόμους φαῦλον.

13. *ἔργον γὰρ κ.τ.λ.* Cp. Plato, Rep. 552. Yet contrast Pol. 7 (5). 12. 1316 b 18, *ὅταν μὲν τῶν ἡγεμόνων τινὲς ἀπολίσσωσι τὰς οὐσίας, καινοτομοῦσιν, ὅταν δὲ τῶν ἄλλων, οὐδὲν γίγνεται δεινόν*.

14. *διότι*, 'that.'

μὲν οὖν here, as in 1265 b 29 and elsewhere, introduces an admission which lends emphasis to the criticism introduced by *ἀλλά*, 24. What the main value of equality of property is, appears from c. 9. 1270 a 38. Another useful effect of laws of this kind is mentioned in 8 (6). 4. 1319 a 6 sqq.

ἔχει τινὰ δύναμιν εἰς τὴν πολιτικὴν κοινωνίαν. For this use of εἰς, cp. 6 (4). 16. 1300 b 20, ὅσα εἰς τὴν πολιτείαν φέρει.

16. φαίνονται διεγνωκότες, 'clearly have recognized': see note on 1261 a 9.

17. Ἰδών. To what law of Solon's does this refer? C. F. Hermann (Gr. Antiqq. 1. § 106. 12) and E. Curtius (Gr. Hist. 1. 329 E. T.) take it as referring to some law fixing a maximum limit to the acquisition of land, but Grote (Gr. Hist. 3. 182, ed. 3) thinks that 'the passage does not bear out such an opinion.' He seems to hold that Aristotle here only refers to Solon's 'annulment of the previous mortgages,' and to the Seisachtheia generally. The former view is probably correct, but in any case Solon's legislation is evidently conceived by Aristotle to have tended to an equality of property. It is deserving of notice that no mention is made of the equality of landed property which Lycurgus is alleged by some authorities to have instituted.

παρ' ἄλλοις. Laws of this nature appear at one time to have existed at Thurii (7 (5). 7. 1307 a 29 sq.) and elsewhere (8 (6). 4. 1319 a 6 sqq.). On the other hand, Polybius remarks as to Crete (6. 46. 1, quoted by C. F. Hermann, Gr. Antiqq. 3. § 63. 16), τὴν τε γὰρ χώραν κατὰ δύναμιν αὐτοῖς ἐφιάσιν οἱ νόμοι, τὸ δὲ λεγόμενον, εἰς ἅπειρον κτᾶσθαι. The Licinian Law at Rome probably imposed a limit only on the occupation (*possessio*) of the public land.

19. Λοκροῖς. According to Büchschütz, Besitz und Erwerb, p. 32 n., the Italian Locrians are meant, and the law was probably among those ascribed to Zaleucus. It appears, unlike the rest, to have applied to property generally (*οὐσία*), and not merely to land.

21. ἔτι δὲ κ.τ.λ. It seems better to supply νόμος ἐστὶ from 17, 19 with διασώζειν than to supply some word from καλύουσιν (19) with the opposite meaning of 'enjoin.' Cp. 8 (6). 4. 1319 a 10, ἦν δὲ τό γε ἀρχαῖον ἐν πολλαῖς πόλεσι νενομοθετημένον μηδὲ πωλεῖν ἐξείναι τοὺς πρῶτους κλήρους. A special protection was given in the Lacedaemonian State to the 'original share,' if we may trust Heraclid. Pont. de Rebuspublicis 2. 7, πωλεῖν δὲ γῆν Λακεδαιμονίους αἰσχρὸν νενομίσται· τῆς δ' ἀρχαίας μοίρας οὐδὲ ἔξεστιν. Aristotle approves the discouragement by the Lacedaemonian lawgiver of the sale of landed property (if that is the meaning of ἡ ὑπάρχουσα [γῆ?], c. 9. 1270 a 20: cp. 8 (6). 4. 1319 a 13, τὸ μὴ δανείζειν εἰς τι μέρος τῆς ὑπαρχούσης ἐκάστω γῆς). Pheidon the Corinthian, again, had sought to keep the number of landowners the same. These legislators appear to have endeavoured, like Plato in the Laws, to secure each household in the possession of the original lot. The motive probably was

partly a wish to prevent the impoverishment of old-established households and the civil troubles which were apt to follow, partly a wish to prop up an oligarchical *régime*, for Plato (Rep. 552 A, 556 A) notices prohibitions of alienation as a means, though one too rarely resorted to, of preserving oligarchies, concentration of wealth in a few hands being regarded by him as commonly the cause of their displacement by democracies.

22. καὶ περὶ Λευκάδα, i. e. 'at Leucas to name one instance,' as in 1. 12. 1259 b 8. As to περὶ Λευκάδα, see Bon. Ind. 579 a 29 sqq.

23. οὐ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. The meaning apparently is that men became admissible to office on the strength of half a lot or less, an arrangement suitable enough to an agricultural democracy like Aphytis (8 (6). 4. 1319 a 14 sqq.), but not suitable to an oligarchy, because poor men came to hold office.

29. μᾶλλον γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Cp. Plutarch, Demetr. c. 32, λαμπρὰν τῇ Πλάτωνι μαρτυρίαν διδοὺς διακελευομένη μὴ τὴν οὐσίαν πλείω, τὴν δὲ ἀπληστίαν ποιεῖν ἐλάσσω τὸν γε βουλούμενον ὡς ἀληθῶς εἶναι πλούσιον, ὡς ὃ γε μὴ παύων φιλοπλουτίαν οὗτος οὔτε πενίας οὔτε ἀπορίας ἀπῆλλακται. Plutarch evidently refers to Plato, Laws 736 E: cp. 742 E and Rep. 521 A. Cp. also Sen. Epist. 2, non qui parum habet, sed qui plus cupit, pauper est.

33. παιδείας. A remarkable view, probably suggested by Spartan precedents: cp. 6 (4). 9. 1294 b 21, οἷον πρῶτον τὸ περὶ τὴν τροφὴν τῶν παίδων· ὁμοίως γὰρ οἱ τῶν πλουσιῶν τρέφονται τοῖς τῶν πενήτων, καὶ παιδεύονται τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον ὃν ἂν δύναντο καὶ τῶν πενήτων οἱ παῖδες· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ἐχομένης ἡλικίας, καὶ ὅταν ἄνδρες γίνωνται, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον, οὐδὲν γὰρ διάδηλος ὁ πλούσιος καὶ ὁ πέννης. Aristotle is quite with him in this matter (5 (8). 1. 1337 a 21 sqq.).

36. τοιαύτην ἐξ ἧς. See above on 1257 b 15, and cp. 1267 a 24.

38. ἔτι, for which Spengel and Sus.² would read ἐπεὶ, Sus.³ ὅτι?, seems defensible. The meaning is—'besides, you need to deal with office in addition to equalizing property, for στάσις is occasioned not only, as Phaleas and his school think, by questions about property, but also by questions about office. It is as great a trial to a man of high capacity to have to share office equally with his inferiors as it is to a poor man to be starved.' Compare Jason's saying (3. 4. 1277 a 24), that it was starvation to him not to be a tyrant. Cp. also Stob. Flor. 45. 21, ἐκ τῶν κοινῶν Ἀριστοτέλους διατριβῶν· αἱ πλείους στάσεις διὰ φιλοτιμίαν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι γίνονται, περὶ τιμῆς γὰρ οὐχ οἱ τυχεῖς, ἀλλ' οἱ δυνατώτατοι διαμφισβητοῦσι.

1267 a. 1. οἱ δὲ χαρίεντες, 'men of education': cp. 1267 a 39, and see L. Schmidt, Ethik der alten Griechen 1. 334 sq. Cp. also Eth. Nic.

1. 3. 1095 b 22, οἱ δὲ χαρίεντες καὶ πρακτικοὶ τιμὴν [προαιρουμένοι], and Pol. 6 (4). 13. 1297 b 9, where this quality in the rulers is treated as a security that they will not plunder or outrage the ruled.

ἐν δὲ ἡ κ.τ.λ. Hom. Il. 9. 319 is quoted to support by the authority of Homer what has just been said as to the feeling of οἱ χαρίεντες. Cp. Plato, Laws 756 E, δοῦλοι γὰρ ἂν καὶ δεσπόται οὐκ ἂν ποτε γένοιτο φίλοι, οὐδὲ ἐν ἴσας τιμαῖς διαγορευόμενοι φαῦλοι καὶ σπουδαῖοι: Eth. Eud. 2. 3. 1221 b 1: and the remarks on constitutions placed by Isocrates in the mouth of Nicocles (Isocr. Nicocles § 14 sqq.).

2. οὐ μόνον δ'. Here there is a transition from *στασιάζουσιν*, 1266 b 38 to *ἀδικοῦσιν*, 3—from men as citizens to men as moral beings. As inequality of property is not the only cause of civil discord, so neither is it the only cause of *ἀδικία*. Aristippus had apparently anticipated a part of what Aristotle says in the passage which follows: see Plutarch, de Cupiditate Divitiarum, c. 3. 524 A sqq., a passage which I do not notice in Mullach's collection of the Sententiae et Apophthegmata of Aristippus in the Fragmenta Philosophorum Graecorum. Compare also Cic. de Offic. 1. 7. 24—1. 8. 26 (referred to by Giph. p. 217).

3. διὰ τὰν ἀναγκαῖα ἀδικοῦσιν, ὧν ἄκος. 'Ἄκος τινός, genetivo vel id significatur quod avertitur, Pol. 7 (5). 8. 1308 b 26, vel id quod expetitur, Pol. 2. 7. 1267 a 3, 9: 7 (5). 5. 1305 a 32' (Bon. Ind. 26 b 50 sq.). For this second meaning of the word ἄκος ('a means of obtaining'), see Liddell and Scott s.v., and cp. 7 (5). 5. 1305 a 32, ἄκος δὲ τοῦ ἢ μὴ γίνεσθαι ἢ τοῦ γίνεσθαι ἦτορ τὸ τὰς φυλάς φέρειν τοὺς ἀρχοντας, and 2. 11. 1273 b 23, φάρμακον τῆς ἡσυχίας. Bonitz, it will be seen, explains ἄκος as 'a means of obtaining' both here and in 9, and there is much to be said for this view. But on the whole I incline, with the commentators generally, to give it in these two passages its more usual meaning of 'remedy' (Sus. 'Gegenmittel'). ὧν will then refer, not to τῶν ἀναγκαίων, but to ἀδικημάτων, which must be supplied from ἀδικοῦσιν. The view of Phaleas was probably shared by many: cp. 6 (4). 8. 1293 b 38 sq. and [Xen.] Rep. Ath. 1. 5.

4. ὅποτε . . . πεινῇ explains ὧν ἄκος: 'the result being that no one will be driven to steal clothes by cold and hunger.'

5. ὅπως . . . ἐπιθυμῶσιν. Χαίρεισι is introduced here and not before, because when a man satisfies an absolute need, though he feels pleasure (see de Part. An. 4. 11. 690 b 26—691 a 5), yet pleasure is not his aim. Compare the distinction drawn between μὴ ἀλγεῖν and χαίρειν in Eth. Eud. 2. 8. 1225 a 24: cp. also Rhet.

1. 12. 1372 b 24, ἀδικοῦσι δὲ τοὺς τοιούτους καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα τοὺς ἔχοντας ἄν αὐτοὶ ἐνδεεῖς ἢ εἰς τἀναγκαῖα ἢ εἰς ὑπεροχὴν ἢ εἰς ἀπόλαυσιν.

ἐὰν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. This passage would be much simplified, if ἀδικοῦεν were substituted for ἐπιθυμοῖεν in 8, but it is perhaps possible to elicit a satisfactory sense from it as it stands. Taking it as it stands, I incline to translate as follows—‘for if men have a desire going beyond mere necessities, they will commit wrongful acts to cure it: nay, not only to cure a desire of this nature, for they may desire superfluities with a view to experiencing painless pleasures.’ I follow Lamb. and Bern. in my rendering of διὰ ταύτην. Sepulveda translates these words ‘medendi gratia,’ apparently interpreting ταύτην as = ἰατρειάν, not τὴν ταύτης ἰατρειάν: it would also be possible to supply τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν with ταύτην. For μείζω ἐπιθυμίαν τῶν ἀναγκαίων (i. e. μείζω ἐπιθυμίαν τῆς ἐπιθυμίας τῶν ἀναγκαίων), cp. c. 10. 1272 a 28, χεῖρον τῶν ἐφόρων (i. e. χεῖρον ἢ τὰ τῶν ἐφόρων), and see Jelf, Gr. Gr. § 781 d. For οὐ τοῖνυν, cp. Xen. Anab. 7. 6. 19, συνεπόμενυ μηδὲ ἂ οἱ ἄλλοι στρατηγοὶ ἔλαβον εἰληφέναι, μὴ τοῖνυν μηδὲ ὅσα τῶν λοχαγῶν ἔνοι, and Demosth. de Cor. cc. 107, 244. What pleasures are meant by ‘painless pleasures,’ appears from Eth. Nic. 10. 2. 1173 b 16, ἄλυτοι γὰρ εἰσιν αἱ τε μαθηματικαὶ καὶ τῶν κατὰ τὰς αἰσθήσεις αἱ διὰ τῆς ὁσφρήσεως, καὶ ἀκροάματα δὲ καὶ δράματα πολλὰ καὶ μῆμαι καὶ ἐλπίδες and de Part. An. 1. 5. 645 a 7 sq. Isocrates (ad Demon. §§ 46–47) is already acquainted with the distinction. It has long been noticed that painless pleasures are elsewhere said by Aristotle not to be accompanied by desire (Eth. Nic. 7. 13. 1152 b 36, ἐπεὶ καὶ ἄνευ λύπης καὶ ἐπιθυμίας εἰσὶν ἡδοναί, οἷον αἱ τοῦ θεωρεῖν ἐνέργειαι, τῆς φύσεως οὐκ ἐνδεοῦς οὐσης: 3. 14. 1119 a 4, μετὰ λύπης ἢ ἐπιθυμίας: Eth. Eud. 2. 10. 1225 b 30, ἔτι ἐπιθυμία μὲν καὶ θυμὸς αἶε μετὰ λύπης). Still an ἐπιθυμία τοῦ θεάσασθαι is spoken of in Rhet. 1. 11. 1370 a 25 sq., and an ἐπιθυμία μαθήσεως in Eth. Nic. 3. 3. 1111 a 31. But here perhaps the question hardly arises, even if we retain ἐπιθυμοῖεν, for the desire spoken of in the passage before us is not a desire for the painless pleasures themselves, but for the superfluities through which men sometimes mistakenly seek them. If this is so, it would seem to be unnecessary to adopt any of the emendations of the words καὶ ἄν ἐπιθυμοῖεν which have been suggested with the view of meeting this difficulty, among which may be noticed that of Schneider, καὶ ἄν ἐπιθυμῶσιν, that of Bojesen, whom Sus. follows, καὶ ἄνευ ἐπιθυμῶν or καὶ ἀνεπιθύμητοι (cp. Clem. Al. Strom. vii. p. 742 A, B), and that of Bernays, who omits ἄν ἐπιθυμοῖεν. With the account here given of the motives of ἀδικία, compare (in addition to the passage from the Rhetoric

quoted above) Pol. 2. 9. 1271 a 16 sq.: 6 (4). 11. 1295 b 10 sq.: Isocr. de Antidosi, § 217 (cp. Aristot. Rhet. 2. 23. 1398 a 29 sqq.): Plato, Laws 870: Cic. de Rep. 2. 41. 68. 8.

9. τί οὖν ἄκος τῶν τριῶν τούτων; For Bonitz' interpretation of ἄκος, see above on 3. The last three words have been translated in many different ways. Lamb. supplies 'malorum,' Vict. 'fomitum,' Sepulv. and Giph. 'cupiditatum.' Susemihl translates, 'in allen diesen drei Fällen': Bernays, 'für diese drei Klassen.' Others supply ἀδικημάτων, and, I incline to think, rightly (cp. 16, πρὸς τὰς μικρὰς ἀδικίας βοηθητικός). If we take this view, the translation will be, 'what then is the remedy for these three kinds of wrong-doing?' The three are (1) wrong-doing for the sake of absolute necessities; (2) wrong-doing for the sake of superfluities with a view to curing painful desire and obtaining pleasure; (3) wrong-doing for the sake of superfluities with a view to obtaining painless pleasure.

11. δι' αὐτῶν χαίρειν. We expect, not δι' αὐτῶν χαίρειν, but χαίρειν ταῖς ἀνευ λυπῶν ἡδοναῖς: Aristotle, however, seems to say that those seekers for painless pleasure who desire to be independent of others for their enjoyment will ask the aid of philosophy, for all other pleasures save that of philosophy (αἱ ἄλλαι, 12) presuppose the assistance of other human beings. He does not absolutely deny that ὑπερβολαί are a means to some sorts of painless pleasure; a tyrant, for instance, may use his power over other men to provide himself with exquisite sculpture or music; but those seekers after painless pleasure who desire to be independent of others will go to philosophy for it (cp. Eth. Nic. 10. 7. 1177 a 27 sqq.).

12. ἐπεὶ ἀδικοῦσί γε κ.τ.λ. 'Other remedies, in short, besides that of Phaleas, are necessary, for ...' For ἐπεὶ ... γε, cp. 1. 5. 1254 b 34: 1. 6. 1255 a 19. In the passage before us ἐπεὶ ... γε introduces an evident fact adduced in support of the unexpressed conclusion to which the preceding sentences point—the conclusion that to remove the occasions of ἀδικία something more than a due supply of the necessities of life is requisite—training, in fact, both moral and intellectual. Both these kinds of training tend to wean the mind from the pursuit of excess—τὰς ὑπερβολάς, i. e. an excess of wealth, power, glory, and the like (4 (7). 1. 1323 a 37-38), or an excess of other goods such as wine and good living (Eth. Nic. 7. 14. 1154 a 15 sqq., referred to by Congreve)—the one by limiting the desires, the other by affording pleasures attainable without command over other human beings; and it is through a craving for excess that men come to commit the worst offences. Men become tyrants, for instance, when they are not content with

the honours and emoluments of citizen-rulers (Eth. Nic. 5. 10. 1134 b 7); and how great the tyrant's crime is may be gathered from the high honours paid to the tyrannicide.

14. καὶ αἱ τιμαί, 'the honours, as well as the crime the punishment of which they reward.'

15. For the place of οὐ, see Bon. Ind. 539 a 5 sqq.

17. ὁ τρόπος τῆς Φαλέου πολιτείας. Cp. c. 5. 1264 a 11.

ἔτι κ.τ.λ. Compare the criticism passed on Plato's Laws in c. 6. 1265 a 18 sqq. Ephorus had already insisted that it is as necessary for a State to possess the qualities which enable it to repel attacks from without as the internal concord (ὁμόνοια) which secures it from στάσις (Diod. 7. 14. 3-4: cp. Ephor. ap. Strab. p. 480), and Aristotle in a similar spirit (cp. Pol. 6 (4). 4. 1291 a 6 sqq.) now goes on to point out that it is necessary to take considerations of national security into account, not only in framing the constitution, but also in reference to the question of the amount of property to be possessed by the members of the State, for if this is too small—and perhaps Aristotle imputes to Phaleas a leaning in this direction, though the latter had said nothing definite—the State will hardly be a match for States similar to itself, while, if the amount is too large, States superior to it in power may well be tempted to attack it. (It is interesting to notice that a Greek State might be too poor to resist attack. In Aristotle's day (4 (7). 11. 1331 a 1 sqq.) the matériel of war had become elaborate and costly.) Thus an ὅρος τῆς οὐσίας is necessary, as he had already said in 1266 b 27; he returns, in fact, to this point, reasserting it on grounds of national security, whereas in the intervening passage, 1266 b 28-1267 a 17, his aim had been to show the insufficiency of even a correct ὅρος τῆς οὐσίας without a correct education. Down to 1267 a 37 Aristotle in criticising Phaleas seeks in the main to point out the latter's errors of omission—he ought to have regulated τεκνοποιία, to have fixed an ὅρος τῆς οὐσίας, to have satisfied the Few as well as the Many, to have instituted a given kind of education, to have taken the security of the State into account: in 1267 a 37-1267 b 9, on the other hand, he deals directly with Phaleas' panacea for στάσις, and points out how small is its value, indicating at the same time the true remedy. Thus the passage 1267 a 17-37 finds an appropriate place where it stands in the text: to place 1267 a 37-b 13 before it (with Susemihl) as an alternative version of 1266 b 38-1267 a 17 (which it does not seem to me to be) is, surely, to disturb the sequence of the criticisms contained in this chapter. For τὰ πρὸς αὐτοὺς πολιτεύονται καλῶς,

cp. Polyb. 6. 46. 8, ἡ καὶ Λακεδαιμονίους . . . κάλλιστα τῶν Ἑλλήνων τὰ πρὸς σφᾶς αὐτοὺς πολιτεύεσθαι καὶ συμφρονεῖν.

19. For the contrast implied in καὶ πρὸς τοὺς γειτνιώντας καὶ τοὺς ἔξωθεν πάντας, cp. 4 (7). 11. 1330 b 35 sqq. and Thuc. 1. 80. 3.

22. τὰς πολιτικὰς χρήσεις. Vict. 'domesticos usus': cp. 5 (8). 6. 1341 a 8, where, as here, it is contrasted with πολεμικάς (the sense of πολιτικόν in c. 6. 1265 a 22 is quite different). Here (cp. 18) the political activities of fellow-citizens in relation to each other are referred to. The citizens of a State must possess a due amount of property (3. 12. 1283 a 17: cp. also 2. 11. 1273 a 24).

24. τοσοῦτον . . . ὧν. See Vahlen, Aristotel. Aufsätze 2. 21 n., and cp. 1266 b 36. Thasos was a case in point. As to its wealth, see Boeckh, Public Economy of Athens E. T. p. 311. 'The Thasians were compelled to defend their gold mines on the continent from the cupidity of Athens, which perhaps claimed them as a conquest won from the Persians' (Thirlwall, Hist. of Greece, 3. 6). Samos also suffered for its fertility in a similar way (Strabo, p. 637).

οἱ πλησίον καὶ κρείττους. Cp. 1266 a 20, οἱ ἐκ τῶν μεγίστων τιμμάτων καὶ βελτίους, and 1263 b 5, τὸ χαρίσασθαι καὶ βοηθῆσαι.

25. ἀμύνειν with the acc. seems to occur but rarely in the writings of Aristotle (see Bon. Ind. s.v. and Mr. Ridgeway, *Cambr. Philol. Trans.* 2. 132), but it is less infrequent in those of Plato (see Ast, *Lexicon Platon.* s.v.).

28. μὲν οὖν ('it is true,' as in 1265 a 17) prepares the way for, and lends increased emphasis to, δεῖ δὲ κ.τ.λ. I take the meaning of the passage to be—'Abundant wealth is advantageous' (why it is so, we learn from 1267 a 22–24: cp. 3. 12. 1283 a 17 sq.: 6 (4). 4. 1291 a 33): 'therefore, let us ask abundant wealth for the State, only stopping short of that excessive amount which suffices of itself to attract attack on the part of stronger States, apart from any other causes of war.' Cp. Poet. 7. 1451 a 3, ὥστε δεῖ καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν σωμάτων καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ζώων ἔχειν μὲν μέγεθος, τοῦτο δὲ εὐσύνοπτον εἶναι, οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν μύθων ἔχειν μὲν μήκος, τοῦτο δ' εὐμνημόνευτον εἶναι.

31. οὕτως ὥς ἂν κ.τ.λ., 'but only under circumstances under which they would go to war, even if' etc. In the anecdote which follows Aristotle's principle finds illustration and confirmation. The wealth of Atarneus was not out of proportion to its defensibility. It was not considerable enough to lead stronger States, not influenced by other motives for attacking it, to attack it in the hope of gain, for a long continuance of costly operations would be necessary for its

reduction. Atarneus was a renowned stronghold, like Pergamon in the same region. As to Eubulus, see Boeckh, *Hermias von Atarneus* (Ges. Kl. Schriften, 6. 183 sqq.), and *Sus.*², Note 247. He was a wealthy Bithynian money-changer, who had got possession of two strong places on the coast of Asia Minor, Atarneus and Assos, at a time when the Persian Empire was falling to pieces. The crisis in his fortunes referred to here must have occurred before he was succeeded—about 352 B.C. according to Boeckh, but certainly not later than 347 B.C.—by Hermias. Boeckh places it as early as 359 B.C. (Ol. 105. 1), when the Persians under Autophradates were operating in this region against the revolted satrap Artabazus. Aristotle, being a friend of Hermias, would be well acquainted with the history of Eubulus, and also with the neighbourhood of Atarneus. For other illustrations derived from this part of the world, see the references in Bon. Ind. 662 b 61 sqq. Autophradates remained a conspicuous Persian leader till 332 B.C., when he disappears from the scene (A. Schäfer, *Demosthenes und seine Zeit*, 3. 169).

35. ἦδη, 'on the spot.'

37. ἔστι μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. Μὲν οὖν, which is here answered by οὐ μὴν, introduces a summing up on the merits of Phaleas' scheme, which is no longer criticised for not being accompanied by other measures, but considered in itself. Susemihl regards ἔστι, 37-ἀδικῶνται, 1267 b 8, as a repetition or alternative version of 1266 b 38-1267 a 17, but it hardly seems to repeat 1267 a 2-17, for this passage refers to ἀδικία, not to στάσις, and its teaching does not agree with 1266 b 38-1267 a 2, for there we are led to infer that equality of property would be a remedy for στάσις, so far as the mass of men are concerned, whereas here we are told that the desires of the many are boundless and that a mere sufficiency will fail permanently to satisfy them.

39. ἄν . . . ἄν. See Bon. Ind. 41 a 59 sq., who compares 3. 9. 1280 a 36: 6 (4). 4. 1290 b 4. The doubled ἄν gives emphasis: see Prof. Jebb on *Soph. Oed. Tyr.* 862, 1438.

40. καὶ φαίνονται. Not only are the χαρίεντες likely to feel irritation, but as a matter of fact they visibly make attacks, etc. (cp. c. 3. 1262 a 18).

1267 b. 1. ἀπληστον. Cp. *Isocr. de Pace*, § 7, where Solon, *Fragm.* 13. 71 sqq. is in the writer's mind.

2. διωβολία. The form found in Attic Inscriptions is διωβελία (so τοῦ ἐπωβελία, ἡμιοβέλιον, ὀβελίσκος, ὀβελεία), though they have τριώβολον, πεντώβολον, δεκάβολον, and the old form ὀβελός only once (and that before B.C. 444) takes the place of the usual ὀβολός (Meisterhans,

Grammatik der attischen Inschriften, p. 9). All the MSS., however, have *διωβολία* here. See Boeckh, Public Econ. of Athens E. T. p. 216 sqq., where the fact noticed by Aristotle is fully illustrated. Here, as is often the case in the Politics, Athens is glanced at without being referred to by name.

πάτριον, 'a settled, traditional thing.'

3. For *ἕως* without *ἄν* with the subj., see Bon. Ind. 307 b 38.

5. *τῶν τοιούτων*, 'the before-mentioned things': i.e. *τοῦ μὴ στασιάζειν πρὸς ἀλλήλους καὶ τοῦ μὴ αἰεὶ δεῖσθαι τοῦ πλείονος* (or *τοῦ μὴ πλεονεκτεῖν*, 7). *Ἀρχή*, which has called forth many emendations, seems to be used in the sense of 'source': cp. 7 (5). 1. 1301 b 4: 7 (5). 7. 1307 a 7: Meteor. 1. 14. 351 a 26, *ἀρχὴ δὲ τούτων καὶ αἴτιον* κ.τ.λ. For the thought, cp. 8 (6). 4. 1319 a 1 sqq.: 6 (4). 13. 1297 b 6 sqq. Compare also Isocr. ad Nicocl. § 16, and the answer of the Pythia to Lycurgus, when he enquired, 'by the establishment of what kind of usages (*ποία νόμιμα*) he would most benefit the Spartans'—*ἰὰν τοὺς μὲν καλῶς ἡγείσθαι τοὺς δὲ πειθαρχεῖν νομοθετήσῃ* (Diod. 7. 14. 2).

6. *ἐπιεικεῖς . . . φαύλους*. Vict. 'honestiores et humiliores.'

13. *ἢ* ('aut certe,' Bon. Ind. 313 a 26) *τάξιν τινα μετρίαν*, 'some moderate maximum.'

14. Is *ἐκ* to be taken with *φαίνεται* (as Vict. takes it) or with *κατασκευάζων* (as Bern.)? Probably with the former. 'It is evident from the legislation of Phaleas that he constructs his State (or citizen-body) on a small scale': cp. Meteor. 2. 2. 354 b 15, *ἐκ ταύτης δὴ τῆς ἀπορίας καὶ ἀρχῇ τῶν ὑγρῶν ἔδοξεν εἶναι καὶ τοῦ παντὸς ὕδατος ἢ βάλαττα*. For *τὴν πόλιν* (Vict. 'ordo civium'), cp. c. 8. 1267 b 30 and 3. 1. 1274 b 41.

15. Phaleas seems to have been as unfavourable to the *τεχνίται*—a far wider term than our 'artisans,' for we hear of *τεχνίται* who were favourites of tyrants, 7 (5). 11. 1314 b 4—as Hippodamus was the reverse. Hippodamus, himself one of the class, brings them within the citizen-body (c. 8. 1267 b 32); Phaleas makes them public slaves. The *βάνανσοι τεχνίται*, as we learn from 3. 5. 1278 a 6 sq., were in early times in not a few States either slaves or aliens, and this continued to be the case to a large extent down to the time of Aristotle. But Phaleas wished them to be public slaves. We do not learn why he proposed this. When Xenophon proposed in the *De Vectigalibus* (4. 23) that the Athenian State should invest in 1200 public slaves, and let them out for service in the mines of Laurium, his aim was to increase the revenue of the State. The scheme of Phaleas would obviously have this effect,

for it would secure the State a monopoly of skilled labour, but whether the object of Phaleas was to enrich the State, is perhaps doubtful. More probably, he wished to keep down an aspiring class, the members of which often acquired considerable wealth (3. 5. 1278 a 24) and would be likely to overshadow or even to buy up his cherished class of small landowners, to say nothing of the difficulty of fixing a maximum to their income. Aristotle, we see, recoils from the strong measure of making all *τεχνῖται* public slaves, but he seems to be willing that *οἱ τὰ κοινὰ ἐργαζόμενοι* (cp. 8 (6). 7. 1321 a 36, *κατασκευάζειν τι τῶν κοινῶν*) should be so. Does this mean 'all workers on public land, buildings, and property' or 'all *τεχνῖται* employed on public property'? It is not clear: perhaps the latter is the more probable interpretation, though, as a matter of fact, Aristotle does make the cultivators of the public land in his own ideal State public slaves (4 (7). 10. 1330 a 31). In any case he adds the proviso that even this measure must be carried into effect in a certain way, if it is to have his approval. Diodorus describes (11. 25. 2 sqq.) how the cities of Sicily, and especially Agrigentum, employed the multitude of Libyan and Carthaginian captives taken after Gelon's victory at Himera in all sorts of public works (*αἱ δὲ πόλεις εἰς πίδαας κατέστησαν τοὺς διαιρεθέντας αἰχμαλώτους καὶ τὰ δημόσια τῶν ἔργων διὰ τούτων ἐπεσκεύαζον κ.τ.λ.*). The work was no doubt cheaply executed, and this would be one of the advantages of employing public slaves for this purpose. Another would be that work would be executed more rapidly and efficiently than if, in accordance with the usual method, a contractor (*ἐργολάβος*) was employed: see C. F. Hermann, Gr. Ant. 3. § 42. 8 (ed. 2). Plato, it may be noted, includes *ἐργολάβοι* among the indications of a *φλεγμαίνουσα πόλις* (Rep. 373 B). On the system of *ἐργολαβεία* or *ἐργωνία*, see C. F. Hermann, Gr. Ant. 3. § 69. 15 (ed. 2), or in the later edition by Thalheim, Rechtsalt. p. 99. 1, and Dittenberger, Sylloge Inscr. Gr. 2. 481 sqq., 507 sqq. (inscr. 353, 367). The scheme of Diophantus would no doubt be unpopular with the many citizens of Athens who were *τεχνῖται* (Büchschütz, Besitz und Erwerb, pp. 325-8), and it probably came to nothing (*κατεσκευάζεν*, 18). Whether the Diophantus here referred to is the well-known Athenian statesman of the time of Demosthenes (as to whom, see A. Schäfer, Demosthenes und seine Zeit, 1. 11. 1: 1. 182), is quite uncertain. Schömann (Griech. Alterth. 1. 365) thinks not.

16. ἀλλ' εἴπερ κ.τ.λ. I see no cause for any change in the text. ὅς, which Bekker, following Morel, inserts before *Διόφαντος*, 18,

rests on no MS. authority and can probably be dispensed with. Aristotle's intention perhaps was to make the sentence run *καθάπερ ἐν Ἐπιδάμῳ τε καὶ Ἀθήνῃσι*, but then he remembered that the scheme of Diophantus remained unexecuted.

22. Ἰππόδαμος δὲ Εὐρυφῶντος Μιλήσιος. Hesychius calls him C. 8. Εὐρυβόοντος παῖς: Photius, Εὐρυκόοντος Μιλήσιος ἢ Θούριος (C. F. Hermann, de Hippodamo Milesio, p. 4 sq.). He was one of the colonists of Thurii. We notice that the name of Hippodamus' father is here mentioned, whereas in c. 7. 1266 a 39 Phaleas is simply described as Φαλέας ὁ Χαλκηδόνιος. Were there other Milesians who bore the name Hippodamus?

τὴν τῶν πόλεων διαίρεσιν, 'the division of cities into streets' or 'quarters': Bern. 'den Städtebau mit getheilten Quartieren.' Diodorus thus describes the laying-out of Thurii, which was done under the direction of Hippodamus—τὴν δὲ πόλιν διελόμενοι κατὰ μὲν μήκος εἰς τέτταρας πλατείας . . . κατὰ δὲ τὸ πλάτος διῶλον εἰς τρεῖς πλατείας . . . ὑπὸ δὲ τούτων τῶν στενωπῶν πεπληρωμένων ταῖς οἰκίαις ἢ πόδῃς ἐφαίνετο καλῶς κατεσκευάσθαι (Diod. 12. 10. 7). For the use of the word πλατεία here, compare the phrase ξενικὴ ὁδός (Hoeck, Kreta 3. 452), which Hoeck explains as 'a strangers' quarter.' C. F. Hermann (de Hippodamo Milesio, p. 52) thinks that when Meton is made in the Aves of Aristophanes (941 sq.) to design an agora at the centre of his city with straight streets converging on it from every point, he reproduces the Hippodameian agora at the Peiraeus, but this seems doubtful, for then Meton's scheme would be nothing new, and much of the point would be lost. Besides, Thurii was not thus laid out.

23. κατέτεμεν. See C. F. Hermann, *ibid.* p. 47. The word is used of 'cutting up' a surface with roads, trenches, or mines: so Strabo (p. 793) says of Alexandria, *ἅπαντα μὲν οὖν ὁδοὺς κατατέμνεται ἐκπλατοῖς καὶ ἀρματηλάτοις*. In the passage before us ὁδοῖς is not expressed. A city laid out in Hippodamus' fashion with straight roads was said to be *εὐτομος*, 4 (7). 11. 1330 b 23, 30. This laying out of Peiraeus is not to be confounded with its fortification by Themistocles; it is probably to be referred to the time of Pericles.

24. καὶ περὶ τὸν ἄλλον βίον, 'as well as in his architectural innovations.'

περιττότερος, see note on 1265 a 11. Hippodamus belonged to the stirring generation, active in striking out fresh paths (5 (8). 6. 1341 a 30 sq.), which followed the Persian Wars.

25. περιεργότερον, 'in too studied and overdone a way.' The meaning of the word is well illustrated by its use in a fragment of

Dicaearchus (Fragm. 33 a: Müller, *Fr. Hist. Gr.* 2. 246), *περίεργος γὰρ ἡ τοιαύτη σχηματοποιία καὶ προσποίητος κ.τ.λ.* Cp. also Isocr. ad Demon. § 27, *εἶναι βούλου τὰ περὶ τὴν ἐσθῆτα φιλόκαλος, ἀλλὰ μὴ καλλωπιστής· ἔστι δὲ φιλόκαλος μὲν τὸ μεγαλοπρεπές, καλλωπιστοῦ δὲ τὸ περίεργον.* Hippodamus was probably influenced, as will be shown presently, by the teaching of Ion of Chios, who was himself perhaps influenced by Pythagoreanism; but his peculiarities of dress, etc., seem to be characteristic rather of the individual than of any school of opinion, political or philosophical. The Pythagoreans of Hippodamus' day do not seem to have worn long hair: Diodorus of Aspendus, who apparently lived at and after the time of Aristotle, is said to have been the first Pythagorean to wear it after the fashion of the Cynics (Athen. Deipn. 163 e-164 a, *τῶν πρὸ αὐτοῦ πυθαγορικῶν λαμπρᾷ τε ἐσθῆτι ἀμφιεννυμένων καὶ λουτροῖς καὶ ἀλείμμασι κουρᾷ τε τῇ συνήθει χρωμένων*). Long hair was in Hippodamus' day a mark of Laconism, and it does not surprise us in a Thurian (cp. Philostrat. *Vita Apollon.* 3. 15, quoted by C. F. Hermann, de Hippodamo p. 20 n., *κομᾶν δὲ ἐπιτηδεύουσιν, ὥσπερ Λακεδαιμόνιοι πάλαι καὶ Θούριοι Ταραντινοὶ τε καὶ Μήλιοι καὶ ὁπόσοις τὸ λακωνίζειν ἦν ἐν λόγῳ*), but the expensive adornment of the long hair of Hippodamus points perhaps rather to his Ionic extraction (cp. Thuc. 1. 6. 3), if it does not remind us of the *Θουριομάντεϊς, ἱατροτέχνας, σφραγιδονυχαργοκομήτας* of Aristoph. *Nub.* 326. His abundant and expensively ornamented robes would recall the Persian costume (Sext. Emp. *Pyrh.* Hyp. 1. 148, *καὶ Πέρσαι μὲν ἀνθοβαφεῖ ἐσθῆτι καὶ ποδῆρει χρῆσθαι νομίζουσιν εὐπρεπὲς εἶναι, ἡμεῖς δὲ ἀπρεπές*), or the Ionian (Tim. *Fr.* 62: Müller, *Fr. Hist. Gr.* 1. 206), or the garment which Zeuxis, a resident at Ephesus, wore at the Olympic festival, into the fabric of which his name was woven in gold letters (Plin. *Nat. Hist.* 35. 62), were it not that they were of cheap material and that he made a point of wearing warm clothing in summer as well as winter, notwithstanding the current proverb, *ἐν θέρει τὴν χλαῖναν κατατρίβεις* (Leutsch und Schneidewin, *Paroemiogr. Gr.* 1. 74). This would seem to have been a purely individual whim, comparable to that of the Sophist Hippias, who would only wear things which he had made himself (Hippias Minor, 368 B sqq.), for if the Cynic Crates (Philemon, *Inc. Fab.* *Fragm.* 53, ap. Diog. Laert. 6. 87)

Τοῦ θέρους μὲν εἶχεν ἱμάτιον δασύ,
 ὡς ἐγκρατὴς ἦ, τοῦ δὲ χειμῶνος ῥάκος,

his crotchet is far more comprehensible than that of Hippodamus. Perhaps, however, like Protagoras (Plato, *Protag.* 321 A), he held that the thick shaggy hides of animals served them as a defence

not only against the cold of winter, but also against the heat of summer, and sought to protect himself in a similar way. Be this as it may, Aristotle had little patience with affectation even in a man like Xenocrates (Athen. Deipn. 530 d, quoted by Bernays, Phokion p. 119), and what he thought of one of these whims of Hippodamus may probably be gathered from Rhet. 3. 7. 1408 a 11, τὸ δ' ἀνάλογόν ἐστιν, εἰ μὴτε περὶ εὐόγκων αὐτοκαθάρως λέγεται μὴτε περὶ εὐτελῶν σεμνῶς, μὴδ' ἐπὶ τῷ εὐτελεῖ ὀνόματι ἐπὶ κόσμος· εἰ δὲ μὴ, κωμωδία φαίνεται, οἷον ποιῇ Κλεοφῶν· ὁμοίως γὰρ ἔνια ἔλεγε καὶ εἰ εἴπειεν ἂν "πότνια σκυή." (Compare the quotation from Strattis in Athen. Deipn. 160 b,

Παραίνεσαι δὲ σφῶν τι βούλομαι σοφόν

ὅταν φακὴν ἔψητε, μὴ 'πιχεῖν μύρον,

and the whole following passage in Athenaeus, and see Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 2. 780.) There was a saying about the people of Miletus—Μιλήσιοι ἀξύνετοι μὲν οὐκ εἰσὶν, δρῶσι δ' ὡς ἂν οἱ ἀξύνετοι (Eth. Nic. 7. 9. 1151 a 9)—which the eccentricities of Hippodamus recall (cp. also Ephor. Fr. 92 Müller). Aristotle must have obtained these details about Hippodamus from some earlier source, but I do not think that there is much reason for doubting the authenticity of the passage. The Greeks were vigilant observers and keen critics of things which seem to us personal trifles (see Mr. Sandys' note on Demosth. contra Steph. 1. c. 68). Hermippus took the trouble to record that Theocritus of Chios criticised the dress of Anaximenes as ἀπαίδευτος (Athen. Deipn. 21 C), and we also hear in the same passage that the grammarian Callistratus in one of his writings found fault with his great contemporary, the Homeric critic Aristarchus, ἐπὶ τῷ μὴ εὐρύθμως ἀμπίχεσθαι, φέροντός τι καὶ τοῦ τοιούτου πρὸς παιδείας ἐξέτασιν. The Socratic Aeschines seems to have been very severe on the dress of Telauges in one of his dialogues (Athen. Deipn. 220 a sqq.). Plato himself reckons it as one of the merits of μουσική (Rep. 425 B), that it teaches men how to dress and wear their hair and carry themselves. Aristotle's object in this curious paragraph probably is in part to prepare the reader for the fancifulness of Hippodamus' constitution, but he also regarded a man's life and character as to some extent a guide to the value of his speculations, in practical philosophy at all events; thus Eudoxus' view that Pleasure is the greatest good gained support from his remarkable temperance (Eth. Nic. 10. 2. 1172 b 15 sqq.: cp. 10. 9. 1179 a 17 sqq., and Rhet. 1. 2. 1356 a 5 sqq.).

26. ἐσθήτος I incline to make dependent on πλήθει καὶ κόσμῳ πολυτελεῖ. C. F. Hermann makes it depend on πλήθει only (de Hippodamo, p. 21 n.), but it seems more natural to carry on both

πλήθει and κόσμῳ πολυτελεί. The combination of costly ornament with clothing of a cheap material is quite in harmony with the other eccentricities attributed to Hippodamus in this passage.

28. λόγιος δὲ καὶ περὶ τὴν ὅλην φύσιν, 'learned in Physics also' (Zeller, Gr. Ph. i. 963. 5), as well as about the laying out of cities: 'learned about Nature as a whole also.' As to the word λόγιος, see Rutherford, New Phrynichus, p. 284. For τὴν ὅλην φύσιν, cp. τῆς ἀπάσης φύσεως, i. 5. 1254 a 31: τῆς ὅλης φύσεως, Metaph. A. 6. 987 b 2 (opp. τὰ ἡθικά): Metaph. A. 8. 1074 b 3, περιέχει τὸ θεῖον τὴν ὅλην φύσιν (cp. Pol. 4 (7). 4. 1326 a 32). To Aristotle the meddling of Hippodamus with ἡ ὅλη φύσις was probably a further sign of περιεργία: cp. de Respir. 21. 480 b 26, τῶν τε γὰρ ἱατρῶν ὅσοι κομφοὶ ἢ περιεργοὶ, λέγουσιν τι περὶ φύσεως καὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς ἐκείθεν ἀξιούσι λαμβάνειν. Was Plato thinking of men like Hippodamus, when he speaks (Rep. 495 C sq.) of ἀνθρωπίσκοι who ἐκ τῶν τεχνῶν ἐκπηδῶσιν εἰς τὴν φιλοσοφίαν, οἱ ἂν κομψότατοι ὄντες τυγχάνωσι περὶ τὸ αὐτῶν τεχνίον?

30. κατεσκευάζε. The imperfect is used with reference to Hippodamus' plans, as being nothing more than plans.

31. μυριάδρον, 'of ten thousand citizens.' Isocrates contrasts Sparta with αἱ μυριάδροι πόλεις, Panath. § 257. Hippodamus evidently wished his State to be large for a Greek State, but not so large as Athens, which had 20,000 citizens.

τρία. In this view of Hippodamus, which may have suggested Plato's classification in the Republic, we can perhaps trace the influence of Egypt: cp. 4 (7). 10. 1329 a 40 sqq.: Plato, Tim. 24 A sqq.: Isocr. Busiris, § 15 sq. Compare also the three classes into which the population of Attica was divided—Eupatridae, Geomori, and Demiurgi. But Hippodamus evidently had a passion for threefold divisions, inherited very probably from Ion of Chios: cp. Isocr. de Antidosi § 268, ὃν (sc. τῶν παλαιῶν σοφιστῶν) ὁ μὲν ἀπειρον τὸ πλῆθος ἔφησεν εἶναι τῶν ὄντων, Ἐμπεδοκλῆς δὲ τέτταρα, καὶ νίκος καὶ φιλίαν ἐν αὐτοῖς, Ἴων δ' οὐ πλείω τριῶν. See vol. i. p. 381 n. and Zeller, Gr. Ph. i. 450. 1. This leaning to the threefold was also Pythagorean: cp. de Caelo i. 1. 268 a 10, καθάπερ γὰρ φασὶ καὶ οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι, τὸ πᾶν καὶ τὰ πάντα τοῖς τρισὶν ὄρισται, and the whole passage down to 268 a 29. That which was divisible into three was held by them to be perfect and continuous. Aristotle himself is inclined to say, τελευτᾷ δ' ἐν τρισὶ πάντα: see note on 1252 b 27 sqq., and cp. Meteor. 3. 4. 374 b 33 sqq. He would not, however, agree that there are only three μέρη πόλεως, or that these are γεωργοί, τεχνίται, and τὸ προπολεμούν: contrast his own enumerations in 4 (7). 8-9 and 6 (4). 4.

33. *καί* explains and limits τὸ προπολεμούν. See note on 1263 a 15.

τὴν χώραν. In most Greek States there was sacred, public, and private land. This was so in Crete, in the Lacedaemonian State (Thirlwall, *Hist. of Greece*, 1. 305), at Athens, etc. Aristotle divides the land of his 'best State' into public (including sacred) and private land, his public land being set apart for the support of the *syssitia* and the worship of the gods, not for the support of the military force, like that of Hippodamus. The public land, here termed *δημοσία*, is called *κοινή* in 36 (cp. 4 (7). 10. 1330 a 10), because it was to be the property of the community (Sus. 'Staatsacker'), and not of private individuals. We are not told why Hippodamus made the soldiers' land public land; perhaps he did so, wishing to keep it more under the control of the State than private land would be—to prevent its alienation, for instance, or its passing into other hands than those of soldiers.

34. *ἰδίαν*. In 3. 4. 1277 b 26 the fem. *ἰδία* is used.

37. It would seem that Hippodamus regarded the office of law as measurable by the action of the law-courts; if the law-courts only checked mutual wrong, law did no more. This would not satisfy Plato or Aristotle, who, unlike the Sophist Lycophron (3. 9. 1280 b 10 sq.), expected law to do something more than protect men from mutual wrong—required it, in fact, to aim at making them good and just. As to the classification of offences here given, C. F. Hermann (*Gr. Ant.* 3. §§ 61–62) traces in Attic law a classification under the three heads of *ὑβρις*, *κακουργία*, and *φόνος*. As to *ὑβρις*, see *Rhet.* 2. 2. 1378 b 23 sqq. and *Rhet.* 1. 13. 1374 a 13 sq., where its nature is explained: see also the remarks of Hug, *Studien aus dem classischen Alterthum*, p. 61. As to the *δίκη βλάβης*, which included all damage, direct or indirect, not falling under some recognized category of offence, see C. F. Hermann, *Gr. Ant.* 3. § 70 and note 9. Mr. Pattison, in his copy of Stahl's edition of the *Politics*, quotes Strabo, p. 702, where Onesicritus, in recording the customs of the Indians of Musicanus' territory, says—*δύσιν δὲ μὴ εἶναι πλὴν φόνου καὶ ὑβρεως· οὐκ ἐπ' αὐτῶ γὰρ τὸ μὴ παθεῖν ταῦτα, τὰ δ' ἐν τοῖς συμβολαίοις ἐπ' αὐτῶ ἐκάστω, ὥστε ἀνέχεσθαι δεῖ εἰάν τις παραβῇ τὴν πίστιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ προσέχειν ὅτῳ πιστευτέον, καὶ μὴ δικῶν πληροῦν τὴν πόλιν*. Compare with this *Pol.* 2. 5. 1263 b 20, and note on 1263 b 21. C. F. Hermann (*de Hippodamo*, p. 29) regards offences against the State and against religion as omitted in Hippodamus' classification, and it would seem that if they are to be included, they must be brought under one or other of his

three heads. A different classification of the subject-matter of laws will be found in Demosth. contra Timocr. c. 192, where *οἱ περὶ τῶν ἰδίων νόμοι* are distinguished from *οἱ περὶ τῶν πρὸς τὸ δημόσιον* (see Hug, Studien, p. 81). Aristotle's own classification of *δικαστήρια*, which is given in 6 (4). 16. 1300 b 18 sqq., throws light on his views as to this subject.

39. *ἐνομοθέτει δὲ κ.τ.λ.* See as to this Supreme Court, vol. i. p. 382 sqq. That a few should judge, as this court would do, of all matters, is treated as an oligarchical arrangement in 6 (4). 16. 1301 a 12: an aristocracy or polity would commit some subjects to all the citizens, others to a few, but here the few were to judge (in appeals at any rate) on all subjects.

1268 a. 2. *φέρειν*, sc. *ᾤετο δεῖν*. 'Deposit' is probably the meaning (Bern. 'einreichen')—cp. *ψηφοφορίας*, and Plato, Laws 753 C—not 'ferri domo' (Vict.), or 'dari unicuique' (Lamb.).

3. *γράφειν* is in the same construction as *φέρειν*. This proposal implies that most people of the class to which dicasts belonged could write. The regulations as to the Ostracism suggest the same conclusion. But then it must be remembered that in either case only a word or two would have to be written, and that in the Ostracism at all events persons unable to write would be allowed to get others to write for them.

τὴν δίκην, cp. *ἐρήμην καταδικάζεσθαι* [sc. *τὴν δίκην*], de Caelo 1. 10. 279 b 10.

4. *κενόν*, sc. *φέρειν πινάκιον*.

τὸ μὲν τὸ δὲ μή, 'wished partly to acquit, partly to condemn.'

τοῦτο διορίζειν, 'to particularize this.'

5. *ἀναγκάζειν*. We see from *οὐδεὶς* in 1268 b 17, that the unexpressed subject of *ἀναγκάζειν* probably is a person or persons, but it is not clear whether we should supply *τὸν νομοθέτην* or interpret with Bern. 'people compel them.'

9. *γίνεσθαι* is dependent on *νόμον ἐτίθει = ἐνομοθέτει*.

ὥς οὕτω κ.τ.λ. See on this passage Dittenberger, *Gött. gel. Anz.*, Oct. 28. 1874, p. 1369 sqq. With him I take Aristotle to mean that Hippodamus proposed this law as a novelty (compare the importance attached to *τὸ ἴδιον* in c. 12), whereas, in reality (*νῦν*, i. e. 'in Wirklichkeit'), says Aristotle, it exists in several States. I do not think Aristotle means that Hippodamus' suggestion may be taken as an indication that no such law then existed, whereas in his own day it existed in several States, for his remark would then possess merely an antiquarian interest and would be out of place where it stands. Besides, the other interpretation suits better

with the use of ὥς with the participle. On ὡν in the sense of 'id quod in re ac veritate est,' see Bon. Ind. 492 a 60 sqq. As to the existence of this law at Athens, see A. Schäfer, Demosthenes und seine Zeit 3. 2. 33, who compares Aristot. Fragm. 428. 1549 a 5 sqq.: Aeschin. in Ctes. c. 154: Isocr. de Pace § 82. It is noticed as a wise law in democratic States in Rhet. ad Alex. 3. 1424 a 34 sqq. It is not clear how if all the fighting class was supported by public land together (doubtless) with its offspring, there should be any need in Hippodamus' State for a separate enactment securing to the children of those slain in war sustenance from the State.

10. παρ' ἄλλοις, 'in other States than that designed by him.'

12. αἵρετούς, 'elected,' not taken by lot—a sign of oligarchy (6 (4). 9. 1294 b 8 sq.). Cp., however, 2. 11. 1273 a 26 sq.

δῆμον δ' ἐποίει κ.τ.λ. This is added, because the word is often used of the poor only, as in c. 6. 1265 b 39 and c. 9. 1270 b 25. Hippodamus might well have meant by it only the γεωργοί and τεχνίται.

13. κοινῶν καὶ ξενικῶν καὶ ὀρφανικῶν, 'public matters, matters relating to aliens, and matters relating to orphans.' For ξενικῶν, Bonitz (Ind. 493 a 42) compares 3. 5. 1278 a 7. Hippodamus would seem to have contemplated the sojourn of aliens in his State—contrast the Lacedaemonian ξηλασία (C. F. Hermann, Gr. Ant. 1. § 27. 14)—and to have provided for magistrates like the Polemarch at Athens (Aristot. Fragm. 388. 1542 b 14 sqq.), charged with their supervision. Ὀρφανοφύλακες and ὀρφανισταί (in the Law of Gortyna, col. 12. 21, ὀρπανοδικασταί) were also known to Greek States (C. F. Hermann, Gr. Ant., ed. Thalheim, Rechtsalt. p. 14. 3), and orphan heiresses were especially cared for (Hdt. 6. 57). Hippodamus' classification, however, brings the supervision of aliens and orphans into unusual prominence: contrast Aristotle's treatment of the subject of magisterial competence in 6 (4). 15. 1299 b 10 sqq. and 8 (6). 8. C. F. Hermann notices the omission of 'res sacrae,' but they are probably included under 'public matters': Hippodamus made a liberal provision for worship (1267 b 35).

16. πρῶτον μὲν seems either not to be taken up at all, or not till οὐ καλῶς δ', 1268 b 4.

τὴν διαίρεσιν. For the acc. after ἀπορῆσαι, cp. Meteor. 2. 2. 355 b 24.

20. γίνονται, i. e. those without arms, the cultivators and artisans. We see from the scolion of Hybrias the Cretan, that the possessor of arms was the lord and master of those who had them not. But

the enslavement of one part of the citizen-body to another is a constitutional solecism: cp. c. 12. 1273 b 37 and 6 (4). 11. 1295 b 25, *βούλεται ἡ πόλις ἐξ ἴσων εἶναι καὶ ὁμοίων ὅτι μάλιστα*.

21. *μὲν οὖν*, I incline to think, introduces, not a correction of *ὥστε γίνονται σχεδὸν δούλοι τῶν τὰ ὅπλα κεκτημένων*, but an inference, as in 1. 1. 1252 a 7: each of the two words retains its own meaning, *μὲν* being answered by *δέ*, 24.

22. *πολιτοφύλακας*. A magistracy bearing this name existed at Larissa (7 (5). 6. 1305 b 29). Its main duty probably was to guard the city against external, and possibly also internal, foes: see *Aen. Tact. Comment. Poliorc.* 1. 3 and 22. 7, where the words *πολιτοφυλακεῖν* and *πολιτοφυλακία* are used. The mention of *στρατηγούς* just before supports the view that this was a military office (see also *Pol.* 8 (6). 8. 1322 a 30-b 1). Sepulveda suggests (p. 51 b) that *πολιτοφύλακες* were to exist in the State of Hippodamus, and it is possible that *strategi* also found a place in it.

23. *μὴ μετέχοντας δὲ τῆς πολιτείας κ.τ.λ.* On the phrase *μετέχειν τῆς πολιτείας*, see the references in *Bon. Ind.* 462 b 26 sqq. It is here used in contradistinction to *κοινωνεῖν τῆς πολιτείας*, though in 27, four lines lower down, it appears to be used in the same sense as this phrase. In line 23 it is implied that, while those who elect to magistracies *κοινωνοῦσι τῆς πολιτείας*, only those who are eligible to the supreme magistracies can truly be said *μετέχειν τῆς πολιτείας*. In 6 (4). 6. 1293 a 3 sqq., however, the distinction between the two expressions is differently drawn, for in that passage *οἱ μετέχοντες τῆς πολιτείας* are those who possess, *οἱ κοινωνοῦντες* those who actually exercise political privileges. The contrast between the Lacedaemonian constitution and that of Hippodamus is probably present to Aristotle's mind, for under the former the ephorship was open to the people, and this helped to recommend the constitution to them (6 (4). 9. 1294 b 29 sqq.). Yet at Carthage the *demos* was propitiated, not in this way, but in another (2. 11. 1273 b 18 sqq.), and the constitution of Solon, the merits of which are often acknowledged by Aristotle, though it opened the dicasteries to all, excluded a large portion of the citizens from office. Even under the fully developed democracy, the Athenian *demos* seems to have willingly left some offices of the highest importance to be filled by those who were fittest to fill them ([*Xen.*] *Rep. Ath.* 1. 3).

25. *ἀλλὰ* introduces a rejoinder from some imagined defender of Hippodamus' scheme, and *τοῦτο δ'* 26 Aristotle's comment in reply.

29. *ἔτι κ.τ.λ.* Hippodamus probably intended, as *Vict.* suggests, that the cultivators should sell food, etc. to the artisans: this would

be a sufficient *raison d'être* for them. This implies, no doubt, that the cultivators will produce enough from their lots to supply both themselves and the artisans, whereas Aristotle questions (42) whether two households could be supported even from the cultivators' and warriors' land together. Still, how else are the artisans to be maintained?

31. καθάπερ, i. e. in the State of Hippodamus (where they have no land) as in others.

33. εὐλόγως, because any social element that contributes to the existence of the State is in a broad sense a part of the State (6 (4). 4. 1290 b 39 sqq.).

34. ἰδίᾳ, 'for themselves.'

36. γεωργήσουσιν, 'are to till the soil': see on this use of the future (cp. ἔσονται, 38) Bon. Ind. 754 b 17 sq.

40. ἀλλότριον, 'alien to the constitution,' and in all likelihood hostile to it (cp. 23 sq.). Hippodamus, however, probably meant the public land to be cultivated by slaves. Aristotle, we notice, does not raise any question as to the mode of cultivating the sacred land, though the same difficulty might arise here also.

42. τό τε πλῆθος κ.τ.λ. 'It will be a difficult matter to produce enough to enable each of them to support as a cultivator two households, and then again, why are not the cultivators to derive directly from their own farms and from the same lots of land at once sustenance for themselves and a supply of food for the fighting class?' Εἰθὺς means 'without any preliminary distinction between public and private land.' Ἄπορον seems to be used in the same sense as in Metaph. Z. 3. 1029 a 33 and Eth. Nic. 1. 4. 1097 a 8, or perhaps as in Plato, Rep. 378 A and 453 D, though Bonitz would appear to explain it as 'deficient,' to judge by the passages with which he groups the passage before us (Ind. 85 b 20). Vict., Lamb., Giph., Sepulveda, and others also translate the word 'too small.' I have rendered γεωργήσῃ δύο οἰκίας 'support as a cultivator two households,' because this rendering seems to be required by the sense, but it is difficult to extract it from the words. Stahr translates 'zwei Haushaltungen zu bestreiten,' but this translation is open to the same objection. Γεωργήσῃ does not suit well with καρπῶν: Spengel, in fact, conjectures πόνων in place of καρπῶν (Aristot. Studien 3. 15), but γεωργήσῃ appears to be the doubtful word. The expression γεωργήσῃ δύο οἰκίας has long been felt to be a very strange one: we fail to find a real parallel to it in such phrases as χορεύειν Φοῖβον, Pind. Isthm. 1. 7 (cp. Soph. Antig. 1151), and if we retain the reading γεωργήσῃ (see critical note), we must

probably seek an explanation of the construction in the use of the cognate accusative. We have *οικεῖν δύο οικίας* in c. 6. 1265 b 26, and it is possible that Aristotle here substitutes *γεωργεῖν* for *οικεῖν* seeing that the phrase *οικεῖν δύο οικίας* (or even *διοικεῖν δύο οικίας*, 4 (7). 10. 1330 a 7) would obviously be inapplicable to the cultivator of whom he is speaking. In 6 (4). 1. 1289 a 1 sqq. we find, if the reading of Π² is correct, *τάξιν ἣν ῥαδίως δυνήσονται κοινωνεῖν*. For *ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς* = *ἀπὸ τοῦ γηπέδου*, see Liddell and Scott s. v. *γῆ* and Bon. Ind. 154 a 39 sq. Or do the words mean 'from the land as a whole'? Bern. would omit *καί* and read *ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς τῶν αὐτῶν κλήρων*, where however *τῆς γῆς* seems superfluous. As to the thought, Comte, on the contrary (Social Statics E. T. p. 130), 'assumes as an average that, under all conditions which are not very unfavourable, the labour of every agricultural family can support at least one other as numerous as itself, if not two or three.' It will be observed that Aristotle takes it for granted that the cultivators will be equal in number to the warriors in the State of Hippodamus, for if the former were more numerous than the latter, one cultivator would not have to maintain two households, and the difficulty anticipated by Aristotle would not arise.

1268 b. 5. *τὸ κρίνειν ἀξιοῦν*. So Π, and though Vet. Int. has 'lex iudicare dignificans,' there is no doubt of the correctness of this reading: cp. 2. 12. 1274 b 11, *ὁ περὶ τὴν μέθην νόμος, τὸ τοὺς νήφοντας συμποσιαρχεῖν*, and 1274 b 19-20. 'Ἀξιοῦν is 'to prescribe' (cp. *φάσκειν*, 1. 13. 1260 b 6), as in 4 (7). 11. 1331 a 3, where it answers to *φάσκοντες*, 1330 b 32.

τῆς δίκης ἀπλῶς γεγραμμένης. Π² read *κρίσεως*: Π¹ *δίκης*, which Sus. adopts. In 18 we have *εἴπερ ἀπλῶς τὸ ἔγκλημα γέγραπται δικαίως*. If we read *κρίσεως* (and perhaps we thus get some additional point from the more marked contrast with *κρίνειν διαιροῦντα*), we cannot well attach to it a different sense from that which it bears in the preceding line, where it seems to mean 'adjudication' or 'judicial decision.' We cannot well interpret the first *κρίσεως* thus, and the second (with Bonitz, Ind. 409 b 60) 'causa,' 'the action.' But if we translate the second *κρίσεως* also as 'the decision,' we must apparently take 'the decision' here as meaning 'the charge to be adjudicated upon.' This is awkward, and it seems better to adopt the reading of Π¹. *Κρίσεως* may well have been repeated by mistake from the preceding line.

ἀπλῶς, 'in absolute terms,' without saying *τὸ μὲν τὸ δὲ μή*, 1268 a 4, or *πῶς μὲν ἔστι πῶς δ' οὐ*. For this was, as is implied here, the special province of the *διαιτητής* (τὸ *διαρεῖν*): cp. Phys. 3. 6. 206 a 12,

ὅταν δὲ διωρισμένων οὕτως μηδετέρως φαίνεται ἐνδέχεσθαι, διαιτητοῦ δεῖ, καὶ ὁῦλον ὅτι πῶς μὲν ἔστι πῶς δ' οὐ, and Rhet. I. 13. 1374 b 19 sq.

6. τοῦτο δ' ἐν κ.τ.λ., 'for this (τὸ κρίνειν διαιροῦντα) is possible in an arbitration, even if there are more arbitrators than one.'

10. μὴ κοινολογῶνται. Vict. 'arbitror, cum verba auctoris attendo, ipsum ostendere voluisse illos nomothetas praecepisse sedilia ipsorum ita aedificari, ut si vellent capita conferre, non possent, communicareque opiniones inter se.' But perhaps we need not go quite so far as this. The object of the prohibition of communication between jurors seems to have been to preserve the secrecy of suffrage (see Shilleto on Demosth. de Falsa Legatione § 265, p. 192 of his edition, and C. F. Hermann, Gr. Ant. I. § 143. 1, who compares Plato, Laws 876 A, ἐν πόλει, ἐν ᾗ δικαστήρια φαῦλα καὶ ἄφωνα, κλέπτοντα τὰς αὐτῶν δόξας, κρύβδην τὰς κρίσεις διαδικάζει). In τιμητοὶ δίκαι, however, where the jurors were left to fix the penalty, communication must have been unavoidable (see C. F. Hermann, Gr. Ant. I. § 143. 11), to say nothing of the 'shouting dicasteries' censured by Plato in the Laws (876 B), the members of which must soon have come to know the opinion of their fellows.

11. ταραχώδης, 'full of perplexity': cp. 5 (8). 2. 1337 a 40, and πολλὴν ἔχει ταραχὴν ('involves much perplexity'), 1268 b 4.

12. ὁ μὲν, Π²: other MSS. μὲν ὁ, a more logical order, but for the displacement of μὲν, see Bon. Ind. 454 a 20 sqq.

ὁ δικάζόμενος, 'he who brings the action, the plaintiff,' as in 3. I. 1275 a 9.

14. ἢ ὁ μὲν πλεόν, ὁ δ' ἔλασσον. These words have been variously interpreted. Bernays translates them 'or whatever larger sum one may select for the plaintiff and whatever smaller sum for the juror': others 'or one juror more than ten and another less.' Susemihl now apparently adopts the rendering of Bernays (Qu. Crit. p. 375). The meaning of the words is doubtful, but perhaps on the whole Bernays' view, which makes them parenthetical, is the one most likely to be correct.

15. καὶ τοῦτον δὴ is right, though Π² have δέ instead of δῆ, for here we have, as in I. 13. 1259 b 32 and 2. 3. 1261 b 23, a transition from particular statements to an universal statement.

μεριοῦσιν, 'divident sententias,' Lamb. followed by Bonitz (Ind. 454 b 30). Is it not rather 'split up the amount' (Schn. 'summam pecuniae divident')? Those who vote part of the amount claimed are apparently contrasted with those who vote all or none. Cp. Philemon, Στρατιώτης (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 4. 27),

Οἱ μὲν ἡρπασάν τι γάρ,
οἱ δ' οὐδέν, οἱ δὲ πάντα.

18. εἴπερ . . . δικάως, 'if the charge has been duly brought in an unqualified form': i. e. if the question which ought to be raised is really an unqualified one. 'Duly,' not 'truly,' for of course if the unqualified charge were true, no one could suppose that the juror who decided that it was so would perjure himself, and the denial of perjury would apply only to a case in which perjury obviously would not occur. For δικάως in the sense of 'properly,' cp. Eth. Eud. 3. 1. 1229 b 34. Aristotle seems to admit by implication that if the charge has been brought in an unqualified form not duly, but otherwise, then the juror, if compelled to give an unqualified verdict, may have to break his oath; he ascribes, however, the perjury thus necessitated, not to the plan of requiring an unqualified verdict from the jury, but to the putting of an improper question.

19. οὐ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. No doubt; and Hippodamus would say at once that the case adduced by Aristotle is not one of those which would create the difficulty he foresees. The kind of case in which he anticipates difficulty is that in which the charge is partially true and partially false (τὸ μὲν τὸ δὲ μὴ, 1268 a 4), and this is not so where a debt of 20 minae is untruly alleged. It is possible that Hippodamus had in view cases in which the issue put to the jury included more charges than one. The indictment of Socrates was of this nature: it ran (Diog. Laert. 2. 40: Xen. Mem. 1. 1)—'Ἀδικεῖ Σωκράτης οὐς μὲν ἡ πόλις νομίζει θεοὺς οὐ νομίζων, ἕτερα δὲ κακὰ δαιμόνια εἰσγούμενος ἀδικεῖ δὲ καὶ τοὺς νέους διαφθείρων τίμημα θάνατος. Suppose that a juror thought that one of these charges was true, but the rest not: was he to say Yes or No to the indictment? The latter would probably be the correct course, yet some might think it not wholly satisfactory. In Socrates' case the three questions ought to have been put separately to the jury, and then the difficulty would not have arisen; but the same evil may well have occasionally assumed subtler forms. No doubt, however, there is much force in Aristotle's plea that the fault lay in the question put to the jury, not in expecting the jury to give an absolute answer. The Roman plan of a 'non liquet' verdict would not have met Hippodamus' difficulty; nor would the form of verdict which the Emperor Augustus adopted in one case (Suet. Aug. c. 33: et cum de falso testamento ageretur, omnesque signatores lege Cornelia tenerentur, non tantum duas tabellas, damnatoriam et absolutoriam, simul cognoscentibus dedit, sed tertiam quoque, qua ignosceretur iis quos fraude ad signandum vel errore inductos constitisset).

21. ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνος ἦδη ἐπιορκεῖ. For the use of ἦδη in this passage, cp. Xen. Hell. 5. 1. 4, τοῦτο γὰρ ἦδη . . . ἀξιολογώτατον ἀνδρὸς ἔργον ἐστίν, and Plato, Gorg. 485 C, ὅταν δὲ δὴ πρεσβύτερον ἴδω ἐτι φιλοσοφοῦντα καὶ μὴ ἀπαλλαττόμενον, πληγῶν μοι δοκεῖ ἦδη δεῖσθαι . . . οὗτος δ' ἀνὴρ. In the passage from Xenophon Sturz, Lex. Xenoph. s. v., translates ἦδη by 'utique' or 'quidem,' but perhaps in all three passages something of the usual meaning of ἦδη is traceable, and we may render that before us 'in him we do arrive at a man who perjures himself.'

22. Athens already awarded special honours to persons who had done great service to the State and their descendants, and even to victors at the four great games (Demosth. in Lept. c. 105 sqq.: see also R. Schöll in *Hermes* 6. 32 sqq.), and Aristotle makes no objection to this; he is himself quite willing to award honours for integrity in office (7 (5). 8. 1309 a 13); but he disapproves of the proposition to award honours to those who claimed to have discovered something advantageous to the State. False accusations, he thought, would thus be encouraged—accusations, for instance, directed against persons deemed to be withholding money from the State or otherwise damaging it. Eubulus appears to have risen to power at Athens by repeated exposures of men who detained or embezzled public money (Schäfer, Demosthenes 1. 175). Aristotle thinks that legislation of the kind desired by Hippodamus might even result in changes of the constitution: thus Theramenes according to Lysias (contra Eratosthen. cc. 68, 70) overthrew the Athenian democracy and laid Athens at the feet of her foes under cover of an assurance that he had made a great and valuable discovery (φάσκων πρᾶγμα εὐρηκέναι μέγα καὶ πολλοῦ ὄξιον). The recommendations of Simonides in Xen. Hiero c. 9 (esp. § 9, εἰ δὲ φανερόν γένοιτο ὅτι καὶ ὁ πρόσοδόν τινα ἀλυπον ἐξευρίσκων τῇ πόλει τιμῆσεται, οὐδ' αὐτὴ ἂν ἡ σκέψις ἀργοῖτο, cp. § 10, ὁ ἀγαθὸν τι εἰσηγούμενος) recall this one of Hippodamus, and are perhaps present to Aristotle's mind. Contrast the view of Diodotus (Thuc. 3. 42. 7) —τὴν δὲ σώφρονα πόλιν [χρῆ] τῷ τε πλείστα εὖ βουλευόντι μὴ προστιθέναι τιμὴν, ἀλλὰ μὴδ' ἐλασσούν τῆς ὑπαρχούσης.

24. ἔχει. Cp. Isocr. Philip. § 68, τὰ μὲν γὰρ τοιαῦτα τῶν ἔργων φθόνον ἔχει καὶ θυσιμένειαν καὶ πολλὰς βλασφημίας.

26. ἄλλο . . . ἑτέραν. See Bon. Ind. 34 b 34 sq.

27. τινες. Very possibly Pythagoreans, for this school held, according to Aristox. Fragm. 19 (Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 2. 278), that it was better μένειν τοῖς πατρίοις ἔθεσιν τε καὶ νόμοις, εἰ καὶ μικρῶ χεῖρω τῶν ἐτέρων εἴη. It was a charge against tyrants that they

altered time-honoured laws (Hdt. 3. 80). The fact, however, that the Greeks used the same word (*κινεῖν*) for the alteration of a law and the development of an art or science, tended to disguise the difference between the two things, and thus Isocrates had said (Evagoras § 7), *ἐπειδὴ καὶ τὰς ἐπιδόσεις ἴσμεν γιγνομένας καὶ τῶν τεχνῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων οὐ διὰ τοὺς ἐμμένοντας τοῖς καθεστῶσιν, ἀλλὰ διὰ τοὺς ἐπαγορβοῦντας καὶ τολμῶντας αἰεὶ τι κινεῖν τῶν μὴ καλῶς ἐχόντων* (compare the remark of the Corinthian orator to the Lacedaemonians in Thuc. 1. 71. 3, *ἀνάγκη δ' ὥσπερ τέχνης αἰεὶ τὰ ἐπιγιγνόμενα κρατεῖν, καὶ ἡσυχάζουσα μὲν πόλει τὰ ἀκίνητα νόμιμα ἄριστα, πρὸς πολλὰ δὲ ἀναγκαζομένοις ἰέναι πολλῆς καὶ τῆς ἐπιτεχνήσεως δεῖ*, which may possibly be in Aristotle's memory here: compare also the view ascribed to Charondas in Diod. 12. 16, to Zaleucus in Stob. Floril. 44. 21, p. 280). Plato provides for the improvement, in course of time, of his legislation in the Laws (769 D), but subject to strict conditions (772 A–D) which almost exclude the possibility of serious changes. See also Polit. 298 E–299 E.

30. *ἐνδέχεται δ'*. Sus., after Spengel, reads *γάρ* in place of *δέ* without MS. authority, but Aristotle occasionally uses *δέ* where we rather expect *γάρ* (e. g. in 3. 9. 1280 a 15, *σχεδὸν δ' οἱ πλείστοι φαῦλοι κριταὶ περὶ τῶν οὐκείων*, where we expect *σχεδὸν γάρ*, and in 8 (6). 7. 1321 a 19, where *ταύτη γάρ* might well take the place of *ταύτη δέ*). Perhaps he adds the words—'and it is not impossible that changes in the laws or constitution may be proposed as a common good'—to anticipate an objection that no revolutionist would proceed in this way (compare the use of *δέ* in 1. 5. 1254 a 36); for it was only those who claimed to have discovered something for the advantage of the community that it was proposed to reward. Theramenes had, in fact, done exactly what Aristotle here says might be done: see note on 22 above.

35. *ἱατρική*, i. e. has improved. This must be elicited from *συνενήνοχεν*.

36. *αἱ τέχναι πᾶσαι καὶ αἱ δυνάμεις*. For the difference between an art, or *ποιητικὴ ἐπιστήμη*, and a 'faculty,' see Cope on Rhet. 1. 4. § 6. 1359 b 12 sqq., where *ῥητορική* and *διαλεκτική* are said to be not *ἐπιστήμαι* but *δυνάμεις*. It is implied in what follows that if *ἡ πολιτικὴ κινεῖται*, this will involve *τὸ κινεῖν τοὺς νόμους*, which are *ἔργα τῆς πολιτικῆς* (Eth. Nic. 10. 10. 1181 a 23).

39. *ἐπ' αὐτῶν τῶν ἔργων*. For this use of *ἐπί*, see Bon. Ind. 268 a 31 sqq.

νόμους. Perhaps unwritten: cp. 1269 a 8. In 42 *νομίμων* is the word used, apparently in the same sense as *νόμοι* here: these

words are interchanged, as Bonitz points out (Ind. 488 a 16 sqq.), in 4 (7). 2. 1324 b 5, 7 also. Much the same thing is said by Thucydides (1. 6. 7, *πολλὰ δ' ἂν καὶ ἄλλα τις ἀποδείξει τοῦ παλαιῶν Ἑλληνικὸν ὁμοίωτροπα τῷ νῦν βαρβαρικῷ διατώμενον*). Popular sentiment, however, with which Isocrates appears to agree (de Antid. § 82), praised most highly the oldest laws, and Aristotle himself often counts the antiquity of an institution or opinion as a point in its favour.

40. *ἐσιδηροφοροῦντο*. Cp. Thuc. 1. 5 sq. where we find both the active and the middle. As to the contrast of Hellenic and barbarian practice in this matter, see Lucian, Anacharsis c. 34.

41. *τὰς γυναῖκας*, i.e. brides, not wives. This custom existed among the Thracians (Hdt. 5. 6). Thirlwall remarks (Hist. of Greece, 1. 175) with respect to Homeric Greece, that 'it does not seem that the marriage contract was commonly regarded in the light of a bargain and sale,' but he adds in a note—'compare, however, Od. 15. 367 and 18. 279 with the constant epithet *ἀλφεσίβοιαι*.' Plato (Laws 841 D) seems to recognize the purchase of brides—*ταῖς μετὰ θεῶν καὶ ἱερῶν γάμων ἐλθούσαις εἰς τὴν οἰκίαν, ὧν ταῖς εἶτε ἄλλῃ ὄψοιεν τρόπῳ κτηταῖς*.

42. *λοιπὰ*, 'still in existence.'

1. *Κύμη*. Which of the cities of this name is meant, is unknown, 1269 a. as also in 7 (5). 5. 1305 a 1.

πλήθός τι, 'a definite number,' as in 3. 1. 1274 b 41. *τῶν αὐτοῦ συγγενῶν* is to be taken with *μαρτύρων*—'witnesses from the number of his own kinsmen.' We are reminded of the practice of compurgation, but compurgators were called by both parties to the suit, they 'swore to the purity and honesty of the oath of their principal,' and they had to be 'possessed of qualities and legal qualifications which should secure their credibility' (Stubbs, Const. Hist. of England 1. 610-1). Some traces of a not very dissimilar custom to that mentioned by Aristotle have been thought to be discoverable in the law of Gortyna—see the recently discovered Gortyna Inscription, col. 2. 37 sqq.: 3. 51: 4. 8, and the comments of Zitelmann (Bücheler und Zitelmann, Das Recht von Gortyn, p. 76-77).

3. *ζητούσι δὲ . . . πάντες*. Cp. 1. 1. 1252 a 2: 2. 5. 1263 b 4: Eth. Nic. 10. 2. 1172 b 36, *ὅτι πᾶσι δοκεῖ τοῦτ' εἶναι φάμεν*.

4. *τοὺς πρώτους*, 'the earliest human beings': cp. Polyb. 4. 20. 7, *τοὺς πρώτους Ἀρκάδων* ('priscos Arcades'): Plato, Tim. 22 A, *Φορωνέως τοῦ πρώτου λεχθέντος*: Antiphon, Tetral. 3. 1. 2, *τοὺς πρώτον γενομένους ἡμῶν*.

5. *εἶτε γηγενεῖς ἦσαν εἴτ' ἐκ φθορᾶς τινὸς ἐσώθησαν*. Here two

current views as to the human race are grouped together—the former enshrined in Greek poetry and literature (Pindar, Nem. 6. 1: Hesiod, Op. et Dies, 108: Plato, Menex. 237 D), and taught by Anaximander (Zeller, Gr. Ph. 1. 209 sq.)—the latter adopted by Plato in the Laws (676 sqq.) and the Timaeus (22 B sqq.). Euripides had already dealt a blow at the ‘earth-born’ myth of man’s origin in his Ion, where Ion says (482), γῆς ἄρ’ ἐκπέφυκα μητρός, and Xuthus rejoins, οὐ πέδον τίττει τέκνα: and Plato (Laws 781 E sqq.) holds that ‘the human race either had no beginning at all and will never have an end, but always will be and has been, or had a beginning an immense time ago’ (Prof. Jowett’s translation). Aristotle himself believed that not only the world (Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 432 sq.), but also mankind (ibid. 508. 1) had existed from everlasting. (See on this subject Dicaearch. Fragm. 3 and 4 (Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 2. 234 sq.), and Bernays, Theophrastos über Frömmigkeit, p. 44 sqq., and Über die unter Philon’s Werken stehende Schrift über die Unzerstörbarkeit des Weltalls, p. 58 sqq.) Thus Aristotle cannot have believed in the ‘earth-born’ theory of man’s origin, though in de Gen. An. 3. 11. 762 b 28 sqq. he thinks it worth while to inquire how γηγενείς can have come into being. The other view, that the earliest known men were the survivors of some vast φθορά was more reconcilable with the doctrine of the eternity of the human race, but Aristotle does not seem to admit universal, or nearly universal, φθοραί. The φθοραί he recognizes are quite partial, arising from some local excess of moisture or aridity (see the interesting discussion of the subject in Meteor. 1. 14). As to the Stoical view, see Zeller, Stoics E. T. pp. 155–160.

Θ. ὁμοίους κ.τ.λ. For ὁμοίους καί, see Bón. Ind. 511 a 21: Vahlen, Beitr. zu Poet. 3. 314: Sus.¹, Ind. Gramm. s. v., who compares 4 (7). 11. 1331 a 3. ‘Similar to ordinary or even’ (Bón. Ind. 357 b 20 sqq.) ‘weak-minded people nowadays.’ Why οἱ πρῶτοι should be so, Aristotle does not explain; but as to the γηγενείς, cp. de Part. An. 2. 4. 650 b 18, συμβαίνει δ’ ἐνὶ γὰρ καὶ γλαφυρωτέραν ἔχειν τὴν διάνοιαν τῶν τοιούτων, οὐ διὰ τὴν ψυχρότητα τοῦ αἵματος, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν λεπτότητα μᾶλλον καὶ διὰ τὸ καθαρὸν εἶναι: τὸ γὰρ γεῶδες οὐδέτερον ἔχει τούτων, and Dio Chrys. Or. 21. 507 R, πατελῶς σκληροὶ καὶ ἄγριοι, τῆς γῆς τὰ τέκνα. As to the survivors of the φθορά, he probably conceived the φθορά as entailing a wholesale destruction of knowledge (cp. Aristot. Fragm. 2. 1474 b 6, [αἱ παροιμίαι] παλαιὰς εἰσὶ φιλοσοφίας ἐν ταῖς μεγίσταις ἀνθρώπων φθοραῖς ἀπολομένης ἐγκαταλείμματα περισσώθεντα διὰ συντομίαν καὶ δεξιότητα: and Metaph. Λ. 8. 1074 b 10 sq.): he also ascribes the progress of the arts to the

favouring influence of time (Eth. Nic. 1. 7. 1098 a 23 sq.: Poet. 4. 1449 a 9—15). Plato had already said that the remnant left by the deluge (in Greece, at all events—Tim. 22 D) would be hill-shepherds or herdsmen ignorant of the arts which flourish in cities (Laws 677 B—678 B), though he draws a favourable picture of their morals and social state (678 E—679 E). Contrast the opposite view of some of the later Stoics: τῶν δὲ νεωτέρων στωικῶν φασὶ τινες τοὺς πρώτους καὶ γηγενεῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων κατὰ πολὺ τῶν νῦν συνέσει διαφέροντας γεγονέναι (Sext. Empir. adv. Phys. 1. 28).

9. ὥσπερ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. 'For, as in relation to the other arts, so in relation to the political [art, and its product, the political] organization it is impossible that everything should be written down with complete precision.' As to αἱ ἄλλαι τέχναι, cp. τὸ κατὰ γράμματα λατρεύεσθαι φαῦλον, Pol. 3. 16. 1287 a 33. It seems to be implied that as written law is necessarily couched in general terms, and human action, which it seeks to guide, is concerned with particulars, it is unlikely that the first form of a law will be as ἀκριβής (cp. Eth. Nic. 2. 2. 1104 a 1 sqq.) as it may be rendered by revision after fuller experience (cp. Plato, Laws 769 D, a passage probably present to Aristotle's mind here: Aristot. Pol. 3. 16. 1287 a 27: Eth. Nic. 1. 7. 1098 a 20, περιγεγράφθω μὲν οὖν τὰγαθὸν αὐτῇ· δεῖ γὰρ ἴσως ὑποτυπῶσαι πρῶτον, εἰθ' ὕστερον ἀναγράψαι et sqq.: Soph. El. 33. 183 b 17 sqq.: Rhet. 1. 1. 1354 b 2). For the omission of περί before τὴν πολιτικὴν τάξιν, Bonitz (Ind. 630 b 2) compares 7 (5). 10. 1311 b 37: Rhet. 2. 18. 1391 b 15, 17: see also below on 1274 b 12. 'Ἡ πολιτικὴ τάξις seems here to include not the πολιτεία only but also laws; it means something more, therefore, than ἡ τάξις τῆς πολιτείας means in Pol. 7 (5). 7. 1307 b 18, and elsewhere (cp. c. 10. 1271 b 40, where ἡ Κρητικὴ τάξις is used in a different sense from τῆς πολιτείας ἡ τάξις, 1272 a 4).

13. ἄλλον . . . τρόπον, i.e. looking not to cases where the law is antiquated and absurd, but to cases where changing it brings little gain and tends to weaken men's respect for law. It appears from 17, that Aristotle feels the same reluctance to disturb measures adopted by magistrates of the State.

17. ὠφελήσεται. See note on 1263 b 28. For the omission of the subject (M^s P¹ wrongly supply τις), see note on 1268 a 5.

19. ψεῦδος δὲ κ.τ.λ. Cp. 3. 16. 1287 a 32 sqq.

21. παρὰ τὸ ἕθος. If we adopt this reading (which is that of the better MSS.) instead of πλὴν παρὰ τὸ ἕθος Bekk., παρὰ will mean 'other than,' or 'except' (cp. 6 (4). 15. 1299 a 18, ἑτερόν τι παρὰ τὰς πολιτικὰς ἀρχάς, and 1. 13. 1259 b 25), and the ἕθος will be

viewed as a kind of *ισχύς*: cp. 3. 15. 1286 b 29, *ισχύν τινα περὶ αὐτὸν ἢ δυνήσεται βιάσθαι τοὺς μὴ βουλομένους πειθαρχεῖν*. For the thought, cp. 7 (5). 9. 1310 a 14 sqq.

τοῦτο, i.e. τὸ ἔθος. Cp. Rhet. 1. 10. 1369 b 6, *ἔθει δὲ (γίνεται), ὅσα διὰ τὸ πολλάκις πεποιηκέναι ποιούσιν*.

23. *ἐτέρους νόμους καινοῦς*. For the order, cp. 1. 2. 1252 b 15-16: de Part. An. 2. 14. 658 a 28, *καθ' ὅλον τὸ σῶμα πρανές*: Pol. 2. 11. 1272 b 26, *αὗται αἱ πολιτεῖαι τρεῖς*. We have, however, in the indictment of Socrates (Xen. Mem. 1. 1: Diog. Laert. 2. 40) *ἕτερα καὶ δαιμόνια* (though in the version of the same indictment given by Plato, Apol. 24 B, *ἕτερα δαιμόνια καινά*). So we find in de Gen. An. 3. 2. 752 b 6, *στόλον μικρὸν ὁμφαλώδη*. In each case, probably, a reason can be discerned for the order in which the words are placed.

24. *εἰ καὶ κινητέοι*, 'if in fact it is allowable to change them': see Riddell, Apology of Plato, p. 168, and compare the use of *εἰ καὶ* in 2. 2. 1261 a 21 and 2. 11. 1273 b 6.

25. Should the laws which embody the constitution be changed? Or sacred laws? Or unwritten laws, such as are referred to in 3. 16. 1287 b 5? Should laws be allowed to be changed even in the case of the best constitution? And is anybody to be permitted to propose a change, or only selected persons? Plato had held (Laws 634 D-E) that only old men should be allowed to draw attention to defects in the laws. Aristotle is, however, perhaps thinking of assigning the right of proposing a change to a specially constituted magistracy.

26. *ταῦτα γὰρ ἔχει μεγάλην διαφοράν*. 'For there is a great difference between these various alternatives.' (See for this expression Bon. Ind. 192 b 13 sqq.) Hence the discussion of the question is likely to take time, and Aristotle drops it.

- C. 9. 29. Aristotle speaks in 4 (7). 14. 1333 b 18 sq. of 'the writers on the Lacedaemonian Constitution' as if there were not a few of them, and describes them as 'admiring the lawgiver because he had trained his citizens to face perils and thus enabled the State to win a wide supremacy.' He names only one of them, Thibron, but Xenophon's work on the subject is also probably present to his mind (see Sus.³, Note 911^{ab}, who refers to Xen. Rep. Lac. 1. 1), besides others which, like that of Critias, have not come down to us. Ephorus had treated of the Lacedaemonian constitution in his history, and he too may possibly be referred to. Aristotle mentions in the chapter before us (1271 a 37) that he was not the first to criticise the arrangements respecting the Admiralty, but it is not

certain whether he means that writers on the constitution had done so. The grounds on which the Lacedaemonian constitution was approved were very various. Hippodamus, like others after him, would praise it for the distinction which it drew between soldiers on the one hand and cultivators and artisans on the other, but it seems to have been commonly commended mainly for two reasons—first, because the system of training which it enforced had given the State empire, and secondly, because it harmonized the claims of the Few and the Many. It was held to be a skilful mixture of all constitutions (2. 6. 1265 b 33 sqq.), and especially of two, democracy and oligarchy (6 (4). 9. 1294 b 14 sqq.). At Sparta rich and poor received the same education in childhood, they dressed alike and fared alike at the public mess-tables. This would please both Phaleas (c. 7. 1266 b 31 sqq.) and Ephorus (ap. Strab. p. 480). Oligarchs and democrats, soldiers and philosophers all found something to commend at Sparta. Socrates commended the obedience to law which gave the State happiness in peace and irresistible strength in war (Xen. Mem. 4. 4. 15). On the other hand, opinions were much divided as to the Helotage (Plato, Laws 776 C sqq.), and other weak points in Lacedaemonian institutions were well known to Thucydides and Isocrates. Aristotle would no doubt be fully acquainted with what had been said on the subject, but he is especially influenced by the views of Plato. Plato is perhaps more favourable to the Lacedaemonian constitution in the Republic than in the Laws. In the Republic he ranks it (with the Cretan) next to the ideal constitution, whereas in the Laws he assigns this place to the constitution described in the dialogue, which differs much from the Lacedaemonian, and if it is true that in the Laws a new merit is discovered in the Lacedaemonian constitution—its mixed and tempered character—it is also true that much is borrowed in this dialogue from Attic legislation.

If we turn to Aristotle's criticisms in the chapter before us, we note first of all that his object is mainly to point out defects, not to give a complete estimate of the constitution. His admiration for Lycurgus is sufficiently proved by his reference to him in 6 (4). 11. 1296 a 20, and by the remark which Plutarch reproduces from the Politics—*δι' ὅπερ καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης ἐλάττωνας σχεῖν φησὶ τιμὰς ἢ προσήκον ἦν αὐτὸν ἔχειν ἐν Λακεδαιμονίᾳ, καίπερ ἔχοντα τὰς μεγίστας ἱερὸν τε γὰρ εἶσθαι αὐτοῦ, καὶ θύουσιν καθ' ἑκάστον ἐνιαυτὸν ὡς θεῷ* (Lycurg. c. 31). In criticising the constitution he takes the word *πολιτεία* in its widest sense and examines the whole social and political organization of the State. Plato had tested the Lacedaemonian constitution by

comparing it either with the ideal constitution or with other actual constitutions of Greece, whereas Aristotle also inquires how far its arrangements fulfil the design of the lawgiver, which was to found an ἀριστοκρατία. This was perhaps the most novel feature of his criticisms. He had included a notice of the Lacedaemonian constitution in his Politics—indeed, he probably repeats in the chapter before us not a little of what he had said in that work—and his studies must have given him an unrivalled knowledge of the subject, but his grasp of the details must not lead us to forget how often he repeats previous criticisms of Plato. Plato had already said that the Lacedaemonian laws aimed only at the production of a single kind of virtue, warlike prowess (Laws 626 A sqq., etc.)—that the Spartans valued external goods such as wealth and honour more than virtue (Rep. 548)—that the Helot type of slavery was wrong (Rep. 469 B sq. : Laws 776 sqq.)—that the lives of the Spartan women were left unregulated by law (Laws 780 E). He so far anticipated in the Laws Aristotle's account of the causes which had thinned the ranks of the Spartan citizens that he makes the lots of land in his State inalienable and indivisible (740 B sqq.), forbids dowries (742 C), restricts the right of bequest (922 E sqq.), and asserts the claims of relatives both in relation to inheritances and in the disposal of orphan heiresses (924 D sqq.). On the other hand, his attention does not seem to have been called to the mischievousness of the Lacedaemonian law by which the enjoyment of political rights was made dependent on the payment of a quota to the syssitia. Nor does he criticise the Lacedaemonian Kingship, Senate, and Ephorate, though we observe that he does not seem to adopt any of these institutions in the Laws.

30. 860. The organization of slavery in the Lacedaemonian State is apparently criticised in what follows as being by no means the best possible; the γυναικῶν ἀνεσις, on the other hand, as not only wrong from an ideal point of view but also as not in accordance with the spirit of the constitution (1269 b 12-14). The διαίτα τῶν ἐφόρων (1270 b 31) and the φιδία (1271 a 31) are criticised on the latter ground. In 1271 a 41 sqq. we find a criticism of the ὑπόθεσις of the constitution which may perhaps be brought under the first of the two heads, though the ὑπόθεσις itself can hardly be said νενομοθετησθαι (32). What does Aristotle consider the ὑπόθεσις of the Lacedaemonian constitution to be? Probably he views it as an ἀριστοκρατία (i. e. as a mixture of ἀρετή and δῆμος) organized πρὸς τὸ κρατεῖν: cp. 1269 b 19-20: 1271 b 2-3: 4 (7). 2. 1324 b 7 sqq.: 2. 11. 1273 a 4, πρὸς τὴν ὑπόθεσιν τῆς ἀριστοκρατίας καὶ τῆς πολιτείας: 6 (4).

7. 1293 b 15 sqq. Yet, as Sus.² (Note 1262) points out, Aristotle seems to speak in 6 (4). 9. 1294 b 14 sqq. as if the Lacedaemonian constitution were a polity, i.e. a combination of oligarchical and democratic elements. As in the chapter on Phaleas, so here Aristotle begins with subjects connected with the primary elements of the State—slavery, the household, property, population, and the like—and passes on from them to constitutional questions.

34. For the omission of *πολεμ*, see note on 1266 b 1. We see from Plato, *Laws* 831 C sqq., that something more than slavery—freedom from the spirit of money-getting—is necessary to secure leisure to a State. In illustration of the difficulty of determining how the citizens of a State may best be secured leisure from necessary work, Aristotle refers to three slave-systems, in two of which the slaves had attacked their masters, while in the third, according to him, a similar catastrophe was only warded off by fortuitous circumstances. These three slave-systems were especially conspicuous and famous (Plato himself refers to two of them in entering on the subject of slavery, *Laws* 776 C sqq., a passage present to Aristotle's mind here); and it is perhaps for this reason that Aristotle regards their failure as proving the difficulty of the subject. It is not impossible, however, that they enjoyed a good deal of credit in some quarters: we see from the passage of the *Laws* just referred to, that even the Helotage of the Lacedaemonian State had its defenders. Many Greeks may have preferred serfage to slavery, and in all the three systems referred to, the slaves were only half enslaved (*μεταξὺ ἐλευθέρων καὶ δούλων*, Pollux 3. 83, quoted by Büchschütz, *Besitz und Erwerb*, p. 127: *δούλοι ἐπὶ τακτοῖς τισιν*, Strab. p. 365, cp. p. 701: *θητεύοντες*, Strab. p. 542). Aristotle, however, holds that serfs of the type of the Helots and Penestae (c. 5. 1264 a 34 sq.: 4 (7). 10. 1330 a 25 sqq.) are dangerous inmates in a State, especially if neighbouring States are not withheld, as in Crete, by their own interest from making common cause with the revolted serfs of their antagonist. Where this is not the case, war with neighbours commonly brings in its train risings of the serfs. As to the importance of the attitude of neighbours in this matter, see Plato, *Rep.* 579 A–B. In c. 10. 1272 b 18 sqq. another reason is given for the quiescence of the Cretan serfs—the distance of Crete from the rest of Greece, together with the fact that it possessed no dependencies outside the island to tempt interference, and was for a very long time exempt from invasion. They probably were not as purely Hellenic as the Helots; they do not seem

to have been employed as hoplites in the wars (c. 5. 1264 a 21), and their freer and more satisfactory position (1264 a 21) may, as Oncken suggests (Sus.², Note 281), have made them more manageable. Aristotle's language in this passage seems to imply that the Argives, Messenians, and Arcadians had no class corresponding to the Helots; yet *περίοικοι* (serfs) are mentioned at Argos in 7 (5). 3. 1303 a 8 (Herodotus speaks of slaves in 6. 83), and it would seem that the Gymnesii or Gymnetes of Argos answered in some degree to the Helots (see Sus.², Note 1518, and Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 74). It is to be noticed that Aristotle in constructing his best State (4 (7). 10. 1330 a 25 sqq.) prefers slaves to serfs, and insists that, if serfs there are to be, they shall be non-Hellenic (*βάρβαροι*). The Mariandynian serfs of the Pontic Heracleia (Strabo, p. 542) were non-Hellenic, but we know not whether Aristotle would regard this race as sufficiently submissive (1330 a 26).

85. *τὴν τῶν ἀναγκαίων σχολήν*, 'leisure from necessary things' (i.e. necessary work): cp. Plato, Tim. 18 B, *τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιτηδευμάτων ἄγοντας σχολήν*, and Plut. Agis 5. 3, *πενία ἀσχολίαν τῶν καλῶν καὶ ἀνελευθερίαν ἐπιφέρουσα* (see Schömann's note on this passage). Cp. also [Plut.] Inst. Lac. c. 40, *ἐν δέ τι τῶν καλῶν καὶ μακαρίων ἐδόκει παρεσκευακῆναι τοῖς πολίταις ὁ Λυκοῦργος, ἀφθονίαν σχολῆς· τέχνης μὲν γὰρ ἄψασθαι βαναύσου τὸ παράπαν οὐκ ἔξεστι . . . οἱ δὲ εἰλωτες αὐτοῖς εἰργάζοντο τὴν γῆν*.

- 1269 b. 3. *τοῖς δὲ Λάκωσιν κ.τ.λ.* Cp. Isocr. Philip. § 51, *πολεμοῦσι μὲν γὰρ [Ἀργεῖοι], ἐξ οὗ περ τὴν πόλιν οἰκοῦσι, πρὸς τοὺς ὁμόρους, ὥσπερ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, τοσοῦτον δὲ διαφέρουσιν ὅσον ἐκείνοι μὲν πρὸς ἡττοὺς αὐτῶν, οὗτοι δὲ πρὸς κρείττους*, and § 74. Does *ἦσαν* mean 'at the time when the Helots first revolted'? Possibly, but the past tense recurs frequently throughout the chapter: see below on 1269 b 31.

5. *ἐπεὶ* adduces a proof that the cause assigned for the troubles of the Lacedaemonian State and the exemption of Crete is the true one.

7. *καὶ εἰ μὴδὲν ἕτερον*, such as (e.g.) self-defence against their attacks. So Vict. 'si nihil periculi impenderet reipublicae ab hoc genere colonorum, relicto hoc malo.'

8. *αὐτούς*, 'serfs such as the Helots.' Aristotle gives a promise in 4 (7). 10. 1330 a 31 sq. to consider the question how slaves are to be treated. He would offer ultimate emancipation to slaves as a reward for good conduct. This is just what the Spartan owner had no power to do (Strabo, p. 365, *κριθῆναι δούλους ἐπὶ τακτοῖς τισιν, ὥστε τὸν ἔχοντα μὴτ' ἐλευθεροῦν ἔξείναι μῆτε πωλεῖν ἔξω τῶν*

δρων τούτους). Plato (Rep. 549 A) seems to regard the Spartans as erring on the side of severity, for in his description of the timocratical man, the type of character corresponding to a timocracy like the Lacedaemonian and Cretan constitutions (544 C), he speaks of him as δούλοις ἀγριος, οὐ καταφρονῶν δούλων, ὥσπερ ὁ Ικανῶς πεπαιδευμένος, and Aristotle himself is said by Plutarch to have ascribed the institution of the Crypteia to Lycurgus (Aristot. Fragm. 495. 1558 b 19 sqq.). But the Spartans may have had occasional fits of leniency.

12. *τρόπον*, probably 'mode of organization,' referring to *τρόπον*, 1269 a 36, not to *τρόπον*, 1269 b 9, for Aristotle is concerned rather with the organization than the administration of the State, and he is opposed to slave-organizations like the Lacedaemonian, not merely to the way in which the Spartans behaved to their slaves.

τοῦτο συμβαίνει (cp. 1269 a 40, οὐδέν πω τοιοῦτον συμβέβηκεν) probably refers to 1269 a 38 sq., and also to 1269 b 7 sqq.

13. *προαίρεσιν*. Cp. 19-22.

14. *πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν πόλεως*. Aristotle adopts this phrase from Plato, Laws 781 B, a passage relating to the subject here discussed. But Mr. Congreve is probably right in explaining it here as=*πρὸς τὴν ἀρίστην τάξιν*, 1269 a 31 (see Sus.², Note 284).

ὥσπερ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. For *μέρος*, not *μέρη*, cp. Eth. Nic. 5. 10. 1134 b 10, τὸ δὲ κτῆμα καὶ τὸ τέκνον, ἕως ἂν ᾗ πηλίκον καὶ μὴ χωρισθῇ, ὥσπερ μέρος αὐτοῦ. In 3. 4. 1277 a 7 man and wife are said to be the component parts of the household, and perhaps the same thing is said here, though on the other hand Mr. Welldon may be right in translating *μέρος*, not 'the constituent elements,' but 'constituent elements.' For though man and wife are the most important parts of the household, others are mentioned in 1. 3. 1253 b 4-7. Plato thinks that, as women are inferior to men in excellence, and therefore need more legislation, the lawgiver who omits to legislate for them leaves far more than half his work undone. See on this subject Plato, Laws 781 A sq.: 806 C: Aristot. Rhet. 1. 5. 1361 a 10 sqq. The Spartan girls were trained both in gymnastic and music (Plato, Laws 806 A: cp. Plutarch, Lyc. c. 14), and marriage and the education of children were controlled by the State, but Aristotle looked to the State to do something more than this—to exercise a control over the life of women inside and outside the household and to develop in them, as well as in children (1. 13. 1260 b 13 sqq.), the moral virtues which they need to possess.

15. δῆλον ὅτι κ.τ.λ. What is the construction of this sentence? Vict. translates, 'ita prope accedere civitatem ut bifariam dissecta sit . . . existimandum est,' apparently making the sentence run δῆλον ὅτι δεῖ νομίζειν καὶ πόλιν (εἶναι) ἐγγὺς τοῦ δίχα διηρῆσθαι, but the translators and commentators generally take ἐγγὺς τοῦ δίχα as an adverb meaning 'nearly equally.' Probably the latter view is correct, though adverbs thus formed do not seem to be by any means common.

19. δλην τὴν πόλιν. See below on 1273 a 38.

20. καρτερικήν. Compare the description of the Lacedaemonian training given by the Lacedaemonian interlocutor of the Laws in Laws 633 B sqq., where the expressions καρτερήσεις τῶν ἀλγυθόνων, πολύπονος πρὸς τὰς καρτερήσεις, δεινὰι καρτερήσεις are used.

22. ἐξημέληκεν, 'has wholly neglected to apply his principle.'

ζῶσι γὰρ κ.τ.λ. An old indictment (Eurip. Androm. 575 sqq.: Ibycus ap. Plutarch. Num. et Lycurg. inter se comp. c. 3: Dionys. Hal. Ant. Rom. 2. 24, οὔτε ἀφῆκαν, ὥσπερ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, τὰς τῶν γυναικῶν φυλακὰς) stated in exceptionally strong language. What the charge amounts to, we see from Eth. Eud. 3. 2. 1231 a 19, οἰνοφλυγία γὰρ καὶ γαστριμαργία καὶ λαγνεία καὶ ὀψοφαγία καὶ πῖντα τὰ τοιαῦτα περὶ τὰς εἰρημένους ἐστὶν αἰσθήσεις, εἰς ἀπὲρ μόρια ἡ ἀκολασία διαιρεῖται (cp. πᾶσαν ἀκολασίαν, Theopomp. Fragm. 178: Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 1. 308). Plato (Rep. 548 B) speaks of the Spartan women as the objects of extravagant expenditure; but in Laws 806 A we get a more favourable impression of their life, and we see from Plutarch's Lives of Agis and Cleomenes that even in the corruptest period there were noble exceptions. According to [Plutarch,] Apophth. Lac. Lycurg. 20, men looked back to a time when adultery was unknown at Sparta. Πρὸς, Bon. Ind. 641 b 46 sqq.

23. ὥστε ἀναγκαῖον κ.τ.λ. The necessity of this is explained by what is said in 1. 9. 1258 a 2 sqq. 'Ἐν τῇ τοιαύτῃ πολιτείᾳ means 'in a constitution of the kind we have just described' (cp. 17, ἐν ὅσαις πολιτείαις φαύλως ἔχει τὸ περὶ τὰς γυναῖκας, as well as c. 4. 1262 b 20 and c. 5. 1264 a 6). In a constitution which allows half the population to live a dissolute life, wealth as the means to dissoluteness must be honoured, especially if the dissolute half of the population bears virtual sway. In [Plutarch,] Apophth. Lac. Lycurg. 20, a Spartan of the 'good old days' asks, πῶς ἂν μοιχὸς ἐν Σπάρτῃ γένοιτο, ἐν ᾗ πλοῦτος καὶ τρυφή καὶ καλλωπισμὸς ἀτιμάζονται;

25. καθάπερ κ.τ.λ. We may gather from 4 (7). 2. 1324 b 9-21, what nations are referred to. Cp. Ephor. Fragm. 78 (Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 1. 258), or rather Scymnus Chius (888 sq.),

Ἐφ' οἷς ἐπεκλήθησαν Γυναικοκρατοῦμενοι
οἱ Σαυρομάται.

Contrast 1. 2. 1252 b 5, ἐν δὲ τοῖς βαρβάροις τὸ θῆλυ καὶ δούλον τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχει τάξιν. It would seem, therefore, that the more warlike barbarian races allowed at all events some of their women to gain ascendancy over them; but it does not follow that many or most of the sex were not made drudges. These nations were strong in θυμός, and θυμός, we learn from Pol. 4 (7). 7. 1327 b 40, is the seat of the affections as well as the source of military spirit.

τῶν στρατιωτικῶν καὶ πολεμικῶν γενῶν. For γένος in this sense, cp. Isocr. Paneg. § 67, ἔστι γὰρ ἀρχικώτατα μὲν τῶν γενῶν καὶ μεγίστας δυναστείας ἔχοντα Σκύθαι καὶ Θρᾶκες καὶ Πέρσαι. The word στρατιωτικός ('soldierlike') is not a common one, but it recurs in 1270 a 5. Compare the contrast of πολεμικός and στρατηγικός in [Plut.] Inst. Lac. c. 25.

26. Κελτῶν. The commentators refer to Athen. Deipn. p. 603 a (see Sus.², Note 287). See also Diod. 5. 32. 7 and Strabo 4. p. 199, who probably draw from the same source as Athenaeus. Sextus Empiricus speaks in similar terms of the Germani (Pyrrhon. Hyp. 3. 199) and of the Persians (ibid. 1. 152). 'Aristotle, like the earlier Greeks generally, appears to make no distinction between the Celts and the Germans' (Sus.², whose notes 287, 722, 953 should be consulted). From the sources of the Danube in the mountain Pyrene (the Pyrenees?) the Celts seem to have extended to the sea (Meteor. 1. 13. 350 a 36 sqq. : Eth. Nic. 3. 10. 1115 b 26 sqq.). There were, besides, Celts at this time 'settled in the neighbourhood of the Ionian Gulf,' an embassy from whom reached Alexander after he had crossed the Danube (Arrian, Anab. 1. 4. 6). Ephorus appears to have given a great extension to the designation (Strabo 4. p. 199, ὑπερβάλλουσιν τῇ μεγέθει λέγει τὴν Κελτικὴν, ὥστε ἡσπερ νῦν Ἰβηρίας καλοῦμεν ἐκείνοις τὰ πλείστα προστέμειν μέχρι Γαδεΐρων). As to φανερός, cp. Polyb. 6. 56. 4, παρὰ μὲν Καρχηδονίοις δῶρα φανερώς διδόντες λαμβάνουσι τὰς ἀρχάς, and perhaps we should also compare the language of Plutarch, Pelopid. c. 19, with regard to the lawgivers of Thebes—λαμπρὸν δὲ τὸν ἔρωτα ταῖς παλαιστοῖς ἐνθερέψαντο συγκεραννύντες τὰ ἥθη τῶν νέων. If Aristotle is not thinking exclusively of barbarian races, he may allude to the Thebans here, and also to the Cretans (cp. c. 10. 1272 a 24) and Chalcidians (Aristot. Fragm. 93. 1492 b 22 sqq.).

28. ὁ μυθολογῆσας πρῶτος. Sus.² (Note 288) points out that just as Aristotle traces the πόλις to a 'first constructor' (1. 2. 1253 a 30), so here he speaks of ὁ μυθολογῆσας πρῶτος. For a similar hint

of the truth in myth, see 5 (8). 6. 1341 b 2. The myths are conceived by Aristotle to embody fragments of truth saved from the wreck of previous periods of greatness in philosophy and art (Metaph. A. 8. 1074 b 1-14). Cp. Plato, Theaet. 180 C. What age, however, he ascribes to the myth here mentioned does not appear.

συζεύξαι, 'paired,' as in 4 (7). 16. 1335 a 16 ('join in wedlock'). Cp. Lucret. 1. 31-40. The two deities are often named together: see Tümpel, Ares und Aphrodite (Teubner, 1880), who illustrates their association in local worships (esp. at Thebes, Aeschyl. Sept. c. Theb. 135 sqq.: cp. Hes. Theog. 933 sqq.)—in poetry (Pind. Pyth. 4. 155: Simonides, Fragm. 43 Bergk: Aeschyl. Suppl. 664 sq.)—and in art. The Ares of the Villa Ludovisi has an Eros at his feet and may perhaps have formed a group with Aphrodite: the Venus of Milo is thought by some to have formed part of a similar group. Tümpel points out that the tradition passed to Rome, where it did the Julian house the service of bringing Venus Victrix, its foundress, into close union with the national god Mars, and thus consecrated the rule of the Caesars. So on silver coins of Augustus we see the Julian Venus looking down at a helmet in her hand, the symbol of Mars (Tümpel, p. 677 n.): compare the couplet ascribed to Petronius Arbiter (Fragm. 46 Buecheler):—

Militis in galea nidum fecere columbae:

Adparet, Marti quam sit amica Venus.

The lines of Rutilius Namatianus (De Reditu Suo, 1. 67 sq.) may also be quoted—

Auctorem generis Venerem Martemque fatemur,

Aeneadum matrem Romulidumque patrem.

Sulla, indeed, had already inscribed on his trophies "Αρη καὶ Νίκη καὶ Ἀφροδίτην" (Plut. Sulla c. 19), and the month sacred to Venus at Rome (April) came next to that sacred to Mars (Plut. Numa c. 19). Compare also the Chalcidian song, Aristot. Fragm. 93. 1492 b 30, σὺν γὰρ ἀνδρείᾳ καὶ ὁ λυσιμελής Ἔρως ἐπὶ Χαλκιδέων θάλλει πόλεισιν. Aphrodite is, however, occasionally conjoined with Dionysus, as in Probl. 30. 953 b 31, ὁρθῶς Διόνυσος καὶ Ἀφροδίτη λέγονται μετ' ἀλλήλων εἶναι, but this is quite comprehensible, as is also the statement of the Scholiast on Aristophanes, Ranae 315, συνίδρυνται τῇ Δήμητρὶ ὁ Διόνυσος.

30. κατακώχμοι. See critical note.

31. τοῦθ', 'the latter.' Cp. Plut. Agis c. 7, ἅτε δὴ τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους ἐπισταμένους κατηκόους ὄντας αἰεὶ τῶν γυναικῶν καὶ πλείον ἐκείναις τῶν δημοσίων ἢ τῶν ἰδίων αὐτοῖς πολυπραγμονεῖν δίδοντας, and Lycurg. c. 14,

καὶ διὰ τοῦτο μᾶλλον τοῦ προσήκοντος αὐτὰς ἐθεράπευον καὶ δεσποίνας προσηγόρευον.

ὑπῆρχεν. We have already had ἦσαν in 1269 b 4, and the past tense recurs in 1269 b 37, 1270 a 18, 31, 32, though we find the present in 1270 a 23. Aristotle appears to look back to the days of Lacedaemonian greatness, wishing perhaps to make his criticism of the constitution apply to the time when its apparent success was greatest.

32. ἐπὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς αὐτῶν, 'at the time when they held the empire of Hellas': cp. c. 10. 1271 b 33, τὴν ἀρχὴν τὴν Ἑλληνικὴν, and Xen. Cyrop. 8. 7. 1, ἐπὶ τῆς αὐτοῦ ἀρχῆς. Aristotle probably refers to the time between the close of the Peloponnesian War and the battle of Leuctra (cp. Xen. Anab. 6. 6. 12 sq., and Diod. 14. 10).

καίτοι κ.τ.λ. The meaning is—'and yet if the rulers of the State are ruled by women, how does this differ from women holding office themselves, of which of course the Spartans would not dream?' Aristotle's words recall the remark addressed to Gorgo the wife of Leonidas (Plut. Lycurg. c. 14)—εἰπούσης γάρ τινος, ὡς ἔοικε, ξένης πρὸς αὐτὴν ὡς "μόναι τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἀρχετε ὑμεῖς αἱ Λάκαιναι," "μόναι γάρ," ἔφη, "τίκτομεν ἀνδρας." For the construction of διαφέρειν with ἦ, cp. c. 10. 1272 b 13 and Xen. Hell. 3. 4. 19.

35. ἀλλ' εἴπερ, 'but if for any purpose whatever': cp. 7 (5). 11. 1315 a 9, and see Bon. Ind. 217 a 55 sqq.

36. ταῦθ', i.e. τὰ τοῦ πολέμου.

37. ἐδήλωσαν δ'. Cp. Xen. Hell. 6. 5. 28: Plutarch, Agesilaus c. 31. Plato may possibly have this circumstance in view in Laws 813 E—814 B. Theopompus seems to have mentioned the fact (Fragm. 291: Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 1. 327). As Vict. says (note on 4 (7). 11. 1330 b 32), the Spartan women appear to have behaved far better during the defence of Sparta against Pyrrhus in 272 B.C. (Plutarch, Pyrrhus c. 27).

38. Sus. translates—'for they were of no use any more than women in other States are on similar occasions.' But there is probably a reference to 34, χρησίμου δ' οὐσης τῆς θρασύτητος πρὸς οὐδὲν τῶν ἐγκυκλίων, and I take the meaning to be—'for they were not at all useful, as women are in other States' (i.e. πρὸς τὰ ἐγκύκλια). Cp. c. 10. 1272 a 40, οὐδὲν γὰρ λήμματός τι τοῖς κόσμοις, ὥσπερ τοῖς ἐφόροις. Women have often been useful in their own sphere in times of peril from war; for instance, there were 110 baking-women with the force blockaded in Plataea (Thuc. 2. 78).

39. θόρυβον δὲ κ.τ.λ. Lamb. 'sed trepidationem et tumultum civitati incusserunt maiorem quam hostes.'

μὲν οὖν, 'indeed' or 'true,' taken up by μὲν οὖν, 1270 a 8, and then answered by ἀλλά, 9. Aristotle here seeks to account for the error of the Lacedaemonian lawgiver, whose name he mentions (perhaps out of respect) only once in this chapter (1270 a 7), though oftener in later ones (c. 10. 1271 b 25 : c. 12. 1273 b 33, 1274 a 29 : also in 6 (4). 11. 1296 a 20). He often seeks to account for the errors he corrects (e. g. in 1. 9. 1257 b 40 sqq.), and explains his reason for doing so in Eth. Nic. 7. 15. 1154 a 22 sqq.

1270 a. 2. ἀπεξενούντο. Giph. (p. 245) refers as to the Messenian war to Justin 3. 4, where however Ephorus is the original source (fragm. 53 : Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 1. 247). Cp. also Aristot. Fragm. 504. 1560 b 17 sqq.

Ἀργείους. Πάλιν (3) seems to imply that the war with Argos preceded the other wars (see Bon. Ind. 559 b 5 sqq.).

4. σχολάσαντες. For the tense, see note on 1271 b 4, ἄρξαντες.

Ὁ νομοθέτης does not always, apparently, in this chapter mean Lycurgus (e. g. in 1270 b 19 the reference would seem to be to Theopompus, for it is to him that Aristotle ascribes the establishment of the ephorate in 7 (5). 11. 1313 a 26 sqq.); but here Lycurgus is referred to, as is evident from 1270 a 7. Thus the passage before us would seem to place the date of Lycurgus' legislation after the close of, at all events, the first Messenian War—i. e. according to the ordinary chronology, after B.C. 723. Yet Aristotle makes Lycurgus the guardian of Charilaus, whom the ordinary chronology places about 880 B.C. Trieber (Forschungen zur spartanischen Verfassungsgeschichte, pp. 44-65) illustrates the contradictions in the testimony of the authorities as to the date of Lycurgus, without, however, referring to this passage. Plutarch, indeed, already notes the fact (Lycurg. c. 1). The remarks of Plato (Laws 780-1, esp. 780 B and 781 A) are probably present to Aristotle's mind here. Plato speaks of Lycurgus as having given way in the matter of the women (εἴξαντος τοῦ νομοθέτου, 781 A). The following passage from Plutarch's Life of Lycurgus (c. 14) deserves to be quoted in full—οὐ γάρ, ὥς Ἀριστοτέλης φησὶν, ἐπιχειρήσας σωφρονίζειν τὰς γυναῖκας ἐπαύστω μὴ κρατῶν τῆς πολλῆς ἀνέσεως καὶ γυναικοκρατίας διὰ τὰς πολλὰς στρατείας τῶν ἀνδρῶν, ἐν αἷς ἡναγκάζοντο κυρίας ἀπολείπειν ἐκεῖνας, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο μᾶλλον τοῦ προσήκοντος αὐτὰς ἐθεράπευον καὶ δεσποίνας προσηγόρευον· ἀλλὰ καὶ τούτων τὴν ἐνδεχομένην ἐπιμέλειαν ἐποίησάτο. Is Plutarch here commenting on the passage of the Politics before us? It is quite possible that he is, for though he connects the γυναικοκρατία with the prolonged absence of the husbands on campaigns far more

distinctly than Aristotle does, and though Aristotle says nothing about the title *δίσπουαι*, there is a great resemblance between what he makes Aristotle say and this passage of the Politics. Perhaps, however, it is more likely that Plutarch is commenting on a passage of the Politics, for Aristotle may have used this work here, as he seems to have done elsewhere in the Politics (see above, p. xviii sq.)

προωδοπεποιημένους. The form *προωδοποιημένη, προωδοποίηται* is elsewhere used by Aristotle (see Bon. Ind. s.v.), and Liddell and Scott (s.v.) would read *προωδοποιημένους* here. *Προωδοπεποίηκε*, however, as these authorities remark, occurs in Probl. 30. 1. 954 b 12. See Götting's note on *προφικονύμηνται* in his edition of [Aristotle,] *Oeconomica*, p. 74.

5. *διὰ τὸν στρατιωτικὸν βίον*. Cp. c. 5. 1263 b 36, *διὰ τὴν παιδείαν*. *ἔχει*. Sus. 'zur Entwicklung bringt': rather, perhaps, 'brings with it'—cp. Xen. *Oecon.* 4. 3, *καὶ ἀσχολίας δὲ μάλιστα ἔχουσι καὶ φίλων καὶ πόλεως συνεπιμελείσθαι αἱ βανανσικαὶ καλούμεναι* [τέχναι].

6. *μέρη*, i.e. *εἶδη*, Bon. Ind. 455 b 46 sqq. (cp. 1271 b 2).

ἄγειν ἐπὶ τοὺς νόμους. Bonitz (Ind. 5 a 47) groups this expression with 7 (5). 11. 1313 a 19, *ἄγειν τὰς βασιλείας ἐπὶ τὸ μετρίωτερον*. In Demosth. adv. Timocr. c. 31 we have *ἄγειτ' αὐτοὺς ὑπὸ τοὺς νόμους*.

8. *αἰτίαι μὲν οὖν εἰσὶν αὗται τῶν γενομένων*. 'The causes then of what happened are these': for the omission of the article before *αἰτίαι*, see above on 1. 3. 1253 b 11. The causes referred to are the long absence of the husbands and the fact that the women had not been prepared by previous experience to submit to the lawgiver's yoke.

9. *ἡμέϊς*. See Vahlen, *Beitr. zu Aristot. Poet.* 2. 37, and *Aristot. Aufs.* 2. 17, where in commenting on 4 (7). 1. 1323 a 38 Vahlen refers among other passages to *Pol.* 4. (7). 3. 1325 a 16 sqq. and 6 (4). 2. 1289 b 9.

10. *τίνι* is probably neuter, like *τοῦ ὁρθῶς καὶ μὴ ὁρθῶς* in the next line, not masculine. Cp. *Eth. Nic.* 7. 3. 1146 a 2 sqq.

12. *πρότερον*, 1269 b 23 sq.: 1269 b 12—14.

13. *οὐ μόνον κ.τ.λ.*, i.e. not only spoils the harmony of the constitution taken by itself, but also spoils its influence and has an ill effect on character. The negligence of the lawgiver in relation to women is not only inconsistent with the *ὑπόθεσις* of the constitution, but also unfavourable to virtue: cp. 1269 b 12, *ἔτι δ' ἡ περὶ τὰς γυναῖκας ἀνεσις καὶ πρὸς τὴν προαίρεσιν τῆς πολιτείας βλαβερὰ καὶ πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν πόλεως*. I incline to the reading *αὐτῆς καθ' αὐτήν*, not *αὐτήν καθ' αὐτήν*, though the latter is the reading both of M^s and Π^s. *Τὴν φιλοχρηματίαν*, because the Spartan fondness for money was well-

known: cp. *ἀ φιλοχρηματία Σπάρταν ὀλεῖ, ἄλλο δὲ οὐδέν* (Aristot. *Fragm.* 501. 1559 b 27 sqq.), and Eurip. *Androm.* 446. For an instance of Spartan *φιλοχρηματία*, see Theopomp. *Fr.* 258 (Müller, *Fr. Hist. Gr.* 1. 322).

15. γάρ. 'I draw attention to this now, for the arrangements of the State respecting property are my next topic.'

τοῖς περὶ τὴν ἀνωμαλίαν τῆς κτήσεως. Cp. 1270 b 7, τὰ περὶ τὴν ἐφορείαν.

18. διόπερ. Property in general falling into a few hands, land did so too. For the fact, cp. *Oecon.* 1. 6. 1344 b 30, πρὸς δὲ φυλακὴν τοῖς τε Περσικοῖς συμφέρει χρῆσθαι καὶ τοῖς Λακωνικοῖς, on which Schömann (*Opusc. Acad.* 3. 223-4) remarks, that both the Persian and the Laconian methods referred to are designed for 'latifundia.' In what follows (18 sqq.) the unequal distribution of landed property in the Lacedaemonian State is traced in part to the freedom of gift (especially on marriage) and of bequest. But nothing here said excludes the operation of another cause, to which the inequality of wealth in this State is ascribed in 7 (5). 7. 1307 a 34, ἔτι διὰ τὸ πάσας τὰς ἀριστοκρατικὰς πολιτείας ὀλιγαρχικὰς εἶναι μᾶλλον πλεονεκτοῦσιν οἱ γνῶριμοι, οἷον καὶ ἐν Λακεδαιμόνῃ εἰς ὀλίγους αἱ οὐσῖαι ἔρχονται. For this use of *εἰς*, compare also *Plut. Agis* c. 5, τῆς εὐπορίας εἰς ὀλίγους συρρυσίσης, *Pol.* 6 (4). 15. 1299 b 1 sq., and 7 (5). 6. 1305 b 11, ἐξ ἐλαττόνων εἰς ἐξακοσίους ἦλθεν, and see *Bon. Ind.* 222 b 17 sqq.

τοῦτο δὲ κ.τ.λ. 'This matter'—i.e. probably τὰ περὶ τὴν ἀνωμαλίαν τῆς κτήσεως, though it is evident from what follows (τῆς πάσης χώρας, 23: τῆς χώρας, 29) that the faulty distribution of the land is uppermost in Aristotle's mind. Cp. 32, φάυλως αὐτοῖς εἶχε τὰ περὶ τὴν τάξιν ταύτην, and 38, βέλτιον τὸ διὰ τῆς κτήσεως ὠμαλισμένης πληθύνει ἀνδρῶν τὴν πόλιν, passages which serve to explain that before us. Aristotle is bound to trace the evil in some degree to the lawgiver, because he is occupied in the Second Book with a criticism of constitutions and lawgivers, and if the faulty distribution of property in the Lacedaemonian State had been due not to ill-conceived laws, but to some other cause, its mention would not have been in place in an attempt to show that the laws of the State were not wholly satisfactory (cp. 2. 1. 1260 b 34, διὰ τὸ μὴ καλῶς ἔχειν ταύτας τὰς νῦν ὑπαρχούσας, διὰ τοῦτο ταύτην δοκῶμεν ἐπιβαλέσθαι τὴν μέθοδον). The remarks which follow (18-39) are interesting, especially because they indicate to some extent how Aristotle intended to deal with the question of property in his 'best State.' We learn from his comments here what we do not

learn from the Fourth Book, that he was in favour of making the citizens' lots of land inalienable and of regulating, or perhaps putting an end to, gift and bequest. He would abolish dowries or limit their amount, and would not allow either a father or his heir to give an heiress in marriage to any one they pleased. See below on 21. We do not learn whether he was, like Plato, in favour of Unigeniture.

19. *ἀνείσθαι μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ.* *Μέν* here = 'while.' The nom. *ὁ νομοθέτης* must be supplied from *τῶν νόμων*: cp. c. 8. 1268 a 5, if *τὸν νομοθέτην* is to be supplied there. Is *οὐσίαν* or *γῆν* to be supplied here with *τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν*? Probably the latter: cp. 8 (6). 4. 1319 a 13, *τὸ μὴ δακνίζειν εἰς τι μέρος τῆς ὑπαρχούσης ἐκάστῳ γῆς*, and 10, *ἣν δὲ τό γε ἀρχαῖον ἐν πολλαῖς πόλεσι νενομοθετημένον μηδὲ πωλεῖν ἐξείναι τοὺς πρώτους κλήρους*, and the regulations of Plato in Laws 741 B: cp. also Heraclid. Pont. de Rebuspublicis 2. 7, *πωλεῖν δὲ γῆν Λακεδαιμονίοις αἰσχρὸν νενόμισται*: *τῆς δ' ἀρχαίας μοίρας οὐδὲ ἔξεστιν*: and [Plutarch,] Inst. Lac. c. 22 (quoted by Gilbert, Studien, p. 163-5), *ἔνιοι δ' ἔφασαν ὅτι καὶ τῶν ξένων δεῖν ὑπομεῖναι ταύτην τὴν ἀσκησιν τῆς πολιτείας κατὰ τὸ βούλημα τοῦ Λυκούργου μετεῖχε τῆς ἀρχῆθεν διατεταγμένης μοίρας*: *πωλεῖν δ' οὐκ ἐξήν*. Aristotle says nothing here about the 'original share': on the other hand, we see that the purchaser no less than the seller lay under a ban. Polybius (6. 45-46) implies that not only had the land been at the outset divided equally among the citizens, but that this equality of landed property was enforced by law; he also holds in the same passage that all ambition to make money was thoroughly and successfully discountenanced by the Lacedaemonian constitution. In all these contentions he is altogether at issue with Aristotle; who can hardly have credited Lycurgus with an equal division of the land belonging to the citizens, or he would have mentioned the fact in c. 7. 1266 b 14 sqq. and here, and who certainly does not hold that an equality of landed property was enforced by law, or the love of money discouraged. Aristotle, however, would evidently have attached but little value to an equal division of the land unsupported by checks on population and by laws making the lot inalienable and regulating gift and bequest. He refers to the subject of population in 1270 a 39 sqq.: here he dwells on the lawgiver's omission to regulate gift and bequest, and traces the inequality of property in part to this cause. Was this criticism of Aristotle's (or possibly a similar criticism in the Politics) known to the writer whom Plutarch follows in his life of Agis (c. 5)? For here the inequality of property in the Lace-

daemonian State is traced to precisely the same cause—the freedom of gift and bequest—though the error is not ascribed to the original lawgiver, but to an ephor named Epitadeus in the fourth century, who is said to have effected a change in the law, of which Aristotle does not seem to be cognisant (*ἐφορεύσας δὲ τις ἀνὴρ δυνατός, αὐθάδης δὲ καὶ χαλεπὸς τὸν τρόπον, Ἐπιτάδευς ὄνομα, πρὸς τὸν υἱὸν αὐτῷ γενομένης διαφορᾶς ῥήτρην ἔγραψεν ἐξεῖναι τὸν ὅλον αὐτοῦ καὶ τὸν κλῆρον ὃ τις ἐθέλοι καὶ ζῶντα δοῦναι καὶ καταλείπειν διατιθέμενον*). There were evidently two views current in Greece as to the cause of the decline of the Lacedaemonian State: many (e.g. the writer of the fourteenth chapter of Xenophon's treatise *de Republica Lacedaemoniorum* and of [Plutarch,] *Inst. Lac.* c. 42) ascribed it to a departure from the laws of Lycurgus; Aristotle, on the contrary, ascribed it to faults in his laws (cp. 4 (7). 14. 1333 b 23, *ἐτι δὲ τοῦτο γελοῖον, εἰ μένοντες ἐν τοῖς νόμοις αὐτοῦ, καὶ μηδενὸς ἐμποδίζοντος πρὸς τὸ χρῆσθαι τοῖς νόμοις, ἀποβεβλήκασι τὸ ζῆν καλῶς*). Is it not, to say the least, possible that the writer whom Plutarch follows in this chapter of his *Life of Agis*, belonged to the former school, and was anxious to save the credit of Lycurgus from the criticism passed on him by Aristotle here or in the *Politics*? He in effect replies to Aristotle, that Lycurgus was not in fault; the fault was that of Epitadeus and the degenerate Spartans of his day. In just the same way Plutarch (*Lycurgus* c. 28) will not believe that Lycurgus can have had anything to do with the *Crypteia*, which Aristotle had attributed to him, or with the ill-treatment of the *Helots* generally, and in another chapter of the same *Life* (c. 14), as we have seen (note on 1270 a 4), will not admit that Lycurgus failed to subject the women to his laws.

21. *διδόναι δὲ καὶ καταλείπειν κ.τ.λ.* We must here again supply *τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν γῆν*. *Vict.* 'non vidit idem incommodum nasci ex utroque facto, non minus enim usu venit ut aliqui locupletiores quam oporteat fiant posteriore hoc modo quam priore.' A man might impoverish himself and his family and enrich others by giving and bequeathing as easily as by selling. He might, for instance, give or bequeath more than he ought to a favourite son and so leave his other sons poorly off, or he might give or bequeath to some flatterer or legacy-hunter (*Plato, Laws* 923 B: cp. *Aristot. Pol.* 2. 5. 1263 b 21 sq.) property which ought to have descended to his own children, but Aristotle probably refers especially to the giving and bequeathing of dowries to daughters (cp. 25). If these were large, as they often were at Sparta, the father might impoverish both himself and his sons and enrich husbands perhaps already

sufficiently wealthy, while his own sons, if impoverished, would be little likely to receive large dowries with their brides. Thus the rich would become richer and the poor poorer. The Spartan father, however, seems from what follows to have had not only full power to give and bequeath dowries, but also full power to give and bequeath an *ἐπίκληρος* or heiress to any one he pleased. The Attic law also gave this power to the father, though his exercise of the right to bequeath an *ἐπίκληρος* was often, it would appear, contested by the relatives, if his will interfered with their claims to her hand (C. F. Hermann, *Gr. Ant.*, ed. Thalheim, *Rechtsalt.* p. 57. 1). The Lacedaemonian law, however, seems to have gone further than the Attic, for if the father died leaving an *ἐπίκληρος* and without having disposed of her hand by will, the person who inherited the *ἐπίκληρος* had full power to give her in marriage to any one he pleased. He was not bound to give her in marriage to a relative; he might give her away to an entire stranger, possibly to a man already rich. In this way again the rich would become richer and the poor poorer. Under the Attic law an *ἐπίκληρος* who had not been given or bequeathed in marriage by her father descended to the nearest male relative, who would be entitled to marry her if he chose, but if he did not, would have no right to give her in marriage to any one he pleased: the right to marry her would in fact pass from him to the male relative next in succession. 'If the person entitled to marry a rich *ἐπίκληρος* waived his claim, he left the field open to the claims of less near relatives (Isaeus 3. 74, p. 45, and 10. 5, p. 80), while in the case of a poor *ἐπίκληρος* (*θῆσσα*) the Attic law required the nearest relative to marry her or to give her a dowry' (Hermann-Thalheim, p. 57. 1). Aristotle holds that property stands a better chance of being evenly distributed when inheritances pass, not by gift or bequest, but by descent, and he recommends oligarchies to adopt this system of succession (7 (5). 8. 1309 a 23 sqq.). Thus, though he would prefer the provisions of the Attic law to those of the Lacedaemonian, he would evidently wish to go far beyond them. He is clearly unwilling to allow even a father to give or bequeath an *ἐπίκληρος* to any one he pleased, and he may well have been in favour of abolishing the right of bequest altogether, or at any rate of imposing severe restrictions on it. Plato had adopted the latter course in the *Laws* (922 E sqq.), where he confines the discretion of testators within narrow limits and exhorts them to remember that their property belongs not to themselves alone, but to their family (*γένος*) and to the whole State (contrast the language of Plutarch as to Solon's law *περί διαθηκῶν*, Solon c. 21), while he

prescribes that in the disposal of heiresses not bequeathed in marriage by their fathers regard shall be had to nearness of relationship and to the preservation of the lot, and in fact gives the relatives in a fixed order of succession the right to marry the heiress, thus withholding from the inheritor of the *ἐπίκληρος* the prerogative which he possessed at Sparta of giving her in marriage to any one he pleased. In the time of Herodotus, if the father had not betrothed his *ἐπίκληρος* before he died, it fell to the Lacedaemonian King to determine to whom she was to be married (Hdt. 6. 57), but possibly only in case there were more claimants than one for her hand; it would seem, however, that by the time of Aristotle the inheritor of the *ἐπίκληρος* had come to have the same right to dispose of her hand as her father. There were some who asserted that Lycurgus forbade dowries (see C. F. Hermann, *De vestigiis institutorum veterum per Platonis de Legibus libros indagandis*, p. 24, n. 78, who refers to Hermippus ap. Athen. Deipn. p. 555 C, Aelian, Var. Hist. 6. 6, and Justin 3. 3. 8). In Crete dowries were fixed in amount by law at half a son's share: this had been mentioned by Ephorus (ap. Strab. p. 482) and was probably known to Aristotle. Compare the Gortyna Inscription, col. 4. 48, and see Bücheler und Zitelmann, *Das Recht von Gortyn*, p. 116. The law of Gortyna also placed a maximum limit on gifts (Bücheler und Zitelmann, pp. 125-9), which seem usually to have been left uncontrolled by Greek legislation (Hermann-Thalheim, p. 64). Under the Attic law there was no right of bequest if there were sons (Isaeus 3. 68, p. 45), but if the story of Epitadeus, as Plutarch tells it, is true, testators at Sparta would appear not to have been subject to this restriction, for Epitadeus' object in introducing the right of bequest is implied to have been to disinherit his own son.

23. καὶ τῶν γυναικῶν, i.e. not only belongs to a few but to women. For the fact, cp. Plutarch, Agis c. 4, τῆς τε μητρὸς Ἀγησιστράτας καὶ τῆς μάμμης Ἀρχιδαμίας, αἱ πλεῖστα χρήματα Λακεδαιμονίων ἐκέκτηντο: and c. 7, ἥν δὲ τότε τῶν Λακωνικῶν πλουτῶν ἐν ταῖς γυναιξὶ τὸ πλεῖστον.

24. γινομένων. The tense indicates a continued occurrence of the circumstance: cp. 1270 b 5.

25. ἦν. For the suppression of *ἄν*, see Goodwin, *Moods and Tenses*, § 49. 2.

26. ἦ καί, here apparently 'or even': see note on 1264 a 15.

νῦν δ' ἔξεστι, 'but, as it is, so far from that being the case . . .' I do not think, with Bücheler, *Sus.* (see *Sus.*², Note 304), and others, that we are obliged to suppose a lacuna after τετάχθαι. The law,

says Aristotle, ought to fix some limit to the amount of dowries, but, as it is, so far from doing so, it actually allows the father or his representative to give an heiress in marriage to any one they please, or, in other words, to dispose as they like of an entire inheritance. It goes, in fact, quite into an extreme in its complaisance. We often find a contrast between what ought to be and what is drawn, as here, by means of βέλτιον or δεῖ followed by νῦν δέ (e. g. in 1271 a 11–14 and 1273 b 21 sqq.).

27. *ὅτε ἂν βούληται*. According to Plutarch, Lysand. c. 30 (cp. Stob. Floril. 67. 16), there was a form of action at Sparta (*κακογαμίον δίκη*) available against those who looked to the wealth rather than the virtue of a family in marriage (cp. Plutarch, Apophth. Lac., Lysand. 15. 230 A). But of this Aristotle seems to know nothing.

28. *μὴ διαθέμενος*, 'without having disposed of her hand by will.'

ὅν ἂν καταλίπη κληρονόμον. For the phrase, cp. Plato, Laws 740 B. Camerarius (p. 99) asks, 'qui autem est heres iste alius praeter illam *ἐπίκληρον*?' and Coray in his edition of the Politics (p. 276) quotes Harpocration's explanation of *ἐπίκληρος*—*ὄρφανὴ ἐπὶ παντὶ τῷ κλήρῳ καταλειμμένη, μὴ ὄντος αὐτῇ ἀδελφοῦ*. If all the property of the father passed to the *ἐπίκληρος*, how would it be possible for him to leave a *κληρονόμος* in addition to the *ἐπίκληρος*? (It may be noted that Harpocration's account seems not to be literally correct, for there might be more *ἐπίκληροι* than one (C. F. Hermann, Gr. Ant. 3. § 64. 11), but that does not concern us here.) The explanation of the enigma probably is, that the *κληρονόμος* referred to in the passage before us is the *κληρονόμος τῆς ἐπικλήρου*, the person who inherits the *ἐπίκληρος*: cp. Demosth. contra Eubulid. c. 41, *ἐπικλήρου δὲ κληρονομήσας εὐπόρου*, and Heraclid. Pont. de Rebuspubl. 28, *καὶ ἀποθανόντος τοῦ ἀνδρός, ὥσπερ τᾶλλα, οὕτω καὶ τὰς γυναῖκας κληρονομοῦσιν*. C. F. Hermann (Gr. Ant. 3. § 64. 10) quotes Gans, Erbrecht, 1. 339—'diesen' (i. e. this recognition of the *ἐπίκληρος*) 'liegt durchaus nicht der Begriff zu Grunde, dass sie selbst als Erbende auftreten, sondern dass sie mit dem Vermögen von den Collateralen ererbt werden.' So too Caillemer (Droit de succession à Athènes, p. 40) says that in an *ἐπιδικασία* for an heiress 'les formes de procédure ressemblaient beaucoup à celles que le législateur avait établies pour les demandes d'envoi en possession d'un hérité.' The *κληρονόμος* would be 'the nearest adult male relative, or if there should be more than one equally near, the eldest of them' (Sus.², Note 305), for we need hardly concern ourselves with the unlikely case of the father naming a *κληρονόμος* without disposing of his daughter's hand.

20. *τοιγαροῦν κ.τ.λ.* As the land found its way into fewer and fewer hands, the number of citizens would dwindle, especially as in the Lacedaemonian State the citizen who could not pay his quota to the *syssitia* lost his political rights. As to the extent of the territory, cp. Isocr. Panath. § 45, (*Λακεδαιμόνιοι*) *ἔχοντες πόλιν ἀλλοτρίαν καὶ χώραν οὐ μόνον ἱκανήν, ἀλλ' ὅσῃν οὐδεμία πόλις τῶν Ἑλληνίδων*. Does Aristotle mean by *τῆς χώρας* the territory belonging to Spartan citizens both in Laconia and in Messenia, or in Laconia alone, for Messenia had long been lost to the Lacedaemonians, when he wrote? He is probably speaking of the time before Leuctra (cp. *ἦσαν*, 31), and, if so, he refers to Laconia and Messenia together. It is perhaps not necessary to suppose that he means 31,500 *ἀργοί*, though, as a matter of fact, the Spartans were *ἀργοί*. If he does, he need not have gone so far as to Babylon to find a parallel to the extent of the State-territory in Plato's Laws. See note on 1265 a 15. As the women who owned land would be married to Spartans, the military strength of the State can hardly have been impaired, however large the number of households may have been in which the family property was derived from the wife, and not from the husband. The evil appears rather to have lain in the concentration of landed property in a few hands, than in its frequent devolution to females. It is, however, no doubt true that female landowners, even when they were free from the vices which Aristotle ascribes to the Spartan women, might be less inclined to use their property for the good of the State than male landowners trained from their earliest years to live for the discharge of their duties as citizens. It does not seem that the feudal plan of proportioning the amount of military service due from the holder of land on military tenure to the amount of land held occurred to the Lacedaemonian lawgiver or to the lawgiver of any other Greek community. If there were no males in the family of the owner, no military service was rendered: the owner was not bound to supply hired military service. Yet the land, whether owned by women or by men, might have been made subject to the burden of supplying a given number of soldiers. It is true that hired military service, though not unknown to the Lacedaemonians, would not have been as satisfactory, or as politically safe, as that of citizens.

31. *αὐτῶν*, 'by themselves,' apart from any reasoning.

32. *φαύλος*, an epithet frequently applied in this book of the Politics to defective social and political arrangements (e.g. in 1271 b 10, c. 10. 1272 b 7, c. 11. 1273 a 36, b 8). *Οὐ καλῶς* (1271 a 26, etc.) is a somewhat milder expression.

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34. *τὴν ὀλιγανθρωπίαν*, 'its paucity of citizens,' or possibly 'its well-known paucity of citizens': for the meaning of *ὀλιγανθρωπία*, see 3. 5. 1278 a 31. Xenophon (Rep. Lac. c. 1) had already spoken of Sparta as *τῶν ὀλιγανθρωποτάτων πόλεων οὖσα*: cp. also Isocr. Panath. § § 255, 257.

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38. *βέλτιον*, i.e. better than populousness obtained by the admission of strangers to citizenship: cp. Plutarch, Agis c. 6, *καλὸν δ' Ἄγεις, ὥσπερ ἦν, ποικύμενος ἐξισῶσαι καὶ ἀναπληρῶσαι τὴν πόλιν*.

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40. ταύτην τὴν διόρθωσιν, i.e. the correction of *δλιγανθρωπία* by means of an equalization of property. For, though this law tends to promote an increase of population, it does nothing to equalize property; on the contrary, it tends to increase the number of pauper citizens and to add to their poverty, thus intensifying the existing disparities of wealth. It encourages parents to bring offspring into the world for whose maintenance no land is available. Plato may possibly have this Lacedaemonian law before him, when he says (Laws 740 D), *μηχαναὶ δ' εἰσὶ πολλαί· καὶ γὰρ ἐπισχέσεις γενέσεως οἷς ἂν εὖρους ἢ γένεσις, καὶ τούναντίον ἐπιμέλειαι καὶ σπουδαὶ πλῆθους γεννημάτων εἰσὶ τιμαῖς τε καὶ ἀτιμίαις καὶ νοουθησέσει πρεσβυτῶν περὶ νέους κ.τ.λ.*

1270 b. 2. *προάγεται*. Spengel (Aristotelische Studien 3. 16): 'imo προάγει.' The middle does not seem to be used in this sense by Aristotle elsewhere (see Bon. Ind. s. v.), but a reference to Liddell and Scott will show that it is thus used by other authors.

3. *νόμος*, 'a law': cp. c. 10. 1272 a 15, *εἰ δὲ μή, μετέχειν νόμος κωλύει τῆς πολιτείας*, and Isaeus De Apollodor. Hered. § 30, *καὶ οὐ μόνον ἰδίᾳ ταῦτα γινώσκουσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ δημοσίᾳ τὸ κοινὸν τῆς πόλεως οὕτω ταῦτ' ἔγνωκε· νόμῳ γὰρ τῷ ἄρχοντι τῶν οἰκῶν, ὅπως ἂν μὴ ἐξηρημῶνται, προστάττει τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν*. *Νόμος* takes up *ὁ νομοθέτης*.

4. *ἄφρουρον*. 'Φρουράν Lacones dicebant τὴν στρατείαν, ut in nota illa formula οἱ ἔφοροι ἔφηναν φρουράν, Xen. Hell. 5. 4. 59' (Schn.).

6. *πολλοὺς γίνεσθαι πένητας*. Sus. 'many poor must come into being': Mr. Welldon, 'there will inevitably be a large body of poor': but I incline to translate (with Prof. Jowett) 'many must necessarily fall into poverty' (cp. c. 7. 1266 b 13, *φαῦλον τὸ πολλοὺς ἐκ πλουσιῶν γίνεσθαι πένητας*). The father of several sons would be likely to become a poor man, and the sons still poorer.

ἀλλὰ μὴν κ.τ.λ. This subject naturally follows. There being many poor men among the citizens, and all being eligible for the ephorship, the corruption of the ephorship followed from the unequal distribution of property.

8. *αὐτῇ*, 'by itself': cp. *αὐτογνώμονας*, 29.

αὐτοῖς. Bernays connects *αὐτοῖς* with *τῶν μεγίστων*, translating 'über die wichtigsten Angelegenheiten Sparta's' (Mr. Welldon, 'issues of the highest importance to the Lacedaemonian State'), but perhaps *αὐτοῖς* should be connected with the sentence generally and translated 'amongst them' or 'in the Lacedaemonian State' (cp. 1271 a 35, *ὅρος δὲ τῆς πολιτείας οὗτός ἐστιν αὐτοῖς ὁ πάτριος*, and c. 10. 1272 a 27, *τοῖς Κρησὶν ἢ τοῖς Λάκωσι*).

γίνονται κ.τ.λ. As to the nature of the distinction between the

demos and the *καλοὶ κάγαθοί* in the Lacedaemonian State, see Schömann, *Opusc. Acad.* 1. 138. It is not necessarily implied here that none but members of the demos ever became ephors; the meaning is, that all the seats in the college of ephors were as open to the demos as to anybody else (cp. 25, *καθίσταται ἐξ ἀπάντων*, and c. 6, 1265 b 39). It appears from 1271 a 3, however, that the senators also, though presumably *καλοὶ κάγαθοί*, were often bribeable.

10. *ἦσαν*. The tense is noticeable. Is it used because Aristotle is speaking here, as elsewhere in this chapter, of the time of the Lacedaemonian empire, or because he looks back to definite instances of corruption arising from poverty?

11. *ἐδήλωσαν*. Vict. 'sc. se esse tales ut muneribus facile labefactari possint': cp. *ἐδήλωσαν δέ*, 1269 b 37.

ἐν τοῖς Ἀνδρίοις, 'in the events at Andros,' 'in the Andros business': cp. 7 (5). 3. 1303 a 38, *μετὰ τὰ τυραννικά*: Isocr. *περὶ τοῦ ζεύγους* § 25, *τὴν δ' εὐνοίαν ἣν εἶχον εἰς τὸ πλῆθος, ἐν τοῖς τυραννικοῖς ἐπεδείξαντο* *συγγενεῖς γὰρ ὄντες Πεισιστράτου κ.τ.λ.*: and *τὰ Κύπρια*, the subject of an Epic poem, Aristot. *Poet.* 23. 1459 b 1. It is quite unknown to what Aristotle here refers, but I venture to suggest whether it is not possible that certain events of the year 333 B.C. are referred to. In that year the Persian fleet under Pharnabazus and Autophradates advanced from Chios first to Andros and then to Siphnos (nearer to Laconia), with the object of bringing about a rising in Greece against Macedon, and thus effecting a diversion in favour of Persia at the critical moment when Alexander was commonly thought to be 'caught and cooped up in Cilicia' (Grote, *Hist. of Greece*, 12. 157 n.). We have, indeed, no record of any negotiations between the ephors and the Persian admirals while the fleet was at Andros, though we know from Diodorus (17. 29) that the Lacedaemonians were already on the side of Persia, and that Memnon had won over many of the Greeks by means of bribes; but at Siphnos King Agis made his appearance in a single trireme, and commenced negotiations for a subsidy and for the despatch of a fleet and an army to his aid in the war which he was contemplating with Macedon. The news of Issus, however, arrived in the midst of these communications and nipped the project in the bud (see A. Schäfer, *Demosthenes und seine Zeit*, 3. 1. 163, who refers to Arrian 2. 13. 4 sq.: Curt. 4. 1. 37). If, as is probable, the ephors sent Agis on this errand, Aristotle may well have thought that they came near to ruining their country. *τὴν πόλιν*, 13, in any case probably means

the Lacedaemonian State, not Andros, for the fact that the corruptness of the Ephors nearly ruined Andros would not be to the point: Aristotle has to prove that it was perilous to their own State. If events of 333 B.C. are really referred to, the circumstance would be interesting, because it would show that this passage was added to, if not written, subsequently to that date. I mention the hypothesis for what it is worth.

14. *ισοτύραννον*. Cp. c. 6. 1265 b 40: Plato, *Laws* 712 D: Xen. *Rep. Lac.* 8. 3-4.

δημαγωγεῖν. Cp. 7 (5). 6. 1305 b 24 sqq. According to Plutarch, Agesilaus was fined by the ephors on one occasion for seeking to court the senators (*De Fraternali Amore*, c. 9, οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἔφοροι τοῦ Ἀγησιλάου τῶν ἀποδεικνυμένων ἀεὶ γερόντων ἐκάστῳ βούν ἀριστεῖον πέμποντος, ἐξημίωσαν αὐτὸν αἰτίαν ὑπειπόντες, ὅτι τοὺς κοινούς ἰδίους κτᾶται δημαγωγῶν καὶ χαριζόμενος).

15. ὥστε κ.τ.λ., 'so that, together with the kingship itself, the constitution received injury in this way also' (i.e. it suffered not only through the venality of the ephors, but also through the kings being forced to court them).

16. *δημοκρατία γὰρ κ.τ.λ.* Sepulv. 'nam ex optimatum imperio in principatum popularem mutabatur' (sc. *respublica*), and so Sus. and others, but the expression ἡ πολιτεία συνέβαινε δημοκρατία seems a strange one, and it is possible that *δημοκρατία* is the subject, not the predicate: cp. Plato, *Rep.* 545 C, τίνα τρόπον τιμοκρατία γένοιτ' ἂν ἐξ ἀριστοκρατίας. For *συνέβαινε*, cp. 2. 7. 1266 b 23.

17. For *συνέχει τὴν πολιτείαν*, cp. Demosth. *adv. Timocr.* c. 2, ἀ δοκεῖ συνέχειν τὴν πολιτείαν, τὰ δικαστήρια.

μὲν οὖν, 'true' or 'indeed,' answered by ἀλλά, 26. Aristotle has just been saying that the organization of the ephorate was such as to injure the constitution, and he now admits its value in holding the constitution together, only to reaffirm (ἀλλ' αἰρετὴν εἶδει κ.τ.λ., 26) his statement respecting its defects of organization.

18. διὰ τὸν νομοθέτην, 'owing to the lawgiver': cp. c. 11. 1273 b 22, and δι' αἰρετὴν, c. 5. 1263 a 29. It would seem that Theopompus must be referred to here: cp. 7 (5). 11. 1313 a 26 sqq. 'Plerumque γίγνεσθαι ἀπὸ τύχης dicitur, sed etiam διὰ τύχην, Phys. 2. 4. 195 b 32: *Rhet.* 1. 10. 1368 b 34' (*Bon. Ind.* 780 b 40 sq.). See critical note.

21. δεῖ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. All the MSS. have the word ταῦτά after *διαμένειν*, except P¹ O¹, which have ταυτά, and P⁴, which has ταῦτα (*Vet. Int.* 'has'). Ar. has 'oportet enim rempublicam quae duratura sit velle ut omnes civitatis partes consentiatque in statu

suo permaneat': he therefore probably read ταῦτά. But if we retain this word, τὴν πολιτείαν must, it would seem, be the subject of βούλεσθαι. The next sentence (23—26), however, certainly reads as if, not τὴν πολιτείαν, but πάντα τὰ μέρη were the subject of βούλεσθαι, and this impression will be confirmed, if we compare c. 10. 1272 a 32 sq.: c. 8. 1268 a 23 sqq.: 6 (4). 9. 1294 b 36 sqq.: 8 (6). 5. 1320 a 14 sqq., especially as εἶναι καὶ διαμένειν is used of constitutions in 7 (5). 9. 1309 b 38—40, οὐδετέραν μὲν γὰρ ἐνδέχεται αὐτῶν (i. e. democracy and oligarchy) εἶναι καὶ διαμένειν ἄνευ τῶν εἰσφόρων καὶ τοῦ πλήθους (cp. Eth. Nic. 8. 11. 1160 a 12). It is true that we gather from 6 (4). 12. 1296 b 15 and 7 (5). 9. 1309 b 16 sqq. that the safety of a constitution is sufficiently secured, if the stronger section of the elements of the State, not necessarily all of them, desire its preservation, but nevertheless I incline on the whole to think that ταῦτά should be omitted. It may have been added by some one who deemed it necessary for the completion of the sentence, or it may be a blundered dittography of πάντα, 21: a dittography of τὰ ἄλλα occurs in 1. 8. 1256 b 18, where Π¹ appear to repeat these words from 16 (see Susemihl's *apparatus criticus*). Schneider would omit ταῦτά or read τὴν αὐτήν in place of it; Bernays would read κατὰ ταῦτά. On the phrase μέρη τῆς πόλεως, which comes to Aristotle from Plato, Rep. 552 A, see vol. i. Appendix A. The 'parts of the State' are here βασιλεῖς, καλοὶ κἀγαθοί, and δῆμος—quite a different enumeration from those given in 4 (7). 8 and 6 (4). 4.

23. μὲν οὖν, 'saepe usurpatur ubi notio modo pronunciata amplius explicatur' (Bon. Ind. 540 b 42): so here πάντα τὰ μέρη are successively taken up and considered separately: a similar use of μὲν οὖν occurs in Soph. El. 6. 169 a 18 sqq.

τιμήν. Aristotle occasionally applies the term ἀρχή to a Kingship (e. g. in 7 (5). 10. 1313 a 8 and 2. 11. 1273 a 30).

24. ἄθλον. Cp. Xen. Rep. Lac. 10. 1—3, and Demosth. in Lept. c. 107. In the latter passage the very same words, τῆς ἀρετῆς ἄθλον, are used of the Lacedaemonian γερονσία (cp. Plutarch, Lycurg. c. 26, νικητήριον τῆς ἀρετῆς).

28. παιδαριώδης. The same thing is said in 1271 a 9 sq. of the κρίσις in the election of senators. Susemihl has already pointed out (Sus.³, Note 324) that the condemnation here passed on the method of electing ephors is not thus limited. We learn from Plutarch, Lyc. c. 26, how elections to the γερονσία were decided. The test was the comparative loudness of the shouts of approval evoked on the appearance in the popular assembly of the different candidates. Plato's language as to the ephorate—

ἐγγὺς τῆς κληρωτῆς ἀγαγὼν δυνάμεως (Laws 692 A: cp. 690 C)—has led to the conjecture that the election of the ephors was in some way or other determined by auspices. See Sus.², Note 324, and Schömann, Gr. Alterth. i. 247. Schömann suggests that the people may have designated a certain number of persons for the ephorate, and that five of those designated may have been selected for the office by taking the auspices. The language of Aristotle in 6 (4). 9. 1294 b 29 sq. has been held to imply that the people did not elect to the ephorate, and the passage before us does not expressly say that they did, though it implies that the office was in some sense an elective one (cp. Isocr. Panath. § 154). In c. 10. 1272 a 31 sqq. we have ἐνταῦθα δ' (in Crete) οὐκ ἐξ ἀπάντων αἰροῦνται τοὺς κόσμους, and as Aristotle is here contrasting the election of the cosmi with that of the ephors, his language might be taken to imply that the Lacedaemonians elected the ephors, if it were certain that we should supply οἱ Κρήτες with αἰροῦνται. But in c. 11. 1272 b 36 αἰροῦνται is used of the election of the Hundred and Four at Carthage, who were not elected by the people, if they were identical with the Hundred, for the Hundred were elected by the Pentarchies (c. 11. 1273 a 14). All we can be sure about, therefore, is that the ephors were elected in a way which Aristotle regarded as 'very childish.' He evidently thinks that the office might safely remain open to all, if the mode of election were improved. He seems, in fact, to hold that the 'very poor' and 'venal' men of whom he speaks (1270 b 9 sq.) would not then be elected ephors.

κρίσεων . . . μεγάλων. Sus.² compares 3. 1. 1275 b 9, οὐκ ἐν Λακεδαιμόνι τὰς τῶν συμβολαίων δικάζει τῶν ἐφόρων ἄλλος ἄλλας. Add 8 (6). 2. 1317 b 26, περὶ τῶν πλείστων καὶ τῶν μεγίστων καὶ τῶν κυριωτάτων, οἷον περὶ εὐθυνῶν καὶ πολιτείας καὶ τῶν ἰδίων συναλλαγμάτων.

30. κατὰ γράμματα καὶ τοὺς νόμους. For the omission of the article before γράμματα, see Bon. Ind. 109 b 44 sqq. Καί is explanatory, as in c. 5. 1263 a 15. The recently discovered Inscription containing a portion of the laws of Gortyna refers to its own provisions as τὰδε τὰ γράμματα (col. 12. 17), or τὰ ἐγγράμματα (col. 1. 54).

31. καὶ ἡ δίαίτα. Their mode of life as well as their powers, which in effect turn an ἀριστοκρατία into a democracy, 16. Cp. Isocr. ad Nicocl. § 31. Plato (Laws 674 A sq.) forbids wine to magistrates during their year of office. He does not seem, however, to have been aware of any excesses on the part of the ephors: see Laws 637 A. The ephors did not take their meals at the public mess-tables, but had a συσσίτιον of their own (see Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. i. 57, who refers to Plutarch, Cleom. c. 8).

82. τῷ βουλήματι τῆς πόλεως, 'the aim of the State.' We expect rather τοῦ νομοθέτου (cp. Eth. Nic. 2. 1. 1103 b 4), or τῆς πολιτείας (Scaliger), and the words πόλις and πολιτεία are often interchanged in the MSS.: still τῆς πόλεως is possible.

αὐτὴ μὲν γάρ, 'for that' etc.: compare the use of αὐτά in 4 (7). 12. 1331 a 21, and see Vahlen on Poet. 15. 1454 b 17.

83. τοῖς ἄλλοις, sc. πολῖταις (Coray).

μᾶλλον, 'rather than in the opposite direction,' as in c. 11. 1273 a 6, or = λίαν, as in c. 6. 1265 a 31? Probably the former.

ὑπερβάλλει, sc. ἡ διαίτα (Bon. Ind. 684 a 39). For the fact, cp. 5 (8). 4. 1338 b 12 sqq.

84. λάθρα τὸν νόμον ἀποδιδράσκοντας. Aristotle has here in his mind the language of Plato about the Spartans in Rep. 548 B, λάθρα τὰς ἡδονὰς καρπούμενοι, ὥσπερ παῖδες πατέρα, τὸν νόμον ἀποδιδράσκοντες. The expression, however, was perhaps first used by Alcibiades: see Aelian, Var. Hist. 13. 37. Lysander was said to be one of these recreants (Aelian, Var. Hist. 13. 8). Dercyllidas also liked to live away from Sparta (Xen. Hell. 4. 3. 2: cp. Plut. Lycurg. c. 15). As to the Spartan Archidamus, see Theopomp. Fr. 259 (Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 1. 322).

87. ἐπιεικῶν μὲν γάρ κ.τ.λ. Xenophon had adduced the arrangements respecting the senate in proof of the care taken by the law-giver of the State to encourage *καλοκἀγαθία* even in old age (de Rep. Lac. c. 10. 1); he had already dwelt (c. 4) on the lawgiver's skill in developing *ἀνδραγαθία* in the young (c. 4. 1-2). 'Ἀνδραγαθία is rather a Xenophontic than an Aristotelian word (Aristotle would seem from Bonitz' Index to use it nowhere else), and perhaps the aim of this passage is to controvert the opinion of Xenophon. As to the meaning of *ἀνδραγαθία*, see L. Schmidt, Ethik der alten Griechen 1. 301 sq. Xenophon, according to him, used it in much the same sense as *ἀρετή*, to denote 'moral perfection.' Συμφέρειν, sc. ταύτην τὴν ἀρχήν.

89. Aristotle seems to have held that judges of important causes should not retain their office after a certain age, for there is an old age of the mind as well as of the body. The view is noticeable, for we are familiar with the opposite practice. He apparently would not approve the life-long tenure of the members of the Athenian Areopagus. The best men in his own ideal State become priests in advanced life. Plato is of much the same opinion (Laws 755 A: 923 B): extreme old age in parents is for reverence rather than for use (Laws 931). The *γέροντες* of the Lacedaemonian State tried cases of homicide (3. 1. 1275 b 10). As to *διανοίας γῆρας*,

however, contrast de An. 1. 4. 408 b 19 sqq., though this passage may perhaps be only aporetic (see Wallace *ad loc.*), and compare Rhet. 2. 13. Giph. compares Lucr. 3. 445 sqq. For *ὥσπερ καὶ* answered by *καί*, Sus.¹ (Ind. Gramm. s. v. *ὥσπερ*) compares c. 8. 1269 a 9 sq.

- 1271 a. 2. ἀπιστεῖν, cp. 23 sqq. Contrast Polyb. 6. 10. 9, τῶν γερόντων, οἱ κατ' ἐκλογὴν ἀριστίνδην κεκριμένοι πάντες ἔμελλον αἰεὶ τῷ δικαίῳ προσνέμειν ἑαυτούς.

3. φαίνονται δὲ κ.τ.λ. 'And it is evident that those who have enjoyed this dignity have often been led by bribery and favouritism to deal recklessly with the public interests.' I have ventured (with Lamb. and others) to connect πολλὰ τῶν κοινῶν not only with καταχαριζόμενοι but also with καταδωροδοκούμενοι, though this use of καταδωροδοκεῖσθαι (med.) is uncommon and hardly finds a complete parallel in Demosth. de Falsa Legatione § 377, οἳ γὰρ ταῦθ' ἀπλῶς δωροδοκῶνται καὶ τιμὴν ἔχουσιν ἀπάντων τούτων οὗτοι ('they have done this because they have been bribed,' Shilleto), for the acc. here is of the thing done, not of the thing betrayed. Sepulv., Vict., Bern., and Sus., in fact, take πολλὰ τῶν κοινῶν with καταχαριζόμενοι only. They may be right, but the sentence seems to read rather the other way.

5. ἀνευθύνοῦς. 'Ανευθύνος is common in Aristotle: ἀνεύθυνος occurs only here, according to Bonitz' Index.

6. δόξειε δ' ἂν κ.τ.λ. Cp. Xen. Rep. Lac. 8. 4, ἔφοροι οὖν ἱκανοὶ μὲν εἰσι ζημιοῦν ὃν ἂν βούλωνται, κύριοι δ' ἐκπράττειν παραχρῆμα, κύριοι δὲ καὶ ἄρχοντας μεταξὺ καταπαῦσαι καὶ εἰρᾶι γε καὶ περὶ τῆς ψυχῆς εἰς ἀγῶνα καταστήσαι: they have also the power to inflict immediate punishment on elected magistrates for any infraction of the laws, as tyrants and the superintendents of the great festivals have. Aristotle does not approve this mode of exacting an account. He regards the power of the ephors as *ισοτύρανος* (1270 b 14) and probably wishes it to be regulated by law (cp. c. 10. 1272 b 5-7). The Athenian plan of requiring a public account from the magistrate at the close of his term of office would evidently be inapplicable or unsatisfactory in the case of magistracies held for life. It would seem from Rhet. 3. 18. 1419 a 31 that the ephors held office subject to accountability.

8. οὐ τοῦτον. 'Ad augendam oppositionis vim negatio, quae poterat ad universum enunciatum referri, ipsi nomini negato praeponitur, veluti 6 (4). 5. 1292 b 6: 2. 7. 1267 a 15' etc. (Bon. Ind. 539 a 5).

9. τὴν αἵρεσιν. For the acc. cp. c. 6. 1265 a 13. The subject

of approaching comment is first mentioned (in the acc.), and then the comment follows. The regulation which determines who may become candidates is distinguished from the selection (*κρίσις*), both being incidents of ἡ αἵρεσις. Perhaps *κρίσις* was the technical term: at all events both Xenophon (de Rep. Lac. 10. 1, 3) and Plutarch (Lyc. c. 26) use it in referring to the election of the senators at Sparta. This election was, in fact, an ἀγών, in which the prize was awarded to the best and most temperate of the candidates (see Xenophon and Plutarch, *ubi supra*). Plutarch describes the process, which seems, as Sus.³ (Note 333) says, to be a peculiar development of the rude old-fashioned method of voting by 'cry.' In 7 (5). 6. 1306 a 18 the process of choosing senators at Elis is said to be *δυναστευτική*, and similar to the same process in the Lacedaemonian State. Thus the childish method followed in the latter State seems somehow to have favoured the predominance of a few wealthy families. Contrast with Aristotle's account of the election of the Lacedaemonian senate those of Isocrates (Panath. § 154) and Polybius (6. 10. 9).

10. αἰτεῖσθαι, 'ask to be elected,' 'offer himself for election.' I do not think that the making of 'a personal canvass' (Mr. Well-don) is necessarily implied.

11. δεῖ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Cp. Plato, Rep. 557 E, τὸ δὲ μηδεμίαν ἀνάγκην, εἶπον, εἶναι ἄρχειν ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ πόλει, μηδ' ἂν ᾗς ἱκανὸς ἄρχειν.

18. νῦν δ' ὅπερ κ.τ.λ. We have just been told what ought to be: now we are told what is: compare for the contrast of δεῖ and νῦν δέ 1270 a 25 sq. and c. 11. 1273 b 21 sqq.

14. φιλοτίμους γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Sepulveda (who seems to read *τούτω*) translates (p. 55): 'ut enim cives ambitiosos redderet, hanc senatores deligendi rationem inivit, cum nemo non ambitiosus imperio se praefici petat.' Mr. Welldon also reads *τούτω* and translates in much the same way. It seems to me that this view of the passage is the right one, and that *τούτω* (cp. c. 11. 1273 b 20 and 3. 5. 1278 a 31 sq.), not *τούτοις*, is the true reading: I translate, therefore, 'for it is in his anxiety to make his citizens emulous of distinction, that he has adopted this regulation for the election of senators'—the regulation that the future senator must ask to be elected—'for' etc. To require men to ask to be elected is to make *φιλοτιμία* a condition of the attainment of the highest honours, and so to encourage the citizens to be *φιλότιμοι*. Sus. and others read *τούτω* but explain it as = τῷ φιλοτίμῳ. If *τούτοις* is read (with Π³ Bekk.), then we must translate, 'for in his anxiety to make his citizens emulous of distinction, he makes use of men of this type in filling vacancies

in the senate'; but *τούτοις κέχρηται πρὸς τὴν αἵρεσιν τῶν γερόντων* is an awkward way of expressing this.

18. *τῶν γ' ἀδικημάτων τῶν ἐκουσίων*. Π² Bekk.¹ read *τῶν γ' ἀδικημάτων ἐκουσίων*, and it is not impossible that instances might be found of a similar displacement of the adjective when emphatic (compare, for instance, Plato, Laws 713 D, *ταῦτόν δὲ καὶ ὁ θεὸς ἄρα φιλόανθρωπος ὦν τὸ γένος ἄμεινον ἡμῶν ἐφίστη τὸ τῶν δαιμόνων*: Theopomp. Fr. 143 (Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 1. 302), *ὅταν περὶ τὸν ἄροτον τρίτον καὶ σπόρον ἡ ὥρα ᾖ*), but the probability here is that, *ἀδικημάτων* immediately preceding *τῶν*, the latter word was omitted in copying by a natural and frequent error of copyists. The words imply that *ἀδικήματα ἀκούσια* are possible: contrast Eth. Nic. 5. 10. 1135 a 15-23. For the view expressed in this passage, cp. Plato, Laws 870: Eth. Nic. 5. 10. 1134 b 7. 'I would rather,' said Dr. Johnson, 'have the rod to be the general terror to all to make them learn, than tell a child, if you do thus or thus, you will be more esteemed than your brothers and sisters.' For other accounts in the Politics and elsewhere of the causes of *ἀδικία*, see note on 1267 a 5. Plato says of the timocratic State (Rep. 548 C)—*διαφανέστατον δ' ἐν αὐτῇ ἐστὶν ἔν τι μόνον ὑπὸ τοῦ θυμοειδοῦς κρατοῦντος, φιλονικίας καὶ φιλοτιμίας*.

19. *μέν* is probably not taken up either by *ἀλλὰ μὴν . . . γε*, 20 or by *δέ*, 22: it seems here as in 1270 a 34 to stand by itself, the course of the sentence being broken at *ἀλλὰ μὴν*.

20. *ἄλλος ἴστω λόγος*, 3. 14-17.

ἀλλὰ μὴν . . . γε, 'but certainly': cp. 3. 4. 1276 b 18, 1277 a 25, and see Ast, Lex. Platon. 1. 103.

21. *μὴ καθάπερ νῦν*. Göttl. 'intellige κατὰ τὸ γένος.' Cp. on this subject c. 11. 1272 b 38-41. Aristotle appears to have agreed with Lysander, if the object of the latter was not, as some thought (7 (5). 1. 1301 b 19 sq.), the abolition of the kingship, but the opening of it to the best men irrespectively of descent. Lysander's scheme was, according to Ephorus (ap. Plutarch. Lysand. c. 30), *ὥς χρὴ τῶν Εὐρωπαυντιδῶν καὶ Ἀγιαδῶν τὴν βασιλείαν ἀφελομένους εἰς μέσον θείναι καὶ ποιέσθαι τὴν αἵρεσιν ἐκ τῶν ἀρίστων*—a sentence continued as follows in the version of the same story given in [Plutarch,] Apophth. Lac. 229 E sqq. (Lysand. 14), *ἵνα μὴ τῶν ἀφ' Ἡρακλείδους, ἀλλ' οἷος Ἡρακλῆς τῇ ἀρετῇ κρινομένων τὸ γέρας ᾖ, ἢ κακείνος εἰς θεῶν τιμὰς ἀνήχθη*. Cp. also Plutarch, Comp. Lysandri et Sullae c. 2. Aristotle does not approve of the restriction of the kingship to the Heraclids, nor of the mode in which the kings were selected from their number. The merits of a father or a family should not help the son; his claims should be decided according to the life led by

him personally (cp. for *βίον* Eth. Nic. 10. 9. 1179 a 18 sq., and for *κρίνεσθαι* Pol. 8 (6). 7. 1321 a 30). Aristotle's language reminds us of the views expressed in the composition of Lysander, the substance of which appears to be given in the passage from the *Apophthegmata Laconica* quoted above.

22. *ὅτι δὲ ὁ νομοθέτης κ.τ.λ.* The connexion perhaps is—'it is impossible to make sure of educating men taken simply on grounds of seniority from a given family (1272 b 40) into models of manhood, and this the lawgiver himself seems virtually to admit.' *Ποιεῖν* 23, 30. *τοὺς βασιλείας*.

24. *συμπρεσβευτάς*, i.e. with the kings or one of them. Two ephors usually accompanied the king on campaigns, and it is to their presence, according to Schömann (Gr. Alterth. 1. 250), that Aristotle here refers. If so, however, the use of the word *συμπρεσβευτάς* seems strange. It is more likely that Aristotle refers to occasions on which the kings were sent on embassies. The lawgiver is here viewed as the author of these administrative traditions.

25. *σωτηρίαν ἐνόμιζον τῇ πόλει κ.τ.λ.* Contrast c. 2. 1261 a 30, *διόπερ τὸ ἴσον τὸ ἀντιπεπονηδὸς σώζει τὰς πόλεις*, and Rhet. 1. 4. 1360 a 19, *ἐν γὰρ τοῖς νόμοις ἐστὶν ἡ σωτηρία τῆς πόλεως*.

26. *οὐ καλῶς δ' οὐδὲ κ.τ.λ.* The defect in the arrangements respecting the *syssitia* here noticed does not seem to have occurred to Plato: cp. Laws 842 B.

28. *ἀπὸ κοινοῦ*, 'at the public expense': see the references in Liddell and Scott s.v. In c. 10. 1272 a 20 we have *ἐκ κοινοῦ τρέφεσθαι*: in 6 (4). 6. 1293 a 19, *τρέφεσθαι ἀπὸ τῆς πόλεως*. For the Cretan system, cp. c. 10. 1272 a 12 sqq. For *τὴν σύνοδον* ('meeting' or 'gathering'), Bonitz (Ind. 731 b 25) compares 4 (7). 12. 1331 b 10: 8 (6). 4. 1319 a 32. Compare also Plato, Laws 640 A, and Theaet. 173 D.

30. καὶ intensifies *σφόδρα* ('though some citizens are extremely poor' etc.).

32. *βούλεται μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ.* 'For he intends' etc. Cp. c. 6. 1265 b 40 sq. The rich are said (Plutarch, Lyc. c. 11) to have been violent in their opposition to the institution of *syssitia*.

33. *κατασκευάσμα*, 'device' perhaps rather than 'institution' (Lamb. 'inventum'). Compare the use of the word in 8 (6). 4. 1319 b 19—30.

γίνεται. See note on 1264 a 14.

35. *ὅρος δὲ κ.τ.λ.*, 'and this is the traditional standard by which participation in the advantages of the constitution is regulated in

the Lacedaemonian State.' Cp. c. 10. 1272 a 15, *εἰ δὲ μή, μετέχειν νόμος κωλύει τῆς πολιτείας, καθάπερ εἴρηται καὶ πρότερον*, and Plato, Rep. 551 A-B, a passage which throws light on the meaning of *ὅρος τῆς πολιτείας* here. In 8 (6). 2. 1317 b 11 the phrase seems to bear a different meaning, 'the criterion of a democratic constitution.'

38. καὶ ἑτεροὶ τινες. 'Critiae tyranni Λακεδαιμονίων πολιτείαν vel similes libros respici probabile est,' Bon. Ind. 822 a 37 sq.

39. στάσεως, as in Lysander's case, 7 (5). 1. 1301 b 19 sq.: 7 (5). 7. 1306 b 33.

ἐπὶ γὰρ τοῖς βασιλεῦσιν. Bonitz (Ind. 268 b 36) compares Rhet. 2. 6. 1384 a 9, *ἐπὶ τοῦτοις*, 'praeterea,' apparently making the meaning 'for in addition to the kings,' but perhaps something more than this is meant—'as a check upon the kings' (cp. 1271 a 23 sq.: 6 (4). 15. 1299 b 36, *οἱ πρόβουλοι καθεστᾶσιν ἐπὶ τοῖς βουλευταῖς*).

40. οὗσι στρατηγοῖς ἀδίδοις. Cp. 3. 15. 1285 b 38. These words are probably added to show how it is that the Admiralship can fairly be called an additional Kingship. It is because the Kingship is nothing more than a perpetual Generalship. It should be noted that an *ἀδιδος ἀρχή* is apparently distinguished from one held for life in Polyb. 6. 45. 5.

1271 b. 1. Πλάτων ἐν τοῖς νόμοις, 'p. 625 C-638 B: cf. p. 660 sqq.: p. 666 E: p. 688 A sq.: p. 705 D' Sus.¹

3. χρησίμη. 'Feminini forma et χρήσιμος et (fortasse paullo rarius) *χρησίμη* exhibetur' (Bon. Ind. 854 b 19).

4. ἀπόλλυντο δὲ ἄρξαντες. Cp. 4 (7). 14. 1334 a 6, *αἱ γὰρ πλείστα τῶν τοιούτων πόλεων πολεμοῦσαι μὲν σώζονται, κατακτησάμεναι δὲ τὴν ἀρχὴν ἀπόλλυνται*. For *ἄρξαντες* in the sense of 'having acquired empire,' cp. *σχολάσαντες*, 1270 a 4, and *κοινωνήσαντες*, c. 5. 1263 b 28, and see Schömann's note on *ἐφορεύσας δὲ τις ἀνὴρ δυνατός* in his edition of Plutarch's Agis and Cleomenes, p. 106. As to the fact, see Plutarch, Agis 5. 1. The ruin of the Lacedaemonian State is also traced to *ὀλιγανθρωπία* in 1270 a 33, but the deeper cause of it is now for the first time dwelt upon. A fuller culture, moral and intellectual, would have taught the Spartans to resist the temptations of their newly acquired wealth and power: cp. 4 (7). 15. 1334 a 22-34. Ephorus had said much the same thing of the Thebans in a striking passage of his history (Fr. 67: Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 1. 254): compare also Plutarch's remarks on the character of Marius (Marius c. 2).

8. κυριωτέραν, 'more sovereign, more *ἀρχιτεκτονική*,' as in Eth. Nic. 1. 1. 1094 a 26.

τούτου δὲ κ.τ.λ. The fault now noticed is hinted by Plato, Laws

661 D—662 B. Isocrates had said much the same thing (Panath. §§ 187—8, 228). Aristotle virtually repeats the charge in 4 (7). 14. 1333 b 9: cp. Eth. Eud. 7. 15. 1248 b 37 sqq. He finds much the same fault with Carthage in c. 11. 1273 a 37 sqq.

7. *τάγαθὰ τὰ περιμάχητα* are goods for which the many strive (cp. Rhet. 1. 6. 1363 a 8 sqq.), such as wealth, honours, bodily pleasures, Eth. Nic. 9. 8. 1168 b 16 sqq.

8. *καλῶς*. Sus.² (Note 346^b) compares 4 (7). 1. 1323 a 40.

ὅτι μέντοι ταῦτα κ.τ.λ. Cp. 4 (7). 15. 1334 a 40—b 3.

10. *φάουλως δὲ ἔχει κ.τ.λ.* In this passage the words of Archidamus (Thuc. 1. 80. 4)—*οὔτε ἐν κοινῷ ἔχομεν (χρήματα) οὔτε ἐτοίμως ἐκ τῶν ἰδίων φέρομεν*—seem to be present to the mind of Aristotle. Polybius (6. 49. 8 sqq.) draws a contrast between the Lacedaemonian and Roman States in this respect.

11. *οὔτε . . τε*. 'Not only is there nothing in the public treasury, but they also are slow to pay extraordinary contributions.' For *οὔτε* followed by *τε*, cp. c. 10. 1272 b 19 sqq.

ἐν τῇ κοινῇ, 'in the public treasury.' See Liddell and Scott s.v. for this sense of the word; they refer among other passages to Thuc. 6. 8. 2, *καὶ περὶ τῶν χρημάτων ὡς εἴη ἐτοίμα ἐν τε τοῖς ἱεροῖς πολλὰ καὶ ἐν τοῖς κοινοῖς*.

12. *ἀναγκαζομένοις*, 'though they are compelled': cp. c. 5. 1264 a 32 and 7 (5). 9. 1309 b 12.

13. *διὰ γὰρ κ.τ.λ.* Here most of the territory is said to belong to the citizens. In Plutarch's life of Lycurgus (c. 8), on the contrary, we are told that Lycurgus made 9000 lots for the Spartans and 30,000 for the Perioeci, nor is there anything to show that the Spartan lots were larger than the Perioecic. In the division made by Agis (Plutarch, Agis c. 8)—4500 Spartan lots against 15,000 for Perioecic hoplites—much the same proportion obtains. It is very possible (cp. 7 (5). 7. 1307 a 34 sq.) that the portion of Laconia belonging to the citizens increased as time went on, and that the aim of Agis was to restore what he conceived to have been the proportion at the outset. We see that the *εἰσφοραὶ* of the State fell to a large extent, if not wholly, on land: as to Athens, see Boeckh, Publ. Econ. of Athens E. T., p. 506.

16. *τὴν μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ.* Aristotle here describes the result of the lawgiver's arrangements.

17. *φιλοχρημάτων*, for the lawgiver has not brought the extravagant habits of the women, who nevertheless rule their husbands, under the control of the State, and he has taught his citizens to prefer wealth to virtue (1271 b 7 sqq.).

18. ταῦτα γὰρ κ.τ.λ. The translation probably is, 'for these are the main points for censure,' not 'for these are the main censures which one may pass upon it': cp. Demosth. in Lept. c. 148, οὐ τοῦτ' ἐπιτιμῶ. It is true that ἐπιτιμῶν is used in 1271 a 38 with a dative of the thing found fault with, and that Aristotle does not seem to use ἐπιτιμῶν with an accusative in this sense anywhere else; still we have τῶν ἐπιτιμηθέντων ἄν in c. 11. 1273 a 2 and αἱ ἐπιτιμώμεναι τῶν κακίων in Eth. Nic. 3. 7. 1114 a 30.
- C. 10. 20. The similarity of the Cretan institutions to those of the Lacedaemonian State must have been early recognized, for Herodotus found the belief prevailing among the Lacedaemonians that Lycurgus had derived his institutions from Crete (Hdt. i. 65). Plato in the Republic (544 C) classes the Cretan and Lacedaemonian constitutions together as timocracies and makes the same description serve for both (547 A sqq.). And so again in the Laws the chief interlocutor draws little or no distinction between the constitutions under which his Cretan and Lacedaemonian comrades live; he applies the same criticisms to both (631 B sqq., 634, 635 sqq., 780 E sqq.). He finds in the one constitution no less than in the other a mixture of monarchy, or authoritative government, with democracy, or the principle of freedom; both are constitutions in the truest sense of the word, inasmuch as they are framed with a view to the common good, whereas in many States part of the citizens are slaves to the rest. It is as hard to decide with regard to the constitution of Cnosus as it is with regard to the Lacedaemonian constitution, whether it is a democracy, oligarchy, aristocracy, or kingship (712 E). Not only Plato, but Xenophon, Ephorus, and Callisthenes are said by Polybius (6. 45 sq.) to have treated the Cretan and Lacedaemonian constitutions as the same, and we see from Strabo, p. 481 sq., that Ephorus did in fact trace many resemblances between them, though he mentioned certain customs as peculiar to Crete (Strab. p. 483) and also spoke of the Lacedaemonians as having 'perfected' the Cretan institutions, which implies that they had altered them to a certain extent. He describes how Cretan freedom was guaranteed by the unanimity and valour which were the fruits of the constitution, in language which contrasts strangely with Aristotle's remark, σώζεται διὰ τὸν τόπον, and with his reference to intervals of civil discord during which the Cretan States were at the mercy of any one who chose to assail them. Ephorus probably wrote, as Plato certainly did, before the raid of Phalaecus (345 B.C.) had

revealed the weakness of the Cretan laws, whereas Aristotle wrote after it. It is perhaps for this reason that Aristotle is far more alive than Plato or Ephorus to the differences between the Cretan and the Lacedaemonian constitution. So far indeed as deviations from the best constitution are concerned, he agrees that the same criticisms are applicable to both (c. 11. 1273 a 2 sq.), but while in the chapters on the Lacedaemonian and Carthaginian constitutions he inquires how far the lawgiver has succeeded in his design of constructing an *ἀριστοκρατία*, he seems to think it hardly worth while to raise this question as to the Cretan constitution; the doubt is rather whether it is a legally ordered constitution at all. Still there seem to have been points in which the Cretan laws were superior to the Lacedaemonian. The freedom of the Cretan States from troubles with their serfs appears indeed to have been no more than a happy accident. But the Cretan *syssitia* were better organized than the Lacedaemonian, for the citizens were not expected to contribute a quota to them, and poverty cost no man his rights under the constitution. No fear can have been felt in Crete of a paucity of citizens, for while in the Lacedaemonian State rewards were given to the father of more than two sons, the Cretan lawgiver discouraged large families. The Cretan women, again, though Plato speaks of them in the *Laws* (780 E sqq.) as equally *ἀνομοθέητοι* with the Spartan, seem to have been less indulged, for dowries were limited in amount to half a son's share (see above on 1270 a 21), and, at Gortyna at any rate, certain important portions of the inheritance were reserved for sons and could not pass to daughters (see below on 1272 a 17). If in the Lacedaemonian State the caprice of testators was, as Aristotle implies, among the causes which led to the concentration of the land in a few hands, Gortyna would seem to have had nothing to fear on this score, for there is no indication in the fragment which we possess of its laws that wills were known there (Bücheler und Zitelmann, *Das Recht von Gortyn*, p. 134). The inheritor of an heiress, again, unlike his Spartan compeer, had no right to give her in marriage to any one he pleased: if he were unwilling to marry her, the right to her hand passed to the next in succession (Bücheler und Zitelmann, p. 151 sq.). How far Crete had its reward in a comparatively even distribution of landed property, we are hardly in a position to say; the language of Polybius (6. 46. 1) points the other way, at any rate as to his own time. A further fact may be noted to the credit of the Cretan States, that though, unlike the Lacedaemonian

daemonian, they had no ambitious dreams of empire, they nevertheless maintained and enforced a laborious system of gymnastic training.

On the other hand, the constitutional organization of the Cretan States was very defective. The government in each of them was in the hands of ten Cosmi and of a Boulê composed of persons who had held the office of Cosmus. We see that this office was not held for life, but whether it was an annual office in the time of Aristotle, as it seems to have been in that of Polybius (6. 46. 4), is uncertain. Aristotle's use of the word *μεταξύ* in 1272 b 5 appears to imply that it was held for some definite term or other, though Zitelmann points out (Bücheler und Zitelmann, p. 54) that the expression 'if he quits office,' and not 'when he quits office,' is used of a Cosmus in the law of Gortyna (col. 1. 52). The Cosmi had large powers, for they were not only the rulers of the State, but also its generals in war. It would perhaps be hardly safe to infer from *αἰροῦνται*, 1272 a 34, that they were elected by the whole citizen-body, but we are distinctly told that only the members of certain *gentes* were eligible; the people, however, acquiesced in their exclusion from the office, because it brought those who held it no illicit gains; nevertheless the monopoly of supreme authority by a few families, which was all the more marked as the powers of the popular assembly were small, cost the Cretan States dear, for it led to the occasional displacement of the Cosmi by violent means. The worst point in the working of Cretan institutions, however, was the insubordination of the most powerful men. They occasionally carried their turbulence to the length of declaring an abeyance of the office of Cosmus, the result being a temporary dissolution of the body politic. The *δυνατοί* here referred to would probably belong to the families whose members were alone eligible to this office. It is evident that whatever the effect of the *syssitia* may have been in equalizing rich and poor, the people in Crete readily rallied round *δυνατοί*, just as in youth they formed *ἀγέλαι* under the leadership of a *δυνατός* (Ephor. ap. Strab. p. 483). In an island so rich in legend as Crete the great families would be likely to be strong.

Ἡ δὲ Κρητικὴ πολιτεία. This must mean the constitution which prevailed in the Cretan cities, for Crete was not gathered into one State. 'The forms of government established in the Dorian colonies in Crete' (and, it would seem, in the Cretan cities generally) 'so closely resembled each other, that we find one only described as common to all' (Thirlwall, *Hist. of Greece* 1. 284).

According to Ephorus, Lyctus Gortyna and some petty towns had remained truer to the primitive institutions of Crete than Cnosus (Ephor. ap. Strab. p. 481). How much Aristotle has drawn in this chapter from Ephorus will best be seen, if a few extracts from Strabo's summary of Ephorus' account of the Cretan constitution are appended (Strab. pp. 481-2)—λέγεσθαι δ' ὑπό τινων ὡς Λακωνικά εἶη τὰ πολλὰ τῶν νομιζομένων Κρητικῶν, τὸ δ' ἀληθές εὐρῆσθαι μὲν ὑπ' ἐκείνων, ἡκριβωκέαι δὲ τοὺς Σπαρτιάτας . . . καὶ δὴ καὶ τὰ Λυττίων νόμματα ποιεῖσθαι μαρτύρια τοὺς τὰ Λακωνικά πρεσβύτερα ἀποφαίνοντας· ἀποίκους γὰρ ὄντας φυλάττειν τὰ τῆς μητροπόλεως ἔθνη, ἐπεὶ ἄλλως γε εὐθὲς εἶναι τὸ τοὺς βέλτιον συνηστώτας καὶ πολιτευομένους τῶν χειρόνων ζηλωτὰς ἀποφαίνειν· οὐκ ἐν δὲ ταῦτα λέγεσθαι . . . πολλὰς γοῦν τῶν ἀποικίδων μὴ φυλάττειν τὰ πάτρια, πολλὰς δὲ καὶ τῶν μὴ ἀποικίδων ἐν Κρήτῃ τὰ αὐτὰ ἔχειν τοῖς ἀποκόμοις ἔθνη (cp. 1271 b 28 sq., where Aristotle adopts Ephorus' view that the colonists of Lyctus found the characteristic Cretan institutions already existing there on their arrival). Besides (Ephorus continues) Althaemenes the founder of the settlement lived five generations before Lycurgus: τῶν δ' ἀρχαίων τὰ μὲν καὶ τὰς διοικήσεις ἔχειν τὰς αὐτὰς καὶ τὰς ἐπωνυμίας, ὥσπερ καὶ τὴν τῶν γερόντων ἀρχὴν . . . τοὺς ἐφόρους δὲ τὰ αὐτὰ τοῖς ἐν Κρήτῃ κόσμοις διοικοῦντας ἐτέρως ὠνομάσθαι· τὰ δὲ συσσίτια ἀνδρεία παρὰ μὲν τοῖς Κρησίν καὶ νῦν ἔτι καλεῖσθαι (cp. Dosiadas ap. Athen. Deipn. 143 b), παρὰ δὲ τοῖς Σπαρτιάταις μὴ διαμῖναι καλούμενα ὁμοίως πρότερον· παρ' Ἀλκίμαϊ γοῦν οὕτω κεῖσθαι "φοῖνας δὲ καὶ ἐν θιάσοισιν ἀνδρείων παρὰ δαιτυμόνεσσι πρέπει παιᾶνα κατάρχειν." Then follows, in the form in which it was current among the Cretans, the story of Lycurgus' visit to Crete after giving up his guardianship of the child Charilaus; this is told at greater length than Aristotle tells it in 1271 b 24 sqq., but to the same effect, except that Aristotle does not allow (cp. 6 (4). 11. 1296 a 20) that Lycurgus ever was king, while the next allegation of these Cretan informants of Ephorus—the statement that Thaletas was the instructor of Lycurgus—is rejected in c. 12. 1274 a 29 sqq. on grounds of chronology, and Aristotle is silent in the Politics as to Lycurgus having, like Minos, asked for guidance in his legislation from a god, though in the Politics (Aristot. Fragm. 492. 1558 a 30 sqq.) he would seem to have followed Ephorus and his Cretan authorities in this matter. Cp. also Strab. p. 476, *ιστόρηται δ' ὁ Μίνως νομοθέτης γενέσθαι σπουδαίους θαλαττοκρατῆσαι τε πρῶτος*, where Ephorus is perhaps again referred to, for he is quoted a few lines lower. The germ of some of the statements in 1271 b 32 sqq. may, in fact, be detected in some lines of the poem which passes under the name of Scymnus Chius—lines which

evidently reproduce passages of Ephorus: see Ephor. Fragm. 61 (Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. i. 249):—

Πρώτους δὲ Κρητὰς φασὶ τῆς Ἑλληνικῆς
ἀρξῆς θαλάττης, ὥς τε νησιωτίδας
πάντας κατασχεῖν, ὥς τε καὶ συνοικίσαι (cp. 1271 b 38)
αὐτῶν Ἐφορος εἴρηκεν, εἶναι φησὶ τε
ἐπώνυμον τὴν νῆσον ἀπὸ Κρητὸς τινοῦ,
τοῦ δὴ γενομένου βασιλέως αὐτόχθονος
πλοῦν ἡμέρας ἀπέχειν δὲ τῆς Λακωνικῆς (cp. 1271 b 35).

The statements of Diodorus 5. 78. 3-4 seem to be based on the same passage of Ephorus. I have not observed that any commentator has pointed out its resemblance to the passage 1271 b 35 sqq.

πάρεγγυς. Ephorus, according to Polybius (6. 45: cp. 6. 46. 9 sq.), treated the Lacedaemonian and Cretan constitutions as identical. Polybius says the same thing less emphatically of Xenophon, Callisthenes, and Plato.

21. μικρὰ μὲν οὐ χεῖρον, e. g. the syssitia.

ἦττον γλαφυρῶς, 'with less neatness of finish,' explained by **ἦττον διήρθρωται**, 24. It is an exception to the general rule, when Charondas is found, c. 12. 1274 b 7, to be **τῇ ἀκριβείᾳ τῶν νόμων γλαφυρώτερος καὶ τῶν νῦν νομοθετῶν**.

22. λέγεται, by Herodotus (1. 65), who says that according to the Lacedaemonians themselves Lycurgus derived his laws from Crete (contrast Plato, Laws 624 A), whereas others ascribed them to the counsels of the Pythia; and by Ephorus, as we have seen, who appears to have blended the two accounts and to have traced the institutions to Crete, though he adds that Lycurgus promulgated them as proceeding from the Delphian Apollo (Strabo, pp. 481-2). Xenophon (Rep. Lac. c. 8. 5) and Plato (Laws 624 A: 632 D: 634 A: contrast Minos 318 C sq.) say nothing of the derivation from Crete (Trieber, Forschungen p. 73 sq.). Isocrates boldly alleges that Lycurgus borrowed from Thesean Athens (Panath. §§ 152-3), but this is only 'his way.' On **καὶ . . . δέ**, 'and also,' see Liddell and Scott **δέ** iii, and cp. Pol. 3. 16. 1287 a 7.

24. ἦττον διήρθρωται, 'less elaborated,' 'less fully worked out in detail': cp. Oecon. 1. 3. 1343 b 16. The word is sometimes used of the change of an embryo into a fully articulated animal—e. g. in Hist. An. 7. 3. 583 b 23: so **διαρθροῦν** in Probl. 3. 31. 875 b 22 is replaced by **διακριβοῦν**, 24 (**ἡκριβοῦναι δὲ τοὺς Σπαρτιάτας** is the expression used by Ephorus, ap. Strab. p. 481): cp. de Gen. An.

1. 17. 721 b 34, *συγκεχυμένον καὶ οὐ διαθρομμένον τὸ γράμμα*, and Eth. Nic. 1. 7. 1098 a 22, *δόξει δ' ἂν παντὸς εἶναι προαγαγεῖν καὶ διαθρῶσαι τὰ καλῶς ἔχοντα τῇ περιγραφῇ, καὶ ὁ χρόνος τῶν τοιούτων εὐρετῆς ἢ συνεργὸς ἀγαθὸς εἶναι*, which confirms what is here said as to the difference between that which is earlier in date and that which is later.

25. *τὴν ἐπιτροπείαν*. Cp. 6 (4). 11. 1296 a 20, *οὐ γὰρ ἦν βασιλεύς*. However, the guardianship after the birth of Charilaus was admitted by some who, like Ephorus (Strabo p. 482), held that Lycurgus was king till Charilaus was born.

Χαρῖλλου. See critical note.

26. *καταλιπὼν*. Cp. Andoc. c. Alcib. c. 17, *κατέλιπε τὸ ἔργον*.

27. *διὰ τὴν συγγένειαν*, i. e. the relationship of Lyctus, a Laconian colony in Crete, to its mother-city. The same expression is used in 1. 2. 1252 b 21 sq., and probably of the same relation. Strabo (p. 476) found *Λύκτος* the name of the city in Homer, but he writes it himself *Λύκτος* (cp. *νυκτί* = *νυκτί* in the Law of Gortyna, col. 2. 14), and this is the form used on coins and in inscriptions (Bursian, Geogr. von Griechenland, 2. 569. 3). On its remarkable situation commanding the one zig-zag track which leads from its fertile plain to the mountain-pastures, see Bursian *ibid.* p. 570. *Λύκτος* is 'Cretan for *ὑψηλός*' (Liddell and Scott, s. v.).

30. *διὸ καὶ νῦν κ.τ.λ.* Cp. 4 (7). 10. 1329 b 16, *διὸ καὶ νῦν ἔτι τῶν ἀπ' ἐκείνου τιμῆς χρώνται τοῖς συσσιτίοις καὶ τῶν νόμων ἐνίοις*, and see vol. I. Appendix E (p. 575, note 2). For *τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον*, cp. 3. 1276 a 13, *εἴπερ οὖν καὶ δημοκρατοῦνται τιμῆς κατὰ τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον*.

31. *ὥς κατασκευάσαντος*, 'their view being that' etc.

32. *δοκεῖ δ' ἡ νῆσος κ.τ.λ.* What follows down to *Κάμικον* (40) is evidently taken from Ephorus: this is clear from the lines of Scymnus Chius quoted above. The passage may be an interpolation, but it is more probable that it was placed where it stands by the hand of Aristotle himself, who has already drawn largely in this chapter from Ephorus, and may well have added it in order to show that there was nothing improbable in the view that the Lacedaemonians owed their famous laws to Crete. Crete, he in effect says, though now so out of the world, is well adapted by nature for supremacy over the Greek race, for it commands the Aegean sea, round which the Greek race is planted. This the Lacedaemonian king Agis III saw, when in B.C. 333 in preparation for an attack on the power of Macedon he despatched his brother Agesilaus to secure Crete.

καὶ before *πρὸς τὴν ἀρχήν* is translated by Sus. 'also,' not 'both,'

and he is probably right. For *πεφυκέναι πρὸς*, cp. Rhiet. 1. 5. 1361 b 10 sq.

34. *πάση . . . τῇ θαλάσῃ*, 'the sea as a whole' (see above on 1. 4. 1253 b 33). What sea, however, is referred to? Evidently ἡ Ἑλληνικὴ θάλασσα, if we compare the lines of Scymnus Chius quoted above on 1271 b 20, with which *σχεδὸν τῶν Ἑλλήνων κ.τ.λ.*, 34, agrees, and ἡ Ἑλληνικὴ θάλασσα would seem to be the Aegean ('the sea by the Greeks familiarly called their own,' Thirlwall, Hist. of Greece, 1. 2), not the Mediterranean: cp. Thuc. 1. 4, and Plutarch, Eumenes c. 19, *ὅπως μὴδεὶς αὐτῶν εἰς Μακεδονίαν ἄπεισι μὴδὲ ὄψεται τὴν Ἑλληνικὴν θάλατταν*. The explanation *ἀπέχει γὰρ κ.τ.λ.*, 35, seems to suggest a reference to the Aegean. We find, in fact, that Eudoxus placed Crete in the Aegean (Strabo p. 474), a view to which Strabo objects. For the connexion of empire in Greece with the sea, cp. Thuc. 1. 15. Ephorus (Fr. 67: Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 1. 254) praised Boeotia for being *τριθάλαττος* and pronounced it well-adapted for hegemony. So in Pol. 4 (7). 6. 1327 b 4 an adequate fleet is considered essential for hegemony over other States.

ἐπὶκειται, 'lies close to,' perhaps with some notion of commanding or dominating: cp. Polyb. 1. 42. 6, and 5. 44. 4, 5, *ἐπὶκειται δὲ καὶ κρατεῖ τῶν καλουμένων Κασπίων πυλῶν*.

35. *ἀπέχει γὰρ κ.τ.λ.* 'From the isle of Cythera, which is parted by a narrow channel from Laconia, the snowy summits of the Cretan Ida are clearly visible, and from them the eye can probably reach the Rhodian Atabyrus and the mountains of Asia Minor' (Thirlwall, Hist. of Greece, 1. 2). Cp. Diod. 5. 59. 2, *Διὸς ἱερὸν τοῦ προσαγορευομένου Ἀταβυρίου . . . κείμενον ἐπὶ τινος ὑψηλῆς ἄκρας, ἀφ' ἧς ἴστιν ἀφορᾶν τὴν Κρήτην*. This temple was in Rhodes.

39. *τῇ Σικελίᾳ*, also an island.

40. *ἀνάλογον*, here an adverb: see on this word Liddell and Scott, and Bon. Ind. 48 a 51 sqq. The Cretan institutions are said to be 'analogous' to the Lacedaemonian, whereas in c. 11. 1272 b 33 sqq. some of the Carthaginian institutions are said to be 'analogous,' and others 'similar' (*παραπλήσια*) to the Lacedaemonian. Things may be 'analogous' without being 'alike' (Hist. An. 2. 1. 497 b 33: de Part. An. 1. 4. 644 a 16 sqq.: see Bon. Ind. 48 a 46), but here a certain amount of likeness is no doubt implied; still 'analogous' is probably a less strong word than 'similar.'

ἡ Κρητικὴ τάξις. Not only *τῆς πολιτείας ἡ τάξις*, 1272 a 4, but the whole body of Cretan institutions (see above on 1269 a 9).

41. γεωργοῦσι τε γὰρ κ.τ.λ. On the importance of this severance between the military and cultivating classes, which was common to the Lacedaemonian and Cretan States and also to Egypt, see 4 (7). 10. 1329 a 40 sqq. Here as there the *syssitia* are mentioned in immediate connexion with it, perhaps as an institution tending to mark off soldiers from cultivators (cp. Hdt. 1. 65, where *syssitia* are included under τὰ εἰς πόλεμον ἔχοντα). Compare Strabo, p. 542, εἴρηται δὲ καὶ τοῦτο, ὅτι πρῶτοι τὴν Ἡράκλειαν κτίσαντες Μιλήσιοι τοὺς Μαρῖανδυνοὺς ἐλωτεύειν ἠνάγκασαν τοὺς προκατέχοντας τὸν τόπον, ὥστε καὶ πιπράσκεσθαι ἐπ' αὐτῶν, μὴ εἰς τὴν ὑπερορίαν δέ (συμβῆναι γὰρ ἐπὶ τοῦτοις), καθάπερ Κρησὶ μὲν ἐθήτευν ἡ Μινῶα καλουμένη σύνοδος, Θετταλοῖς δὲ οἱ Πενίσται.

4. ἔτι δὲ τῆς πολιτείας ἡ τάξις (sc. ἔχει ἀνάλογον). See note on 1272 a. 1264 b 31.

οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἔφοροι κ.τ.λ. Trieber (Forschungen, p. 90 n.) justly remarks that Aristotle seems to be in conflict with himself, when he derives the ephorship from Crete as if it had been introduced by Lycurgus, while nevertheless he ascribes its institution to Theopompus (7 (5). 11. 1313 a 25 sq.), unless indeed he supposes that Theopompus also borrowed from Crete. The functions of the *cosmi* do not seem to have been quite the same as those of the ephors, for they commanded the troops on a campaign (1272 a 9), which the ephors did not.

8. ἴσοι, 'correspond to': cp. ἀνάλογον, 1271 b 40. Cp. Soph. O. T. 845, 1498, and see Prof. Jebb's notes. Cp. also Lysias Or. 19. 36.

βασιλεία δὲ κ.τ.λ. Aristotle goes on to mention other similarities between the Lacedaemonian and Cretan constitutions. Kingship once existed in Crete, as it still does in the Lacedaemonian State, and the popular assembly in Crete is like the Lacedaemonian. Thirlwall (Hist. of Greece, 1. 285) thinks that Aristotle probably 'has the age of Minos in his view,' but, as he points out, Herodotus mentions (4. 154) a King of Axus in Crete as grandfather of the founder of Cyrene according to the Cyrenean tradition. We are perhaps in the region of fable when we read in Diodorus (5. 59. 1) the moving history of 'Althaemenes, son of Catreus, king of the Cretans,' and still more when we mount up to the autochthonous King Cres mentioned in the lines of Scymnus Chius. For πρότερον μὲν answered by εἶτα, see Bon. Ind. s.v. εἶτα.

11. κυρία δ' οὐδενὸς κ.τ.λ. With the passage before us should be compared Aristot. Fragm. 493. 1558 b 9 (Plut. Lycurg. c. 6)—for what Plutarch here says may well be based on the Λακεδαιμονίων

Πολιτεία of Aristotle, whom he mentions by name shortly before—*τοῦ δὲ πλήθους ἀβροισθέντος εἰπεῖν μὲν οὐδενὶ γνώμην τῶν ἄλλων ἐφέετο, τὴν δ' ὑπὸ τῶν γερόντων καὶ τῶν βασιλείων προτεθείσων ἐπικρίνας κύριος ἦν ὁ δῆμος*, and also *Pol. 2. 11. 1273 a 9, ἃ δ' ἂν εἰσφέρωσιν οὗτοι* (i.e. the Carthaginian Suffetes and senators), οὐ διακούσαι μόνον ἀποδιδάσκει τῷ δήμῳ τὰ δόξαντα τοῖς ἄρχουσιν, ἀλλὰ κύριοι κρίνουν εἰσὶ καὶ τῷ βουλομένῳ τοῖς εἰσφερομένοις ἀντίπειν ἔξεστιν, ὅπερ ἐν ταῖς ἐτέραις πολιτείαις οὐκ ἔστιν (i.e. in the Lacedaemonian and Cretan constitutions). It is not quite clear whether *ὅπερ—ἔστιν* refers to both κύριοι—εἰσὶ and τῷ βουλομένῳ—ἔξεστιν, or only to the latter clause. We have, however, a definite intimation in the passage before us that the only power possessed by the assembly in Crete was that of confirming the resolutions of the senators and cosmi (cp. *Polyb. 22. 15. 1 [21. 32. 1, Hultsch]*, referred to by Liddell and Scott s. v. *συνεπιψηφίζω—δόξαντος δὲ τῷ συνεδρίῳ καὶ τοῦ δήμου συνεπιψηφίσαντος, ἐκυρώθη τὰ κατὰ τὰς διαλύσεις*). It might probably withhold that confirmation, and most authorities think that, if it did so, the resolution laid before it remained without legal force, but Gilbert (*Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 221*) thinks otherwise, and there is much to be said for his view, if we take *ὅπερ—ἔστιν* to refer to κύριοι κρίνουν εἰσὶ as well as to τῷ βουλομένῳ—ἔξεστιν. In any case the fact that it was not open to any member of the assembly who pleased to speak against the proposals of the senate and cosmi—whether any one at all was empowered to do so, we are not distinctly told, though we gather that any member who pleased might speak in support of them—must have tended to make a refusal to confirm an event of rare occurrence. Still the rights of the members of the assembly in Crete were in this matter of speaking the same as those possessed by the members of the Lacedaemonian assembly, and that the Lacedaemonian assembly possessed real authority we see from such passages as *Thuc. 1. 87: Xen. Hell. 2. 2. 19: Plutarch, Ages. c. 6*. The various ways of limiting the powers of the popular assembly are described in 6 (4). 14. 1298 b 26 sqq. One of them is *ἡ ταῦτα ψηφίεσθαι τὸν δῆμον ἢ μηδὲν ἐναντίον τοῖς εἰσφερομένοις*, a plan not very unlike the Cretan. In some States no such thing as a popular assembly existed (3. 1. 1275 b 7). The Speaker of the English House of Commons of 1593 in answer to his request for liberty of speech, was told that it is granted, 'but not to speak every one what he listeth or what cometh into his brain to utter; their privilege was *Ay or No*' (Acland and Ransome, *Political History of England*, p. 82).

12. *μὲν οὖν* here, as in c. 6. 1265 a 10 and c. 11. 1273 a 2, introduces a transition from description to criticism: we have been told that the *syssitia* and *cosmi* in Crete correspond to the Lacedaemonian *syssitia* and *ephors*, but now we learn that while the organization of the Cretan *syssitia* is better than that of the Lacedaemonian, the Board of *Cosmi* is a less satisfactory institution even than the *ephorate*. The sentence introduced by *μὲν οὖν* is repeated in 26, and then the answering *δέ* comes in 28.

15. *νόμος*, 'a law': see above on 1270 b 3.

16. *πρότερον*, c. 9. 1271 a 26—37.

κοινοτέρως, sc. *τὰ τῶν συσσιτίων ἔχει*: 'the *syssitia* are placed on a more public footing': cp. c. 9. 1271 a 28, *ἔδει γὰρ ἀπὸ κοινοῦ μᾶλλον εἶναι τὴν σύνοδον, καθάπερ ἐν Κρήτῃ*, and below 1272 a 20, *ὥστ' ἐκ κοινοῦ τρέφεσθαι πάντας*. Ephorus had already mentioned that the Cretan *syssitia* were maintained at the public expense (ap. Strab. p. 480)—*τοὺς δὲ τελείους ἐν τοῖς συσσιτίοις ἂ καλοῦσιν ἀνδρεία συσσιτεῖν, ὅπως τῶν ἰσῶν μετὰσχοιεν τοῖς εὐπόροις οἱ πενέστεροι δημοσίᾳ τρεφόμενοι* (cp. Pol. 2. 5. 1263 b 40 sq.)—but whether he also stated that this was otherwise in the Lacedaemonian State, we do not know. In Crete we see that the provision for the *syssitia* was put on a level with that for the worship of the gods and the public liturgies.

17. 'For from the whole of the agricultural produce and live stock raised on the public land and the tributes rendered by the serfs one part is assigned for the service of the gods and the discharge of the public liturgies, and the other for the *syssitia*.' For the order of *τῶν γινόμενων καρπῶν τε καὶ βοσκημάτων ἐκ τῶν δημοσίων*, cp. de Part. An. 4. 10. 690 a 23, *τὸ ἐκλείπον ὁστῶδες ἐκ τοῦ ποδός*: 4. 1. 676 b 15, *διὰ τὰς εἰρημένας αἰτίας πρότερον*. For *τὰς κοινὰς λειτουργίας*, cp. Rhet. ad Alex. 3. 1424 a 23, *τοῖς δὲ πλουτοῦσιν εἰς τὰς κοινὰς λειτουργίας ἐκουσίαν ἄπασαν φιλοτιμίαν ἐμποιήσωσιν*. It would seem that the liturgies, elsewhere borne by rich men, were undertaken in Crete by the State. Compare Aristotle's own arrangement as to the public land (4 (7). 10. 1330 a 9 sqq.), which is not very dissimilar from the Cretan, though no provision is made for the liturgies, many of which he would be glad to abolish (8 (6). 5. 1320 b 3 sq.). The scheme for the division of the produce adopted in Plato's *Laws* 847 E is said to 'approach near to that sanctioned by the Cretan law,' but it is not easy to combine it with that described here. It is enough to say, with Thirlwall (*Hist. of Greece*, 1. 288), of Dosiadas' account (ap. Athen. Deipn. p. 143) of the *syssitia* at *Lyctus*, that the system which prevailed at *Lyctus* seems to have been different from that which Aristotle here describes as obtaining

generally in Crete. The public land was evidently in part arable, in part pasture. Bücheler und Zitelmann (*Das Recht von Gortyn*, p. 138 sqq.) infer from some provisions of the succession-law of Gortyna (col. 4. 31 sqq.), which reserve for the sons, where there are sons and daughters, the succession to houses in Gortyna itself and to cattle and sheep, no mention being made of land, that the citizens of Gortyna grazed their cattle and sheep on the public pastures, which consequently must have lain, in part at all events, near the city. If this was so, the *βοσκήματα* here referred to would probably be private property. It is not quite clear from Aristotle's language, whether the produce from the public lands and the *φόροι* of the serfs were used for these purposes exclusively, no balance being left for others. The term *φόροι* applied to the contributions of the serfs indicates subjection, and probably conquest. These *φόροι* would seem to have been due to the State: a rent would perhaps be payable to the owner of the land in addition.

20. *ὅστ' ἐκ κοινοῦ κ.τ.λ.* If we understand this to mean that women and girls took part in the Cretan *syssitia*, it conflicts with Plato, *Laws* 780 E, as Oncken points out (*Staatslehre des Aristoteles*, 2. 386 sq.), and also with c. 12. 1274 b 11, not to dwell on the name *ἀνδρεία*. Probably all that is meant is that the share of produce given to each householder was sufficient to provide not only for the needs of himself and his sons at the public tables, but also for his wife and daughters at home. See *Sus.*³, Note 366.

22. *πρὸς δὲ τὴν ὀλιγοσιτίαν κ.τ.λ.* 'And for securing scantiness of fare, in the view that it is beneficial, the lawgiver has devised many contrivances.' The transition from *syssitia* to *ὀλιγοσιτία*, and next to preventives of *πολυτεκνία*, is, as we shall see, easy. 'Ὠφέλιμον includes considerations both of health and morality. The aim of the Lacedaemonian lawgiver in studying the same thing is explained in *Xen. Rep. Lac.* 2. 5-6, *Plutarch, Lycurg.* c. 10, and [*Plutarch,*] *Inst. Lac.* c. 13. Ephorus confirms Aristotle's statement as to Crete (*Strab.* p. 480, *σωφρόνως καὶ λιτῶς ζῶσιν ἅπασιν*). Epimenides the Cretan is, in fact, said (*Plato, Laws* 677 E) to have achieved by his 'device' (*μηχάνημα*) what Hesiod divined before him: the reference no doubt is to the lines (*Op. et Dies*, 40)—

*Νήπιοι, οὐδὲ ἴσασιν ὅσφ' πλέον ἤμισυ παντός,
οὐδ' ὅσον ἐν μαλάχῃ τε καὶ ἀσφοδελῷ μέγ' ὄνειρα.*

The *μηχάνημα* referred to by Plato may possibly be the famous *ἄλιμος*, 'of which a small quantity satisfied both hunger and thirst': see *Herodotus* *Fr.* 19 (*Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr.* 2. 33) and *Hermippus* *Callim.* *Fr.* 18 (*Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr.* 3. 40), together with *Stallbaum's*

note on Laws 677 E, and also the note of Mr. Purves (Selections from Plato, p. 376), to whose references may be added Plutarch de Facie in Orbe Lunae c. 25. 940 C, *ἤνίστατο μὲν Ἡσίοδος, εἰπὼν*

Οὐδ' ὅσον ἐν μαλάχῃ τε καὶ ἀσφοδέλφ' μέγ' ὄνειαρ,

ἔργῳ δ' ἐμφανῇ παρέσχεον Ἐπιμενίδης, διδάξας ὅτι μικρῷ παντάπασιν ἡ φύσις ὑπεκαύματι ζωπυρεῖ καὶ συνέχει τὸ ζῶον, ἂν ὅσον ἐλαίας μέγεθος λάβῃ, μηδεμίας ἔτι τροφῆς δεόμενον. It is possible that Aristotle here includes the invention of Epimenides among the expedients which he ascribes to the Cretan lawgiver. At any rate, Crete seems to have given birth to, or derived from Egypt (Diod. 1. 82. 2), an idea which came to be widely diffused in Greece. The object of the original lawgiver probably was to make hardy soldiers of his Cretans (cp. Xen. Cyrop. 8. 1. 43, where we are told that Cyrus, in the case of those whom he destined for slavery, *ἐπεμέλετο ὅπως μήτε ἄσιτοι μήτε ἄποτοί ποτε ἔσονται ἐλευθερίων ἔνεκα μελετημάτων*): it is hardly likely that he shared the mystical and ascetic tendency of Epimenides, still less that he found the virtues in a spare diet which Xenophon and others attributed to it. To them scanty food meant scanty *περιττώματα*, and scanty *περιττώματα* meant freedom from disease: thus the Persians of the Cyropaedia owed it, we are told, to the scantiness of their food that they rarely needed to spit or to blow their noses (Cyrop. 1. 2. 16: 8. 8. 8—9): cp. Plutarch de Sanitate Tuenda c. 14, *μάλιστα δὲ τροφαῖς κεχρημένους ἐμβριθέσι καὶ κρεώδεσιν ἢ ποικιλαις, ὀλιγοσιτεῖν, καὶ μηδὲν ὑπολιπεῖν περιττώματος πλήθος ἐν τῷ σώματι*: so too Dicaearchus ap. Porphy. de Abstinence 4. 2 (ed. Nauck, p. 158. 14 sqq.: Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 2. 233—4), and Porphyry in the account of the Essenes which he gives on Josephus' authority (de Abstin. 4. 13, p. 174. 21 sqq. ed. Nauck: Bernays, Theophrastus' Schrift über Frömmigkeit, p. 155). Compare also [Aristot.] Probl. 1. 46. 865 a 1, *ἡ ὅτι τοῦ νοσεῖν αἴτιον περιττώματος πλήθος, τοῦτο δὲ γίνεται ἥνικα τροφῆς ὑπερβολὴ ἢ πόνων ἔνδεια*: Theopomp. Fr. 57 (Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 1. 286). Aristotle himself holds that luxurious living accelerates puberty (Phys. 5. 6. 230 b 1, *αὐξήσεις αἱ τῶν ταχὺ διὰ τρυφῆν ἡβώντων*). Thus the transition from *ὀλιγοσιτία* to checks on *πολυτεκνία* is easy. Aristotle's *ὅρος*, however, is not *γλίσχρως*, but *σωφρόνως καὶ ἐλευθερίως* . . . *ζῆν* (c. 6. 1265 a 29 sqq.: 4 (7). 5. 1326 b 30 sqq.); he is for avoiding either extreme.

23. *καὶ πρὸς κ.τ.λ.* Cp. Ephor. ap. Strab. p. 482, *γαμῖν μὲν ἅμα πάντες ἀναγκάζονται παρ' αὐτοῖς οἱ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον ἐκ τῆς τῶν παίδων ἀγέλης ἐκκριθέντες, οὐκ εὐθύς δ' ἄγονται παρ' ἑαυτοῦς τὰς γαμθείας παῖδας, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ ἡβῃ διοικεῖν ἱκαναὶ ὥσι τὰ περὶ τοὺς οἴκους*, and see Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 223 sq., who refers to Heraclid. Pont. De

Rebuspubl. 3. 3 *sub fin.* (Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 2. 211). Aristotle approves the end (cp. 4 (7). 16. 1335 a 36-b 2), but not the means used in Crete, for though the discussion on this point is postponed, his judgment is not doubtful. Contrast the law of the Lacedaemonian State which encouraged πολυτεκνία (c. 9. 1270 b 1 sqq.).

24. ποιήσας, cp. ἐποίησε, c. 12. 1274 b 7. For ποιεῖν in the sense of 'constituere, sancire legibus,' see Sturz, Lex. Xenoph. s. v., P 29.

26. In place of δέ Sus.²⁸ following Lambinus reads δῆ, but compare 7 (5). 10. 1311 a 8, ὅτι δ' ἡ τυραννὶς ἔχει κακὰ καὶ τὰ τῆς δημοκρατίας καὶ τὰ τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας, φανερόν.

28. δέ answers to μὲν οὖν, 12.

29. γίνονται, 'are elected': cp. γινομένων, 36, and c. 9. 1270 b 8.

30. συμφέρει πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν, 'is of advantage in relation to the constitution' (explained by βούλεται μένειν τὴν πολιτείαν, 33): cp. c. 6. 1265 b 25, συμφέρει πρὸς οἰκονομίαν, and see Bon. Ind. 719 a 35 sqq.

35. περὶ ὧν κ.τ.λ. The third of these criticisms, that relating to 'rule exercised without the check of law,' reminds us of Aristotle's remark as to the Lacedaemonian Ephors (c. 9. 1270 b 28 sqq.), that they 'judge without the check of law,' while his first and second criticisms repeat those which he has passed on the Lacedaemonian Senators (c. 9. 1270 b 38 sqq.), but to refer ὧν both to the Cosmi and to the Senators makes the sentence read awkwardly, and it is more likely that Aristotle is here speaking of the Senators only, though he has not said of the Lacedaemonian Senators that they 'rule without the check of law.' For this expression, which is not quite the same as 'judge without the check of law,' cp. 3. 15. 1286 a 12. Demosthenes (in Lept. c. 107) speaks of the Lacedaemonian Senator as δεσπότης τῶν πολλῶν. We see that while the magistracy of the Cosmi is more defective than the Ephorate, the Cretan Senate may be characterized in the same way as the Lacedaemonian. For γινομένων 36, cp. 7 (5). 8. 1308 a 5, τοὺς ἐν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς γινομένους.

40. 'De οὐδέν τι v. Jacobs. ad Achill. Tat. p. 728' (Göttl.). See critical note. For the happy results which follow when office is not a source of gain, see 7 (5). 8. 1308 b 31 sqq., and Isocr. Panath. § 145, who speaks of τὰ λήμματα τὰ εἰθισμένα δίδοσθαι ταῖς ἀρχαῖς.

41. ὥσπερ. Cp. c. 9. 1269 b 38.

πόρρω γε κ.τ.λ. Aristotle probably regarded Persia or the Greek States of the mainland of Europe and Asia as the most likely

sources of corruption (cp. Hdt. 5. 51): the Greek islands were usually poor (Isocr. Paneg. § 132: cp. also Xen. Hell. 6. 1. 12, οἶσθα δὲ δήπου ὅτι καὶ βασιλεὺς ὁ Περσῶν οὐ νήσους ἀλλ' ἤπειρον καρπούμενος πλουσιώτατος ἀνθρώπων ἐστίν). In cities like Athens corrupting agencies might no doubt be found within the State: cp. Aristot. Fragm. 371. 1540 a 17 sq. (Harpocr. s. v. δεκάζων), 'Ἀριστοτέλης δ' ἐν Ἀθηναίων πολιτείᾳ "Αυτὸν φησι καταδείξαι τὸ δεκάζειν τὰ δικαστήρια. Has Aristotle the passage before us (cp. also 1272 b 17) in his mind, when he says in 7 (5). 8. 1308 a 24, σώζονται δ' αἱ πολιτεῖαι οὐ μόνον διὰ τὸ πόρρω εἶναι τῶν διαφθειρόντων, ἀλλ' ἐνίοτε καὶ διὰ τὸ ἐγγύς; If so, he uses διαφθείρειν in a different sense from that in which he uses it in 1272 b 1.

1. τῆς ἁμαρτίας ταύτης, i.e. the restriction of the offices of 1272 b. Cosmus and Senator to certain families, notwithstanding the largeness of their powers.

2. οὐ πολιτικὴ ἀλλὰ δυναστευτική. Cp. 10, and 4 (7). 2. 1324 b 26, πῶς γὰρ ἂν εἷη τοῦτο πολιτικὸν ἢ νομοθετικόν, ὃ γε μὴδὲ νόμιμόν ἐστιν; οὐ νόμιμον δὲ τὸ μὴ μόνον δικαίως ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀδίκως ἄρχειν, κρατεῖν δ' ἔστι καὶ μὴ δικαίως. The remedy employed involves a resort to arbitrary measures on the part of a handful of powerful men quite out of character with a constitution governed by law: hence it is δυναστευτική, for a δυναστεία is the tyranny of a handful, as the τυραννίς is the tyranny of one man and the extreme democracy the tyranny of the Many (6 (4). 14. 1298 a 31 sq.), and tyranny is least of all a constitution (6 (4). 8. 1293 b 29). See below on 19.

4. αὐτῶν, 'their colleagues themselves,' whom one would least expect to do such a thing.

ἔξεστι δὲ κ.τ.λ. It would seem that not only might individual cosmi resign before the expiration of their term of office, but that the cosmi might resign in a body, thus leaving the State without cosmi. Apart from this, however, Aristotle objects to the magistrate resigning in the midst of his term, for, as he says in c. 9. 1271 a 11, δεῖ καὶ βουλόμενον καὶ μὴ βουλόμενον ἄρχειν τὸν ἄξιον τῆς ἀρχῆς. Possibly, however, resignation before the close of the official term was not usually allowed in Greece. It seems to have been allowed at Rome (Mommsen, Römische Staatsrecht 1. 508 sqq.: Dict. of Greek and Roman Antiquities, art. Magistratus, p. 724 a).

6. Congreve, followed by Welldon, would read δέ in place of δῆ, but perhaps δῆ is defensible (it is the reading of all the MSS. and the Vet. Int.). 'As the present method leads to violence and other inconveniences, it is therefore better to regulate the matter by law.'

7. οὐ γὰρ ἀσφαλὴς ὁ κανὼν. Cp. 3. 15. 1286 a 17 sq.: Eth. Nic. 5. 10. 1134 a 35: Hyperid. Or. Fun. col. 9. 23 sqq. (p. 63 Blass). Aristotle may possibly here have in his mind a familiar line from the Peirithous of Euripides (Fr. 600 Nauck), which seems also to be present to his memory in 3. 16. 1287 b 6 sq.:

Τρόπος ἐστὶ χρηστός ἀσφαλέστερος νόμος.

8. τὸ τῆς ἀκοσμίας κ.τ.λ., 'the way the great men have of declaring an abeyance of the magistracy of the Cosmi': cp. 7 (5). 7. 1307 b 18, *δυναστείαν τῶν ἐπιχειρησάντων νεωτερίζειν*. 'Ἀκοσμία is formed on the model of *ἀναρχία*, 'the abeyance of the archonship,' Xen. Hell. 2. 3. 1. I have retained in the text the reading of Π², but not without much hesitation. Π¹ read πάντων δὲ φανότατον τὸ τῆς ἀκοσμίας, ἣν καθιστάσι πολλάκις ὅταν μὴ δίκας βούλωνται δοῦναι τῶν δυναστῶν. This is unintelligible without Coray's slight emendation of οἱ ἄν for ὅταν, but with this it is certainly smoother Greek, though perhaps not more Aristotelian, than the reading of Π². But all the MSS. and also the Vet. Int. have ὅταν. As to the reading of Π¹ τῶν δυναστῶν, perhaps we rather expect to hear of *δυνατοί* than *δυνάσται*, notwithstanding *δυναστευτική*, 3. The Cretan constitution is not pronounced to be a *δυναστεία* μᾶλλον till 10, and even then is probably regarded rather as a virtual, than as an actual, *δυναστεία*. The mention of *δυνάσται* no doubt makes the inference that the constitution is a *δυναστεία* easy: perhaps indeed it makes it too easy. For if Aristotle had already spoken of *δυνάσται*, he would hardly need to draw the inference that the Cretan constitution approaches a *δυναστεία*, as he does in 1272 b 9 sq. We find a reference to *δυνατοί* in Crete in the account of Ephorus ap. Strab. p. 483, τὰς δ' ἀγέλας συνάγουσιν οἱ ἐπιφανέστατοι τῶν παίδων καὶ δυνατότατοι. Cretan methods remind us of the 'liberum veto' of Poland. They far transcend the turbulence of medieval Genoa (Machiavelli, History of Florence, p. 211 E. T. Bohn).

10. οὐ πολιτεία, because a constitution is not compatible with these moments of surrender to the will of powerful individuals: cp. 6 (4). 4. 1292 a 32, ὅπου γὰρ μὴ νόμοι ἄρχουσιν, οὐκ ἔστι πολιτεία. Intentionally or not, Aristotle negatives here the remark of the Athenian interlocutor of the Laws (712 E) to Cleinias the Cretan and Megillus the Lacedaemonian—ὅτως γάρ, ὡ ἄριστοι, πολιτειῶν μετέχετε· ἀς δὲ ὠνομάκαμεν νῦν, οὐκ εἰσὶ πολιτεῖαι. A *δυναστεία* is thus described in Pol. 6 (4). 5. 1292 b 5—τέταρτον δ' [εἶδος ὀλιγαρχίας], ὅταν ὑπάρχῃ τό τε νῦν λεχθέν (i. e. ὅταν παῖς ἀπὸ πατρὸς εἰσῇ), καὶ ἀρχὴ μὴ ὁ νόμος ἀλλ' οἱ ἄρχοντες· καὶ ἔστω ἀντίστροφος αὕτη ἐν ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις ὥσπερ ἡ τυραννὶς ἐν ταῖς μοναρχίαις καὶ περὶ ἧς τελευταίας εἵπαμεν δημοκρατίας ἐν ταῖς δημο-

κρατίας' καὶ καλοῦσι δὴ τὴν τοιαύτην ὀλιγαρχίαν *δυναστείαν*: cp. 6 (4). 6. 1293 a 30, ὅταν δὲ ἤδη πολὺ ὑπερτείνωσι ταῖς οὐσίαις καὶ ταῖς πολυφιλίαις, ἐγγὺς ἡ τοιαύτη *δυναστεία μοναρχίας* ἐστίν, καὶ κύριοι γίνονται οἱ ἄνθρωποι ἀλλ' οὐχ ὁ νόμος. Aristotle holds that the Cretan constitution is rather a *δυναστεία* than a constitution regulated by law, because, though in its ordinary course the magistrates are appointed by election, and the popular assembly possesses certain rights of a definite, though narrow, kind, and so far the constitution does not resemble a *δυναστεία*, it is subject to intervals of license, in which the will of a few powerful individuals overmasters all law.

11. εἰώθασι δὲ κ.τ.λ. We see from the passages quoted in the preceding note that Aristotle regards a *δυναστεία* as 'near to monarchy,' and now we are told that the leading men form followings for themselves by breaking up the *demos* and their friends into factions, and so set up a monarchy (cp. 6 (4). 12. 1297 a 8, τῶν τὰς ἀριστοκρατικὰς βουλευμένων ποιεῖν πολιτείας), just as Peisistratus did according to Herodotus (Hdt. 1. 59, ὃς στασιαζόντων τῶν παρὰ αὐτὸν καὶ τῶν ἐκ τοῦ πεδίου Ἀθηναίων . . . καταφρονήσας τὴν τυραννίδα, ἤγειρε τρίτην στάσιν). As to διαλαμβάνοντας ('dividing into parties'), cp. 8 (6). 5. 1320 b 8, διαλαμβάνοντας τοὺς ἀπόρους, and 6 (4). 11. 1296 a 10, ἐν δὲ ταῖς μικραῖς ῥάδιόν τε διαλαβεῖν εἰς δύο πάντας κ.τ.λ. With this picture of Cretan feuds compare Polyb. 4. 53. 5, ἐγγενομένης δὲ φιλοτιμίας ἐκ τῶν τυχόντων, ὅπερ ἔθος ἐστὶ Κρησίν, ἐστασίασαν πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους.

13. τὸ τοιοῦτον, 'the state of things just described.' For the thought here expressed, cp. c. 11. 1272 b 30—33, where the absence of στάσις and of any τύραννος is said to be σημεῖον πολιτείας συντεταγμένης, and Thuc. 1. 18. 1, ἡ γὰρ Λακεδαίμων . . . ἐπὶ πλείστον ὧν ἴσμεν χρόνον στασιάσασα, ὅμως ἐκ παλαιότητος καὶ εὐνομίῃ καὶ αἰεὶ ἀτυράννευτος ἦν.

15. ἔστι δ' ἐπικίνδυνος κ.τ.λ. 'A State in this condition' (subject to intervals of non-existence) 'is in peril, as' (or 'if') 'those who wish to attack it are also able to do so.' Stahr, however, translates, 'läuft derselbe (Staat) Gefahr, jedem der ihn angreifen will und kann zur Beute zu werden,' but in the absence of other instances of this use of ἐπικίνδυνος with a genitive it is hardly safe to interpret the passage thus.

17. εἴρηται, 1272 a 41.

σώζεται, sc. ἡ πόλις, for Aristotle seems to forget that he is speaking not of one State, but of the many States of Crete.

ξενηλασίας plural, as usual. 'Distance has produced the effect of a law expelling foreigners.' Hoeck (Kreta 3. 442 sqq.) illus-

trates the isolation of Crete, but also points out (p. 450 sqq.) that there are many indications that foreigners were not excluded from the island. He refers to Plato, Laws 848 A among other passages.

18. καί may perhaps here mean 'for instance,' as occasionally elsewhere (e. g. in 1. 12. 1259 b 8).

μένει τοῖς Κρησίν. 'The perioeci stand firm in the Cretan States' (not, I think, 'are faithful to the Cretans,' as some translate, though the dative τοῖς Κρησίν probably implies some advantage to the Cretans from their attitude). Cp. 1272 a 26, *ὅτι δὲ τὰ περὶ τὰ συσσίτια βέλτιον τέτακται τοῖς Κρησίν ἢ τοῖς Λάκωσι, φανερόν*, and 1270 a 37, *τοῖς Σπαρτιάταις*, and for μένει, 8 (6). 5. 1319 b 35, *μίαν γὰρ ἡ δύο ἡ τρεῖς ἡμέρας οὐ χαλεπὸν μέναι πολιτευομένους ὁπωσοῦν*.

19. ἀφίστανται. Cp. Plato, Laws 777 B, *χαλεπὸν δὲ τὸ κτῆμα ἔργῳ γὰρ πολλὰκίς ἐπιδίδεσθαι περὶ τὰς Μεσσηνίων συχνὰς εἰσθυσίας ἀποστάσεις γίνεσθαι*.

οὔτε γὰρ κ.τ.λ. apparently gives the reason why the Cretan perioeci do not revolt like the Helots; but Aristotle does not explain how external dominion leads to the revolt of serfs. Does he hint that it was the foreign empire of the Lacedaemonians that led to the liberation of Messenia by Thebes? Perhaps he only means that external dominion involves foreign war, which he has stated in c. 9. 1269 b 5 to be one main reason for serf-revolts. 'Not only,' we are told, 'do they not possess any external dominion, but' (οὔτε—τε) 'it is only lately that a foreign war' (*πόλεμος ξενικός*—cp. *ξενηλασίας*, 17—not, probably, 'a mercenary war,' for its being waged by mercenaries is not to the point) 'has passed over to the island' (cp. Choerilus ap. Rhet. 3. 14. 1415 a 17, *ὅπως Ἀσίας ἀπὸ γαίης ἦλθεν εἰς Εὐρώπην πόλεμος μέγας*). Wars between one Cretan city and another, he has already said, did not lead to revolts of the serfs (c. 9. 1269 a 40 sqq.): indeed it would seem from the language of this passage—*περὶ δὲ τοὺς Κρήτας οὐδὲν πω τοιοῦτον συμβέβηκεν*—that even the 'foreign war' here referred to did not, though it manifested the weakness of their institutions. Whether Aristotle refers here to the operations of Phalaecus and his mercenaries in the island (345 B.C.), or to its subjugation by Agesilaus, brother of the Lacedaemonian king Agis III, in 333 B.C., is uncertain, but perhaps it is more probable that Phalaecus is referred to, for Aristotle is evidently speaking of the first intrusion of a foreign war into Crete. Though Phalaecus was ultimately foiled and slain before Cydonia, he had previously taken Lyctus.

- C. 11. 25. *περιτῶς*, 'in a vein above the common.' See note on 1265 a 11.

μάλιστα δ' ἔνια κ.τ.λ., 'but so far as the Carthaginian constitution can be said to resemble any other, it comes nearest in some points at least to the Laconian.' Cp. *σύνεγγός πως*, 27.

28. αὐται γὰρ αἱ πολιτεῖαι τρεῖς. For the order, which is quite regular, see note on 1269 a 23. The Cretan constitution is now brought in, which had already been said to be the model on which the Lacedaemonian was framed.

29. The older editors place a full stop after *Καρχηδονίων* (as do Bernays and Susseml), whereas Bekker places only a comma there, thus making αὐτοῖς, 30, refer to all three States. There is something to be said in favour of Bekker's view, but on the whole I am inclined to think that Bern. and Sus. are right. If we place a full stop or colon after *Καρχηδονίων, καὶ πολλά* 29 will take up *πολλά* 25.

30. σημείον δὲ κ.τ.λ. 'And it is an indication of a constitution carefully framed with a definite aim that, possessing though it does its well-known popular element, Carthage remains faithful to the arrangements of its constitution.' In most States the laws are not *συντεταγμένοι*, but *χύδην κείμενοι*, 4 (7). 2. 1324 b 5-9. The meaning of the word comes out clearly in 4 (7). 14. 1333 b 7 sq.: 8 (6). 1. 1317 a 6: Metaph. A. 10. 1075 a 18 sq. Schneider, followed by Bernays and others, would insert εἰ before *συντεταγμένης*, but this is probably unnecessary: cp. Democrit. Fragm. 45, τοῖσι δὲ τρόπος ἐστὶ εὐτακτος, τούτοις καὶ βίος ἐντέτακται. *Τεταγμένη πολιτεία* is a term used by Plato (Rep. 619 C)—in a different sense, however, for it seems to be used in that passage of a constitution favourable to the formation of habits of virtuous action. With *ἔχουσαν* (which Π³ Vet. Int. have, though it is omitted in M³ P¹), I supply *τὴν πόλιν*, which, as has been already noticed in the note on 1266 b 1, is often omitted by Aristotle. Τὸν δῆμον, as in c. 12. 1274 a 2, τὸν δὲ δῆμον καταστήσαι, and 7 (5). 3. 1303 a 30, τὸ ἄγος: it was well-known that the citizen-body at Carthage comprised a mass of poor (cp. 7 (5). 12. 1316 b 5, where Carthage is even described as *δημοκρατούμένη*, if the reading is right, and Plutarch, Praecepta Reipubl. Gerend. c. 3, where the character of the Carthaginian demos is sketched and contrasted with the character of the Athenian in a striking passage probably based on some earlier authority). For *δῆμος* in the sense of 'a popular element,' cp. c. 12. 1274 a 2: c. 6. 1265 b 39. For *ἡ τάξις τῆς πολιτείας*, cp. c. 10. 1272 a 4. The quiescence of the demos, it appears later (1273 b 21), is due to a fortunate accident rather than to the skill of the lawgiver.

32. *στάσιν*. The design of Hanno, however, is mentioned in 7 (5). 7. 1307 a 5.

καί, 'at all' (Riddell, *Apology of Plato*, p. 168).

τύραννον. Yet in 7 (5). 12. 1316 a 34 a tyranny is said to have changed into an *ἀριστοκρατία* at Carthage, if the reading is right. Perhaps Aristotle intends to confine his assertion to the duration of the *ἀριστοκρατία*, and does not reckon what preceded it. It is, we note, in this same twelfth chapter of the book on *Revolutions* (B. 7)—a chapter somewhat loosely hung on to the book and not impossibly later in date—that Carthage is referred to as *δημοκρατυμένη* (1316 b 5).

33. *ἔχει δὲ κ.τ.λ.* Some remarks on the Carthaginian constitution will be found in Appendix B. The word *ἐταιρία* is used in so many different senses that it is hardly possible to determine the exact nature of these *συσσίτια τῶν ἐταιριῶν* at Carthage. Its most usual meaning is 'a political club or association,' but Aristotle would hardly compare gatherings of this nature with the Lacedaemonian *Phiditia*. 'Εταιρία is used by Dosiadas in his description of the *syssitia* of Lyctus in much the same sense apparently as *συσσίτιον* (cp. *Athen. Deipn.* p. 143, *διήρηται δ' οἱ πολῖται πάντες καθ' ἐταιρίας, καλοῦσι δὲ ταύτας ἀνδρεία· τὴν γ' ἐπιμέλειαν ἔχει τοῦ συσσιτίου γυνή*), so that *τὰ συσσίτια τῶν ἐταιριῶν* may here only mean 'the common meals of the messes.' One would suppose from the comparison of them with the *Phiditia*, that they must have comprised the whole citizen-body, and that they must have been designed, like them, to promote efficiency in war.

36. *ἐκ τῶν τυχόντων*, cp. *ἐξ ἀπάντων*, c. 9. 1270 b 26.

38. *καὶ βέλτιον δὲ κ.τ.λ.*, 'and it is also better that the kings (at Carthage) neither belong to one and the same family, nor that again an ordinary one; and that if the family from which they are taken is of marked excellence, they are appointed from it by election rather than by seniority.' I have adopted the reading of Π², *κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναι γένος* (κατ' αὐτὸ pr. P¹, *καταυτὸ* pr. M^s, *καταυτὸ* corr. M^s, 'per se' Vet. Int.), but Susemihl's reading, *καθ' αὐτὸ εἶναι γένος* ('do not form a family apart'), has many claims to attention. The *κατ' αὐτὸ* of P¹ and *καταυτὸ* of M^s, however, may easily have originated in a miswriting of *κατὰ ταῦτ'*, the second *τα* being omitted, as often happens (cp. 6 (4). 15. 1299 b 27, where *κατὰ ταύτας τὰς διαφοράς*, which is probably the right reading, has undergone similar changes); and there is some roughness in the expression *τοὺς βασιλεῖς καθ' αὐτὸ εἶναι γένος*. Besides, no MS. gives *καθ' αὐτό*. There is also some awkward-

ness in the sequence of *μηδέ* (or *μήτε*, Sus.) *τοῦτο τὸ τυχόν*, if we read *καθ' αὐτό*, for we shall have to translate—'it is better that the kings do not form a family apart, nor this an ordinary one': we seem to need 'do not belong to' instead of 'do not form,' but it is not easy to get this meaning from the words *μήτε καθ' αὐτό εἶναι γένος*. And how can it be said that the kings form a whole family? On the other hand, it must be admitted that the use of *κατά* in *κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναι γένος* is not a common one. *Κατά* with the acc., however, occasionally bears much the same meaning as *ἐν*: thus *κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν ἡλικίαν*, de Gen. An. 1. 19. 727 a 5, is replaced by *ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ ἡλικίᾳ*, de Gen. An. 1. 20. 728 b 24. (The use of the phrase *εἶναι κατά* is slightly different in 3. 4. 1276 b 33, where *ἀγαθόν* should perhaps be supplied.) Aristotle objects to a single family monopolizing two posts of such importance as the Lacedaemonian kingships: cp. 7 (5). 7. 1306 b 22 sqq. and 7. (5). 6. 1305 b 2 sqq. Arrangements of this kind often led to *στάσις*, especially when the favoured family was not one of conspicuous merit, and Aristotle does not seem to think that the Heracleidae of the Lacedaemonian State were so: hence the design of Lysander (7 (5). 7. 1306 b 31 sq.). We have in this passage *μήτε* followed by *μηδέ* and *τε*, much as we have *μήτε—μηδέ—μήτε* in Plato, Gorg. 500 B, *μήτε αὐτὸς οἶον δεῖν πρὸς ἐμὲ παίζειν, μηδ' ὃ τι ἂν τύχῃ παρὰ τὰ δοκοῦντα ἀποκρίνου, μήτ' αὖ τὰ παρ' ἐμοῦ οὕτως ἀποδέχου ὥς παίζοντος*. On *μήτε—μηδέ*, see Jelf, Gr. Gr. § 775. 2. d and Obs. 5 (where this passage from the Gorgias is quoted), and Ast, Lex. Plat. s. vv. *μηδέ, οὐδέ*. *Μηδέ* following *μήτε* 'gives its clause an adversative or emphatic force,' 'neither—nor yet' (Jelf, *ibid.*). No change, therefore, is called for in *μηδέ*. As to the view here expressed by Aristotle, cp. Cic. de Rep. 2. 12. 24, *quo quidem tempore novus ille populus (the Roman) vidit tamen id quod fugit Lacedaemonium Lycurgum, qui regem non deligendum duxit, si modo hoc in Lycurgi potestate potuit esse, sed habendum, qualiscunque is foret, qui modo esset Herculis stirpe generatus. Nostri illi etiam tum agrestes viderunt virtutem et sapientiam regalem, non progeniem, quaeri oportere*. Herodotus (5. 39, 42) evidently bears no goodwill to the rule of succession by which Cleomenes was preferred to Doriesus.

41. *εὐτελείς*, 'insignificant in character': Bonitz (Ind. s. v.) compares Rhet. 2. 15. 1390 b 24, *εἰσὶν οἱ πολλοὶ (τῶν εὐγενῶν) εὐτελείς*.

2. *τὰ μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ.* Aristotle here passes with *μὲν οὖν* from fact 1273 a, to criticism, as in c. 6. 1265 a 10 and c. 10. 1272 a 12, but he

continues to make the Carthaginian constitution the subject of his remarks, so that it hardly seems necessary to add (*e conj.*) τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις either (with Thurot, Études p. 32) after μᾶλλον, 6, or (with Sus.) after πολιτείας, 5. The Carthaginian and Cretan States, no less than the Lacedaemonian, are open to the charge of making military success and predominance their aim and thinking τὰ ἀγαθὰ τὰ περιμάχητα better than virtue. The same thing is said in 4 (7). 14. 1333 b 5 sqq. of the lawgivers of all the best-constituted Hellenic States. Cp. also below, 1273 a 37 sq. Τῶν ἐπιτιμηθέντων ἄν must here mean 'of the points open to censure' (not 'of the censures one might pass'): cp. Eth. Nic. 3. 7. 1114 a 30, αἱ ἐπιτιμώμεναι τῶν κακιῶν. See note on 1271 b 18. Here the παρεκβάσεις referred to are παρεκβάσεις τῆς ἀρίστης πολιτείας (cp. c. 9. 1269 a 31), as in 6 (4). 3. 1290 a 24 sqq., not παρεκβάσεις τῶν ὀρθῶν πολιτειῶν as in 3. 7.

4. τῶν δέ, sc. ἐπιτιμηθέντων ἄν. The framers of 'aristocratic' constitutions are said in 6 (4). 12. 1297 a 7 sqq. often to give the rich too much power.

πρὸς τὴν ὑπόθεσιν κ.τ.λ., 'in relation to its aim of being an Aristocracy or Polity.' For καί = 'or,' see Bon. Ind. 357 b 20 sq. It is possible, however, that καὶ τῆς πολιτείας is added (cp. 1. 9. 1257 b 9, τὴν χρηματιστικὴν καὶ τὴν καπηλικήν) to explain the sense in which the word ἀριστοκρατία is used, for it might mean 'the best constitution' (6 (4). 7. 1293 b 1).

5. δῆμον = δημοκρατίαν, as (e.g.) in 6 (4). 3. 1290 a 16.

6. μᾶλλον, 'rather than in the opposite direction' (cp. c. 7. 1266 a 36 and c. 9. 1270 b 33).

τοῦ μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. A deviation in a democratic direction is here noticed. Μέν (= 'while') is answered, I think, by δ' in δ' ἂν εἰσφέρωσιν. For the parenthesis εἰ δὲ μὴ κ.τ.λ., cp. c. 10. 1272 a 15.

8. If πάντες is read (which P^a omits) after ὁμογνωμονῶσι, two explanations are possible: either πάντες means 'both authorities,' as it frequently does in the style of Aristotle (Bon. Ind. 571 b 50 sqq.), or absolute unanimity not only of the Suffetes but of the senators was required. The latter is improbable: Sus.^a (Note 387) refers to Liv. 21. 3 sq.: 21. 9. 3-11. 2: 23. 12 sqq. to disprove it. Aristotle most likely means by 'are unanimous' 'are unanimous as to bringing or not bringing a given question before the popular assembly.' Καὶ τούτων, 9, will then mean 'over matters as to the reference of which to the popular assembly the kings and senators are not unanimous, as well as over those which they agree to refer to it.' If, on the other hand, 'are unanimous' means 'are agreed

on a measure,' then *καὶ τούτων* will mean 'over the measure which is the subject of that difference of opinion, as well as over matters voluntarily referred to the assembly in cases of unanimity.' In either case the power possessed by the assembly was a very real and substantial one, though it would seem that it had not, like most popular assemblies in Greece (6 (4). 14), an absolute claim to have certain specified matters, such as questions of war, peace, alliance, and the like, referred to it. If the kings and the senate agreed not to refer a question to the assembly, they could effectually prevent this question coming before it. Susemihl (Note 387) remarks that the Second Punic War was decided on by Suffetes and Senate alone, notwithstanding that the assembly had by that time (Polyb. 6. 51. 6) gained the chief voice in deliberation.

9. ἀ... *ἀν εἰσφέρωσιν οὗτοι*, 'as to any matters brought by them before the assembly' (cp. *εἰσφοράν*, 8 (6). 8. 1322 b 14). See note on 1264 b 39.

οὐ διακοῦσαι μόνον κ.τ.λ. Cp. Eth. Nic. 3. 5. 1113 a 7, *δῆλον δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἀρχαίων πολιτειῶν, ὡς Ὅμηρος ἐμμείτου· οἱ γὰρ βασιλεῖς ἀπροέβαιον ἀνῆγγελλον τῷ δήμῳ*.

10. ἀποδιδόσθαι. See note on 1265 a 6. 'Αποδιδόναι often means 'dare id quod convenit vel par est' (Ast, *Lex. Platon.* s. v.), as for instance in Plat. Polit. 295 A, *ἀκριβῶς ἐνὶ ἐκάστῳ τὸ προσήκον ἀποδιδόναι*.

11. κρίνειν, 'to come to a decision of their own.' The word used in Plut. Lycurg. c. 6 (Aristot. *Fragm.* 493. 1558 b 9 sqq.) to describe the powers of the Lacedaemonian assembly is *ἐπικρίναι*—*τοῦ δὲ πλήθους ἀθροισθέντος εἰπεῖν μὲν οὐδενὶ γνώμην τῶν ἄλλων ἐφέιτο, τὴν δ' ὑπὸ τῶν γερόντων καὶ τῶν βασιλέων προτεθείσαν ἐπικρίναι κύριος ἦν ὁ δήμος*. For the meaning of *ἐπικρίναι*, cp. Plato, *Laws* 768 A, *εἰάν δὲ μὴ δύνησθον κοινωῆσαι τῆς ὁμολογίας αὐτοί, τὴν βουλὴν ἐπικρίναι αὐτῶν τὴν αἴρσιν ἐκατέρου*, and for that of *κρίνειν*, Aristot. Eth. Nic. 3. 5. 1113 a 11, *ἐκ τοῦ βουλευέσασθαι κρίναντες*. See note on 1272 a 11.

12. *ἔπερ*. See note on 1272 a 11.

ἐν ταῖς ἐτέραις πολιτείαις, i. e. the Lacedaemonian and Cretan.

13. *τὰς πενταρχίας*. As *δεκαρχίαι* = 'decemviratus' (cp. Xen. *Hell.* 3. 4. 2), so *πενταρχίαι* = 'quinqveviratus' (Kluge, *Aristoteles de politia Carthaginiensium*, p. 121—2). Nothing is known about these bodies of five magistrates. On self-election as an oligarchical feature, cp. 6 (4). 5. 1292 b 1 sqq.: it is so only if eligibility is confined to a few.

16. *πλείονα ἄρχειν χρόνον τῶν ἄλλων*. So *ὀλιγοχρόνιοι ἀρχαί* are a sign of democracy (8 (6). 2. 1317 b 24). *Τῶν ἄλλων* is translated

by Bern. 'als die Mitglieder anderer Behörden,' and by Mr. Weldon 'than any other board of officers,' but Sus. translates 'than all other magistrates,' and, I incline to think, rightly.

ἐξεληλυθότες, 'after exit from office.' Kluge compares *eis τὰς ἀρχὰς βαδίζειν*, 2. 7. 1266 b 24 : cp. also *eis τὰς ἀρχὰς παρίναι*, 7 (5). 3. 1303 a 17.

17. τὸ δὲ ἀμίσθους καὶ μὴ κληρωτάς, sc. εἶναι. Here Aristotle notices one or two points which might seem to be deviations in an oligarchical direction, but are not. The payment of magistrates is democratic (8 (6). 2. 1317 b 35-38), but the non-payment of them is compatible with aristocracy as well as with oligarchy. The same may be said of appointment by election, not by lot (cp. 6 (4). 9. 1294 b 7-13, 32-33, etc.). No deviation from the aristocratic *ὑπόθεσις* of the constitution is involved in these arrangements.

18. καὶ τὸ τὰς δίκας κ.τ.λ. The Carthaginian and Lacedaemonian States had this feature of judicial procedure in common, that in them all suits came before magistrates of the State for adjudication, not before the citizen-body (3. 1. 1275 b 8 sqq.). In the latter State, however, each magistracy had its own exclusive field of judicial competence, so that a very small number of persons possessed the right of dealing with this or that offence—of inflicting, for instance, the punishment of death or exile (6 (4). 9. 1294 b 33, where this is noted as an oligarchical feature of the constitution)—whereas at Carthage this was not so: all magistracies were competent to try any suit—whether severally or in combination, we do not learn. We are left to guess why this arrangement is more suitable to an aristocracy than the other, just as in 4 (7). 11. 1330 b 20 we are not told why a plurality of 'strong places' in a city is suitable to an aristocracy; but the reason may perhaps be that under the Carthaginian system less is left to the decision of a very few, for it must be remembered that an *ἀριστοκρατία* takes account of *ἐλευθερία* (or *δῆμος*) as well as of wealth and virtue (6 (4). 7. 1293 b 14 sq. : 6 (4). 8. 1294 a 19-25). Or possibly the Carthaginian system may be regarded as more suitable to an aristocracy, because it assumes and implies a greater diffusion of virtue among the holders of magistracies than the other.

21. For *παρεκβαίνειν* followed by a genitive, see Bon. Ind. 568 a 27 sqq.

22. *διδόναι* here = *δέξαι*, Bon. Ind. 186 b 4 sqq.

23. *συνδοκεῖ*, i. e. approves itself not only to the Carthaginian constitution but also to the mass of men. Cp. Plato, *Laws* 763 D, *δεῖ δὴ καὶ τούτους δυνατοὺς τε εἶναι καὶ σχολάζοντας τῶν κοινῶν ἐπιμελεῖσθαι*,

and see the criticisms which Aristotle passes on the Laws in c. 6. 1266 a 12 sqq.

25. *καλῶς* probably qualifies both *ἄρχειν* and *σχολάζειν*: cp. 4 (7). 5. 1326 b 30, *πλήθει δὲ καὶ μεγέθει τοσαύτην ὥστε δύνασθαι τοὺς οἰκούντας ζῆν σχολάζοντας ἐλευθερίως ἅμα καὶ σωφρόνως*. *Καλῶς σχολάζειν* is a condition of *καλῶς ἄρχειν*.

28. *καί*, 'among others,' 'for example': cp. 4 (7). 12. 1331 a 31, *οἷαν καὶ περὶ Θετταλίαν ὀνομάζουσιν*: 4 (7). 1. 1323 b 26: 1. 12. 1259 b 8.

29. *εἰς δύο ταῦτα βλέποντες*. In 35 (cp. c. 12. 1274 b 21) we have *βλέπειν* used with *πρός*: for *βλέπειν* with *εἰς*, see Bon. Ind. 138 a 51 sqq.

30. *τὰς μεγίστας*. 'Ἀρχάς' is omitted, though it is some time since even *ἄρχοντες* were referred to (24); but no one will be at a loss to supply the missing word, so it drops out.

31. *ἀμάρτημα νομοθέτου*, 'a lawgiver's error': cp. 3. 4. 1277 a 20, *ὡς οὐδὲν τινα ἄρχοντος παιδείαν*. Lawgivers are regarded as responsible, if what ought to be attended to at the outset (*ἐξ ἀρχῆς*, cp. c. 9. 1269 b 39) is not attended to. Here Aristotle traces back the practice of the Carthaginians in paying regard to wealth as well as excellence, when they elect magistrates, to an omission on the part of the lawgiver or founder of the State (cp. c. 9. 1270 a 18, *τοῦτο δὲ καὶ διὰ τῶν νόμων τέτακται φαῦλως*), who ought to have done what Aristotle himself does in constructing his best State (4 (7). 9. 1329 a 17 sqq.), and secured *εὐπορία* to the best men of the State. Cp. Isocr. Busir. § 18, *ἔτι δὲ τὸ μηδένα (τῶν μαχίμων) τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἀποροῦντα τῶν κοινῶν προσταγμάτων ἀμελεῖν*.

35. *εἰ δὲ κ.τ.λ.*, i. e. but if it is right to look to wealth as well as to virtue in electing to offices, it is not right or necessary to go to the extreme of making the greatest offices in the State purchasable; yet there is a law at Carthage to this effect. For the fact, cp. Polyb. 6. 56. 4, *παρὰ μὲν Καρχηδονίοις δῶρα φανερώς διδόντες λαμβάνουσι τὰς ἀρχάς*. Plato perhaps was thinking of Carthage, when he speaks (Rep. 544 D) of *ὠνηταὶ βασιλείαι*.

χάριν σχολῆς. 'Χάρω plerumque ipsi nomini postponitur; aliquoties antepositum legitur,' Bon. Ind. 846 a 42.

37. *ἐντιμον γὰρ κ.τ.λ.* The phrase *ἐντιμον ποιεῖν* recurs in 3. 15. 1286 b 14, *ἐπεὶ δὲ χεῖρους γιγνόμενοι ἐχρηματίζοντο ἀπὸ τῶν κοινῶν, ἐντεῦθεν ποθεν εὖλογον γενέσθαι τὰς ὀλιγαρχίας* *ἐντιμον γὰρ ἐποίησαν τὸν πλοῦτον*. Cp. also Plato, Rep. 550 E sqq. referred to by Giph., and 554 B.

38. *τὴν πόλιν ὅλην*. Compare the use of this phrase in c. 5. 1264 b 16 sqq., in 3. 13. 1283 b 40, where it seems to be explained

by τῶν πολιτῶν 41, and in 2. 9. 1269 b 19, where it includes not only the citizens, but also the women of the citizen class.

39. **39. 39. δ' ἐν κ.τ.λ.** Susemihl reads γάρ, though all the MSS. as well as Vet. Int. have δέ. Δέ seems to be quite in place here, for the sentence which it introduces does not appear to be added in proof of that which precedes (ἐντιμον γάρ—φιλοχρήματον), in which no reference is made to τὸ κύριον. Aristotle's meaning probably is—'the law makes wealth to be esteemed more than virtue, and renders the whole city fond of money, and those who purchase these high offices will come to prize above all other things the wealth by which they are won, yet what the possessors of supreme authority prize most will be most prized by the other citizens also.' We read already in Xen. *Cyrop.* 8. 8. 5, ὅποιοί τινες γὰρ ἂν οἱ προστάται δοί, τοιοῦτοι καὶ οἱ ὑπ' αὐτοὺς ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ γίνονται, and the same thing is said by Isocrates (ad *Nicocl.* § 31, τὸ τῆς πόλεως ὅλης ἥθος ὁμοιοῦται τοῖς ἀρχουσιν: cp. *Areopag.* § 22: *Nicocl.* § 37). Cp. also Plato, *Laws* 711 B sqq.

41. **τούτοις = τῇ τούτων**, just as in the passage quoted in the last note from Isocr. ad *Nicocl.* τοῖς ἀρχουσιν = τῷ τῶν ἀρχόντων (see Jelf, *Gr. Gr.* § 781 d. Obs. 2). Τούτοις refers to τὸ κύριον: for the plural, cp. 1273 a 11, κύριοι, which refers to τῷ δήμῳ, 10. We are reminded of Plato, *Laws* 711 C, καὶ πῶς οἰόμεθα ταχὺ ξυνακολουθήσειν τοὺς ἄλλους πολίτας τῇ τὴν τοιαύτην πειθῶ καὶ ἅμα βίαν εἰληφότε;

1273 b. 1. οὐχ οἶόν τ' εἶναι βεβαίως ἀριστοκρατεῖσθαι τὴν πολιτείαν. So Π¹: οὐχ οἶόν τ' εἶναι βεβαίως ἀριστοκρατικὴν πολιτείαν, Π². With ἀριστοκρατεῖσθαι we expect πόλιν rather than πολιτείαν, but it may possibly be right to supply τὴν τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων (πολιτείαν) with δημοκρατεῖσθαι in 2. 6. 1265 b 35–38 (see note on this passage). Perhaps on the whole it is probable that the reading of Π¹ is the original reading, and that of Π² the result of an attempt on the part of some one or other (possibly Aristotle himself, though that is not very likely) to soften the harshness of ἀριστοκρατεῖσθαι. As to the thought, we must bear the passage before us in mind when we are told in 6 (4). 7. 1293 b 14 sqq., that an ἀριστοκρατία will pay regard to πλούτος, ἀρετή, and δῆμος. It will not be durable, if it does not honour virtue most. Compare the passages referred to above on 37, and also 7 (5). 12. 1316 b 5 sqq. Aristotle seems to have thought it likely that the Carthaginian ἀριστοκρατία would ultimately pass into an oligarchy.

39. 39. δ' ἐν κ.τ.λ. This is a further objection. Not only does this law lead the citizens to count wealth more precious than virtue, and thus tend to imperil the aristocratic character of the

constitution, but the purchasers of these great offices will probably learn by degrees to seek to replace the money spent in their purchase by dishonest gains.

3. εἰ πένης μὲν ὦν . . . κερδαίνειν. And this is the view implied by the law making these offices purchaseable (cp. 1273 a 24 sq.). After φαυλότερος δ' ὦν we should supply, with Bernays, 'like those purchasers of office.' The argument is an *argumentum ad hominem* addressed to the lawgiver or the supporters of this law.

5. διὸ κ.τ.λ. This amounts to saying—'therefore the ἐπισκεῖς should be put in a position to rule': εὐπορία should be secured to them. And then, in the next sentence, Aristotle goes on—'but even if the lawgiver neglected to secure a sufficiency of means to the best men both in and out of office, still it is better that he should provide for their leisure when in office.' As to τοῦτους, 5, see note on 1260 b 35 and Bon. Ind. 546 a 47. For προεῖτο, Liddell and Scott (s. v.) compare 7 (5). 7. 1307 b 4: see also Bon. Ind. 638 b 54 sqq.

9. ὅπερ κ.τ.λ. M. Yriarte says of the Venetian system of government (Vie d'un Patricien de Venise, p. 95)—'il permet le cumul de plusieurs fonctions, et le permet à un tel point qu'il n'est pas rare de voir un Sénateur occuper en même temps jusqu'à cinq ou six postes très-importants dans l'État.' See also Dr. Arnold, History of Rome 2. 550, note 6. We learn from Pol. 7 (5). 10. 1310 b 22, that some of the earlier tyrannies owed their origin to the practice adopted by certain oligarchies of entrusting the most important magistracies to a single holder.

11. προστάττειν. Cp. 6 (4). 15. 1299 b 7 sq.

12. ὅπου μὴ μικρὰ πόλις. Cp. 6 (4). 15. 1299 a 34 sqq. and 8 (6). 8. 1321 b 8 sqq.

πολιτικώτερον here seems to be taken by Bonitz (Ind. 614 a 30—39, b 10—24) in a similar sense to that which it bears in 6 (4). 9. 1294 a 41, κοινὸν δὲ καὶ μέσον τούτων ἀμφοτέρω ταῦτα, διὸ καὶ πολιτικόν, μέμικται γὰρ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν: i.e. in a sense contrasted with δημοκρατικόν, ὀλιγαρχικόν etc., 'aptum ad moderatum quoddam imperium popolare.' But must it not be used here in some sense in which καὶ κάλλιον—βᾶττον can serve as a justification of it? Its meaning is probably 'more statesmanlike,' 'more agreeable to political science,' as in 4 (7). 2. 1324 b 26 (cp. ἔργον τοῦ πολιτικοῦ, 24) and 4 (7). 14. 1333 b 35. Cp. also Demosth. de Falsa Legatione § 114 Shilleto (p. 373), καίτοι τῶν σκῆψεων τούτων οὐδεμία ἐστὶ πολιτικὴ οὐδὲ δικαία, where Shilleto translates 'one which you would take from a statesman.'

13. κοινότερόν τε γὰρ κ.τ.λ. 'For it is fairer to all, as we said' (the reference probably is to 2. 2. 1261 b 1 sqq.), 'and work of one and the same kind, whatever it is (ἐκαστον), is done better and more quickly.' Cp. Plato, Rep. 370 C, ἐκ δὴ τούτων πλείω τε ἕκαστα γίγνεται καὶ κάλλιον καὶ ῥᾶον, ὅταν εἷς ἐν κατὰ φύσιν καὶ ἐν καιρῷ σχολὴν τῶν ἄλλων ἄγων πράττη, and Aristot. Pol. 1. 2. 1252 b 3 sqq. For κοινότερον, cp. Rhet. ad Alex. 9. 1430 a 1, καὶ ἡμεῖς δέ, ἂν ἴσως καὶ κοινῶς πρὸς αὐτοὺς προσφερώμεθα, πολὺν χρόνον τὴν συμμαχίαν φυλάξομεν, where κοινῶς is conjoined with ἴσως (see Liddell and Scott s. v. ἴσος, ii. 3) and opposed to πλεονεκτικῶς, 1429 b 38. Ἐκαστον τῶν αὐτῶν seems = ἐν ἔργον, 1273 b 9, e. g. τὸ σκυτοτομεῖν as distinguished from a combination of αὐλεῖν καὶ σκυτοτομεῖν: cp. Isocr. Busir. § 16, ἀπαντας δὲ τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς περιλαβὼν ἐξ ὧν ἄριστ' ἂν τις τὰ κοινὰ διοικήσειεν, αἰεὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς τὰς αὐτὰς πράξεις μεταχειρίζεσθαι προσέταξεν, εἰδὼς τοὺς μὲν μεταβαλλομένους τὰς ἐργασίας οὐδὲ πρὸς ἐν τῶν ἔργων ἀκριβῶς ἔχοντας, τοὺς δ' ἐπὶ ταῖς αὐταῖς πράξεσι συνεχῶς διαμένοντας εἰς ὑπερβολὴν ἕκαστον ἀποτελοῦντας, and Nicocl. § 18, οἱ δ' αἰεὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἐπιστατοῦντες κ.τ.λ. Yet there is much to be said for Bernays' conjecture of τῶν ἔργων in place of τῶν αὐτῶν. Has Cicero this passage in his memory when he writes to Atticus (13. 10. 2)—Ad Dolabellam, ut scribis, ita puto faciendum, κοινότερα quaedam et πολιτικώτερα? We perhaps find an echo of it in Plutarch, Reip. Gerend. Praecepta c. 15. 812 D, οὐ γὰρ μόνον τῆς δυνάμεως εἰς πολλοὺς διανεμέσθαι δοκούσης, ἦττον ἐνοχλεῖ τὸν φόβον τὸ μέγεθος, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ τῶν χρειῶν ἐπιτελεῖται μᾶλλον.

15. τοῦτο, i. e. the advantage of a diffusion of ἀρχή. It is not quite certain whether ἐπὶ τῶν πολεμικῶν καὶ τῶν ναυτικῶν means 'in military and naval affairs' or 'in affairs of war and in maritime affairs.' I rather incline to the former view. In fleets and armies almost every one may be said both to rule and to be ruled, for each has a superior at the same time as he commands inferiors. There were in the Lacedaemonian army even enomotarchs, i. e. leaders of 30 or 40 men, and very possibly commanders on even a smaller scale. Lord Napier of Magdala remarks (*Times*, July 25, 1885), that 'the command even of a small body of soldiers involves . . . the exercise both of subordinate discipline and of discipline in command.' In civic life a share of ruling and being ruled is secured in a different way—by alternation (2. 2. 1261 b 1 sqq.)—but the result is the same.

17. διὰ πάντων διελήλυθε. This phrase recurs in 6 (4). 14. 1298 a 17 and 6 (4). 15. 1300 a 26, where however it is used of office, not of ruling and being ruled.

18. δλιγαρχικῆς, and hence exposed to much danger of being

upset (7 (5). 12. 1315 b 11 : 7 (5). 1. 1302 a 4 sqq. : compare the transition in c. 6. 1266 a 11 sqq. from *ὀλιγαρχικόν*, 12, to *ἐπικίνδυνον*, 27). As oligarchies rest on wealth, the remedy employed at Carthage (that of enrichment) was an excellent one, for it brought fresh blood into the ruling class, or at all events made the people less hostile. See on this subject 8 (6). 5. 1320 a 35-b 16, *τεχναστέον οὖν ὅπως ἂν εὐπορία γένοιτο χρόνιος κ.τ.λ.* Ischomachus (Xen. Oecon. 14. 4 sqq.) contrasts the laws of Draco and Solon, which punish those who do wrong, with the 'royal laws' (i. e. those of kings, or perhaps those of the king of Persia—see Holden, *Oeconomicus*, p. 217), which enrich those who do right, and says that in his management of his slaves he employs both methods, and that further, when he finds slaves anxious to be commended by him, *τούτοις ὥσπερ ἐλευθέροις ἤδη χρῶμαι, οὐ μόνον πλουτίζων ἀλλὰ καὶ τιμῶν ὡς καλοὺς τε κάγαθούς.* See also Xen. Cyrop. 8. 2. 22.

ἐκφεύγουσι, sc. *τὸν κίνδυνον* (Coray). Bernays, ingeniously enough, would insert (*e conji.*) *στάσιν* after *ἀριστά*, but it is doubtful whether anything has dropped out. Aristotle often omits a word where it will be readily supplied. See note on 1266 b 1, and cp. 5 (8). 5. 1340 b 17, where *πρὸς τὴν ψυχὴν* is left to be supplied by the reader. We find *ἐκφεύγειν*, however, used absolutely now and then, and *διαφεύγειν* is frequently thus used (e. g. in Hdt. 1. 10).

19. *τῷ πλουτεῖν*. So all MSS. *Τῷ πλουτίζειν* (Schn.) would certainly be much simpler, but perhaps *τῷ πλουτεῖν* (which Bernays leaves unaltered) is defensible. *Πλουτεῖν* means 'to become rich' as well as 'to be rich,' cp. 8 (6). 4. 1318 b 20, and Menand. *Κόλαξ*, Fr. 6 (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 4. 154), *οὐδείς ἐπλούτησεν ταχέως δίκαιος ὢν*: thus *τῷ πλουτεῖν* may here be translated 'by becoming rich,' 'by enrichment.' Members of the *demos* became rich and contented through being despatched to the cities dependent on Carthage in some capacity the exact nature of which is uncertain (as officials, if we follow Susemihl—as colonists, if we follow Grote, *History of Greece* 10. 545): cp. 8 (6). 5. 1320 b 4, *τοιοῦτον δέ τινα τρόπον Καρχηδόνιοι πολιτευόμενοι φίλον κέκτηνται τὸν δῆμον· αἱ γάρ τινες ἐκπέμποντες τοῦ δήμου πρὸς τὰς περιουκίδας ποιοῦσιν εὐπρόους.* See Sus.³, Note 398, who explains the 'cities' here mentioned to be cities of the agricultural section of the indigenous Libyans subject to Carthage, as distinguished on the one hand from Phoenician cities ruled by her and on the other from pastoral Libyan tribes.

ἐπὶ τὰς πόλεις. In 1320 b 4 sqq. (quoted in the last note) *ἐκπέμπειν* is used with *πρὸς*. 'Επὶ perhaps implies that they were sent out to rule the cities: cp. Xen. Hell. 3. 4. 20, *τούτων Ξενοκλέα μὲν καὶ*

ἄλλον ἔταξεν ἐπὶ τοὺς ἱππίας κ.τ.λ. 'Εκπέμπειν is used of sending out officials in c. 9. 1271 a 24, but it is also commonly used of colonists (see Liddell and Scott s.v.). For τὰς πόλεις, 'the cities dependent on Carthage,' compare the use of ἀπὸ τῶν πόλεων in Xen. Hell. 3. 4. 20 and of ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν in [Xen.] Rep. Ath. 1. 14.

21. ἀλλὰ κ.τ.λ. Cp. 6 (4). 9. 1294 b 36 and 4 (7). 13. 1332 a 28 sq.

τουτί. Aristotle would seem, if we may judge from the Index Aristotelicus, to use οὔτοσί but rarely. For the contrast between τύχης ἔργον and διὰ τὸν νομοθέτην, cp. 4 (7). 13. 1332 a 29 sqq., and for διὰ τὸν νομοθέτην, see above on 1270 b 19.

23. φάρμακον . . . τῆς ἡσυχίας. Compare the use of ἄκος in 7 (5). 5. 1305 a 32 sq.

25. Κρητικῆς. For the omission of the article, see Bon. Ind. 109 b 44 sqq. and Vahlen, Beitr. zu d. Poet. 4. 409.

δικαίως surprises us, but still the Cretan constitution had its merits.

- C. 12. 27. τῶν δὲ κ.τ.λ. Looking to the programme of the Second Book which we find in its opening chapter, we might well expect it to close with the review of the Carthaginian constitution. We are there prepared for a review of the constitutions subsisting in reputedly well-governed States and of schemes of constitution put forth by individuals and generally well thought of; but now Aristotle speaks as if he had promised a review of οἱ ἀποφηνάμενοι περὶ πολιτείας, divides them into two classes, those who had not taken an active part in politics and those who had, and calls to mind that he has not yet spoken of anyone except Lycurgus belonging to the latter class. He will now, we gather, enter on a review, not of existing constitutions or of schemes of constitution, but of lawgivers who had played a part in politics. It is no doubt true that, as Aristotle ranks Solon among the best lawgivers in 6 (4). 11. 1296 a 18 sqq., we look for a criticism of the Solonian constitution from him, and that this constitution, having passed away and given place to another, is not in strictness included in either of the two classes of constitution marked out for treatment in the first chapter of the Second Book. Still there is some awkwardness about this addition to the programme, and the purpose of the book—the indication of what is good and useful in the constitutions reviewed and the revelation of their general inadequacy (2. 1. 1260 b 32–35)—seems to be but little served by the inquiries of this concluding chapter. The more valuable portion of it—that relating to Solon—rather corrects current mistakes as to the

nature of his legislation than criticises it, and the remainder is little more than a collection of jottings. The notice of Solon's legislation, though possibly incomplete, seems to be Aristotelian, but it may have been tacked on by some later hand to the notice of the Carthaginian constitution, and the authenticity of the rest of the chapter in its present shape is very questionable. See note on 1274 a 22.

35. Σόλωνα δ' ἔνιοι κ.τ.λ. This approval is mentioned because good repute confers a claim to notice (c. 1. 1260 b 32). Plato had already said in Rep. 599 E, *σεῖ δὲ τίς αἰτιάται πόλιν νομοθέτην ἀγαθὸν γεγονέναι καὶ σφῆς ὠφεληκέναι*; *Χαρώνδαν μὲν γὰρ Ἰταλία καὶ Σικελία, καὶ ἡμεῖς Σόλωνα*. Aristotle himself ranks Solon among the 'best lawgivers' (see above on 27). It is not clear whether Isocrates is referred to among these ἔνιοι, though he was an eulogist of Solon and of the *πάτριος δημοκρατία* (cp. Areopag. §§ 16–17, 26–27, 37: de Antid. § 232). They regarded Solon as the destroyer of an extreme oligarchy, on the ruins of which he constructed the *πάτριος δημοκρατία*, a wisely mixed constitution: they took him to have founded the Areopagus, to have introduced the system of filling magistracies by election, and to have created the popular dicastery, thus as it were equipping the State with a complete set of new institutions. 'Most writers,' says Plutarch (Solon c. 19), 'made Solon the author of the Areopagus': Plutarch himself, however, doubts the fact for the reason he there mentions. To this view of Solon's work Aristotle objects; he says that Solon would seem to have found the council of the Areopagus and the system of filling the magistracies by election already established, and that he was only so far responsible in relation to those matters that he left them as he found them, whereas he did institute the popular element in the constitution by founding the popular dicasteries. He appeals in support of his contention to the opinion of a second set of critics, who made Solon responsible for the existing extreme democracy. They complained that so far from being the author of a mixed constitution, he overpowered the oligarchical element of the constitution by the democratic, inasmuch as he gave supreme power to the popular dicastery. Armed with this judicial authority, the people became masters of the State; one statesman after another had to play into their hands, and so the extreme democracy gradually came into being. Aristotle, however, holds that these inquirers ascribed to Solon's institution of popular dicasteries consequences which would not have resulted from it, if it had not been for accidental circumstances. Solon was far from intending to found an extreme democracy; he

gave, in fact, only a modicum of power to the people—enough to content them and no more—and reserved office for the better-to-do classes. On the other hand, he was not the contriver of an elaborate mixed constitution, but rather the founder of the beginnings of popular liberty; still less was he the undoer of the power of the Few. He left office in their hands, and gave the people only just enough power to make the holders of office govern well (8 (6). 4. 1318 b 27–1319 a 6). That Aristotle approved of Solon's legislation is evident from 6 (4). 11. 1296 a 18 sq.: 8 (6). 4. 1318 b 27 sqq.: 3. 11. 1281 b 21–1282 a 41.

39. *μίξαντα καλῶς τὴν πολιτείαν κ.τ.λ.* These critics appear to have thought that a good mixed constitution should include oligarchical, aristocratical, and popular elements: compare the view referred to in c. 6. 1265 b 33 sqq. Aristotle may perhaps have regarded the Areopagus as an oligarchical rather than an aristocratic institution (7 (5). 4. 1304 a 20: cp. 6 (4). 3. 1290 a 27), but he would hardly agree that election to office, unless it is *κατ' ἀρετήν*, is an aristocratic feature (cp. 6 (4). 9. 1294 b 7 sqq.), or think that the mere admissibility of all citizens to serve on the dicasteries, without the accompaniment of pay to the poor for serving, is a large step in the democratic direction.

41. Here, as it seems to me, Aristotle's statement of his own opinion begins.

1274 a. 2. *τὸν δὲ δῆμον καταστήσαι κ.τ.λ.*, 'set up the demos' (gave a place in the constitution to the demos) 'by enacting that all the citizens should be admitted to sit on the dicasteries.' Aristotle uses the same words—*καταλύσαι*, *καταστήσαι*—as had been used by the critics to whom he refers, in order to bring out clearly the difference of his own view. Solon is here so far connected with the dicasteries that he is said to have provided that membership of them should be open to all citizens.

5. *ὥσπερ τυράννῳ τῷ δήμῳ χαριζόμενοι.* An indication of the *τελευταία δημοκρατία*: cp. 6 (4). 4. 1292 a 11, *μόναρχος γὰρ ὁ δῆμος γίνεται κ.τ.λ.*: 7 (5). 11. 1313 b 38: 8 (6). 5. 1320 a 4 sq.

8. *τὴν νῦν δημοκρατίαν.* Cp. 10, where this expression is repeated. It is implied that the Athenian democracy was in the writer's time a democracy of an advanced kind—perhaps a *τελευταία δημοκρατία*. The passage is noticeable, because Aristotle commonly avoids mentioning Athens in connexion with his censures of extreme democracy. Some have doubted its genuineness because of its unwonted outspokenness.

8. *Ἐφιάλτης . . . καὶ Περικλῆς*, cp. Plutarch, *Praecepta Reip.*

Gerend. c. 15. 812 D, ὡς Περικλῆς Μενίπῳ μὲν ἐχρήτο πρὸς τὰς στρατηγίας, δι' Ἐφιάλτου δὲ τὴν ἐξ Ἀρείου πάγου βουλὴν ἐταπείνωσε, διὰ δὲ Χαρίνου τὸ κατὰ Μεγαρίων ἐκύρωσε ψήφισμα, Λάμπωνα δὲ Θουρίων οἰκιστὴν ἐξέπεμψεν.

10. αὖξων. Cp. 8 (6). 4. 1319 b 21, οἷς Κλεισθένης Ἀθήνησιν ἐχρήσατο βουλόμενος αὖξῃσαι τὴν δημοκρατίαν.

12. ἀπὸ συμπτώματος. Cp. 7 (5). 6. 1306 b 6.

τῆς ναυαρχίας, a rare word, apparently, in the sense in which it is here used.

13. ἐν τοῖς Μηδικοῖς. Cp. 7 (5). 4. 1304 a 20, οἷον ἡ ἐν Ἀρείῳ πάγῳ βουλὴ εὐδοκμήσασα ἐν τοῖς Μηδικοῖς ἔδοξε συντονωτέραν ποιῆσαι τὴν πολιτείαν, καὶ πάλιν ὁ ναυτικός ὄχλος γενόμενος αἷτιος τῆς περὶ Σαλαμίνα νίκης καὶ διὰ ταύτης τῆς ἡγεμονίας διὰ τὴν κατὰ θάλατταν δύναμιν τὴν δημοκρατίαν ἰσχυροτέραν ἐποίησεν: Isocr. de Antid. § 316 sq.: Plato, Laws 707, and also 708 E, ἔμελλον λέγειν, ὡς οὐδεὶς ποτε ἀνθρώπων οὐδὲν νομοθετεῖ, τύχαι δὲ καὶ ξυμφοραὶ παντοῖαι πίπτουσαι παντοίως νομοθετοῦσι τὰ πάντα ἡμῖν· ἡ γὰρ πόλεμος τις βιασάμενος ἀνέτρεψε πολιτείας καὶ μετέβαλε νόμους κ.τ.λ.

14. δημαγωγούς φαύλους. Probably those alluded to by Isocrates, de Antidosi §§ 316—7, a passage which Aristotle evidently has in his mind here. Aristotle had a good opinion of the antagonist of Pericles, Thucydides son of Melesias (Plutarch, Nicias c. 2), but would hardly have applied this expression to Pericles, even for the sake of contradicting Isocrates, who calls him δημαγωγὸς ἀγαθός (de Antid. § 234).

15. ἐπεὶ Ἰδλων γε κ.τ.λ. Cp. Solon, Fragm. 5 (Bergk), and Pol. 3. 11. 1281 b 32 sqq. It would seem, however, from 8 (6). 4. 1318 b 21 sqq., that Solon might have given the people less; and Plato in the Laws, though he allows the people some share in judicial and deliberative functions, reserves the review of the conduct of magistrates in office for his great college of the priests of Apollo.

16. ἀποδιδόναι. See note on 1273 a 10, ἀποδιδάσκει τῷ δήμῳ.

17. μηδὲ γὰρ τούτου κ.τ.λ. Cp. Plato, Laws 767 E—768 B, and Pol. 8 (6). 5. 1320 a 14 sqq.

18. ἀρχάς, here as in 6 (4). 14. 1298 a 1—3 (contrast 3. 1. 1275 a 23—29) distinguished from τὸ δικάζον. Cp. 3. 4. 1277 b 1, διὸ παρ' ἐνίοις οὐ μετέχον οἱ δημιουργοὶ τὸ παλαιὸν ἀρχῶν, πρὶν δῆμον γενέσθαι τὸν ἴσχατον, where Athens may be among the States referred to, for, as Schömann says (Gr. Alterth. 1. 342), 'it is clear that as the three upper classes of the Solonian Constitution were framed in relation to the amount of their landed property, all those who

owned no land must have been placed in the fourth, even when well endowed with other kinds of property.' The Archonship was probably confined to the first class (Plut. Aristid. c. 1).

19. ἐκ τῶν πεντακοσιομεδίμων κ.τ.λ. Diels (Über die Berliner Fragmente der Ἀθηναίων Πολιτεία des Aristoteles, p. 33. 3) regards 1274 a 19-21 as an interpolation, and if with Susemihl we regard all that follows νομοθέται δέ, 22, as spurious, there is something to be said for rejecting ἐκ τῶν πεντακοσιομεδίμων—μετῆν, 21, also. These words, however, seem to be added to justify and enforce τῶν γνωρίμων καὶ τῶν εὐπόρων, and to show that Solon not only confined office to well-to-do men, but did so by the requirement of a property qualification (cp. 8 (6). 4. 1318 b 30, ἄρχειν δὲ τὰς μεγίστας αἰρετοὺς καὶ ἀπὸ τιμημάτων . . . ἢ καὶ ἀπὸ τιμημάτων μὲν μηδεμίαν, ἀλλὰ τοὺς δυναμένους).

20. τρίτου τέλους probably means 'third in mention' (cp. c. 6. 1264 b 33: c. 11. 1272 b 28), not necessarily 'third in point of dignity.' Susemihl brackets (though doubtfully) these two words as spurious, but τέλους seems to be needed for τὸ τέταρτον, 21.

21. οἷς κ.τ.λ. The fact was mentioned by Aristotle in the Ἀθηναίων Πολιτεία also (Aristot. Fragm. 350. 1537 a 20 sqq.).

22. νομοθέται δὲ ἐγένοντο κ.τ.λ. The review of Solon's legislation seems, as has been said, hardly to be complete. Be that, however, as it may, we expect it to be followed by a review of lawgivers who legislated for their own States or for others after taking an active part in politics (πολιτευθέντες αὐτοί, 1273 b 31), whether they were the authors of laws only or of constitutions as well as laws, for it is doubtful whether Susemihl is right in thinking that the authors of laws only are dismissed in 1273 b 32 from consideration. And we do find that in what follows lawgivers who legislated for other States than their own (Charondas, Philolaus, Androdamas) are specially noted. Nothing, however, is said as to the lawgivers now enumerated having taken an active part in politics, and we are even more at a loss in this part of the chapter than in that relating to Solon to see how the scanty notices given of their legislation serve the main purpose of the book, which is set forth in c. 1. 1260 b 32-36. Of Zaleucus all that we are told is that he legislated for the Epizephyrian Locrians, and it would even seem (see next note) that Aristotle elsewhere gave an account of him which would at all events exclude the idea of his having legislated *after* taking an active part in politics, for according to the Πολιτεία he was a shepherd and a slave when he became a lawgiver. About Charondas we learn a little more, and perhaps there is a reason for the insertion of the story about Philolaus and

Diocles, though it seems out of keeping in the Politics. From this point onward the object of the writer appears to be to note anything special and peculiar to each lawgiver. This aim had not, to say the least, been equally prominent in previous chapters, though we find, it is true, some traces of it in c. 7. 1266 a 33-36, 39 and c. 8. 1267 b 29. The passage 1274 b 9-15 is especially open to suspicion. A recurrence to Phaleas and Plato seems quite out of place, especially now that we are concerned with lawgivers, and with lawgivers who had taken an active part in politics, of whom Plato was not one. The statement (1274 b 9 sq.) that Plato was the first to propose a community of property conflicts with c. 7. 1266 a 34 sq. It is true that there is much that is characteristic of Aristotle in the style of the passage which begins at 1274 a 22 and extends to the end of the chapter. The quiet correction of Ephorus (1274 a 25 sqq.), and of the too patriotic Locrian legend which traced back the beginnings of the legislative art to the Locrian Onomacritus, is also quite in Aristotle's vein.

On the whole, the guess is perhaps permissible that Aristotle may have left only the fragment about Solon and a few rough data for insertion after the notice of the Carthaginian constitution, and that some member of the school, not very long after his death, completed them as he best could. Zeller, it should be noticed, holds that the chapter has suffered from interpolation (Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 676).

Ζάλευκος τε κ.τ.λ. Of the lawgivers noticed in the remaining portion of the chapter, some seem to have been authors of constitutions as well as laws, others of laws only. We cannot be certain that the 'ill-compounded *ἀριστοκρατία*' at the Epizephyrian Locri which Aristotle criticises in 7 (5). 7. 1307 a 38 sq. was regarded by him as the work of Zaleucus, but Plutarch speaks of Zaleucus as the author of a constitution (Numa c. 4). Charondas, however, appears to be referred to in 6 (4). 12. 1297 a 7 sqq. as the founder of an *ἀριστοκρατία*, or at all events of a constitution of some kind: cp. 6 (4). 11. 1296 a 21: 6 (4). 13. 1297 a 21 sqq. Draco and Pittacus, on the contrary, are stated to be authors of laws only in 1274 b 15, 18. It is hardly likely that Cicero refers to this passage in Ep. ad Att. 6. 1. 18: *Quis Zaleucum leges Locris scripsisse non dixit? Num igitur iacet Theophrastus, si id a Timaeo reprehensum est?* Cp. Cic. de Leg. 2. 6. 15, where Timaeus is said to have denied that Zaleucus ever existed. There were perhaps some who ascribed the Politics to Theophrastus, but Cicero can hardly have been among them,

for, as has been pointed out elsewhere, he says in the *De Finibus* (5. 4. 11) that both Aristotle and Theophrastus had written 'de optimo statu rei publicae,' so that at all events the two books of the *Politics* which relate to this subject cannot have been attributed by him to Theophrastus. It has apparently escaped notice, that while Zaleucus is here classed among those who had become lawgivers after taking an active part in politics (πολιτευθέντες αὐτοί, 1273 b 31), he is said by the Scholiast on Pindar on the authority of Aristotle to have been a shepherd and a slave when he was called on to legislate (Aristot. *Fragm.* 505. 1561 a 5 sqq.). Perhaps, however, the words πολιτευθέντες αὐτοί need not be interpreted as implying that the participation in political life preceded the legislation; the intention may be only to contrast lawgivers who took an active part in politics at some time in their life with those who διετέλεσαν ιδιωτεύοντες τὸν βίον (1273 b 28).

24. ταῖς Χαλκιδικαῖς. Some would omit ταῖς, but cp. 1. 11. 1258 b 19, τῶν ἄλλων ζώων τῶν πλωτῶν ἢ πτηνῶν, ἀφ' ὧν ἔστι τυγχάνειν βοηθείας, where τῶν ἄλλων ζώων undergoes a similar series of limitations.

25. πειρῶνται δὲ κ.τ.λ. 'And some attempt even to put facts together, their view being that' etc. Welldon, following Congreve, translates συνάγειν 'to make out a catena of legislators,' and so also Bernays, 'eine ununterbrochene Reihenfolge von Gesetzgebern nachzuweisen,' but the correctness of this rendering seems doubtful. For the construction, cp. 6 (4). 9. 1294 b 20. Who were these *τινες*? Trieber (*Forschungen*, pp. 67, 72, 101) and Sus.² (Note 418) say Ephorus; and it is true that Ephorus (ap. Strab. 10. p. 482), on the authority of 'the Cretans,' brings Lycurgus into communication with Thales—μελοποιῶ ἀνδρὶ καὶ νομοθετικῷ—from whom he is said to learn in particular the way in which Rhadamanthus, and afterwards Minos, fathered their laws on Zeus. But we nowhere learn that Ephorus connected Thales with Onomacritus; and as to Zaleucus, Ephorus would seem from Strabo 6. p. 260 to have regarded his laws as a compilation ἐκ τε τῶν Κρητικῶν νομίμων καὶ Λακωνικῶν καὶ ἐκ τῶν Ἀρεοπαγικῶν. This hardly looks as if he made Zaleucus and Lycurgus disciples of Thales, and therefore contemporaries or nearly so. Ephorus, it is true, was an enthusiast for things Cretan, and may well have pointed to Crete as the birthplace of the legislative art among others—indeed, those who traced the beginnings of Greek civilization to Crete were probably very much in the right (see E. Curtius, *History of Greece*

E. T. 1. 73)—but one would rather suspect a Locrian origin for a tradition which made a Locrian the first skilled legislator, and placed Zaleucus and Lycurgus on a level, thus virtually denying the debt of the former to the latter. We know that the Italian Locri claimed to have been the first State to use written laws, those which Zaleucus had given it (Scymnus Chius, 314 sqq.). If again the Locrian Onomacritus mentioned here is the same man as the well-known Athenian oracle-monger of Peisistratid times, the anachronism is very great—too great, probably, for Ephorus to have committed. We should also expect Ephorus, with his strong interest in Crete, to look back to Rhadamanthus or Minos as the earliest able lawgiver.

26. *γυμνασθῆναι δ' αὐτὸν κ.τ.λ.*, 'and that he trained himself by practice in Crete, though a Locrian and sojourning there in the exercise of the prophetic art.' For *γυμνασθῆναι*, cp. Isocr. de Antid. § 187, where it is coupled with *ἐντραβείς γενέσθαι*.

28. *Θάλητα*. Thales the Cretan, in contradistinction to whom Thales the Milesian is thus designated in 1. 11. 1259 a 6. On Thales the Cretan, the other and probably later form of whose name is Thaletas, see Dict. of Greek and Roman Biography, and Sus.², Note 419. In associating Thales with Lycurgus, Ephorus and the authorities here criticised gave currency to a long-enduring and widespread error, which survives not only in Plutarch, Lycurgus c. 4, but also in Sextus Empiricus adv. Math. 2. 21, and Diog. Laert. 1. 38. We probably learn the true date of Thales the Cretan from the De Musica attributed to Plutarch (c. 10), where he is said on the authority of Glaucus (a Rhegian, contemporary with Democritus) to have lived after Archilochus. The contradiction given in the text on chronological grounds to the ingenious combination of these *times* may perhaps apply to the whole of it. Lawgivers do not fall so easily into an order of filiation: Lycurgus was not the pupil of Thales, nor Thales the contemporary of Onomacritus, nor Zaleucus the contemporary of Lycurgus, nor Charondas the pupil of Zaleucus.

30. *ἀλλὰ ταῦτα κ.τ.λ.* For the transition, cp. 1. 5. 1254 a 33, *ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ἴσως ἐξωτερικώτερας ἐστὶ σκέψεως, τὸ δὲ ζῶον πρῶτον συνέστηκεν ἐκ ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος*, where Aristotle turns from a question lying somewhat off his path to the inquiry which he is pursuing. So here the meaning seems to be—'but all this rests on an error of chronology, and to return to our subject, Philolaus the Corinthian also legislated for a city not his own, Thebes.' It seems doubtful whether, as some have thought, the *times* of 25 are found fault with

here for omitting Philolaus in their enumeration. Ἐγένετο δὲ καὶ Φιλόλαος is repeated in 1274 b 18, ἐγένετο δὲ καὶ Πιττακός, and 23, ἐγένετο δὲ καὶ Ἀνδροδάμας.

τῷ χρόνῳ. So Π, Vet. Int., Bekk.: Ar. 'sed qui ista dicunt, tempora non supputant,' on the strength of which rendering Schneider, Coray, and Susemihl read τῶν χρόνων. Τοῖς χρόνοις seems to be read by Bonitz (Ind. 856 a 20), who groups this passage with 6 (4). 6. 1293 a 1 and 4 (7). 10. 1329 b 24, and the plural is certainly far more usual in this sense. As to λέγουσιν . . . λέγοντες, the repetition, though harsh, may perhaps be explained by such phrases as ἐποίησεν οὐ καλόν, ὀρθῶς ποιήσας, c. 9. 1270 a 20.

32. ἦν δὲ κ.τ.λ. The purpose of this narrative seems to be partly to show how remarkable the career of Philolaus was, but still more to explain how a Corinthian came to live at Thebes: we were informed a few lines back how it was that a Locrian came to sojourn in Crete. The striking feature of the story to the mind of a Greek would be that a member of the ruling family of Corinth should have been willing to give up country and home, honours and power, and to accompany Diocles into a life-long exile. A tale like this was not out of place at the head of the legislative traditions of Thebes: cp. Plutarch, Pelopid. c. 19, ὅλως δὲ τῆς περὶ τοὺς ἐραστὰς συνηθείας οὐχ, ὥσπερ οἱ ποιηταὶ λέγουσι, Θηβαίοις τὸ Λαίου πάθος ἀρχὴν παρέσχευ, ἀλλ' οἱ νομοθέται τὸ φύσει θυμοειδὲς αὐτῶν καὶ ἄκρατον ἀνιέναι καὶ ἀνυγραίνειν εὐθύς ἐκ παίδων βουλόμενοι πολὺν μὲν ἀνεμίξαντο καὶ σπουδῇ καὶ παιδιᾷ πάσῃ τὸν αὐτὸν εἰς τιμὴν καὶ προεδρίαν ἄγοντες, λαμπρὸν δὲ τὸν ἔρωτα ταῖς παλαίστρας ἐνεθρέψαντο συγκεραννύντες τὰ ἥθη τῶν νέων. Plutarch's reference to the untempered strength of the spirited element in the Theban nature suggests that the Thebans may be present to Aristotle's mind when he says (4 (7). 7. 1327 b 34), τὰ μὲν γὰρ (τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἔθνη) ἔχει τὴν φύσιν μονόκωλον.

36. καὶ νῦν ἔτι κ.τ.λ. Aristotle seems also to have mentioned (perhaps in his Ἐρωτικός) a tomb of Iolaus, probably at Thebes, at which lovers exchanged pledges of fidelity (Plutarch, Pelopid. c. 18: Aristot. Fragm. 92. 1492 a 39).

37. πρὸς δὲ τὴν τῶν Κορινθίων χώραν, 'in the direction of the Corinthian territory.' The tombs were mounds, but the distance would be not far from 40 miles, as the crow flies. So Althaemenes, after exiling himself from Crete lest he should fulfil prophecy and kill his father, built the temple of the Atabyrian Zeus on a high peak in the island of Rhodes, from which his native land could be descried on the horizon (Diod. 5. 59. 2). As to the position of the tomb of Diocles, compare the last stanza of Wordsworth's *Laodamia*:

even the elm-trees planted on the grave of Protesilaus could not bear the sight of Ilium (Anth. Pal. 7. 141).

40. διὰ τὴν ἀπέχθειαν τοῦ πάθους. Vict. 'propter odium illius affectus' (cp. διαμίσθας τὸν ἔρωτα, 34).

ὅπως . . . ἔσται after τάξασθαι. Weber (Die Absichtssätze bei Aristot., p. 36) compares Soph. El. 33. 183 b 3 sq.

ἀποπτος here 'visible,' not, as in Soph. Aj. 15, 'invisible.'

3. παιδοποιίας, not τεκνοποιίας. Τεκνοποιία, 'the begetting of off- 1274 b. spring,' is common to man with the lower animals; not so παιδοποιία, which means 'the begetting of children': we often find παιδοποιία conjoined with γάμοι (e.g. in Plato, Rep. 423 E, 459 A, Symp. 192 B; Plutarch, Solon c. 6). But C. F. Hermann (Gr. Ant. 1. 180. 10) may possibly be right in translating the word here 'adoption,' for in Plutarch, Quaest. Platon. 1. 3. 1000 D we find παιδοποιεῖσθαι used in the sense of 'adopt' (ὥσπερ ὁ μὴ τεκὼν παιδοποιεῖται τὸν ἀριστον, where however Wytttenbach would read παῖδα ποιεῖται, comparing Paus. 7. 1. 3). On the other hand, it should be remembered that the laws referred to might be called θετικοί without relating solely to adoption. No other instance of the occurrence of παιδοποιία in Aristotle's writings is given in the Index Aristotelicus, though τεκνοποιία, which is never used by Plato or by the Attic Orators, is of frequent occurrence in them.

The antecedent of οὗς seems to be in the gen. after νομοθέτης: it is, however, as often happens, caught into the relative clause.

4. θετικούς, 'relating to adoption.' See Büchschütz, Besitz und Erwerb, p. 32, and C. F. Hermann, Gr. Ant. 3. § 65. 2, who points out that Philolaus, if he was the first to permit adoption at Thebes, in effect introduced testation. This would be the case even if the form of adoption introduced by him was, like that prescribed by the law of Gortyna (Bücheler und Zitelmann, p. 161), *adoptio inter vivos*. The aim of Philolaus in permitting adoption was very different from that which Isaeus ascribes to the Attic lawgiver—ὁ γὰρ νομοθέτης, ὃ ἄνδρες, διὰ τοῦτο τὸν νόμον ἔθηκεν οὕτως, ὁρῶν μόνην ταύτην καταφυγὴν οὖσαν τῆς ἐρημίας καὶ παραψυχῇ τοῦ βίου τοῖς ἀπαισι τῶν ἀνθρώπων, τὸ εἶναι ποιήσασθαι ὃν τινα ἂν βούλωνται (2. 13).

ἰδίως. His aim he shared with Pheidon, who was, like himself, a Corinthian (c. 6. 1265 b 12 sqq.), and perhaps earlier than Philolaus, but the means used were peculiar to the latter. From this point onwards we note an effort to point out anything special and peculiar to each lawgiver. Some attention had been paid to this before (c. 7. 1266 a 33-36, 39: c. 8. 1267 b 29), but now the thing is done systematically. Probably the view is that enactments peculiar to a

lawgiver are those which are most likely to deserve attention. To produce something *ἴδιον* was held to be the surest sign of capacity and training: cp. Plutarch adv. Colot. c. 26. 1121 E, τοῦ δ' Ἀρκεσίλαου τὸν Ἐπίκουρον οὐ μετρίως τοῖκεν ἡ δόξα παραλυπεῖν . . . μηδὲν γὰρ αὐτὸν ἴδιον λέγοντα, φησὶν, ὑπόληψιν ἐμποιεῖν καὶ δόξαν ἀνθρώποις ἀγραμμάτοις, ἅτε δὴ πολυγράμματος αὐτὸς ὢν καὶ μεμνησμένος: Aristot. Metaph. A. 1. 981 b 13 sqq.: Metaph. A. 4. 984 b 31: see also de Soph. El. 33. 183 b 20 sqq. Ephorus and others are said by Polybius (6. 45. 3) to have pointed out certain things as *ἴδια τῆς Λακεδαιμονίων πολιτείας*. Inquiries respecting *εὐρήματα* and their authors were popular in Greece (Pol. 5 (8). 6. 1341 b 2 sqq.: Aeschyl. Prom. Vinct. 476 sqq.: Plato, Phaedrus 274 C, Rep. 600 A), and they were especially popular in Aristotle's day: Ephorus paid much attention to the subject in his History (Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. vol. 1. p. lxi), and is also said to have written a separate work on *εὐρήματα*, as did two successive heads of the Peripatetic School, Theophrastus and Strato (Diog. Laert. 5. 47, 60): Hermippus also in his book on Lawgivers concerned himself with *εὐρέσεις* (Athen. Deipn. 154 d). Isocrates, in arguing (Paneg. § 10) that honour should be paid rather to the best practitioners of an art than to its originators, implies that the prevailing tendency was in the latter direction. It is not surprising, then, that the authors of anything *ἴδιον* in legislation should be noted here; still the aim of the Second Book is not history but criticism, and of criticism there is hardly anything in this concluding chapter.

6. *ψευδομαρτύρων*. See critical note.

7. *πρῶτος γὰρ κ.τ.λ.* 'For he was the first to introduce the denunciation for false witness.' See Mr. Sandys' note on Demosth. Or. 2 adv. Steph. c. 7 (p. 115 of his edition), and, on the general significance of the innovation, which gave unsuccessful litigants an opportunity of re-opening questions decided against them, C. F. Hermann, Gr. Ant. 3. § 72 (in Thalheim's edition, Rechtsalterth. § 17. p. 119 sq.), who refers to [Demosth.] contra Evurg. c. 1. These suits had evidently become in Aristotle's time a great social nuisance: cp. c. 5. 1263 b 20 sq. *Ἐποίησε* is here used of a legislator, as e.g. in c. 9. 1270 a 20.

8. *γλαφυρώτερος*, 'more finished': see note on 1271 b 21.

9. [Φαλέου . . . ἄχρηστον.] As to this passage, see note on 1274 a 22. In c. 7. 1266 a 34 we read οὐδεὶς γὰρ οὔτε τὴν περὶ τὰ τέκνα κοινότητα καὶ τὰς γυναῖκας ἄλλος κεκαινοτόμηκεν (except Plato) οὔτε περὶ τὰ συσσίτια τῶν γυναικῶν: here, on the contrary, the suggestion of a community of property is said to be also peculiar to him. The

two passages seem inconsistent, and probably the earlier statement is the truer. Most of the suggestions with which Plato is here credited are trivial enough, and it may well be doubted whether this paragraph is anything more than a marginal annotation from the pen of some reader of the treatise, which has crept into the text. Its style, however, resembles that of Aristotle, and its date may well be very early. Φαλείου seems to be the correct reading, not Φιλολάου, though Φιλολάου has the weight of MS. authority in its favour, for a re-equalization, or at any rate an equalization, of οὐσίαι (the word οὐσίαι is used also in 1266 a 37 and 1267 b 5, though, as Aristotle points out in 1267 b 9, his project extended only to land) has been ascribed to Phaleas (c. 7. 1266 b 1 sq.), whereas nothing of the kind has been attributed to Philolaus.

ἀνομάλωσις. Here all the MSS. read ἀνωμάλωσις (Vet. Int. 'irregularitas')—i. e. 'partitio inaequalis,' which is evidently not the sense intended. Ἀνομάλωσις ('aequalitatis restitutio': see Bon. Ind. s. v.) is probably the true reading: the word does not, however, occur elsewhere in Aristotle: still we have ἀνωμαλίσθαι (from ἀνωμαλίζειν) in Rhet. 3. 11. 1412 a 16, and some would read ἀνωμαλισθησομένην for ἀν ὁμαλισθησομένην in Pol. 2. 6. 1265 a 40.

11. δ . . . συμποσιαρχεῖν. Cp. Plato, Laws 671 D—672 A. For the construction ὁ νόμος, τὸ κ.τ.λ., cp. c. 8. 1268 b 4, ὁ περὶ τῆς κρίσεως νόμος, τὸ κρίνειν ἀξιοῦν διαιροῦντα κ.τ.λ., and below 19—20.

12. καὶ τὴν . . . ἄχρηστον. Sus. compares Plato, Laws 794 D—795 D. Τὴν . . . ἀσκησιν is governed by περὶ, 11: see the passages collected by Bonitz (Ind. 630 a 39 sqq.), and cp. also Pol. 7 (5). 10. 1311 b 37, and de Gen. An. 3. 1. 749 b 24, where PZ omit διὰ. Κατὰ τὴν μελέτην (13), 'by practice': cp. κατὰ φύσιν, κατὰ τύχην. Plato's view was that the difference between the right hand and the left has arisen διὰ τὰ ἔθνη, οὐκ ὁρθῶς χρωμένων, there being by nature none whatever (Laws 794 E). Aristotle, on the contrary, held that this difference existed by nature (Eth. Nic. 5. 10. 1134 b 33 sqq.: de Caelo 2. 2. 284 b 6 sqq.: Hist. An. 2. 1. 497 b 31), though men might make themselves ambidextrous by practice: cp. Magn. Mor. 1. 34. 1194 b 32, τὰ φύσει ὄντα μεταλαμβάνουσι μεταβολῆς· λέγω δ' οἷον εἰ τῇ ἀριστερᾷ μελετῶμεν πάντες αἱ βάλλειν, γυνοίμεθ' ἂν ἀμφιδέξιοι· ἀλλὰ φύσει γε ἀριστερά ἐστί κ.τ.λ. He would probably, however, be opposed to attempts to counteract nature by habituation (4 (7). 17. 1337 a 1: 4 (7). 14. 1332 b 35 sqq.).

14. ὥς δέον κ.τ.λ. Cp. Plato, Laws 795 C, ὅτι τὸν διττὰ δεῖ κεκτημένον οἷς ἀμύνοντό τ' ἂν καὶ ἐπιτιθεῖτο ἄλλοις, μηδὲν ἀργὸν τούτων μηδὲ ἀνεπιστήμον εἶναι κατὰ δύναμιν.

τοῖν χερσίν. 'In Attic the dual of δ , η , $\tau\acute{o}$ has commonly but one gender $\tau\acute{\omega}$, $\tau\acute{o}\iota\upsilon$ ' (Liddell and Scott s. v.). See Jelf, Gr. Gr. § 388. 3 b, and cp. Plato, Protag. 314 D: Theaetet. 155 E.

17. καί, 'at all': see Riddell, Apology of Plato, p. 168.

ἡ χαλεπότης. Cp. Rhet. 2. 23. 1400 b 21. See C. F. Hermann, Gr. Ant. 3. § 73. 10 (in Thalheim's edition, Rechtsalt. § 18. p. 122. 5).

18. A transition is made from Draco to Pittacus, because Pittacus also was the author of laws only: the two lawgivers, however, had more than this in common, for Pittacus' law about drunkards was, like those of Draco, famous for its severity ([Plutarch,] Sept. Sap. Conv. 13, τὸν σὺν ἐκέλευον τὸν χαλεπὸν νόμον).

20. τι πταίσωσι. See critical note.

21. οὐ πρὸς τὴν κ.τ.λ. Literally, 'he paid regard not to the greater consideration which it might be pleaded is due to men who offend when drunk, but' etc. Ὅτι is used, and not $\eta\iota$, because the writer does not wish to affirm that this greater consideration is due. The question with regard to which neutrality is here maintained, a neutrality perhaps slightly benevolent to the drunkard, is solved without hesitation in Eth. Nic. 3. 2. 1110 b 24 sqq., where the drunken offender is said not to act δι' ἄγνοιαν, much less involuntarily (in which case alone συγγνώμη is called for, Eth. Nic. 3. 1. 1109 b 31 sq.), but only ἀγνοῶν: thus Pittacus was quite right, ἡ γὰρ ἀρχὴ ἐν αὐτῷ κύριος γὰρ τοῦ μὴ μεθυσθῆναι, τοῦτο δ' αἴτιον τῆς ἀγνοίας (Eth. Nic. 3. 7. 1113 b 30 sqq.). Lesbos, we remember, was a wine-producing island, and Pittacus was engaged in restoring order to Mytilene. According to the English law, if intoxication amounts to stupidity, it reduces the crime (Ruling of an English Judge, *Times*, Feb. 4, 1881). It should be noted that Pittacus was credited with the exclamation Συγγνώμη τιμωρίας κρείσσων, on liberating his opponent Alcaeus (Diog. Laert. 1. 76).

24. οὐδ, sc. νόμος, latent in νομοθέτης.

26. τὰ μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. Constitutions which 'took effect' (κυρίας) seem to be here distinguished from schemes which remained mere schemes. Κυρίας, however, would more naturally mean 'actually in force,' and this winding-up would be more in place at the close of the notice of the Carthaginian constitution, than at the end of a chapter on νομοθέται, for it makes no reference to νομοθέται. We note also that μὲν οὖν is not taken up by δέ at the commencement of the next book, which begins τῷ περὶ πολιτείας ἐπισκοποῦντι without any connecting particle, as does the Sixth Book likewise. This is hardly reassuring as to the state of the text, though it is impossible to say what precisely has happened to it.

APPENDIX A.

The Relation of the teaching of the Nicomachean Ethics to that of the Politics.

It is proposed to examine in the present Appendix, so far as limits of space will allow, the relation in which the Politics stands to the Nicomachean Ethics, and also to ask how far its teaching agrees with that of the latter treatise—how far the two works can be said to form well-planned parts of a coherent whole.

In dealing with these questions, it will be necessary for us to take the Nicomachean Ethics as it stands, without pausing to inquire whether parts of it are due to other hands than Aristotle's, or whether intrusive or interpolated matter is present in the work, or again whether its component parts were designed at the time of composition to form part of the whole which they at present constitute. To enter on these and other vexed questions with regard to the state of the text of this work would carry us too far.

That the Nicomachean Ethics should have a sequel was necessary for more reasons than one. As we have already seen, Aristotle himself mentions one of these reasons at the beginning of the last chapter of the treatise. Moral Philosophy is to him a practical science with a practical aim : οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν τοῖς πρακτοῖς τέλος τὸ θεωρησαι ἕκαστα καὶ γινῶναι, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τὸ πράττειν αὐτὰ (Eth. Nic. 10. 10. 1179 a 35)—οὐ γὰρ ἵν' εἰδῶμεν τί ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετὴ σκεπτόμεθα, ἀλλ' ἵν' ἀγαθοὶ γενώμεθα, ἐπεὶ οὐδὲν ἂν ᾖ ὄφελος αὐτῆς (Eth. Nic. 2. 2. 1103 b 27): the study of Morals thus involves a study of the means by which men are made good. It involves therefore a study of the State. To stop short at the close of the Nicomachean Ethics would be to leave the science of moral action incomplete, to balk its aim and rob it of its effectiveness.

But then again it is in the State that happiness assumes its noblest form (Eth. Nic. 1. 1. 1094 b 7 sqq.). We must study it in the State if we wish to see it at its best. Nor is this all. Aristotle

would probably say that we have not fully explored the nature of the *σπουδαῖος* till we have explored the State of which he is a part. We do not fully understand what the *σπουδαῖος* is until we have viewed him as a part of a whole—as a husband, father, citizen, soldier, and ruler.

Plato had treated of Ethics and Politics in one and the same dialogue. He had not only traced a parallel between the State and the soul of the individual, but had laid stress on the mutual reaction of individual and State. As is the individual, so is the State; as is the State, so is the individual. The individual, he seemed to say, could no more be understood apart from the State than a limb apart from the body to which it belongs. Ethics and Politics, according to this view, gain by being treated together; the individual must not be severed from the State which makes him what he is, nor the State from the individual who gives it its character. The Republic of Plato gains in concreteness by its adoption of this method. We study the good man and his opposites, as we see them in actual life, in a 'setting' of institutions. We view them in connexion with the little world of which they form a part. We recognize not only what the *σπουδαῖος* is, but what makes him what he is, and see the medium in which he lives and moves. The relation between the individual and the State has never been more vigorously portrayed than in the Republic. The unsound State, we see, is fatal even to sound philosophy. The four virtues of the Republic are public virtues, all of them relative to the Whole of which they are the pillars; they presuppose the State and the State presupposes them.

Aristotle's plan, on the contrary, is to part the study of *εὐδαιμονία* and the virtues of which it is the outcome from the study of the State and its various forms. He thus severs what Plato had joined together. Plato's plan of dealing with Ethics and Politics in one work had, in fact, its disadvantages. Pent within so narrow a space, neither could really thrive. It brought out, indeed, more effectively than any other method could have done the pressing need of a return to justice and of a reform of the State, and this was precisely what Plato sought to do; but a full scientific treatment of the two subjects was hardly possible without a double inquiry. In dealing with them separately Aristotle took a great step in advance. In the interest of science, he concerns himself in the Nicomachean Ethics primarily with the individual viewed as the subject of *εὐδαιμονία* and as exercising the various moral and intellectual virtues. He asks what constitutes virtuous action and happiness, and dwells only

incidentally on the forces external to the individual which bring them into being, and the field in which they are realized. His aim is for the time to view virtue as an internal fact, a psychological diathesis, rather than as the life-breath of society or its product—to approach it rather from the side of Psychology than from that of Politics. But he too, in his turn, as he passes from virtues like Temperance or Liberality to virtues like Justice and Moral Prudence, and then to Friendship, is led further and further into the domain of Politics. If we are not yet asked to analyse the State, we are taught to study the work of Justice in the State. If the objects in the foreground are still virtues, we look through them into a background of Politics, and thus the study of Ethics leads Aristotle on to the study of Politics. If, unlike Plato, he treats of Ethics in one work and Politics in another, he is far from intending to break the link which binds the two subjects together, or to stop short in his inquiries at the close of the Nicomachean Ethics.

It was necessary then that this treatise should have a sequel, but how far is the Politics an appropriate sequel to it and in accord with it?

It is easy to see that the two treatises have much in common. Not only do both of them presuppose the great central principles of the Aristotelian philosophy, but a broad similarity of method and treatment is traceable throughout them. We find evidence in both of a desire to gather up all that is sound in the work of previous inquirers and in the beliefs of ordinary men, to do justice to all aspects of truth, and to frame a creed in which all the jarring schools would find their best results embodied. Half-truths were to vanish before the whole truth, as the stars disappear before the light of day. Aristotle sought to mediate between contending doctrines, and to sum up the best traditions of the Greek race and the net result of Greek inquiry in a broad-based and broad-minded system¹. This could only be done by steering a midway course. Truth no less than moral virtue lay in a mean; the conception of the mean is of the very essence of Aristotle's philosophy. We

¹ Τὸ διορίζειν was precisely that of which the Many are incapable (Eth. Nic. 10. 1. 1172 b 3) and of which the philosopher should be capable. ἴσως οὖν τοὺς τοιοῦτους δεῖ τῶν λόγων διαιρεῖν καὶ διορίζειν ἐφ' ὅσον ἐκότεροι καὶ πῇ ἀληθεύουσιν (Eth. Nic. 9. 8. 1168 b 12). Ληπτέος δὲ τρόπος ὅστις ἡμῖν ἅμα τὰ τε δοκούντα περὶ τούτων

μάλιστα ἀποδώσει καὶ τὰς ἀπορίας λύσει καὶ τὰς ἐναντιώσεις. τοῦτο δ' ἔσται, ἐὰν εὐλόγως φαίνηται τὰ ἐναντία δοκούντα· μάλιστα γὰρ ὁμολογούμενος ὁ τοιοῦτος ἔσται λόγος τοῖς φαινόμενοις. συμβαίνει δὲ μένειν τὰς ἐναντιώσεις, ἐὰν ἔστι μὲν ὡς ἀληθὲς ἢ τὸ λεγόμενον, ἔστι δ' ὡς οὐ (Eth. Eud. 7. 2. 1235 b 13 sqq.).

hear less of the mean in the Politics than in the Nicomachean Ethics, but the idea is very present there also¹. The same breadth of view appears in Aristotle's readiness to recognize higher and lower forms of things. Just as in the Nicomachean Ethics the recognition of higher forms of virtue, or justice, or pleasure, or friendship does not preclude the recognition of lower forms also, so in the Politics, side by side with the true citizen and the best constitution, the citizen of the deviation-forms and the deviation-forms themselves receive recognition. Aristotle declines to say, as Cicero in effect said², that the lower forms of State are not States at all. Many a problem is solved in both treatises by the use of this method. It enables Aristotle to do justice both to the higher and to the lower forms of things without sinning either against truth or against the ordinary use of language³, and authorizes a careful study both of the more and of the less perfect. The Nicomachean Ethics and the Politics would have been far less comprehensive in treatment than they are, if Aristotle had followed a different course in this respect. So again, the two works agree in aiming both at speculative truth and practical utility⁴. Another common feature is an unwillingness to rest content with generalities. Broad general descriptions of things are wanting, Aristotle feels, in clearness; they seem to say much, but really say little. We learn but little when we are told that virtue is *τὸ εἶχειν τὴν ψυχὴν* (Pol. 1. 13. 1260 a 25 sq.). Plato and the contemporary Academy dealt too much in these generalities. Aristotle insists on *τὸ διορίσκειν* (e.g. in Pol. 2. 5. 1264 a 14, 37, and 2. 6. 1265 a 28 sqq., b 18 sqq.), and his definition of virtue is full and particular. This effort to be clear and detailed is traceable in both treatises. In both Aristotle learns the nature of the Whole (e.g. *εὐδαιμονία, οἰκία, πόλις*) by beginning with the part and working up from it to the Whole.

But these broad similarities do not carry us very far, and if we are to judge to what extent the two works are in accord, we must recall some of the more important passages in the Nicomachean

¹ See for instance Pol. 6 (4). 11. 1295 a 35 sqq.; 6 (4). 9. 1294 a 41: 2. 6. 1265 a 32 sqq. (cp. 4 (7). 5. 1326 b 30-39): 4 (7). 7. 1327 b 29 sqq.

² See vol. i. p. 216 note, and above p. xiv.

³ Cp. Eth. Nic. 8. 5. 1157 a 25, *ἐπεὶ γὰρ οἱ ἄνθρωποι λέγουσι φίλους καὶ τοὺς διὰ τὸ χρησιμὸν . . . καὶ τοὺς*

δι' ἡδονὴν ἀλλήλους στέργοντας . . . ἴσως λέγειν μὲν δεῖ καὶ ἡμᾶς φίλους τοὺς τοιούτους, εἶθ' ὅτε τῆς φιλίας πλείω, καὶ πρῶτας μὲν καὶ κυρίως τὴν τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἢ ἀγαθοί, τὰς δὲ λοιπὰς καθ' ὁμιλίτητα.

⁴ See Eth. Nic. 2. 2. 1103 b 26 sqq., 10. 10. 1179 a 35 sqq., and above on 1. 3. 1253 b 14 as to the Politics.

Ethics in which light is thrown on the State, its functions and organization.

The reader of the Nicomachean Ethics, as he passes on from book to book, finds the relation of virtue to the State and of Ethics to Politics coming ever more prominently before him. Virtue, he learns, is the offspring of law, and law is an incident of the State. Virtue varies with the constitution, and reaches its full height only in the best constitution. Some virtues, again, belong exclusively or especially to the ruler. In these and other ways we are constantly being reminded of the importance of the State.

The earliest pages of the treatise bring the πολιτική ἐπιστήμη before us, the Science which is at once the Science of the State and the Science of Life. Its end is nothing less than the end of human life; it is supreme over the State as over the individual, 'determining what sciences are to exist in the State, and what each man is to learn, and how far'—'legislating what is to be done and not done.' (Not a word, we note, is said here about those lower problems of πολιτική, of which we hear so much in the first chapter of the Sixth Book of the Politics.) We are told further, that the happiness of a State or nation is a nobler and more divine thing than the happiness of an individual; later (Eth. Nic. I. 5. 1097 b 8 sqq.: cp. 9. 9. 1169 b 16 sqq.), we learn that man is by nature a political animal, and that his needs are not fully satisfied unless the needs of the persons who live in society with him—his parents, wife, children, and fellow-citizens—are also satisfied. In all this the Nicomachean Ethics anticipates the teaching of the Politics, that man is more fully a political animal than any of the gregarious animals (Pol. I. 2. 1253 a 7 sqq.), that the training which produces a πολιτικός is the same as that which produces a σπουδαῖος, so that the πολιτικός cannot be far other than the σπουδαῖος (Pol. 3. 18), and that the πολιτικός must know both the end of human life and the best means of attaining it (Pol. 4 (7). 13. 1331 b 26 sqq.).

Later on in the first book of the Nicomachean Ethics (c. 13. 1102 a 18 sqq.), we are told that broad psychological data, such as the division of the soul into a rational and an irrational part, have an interest and importance for the true πολιτικός, and we soon learn why: the appetitive section of the irrational part of the soul needs to be brought under the control of right reason (λόγος), so that moral virtue may be developed, but this can only be accomplished through habituation, and habituation to virtue is the business of the lawgiver, or in other words, of the State. The true statesman—the lawgivers of the Lacedaemonian and Cretan

States, for instance—is generally held to concern himself with the development of virtue (Eth. Nic. 1. 13. 1102 a 7 sqq.); every lawgiver aims at making his citizens virtuous, and the only difference between lawgivers is that some do this well and others not; it is in this that a good constitution differs from a bad one (Eth. Nic. 2. 1. 1103 b 2 sqq.). In fact, as those are held to be bravest whose States honour the brave and disgrace the coward (Eth. Nic. 3. 11. 1116 a 18 sqq.), the virtue of the individual appears to depend on the distribution of reward and punishment, pleasure and pain, by the State. Often as in this treatise the ordinary *πολιτικοί* are weighed in the balance and found wanting, *νομοθέται* are always treated with respect: *νομοθετική*, we are told in a later book (Eth. Nic. 6. 8. 1141 b 24 sqq.), is the architectonic form of *φρόνησις περὶ πόλιν*: the makers of *ψηφίσματα* are mere *χειροτέχνηαι*.

Aristotle's psychology and ethics reveal to him, in fact, the necessity of a power capable of disciplining the lower nature by habituation, and he ascribes a power of this kind to the lawgiver. Not all lawgivers were wise enough to begin their training of the citizen in childhood, or to supervise education and the habits of adult life (Eth. Nic. 10. 10. 1180 a 24 sqq.), but all sought more or less wisely and well to make their citizens virtuous by a skilful use of pain and pleasure, or, in other words, by habituation. The account of Universal Justice in the Fifth Book confirms all this, for what the laws prescribe (or 'normally constituted laws,' at all events) is there said to be universally just (c. 3. 1129 b 14 sqq.); and if (c. 5. 1130 b 26 sqq.) a question is raised, whether *πολιτική* has to do with the training which makes a good man as distinguished from a good citizen, this is perhaps nothing more than an anticipation of the teaching of the Politics, that *πολιτική* is concerned with other forms of State than the best, in which alone the virtue of the citizen is identical with that of the good man.

Already then we discern the ethical necessity of the lawgiver and the State, but the study of Particular Justice brings the State more vividly before us. Aristotle's account of it incidentally corrects Plato's account of Justice in the Republic, according to which a just man is he who does the work for which he is fit (*τὰ αὐτοῦ πράττει*). Justice, in Aristotle's view, has rather to do with external goods—honour, wealth, and the like—than with work. He is just who gives these to those to whom they are due, not he who does the work for which he is fit. Justice is a question of external goods, not of functions. But the main purpose of the

Fifth Book probably is to show that Justice, like all other moral virtues, has to do with a mean—that it is *ἀνάλογον* and *ὡς ὁ λόγος*¹ (the word for reason and proportion in Greek being the same), and that it has more kinds than one². True justice does not, as Plato thought (Laws 757 A–D), always take account of virtue in the award it makes. The justice of the lawgiver and ruler does so, but not that of the judge.

We see in Aristotle's account of Justice an effort to be more definite than Plato had been, and to keep closer to facts. We learn that Justice differs with the social function. The justice of the ruler is not as the justice of the judge. Far more than any other moral virtue, justice presupposes the *κοινωνία* of the State, for it especially appertains to the lawgiver, the ruler, the judge, and the citizen, if it also appears in the *ἀλλακτικὴ κοινωνία*³, which need not, of course, be between fellow-citizens. Its highest type apparently implies rule. It is to be found rather in the relations of the State than in those of the household—*ἐπὶ κοινωνῶν βίον πρὸς τὸ εἶναι αὐτάρκειαν, εὐλευθέρων καὶ ἴσων ἢ κατ' ἀναλογίαν ἢ κατ' ἀριθμὸν* (Eth. Nic. 5. 10. 1134 a 26)—between those between whom law subsists (30)⁴, or can subsist (Eth. Nic. 8. 13. 1161 b 6 sq.). But then there are two kinds even of τὸ πολιτικὸν δίκαιον, one natural, the other conventional, and we gather that the true standard of that which is naturally just among men is to be found in the best constitution (*μία μόνον πανταχοῦ κατὰ φύσιν ἢ ἀρίστη*, Eth. Nic. 5. 10. 1135 a 5).

¹ Cp. Eth. Nic. 3. 10. 1115 b 17, *ὁ μὲν οὖν ἀ δεῖ καὶ οὐ ἕνεκα ὑπομένειν καὶ φοβούμενος καὶ ὡς δεῖ καὶ ὅτε, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ θαρρῶν, ἀνδρείως κατ' ἄλῃαν γὰρ καὶ ὡς ἂν ὁ λόγος πᾶσχει καὶ πράττει ὁ ἀνδρείος*.

² 'In my opinion,' says Mr. Jackson (Fifth Book of the Nic. Ethics, p. 87), 'c. 5 [of Eth. Nic. 5] should be read in close connection with cc. 2–4, the passage as a whole being an attempt at once to connect and to distinguish three kinds of particular justice. In order to connect these three kinds of particular justice, the author regards them each as *ἀνάλογόν τι*: in order to distinguish them, he represents each by a special and appropriate kind of *ἀναλογία*.'

³ In the account of the *ἀλλακτικὴ κοινωνία* (Eth. Nic. 5. 8) and the part that money plays in making it possible, a social value is assigned to money different from that which it is implied to possess in the First Book of the

Politics, though there too money is said to be the *στοιχείον καὶ πέρας τῆς ἀλλαγῆς*, just as here it is said to be the *μέτρον*, or standard, by which the value of the commodities exchanged is measured and determined (cp. Eth. Nic. 9. 1. 1164 a 1 sq.).

⁴ This would appear to exclude the *παμβασιλεία*: cp. Pol. 3. 13. 1284 a 11 sqq. It of course implies that the relation of man to the lower animals is in strictness one with which justice has nothing to do: they have, in Aristotle's view, no rights against man and cannot be wronged (*ἀδικεῖσθαι*) by him: they are merely *ὄργανα* for his use, not *κοινωνοί*: they are not even, like the slave, human *ὄργανα* and therefore capable of being the objects of friendship (cp. Eth. Nic. 8. 13. 1161 a 32 sqq.). See as to this view Porphyry de Abstinence, 1. 4–6. It justified the slaughter of animals, the rightfulness of which had been questioned by some.

Already we have been told (5. 6. 1131 a 26 sqq.) that different constitutions distribute what they have to distribute on different principles, and now we are made aware that justice varies with the constitution, and attains its true form only in the best constitution. This quite agrees with the teaching of the Politics (cp. Pol. 7 (5). 9. 1309 a 37, *εἰ γὰρ μὴ ταῦτόν τὸ δίκαιον κατὰ πάσας τὰς πολιτείας, ἀνάγκη καὶ τῆς δικαιοσύνης εἶναι διαφορὰς*).

Aristotle's ethical treatise is pervaded by the half-mathematical conceptions of the mean and the proportional, and we nowhere learn more clearly than in its Fifth Book how important is the part played by 'proportion' (*τὸ κατ' ἀναλογίαν ἴσον*) in holding the State together (Eth. Nic. 5. 8. 1132 b 33, *τῷ ἀντιποιεῖν ἀνάλογον συμμένει ἡ πόλις*: cp. Pol. 2. 2. 1261 a 30, *τὸ ἴσον τὸ ἀντιπεπονθὸς σώζει τὰς πόλεις, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς ἡθικοῖς εἴρηται πρότερον*).

The books on Friendship possess an especial interest for the student of the Politics, both on account of the importance of Friendship to the State (Eth. Nic. 8. 1. 1155 a 22 sqq.: Pol. 2. 4. 1262 b 7 sqq.) and because they study Friendship not only in its highest form—the friendship of the good—but also as a concomitant of every kind of *κοινωνία*. The less temporary and the more comprehensive are the aims with which a *κοινωνία* is formed, the stronger is the link which binds one member of it to another, and the fuller the friendship. The link which binds together a band of merchants making a voyage for gain is a far less close one than that which binds together the members of a State, for the latter have joined together not for the sake of that which is advantageous for the moment, but to win that which will benefit their life as a whole (Eth. Nic. 8. 11. 1160 a 21). We learn in these books how all *κοινωνίαι* should be constituted, if friendship is to prevail within them. We learn the true form both of the parental relation and of the manifold relations of kinship which spring from it; we study the relation of husband and wife, the relation of master and slave, and then again the political relations on which the family relations seem to be modelled—those which prevail between ruler and ruled in a Kingship, an Aristocracy, and a Timocracy, or again those prevailing in a Tyranny, an Oligarchy, and a Democracy. The study of all these *κοινωνίαι*, and especially of the six constitutions, makes it clear that justice is a condition of friendship in *κοινωνίαι*. The members of a *κοινωνία* must render honour and advantage (*ὠφέλεια*) to each other *κατ' ἀξίαν*, if friendship is to prevail in it. The father must benefit the child, and the child must honour the father. The king must rule for the advan-

tage of his subjects and they must render him honour. It is because in Tyranny, Oligarchy, and Democracy the rulers rule, not for the advantage of the ruled, but for their own advantage, thus monopolising both honour and advantage—it is because, in fact, they rule unjustly—that there is so little friendship in States thus governed. Honour belongs justly to rulers, benefit to those ruled, but the rulers in a deviation-form grasp both at honour and gain¹.

Thus the books on Friendship enforce anew the importance of Justice: we learn more clearly than before how essential Justice is to *κοινωνίας*: we see that not only the lawgiver, the ruler, the judge, and the trader need to be just, but that all members of *κοινωνίας* need to be so—even children and slaves—and that precisely in so far as they are so, will Friendship be present in the *κοινωνία*. This holds good both of equal and unequal *κοινωνίας* (Eth. Nic. 8. 15. 1162 b 2 sq.): τὸ ἰσάζειν is necessary in both. It is best, indeed, that in friendship 'the same thing should be rendered on both sides' (Eth. Nic. 8. 5. 1156 b 33 sqq.)—that the friendship should rest, not on the return of an equivalent amount of different things, but on an identical return: in the relations of the State, however, and in many of those of the household this is not possible; hence here a return must be made κατ' ἀξίαν.

Political society rests on τὸ ἀνάλογον, on τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν: this is the far-reaching principle laid down in these books of the Nicomachean Ethics. It is an infraction of the principles of political society, when the ruler draws to himself the whole advantage: rule to be justifiable must be πρὸς τὸ κοινῇ συμφέρον. The just is that which is for the common advantage. Aristotle's ethical treatise thus contains the germ and something more of his Politics. The former treatise gives us at all events one of the main laws which govern *κοινωνίας*: the latter works it out in its application to the State.

And yet there are points in which the teaching of these books of the Nicomachean Ethics is not quite borne out by that of the Politics. Take, for instance, the account they give of the deviation-forms of constitution. These are implied in the Eighth Book of the Nicomachean Ethics to arise from the deterioration of the rulers of the normal constitutions. The rulers of an oligarchy are 'few and bad' (Eth. Nic. 8. 12. 1160 b 12 sqq.). The Politics appears to be more ready to recognize that even the deviation-forms are founded on δίκαιον τι. The book on Revolutions,

¹ Cp. Pol. 8 (6). 7. 1321 a 40 sq.

indeed, goes so far as to say that it is not safe to base a constitution wholly on ἡ κατ' ἀξίαν ἰσότης (7 (5). 1. 1302 a 2 sq.¹): the most durable constitutions are those which are partly based on this kind of equality, partly on arithmetical equality. We learn in the Sixth Book of the Politics that the deviation-forms are not mere gratuitous embodiments of injustice: we are taught, on the contrary, to trace the law of their appearance; the social conditions of a community, we find, have much to do with its government. A deviation-form of some kind is often the only possible constitution. Aristotle had also learnt by the time at which the Sixth Book of the Politics was written, that there are better and worse shades of each deviation-form. So again, the scheme of constitutional change given in Eth. Nic. 8. 12, according to which Kingship passes into Tyranny, and Aristocracy into Oligarchy, and Timocracy into Democracy, is quite different from any of those given in the Politics (cp. Pol. 3. 15. 1286 b 8 sqq.: 6 (4). 13. 1297 b 16 sqq.). In the former of these passages Kingship is made to change into Polity, in the latter first into Oligarchy, and then into Polity. In the Politics (7 (5). 7. 1307 a 20-25: 7 (5). 12. 1316 a 17 sqq.) Aristotle is far from thinking that constitutions change most often into the forms most akin to them. His view of the just or normal constitution in the Politics seems also to be different. Justice, we are there told, requires that all elements which contribute to the being and well-being of a State—not only virtue, but also wealth and free birth—should receive due recognition (Pol. 3. 13. 1283 a 26 sqq.). Constitutions which rest on a bare superiority in one such element only, even if that element be virtue, are unjust. Superiority in virtue must be transcendent if it is to confer an exclusive title to rule.

We are further surprised to find Aristotle speaking in Eth. Nic. 8. 14. 1161 b 13 sqq. of πολιτικαὶ φιλίας as resting on compact (οἷον γὰρ καθ' ὁμολογίαν τινὰ φαίνονται εἶναι), when we remember the decided way in which at the outset of the Politics he de-

¹ The view that the constitution should rest partly on ἀριθμητικὴ ἰσότης, partly on ἡ κατ' ἀξίαν ἰσότης is, it should be noticed, derived from Plato's Laws 757 D, ἀναγκαῖόν γε μὴν καὶ τούτοις παρουνυμιοῖσι ('his quae iusta quidem vocantur, nec tamen revera iusta sunt,' Stallbaum) ποτε προσχρήσασθαι πόλιν ἄσασαν, εἰ μέλλει στάσεων ἐαυτῇ μὴ προσκοιναῖσθαι κατὰ τι μέρος . . . διδὲ τῷ τοῦ κλήρου ἴσῳ ἀνάγκῃ προσχρήσασθαι δυσκολίας τῶν

πολλῶν ἕνεκα . . . οὕτω δὲ χρηστὸν ἀναγκαῖως μὲν τοῖν ἰσοτήτων ἀμφοῖν, ὥς δ' ὅτι μάλιστα ἐπ' ὀλιγίστοις τῇ ἑτέρᾳ, τῇ τῆς τύχης δεομένην. Plutarch (Solon, c. 14) even carries the idea back to Solon—λέγεται δὲ καὶ φωνή τις αὐτοῦ περιφερομένη πρότερον εἰπόντος ὡς τὸ ἴσον πόλεμον οὐ ποιεῖ καὶ τοῖς κτηματικοῖς ἀρέσκειν καὶ τοῖς ἀκτήμοσι, τῶν μὲν ἀξία καὶ ἀρετῇ, τῶν δὲ μέτρῳ καὶ ἀριθμῷ τὸ ἴσον εἶναι προσδοκόντων.

clares the State to be based on nature. The relation of kinship, again, seems in this book of the Nicomachean Ethics to count for more in comparison with the political relation, than in the Politics, and man is said to be by nature *συνδυαστικὸν μᾶλλον ἢ πολιτικόν* (Eth. Nic. 8. 14. 1162 a 17). On the other hand, when we read that *πολιτικὴ φιλία* thrives best between good men (Eth. Nic. 9. 6. 1167 b 4 sqq.: cp. 9. 8. 1169 a 8 sqq.), we recognize an anticipation of the teaching of the Politics, that the best State is the State whose citizens are *ἀπλῶς σπουδαῖοι*. The same book also prepares us for the limitation of the number of the citizens in the best State (Eth. Nic. 9. 10. 1170 b 29 sqq.: cp. Pol. 4 (7). 4).

The whole tenour of the Nicomachean Ethics points to the conclusion that virtue not only presupposes a life in relation to others, but life in a State, and further a good State, or even the best State. Nay more, one kind of Justice presupposes the exercise of rule, for it appears only in the ruler. That *φρόνησις* is peculiar to the ruler, Aristotle asserts in the Politics (3. 4. 1277 b 25)¹, but not, it would seem, in the Nicomachean Ethics.

So largely indeed does the latter treatise admit virtue to be modified by the constitution and by the social function discharged, that we might almost expect it, seeing that it has a practical aim in view, to deal with the variations of duty under different constitutions and in different social positions. But this it does not do. Its moral teaching seems to apply indifferently to all constitutions, for all that we hear to the contrary. And then again, if the State is represented in the Nicomachean Ethics as essential to virtue, it seems to be essential rather to moral than to intellectual virtue. We do not learn whether the State does as much for the highest element of man's nature, the speculative intelligence, as it does for the appetitive nature and for moral virtue. At all events, we are not told what it is that the State does for *σοφία*, though we know that it 'rules for its sake' (*ἐπιτάττει σοφίας ἕνεκα*, Eth. Nic. 6. 13. 1145 a 9)².

The last book of the treatise, which finds *τελεία εὐδαιμονία* in the contemplative life and exalts this life above the political life, should have traced the dependence of the highest of man's energies on the excellence of the State. So far however is it from doing this, and completing the indications given us earlier in the work of the intimate relation between virtue and the State, that it closes with a

¹ Following Plato (Rep. 433 C) Plato how much a defective State and Xenophon (Cyp. 1. 6. 22).

² We learn from the Republic of

chapter (c. 10), which, though it points to the State as the most effective agency in the production of virtue, seems half to hint that its place may to a certain extent be filled by heads of families trained in legislative science. We are conscious, as has been observed elsewhere, of some change of tone, when we pass to the commencement of the Politics. We there learn that man is by nature a part of a Whole; he is a part of the State, born to rule and be ruled with a view to the highest and most complete life. The Politics asserts emphatically and in unmistakable terms the truth which the abstract method of the Nicomachean Ethics had kept somewhat in the background, though even there facts constantly force it on our notice—the truth that the life of the State is marked out for man by nature. Even the virtue of the wife and the child, we are here told, is relative to the constitution (Pol. 1. 13. 1260 b 8 sqq.); much more is this true of the virtue of the citizen. The citizen varies with the constitution, but the citizen of the best constitution, and therefore the *σπουδαῖος*, is he who is able and purposed to rule and be ruled with a view to a life in accordance with virtue (Pol. 3. 13. 1284 a 1 sq.). We might well infer that the life of ruling and being ruled, or in other words the political life, is the highest life open to man. It is not till we reach the Fourth Book of the Politics, that the lesson of the last book of the Nicomachean Ethics is again impressed on us—the lesson that the supreme end of man is not work (*ἀσχολία*) but leisure (*σχολή*)—not the political life, not even the life of the ruler in the best State, but rather the life of leisure and contemplation. The highest employment of man, we are again told, is the employment of leisure; his highest and most godlike moments are moments of speculation, not of political activity. True, the right use of leisure presupposes the active virtues (Pol. 4 (7). 15. 1334 a 16 sqq.); still the ruler rules for the sake of speculative virtue (*σοφία*), not over her. But the Politics couples this doctrine with the emphatic assertion that man is a part of the State. Many of the virtues enumerated in the Nicomachean Ethics drop out of sight in the Politics, but some features in the character of the *σπουδαῖος* acquire a fresh prominence. We see him in a ‘setting’ of institutions, as we know him in actual life; we see him as a member of a *πᾶσις*, and therefore as one who is ‘his brother’s keeper’¹, and who cares for the virtue of all his equals and dependents in the community to which he belongs. We see him in connexion with the social positions which he fills—a husband, a father, a master, a proprietor, a citizen, and

¹ Pol. 3. 9. 1280 b 1 sqq.

a ruler. Virtue is depicted diffusive of itself and radiating its influence through household and State. We learn to know happiness better, when it is embodied for us in an entire State of happy men.

Thus the Politics completes the Nicomachean Ethics. The latter treatise is, in fact, presupposed by the former. It would not have been possible to discover the best constitution, if the nature of the most desirable life, or in other words of *εὐδαιμονία*, had not been ascertained previously (Pol. 4 (7). 1. 1323 a 14 sq.: 4 (7). 13. 1332 a 7 sqq.).

But then again, the last three books of the Politics teach us a lesson of which we have heard but little in the Nicomachean Ethics. If the State is at its best when it is realizing *εὐδαιμονία*, Political Science falls short of completeness unless it can deal with cases in which the production of *σπουδαῖοι* and *εὐδαίμονες* is out of the question. The highest mission of Political Science is not its only mission; it needs to understand the deviation-forms and to know how to constitute them, as much as it needs to understand the best State. Political Science has its technical side; it is not a mere handmaid to Ethics. Thus if the Nicomachean Ethics sought in some measure to view the moral agent apart from the State, one portion of the Politics studies the State apart in some degree from ethical aims. In Aristotle's hands, Ethics and Politics show to this extent an inclination to draw away from each other.

Not all the Politics, we see, is a strictly necessary sequel to the Nicomachean Ethics. When Aristotle announces his intention to study all constitutions—which he does as early as the close of his ethical treatise—he goes beyond the limits of the task which the interests of Moral Philosophy obliged him to undertake. He in effect implies that his purpose is to deal with Political Science not simply as a sequel to Ethics, but as a science deserving of study even apart from ethical considerations. Plato had studied the inferior constitutions in the Republic, only to show how fatal they are to justice and happiness; Aristotle will study them because it is the business of the *πολιτικός* to know how to construct even these lower forms of the State.

Aristotle, in fact, worked out to its results the parallel between *πολιτική* on the one hand, and *γυμναστική* and *ιατρική* on the other, which he inherited from the Gorgias of Plato (464 B sqq.) and from Socrates. These are arts, while *πολιτική* is a practical science; yet on the whole a resemblance exists between them¹, though it is

¹ Cp. Pol. 6 (4). 1. 1288 b 10 sqq.: 3. 6. 1278 b 37 sqq.: Eth. Nic. 10. 10. 1180 b 7 sqq.

not complete at all points¹. Πολιτική, no less than δυνάμεις like Rhetoric and Dialectic², resembles the arts in dealing with cases in which an imperfect success is alone attainable as readily as with others; 'it is quite possible to treat scientifically patients who can never enjoy health' (Rhet. 1. 1. 1355 b 13). Just as it is the business of Medicine to treat any one who may be proposed for treatment (τὸν προτεθέντα, Eth. Nic. 10. 10. 1180 b 26³), so it is the business of πολιτική to study how any given constitution is to be brought into being, and how, having been brought into being, it is to be kept in being as long as possible, even if the constitution thus demanded at its hands falls short of that to which the circumstances of the particular State enable it to attain (μήτε τὴν ἐνδεχομένην ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων ἀλλὰ τινα φαυλοτέραν, Pol. 6 (4). 1. 1288 b 28 sqq.).

Thus the political branch of πολιτική seems, as it were, to waver between two levels; it is, on the one hand, a practical science closely akin to Ethics, if indeed it does not deal with a nobler subject-matter; it is, on the other, an art or productive science like Medicine, ready to construct on demand any constitutional form which may be asked of it, whatever its merits or demerits, in such a way as to be as durable as possible; indeed, stooping even lower than Medicine, for while Medicine seeks in all cases to restore some degree of health, Political Science is not in every case to require States to adopt a good constitution.

Why, we ask, does not the Nicomachean Ethics also make it its business to deal with τὸν προτεθέντα and to do as much as possible for the virtue and happiness of the ill-circumstanced individual, just as the Politics does its best for the ill-circumstanced State? ⁴ We do, in fact, find lower as well as higher virtues described in the Nicomachean Ethics—continence as well as temperance; the lower kinds of friendship as well as the higher; justice as well as equity and friendship; prudence as well as speculative virtue—but why does not the treatise go on to trace out a life for the less favourably constituted individual, as the Politics traces a fitting organization for the less favourably circumstanced State? The answer is that

¹ Pol. 2. 8. 1269 a 19 sqq.: 3. 16. 1287 a 32 sqq.

² Rhet. 1. 4. 1359 b 12 sq.: 1. 1. 1355 b 10 sqq.: Top. 1. 3. 101 b 5 sqq.

³ Cp. Eth. Nic. 1. 11. 1101 a 3, καθάπερ καὶ στρατηγὸν ἀγαθὸν τῷ παρόντι στρατοπέδῳ χρῆσθαι πολεμικάτα καὶ σκυτοτόμον ἐκ τῶν δοθέντων σκυτῶν κάλλιστον ὑπόδημα ποιεῖν, τὸν αὐ-

τὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τεχνίτας ἀπαντας.

⁴ See on this subject the remarks of Teichmüller, Einheit des Aristotel. Eudämonie, pp. 103-108, though perhaps there is more difference between the Nicomachean Ethics and the Politics in this matter than Teichmüller here allows.

in strictness it has to do only with the virtues and the virtuous action which culminate in *eudaimonia*: it seeks to draw out the contents of *eudaimonia*: thus its aim is essentially ideal, and any attempt to do for the less well-endowed individual what the Politics does for the less favoured State would have conflicted with its plan. The question, however, remains, why the work was constructed on this plan—why Aristotle's treatment of Ethics is more ideal than his treatment of Politics. Perhaps the steps which Plato had already taken in the direction of sketching lower and more easily attainable forms of the State (Laws 739 E) may have suggested to Aristotle a broader and more practical treatment of Politics.

But if the Politics is something more than a sequel to the Nicomachean Ethics, the teaching of the latter treatise seems also to be less adjusted to that of the former than we might have expected. We learn in the Politics to regard man as a part of a greater Whole, the State, and we expect to find this fact kept in view by Aristotle in his ethical treatise. Virtue, we anticipate, will be the sum of the qualities which tend to the maintenance and excellence of the Whole, and the first question discussed in the work will be the question what these qualities are. The course followed, however, is quite different. Aristotle's ethical ideal is deduced partly from psychological facts, or alleged psychological facts, such as the natural supremacy of a certain part of the soul over other parts, partly from opinion, and especially opinion evidenced in action, or the opinion of wise and good men; in no way from the nature of the State or the conditions of its successful working. On the contrary, the State seems rather to be adjusted to the *σπουδαίος* than the *σπουδαίος* to the State; we are nowhere taught by Aristotle to deduce the nature of virtue from the nature of the State. If this had been otherwise, the ethical ideal of Aristotle might have been somewhat different from what it is. The virtues which tend to make men valuable members of a Whole would probably have assumed a more conspicuous place in it. The highest virtue would have been discovered not by asking what is the virtue of the most divine part of the soul, but by asking what virtue tends most to the harmony and excellence of the State. We do, in fact, find that in the Politics the highest virtue, that virtue whose exercise is more the end of human life than the exercise of any other—speculative virtue—is placed in a new light, as being (together with temperance, prudence, and justice) preservative of the State in those times of peace and leisure which are fatal to the exclusively military

State (4 (7). 15. 1334 a 22 sqq.). But we hear nothing about this in the Nicomachean Ethics. There, on the whole, the principle that man is by nature a part of the State seems to find less application than might have been expected¹. Virtue is described rather as the supremacy of that part of the soul which is rightfully supreme, than as the adaptation of the individual to the maintenance of the highest type of society. Ethical Science dominates Political Science, not Political Science Ethical. The supreme end of the State is contemplative activity, precisely the activity in the exercise of which the individual is most independent of his fellows.

But then again, as we have seen, Political Science claims freedom for itself. The Politics studies the *πολις* and the various *πολιτείας* more independently of Ethics than we might have expected. If Aristotle's only object had been to complete the Nicomachean Ethics, the Politics would have been a very different work from what it is. It would have been more ideal and less technical.

We see then that the two treatises are to a certain extent correlated, but that they are not perfectly adjusted to each other.

One remark may be added. There is no sign that Aristotle deduced from the Politics the lesson which it would seem clearly to imply, as to man's chance of attaining full virtue and happiness. The further we advance in the Politics, the more clearly we see how dependent the moral virtue of the individual is on the constitution—that is, on the ethical creed adopted by the State as a whole—and also how much the constitution depends on causes not altogether subject to man's control. The result is—as the reader of the Politics can hardly fail to see, whether Aristotle himself saw it or not—that virtue can rarely be attainable in its purity, for only the citizen of the best constitution is *ἀπλῶς σπουδαῖος*, and that if virtue is rarely attainable, still more must this be the case with happiness, for happiness presupposes not only pure and complete virtue, but also a certain measure of external and bodily goods. We hardly saw this, while we were

¹ Some virtues which are implied in the Politics to be essential to the successful working of the State appear to escape notice in the Nicomachean Ethics: e.g. that which is exercised in caring that others shall be virtuous (Pol. 3. 9. 1280 b 1 sqq.: 1. 13. 1259 b 18 sqq.)—unless indeed, as

is probably the case, *φρόνησις* is the virtue whose existence is here implied. But then, how imperfect is the sketch of *φρόνησις* or *πολιτική* in the Nicomachean Ethics, if this important feature of its action is not dwelt on there.

absorbed in the Nicomachean Ethics with the analysis of the nature of happiness: it is when we turn to the question how happiness is produced, that we learn how little it can really be said to be *πολύκωμον*, as it is said to be in *Eth. Nic.* i. 10. 1099 b 18—how little we are able without the aid of Nature and Fortune to bring the best State into being¹, or in other words, to realize the indispensable condition of full virtue and happiness. The ideal picture of *εὐδαιμονία* in the Nicomachean Ethics turns out to be little else than a glorious vision. We see the goal of human life, but the road to it seems to be well-nigh blocked.

APPENDIX B.

*On the Carthaginian Constitution*².

THE Carthaginian State was not a declining State when Aristotle wrote, like the Lacedaemonian and Cretan States, but was perhaps in its prime or approaching it. Carthage was a seaport, unlike Sparta and most of the Cretan cities, and a very populous seaport, for even in the days of its decline it is said to have had seven hundred thousand inhabitants³; the number of its citizens, therefore, was probably also very great—great enough, one would have thought, to remove Carthage from the category of well-governed States, if in these the citizen-body was never allowed to pass moderate limits (4 (7). 4. 1326 a 27 sq.). We know not who had written on the Carthaginian constitution before Aristotle—he himself may have already sketched it in his *Politics*—but it evidently enjoyed a high reputation. Aristotle remarks that the fact of its stability, notwithstanding that a *demos* existed at Carthage, proved it to be a well-designed constitution, and that under it Carthage had been free from serious civil trouble, and also from tyrants. It is clear that whatever Aristotle may say as to the political weaknesses of Asiatic

¹ Cp. *Pol.* 6 (4). 11. 1295 a 25 sqq.

² See on this subject Susemihl's notes (*Sus.*², Notes 376–398), which have been of much use to me.

³ It is thus that Grote (*History of Greece*, 10. 542) interprets the words of Strabo, p. 833, *πόλεις μὲν εἶχον τριακοσίας ἐν τῇ Λιβύῃ, ἀνθρώπων δ' ἐν*

τῇ πόλει μυριάδας ἰβδομήκοντα. Mommsen, however, takes Strabo to refer, not to the inhabitants, but to the citizens of Carthage, 'whether dwelling in the city or its neighbourhood, or resident in its subject-territory or in other lands' (*History of Rome*, E. T. 2. 24 n.).

racés (4 (7). 7), the Carthaginians deserve the credit, often ascribed too exclusively to Greece and Rome, of being among the earliest pioneers of free institutions.

We do not hear that, like the Lacedaemonian State, Carthage forbade its citizens to practise agriculture, trade, and the handicrafts, but it seems to have sought to encourage a military spirit in them (4 (7). 2. 1324 b 12 sqq.), and though we are not told that anything corresponding to the Lacedaemonian and Cretan systems of gymnastic training existed at Carthage, we hear of the existence of *syssitia*, and these may well have been there also, no less than at Sparta and in Crete, designed with a view to war.

It is, however, on the political constitution that Aristotle mainly dwells. His chapter on the Lacedaemonian constitution throws much light on the social organization of the Lacedaemonian State, but this cannot be said of his chapter on the Carthaginian constitution. We learn far less from him, indeed, than we could wish even as to the political constitution, for he is mainly preoccupied with the question, how far the Carthaginian constitution fulfilled its aim of being an *ἀριστοκρατία*, and not an oligarchy or a democracy. His remarks on this question throw some light on the arrangements of the constitution, but only enough to make us wish for more.

He had mentioned at the outset of the chapter that the Carthaginian constitution was similar in some respects to the Lacedaemonian, and he is thus led to enumerate, though in the briefest and baldest way, first those Carthaginian institutions which were similar (*παράλληλα*, 33), and next those which were analogous (*ἀνάλογον*, 37), to Lacedaemonian institutions. The former epithet is applied to the Carthaginian *syssitia* and to the Council of the Hundred and Four, which are respectively compared with the *Phiditia* and the *Ephors*, while the Carthaginian kings and senate are described as analogous to their Lacedaemonian correlatives. The Carthaginian constitution, though an *ἀριστοκρατία* (6 (4). 7. 1293 b 14 sqq.), is held by Aristotle to deviate from the true model of an *ἀριστοκρατία* both in an oligarchical and in a democratic direction. It sometimes conceded too much to the people and sometimes too much to the rich. A strict *ἀριστοκρατία* would not have given as much power to the popular assembly as the Carthaginian constitution gave it¹—would not have given it full power to arrive at decisions of its own or have allowed any one who pleased to speak against the pro-

¹ See Sus.² Note 388, who points out how limited were the powers of the people even in a democracy of the more moderate type.

posals of the magistrates. On the other hand, poor men of high merit had a career open to them in the Lacedaemonian State which was not open to them at Carthage. Carthage, indeed, not only tended to exclude poor men from high office, but confined two at least of its highest magistracies to wealthy men, actually making them purchaseable. The Carthaginian practice of allowing several offices to be held by one man also had an oligarchical tendency, inasmuch as it diminished the number of office-holders. Many even of the wealthy would find that office came to them but rarely. Thus, if we can understand how the Carthage of Aristotle's day could be described, not quite baselessly, as *δημοκρατούμένη* (7 (5). 12. 1316 b 5), we can still better understand the language which Isocrates puts into the mouth of Nicocles with regard to it—*ἔτι δὲ Καρχηδονίους καὶ Λακεδαιμονίους τοὺς ἀρίστα τῶν Ἑλλήνων πολιτευομένους οἴκοι μὲν ὀλιγαρχομένους, παρὰ δὲ τὸν πόλεμον βασιλευομένους* (Nicocl. § 24). Carthage, he holds, was oligarchically ruled at home, but ruled by kings in the field. Aristotle, on the contrary, would say that the Carthaginian constitution was an aristocracy, though it deviated from the true standard partly in the direction of democracy and still more in that of oligarchy. It was an aristocracy because it did homage to virtue as well as to wealth and popular power (6 (4). 7. 1293 b 14 sqq.), but it was so much mastered by a worship of wealth that Aristotle doubted whether it was a durable aristocracy, and would seem to have anticipated that it would ultimately become an oligarchy (1273 a 41 sq.). If it is allowable slightly to alter a phrase of Mr. Lowell's, the Carthaginian aristocracy was 'an aristocracy with oligarchical instincts.'

When we pass from the broad outline of the constitution to details, we find ourselves much at a loss, but it would seem that till the fifth century before Christ, when the Council of the Hundred and Four was instituted, the Kings (i.e. the Suffetes or Judges) and the Senate were supreme at Carthage, and that even after that event they probably retained to a large extent the immediate administration of affairs, for we are told that nothing came before the popular assembly except matters referred to it by them, or matters as to the reference of which to the popular assembly the kings and senate were not agreed (1273 a 6 sqq.). It would appear, therefore, that in practice either the kings or the senate could compel the reference of a question to the popular assembly. It does not seem that there were any determinate subjects with which the popular assembly had the exclusive right of dealing, and

no doubt the kings and the senate would commonly deal with administrative questions themselves. For all we hear to the contrary, they may have had the right to legislate also.

The Kings, or Suffetes, who were probably two in number, and who are compared by Livy to the Roman Consuls (30. 7. 5, *suffetes, quod velut consulare imperium apud eos erat*), cannot have held office for life, as Cicero appears to imply that they did (*De Rep.* 2. 23. 42-43), for Aristotle tells us (1273 a 15 sqq.) that the members of the Pentarchies held office for a longer term than any other magistrates, and they did not hold office for life. The kingship was probably an annual office, but those who held it may have been indefinitely re-eligible. We gather from Aristotle's language (1272 b 38 sqq.) that the kings were not taken, like the Lacedaemonian, from a single family, and that they were elected from families of merit, and were men of mark themselves, though they needed also to be wealthy men, but we know not by whom they were elected; Aristotle speaks, indeed, of the kingship as a purchaseable office (cp. Plato, *Rep.* 544 D). Isocrates, in the passage of the *Nicocles* which has already been quoted (§ 24), appears to regard the kings as the generals of the State, but Aristotle distinguishes the offices of King and General (1273 a 36 sq.). These two offices, however, may often have been combined. They are described by Aristotle in 1273 a 30, 36 as the greatest in the State, but in 1273 a 15 he refers in similar terms to 'the Hundred.' We have seen that in comparing the Carthaginian kingship with the Lacedaemonian he uses the epithet 'analogous,' not 'similar,' and it is clear that these two forms of kingship differed in many respects; the Carthaginian kingship was elective and purchaseable, was not held for life, and was not always combined with the Generalship.

We learn little from Aristotle as to the Senate. We have already seen that it probably shared with the Kings or Suffetes the ordinary administration of the State, and that he speaks of it as 'analogous' to the Lacedaemonian. It must have been a far more numerous body than the Lacedaemonian Senate, for the inner council by which it was to a large extent guided itself numbered thirty members (*Liv.* 30. 16. 3: *oratores ad pacem petendam mitunt triginta seniorum principes; id erat sanctius apud illos consilium, maximaque ad ipsum senatum regendum vis*), and the Carthaginian Senators cannot, like the Lacedaemonian, have held office for life, at any rate in the time of Aristotle, for Aristotle implies that no magistracies at Carthage were held for life (1273 a 15

sq.). Valerius Maximus (*Facta et Dicta Memorabilia*, 9. 5. 4) remarks on the arrogance of the Carthaginian Senate in using a bath of their own, distinct from that used by the plebs, and the contrast of Roman and Carthaginian custom in this matter is not without significance. See on the subject of the Carthaginian Senate *Sus.*², Note 382.

The Council of the Hundred and Four is described by Aristotle as 'similar' to the Lacedaemonian Ephorate. He probably means that its function in the State was similar, and that, like the Ephorate (c. 9. 1271 a 6), it exercised a control over the other magistracies, and especially over the kings. He mentions a body called 'the Hundred' as the greatest magistracy of the State (1273 a 14 sq.), and the question arises whether he means by 'the Hundred' the Hundred and Four. It is not absolutely certain that he does, for the use of the word *αποῦνται* (1272 b 36) in reference to the election of the Hundred and Four might be taken to suggest (if we supply *οἱ Καρχηδόνιοι*, as in 1273 a 29) that they were elected by the citizens generally, whereas we are told that the Hundred were elected by certain Boards of Five called Pentarchies; it is also true that, if we identify the Hundred with the Hundred and Four, we shall have to suppose that the Pentarchies, which Aristotle criticises as defectively constituted (1273 a 13 sq.), nevertheless elected the Hundred and Four well and fairly, for Aristotle says that the Hundred and Four were chosen on grounds of merit (1272 b 36). Still it is difficult to believe that a Council answering, as the Hundred and Four did, to the Lacedaemonian Ephorate, which, as Susemihl points out (*Note* 379), is itself called *ἡ μεγίστη ἀρχή* in 2. 9. 1270 b 18 sq., can have been second to any other magistracy at Carthage; it seems, therefore, on the whole, likely that it is to be identified with the Hundred, *ἡ μεγίστη ἀρχή*. If, however, we identify the Hundred and the Hundred and Four, the resemblance which Aristotle traces between the Hundred and Four and the Ephorate cannot have extended to the mode in which the members of these two magistracies were appointed, for the Ephors were not elected by Pentarchies. Nor can the Hundred and Four have resembled the Ephorate in being recruited from the people and in forming a bulwark of popular power, for it was a principle at Carthage to prefer rich men to poor men in elections to office. Aristotle himself implies that the Hundred and Four were far superior to the Ephors in character, position, and capacity (1272 b 35 sq.). The resemblance between the two magistracies must probably have

lain, as has been said, in similarity of function. The Hundred and Four, like the Ephors, seem to have controlled the Kings and the Generals, and perhaps also the Senate.

This great council has commonly been identified with the magistracy, the original creation of which in the fifth century before Christ is thus described by Justin (19. 2. 5-6)—*dein, cum familia tanta imperatorum* (the descendants of Mago) *gravis liberae civitati esset omniaque ipsi agerent simul et iudicaret, centum ex numero senatorum iudices deliguntur, qui reversis a bello ducibus rationem rerum gestarum exigerent, ut hoc metu ita in bello imperia cogitarent, ut domi iudicia legesque respicerent.* Aristotle says nothing about the Hundred and Four being senators, and Justin speaks of the 'centum iudices' as reviewing the conduct of the generals after their return from the field, not as controlling the kings and senate, but they may have added to their functions as time went on, and we have already seen that the kings were often the generals of the State. It is a further question whether Livy alludes to the Hundred and Four, or even to the 'centum iudices' of Justin, in the well-known passage (33. 46) in which he depicts the 'impotens regnum' of the 'ordo iudicum' at Carthage in the time of Hannibal. 'Iudicum ordo Carthagine ea tempestate dominabatur, eo maxime quod idem perpetui iudices erant. Res fama vitaeque omnium in illorum potestate erat. Qui unum eius ordinis offenderet, omnes adversos habebat, nec accusator apud infensos iudices deerat.' The term 'ordo iudicum' would seem to be a wider one than 'centum iudices,' and may perhaps include the whole 'order' of judges at Carthage, not merely a single court, however important. And then again, if 'the property, the good fame, and the life of every one lay in the power' of the 'centum iudices,' their jurisdiction must have at this time extended far beyond its original limits, for their functions were confined at the outset, as we have seen, to the control of the Generals. The 'ordo iudicum' of Livy, again, is recruited by the accession to it of quaestors, and probably other magistrates, at the expiration of their term of office (Liv. 33. 46. 4); we hear nothing of this in relation to the Hundred and Four, or indeed the 'centum iudices.' And if Livy means by saying 'idem perpetui iudices erant,' that the members of the 'ordo iudicum' held office for life, this certainly was not true of the Hundred and Four in Aristotle's time. It is evident, indeed, from the expression 'ea tempestate,' that Livy is describing a state of things which had not always existed. He is speaking of a time a century and a quarter after that of Aristotle.

We have seen that Isocrates puts in the mouth of Nicocles an interesting remark on the dual character of the Lacedaemonian and Carthaginian constitutions. They were, he says, oligarchies at home and kingships in the field. It was probably with a view to diminish this duality and to bring the Kingship and the Generalship under the control of the oligarchy, that the Council of the Hundred and Four was instituted. The Lacedaemonian Ephorate was intended to serve a similar purpose, but a democratic character was skilfully imparted to it which was wanting in the Hundred and Four, and the services of the Lacedaemonian demos were thus enlisted in the task of checking and controlling the Kings.

In the Lacedaemonian and Cretan constitutions, and indeed in the earlier constitutions of Greece generally (7 (5). 5. 1305 a 15 sqq.: 7 (5). 10. 1310 b 21 sqq.), not a few great magistracies found a place. This is true of the Carthaginian constitution also, though the great magistracies tenable for life, which form so conspicuous a feature of the Lacedaemonian and Cretan constitutions, seem to have been wanting in it. The democratic spirit (8 (6). 2. 1317 b 24 sqq.), though stronger at Carthage than in the Lacedaemonian and Cretan States, had not yet begun in Aristotle's day to abolish or cripple the great magistracies. When in the fifth century before Christ the House of Mago had threatened to become too powerful for the safety of the State (Mommsen, *History of Rome*, E. T. 2. 16), its ascendancy was checked by the creation of a new great magistracy, not by the abolition of the Kingship and Generalship, the offices through which it asserted its influence, or by the aggrandisement of the popular assembly. The Carthaginian constitution, after this great change had been made in it, came to belong to the class of constitutions in which the magistracies are ranged, as it were, in two tiers, one or more magistracies being charged with the control of the rest. At Carthage this controlling authority was lodged with the Hundred and Four, just as in the Lacedaemonian State it was lodged with the Ephors, in early Athens with the Council of the Areopagus, and in the State described in Plato's *Laws* with the Nomophylakes, the priests of Apollo, and the Nocturnal Council.

In reading Aristotle's remarks on the Carthaginian constitution, we must not forget that he criticises it from a point of view from which it was probably seldom regarded by its framers. Their desire was for a constitution which, while it favoured the acquisition and preservation of empire by the State, would also guard its liberties—a constitution under which the virtues and the ascend-

ency of great leaders like those of the House of Mago might be made as useful to the community and as little perilous to it as possible; Aristotle, on the other hand, is mainly interested in the inquiry, how far does the Carthaginian constitution give supremacy to virtue and place power in the hands of virtuous men?

APPENDIX C.

THE following are the variations of MS. Phillipps 891 (z) from the text of the first two books of the *Vetus Versio* of the Politics printed by Sussemihl in his edition of 1872. Some unimportant variations of spelling are omitted.

BOOK I.

Sus. p. 1. 2. om. *et* pr. z; it is added in the darker ink used in the marginal glosses: 4. om. *quidem* (with a b g n t): 6. om. *et* pr. z (it is added in darker ink): 8. om. *et* before *regale*. 2. 2. om. *puta* (with a): 3. *patremfamiliae*] *patrem familias*: *yconomum*] *yconomicum*: 5. aut] *et* (with almost all MSS.). 3. 4. *hiis*] *his*, and so mostly: 5. *itaque*] *utique* (with a): *combinari*] *combinare*: 9. *quod quidem*] *quicquid*: 11. *haec*] *hoc* (with a m t). 4. 2. *servum* pr. z altered to *servus* in lighter ink: 4. om. *paupere* (with a): om. *utique*: om. *optime*: 6. *femina*] the first two letters are over an erasure: 8. om. *ipsorum*. 5. 1. *domum*] *dominum*: *praeeminenter*] *praeeminentem*: 2. om. *que*: 4. *karondas*: *omosiphios*: 5. *epymenides*: *otres*: *omokapnos*: 7. *et* is added before *vicinia*. 6. 1. om. *et* before *primum*: 3. *vicinae*] *vicine* pr. z: 5. *dispersim*: 6. om. *hii*: 10. *consequens*] *qñs*. 7. 4. om. *et* before *finis*: 8. *qui* is added after *fortunam* (*quia* in a) and followed by *at* in place of *aut*; *qui* is expunged and *at* corrected in a different ink from that of the MS. 8. 4. *et* is added after *homo* (as in a). 9. 1. om. *est*: 2. *hominibus* after *proprium est* (as in a): 5. om. *natura*: 9. *autem*] *enim*: *definita*] *diffinita*, and so elsewhere. 10. 1. *est* is added after *manifestum* (as in a): 4. *persesufficientiam*] *sufficientiam*: 6. the first half of *communitatem* is over an erasure and in darker ink: 10. *nascitur autem homo habens arma*: 12. *ad* is added after *venerea et*. 11. 1. *diki*: 2. *diki*: 9. *servis* pr. z?: om. *et* before *maritus*: 11. om. *sunt*: 12. *tekuofactiva*. 12. 3. om. *his autem*

pr. z, but the words are added above the line (with a caret) in an ink very similar to that of the MS.: 5. *trimatistica*: despota] *despolia*: 7. *ut* is added before *utique*: 9. *despolica* is expunged by dots placed beneath (the ink of these dots is perhaps different from that of the MS.): *politica*] *pollitica*. 13. 4. *manifestum quod* is added after *est*: 5. om. *est*. 14. 1. om. *quidem*: *proratus* (with a): 7. *subinducere*: 9. *cilarizarent*: *archiletoribus*. 15. 1. *igitur* is added after *quidem*: 4. om. *autem* after *adhuc*: differt] *differunt*: 6. om. *hanc* (so a g n): 8. *autem* after *possessa* (so a b t): *quae*] *quod*: 9. om. *quidem*. 16. 4. *autem* is added after *iste* in pr. z, but expunged in a different ink from that of the MS.: *est* after *homo* (so a): 6. *natura* after *talīs* (with a): 8. *post* after *considerandum*: om. *haec*. 17. 2. *adiscere*: 4. *segregata*: 5. om. *et* after *multae*: 10. om. *sive* after *commune*: 13. *armonie*. 18. 5. in *corruptis*] *incorruptis*: om. *et* after *quod* (so a Alb.): 8. om. *utique*: 9. *dicimus*] *diximus* (with a c m Alb.): 12. *autem* written twice (the second *autem* expunged, but in a darker ink than that of the MS.). 19. 3. *aequo*] *quo* pr. z, but *e* is added above the line (with a caret) in the ink of the MS.: *aut e*] *aut*, but this word is written over an erasure and in darker ink than that of the MS.: 9. om. *omnibus*: 12. *est* after *opus* (with a). 20. 7. *corpori*] *corporibus*: om. *a* before *domesticis*: 9. *quae liberorum et servorum*] *quae servorum et quae liberorum*: 11. om. *et* (with a). 21. 1. *fuerint*] *sunt* (with a): 5. *facile* is in the margin, but in the same hand and ink as the MS.: 7. *quod*] the original reading in z was not *quod*, but something different (probably *quis*), which has been altered into *quod* in darker ink: 11. *superata* pr. z, altered into *superati* by erasure. 22. 1. *rhethora scribunt*] *rethorici scribunt* pr. z, but these words have been expunged by dots placed beneath them, and *rhethora scribit* has been written in the margin in a different ink: 4. *illo* pr. z, altered into *alio* in a different ink: *sapientum*] *sapientium*: 6. *et* is added before *violentiam*: 8. *violentia*] *violentiam* (with a o y): 9. *benivolentia*: 10. *sepositis*] *positis*. 23. 1. *est* is added: 5. om. *aliquis*: 8. *equidem*] *et quidem*: 9. *hos*] *hoc*: 10. *necesse enim esse aliquos dicere*] *necesse enim est dicere aliquos esse*. 24. 2. om. *et*: *autem*] *quidem*: 3. om. *et*: *Eleloga*] *egloga* (*elegia* in the margin in darker ink): om. *enim*: 4. *progeneticibus*] the four or five letters which precede *-bus* are over an erasure: *addicere*] *addere*: 6. om. *et* before *nobiles* (with a): *ignobiles*] *innobiles*: 9. *quidem* after *hoc* (with a). 25. 1. om. *natura* (with pr. a): 2. om. *quod* (with a): 4. *nata*] *nati*: *principatu* after the second *principari* (so a): 7. *veluti*] *velut*. 26. 3. *hic quidem*] *haec quidem*: *hic autem*] *haec autem*: 9. *quidem qui*

quidam (with a): *Siracensis*: 11. plus] *plura*. 27. 3. om. *omnes*: 4. *quae est*] *quae et*: 6. *magnum* after *habens* (with a): 7. *haec*] *hoc*. 28. 3. om. *utique*: 8. *et* is added before *ex* (as in a): 10. om. *quidem*: 12. *utrum autem*] *utrum autem enim*, but *enim* is expunged by dots placed beneath it (by whom, is uncertain) and *utrum autem* (except the first *u*) is written over an erasure in darker ink than that of the MS. 29. 3. *multae*] *nulla* pr. z; *s* is added above the line in a different ink: 4. *agricultura*] *agricultura* (with a t): 5. *universaliter*] *utiliter*: 7. om. *et* before *animalium* (with a): 9. *enim*] *et enim* (so a): *quidem*] *quod*: 10. *que* is added in a different ink above *utro*: 11. *esse* is added after *quidem*. 30. 8. *necessarium* after *fuert* (with a b t): 9. *m* of *viventem* is over an erasure. 31. 1. *tot* before, not after, *fere*: 2. *quicunque*] *quaecunque*: *sponte natam*] *spontaneam* (with a): 3. per commutationem] *percontationem* pr. z?, but the word has been touched up with darker ink and made hardly legible, so that it is not easy to say what the original reading was (*i. commutationem* is written above in similar ink to the MS.): 7. *simul* after *furativam*: 10. *videtur* after *natura* (with a): 11. *perfectionem*] *perfectam*: 13. *coe* of *coepariunt* is over an erasure (as in a). 32. 1. om. *utique* (with a): om. *sibi ipsi*: 3. *generatis*] *genitis*: om. *in se ipsis*: 7. om. *cibi*: 8. *ipsis*] *eis*: 10. *ipsa* after *omnia*. 33. 2. om. *et*: 3. *possessivae* after *naturam* (with a): 4. *quorum*] *quarum*: 5. *communione* (with b c): 6. *videntur*] *universaliter* was first written, then expunged, and *videntur* added in the margin probably by the writer of the MS. 34. 1. om. *ponitur* after *viris* pr. z (it is added above in darker ink): 2. *organum*] *organorum*: *nullius*] *ullius*: 7. *vocare*] *vocari*: om. *quam*: 8. *terminus* after *esse* (with a t Alb.): 12. *fit* after *magis* (with a): 13. *autem*] *enim*. 35. 2. om. *rei*: 6. *factum* after *est* (with a): 10. *qua*] *quare*. 36. 1. *est* after *opus* (with a): 9. *nulla*] *ulla*: 11. *magis* is joined to the preceding sentence in z, and not to *peregrino*. 37. 1. *enim* after *facile*: 6. *pondere et magnitudine* (so a): 7. *absolvant*: 9. *species* after *pecuniativae*. 38. 2. *rursum deliramentum esse* after *videtur* (so a): 4. om. *nullo dignum*: 6. *sit* is added after *inconveniens* (as in a): *perit*: 7. om. *propter* (with pr. a): 8. om. *factis*: 9. *alterum* after *aliquid* (as in a): 11. full stop after *yconomica*, the next word *Campsoria* beginning with a capital letter: 12. *per*] *propter*. 39. 3. in infinitum] *infinitorum*: 5. *-um of illum* is over an erasure: om. *in* before *infinilum* (with a c m Alb.): 10. *necessarium*] *necessarium*: 11. *video*] *vide'* (= *videmus*), but the *e* is followed by an erasure, and I do not feel absolutely certain that the symbol for *-mus* is in the ink of the MS.; still it resembles other symbols

in the MS. of the same import: 13. variat] *variatur*. 40. 1. *ulterque*, I think, pr. z, but it has been altered into *utrique* in ink somewhat darker than that of the MS.: after *est* is added *geca*, but this is expunged by dots placed beneath: *et* is added after *usus*: 8. *et* is added before *ipsius*: 9. quoniam] *quia*: om. *et* (with a): 10. in possessione] *impossibile*: *et* is added before *omnis*: 12. om. *non*. 41. 1. factivam] *factiva* (with b c): om. *si* pr. z (it is added in a darker ink): possint] *possunt* (with a c m Alb.): 2. *hoc* is added before *acquirere* (as in a): 6. om. *hoc*. 42. 4. naturam] *natura* (with c Alb.): 6. yconomo] so pr. z, but *ic* is inserted (with a caret) before the final *o* in the ink of the MS.: 7. autem] *etiam*: 10. om. *aut* pr. z (with a); it is added in a lighter ink. 43. 1. subservientis] *ut servientis*: 3. exhibere] *exibere*: omni] *omnium* (with a and pr. b): 9. om. *est*: *habentur*, but the *e* is over an erasure and in darker ink: obolostatica] *ob olostatica*: 10. sit] *fit*: 11. om. *usura*; *i. usura*, however, is written above the line in darker ink. 44. 1. se ipsum] *se ipsam*: 2. parta] *partu*: *fiunt* is added after *ipsa*, but expunged by dots placed beneath, apparently in the same ink as the MS.: 3. om. *maxime*: 12. qualibus] *quibus*: 14. nudae] the second and third letters are over an erasure and are touched with darker ink. 45. 1. convenit] *qlin' (contingit?)*: 2. *igitur pecuniativae* is added in the margin in the same handwriting and ink as the MS.: 4. *nacleria* pr. z: *fortigia*: 7. *mistarnia*] *ministrativa*: 12. terra] *altera*: 14. *ex terra* before *species*: unoquoque] *unaquaque*. 46. 1. horum] *harum*: 5. *banausike*: 7. after *minimum* is written *reoperatur* but expunged by dots placed beneath, and *requiritur* is written above in the same hand and apparently the same ink: 8. *Karitide Paris*: *Limnio*: 13. om. *et*. 47. 2. contingit] *contigit*: 3. ipsi] *ipsis*: 5. *olivarium* after *ubertatem*: 6. hieme] *yeme*: 7. *kio*: *pro* before *omnibus modico* (with a): 8. adiciente] *addiciente*. 48. 1. *Tales*: after *quidem h* crossed through: 2. *fecisse* before *ostensionem* (so a): 4. *praeparare* is added in the margin in the hand and ink of the MS. in substitution for a word which is expunged by dots placed beneath it: 6. venalium] *venalem*: 10. *assumpsit* pr. z, altered in the ink of the MS. to *supersumpsit*: *Dionisius*: 11. *asportare*] *asportare*: 12. *Siracusicus*. 49. 3. *in* is added before *domibus*: 6. yconomicae] *yconomie*: 11. *natura* after *femella*. 50. 2. *ex aequali enim vult esse*] *exaequari enim vult*: 3. *at tamen*] *atlamen*: 4. *quaerit*] *quaerunt*: 11. *horum* after *omnium*: 12. *regem quidem differre*] *quidem differre regem*. 51. 1. *iuvenem*] *iuvenius*: 5. *horum*] *eorum*: 6. om. *quidem*: 7. om. *utique*: 8. *aliis* is added before *hiis*: 9. om. *et*

before *fortitudo*: 11. different] *differunt*. 52. 1. *uxore* is written above *muliere* and *filio* above *puero* in the hand and ink of the MS.: sunt] *sint*: 2. *esse* before *temperatam* (with a): intemperatus] *in* is added above *temperatus* (with a caret) in the hand and ink of the MS.: 4. *et* is crossed through before *natura*: 6. *kalokalia*: 14. *est* is added after *necesse*. 53. 1. om. *esse*: *differentiae* is over an erasure: 2. *exemplificatur*] *exemplificabitur* (with a): 6. *et in aliis. quare natura quae plura principantia et subiecta*] *et in aliis quae natura sunt, puta principantia et subiecta*, but the words *quae natura sunt puta* are written in the hand and ink of the MS. over an erasure: 9. *quidem* after *servus* runs into the margin: 11. the first *habet* is added above the line with a caret, but in the hand and ink of the MS. 54. 4. *immittit*] *immittitur*: 5. *et*] *est*: 9. *hoc* is over an erasure: 11. *aut*] *est*, but over an erasure: 12. *dicunt* is added above the line (with a caret) in the hand and ink of the MS. 55. 1. *dixit*] *dicit* (with a): 11. *aut differt*] *differt autem*: 12. *hic*] *hoc* (so a). 56. 4. *esse* after *oportet*: 9. *isto*] *hoc* (so Alb.): 10. *autem* om. pr. z, but it is added above the line with a caret, I think in the hand and ink of the MS.: 11. *homilia*] *omelia*: quod] *quidem*: 12. quod quidem bene] *bene quidem*. 57. 6. *esse* is added before *studiosas* (as in a m Alb.): 7. *politiae*] *policiae*: 8. *de hiis quidem*] *quidem de his*: 9. om. *dicendum*: om. *finem*: 11. *politia*] *policia*.

BOOK II.

58. 2. *qui*] *quae*: 4. *legibus* after *dicuntur* (so a): 7. *sophyzare*: 8. *propter* after *non*: has] *eas* (with a): 10. om. *est* (with a m). 59. 1. *civitas*] *civilitas*: 3. om. *quidem* pr. z (it is added in lighter ink, but in the hand of the MS.): 4. *sotii*: 10. *sic*] *sit*: 12. *causam*] *caussa*. 60. 5. *omnem*] *omnium* (with a): 11. *esses* before *quis* (with Alb.): *operari* before *hoc* (with a): 13. om. *et* (with a m). 61. 4. *differet*] *differret*: 6. *Archades*: *et* is added before *ex*: 8. om. *et* pr. z (it is added with a caret in lighter ink but in the hand of the MS.): 11. *alium* before *aliquem*. 62. 1. *eidem*] *idem hiidem*: 3. *semper* after 4. *principari* (so a): 7. *in parte*] *imperate*. 63. 6. om. *quidem*: 10. om. *magis*: 11. *est* before *optimum* (with a): scilicet] *sed*. 64. 4. *dicet*] *dicit*: 7. om. *ut* pr. z, but something which may possibly stand for it is added above the line (with a caret) in a similar ink to that of the MS.: 8. om. *autem*: 9. om. *ut*. 65. 2. *omnes*] *omnis*: 4. *ad haec*] *adhuc*: 7. *quam quantum*] *quamquam tamen*: 8. *neglegunt*] *negliguntur* (with a b t Alb.): 11.

est before *similiter*: 12. *aulem* is added after *adhuc*, but struck out. 66. 1. quotuscunque contingit] *et quotcunque contingat*: 3. aut] *aulem*: quorumcunque] *quotcunque*: 6. sic] so pr. z, but it has been altered into *sit* in a different ink: 7. om. *millium* after *decem*: 11. aut] *aulem*: ad haec] *adhuc*: contribulem] *contribuelem* with a dot under the first *e*. 67. 1. *proprium* after *nepotem* (with a): 3. secundum] *sed*: 5. *quidam* before *accidere*: 7. *libia*: 8. sunt autem quaedam etiam femellae etiam] *sunt etiam quaedam et femellae*: 11. *Farsalo*. 68. 4. *et* is added before *ad*. 69. 8. ordinare] *ordinari* (with a): 10. *in* is added before *civilatibus*. 70. 4. unum fieri ambos (with a): 5. om. *quidem*: 8. om. *modicum*: 11. filii] *filii*: 12. om. *ut*. 71. 1. *dilligere*: *dillectum*: 3. transferre] *transferri*: 7. om. *in* (so a). 72. 3. om. *modo*: 6. quis] *aliquis* (with a): 8. om. *omnes*. 73. 1. communes] *omnes*: 3. sibi] *sic*: 5. *in operibus et in fruitionibus* is altered in the margin by the writer of the MS. to *in fruitionibus et operibus*: 13. ad ministraciones] *administraciones*. 74. 1. *ancilares*: 3. *superornatum*] *semper ornatum*: 4. *differret* altered into *differet*. 75. 3. *velut*] *velud*: 4. qui] *quidem*: *est* is added before *dicere* (as in a t Alb.): 11. *est* after *hoc* (as in a Alb.): 12. *esse aulem phylaulon*. 76. 1. *amare oportet* (omitting *se ipsum* with a): 5. om. *in* (with a): haec itaque accidunt] *hoc utique accusat* (not, I think, *accidat*): 6. ad haec] *adhuc*: 7. manifeste] *maxime vel manifeste*: 12. *philantropos*. 77. 1. *et* is added before *cum*: 4. testimoniorum] *testium* (with a): 5. adulationes] *allocutiones vel adulationes*: 6. possidentes] *possi* pr. z at the end of a line (*tes* is added above the line in darker ink): 11. communicantes] *incommunicantes*: 12. *esse* after *omnino* (with b c m). 78. 4. *prope*] *proprie* (with a): 5. *simphoniam*: 6. *rilhmon*: 8. futurum] *futuram*: 12. in] *et*. 79. 5. *utique* after *fiet* (with a b m t Alb.): 7. civitatem] *civilitatem*: 8. *tribum* pr. z?, altered into *tribubus* in darker ink: 10. *facere* before *Lacedaemonii* (with a). 80. 2. no stop after *est*, a full stop after *prius*: 3. *oportet* after *possessiones* (with a): unumquemque] *unumquodque*: 5. *communia* after *omnia* (with a): different] possibly *differunt*, but a worm-hole in the parchment makes the reading uncertain: 6. illis] *aliis* (with Alb.): 7. nisi] *si nihil* (with a): 8. om. *tale*: 10. om. *et*. 81. 4. om. *et disceptationes*: 5. existent] *existunt* (with a): hiis] *hi*: 6. legalibus] *legibus* (with a c): 7. municipia] *municipium*: 10. om. *esse*. 82. 2. om. *aulem*: 3. municipum] *municipium*: 5. communes possessiones] *omnes*: 8. eadem] *eodem*. 83. 3. semper] *super*: 4. miscere] *misceri*: 6. auferens] *aufferens*: om. *felicem*: 7. felicitare] *felicitata*

tem was first written; it is changed into *felicitare* in the hand and ink of the MS. 84. 5. *politia*] *polithia*. 85. 7. om. *oportere* (with a): 9. om. *de*. 86. 3. *communio* facere] *facere communionem* (with a): *circumducit* after *iterum*: 4. *alteram*] *aliam* (with a): *mulierum*] the original reading is uncertain, but, whatever it was, it has been made into *mulierum* in darker ink: 9. *quinque*] *quimque* pr. z? 87. 2. *alia* before *aliqua* (with a). 88. 3. *acceptat*] *aceptat*: 5. om. *et* before *multitudinem* (with t Alb.): 9. *universale*] *naturale*: 11. *utrumque*] *utrum*. 89. 5. *sinere*] *si vere*: *puerorum* after *procreationem* (with a): 10. *quidem*] *equidem*: *sunt*] *sint* (with a c m): 12. *iugarios*] so z, but in the margin *aliter delectos*. 90. 3. *plures numero quidam*: 6. *sinere*] *si vere*: 8. *Fudon* altered into *Fydon* in darker ink: om. *quidem*. 91. 3. *omnem*] *omnium*: *sinit*] *scivit*: 10. *politiam*] *polityam*: *ex utentibus*] *existentibus*. 92. 1. *igitur*] *enim*: *constituit*] *constituerit*: 3. *politiam*] *polityam*: 6. *politiam*] *politeiam*, and so mostly: 7. *aiunt* is added after *enim*, but is expunged by dots placed beneath in the ink of the MS.: 9. *regnum*] *regum*: 10. *plebeiorum* after *principatum* (with a): 11. *ephoros*] *elernos*. 93. 2. *dictum est* after *hiis*: 3. *aut*] *haud* pr. z, changed into *aut* apparently in the same ink as the MS.: 7. *oligarchiam*] *oligarkica*: 9. *electis*] *ellectos*, but *ellectis* may have been first written: 12. *tentare*] *templare*. 94. 2. *consilii*] *concilii* pr. z, but s is added above the line (with a caret) before c in the darker ink used for some of the glosses. 95. 3. *honorabilitatibus*] *honorabilibus* (with a): 7. *politia*] *policia*: 9. *institui*] *instituti*: 10. *mediocres*] *mediocris*. 96. 2. *habent*] *habet*: 3. *omnes*] *summis*: 7. *incohant*] *inchoant*: 8. *quod*] *quidem*: 9. *aiunt*] *autem*: 10. *felleas*, and so elsewhere. 97. 1. *celerime*: 3. an erasure between *leges* and *scribens*: 5. *minimae*] *minuim* (with a cross in faint ink above it): 6. om. *et* (with a m): 9. *magnitudinem*] *multitudinem*: 12. om. *quidem* (with a). 98. 4. *leges* after *prohibent*: 9. *autem vel*] *aut*: 10. *vivat*] *vivatur*: 11. *vivat*] *vivatur*: *est* is expunged after *non*. 99. 2. *erudit*] *eruditi*: 3. *haec*] *hoc*? 4. om. *existere* (with a). 100. 2. *putat*] *putant* (with a): 3. *esurire*] *exurire* (with a): 4. *habeant*] *habent* (with b): 6. *sine*] *sive*: 9. *possint*] *possunt* (with b c t Alb.): *utique* before *non*: 11. *maxima*] *maxime*. 101. 1. *magni*] *magis*: 8. *sufficientem*] *sufficienter*. 102. 3. *prolem*] *pro levi*: *bellum inferre* before *propter habundanciam* (with a): 4. om. *ut*: 5. *euboilus*: *aulofradati*: *artaneam*: 8. *atraneam*: 12. *utique* after *gratiosi*. 103. 1. *existentes*] *existente* pr. z (with pr. a), s being added above the line in a different ink: 6. *replectionem* or *repletionem*. 104. 6. *dnofantus*: 9. *dixit*]

dixerit (with a): om. *bene* after *non* (with a): the first letter of *Ipodamus* is not filled in: 10. *eurifontis milisios*: 13. *curiosus* (with a b). 105. 1. *et*] *etiam* (with c): 3. *aliquid* after *de policia*: 9. *deputata facient*] *reputata faciant*: 10. *vivent*] *vivant*: 12. *disceptationes*] *disceptati omnes*?: 13. *iniuriam*] *iniuriarum* altered in the ink of the MS. to *iniuriam*. 106. 3. *constituit*] *construxit*: 4. *non per sententiae collationem*] *non propter senum collationem*: 6. *condemnetur*] *condempnet*: 9. *haec vel haec*] *hoc vel hoc*? 107. 5. om. *igitur*: 6. *Ipodami*: *ordinationis*] *oportet dignationis*: *haec*] *hee* (with b c): 10. *servi*] *secundum*. 108. 5. *oportet*] *oportebit*: 7. *quid*] *quidem* (with c): 9. om. *in*: 12. om. *propriam* before *colent*. 109. 4. *propria*] *propriam*: 8. *non*] *nunc*: 9. *summent*] *summent*: 11. om. *lex*. 110. 3. *collocuntur*] *colloquuntur*: 4. *ut* is added in the margin at the end of the line in a lighter ink, but apparently in the same hand as the MS.: 8. *mnas*] *minas*, and so elsewhere: 10. *partientur*] *patientur* (with b): 11. *condempnabunt*, as elsewhere: *erit* before *modus*: 12. *sententiarum*] *summarum*: om. *nullus* (with pr. a). 111. 1. *abiudicans*] *adiudicans*: 3. *aliquod*] *aliquid*: 5. *aspectus*: *calumpnias*: 7. om. *et*: 11. *politiae*] *politice*: 12. *autem* is added after *memoriam*. 112. 2. *videbitur*] *videtur* (with a): 3. *medicinali*, but the stroke above the final *i* may have been added at a later time or by a later hand: 5. *etiam*] *et*: 8. *barbaticas*: 9. *ab invicem*] *adinvicem* (with a Alb.): 11. *komi* (with a): *si multitudo*] *similitudo* (with pr. a b): 12. *homicidium*] *homicidam*. 113. 1. *homicidii*: 4. *et* after *dicitur* (with a): 6. *ad haec*] *adhuc*: 7. *diligenter*] *diligentius* (with a): 13. *facile* is added in the margin in the hand and ink of the MS. 114. 1. *enim*] *erit* pr. z, but it is expunged and *enim* substituted in perhaps a slightly different ink: *mutaverit*] *multaverit*: 2. *asuescens*: 3. *simile* after *movere*: 4. *haec*] *hoc*?: 6. om. *ex*: om. *leges*: 11. *temporum*] *ipsorum*. 115. 1. *quidem* is added (with a caret) above the line in the hand and ink of the MS.: 5. *scholam*] *scolam*: 6. *Tessallorum*: 7. *Tessallis*: 8. *perversant* (with a). 116. 2. *archades*: 3. om. *a*: *et* is added before *adhuc* (as in a): 4. *achaycis*: om. *et* before *perebiis*: 5. *operosum*] *operose* (with a): 9. *optimum*] *optunum*: 10. *mulieres*] *multitudines* pr. z, but this is expunged in darker ink, and *mulieres* written above, also in darker ink. 117. 7. *et* is added before *ad*. 118. 2. *matrem* pr. z, *martem* substituted in the hand and ink of the MS.: 7. *autem*] *enim* (with b t): 9. om. *nocivae* (with pr. a): *haec*] *hoc*: *lakosensum*: 13. *lakosensibus*. 119. 2. om. *et* before *messenios*: 4. om. *habet*: 5. om. *autem*: *conatum*] *cognatum* pr. z, *conatum* written above in darker

ink: 6. ut] *ubi*: 7. peccati] *peccata*: 9. et] *aut*: 10. *et* is added above the line (with a caret) in the hand and ink of the MS. 120. 1. post ea enim] *postea vero* (with a): 5. om. *quidem*. 121. 2. derelinquet] *derelinquat* (with b c t Alb.): 8. sub prioribus] *superioribus*: 10. om. *et* before *decem* (with Alb.): *attamen*. 122. 4. enim] *aulem*: eum] *cum*: *tres* after *filios*: 5. *afruron*: 6. quod] *quia* (with a c): 9. *ut et*: 10. principum] *praecipuum*: 11. penuriam] *pecuniam* (with pr. m and pr. a). 123. 1. autem] *quidem*: 3. aequityrannum] *sequi tyrannum*: 4. laedatur politia] *politeia politetiam ledant*: 8. evenerit] *venit*. 124. 1. *kaikagati*, but the first *i* is not in the ink of the MS.: 8. *dicta* pr. z, but it is crossed through and *dieta* written above in the hand and ink of the MS.: 13. *epieikesi* was probably the original reading, for there is an erasure after the final letter of *epieikes*. 125. 1. *andragarchiam* (so a): *forsitam*: 4. om. *ut et* (with a): 5. diffidat] *discredat*: 6. velle videri dativi et inutiliter tribuentes] *velle videri dativi et lucrativi tribuentes*: 8. correctione] *coruptione* probably pr. z, altered into *coreptione*: 10. donum] *domum* z, *donum* in lighter ink in the margin: 11. correctiones] *coruptiones* pr. z, altered in darker ink into *coreptiones*. 126. 1. *dignificabantur*: 4. *amatores*] the last letter but one has been written over and is indistinct: 5. *usus*] *usu* (with pr. a): 6. om. *exislens*: 8. *honoris*] *honorum*. 127. 1. iudicari regum] *iudicare regnum*: autem] *aut*: 2. *kaloskagathos*] *kaluskatus* pr. z, but *ga* is inserted with a caret before *t* and the last *u* is altered into *a*, perhaps in a different ink from the MS.: 4. emittebant] *emillebat*: 8. *Creta*] *cata* pr. z; *crela* is written above in the hand and ink of the marginal glosses: 11. *voluntatis*] *voluntati*: om. *quidem*. 128. 3. *ista*] *ita* (with a): 5. *eam*] *eum* altered into *eam*: *navigii*: *quidam*] *quidem*: 8. om. *constituit*: 10. increpuit] *increpavit* (with a). 129. 6. *communes*] *omnes*: 7. *coactis*] *coacti*: 8. *que*] *quae*: 10. *fecit*] the second letter has been written over, and what it originally was is uncertain; *e* is written above it, apparently in the ink of the MS.: 12. in tantum] *iterum*. 130. 3. *modica*] *modicam*: 6. *iunioribus*] *in moribus*: *likurgum* (with a): 7. *karuli* (with a): 8. om. *est*: 13. *minus* (*mi* pr. a): *et* is added before *insula*. 131. 3. om. *quidem*: 4. *triopisci*: 5. *quidem* before *has*: 6. *scicilie*: 9. *servi*] *servis*: 11. *filicia*. 132. 2. *eandem* after *habent* (with t): 3. om. *quidem*: 5. *boulin*: autem] *quidem*: om. *quidem*: 6. *kosmoi*] *kosmois*: 8. *consentendiandi*] *consenciendi*: 10. in *Lacedaemonia*] *Illacedemonia*: 12. *lex*] *hoc* or *haec*: om. *et*: 13. in *Creta*] *Incata* with a dot under the first *a* to expunge it and what is probably an *e* written above. 133. 1. *et*

is added before *ex* (as in a): *ferunt*] *fuertunt*: 3. *haec*] *huius*: *et* is added after *ut* (as in a b c t Alb.): 4. *omnes*] *homines*: *et* is added before *ad*: 5. *disiugationem*] *disiungationem* (with a Alb.): 9. *sunt*] *sint*: *in* is added after *quam*: *manifestum*] *infra*: *kosmos*] *komos*: 11. *ephororum*] *fororum*: *ephororum*] *eforum*. 134. 2. *enim*] *est*: 3. *datus* is added after *omnibus*, and *esse participans populus maximi principatus vult* omitted: 4. *hic*] *hui*: 5. *e*] *ex*: 6. after *kosmi* follows *de* at the beginning of the next line but projecting into the margin, and between *de* and *quibus* is inserted *esse participans populus maximi praesidi*: 8. *ipsis*] *temporis*: 9. *autognomonas*] *antlogmonas*. 135. 4. *intermedie*] *intermedium* (with a): *kosmois*] *kosmis* (with a): 6. *omnia* is added after *quam*: 7. *id*] *ad*: 8. *sententias*] *sententia* (with a): 10. *assumentes*] *consumentes* (with a). 136. 1. *at* pr. z, altered into *aut* not (I think) in the ink of the MS.: 6. *et quod* pr. z, altered to *et quidam*, perhaps in the ink of the MS.: 12. *calcedonii*. 137. 3. *sunt*] *sibi*: 5. *se* is added in the margin in the hand and ink of the MS.: 7. *dici*] *dicit*: 9. *societatum*] *civilatum*: *philitiois*] *filicios* (with a): 10. *ephoris*] *ephorus*. 138. 1. *om. autem*: 2. *gerusiam*] *gerusia* (with a): 3. *autem*] *esse*: 4. *quid*] *quod*: *differens*] *differrens*: 6. *et* is added before *multum* (as in a): 8. *om. utique*: 10. *demum*] *demoticum*. 139. 3. *quae-cunque*] *quodcunque*: *et* is added after *intulerint*: 4. *audire*] *audite*: *solum*] *solis*: 5. *volenti*] *nollenti*: 6. *dominas existentes*] *dominans existens*: 9. *qui* is added after *hos* (as in a). 140. 1. *aliis*] *his*: 7. *igitur*] *enim*: *om. autem*: 8. *quidam*] *quidem*: 13. *hoc* after *videre*. 141. 2. *aspicere*: 4. *regnum*] *regum*: 6. *quodcunque autem*] *quicunque enim*: *om. esse*. 142. 3. *praeferret*] *praefert* (with a): *legislator*] *legum lator*: *sed et*: 4. *om. utique*: 5. *acceptatur*, and so elsewhere: 7. *legum latorem*: 8. *ubi*] *ibi* (with a): 9. *participare principatibus*] *percipe principantibus*: 11. *velotius*. 143. 2. *efugiunt*: *inditando*] *in dilando*: 3. *emittentes*] *eminentes*: 6. *absces-serit*] *abscenserit*: 7. *est*] *esse*. 144. 1. *perseverarunt*] *persevera-verunt*: 2. *singulari*] *singuli* pr. z, corrected in a different ink: 4. *om. fuerunt*: 5. *politice*] *politeye*: *quidem*] *enim quidem*: 6. *licurgus*: 9. *legum latorem*: 10. *intemperatum* pr. z, altered to *intemperatam*: 12. *quod quidem*] *quod quod*, but a dot beside the first *quod* is perhaps intended to expunge it. 145. 1. *scilicet*] *sed*: 2. *om. et*: 3. *quod*] *quidem*: 4. *fecerit*] *fecit*: 5. *tyranno*] *titano*: 8. *peridoes* pr. z, but *pericles* ? is written in the margin in the same hand: 9. *populi*] *populum*. 146. 1. *epieikeis*] *epieikis*: 4. *erit*] *esset*: 6. *medicinis* altered into *medignis*: 8. *legum latores*: *Zalentus*: *Locris*] *loc'*: 9. *karondas catameus*: 11. *legum lationem*: 12. *Locrus*] *locris*.

147. 1. om. *fuisse*: 2. *thelecam*: *thelece*: om. *et Zaleucum* (with a): *Zalenti* (with a b m): 4. *tempori*] *temporis* pr. z, but the *a* has been partly erased: Philolaus] *Filolaus*, but the *F* is written in dark ink over some letter now undecipherable: 5. *Filolaus*: 6. *Diobleis* pr. z, but this is expunged by dots placed beneath, and *Dioclis* is added in the margin, apparently in the same hand: *olimpiasem* pr. z, altered into *olimpiadem*: 7. *anchiones*: abiit] *ab his*: 8. *finiverunt*] *finierunt*: 9. *conspectibilia*, and so elsewhere: 11. *et* is added before *fabulantur*: om. *enim*. 148. 4. *legum lator*: *ipsis fuit*] *fit ipsis*: 5. *leges*] *legis*: 8. *vindictae*] *in dōce?* (*in doctae?*, but *vindictae* is right, cp. 1320 a 12): 9. *legum latoribus*: 10. *filolia* (with a): 11. om. *et substantiae* (with a). 149. 1. *coa* is added after *lex*, but is expunged by dots placed beneath which seem to be in the ink of the MS.: 2. *semposiarchizare* (with a): 3. *hac*] *hanc*: 4. *utile* pr. z?, for the stroke over the *e*, which makes it *utilem*, is in darker ink: *hac autem inutile*] *hanc autem inutilem*: 5. *existenti*] the original reading, which is now undecipherable, has been altered into *existentes*: *posuit*] *possidere* (with a): 6. om. *est* (with a): 7. *pilachus*: 8. *politiae*] *polithis*: 9. *damni*] *damnum*: 11. *conferrens*. 150. 1. *reginus*: *calcidibus*: om. *qui*: in Thracia] *intracia*: 3. *dicere aliquis*] *ducere eis* (with a): 7. *sint*] *sunt*.

ADDITIONS AND CORRECTIONS.

P. xii, line 17. An epic fragment of Rhianus (Meineke, *Analecta Alexandrina*, p. 199: Prof. Mahaffy, *Greek Life and Thought from the Age of Alexander to the Roman Conquest*, Appendix C) reminds us here and there of Pol. 6 (4). 11. 1295 b 6 sqq., but we cannot be sure that Rhianus was acquainted with this passage.

P. xxxiii, line 11, *for γεγονότες read γενόμενοι*

P. 26, last line but one, *dele the commas*

P. 31, line 22, *read τοῖς μὲν*

P. 87, last line, *read in*

P. 93, heading, *for 15 read 7*

P. 95, heading, *read 1273 b 15—1274 b 20.*

P. 120, line 1, *for 3 a read 32*

P. 151, line 9, *for of one read alone*

P. 169, line 4, *read ἀλλήλους*

P. 185, line 17, *dele bracket after 649'*

P. 194, line 14, *for 8. c. read c. 8.*

P. 200, end of note on κτήματα, *add* The shepherds of a hamlet near Elympos in the island of Carpathus 'call their mules κτήματα or possessions . . . This use of the word κτήματα is, I take it, of distinctly classical origin' (Mr. J. T. Bent, *Journal of Hellenic Studies*, vol. 6, p. 241).

P. 212, line 1, *read βασιλείας*

P. 213, line 13, *read [ἀγαθῶν].*

P. 221, line 29, *for ἄρα read ἄρα*

P. 245, line 2, *add* Compare the use of λέγω δέ in Oecon. 1. 6. 1345 a 26 sqq.

P. 262, line 4, *after οἰκεῖν add* Compare Oecon. 2. 1352 b 1 sqq.

P. 294, line 1, *after labour add* (cp. Oecon. 2. 1350 b 30 sqq.)

P. 294, line 30, *read ἐργολαβία*

P. 309, last line but eleven, *for* of a not very dissimilar custom to that mentioned by Aristotle *read* of the employment of witnesses of this kind

P. 316, note on 1269 a 35, *add* Cp. also Magn. Mor. 1. 35. 1198 b 14 sqq.

P. 322, last line but six, *read ἐπαύσατο*

P. 323, note on προωδοποιούμενους, *add* See also Veitch, *Greek Verbs Irregular and Defective*, s. v. 'Οδοιπορέω.

P. 334, line 25, *after ἀριστοκρατίας add* and Aristot. Pol. 7 (5). 3. 1303 a 5.

P. 376, line 2. Plutarch here speaks only of the Eponymous Archonship, but C. F. Hermann (*Gr. Ant.* 1. § 109), Schömann (*Gr. Alterth.* 1. 343), and Gilbert (*Gr. Staatsalt.* 1. 134) hold that the restriction applied to all the Archonships.

P. 386, lines 24-27. I believe that this remark was suggested by a remark in Mr. J. Cook Wilson's unpublished Essay for the Conington Prize, which I read with much interest some years ago.

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